## 1

#### Ethics must began a priori. Permissibility negates since the word ought in the resolution indicates an obligation so its their burden to prove the existence of one.

#### 1] Is/Ought Gap – experience in the phenomenal world only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises within the noumenal world to make a moral theory.

#### The existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth—that means we must treat others as ends in themselves.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS/Recut Lex AKu \*brackets for gendered language

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action,[they] he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Practical reason resolves regress - I can keep asking “why should I follow this” but asking “why reason” requires reason so its inescapable. Regress collapses to skep since no one can generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them.

Ethics must be universal – 2+2 = 4 can’t be true for me but not for you. That’s incoherent.

There is an act omission distinction otherwise we are infinitely culpable for anything like, me being responsible for the the war in Yemen which is illogical – negate, omitting is a morally permissible action to avoid culpability, which means the squo is ok and theres no moral obligation to do the aff

Now negate

#### 1] Strikes violate rights.

**Gourevitch, 16** **(Alex Gourevitch, associate professor of political science at Brown University, 6-13-2016, accessed on 10-12-2021, *Perspectives on Politics*, "Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike", https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592716000049) //D.Ying**

Yet there is more. The standard strike potentially threatens the fundamental freedoms of three specific groups. • Freedom of contract. It conflicts with the freedom of contract of those replacement workers who would be willing to take the job on terms that strikers will not. Note that this is not a possible conflict but a necessary one. Strikers claim the job is theirs, which means replacements have no right to it. But replacements claim everyone should have the equal freedom to contract with an employer for a job. • Property rights. A strike seriously interferes with the employer’s property rights. The point of a strike is to stop production. But the point of a property right is that, at least in the owner’s core area of activity, nobody else has the right to interfere with his use of that property. The strikers, by claiming that the employer has no right to hire replacements and thus no way of employing his property profitably, effectively render the employer unfree to use his property as he sees fit. To be clear, strikers claim the right not just to block replacement workers, but to prevent the employer from putting his property to work without their permission. For instance, New Deal “sit-down” strikes made it impossible to operate factories, which was one reason why the courts claimed it violated employer property rights. 24 Similarly, during the Seattle general strike in 1919, the General Strike Committee forced owners to ask permission to engage in certain productive activities—permission it often denied. 25 • Freedom of association. Though the conceptual issues here are complicated, a strike can seriously constrain a worker’s freedom of association. It does so most seriously when the strike is a group right, in which only authorized representatives of the union may call a strike. In this case, the right to strike is not the individual’s right in the same way that, say, the freedom to join a church or volunteer organization is. Moreover, the strike can be coercively imposed even on dissenting members, especially when the dissenters work in closed or union shops. That is because refusal to follow the strike leads to dismissal from the union, which would mean loss of the job in union or closed shops. The threat of losing a job is usually considered a coercive threat. So not only might workers be forced to join unions—depending on the law—but also they might be forced to go along with one of the union’s riskiest collective actions. Note that each one of these concerns follows directly from the nature of the right to strike itself. Interference with freedom of contract, property rights, and the freedom of association are all part and parcel of defending the right that striking workers claim to “their” jobs. These are difficult forms of coercive interference to justify on their own terms and they appear to rest on a claim without foundation. Just what right do workers have to jobs that they refuse to perform?

#### 2] Violates the commitment to not cause harm

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

In addition to the above, engaging in a labor strike demonstration is a gross violation of the **prima facie duty of the social worker**, nonmaleficence: **to not cause harm**, and display a commitment to the well-being of the client, organization as well as society. As Social Workers withdraw their labor, services are ceased, and automatic disruption occurs which can inflict serious harm on clients, organizational functioning as well as society. According to Mehta and Swell (2014), examples of the harm caused to clients and organizational functioning include severe and fatal delays in executing or developing timeous interventions **for at-risk clients,** miscommunication, and no service delivery. Moreover, by withdrawing their labor in a strike demonstration, ethical principles such as beneficence and social justice are also not adhered to as no acts of kindness, empathy is shown, and the most vulnerable members of society **will be impacted the most**.

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters must specify how they enforce the unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### 1] Topic lit – enforcement is the core question of the topic and there's no consensus on normal means so you must spec. Weiss

Marley S. Weiss [Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law], 2000, “The Right To Strike In Essential Services Under United States Labor Law”, https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2189&context=fac\_pubs

2. Strikes, Lockouts, and Other Lawful Primary Weapons under the NLRA The parties, both labor and management, are under a duty to bargain in good faith with each other, “but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession”. The essential idea here is that both sides must genuinely try to reach mutual agreement. However, this simple concept is extremely difficult to enforce, and employers too often resort to bad faith bargaining, bargaining on the surface with no real intention of concluding an agreement, as part of a strategy to eliminate union representation from the workplace. In addition, the duty to bargain is limited to matters falling within the Section 8(d) statutory phrase, “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”, and the right to strike is similarly limited to issues falling within the scope of mandatory bargaining as defined by that phrase. Although the phrase has been broadly construed in many respects, as to certain issues, the contrary has been the case. Capital redeployment, that is, relocation of operations, disinvestment in unionized plants, subcontracting, and plant closure decisions, provide employers with a potent set of weapons against unions. While bargaining over the effects of such decisions is plainly mandatory, the extent to which bargaining is required over the decisions themselves have been hotly contested.

#### This acts as a resolvability standard. Debate has to make sense and be comparable for the judge to make a decision which means it's an independent voter and outweighs.

#### 2] Stable advocacy – 1AR clarification delinks neg positions that prove why enforcement in a certain instance is bad by saying it isn't their method of enforcement – wrecks neg ballot access and kills in depth clash – CX doesn't check since it kills 1NC construction pre-round since I don't know advocacy till in round, and judges do not flow cross ex so its not verifiable.

