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## **1**

#### **The standard is maximizing expected foreseen well-being.**

#### **Pleasure is both unconditionally and intrinsically valuable.**

**Goldstein 89** [Irwin Goldstein, “Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, ntrinsic Values”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , Dec., 1989, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Dec., 1989), pp. 255-276, International Phenomenological Society,<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107959?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents>, Irvin Goldstein was a philosophy professor at Davidson College for 31 years] //Lex AKu

What is good overall, right, or obligatory varies according to effects. Each is context-dependent and may vary across cultures. Evaluations of what is so universally are hazardous; such high level principles seem inevitably to meet expectations. We need not expect exertion to be good overall univer- sally: its value hinges on effects, which vary. What is right may vary with context and so cross-culturally. Even stealing and killing are sometimes right (Noddings, i984: 93). If he is using 'moral demands' to designate duties (actual, not prima facie) and to exclude intrinsic badness, Gilbert Harman may be correct in saying "there are no basic moral demands that apply to everyone" (I984: 27). Though calling all members in a class good is risky, intrinsic universal evaluations can be less precarious than other universal evaluations. **Pleasure's intrinsic worth is not context-dependent and so not subject to con- textual fluctuations**. **When in pain, I can immediately recognize bad even if I am oblivious to the sensation's context and indifferent to moral considerations; pain's intrinsic badness is not founded in and so potentially undermined by pain's surroundings.** Because we direct so many evalua- tions to what is good overall or morally good, much of what we justly call 'good' simpliciter is good only in some circumstances. **This helps camouflage the fact that pleasure and other value-conferring ends are good in themselves unconditionally**. **Pleasure is good as such, because of its pleasurableness, not because of some further good quality which colors pleasure and may or may not be present**. **The foundation of pleasure's goodness, its pleasurableness, marks every pleasure.** How could pleasure fail to be intrinsically good? G. E. Moore's reasoning resembles mine when he writes that a judgment of intrinsic goodness "if true of one instance of the thing in question, is necessarily true of all" (1903: 27). **Since at least some pleasure is good intrinsically simply because of its pleasurableness, pleasure should always be good intrinsically, whatever the society, and so be an unconditional value.** Pleasure's standing as an intrinsic value is founded in pleasure's nature. **Appreciating its value and understanding what pleasure is are not inde- pendent projects. Intrinsic goodness** is not merely incidental to pleasure; I suggest it **is fundamental to what makes an experience pleasure**. **As hot and cold are opposites in temperature and north and south in direction, so pleasure and pain**, both physical and emotional, **are opposites in intrinsic agreeability**. Heat is ipso facto, and thus always, linked to high tempera- ture; so, achieved in a virtuous or vicious activity, **pleasure in itself is ipso facto and so always agreeable and pain ipso facto and so always disagree- able**. I propose that **pleasure's goodness -** which for me is, in part, its char- acter of affording valid, intrinsic grounds for desire - **fixes pleasure's agreeableness, and pain's badness dictates its disagreeableness.**' Plea- sure and pain, then, contrast with experiences of warmth or coldness, which are linked to value only incidentally: pleasure and pain are oppo- sites through their opposing intrinsic worth. For every pleasure, intrinsic goodness is fundamental to what marks a psychological occurrence, localized or nonlocalized, as pleasure. **Grounding dislike, having dis- value, is a defining feature of the unpleasant and so common to all unpleasantness.** This view of pleasure answers pluralists, who detect no property shared by all pleasure which unites the diverse phenomena we label 'pleasure' into a single class.'6 The interrelated properties of pleasure's agreeable- ness, its natural tendency to attract sentient beings and, more fundamen- tally, its intrinsic nonmoral goodness and intrinsic grounding of desire unify the psychological occurrences, localized and nonlocalized, we label 'pleasure'. Pain, physical and emotional, forms a single class opposite to pleasure through its disagreeableness, its tendency to repel, its intrinsic badness and grounding of aversion."

