# **1NC**

## **1**

Interpretation: The affirmative must defend a policy action that advocates that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

vio

#### **Real world interpretation agrees — the resolution demands legislation**

**Hurd, 81** – Justice for the Supreme Court of Kansas (J., State v. Kearns, 2/11/1981, 623 P.2d 507)

The language in Article 2, § 20 of the Kansas Constitution is clear, unambiguous and incapable of any interpretation other than prescribing mandatory wording for the enactment of a bill into law. The words "resolved" and "enacted" are words of art having acquired a very special meaning in the legislative process. We will not attempt to change or alter the definition of those words and thus render them meaningless.

#### **"Outer space" is the entire region outside Earth.**

**Wordsmyth (Wordsmyth, dictionary, No Date, accessed on 11-28-2021, *Kids.Wordsmyth*, "space", https://kids.wordsmyth.net/we/?rid=39583&ent\_l=space) //D.Ying**

definition 2: **the area that contains the entire universe beyond the earth; outer space.**

#### **Vote neg**

#### **1] Predictable limits –absent topical constraints affirmative there is no stasis point for neg preparation which means we can’t predictably research your affirmative since there are thousands of literatures bases you could choose to base your affirmative on. That outweighs – a) you can dedicate 4 years to learning one literature base creating a structural skew to debaters who switch topics every 2 months and b) you can cherry pick advocacies like “racism is bad” which makes contesting the aff psychologically violent and they can always revise their aff to de-link from the few generics that are responsive.**

#### **2] Clash – the topic delineates aff and neg ground on an issue that allows in depth engagement while their model creates one-sided monologues. Their model forecloses the ability of intricate debate and advocacy refinement by forcing us into stale generics, since we can’t predictably research the 1ac. These positions don’t test the aff in rigorous ways since they are generic and supposed to apply to every affirmative. That turns the aff – absent rigorous testing of the aff echo chambers that operate within existing structural privilege without self-questioning and refinement of strategies.**

#### **3] TVA -**

#### **Procedural Fairness first—a) ballot pic – at the end of the day they care about competition and want their arguments to be flowed which proves they care about competition, if they don’t care about winning then just vote neg. Solves their offense, there is no reason a ballot is key – our interp precludes voting on non-topical affs but not the reading of them b) scope of solvency – one ballot can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews which means the only impact to a ballot is fairness and resolving skews, c) competitive incentives – debate is a game and games are silly without a level playing field. There is no incentive to prep and research for hundreds of hours if you know you’ll be at a structural disadvantage which makes the game bad and prevents rigorous contestation of positions which produces the best advocates.**

#### 

#### **Drop the debater – Changing your advocacy kills NC strat because the 1ac advocacy is the only stasis point for NC offense, anything else moots all clash and fairness. No cross apps from the aff since framework proves that that layer was skewed to begin with so we can’t actually test the truth of cross applications to the affirmative.**

#### **New 2nr answers to AC preempts because they are hidden, and implications are unknown until the 1ar.**

#### **No impact turns or rvis - A] Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T. B] Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position.**

## **2**

#### **Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.**

#### **Violation – they don’t**

#### **1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs who can’t bypass paywalled articles.**

**Louden 10** – Allan D. Louden, professor of Communication at Wake Forest (“Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century” Wake Forest National Debate Conference. IDEA, 2010)

Groups interested in engaging in competitive National Debate Tournament (NDT)-Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA)-style policy debate are entering an exciting time in the debate community where **digital resources are making research and networking increasingly accessible**. Those developing programs should be encouraged to choose their own topics and resolutions, but they should also make use of the massive resources available by focusing on the official NDT-CEDA resolution. **New initiatives in the field of open-source debate make evidence sharing, such as the Open Caselist, a powerful tool for new programs to engage and compete against established teams**. It is no coincidence that **the winners of the NDT tend to be the schools with the largest coaching staffs, but the increased distribution and free sharing of evidence and resources have made smaller debate programs increasingly capable of competing against larger institutions**. We are now seeing the beginnings of **increased resource sharing**, with multiple initiatives focusing on regional evidence sharing for groups of developing debate programs. This **is one example of dramatic changes occurring in the community that are capable of opening the doors for new participation in debate**. Regardless of outside influence, such as an organized campaign by preexisting debate organizations to increase resource distribution, students are independently capable of establishing the foundations for a larger competitive program. The following suggestions are a nonlinear set of options available to students who wish to establish a struc-tured and coached debate program, and eventually developing the capability to maintain multiple professional teaching positions, such as those discussed earlier in the chapter.