#### Fairness- consittutive of comp activites, args presume

#### DTD – drop the arg doesn’t make sense in the context of the shell, otherwise you can shift into anything.

#### No RVI’s- a) 1AR can go all in on a 30 second shell and put us in a massive disadvantage, b) 1AR has 2 speeches to genearte theory vs our one.

#### CI- intervention, collapses, race to the top

## 3

#### Counterplan: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike except in the instance that strikes directly demand discrimination towards certain groups of individuals

BPSC[Unfair Labor Practices by Union, http://bpscllc.com/unfair-labor-practices-by-unions.html, N.D., Business & People Strategy Consulting Group, California's trusted source for workplace human resources and employment law] [SS]

Causing or Attempting to Cause Discrimination: Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3). The section is violated by agreements or arrangements with employers, other than lawful union-security agreements, that condition employment or job benefits on union membership, on the performance of union membership obligations or on arbitrary grounds. But union action that causes detriment to an individual employee does not violate Section 8(b)(2) if it is consistent with nondiscriminatory provisions of a bargaining contract negotiated for the benefit of the total bargaining unit, or if the action is based on some other legitimate purpose. A union’s conduct, accompanied by statements advising or suggesting that action is expected of an employer, may be enough to find a violation of this section if the union’s action can be shown to be a causal factor in the employer’s discrimination. Contracts or informal arrangements with a union under which an employer gives preferential treatment to union members also violate Section 8(b)(2). However, an employer and a union may agree that the employer will hire new employees exclusively through the union hiring hall if there is no discrimination against nonunion members on the basis of union membership obligations. In setting referral standards, a union may consider legitimate aims such as sharing available work and easing the impact of local unemployment. The union may also charge referral fees if the amount of the fee is reasonably related to the cost of operating the referral service. A union that attempts to force an employer to enter into an illegal union-security agreement, or that enters into and keeps in effect such an agreement, also violates Section 8(b)(2), as does a union that attempts to enforce such an illegal agreement by bringing about an employee’s discharge. Even when a union-security provision of a bargaining contract meets all statutory requirements, a union may not lawfully require the discharge of employees under the provision unless they were informed of the union-security agreement and their specific obligation under it. A union violates Section 8(b)(2) if it tries to use the union-security provisions of a contract to collect payments other than those lawfully required, such as assessments, fines and penalties. Other examples of Section 8(b)(2) violations include: Causing an employer to discharge employees because they circulated a petition urging a change in the union’s method of selecting shop stewards Causing an employer to discharge employees because they made speeches against a contract proposed by the union Making a contract that requires an employer to hire only members of the union or employees “satisfactory” to the union Causing an employer to reduce employees’ seniority because they engaged in anti-union acts Refusing referral or giving preference on the basis of race or union activities when making job referrals to units represented by the union Seeking the discharge of an employee under a union-security agreement for failure to pay a fine levied by the union

#### Racist union strikes have happened before

Allison Keyes, JUNE 30, **2017**, "The East St. Louis Race Riot Left Dozens Dead, Devastating a Community on the Rise," Smithsonian Magazine, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/east-st-louis-race-riot-left-dozens-dead-devastating-community-on-the-rise-180963885/ //SR

Racial tensions began simmering in East St. Louis—a city where thousands of blacks had moved from the South to work in war factories—as early as February 1917. The African-American population was 6,000 in 1910 and nearly double that by 1917. In the spring, the largely white workforce at the Aluminum Ore Company went on strike. Hundreds of blacks were hired. After a City Council meeting on May 28, angry white workers lodged formal complaints against black migrants. When word of an attempted robbery of a white man by an armed black man spread through the city, mobs started beating any African-Americans they found, even pulling individuals off of streetcars and trolleys. The National Guard was called in but dispersed in June.

## 4

#### CP: Just government should recognize a right to strike except for military workers

#### Armed forces can’t strike now

LII 6 [Cornell Legal Information Institute, 2006, "10 U.S. Code § 976," Cornell Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/976]/Kankee

(a)In this section: (1)The term “member of the armed forces” means (A) a member of the armed forces who is serving on active duty, (B) a member of the National Guard who is serving on full-time National Guard duty, or (C) a member of a Reserve component while performing inactive-duty training. (2)The term “military labor organization” means any organization that engages in or attempts to engage in— (A)negotiating or bargaining with any civilian officer or employee, or with any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces; (B)representing individual members of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such member in the armed forces; or (C)striking, picketing, marching, demonstrating, or any other similar form of concerted action which is directed against the Government of the United States and which is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (i)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of military service of any member of the armed forces, (ii)recognize any organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with complaints and grievances of such members arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces, or (iii)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of military service of individual members of the armed forces. (3)The term “civilian officer or employee” means an employee, as such term is defined in section 2105 of title 5. (b)It shall be unlawful for a member of the armed forces, knowing of the activities or objectives of a particular military labor organization— (1)to join or maintain membership in such organization; or (2)to attempt to enroll any other member of the armed forces as a member of such organization. (c)It shall be unlawful for any person— (1)to enroll in a military labor organization any member of the armed forces or to solicit or accept dues or fees for such an organization from any member of the armed forces; or (2)to negotiate or bargain, or attempt through any coercive act to negotiate or bargain, with any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of service of such members; (3)to organize or attempt to organize, or participate in, any strike, picketing, march, demonstration, or other similar form of concerted action involving members of the armed forces that is directed against the Government of the United States and that is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (A)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of service of any member of the armed forces, (B)recognize any military labor organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with any complaint or grievance of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces, or (C)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of service in the armed forces of individual members of the armed forces; or (4)to use any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by this subsection or by subsection (b) or (d). (d)It shall be unlawful for any military labor organization to represent, or attempt to represent, any member of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces. (e)No member of the armed forces, and no civilian officer or employee, may— (1)negotiate or bargain on behalf of the United States concerning the terms or conditions of military service of members of the armed forces with any person who represents or purports to represent members of the armed forces, or (2)permit or authorize the use of any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity which is for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by subsection (b), (c), or (d). Nothing in this subsection shall prevent commanders or supervisors from giving consideration to the views of any member of the armed forces presented individually or as a result of participation on command-sponsored or authorized advisory councils, committees, or organizations. (f)Whoever violates subsection (b), (c), or (d) shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000. (g)Nothing in this section shall limit the right of any member of the armed forces— (1)to join or maintain membership in any organization or association not constituting a “military labor organization” as defined in subsection (a)(2) of this section; (2)to present complaints or grievances concerning the terms or conditions of the service of such member in the armed forces in accordance with established military procedures; (3)to seek or receive information or counseling from any source; (4)to be represented by counsel in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations; (5)to petition the Congress for redress of grievances; or (6)to take such other administrative action to seek such administrative or judicial relief, as is authorized by applicable laws and regulations.

