# 1

#### Interpretation—the aff must disclose the plan/advocacy text before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation—they didn't

Graphical user interface, application, Teams

Description automatically generated

#### First is prep and clash—two internal links—a) neg prep—4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn a little about the affirmative and piece together what 1nc positions apply and cut and research their applications to the affirmative b) aff quality—plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot affs. If the aff isn't inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, it should lose—this will answer the 1ar's claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there's still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can't check against the broader literature.

#### Procedural Fairness first—a) ballot pic – at the end of the day they care about competition and want their arguments to be flowed which proves they care about competition, if they don’t care about winning then just vote neg. Solves their offense, there is no reason a ballot is key – our interp precludes voting on non-topical affs but not the reading of them b) scope of solvency – one ballot can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews which means the only impact to a ballot is fairness and resolving skews, c) competitive incentives – debate is a game and games are silly without a level playing field. There is no incentive to prep and research for hundreds of hours if you know you’ll be at a structural disadvantage which makes the game bad and prevents rigorous contestation of positions which produces the best advocates.

#### Competing interps – a) you either defend the rez or don’t – there’s no in between. Drop the debater – Changing your advocacy kills NC strat because the 1ac advocacy is the only stasis point for NC offense, anything else moots all clash and fairness. No cross apps from the aff since disclosure proves that that layer was skewed to begin with so we can’t actually test the truth of cross applications to the affirmative.

#### New 2nr answers to AC preempts because they are hidden, and implications are unknown until the 1ar.

## 2

#### Our Interpretation is the affirmative should instrumentally defend the resolution – hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet – anything new in the 1AR is either extra-T since it includes the non-topical parts of the Aff or effects-T since it’s a future result of the advocacy which both link to our offense.

#### “Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### 1] Predictable limits –absent topical constraints affirmative there is no stasis point for neg preparation which means we can’t predictably research your affirmative since there are thousands of literatures bases you could choose to base your affirmative on. That outweighs – a) you can dedicate 4 years to learning one literature base creating a structural skew to debaters who switch topics every 2 months and b) you can cherry pick advocacies like “racism is bad” which makes contesting the aff psychologically violent and they can always revise their aff to de-link from the few generics that are responsive.

#### 2] Clash – the topic delineates aff and neg ground on an issue that allows in depth engagement while their model creates one-sided monologues. Their model forecloses the ability of intricate debate and advocacy refinement by forcing us into stale generics, since we can’t predictably research the 1ac. These positions don’t test the aff in rigorous ways since they are generic and supposed to apply to every affirmative. That turns the aff – absent rigorous testing of the aff echo chambers that operate within existing structural privilege without self-questioning and refinement of strategies.

#### 3] TVA – defend.a hypoetethical just government as a form of futurism

Defend the right to strike for queer workers as a form of resisting violence

#### No impact turns or rvis - A] Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T. B] Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position.

## 3

**The meta ethic is practical reason.**

#### 1] Is/Ought Gap – experience in the phenomenal world only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises within the noumenal world to make a moral theory.

#### Any moral system faces the problem of regress – I can keep asking “why should I follow this.” Regress collapses to skep since no one can generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” asks for a reason for reasons, which concedes its authority.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### The counter role of the ballot is to determine the debater that moves us towards a society of universal freedom

#### Applied Kantianism is key to abstract over the state’s influences on our desires towards a universal demand for equality within civil society.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. // NB

One of the most popular criticisms of **Kant’s** moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the **universal and** the **concrete** is a valid distinction, the **unity** of the two **is required** for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that **I cannot simply satisfy** my **desires without considering** the **rightness** or wrongness of my actions suggests that my **empirical character must be** held **in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate **principles** that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula **of Universal Law** enjoins no more than that **we act only on maxims that are open to others also**.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. **The individual is** **not allowed to exclude others** as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. … Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the **abstraction** requirement may be best understood **as a demand for intersubjectivity** or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt **to avoid ethical egoism** in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. **To avoid** ethical **egoism one must abstract from** (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and **subjective maxims**. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is **that** it **contravenes racist ideology** to the extent that racist ideology is based **on the use of persons** of a different race **as a means to an end** rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What **deconstruction will reveal** is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the **disunity** between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, **Kant** the man **has his own** personal and moral **problems**. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, **it would be equally deplorable to reject** the categorical imperative **without ﬁrst exploring** its **emancipatory potential**.

### Offense

#### 1] K – affs are non-universalizable because if everyone read a k-aff there would be no topic in the first place and therefore no debate

#### 2] The aff has a deontological obligation to be topical.

Nebel 15 Jake Nebel,"The Priority of Resolutional Semantics by Jake Nebel," Briefly, <https://www.vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/> //Lex VM

A second strategy denies that such pragmatic benefits are relevant. This strategy is more deontological. One version of this strategy appeals to the importance of consent or agreement. Suppose that you give your opponents prior notice that you’ll be affirming the September/October 2012 resolution instead of the current one. There is a sense in which your affirmation of that resolution is now predictable: your opponents know, or are in a position to know, what you will be defending. And suppose that the older resolution is conducive to better (i.e., more fair and more educational) debate. Still, it’s unfair of you to expect your opponents to follow suit. Why? Because they didn’t agree to debate that topic. They registered for a tournament whose invitation specified the current resolution, not the Sept/Oct 2012 resolution or a free-for-all. The “social contract” argument for topicality holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic. This claim might be contested, depending on what constitutes implicit consent. What is less contestable is this: given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism. Someone who wishes to debate only the announced resolution has a strong claim against changing the topic, and no one has a stronger claim against debating the announced resolution (ignoring, for now, some possible exceptions to be discussed in the next subsection). So it is unfair to expect your opponent to debate anything other than the announced resolution. This unfairness is a constraint on the pursuit of education or other goods: it wrongs and is unjustifiable to your opponent.