#### **2] Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework: Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose. That precludes the ability to have agency and have the value conferring status that their framework says is valuable.**

#### **3] Actor specificity: A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefit some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. C] No act omission distinction---choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act. Applies to this rez since its still a government policy on what private entities within can do.**

#### **4] Ground – every impact function under util whereas other ethics can flow to one side exclusively. Util ensures equal playing field since affirmatives have different advantage areas and negs can read different pics, cps and disads. Kills fairness since we both need equal playing field.**

#### **5] Extinction is the biggest impact.**

**Pummer 15** [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

**There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now**, whatever general moral view we adopt**: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war.** How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that **we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world.** According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. **Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here.** If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how **reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are s’o many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people.** Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, **this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake.** **Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter.** Even John Rawls wrote, “**All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.**” **Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view.** **They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk**, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. **Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.** It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). **To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being.** To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – **suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being**, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But **once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.** Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be ndermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** **What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts?** I’ve just argued that **there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree.** But **even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one** (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), **they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk.** Perhaps most disturbingly still, **even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world.** Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. **It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if**, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, **all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world.** While there are some non-crazy **views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness**, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless **seem to be fairly implausible views.** And **even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve.** Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. **Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast.** We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. **If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period.** Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. **Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.**” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### **That means prefer consequentialism – its best suited to prevent extinction since looking into the intrinsic nature of stuff will never be able to prevent catastrophic consequences that lead to extinction but looking at foreseen consequences can.**

## **2**

#### **Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.**

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

**In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule,** suggesting that **democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent**. In fact, **many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements**—**large-scale** poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its **aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.**

**China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to** [**innovate**](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china)**.** **It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration.** Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But **much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries.** This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. **But in China the** consumer applications **have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals.** That’s why **ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international** vanguards of Chinese success**—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.**

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed **95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens.** Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. **Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive,** although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### **Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180**

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review,<https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few **private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while**: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle. That **all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged.** In 2014, a year **after** **Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China,** the **Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation,** as it had already **begun doing with AI and solar power**. It **issued a policy directive called** [**Document 60**](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) **that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space** industry**.** “**Xi’s goal was that** if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “**He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”** As a result, there are **now 78 commercial space companies operating in China,** according to a [2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than **half have been founded since 201**4, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services. For example, **Galactic Energy**, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company **i-Space**, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does **LinkSpace** (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another. **Spacety**, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost. To a large extent, **China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US**: using **government contracts and** subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence. Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC **funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018**—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but **nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago**. At least **42 companies had no known government funding.** And much of the **government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one**. “[These **companies**] are **drawing high-tech development to these local communities,**” says Hines. “And in return, **they’re given more autonomy by the local government.”** While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities. There’s also **one advantage specific to China: manufacturing.** “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s **China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.”** Zheng believes the **country is in a better position than any other to** take advantage of the space industry’s new need for **mass production of satellites and rockets alike.** Making friends The **most critical strategic reason to encourage a** private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders. “China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re **taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.** Although **China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry,** the **nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about**. While Chinese companies may look **private on paper**, they must **still submit to government guidance and control**, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The **distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy**, especially if the **government is a frequent customer**. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895). And Hines adds that it’s **not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army**, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### **Loss of stability causes the CCP to escalate tensions and lash out – uniquely threatens Taiwan.**

**Blumenthal and Urda 9/28** [09-28-20, Dan Blumenthal, Jakob Urda, The National Interest, “China’s aggressive tactics aim to bolster the Communist Party’s legitimacy”, https://www.aei.org/articles/chinas-aggressive-tactics-aim-to-bolster-the-communist-partys-legitimacy/, Jakob Urda is a Masters Student at Georgetown University and research specialist at a technology consultancy. He has previously worked at the Chicago Project on Security and Threats and studied in the Institute for the Study of War’s War Studies Program. Dan Blumenthal is the director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of the forthcoming book The China Nightmare: the Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State (AEI Press, November 17, 2020] //Lex AKu