Amendments 1997—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 105–85 substituted “shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000.” for “shall, in the case of an individual, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and in the case of an organization or association, be fined not less than $25,000 and not more than $250,000.” 1987—Subsec. (a)(1) to (3). Pub. L. 100–26 inserted “The term” after each par. designation and struck out uppercase letter of first word after first quotation marks in each paragraph and substituted lowercase letter. 1986—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 99–661 struck out the second of two commas before “(B)”. 1984—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 98–525 added cl. (B) and redesignated existing cl. (B) as (C). Findings; Purpose Pub. L. 95–610, § 1, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3085, provided that: “(a)The Congress makes the following findings: “(1)Members of the armed forces of the United States must be prepared to fight and, if necessary, to die to protect the welfare, security, and liberty of the United States and of their fellow citizens. “(2)Discipline and prompt obedience to lawful orders of superior officers are essential and time-honored elements of the American military tradition and have been reinforced from the earliest articles of war by laws and regulations prohibiting conduct detrimental to the military chain of command and lawful military authority. “(3)The processes of conventional collective bargaining and labor-management negotiation cannot and should not be applied to the relationships between members of the armed forces and their military and civilian superiors. “(4)Strikes, slowdowns, picketing, and other traditional forms of job action have no place in the armed forces. “(5)Unionization of the armed forces would be incompatible with the military chain of command, would undermine the role, authority, and position of the commander, and would impair the morale and readiness of the armed forces. “(6)The circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of the armed forces to perform their mission are not comparable to the circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of Federal civilian agencies to perform their functions and should be viewed in light of the need for effective performance of duty by each member of the armed forces. “(b)The purpose of this Act [enacting this section] is to promote the readiness of the armed forces to defend the United States.”

#### Military unions wreck civilian military relations and US hegemony – extinction

Caforio 18 [Giuseppe Caforio, Brigadier General with degrees in law, political science, and strategic studies (FYI, the author died ~2015, but this was republished in 2018 in an anthology book), 5-20-2018, "Unionisation of the Military: Representation of the Interests of Military Personnel," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-71602-2\_19]/Kankee

THE OPPOSITION TO UNIONIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES But if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionization issue for the armed forces? Why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel? The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, which is summarized thusly by David R. Segal: Because of its unique social function—the legitimate management of violence—the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer. They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment any time they wish. They are subject to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed. They are required to place the needs of service above the needs of their families, and must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And in time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives. Obviously, the man on the firing line is required to make a commitment of a different order from that made by the worker on the assembly line. (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 28). Bernhard Boene, in a study devoted to a different research topic (Boene, 1990), is both precise and efficacious in differentiating military "work" from civilian work. Military specificity, writes Boene, does not lie only in the area of the risks to which one supposes the combatant is exposed, but also in the limits of application of common rationality in combat and in the situation of habitual transgression of social norms that it entails. This implies a particular type of socialization. Notwithstanding partial analogies, according to Boene, civil emergencies belong to a different reality than military ones do. An officer, in particular, is not an ordinary civil servant: he must respond to a "call," consisting of a particular interest in military things, dedication to the common welfare, acceptance of risking his life, and submission to a series of obligations that are peculiar to the military profession. SOME THEORETICAL POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE Discussing a sample survey, David Segal observes that in the United States, in the absence of a union for military personnel, there is a considerable "misfit" between soldiers' perception of the characteristics of their role and the preferred characteristics, while in an analogous sample of civilian manpower this misfit is much smaller. In examining the attempted remedies, Segal states: "Any change to be achieved through organizational interventions, however, is likely to be incremental, and not to resolve the discrepancy between the characteristics that military personnel would like in their jobs and the characteristics that they perceived their jobs to have" (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 46). According to Segal, unionization can solve this problem, but it presents two dangers that must be carefully weighed: the first is that it tends to extend its influence also to aspects of management and direction of the military apparatus; the second is that it involves a politicisation of the personnel. Gwyn Harries Jenkins examines the consequences that unionisation would have on the operational efficiency of the armed forces and identifies three fundamental ones: 1. The creation of a dual authority structure: Since there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment and a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, unionization extends the boundaries of these changes: it brings into armed forces the full effects of the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society, creating a dual authority structure while modifying the traditional basis of compliance. (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 70) 2. A much greater resemblance of the style of military command to that of civilian management. The new tasks and the introduction of unionization would require commanders to possess skills and orientations more and more like those of civilian managers. 3. An abdication by the officer of his traditional image. Indeed, if the officer "wishes to retain his self-image and ideas of honor, then the introduction of trade unions into the military creates a conflict situation with substantial dysfunctional consequences" (H.Jenkins, 1977, p. 71). Harries Jenkins concludes, however, by affirming that, as a radical criticism of the existing military system, "the unionization of the armed forces can only result in an improvement to an otherwise defective situation" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 69). According to William Taylor and Roger Arango (Taylor et al., 1977b), many reasons offered in the United States for or against the unionization of military personnel appear to be rhetorical and not sufficiently investigated. Those who take a negative critical stance, for example, contend that unionization would lead to a breakdown in discipline; threaten the chain of command; and, especially, undermine the military's ability to carry out its assigned mission. Through a concrete field analysis, these authors believe they can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of this process. Among the advantages are the acquisition of a greater sense of individual security, a valorization of the dignity of individuals, improved social communication, and greater competitiveness with other occupations and professions in recruiting personnel. The real drawbacks would essentially be reduced to two: a risk of divisiveness within units, due to acquired strife between personnel categories; and an increase in personnel costs. Carlo Jean (Jean, 1981) states that in itself, the creation of unions would inevitably produce increased confrontation; without it, the union representatives would have neither prestige nor credibility. He does not believe, however, that the biggest drawback that would derive from it would be that of undermining the internal cohesiveness of the armed forces and their operational capacity. According to this author military leaders would align themselves with the union's demands out of necessity to avoid internal breakup. An unacceptable corporative force would be produced that sooner or later would inevitably oppose it to the political power. The danger that a union of military personnel involves for civil society is, in his opinion, much greater than its negative implications on the efficiency of the military itself. Along the same line is the fear expressed by Sen. Thurmond (reported by David Cortright, cited essay) that unionization might reinforce the military establishment and increase its influence over society at large, decreasing the capacity for political control. This issue had already been treated by Cortright in another essay (Cortright and Thurmond, 1977b), where on the one hand he argued that unionization in the armed forces would help to prevent any form of separateness from civil society while noting on the other that little attention was given to the possibility that unionization substantially strengthens the military's ability to wield influence. Thurmond, again, judges the European experience negatively and asks himself how unionized troops would respond in battle. However, to remain faithful to his position, Thurmond conceives the armed forces as a separate body from civil society, argues that military personnel are not comparable to other labor force categories, and advances the fear that union representation of the interests of military personnel would bring the defence budget to unacceptable levels. Of the countries included in our study, unions for military personnel exist in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Unionization is prohibited in England, the United States, Canada, France, Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Strikes are allowed only in Austria and Sweden. ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES THROUGH THE THOUGHT OF VARIOUS AUTHORS