#### **2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat**

#### **3] Depth of clash – it allows debaters to have nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to higher quality ev comparison – outweighs cause thinking on your feet is NUQ but the best quality responses come from full access to a case.**

#### **D] Voter**

#### **Fairness**

#### **Education**

#### **Dtd**

#### **No rvi’s**

#### **Ci**

## **3**

#### **Any moral system faces the problem of regress – I can keep asking “why should I follow this.” Regress collapses to skep since no one can generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” asks for a reason for reasons, which concedes its authority. Reason means we must be able to universally will maxims— [A] our judgements are authoritative and can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me. [B] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others. Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.**

#### **The counter role of the ballot is to determine the debater that moves us towards a society of universal freedom**

#### **Applied Kantianism is key to abstract over the state’s influences on our desires towards a universal demand for equality within civil society.**

**Farr 02** Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. // NB

One of the most popular criticisms of **Kant’s** moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the **universal and** the **concrete** is a valid distinction, the **unity** of the two **is required** for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that **I cannot simply satisfy** my **desires without considering** the **rightness** or wrongness of my actions suggests that my **empirical character must be** held **in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate **principles** that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula **of Universal Law** enjoins no more than that **we act only on maxims that are open to others also**.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. **The individual is** **not allowed to exclude others** as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. … Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the **abstraction** requirement may be best understood **as a demand for intersubjectivity** or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt **to avoid ethical egoism** in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. **To avoid** ethical **egoism one must abstract from** (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and **subjective maxims**. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is **that** it **contravenes racist ideology** to the extent that racist ideology is based **on the use of persons** of a different race **as a means to an end** rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What **deconstruction will reveal** is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the **disunity** between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, **Kant** the man **has his own** personal and moral **problems**. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, **it would be equally deplorable to reject** the categorical imperative **without ﬁrst exploring** its **emancipatory potential**.

#### **[1] Using a universal starting point of reason to each particular allows people to access morality**

#### **[2] Kant isn’t abstract – rather he defines what suffering is to hold the state’s wrongdoing to universal criticism – otherwise the state can claim random things are the problem**

#### **Prefer additionally –**

#### **[A] we set ends based on practical identities like student or debater. However, human identity – or agency – is the source of practical identity since it’s necessary to choose which roles to take on.**

#### **Impacts: 1] Justifies valuing humanity as an end – we find our lives worth living under our practical identities and activities, but that means we must value agency as the source of that value. 2] Hijacks the role of the ballot – judge is a practical identity, which requires first valuing human identity. Now Negate –**

#### **[1] The aff has a deontological obligation to be topical.**

Nebel 15 Jake Nebel,"The Priority of Resolutional Semantics by Jake Nebel," Briefly,<https://www.vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/> //Lex VM

A second strategy denies that such pragmatic benefits are relevant. **This strategy is more deontological. One version of this strategy appeals to the importance of consent or agreement. Suppose that you give your opponents prior notice that you’ll be affirming the September/October 2012 resolution instead of the current one.** There is a sense in which your affirmation of that resolution is now predictable: your opponents know, or are in a position to know, what you will be defending. And suppose that the older resolution is conducive to better (i.e., more fair and more educational) debate. Still, **it’s unfair of you to expect your opponents to follow suit. Why? Because they didn’t agree to debate that topic. They registered for a tournament whose invitation specified the current resolution, not the Sept/Oct 2012 resolution or a free-for-all. The “social contract” argument for topicality holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic.** This claim might be contested, depending on what constitutes implicit consent. What is less contestable is this: given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism. Someone who wishes to debate only the announced resolution has a strong claim against changing the topic, and no one has a stronger claim against debating the announced resolution (ignoring, for now, some possible exceptions to be discussed in the next subsection). So it is unfair to expect your opponent to debate anything other than the announced resolution. **This unfairness is a constraint on the pursuit of education or other goods: it wrongs and is unjustifiable to your opponent.**

#### **2] K – affs are non-universalizable because if everyone read a k-aff there would be no topic in the first place and therefore no debate**

## **Case**

#### **Vote neg on presumption**

#### **[1] They have no intrinsic benefit to specifically reading [x] within the debate space and thus no reason to affirm their strategy**

#### **[2] Movements don’t spill up – competition means you ally yourself with people who vote for you and alienate those who are forced to debate you ensuring the failure of the movement**

#### **[3] The regurgitation of knowledge from the 1ac proves that it is not a departure from the status quo, but rather gets coopted by academia**

#### **Voting for them is a turn—it recenters the human, they are not actually going to do the alt, they are using animals to win the ballot which is the worst humanistic violence.**

#### **5] Alternative fails – we can never experience what animals feel like or speak from experience since we aren’t them. The best way to solve the impacts is to take pragmatic action to avoid existential threats which harm animals. I.e the TVA**

No solvency – aff doesn’t do anything. No one is going to become a vegan.