Yet **for the CCP, external aggression is a necessary tool to combat internal weakness.** **The CCP is obsessed with its fragilities, such as the threat of losing popular support and legitimacy and demands for more justice and freedoms.** **When Chinese people criticize their government, China must** act more aggressively abroad. Beijing uses external aggression to fan Chinese nationalism and cast the CCP as the protector **of the people and champion of a new era of Chinese glory.** Coronavirus was a true moment of weakness for the CCP, as it exposed fissures in China’s overcentralized authoritarian political system to light. A now-infamous example of Chinese paranoia over potentially out-of-control domestic crises was the case of Dr. Li Wenliang. On February 7, Li, a doctor who warned of the coronavirus but was quickly censored by the Wuhan police, died from the virus himself. Li’s death quickly became the top trending topic on Chinese social media with hashtags such as “We want freedom of speech.” The CCP censored all mentions of Li or any coronavirus failings, fearing more organized protests. Simultaneously, the coronavirus battered China’s economic growth, which underpins the CCP’s claim to legitimacy, with an unprecedented 6.8 percent Q1 contraction. Far from the unified front which Beijing seeks to project, the coronavirus revealed the CCP’s dysfunction. For example, Dali, a midsize city, intercepted and distributed a shipment of surgical masks headed to the hard-hit municipality of Chongqing. Similarly, the City of Qingdao instructed customs officials to hold on to a shipment of masks and medical products headed to Shenyang. At the same time, Hong Kong dealt the CCP a major political embarrassment when it halted traffic coming in from the mainland. These reports demonstrate the government’s inability to enforce basic order among competing cities and provinces. **In response to the tumult caused by the coronavirus crisis, the CCP mobilized popular support by** reigniting conflicts with its neighbors. On April 2, during the peak of the coronavirus, **a Chinese maritime security vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Parcel islands.** Just two weeks later on April 16, **China escalated a month’s long standoff with Malaysia by deploying the coast guard to a disputed oil shelf**. **China also stepped up its military activities targeting Taiwan**—who’s coronavirus response was strong and effective—**with as many as three incursions in a single week in June.** These episodes were widely condemned by the international community, but greeted with nationalist revelry at home. **The** need to project strength and unity domestically explains the timing of China’s border dispute with India**.** **In May, violent brawls broke out between Chinese and Indian soldiers near Sikkim. On June 15, the Indian government reported that twenty Indian soldiers were killed by Chinese soldiers in the Galwan River Valley**, a disputed border region controlled by India but claimed by China. The **CCP has made full use of the crisis to rally nationalism**. China’s foreign ministry issued statements blaming India for the clashes and state-propaganda popularized the slogan “China is not afraid.” The Global Times, a propaganda outlet, cast the clashes as an Indian invasion, saying “India has illegally constructed defense facilities across the border into Chinese territory in the Galwan Valley region.” Importantly, Chinese state-owned news outlets were also running news about India’s poor coronavirus response at the time, in contrast to its own “successes.” The recent border clashes mirror China’s 2017 standoff with India at Doklam, a strategic point near Bhutan. During the conflict, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made statements that cast the conflict as an Indian attack upon China, and state media circulated images from the 1962 Sino-Indian War, to remind the China populace that Beijing had defeated Delhi before. The India clashes coincided with another threat to CCP legitimacy: a fight to remove pro-democracy advocates from the Hong Kong Legislative Council. China ended up harshly cracking down on the supposedly autonomous city as well. Understanding China’s weaknesses is essential for policymakers attempting to make sense of its aggression. This dynamic is not only a Xi Jinping phenomenon: China’s modern history shows that domestic crises are often followed by belligerence. A **study that pre-dated Xi’s rule, with a dataset of over three thousand interactions between the United States and China, found that the CCP was twice as likely to initiate disputes when the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) experienced a substantial drop.** **The SSE is a barometer of elite sentiment in China because the government pledges to protect elite investments and uses SSE listings to reward party insiders.** Insight into the CCP’s domestic political objectives helps determine the magnitude of the conflict and appropriate response. **The editor of the Global Times wrote that a belligerent foreign policy was “necessary to satisfy the Chinese people.”** Policymakers can use history to deduce what levels of aggression are “necessary” for the CCP’s goals. In India, it is unlikely that clashes will escalate into invasion because the current skirmishes satisfy the CCP’s purpose of bolstering legitimacy. However, **Taiwan** may be **in particular danger from China’s reactionary aggression.** This is because **the ways in which conflict with Taiwan would bolster the CCP’s legitimacy align more closely with more violent coercion**—reunification is a core element of the CCP’s platform and Taiwan’s clear success fighting the coronavirus is a major blow to Beijing’s legitimacy. Because Taiwan’s “threat” to the CCP stems from its mere existence, it is particularly vulnerable to reactionary aggression. Xi is a self-proclaimed follower of Mao. So, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis is a powerful example; Mao needed to generate support for the great leap forward and deflect criticism **from poor economic growth.** To stir the nation, **Mao seized islands controlled by Taiwan and threatened an invasion of the country until restrained by American nuclear brinksmanship.** Over the last three months, China has faced another crisis in the form of historic floods. The Yangtze river basin has been inundated, affecting sixty-three million Chinese and inflicting over twenty-five billion dollars in direct damages. Many Chinese have raised concerns that the government’s massive infrastructure projects have worsened the crisis by draining wetlands and promoting development in flood-prone areas. Poor transparency has stirred more backlash as the CCP has been accused of hiding the extent of damages and censoring criticism. One political commentator in Beijing even predicted that the “Chinese public will question Beijing from this year’s continuous natural and man-made disasters, and even question China’s governance model and its effectiveness.” Instead of hoping that the crisis created by the current floods will give China’s neighbors breathing space, **the** United States should brace itself for the possibility of renewed aggression**. The CCP must prove its worthiness to the tens of millions of displaced people across China**, **making it prone to lashing out**. **Taiwan may be an appealing target; it has been spared from flooding and has been visible in assisting neighboring countries like Japan with post-flood reconstruction**. Already, China has begun live-fire sea-crossing drills near Taiwan.