No 1AR theory –A] 7-6 time skew means it’s endlessly aff biased B] I don’t have a 3nr which allows for endless extrapolation

If they win they get 1AR theory only 1 1AR shell, a) recipricoity, b) splits 1AR too many ways.

DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew – ows on quantifiability

## Case

### Ov

#### 1] C/A Koorsgaard 83 – Pain and pleasure are hypothetical imperatives that gains its value from humanity conferring value upon it but are not unconditionally valuable like humanity.

#### 2] Pain and pleasure aren’t a reliable starting point for ethics – everyone has a constantly changing and different account of what causes them pain or pleasure, i.e a masochist or a smoker which makes aggregating impossible since empirical circumstances are fluctuating.

#### 3] Kant hijacks – the way to maximize well – being is by following the categorical imperative since it avoids pain through things like murder and exploitation.

#### 4] The universe is infinite.

Bostrom ’08 (Bostrom, Nick [Professor at University of Oxford, director of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, PhD from London School of Economics]. The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics. 2008. http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf)

In the standard Big Bang model, assuming the simplest topology (i.e., that space is singly connected), there are three basic possibilities: the universe can be open, flat, or closed. Current data suggests a flat or open universe, although the final verdict is pending. If the universe is either open or flat, then it is spatially infinite at every point in time and the model entails that it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. There exists a common misconception which confuses the universe with the (finite) ‘observable universe’. But the observable part—the part that coulsd causally affect us—would be just an infinitesimal fraction of the whole. Statements about the “mass of the universe” or the “number of protons in the universe” generally refer to the content of this observable part; see e.g. [1]. Many cosmologists [also] believe that our universe is just one in an infinite ensemble of universes (a multiverse), and this adds to the probability that the world is canonically infinite; for a popular review, see e.g. [1].

#### There’s always infinite pleasure and pain in the universe—util is incoherent since we can’t add or subtract from that and triggers permissibility.

### Adv

### Case – Inequality

#### Inequality is not statistically significant – there’s zero need for strike rights.

Wright et. al ’19 [Joshua D., Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick, and Jan M. Rybnicek; University Professor and Executive Director, Global Antitrust Institute at Scalia Law School; Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips, United States Federal Trade Commission; Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Counsel in the antitrust, competition, and trade practice of Freshfields, Bruckahus Deringer LLP; Arizona State Law Review, “REQUIEM FOR A PARADOX: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust,” vol. 51; KP]

2. The Empirical Evidence: Is Inequality Really Growing?

All of the papers discussed above assume that inequality has increased in recent years. This view is fairly common among economists and would seem to be borne out as seen in Figure 2 below, which presents the Gini coefficient for U.S. incomes for the last fifty years.166

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

Figure 3, which plots the ratio of the share of US income among the fifth quintile of income-earning households to the share among the first quintile of households167 tells a similar story.