#### **6] A total rejection of anthropocentrism fails and reinscribes human-centric ideals – middle ground that preserves beneficial human ethics while acknowledging our flaws is best**

**Hayward 97:** [Tim Hayward (Professor of Politics at University of Edinburgh), “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” Environmental Values 6 (1997): 49-63]

But if the project of overcoming speciesism can be pursued with some expectation of success, this is not the case with the overcoming of anthropocentrism. **What makes anthropocentrism unavoidable is a limitation** of a quite different sort, one **which cannot be overcome even in principle** because it involves a non-contingent limitation on moral thinking as such. While overcoming speciesism involves a commitment to the pursuit of knowledge of relevant similarities and differences between humans and other species, the criteria of relevance will always have an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism about them. Speciesism is the arbitrary refusal to extend moral consideration to relevantly similar cases; the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is marked by the impossibility of giving meaningful moral consideration to cases which bear no similarity to any aspect of human cases. The emphasis is on the ‘meaningful’ here: for in the abstract one could of course declare that some feature of the nonhuman world was morally valuable, despite meeting no determinate criterion of value already recognised by any human, but because the new value is completely unrelated to any existing value it will remain radically indeterminate as a guide to action. If the ultimate point of an ethic is to yield a determinate guide to human action, then, the **human reference is ineliminable even when extending moral concern to nonhumans**. So my argument is that **one cannot know if any judgement is speciesist if one has no benchmark against which to test arbitrariness**; and, more specifically, **if we are concerned to avoid speciesism of humans then one must have standards of comparison** between them and others. Thus features of humans remain the benchmark. As long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criteria of value will be limited by this fact. **It is this fact which precludes the possibility of a radically nonanthropocentric value scheme**, if by that is meant the adoption of a set of values which are supposed to be completely unrelated to any existing human values. Any attempt to construct a radically non-anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be arbitrary – because founded on no certain knowledge – but also to be more insidiously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a matter of fact are selected by a human, onto nonhuman beings without certain warrant for doing so. This, of course, is the error of anthropomorphism, and will inevitably, I believe, be committed in any attempt to expunge anthropocentrism altogether. But is admitting this unavoidable element of anthropocentrism not tanta- mount to admitting the unavoidability of human chauvinism? My claim is that it is not. What is unavoidable is that human valuers make use of anthropocentric benchmarks; yet in doing so, they may find that in all consistency they must, for instance, give priority to vital nonhuman interests over more trivial human interests. For the human chauvinist, by contrast, interests of humans must always take precedence over the interests of nonhumans. Human chauvinism does not take human values as a benchmark of comparison, since it admits no comparison between humans and nonhumans. Human chauvinism ultimately values humans because they are humans. While the human chauvinist may officially claim there are criteria which provide reasons for preferring humans – such as that they have language, rationality, sociality etc. – no amount of evidence that other beings fulfil these criteria would satisfy them that they should be afforded a similar moral concern. The bottom line for the human chauvinist is that being human is a necessary and sufficient condition of moral concern. What I am pointing out as **the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is an asymmetry between humans and other species** which is not the product of chauvinist prejudice. To sum up, then, what is unavoidable about anthropocentrism is precisely what makes ethics possible at all. It is a basic feature of the logic of obligation: if an ethic is a guide to action; and if a particular ethic requires an agent to make others’ ends her ends, then they become just that – the agent’s ends. **This is a** non- contingent but **substantive limitation on any attempt to construct a completely nonanthropocentric ethic.** Values are always the values of the valuer:3 so as long as the class of valuers includes human beings, human values are ineliminable. Having argued that this is unavoidable, I also want to argue that it is no bad thing.

#### **7] Some amount of human centeredness is inevitable: we can never fully understand the non-human**

**Parker 96:** [Kelly A., Associate Professor and Chair of philosophy at Grand valley state Pragmatism and Environmental Thought, Environmental Pragmatism edited by Andrew Light and Eric Katz]

I have spoken of the experience of organisms‑in‑environments as centrally important. **Pragmatism is "anthropocentric**" (or better, "anthropometric")24 in one respect: **the human organism is inevitably the one that discusses value**. This is so because **human experience**, the human perspective on value, **is the only** **thing we know** as humans. Many other entities indeed have experience and do value things. Again, this is not to say that human whim is the measure of all things, only that **humans are** in fact **the measurers.** This must be a factor in all our deliberations about environmental issues. We can and should speak on the others' behalf when appropriate, but **we cannot speak from their experience**. We can in some sense hear their voices, but we cannot speak in their voices. I see no way out of our own distinctively human bodies. In this sense, **the human yardstick of experience becomes,** by default, **the measure of all things**. Although the debate over environmental issues is thus limited to human participants, this is not inappropriate ‑ after all, the debate centers almost exclusively on human threats to the world. Wolves, spotted owls, and old­growth forests are unable to enter the ethics debate except through their human spokespersons, and that is perhaps regrettable. Far better that they should speak for themselves! Lacking this, they do at least have spokespersons ‑ and these spokespersons, their advocates, need to communicate their concerns only to other humans. To do this in anthropic value categories is not shameful. It is, after all, the only way to go.

#### 

### **Kant**

#### **1] Our framework precludes – we need to be able to set and pursue the end of challenging anthro which concedes the validity of my framework.**

#### **2] Reason is a side constraint – to get away from anthro we need to be able to reason and use the ethical egoism isolated in the farr evidence to realize that there is no reason that humans are superior to animals and that animals should be treated the same.**

#### **3] Using our framework solves – anthro stems from treating animals as a mere means to an end of humans but our framework combats that by recognizing animals as capable of reasoning and pursuing their own ends.**

r1