#### **Attempts at Taiwan cause US draw in, even during decline**

**Bernstein 20** Richard Bernstein,, 8-17-2020, "The Scary War Game Over Taiwan That the U.S. Loses Again and Again," No Publication, https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/08/17/the\_scary\_war\_game\_over\_taiwan\_that\_the\_us\_loses\_again\_and\_again\_124836.html mvp

But as **the U.S. seeks a closer alliance with Taiwan – illustrated by** the visit of Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar there last week, the highest-level official U.S. delegation to the island in 40 years **– the possibility of war between the two superpowers may be more than theoretical: A bill now before both houses of Congress, the Taiwan Defense Act, would end the long-held American policy of “strategic ambiguity” –** which aims to keep China guessing as to the U.S. response to any attempt to take Taiwan by force – **and require the U.S. “to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat” an attempt by China “to use military force to seize control of Taiwan.”**

#### **US-China war goes nuclear**

**Talmadge 18**, Caitlin [**PoliSci PhD from MIT**, Government BA from Harvard, Prof of Security Studies at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.] “Beijing’s Nuclear Option.” Foreign Affairs. October 15, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option TG

**As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built** military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will **threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region**. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but **the** prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible **as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.**

Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional **warfare would be a potential** recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

**China**, by contrast, **not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces**, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that **a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal**. Faced with such a threat, **Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons** while they were still able to.

As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a **conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation.** Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its **consequences for the region and the world would be devastating**. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, **the** risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

## **3**

Interp: Aff can’t say the aff gets 1AR theory, it’s drop the debater, no neg rvis, and it’s the highest layer of the round.

1] Strat skew – makes the highest layer of the round inaccessible to the neg since you can introuce a shell that comes prior to anything and is a reason to drop me and I can never win off it since I don’t get an rvi. Independently, this incentives spamming shells in the 1AR. Reject “you can answer” combo shell proves ur norm is bad.

#### **Concede fairness voter –**

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#### **Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm sine if you lose you will know better than to read silly arguments like this again.**

#### **Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.**

#### **No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory**

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