Chart, line chart

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Robert Kaestner and Darren Lubotsky underscore the point that inequality measures can be significantly affected by a failure to account for government transfers and employee benefits that presumably substitute for cash income.168 Given that healthcare costs have grown faster than inflation in recent years, a failure to account for health insurance benefits could significantly affect economic inequality measures. Reviewing estimates from the literature, Kaestner and Lubotsky find that including health insurance substantially reduces the gap between incomes at the high end of the distribution and those at the low end.169 Interestingly, however, the authors find that there is still an upward trend in inequality over time when the cash equivalent of health insurance and government transfers are included.170 The trend, however, is substantially muted.171 Specifically, including government transfers and the imputed value of employer subsidized health insurance, Kaestner and Lubotsky indicate that the ratio of income between households at the ninetieth percentile and the tenth percentile was about five in 1995, growing to 5.2 in 2004 and to 5.6 in 2012.172

Although yearly estimates of this more complete measure of income inequality are not available, and the time series span is somewhat limited, another approach might be to examine consumption inequality since consumption will be a function of effective income, and consumption data are more readily available. Also, consumption might be a better measure of welfare as argued by Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan.173 When determining the desirability of antitrust enforcement to address economic inequality, presumably one not only wants to examine the indirect effects on people’s incomes and wealth, but also the direct effect on consumer welfare, for which consumption might be a useful proxy.

Considering the arguments raised above regarding the desirability of using antitrust to fight inequality, one might reason that higher prices coming from increased concentration make both the well-off investors and executives and the lowly consumer worse off, but the investors and executives are compensated through high incomes due to their monopoly profits. Under these arguments, we should see an upward trend in the consumption ratio between the haves and the have-nots. Figure 4, which uses data on average consumption by households in the various income quintiles from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey,174 shows that while the ratio has grown over time, the growth is much smaller than that found for income itself. Further, unlike income, the growth is not nearly as consistent with periods of increasing inequality and decreasing inequality alike.

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#### Inequality hasn’t changed in nine decades.

Atkinson ‘21 [Robert; 3/10/21; Founder and President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning from the University of North Carolina; "How Progressives Have Spun Dubious Theories and Faulty Research Into a Harmful New Antitrust Doctrine," https://itif.org/publications/2021/03/10/how-progressives-have-spun-dubious-theories-and-faulty-research-harmful-new]

Myth 7: Market Concentration Has Caused Labor’s Share of Income to Fall26

Neo-Brandeisians have argued that increased market concentration has reduced the share of national income going to labor. The idea is that as companies gain more market power, they take an increased share of economic output, with workers getting less.

But according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, virtually none of labor’s lost share of income goes to increased profits, as a theory of market power might predict. Rather, the gains are almost totally from increases in both rental income—imputed rent (the value an owner would get from renting the home they occupy at market rates) homeowners receive and actual rent renters pay—and to some extent the mismeasurement of self-employment income. And when looking at the change in combined worker, rental, and self-employment income as a share of net national income, versus combined profits and net interest income, the former ratio is essentially unchanged over the last 90 years. (See figure 4.) In other words, the declining share of labor income has almost nothing do with monopoly power.

#### Labor power is high now.

Irwin ’21 [Neil; June 5; senior economics correspondent; New York Times, “Workers Are Gaining Leverage Over Employers Right Before Our Eyes,” <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/05/upshot/jobs-rising-wages.html>; KP]

Yet in key respects, the shift builds on changes already underway in the tight labor market preceding the pandemic, when the unemployment rate was 4 percent or lower for two straight years.

That follows decades in which union power declined, unemployment was frequently high and employers made an art out of shifting work toward contract and gig arrangements that favored their interests over those of their employees. It would take years of change to undo those cumulative effects.

But the demographic picture is not becoming any more favorable for employers eager to fill positions. Population growth for Americans between ages 20 and 64 turned negative last year for the first time in the nation’s history. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the potential labor force will grow a mere 0.3 percent to 0.4 percent annually for the remainder of the 2020s; the size of the work force rose an average of 0.8 percent a year from 2000 to 2020.

An important question for the overall economy is whether employers will be able to create conditions attractive enough to coax back in some of the millions of working-age adults not currently part of the labor force. Depending on your view of the causes, the end of expanded pandemic-era jobless benefits might also have an effect. Some businesses may need to raise prices or retool how they operate; others may be forced to close entirely.

Higher wages are part of the story. The jobs report issued on Friday showed that average hourly earnings for nonmanagerial workers were 1.3 percent higher in May than two months earlier. Other than in a brief period of statistical distortions early in the pandemic, that is the strongest two-month gain since 1983.

But wages alone aren’t enough, and firms seem to be finding it in their own best interest to seek out workers across all strata of society, to the benefit of people who have missed out on opportunity in the last few decades.

“I’ve been doing this a long time and have never felt more excited and more optimistic about the level of creative investment on this issue,” said Bertina Ceccarelli, chief executive of NPower, a nonprofit aimed at helping military veterans and disadvantaged young adults start tech industry careers. “It’s an explosive moment right now.”

In effect, an entire generation of managers that came of age in an era of abundant workers is being forced to learn how to operate amid labor scarcity. That means different things for different companies and workers — and often involves strategies more elaborate than simply paying a signing bonus or a higher hourly wage.

At the high end of the labor market, that can mean workers are more emboldened to leave a job if employers are insufficiently flexible on issues like working from home.

#### Wages are at historic highs.

Domm ’21 [Patti; May 22; CNBC Markets Editor, responsible for news coverage of the markets and economy; CNBC; “Workers’ wages are rising at the fastest pace in years. Companies’ profits could take a hit,” <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/22/wages-rise-at-the-fastest-pace-in-years-firms-profits-could-take-a-hit.html>; KP]

Workers are getting higher wages, but at some point that could bite into companies’ profits.

As the economy reopens, costs are climbing for everything from packaging and raw materials to shipping. In addition to these expenses, companies are also paying more to get workers to come in the door.

But the disparity between labor costs and profits has been so wide for so long, that employers should be able to increase pay if they can raise prices for goods and services or improve productivity.

McDonald’s said last week that it was boosting wages for the 36,500 hourly workers at company-owned stores by 10%, and Chipotle announced it will raise wages to an average of $15 an hour by the end of June. Bank of America said it would raise minimum wages for its hourly workers to $25 an hour, from the current $20, by 2025.

Sports equipment company Under Armour also announced it would boost the minimum hourly wage for its retail and distribution workers to $15 from $10.

“It’s some of the strongest wage growth we’ve seen in a quarter century,” said Mark Zandi, Moody’s Analytics chief economist. He said the 3% wage growth for private workers in the first quarter was the strongest since the 1990s and productivity has picked up at the same time.

### Case – Growth

#### Growth is stable and pessimists are historically wrong---no coming recession.

Barbera ’21 [Robert J; July 20; Director of the Center for Financial Economics, PhD from John Hopkins University, 30 years as a Wall Street economist; Center for Financial Economics, “Does the 2021 Boom Lock the U.S. into 2023-2025 Gloom?” https://krieger.jhu.edu/financial-economics/2021/07/20/does-the-2021-boom-lock-the-u-s-into-2023-2025-gloom/]

Is it *likely*? The CBO forecasters had to acknowledge the reality of recent surging labor productivity. But rather than view that change as significant, they chose to insist that their earlier guess for sustainable productivity gains was correct. That completely arbitrary decision led them to forecast meagre prospective productivity growth ahead, and is central to their forecast of a swoon for 2023-2025 real GDP growth.

CBO’s insistence on this dour view forces them into pretty improbable territory. Glance at the chart below. It reveals that the flow of output, second half 2021, is deemed to already be well above the economy’s potential. With unemployment still close to 6% and with labor force participation still quite depressed, declaring that the economy is already in excessive territory, seems hard to support. I think it is flat out wrong.

Real GDP forecast and real potential GDP for 2020 to 2025

Deconstructing CBO’s Potential Output estimate

CBO’s characterization of potential is driven by three assumptions. Sustainable annual gains for U.S. labor productivity will average around 1.8%. Full employment for the U.S. economy is centered a bit above 4%. At full employment U.S. labor force growth is capped at around 0.3% per year. Combine these three items and you end up sketching out CBO’s version of the upside boundary for U.S. real GDP.

Again, however, embracing these assumptions forces you to assert that the economy, as we enter the second half of 2021, is already operating above its sustainable level, strikingly at odds with common sense amid very high joblessness, very low labor force participation and very low levels of capacity utilization for our industrial sector.

How might we modify an estimate of potential, so that it squares with the notion of ample excess labor and production capacity, mid-2021? Simply acknowledge that the spurt for productivity, over the past 6 quarters, need not be followed by a productivity swoon.

Additionally, we can revisit the question of full employment. CBO asserts that employment levels extended beyond safe levels, throughout 2018 and 2019. But there was little evidence of wage and or price pressures in late 2019. Labor force conditions then may have been at, but not beyond full employment after all, at that time.

Consider those two factors, and a post-boom 2%, not 1%, real GDP growth performance is easy to pencil in.

Productivity’s Trajectory Need Not Mean Revert.

CBO embraces the pre-pandemic consensus view on sustainable productivity gains, 1.8% per year. But over the 6 quarters ending in 2021:Q2, labor productivity wildly outstripped this performance, rising at around a 3.4% annualized pace, nearly double CBO’s sustainable rate.

Does it make sense to be adamant about sustainable productivity levels? Not really. Since 1950, long run average growth rates for labor productivity are neither stable nor predictable. They range anywhere from 1.6% to 2.6%, putting CBO’s figure on the very low end of post war history.

Histogram showing rolling average of productivity growth, 1952-2018.

Where did CBO come up with 1.8%? That is the bad news performance of the previous expansion. But CBO’s insistence on continued poor performance, despite nearly two years of boom, seems awfully conservative. Indeed, it amounts to insisting that good productivity news today, rather than a reason to revise up expectations for prospective productivity, necessitates a forecast of dastardly productivity performance and depressing economic growth news tomorrow.

CBO could have taken a somewhat less dour approach. They could have stuck to their guns about full employment levels and sustainable long-term productivity and labor force trajectories. But they could have attached theses trend trajectories to the elevated output levels achieved amid the boom. Simply allowing the economy to pocket the gains delivered by recent great productivity news would put 2025:Q4 3% higher than CBO’s current forecast.

Optimists could go further. They could envision an important upshift in the longer run trajectory for economic growth. Can two years of boom help us break out of the doldrums of piddling productivity growth and depressed labor force participation—the U.S. economic reality of the past two decades? Lift labor productivity to the mid-point of its post war range, 2.3% per year, and real GDP, 2025:Q4, is 5% higher than CBO’s current projection.

Reconsidering Full employment Levels

Similarly, CBO identifies 2018:Q1 as the period in which the U.S. economy slightly eclipsed full employment. At that time the jobless rate was at 4% and 25-to-54-year-old—prime age—workers’ participation rates stood at 82%. By 2019:Q4 the jobless rate had fallen to 3.5% and prime age participation had rebounded to 83%, and amid these further gains for employment no discernable wage acceleration appeared. If we choose to identify 2019:Q4 as full employment, then the potential labor force, 2025:Q4 is roughly 1% higher than CBO’s estimate, offering more room for growth before hitting labor market ceilings.

Worshipping at the Altar of No Free Lunches.

Why does CBO insist that short term gains require outyear pains? Take a step back and the message embedded in the updated CBO forecast is clear. CBO, and many conventional analysts will not allow short-term stimulus to change their guesses about the economy’s long-term trajectory. They must embed today’s stimulus supported boom, because we are knee deep in it. But they marry to it mean reverting arithmetic that force the economy back to their pre-boom guess for its sustainable level. The economist mantra, there is no such thing as a free lunch, is a powerful notion, and it leads many economists to insist on dangers that they simply should acknowledge are largely speculative.

#### Growth is the strongest in months.

Smart ’10-22 [Tim; October 22; Reporter; U.S. News and World Report, “Survey: U.S. Economic Growth Accelerated in October, Led by Services,” <https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2021-10-22/survey-us-economic-growth-accelerated-in-october-led-by-services>]

Growth in U.S. economic activity accelerated in October, overcoming supply chain snafus and shortages of labor and materials, according to the flash composite Purchasing Managers Index released Friday by IHS Markit.

The overall index now stands at 57.3, up from 55 last month, with the services sector index at 58.2, a three-month high and up from 54.9 in September. Manufacturing slipped to 59.2 from 60.7 in September, registering a seven-month low.

Economists projected the services index at 55.2, with the manufacturing index estimated at 60.7.

"U.S. Private sector businesses recorded a sharp and accelerated upturn in output led by the service sector during October," the report said, "with growth the strongest for three months, albeit still much weaker than earlier in the year."

The report noted companies struggled with a backlog of orders, constrained by a lack of workers and key parts. Prices rose at a record pace, reflecting rising inflation across many categories of goods.

The report mirrors many other recent readings on the economy, which show strong demand from customers running head-on into shortages and higher prices.

#### No impact to economic decline --- countries respond with cooperation not conflict

Clary 15—PhD in Political Science from MIT and a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown [Christopher, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” *MIT Political Science Department*, Research Paper No. 2015-8, p. 4]

Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

### Case – Democracy

#### Democratic governance is irrelevant.

Doorenspleet 19 – Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. [Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 98-99]

The first caveat is that none of the studies which have directly tested the democratic peace hypothesis demonstrated that democracy is the only and most important factor when explaining interstate war. Some studies provided evidence that other factors are significant as well, and other studies indicated that alternative explanations are much more powerful, sometimes even showing that the impact of democracy is simply spurious. Geographical and economic factors, for example, play a key role as well, and tend to be far more important, so it is certainly not only democracy which matters. Secondly, these findings are based on quantitative studies, which show correlation but not necessarily causation. While there is a lively ongoing debate about the causal mechanisms, it is still unclear how we can understand and interpret the expected absence of interstate war between democracies. The number of studies which criticize these ideas has increased considerably since the mid-1990s, not just theoretically but particularly empirically as there is no strong evidence to back up the ideas that norms and institutional constraints are the key mechanisms

(see Hayes 2011). Moreover, the quest to find the underlying mechanisms should not get priority anyway in future research, in my view, as the statistical evidence for the democratic peace hypotheses is weak over¬all (see first caveat above). Thirdly, democracies are not more peaceful than dictatorships. While there might be some evidence for democratic peace among democratic states (or at least a correlation), democracies are not more peaceful in general. The evidence for a monadic link is not clear, not significant and certainly not robust. There is no clear support for the monadic peace hypothesis which states that interstate war is less likely in democracies compared to dictatorships in general. And democracies do fight with dictatorships—quite a lot. Finally, 'democratizing for peace' seems a dangerous route to take, as democratizing states fight most—more than both democracies and dictatorships. Democracies might not fight with each other, but the coun¬tries that are democratizing are quite war-prone. Moreover, there is convincing evidence that hybrid systems (or semi-democracies) are more likely to be involved in interstate wars, not only compared to countries with higher levels of democracy but also to countries with lower levels of democracy. Democratization can be a very unpredictable and possibly dangerous process, and the findings in this chapter show that democratizing for peace is likely to end in a deadly disaster.

#### Democratic decline’s inevitable domestically and globally---even large Biden policy reversals aren’t enough

Martin Wolf 20, chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, 11/10/20, “Democracy in a time of division,” <https://www.ft.com/content/95ef4589-e96f-46d7-95ee-24433ee58f73>

The election of Joe Biden as US president is the first good news for embattled believers in liberal democracy and the postwar multilateral order since 2016. He is a decent man with an instinctive grasp of the values America has, at its best, stood for. On the assumption that Donald Trump’s attack on the electoral process fails, Mr Biden will be president. That will be a huge relief. But it is folly to imagine that Trumpist division is defeated.

More broadly, liberal democracy will remain embattled, in the US and elsewhere. The evidence on this reality is, alas, clear. Research at the Centre for the Future of Democracy at Cambridge university shows a rise in global dissatisfaction with democracy since shortly before the 2008 financial crisis. The rise in dissatisfaction in the English-speaking democracies, led by the US, is striking. Frighteningly, in 2020, the respected US-based think-tank, Freedom House, ranked the quality of US democracy 33rd in the world among countries larger than 1m people, between Slovakia and Argentina. Given Mr Trump’s record, that is hardly surprising. Moreover, this was before his attempt to throw the electoral system, the core of democracy, into disrepute, with unsupported allegations of fraud.

Mr Biden’s ability to reverse all this is likely to be limited, even though he will surely wish to do so. He will surely confront obdurate resistance from Republicans in Congress, who will try to ensure that he and the federal government are seen to fail

### Case – Populism

Populism is thumped by Brazil, Turkey, and the UK – already populist as hell.

#### No impact.

Ferguson ’16 [Niall; autumn 2016; Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, Senior Fellow of the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, and Visiting Professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, “Populism as a Backlash against Globalization - Historical Perspectives,” <https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-autumn-2016--issue-no-8/populism-as-a-backlash-against-globalization>]

Such comparisons between the United States today and Germany in the 1930s are becoming commonplace. As a professional historian, I would like to offer what seems to me a better analogy. Our Tranquil Times Journalists are fond of saying that we are living in a time of “unprecedented” instability. In reality, as numerous studies have shown, our time is a period of remarkable stability in terms of conflict. In fact, viewed globally, there has been a small uptick in organized lethal violence since the misnamed Arab Spring. But even allowing for the horrors of the Syrian civil war, the world is an order of magnitude less dangerous than it was in the 1970s and 1980s, and a haven of peace and tranquility compared with the period between 1914 and 1945. This point matters because the defining feature of interwar fascism was its militarism. Fascists wore uniforms. They marched in enormous and well-drilled parades and they planned wars. That is not what we see today. So why do so many commentators feel that we are living through “unprecedented instability?” The answer, aside from plain ignorance of history, is that political populism has become a global phenomenon, and established politicians and political parties are struggling even to understand it, much less resist it. Yet populism is not such a mysterious thing, if one only has some historical knowledge. The important point is not to make the mistake of confusing it with fascism, which it resembles in only a few respects. Rather like a television chef, I shall describe a recipe for populism, based on historical experience. It is a simple recipe, with just five ingredients. Five Ingredients for A Populist Backlash The first of these ingredients is a rise in immigration. In the past 45 years, the percentage of the population of the United States that is foreign-born has risen from below 5 percent in 1970 to over 13 percent in 2014—almost as high as the rates achieved between 1860 and 1910, which ranged between 13 percent and an all-time high of 14.7 percent in 1890. So when people say, as they often do, that “the United States is a land based on immigration,” they are indulging in selective recollection. There was a period, between 1910 and 1970, when immigration drastically declined. It is only in relatively recent times that we have seen immigration reach levels comparable with those of a century ago, in what has justly been called the first age of globalization. Ingredient number two is an increase in inequality. Drawing on the work done on income distribution by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, we can see that we have recently regained the heights of inequality that were last seen in the pre-World War I period. The share of income going to the top one percent of earners is back up from below 8 percent of total income in 1970 to above 20 percent of total income. The peak before the financial crisis, in 2007, was almost exactly the same as the peak on the eve of the Great Depression in 1928. Ingredient number three is the perception of corruption. For populism to thrive, people have to start believing that the political establishment is no longer clean. Recent Gallup data on public approval of institutions in the United States show, among other things, notable drops in the standing of all institutions save the military and small businesses. Just 9 percent of Americans have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Congress—a remarkable figure. It is striking to see which other institutions are down near the bottom of the league. Big business is second-lowest, with just 21 percent of the public expressing confidence in it. Newspapers, television news, and the criminal justice system fare only slightly better. What is even more remarkable is the list of institutions that have fallen furthest in recent times: the U.S. Supreme Court now has just a 36 percent approval rating, down from a historical average of 44 percent, while the Presidency has dropped from 43 percent to 36 percent approval. The financial crisis appears to have convinced many Americans—and not without good reason—that there is an unhealthy and likely corrupt relationship between political institutions, big business, and the media. The fourth ingredient necessary for a populist backlash is a major financial crisis. The three biggest financial crises in modern history—if one uses the U.S. equity market index as the measure—were the crises of 1873, 1929, and 2008. Each was followed by a prolonged period of depressed economic performance, though these varied in their depth and duration. In the most recent of these crises, the peak of the U.S. stock market was October 2007. With the onset of the financial crisis, we essentially replayed for about a year the events of 1929 and 1930. However, beginning in mid to late 2009, we bounced out of the crisis, thanks to a combination of monetary, fiscal, and Chinese stimulus, whereas the Great Depression was characterized by a deep and prolonged decline in stock prices, as well as much higher unemployment rates and lower growth. The first of these historical crises is the least known: the post-1873 “great depression,” as contemporaries called it. What happened after 1873 was nothing as dramatic as 1929; it was more of a slow burn. The United States and, indeed, the world economy went from a financial crisis—which was driven by excessively loose monetary policy and real estate speculation, amongst other things—into a protracted period of deflation. Economic activity was much less impaired than in the 1930s. Yet the sustained decline in prices inflicted considerable pain, especially on indebted farmers, who complained (in reference to the then prevailing gold standard) that they were being “crucified on a cross of gold.” We have come a long way since those days; gold is no longer a key component of the monetary base, and farmers are no longer a major part of the workforce. Nevertheless, in my view, the period after 1873 is much more like our own time, both economically and politically, than the period after 1929. There is still one missing ingredient to be added. If one were cooking, this would be the moment when flames would leap from the pan. The flammable ingredient is, of course, the demagogue, for populist demagogues react vituperatively and explosively against all of the aforementioned four ingredients. Kearney’s Cause Now, my argument is not intended to dismiss or downplay those elements of Donald Trump’s campaign for President of the United States that have been implicitly, if not explicitly, racist. Nor do I treat lightly the various signals he has given of indifference to, or at least ignorance of, the U.S. Constitution. My point is that these demerits do not by themselves qualify Trump for comparison with Mussolini, much less with Hitler. Rather, I want to argue that Trump has much more in common with the demagogues of the earlier, lesser depression of the late nineteenth century, and that it is to that period that we should look for historical analogies and insights. The best illustration of my case is the now forgotten figure of Denis Kearney, leader of the Workingmen’s Party of California and the author of the slogan “The Chinese Must Go!” Himself an Irish immigrant to the United States—as opposed to the son of a Scottish immigrant and grandson of a German, which is what Donald Trump is—Kearney was part of a movement of nativist parties and “Anti-Coolie” clubs that sought to end Chinese immigration into the United States. The report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration in 1877 gives a flavor of the times. “The Pacific coast must in time become either Mongolian or American,” was the committee’s view. The report argued that the Chinese brought with them the habits of despotic government, a tendency to lie in court, a weakness for tax evasion and “insufficient brainspace […] to furnish [the] motive power for self-government.” Moreover, Chinese women were “bought and sold for prostitution and treated worse than dogs,” while the Chinese were “cruel and indifferent to their sick.” Giving such inferior beings citizenship, the committee’s report declared, “would practically destroy republican institutions on the Pacific coast.” The realities were, it scarcely needs to be said, very different. According to the “Six Companies” of Chinese in San Francisco—corporate bodies that represented the Chinese population of the city—there was compelling evidence that Chinese immigration was a boon to California. Not only did the Chinese provide labor for the state’s rapidly developing railroads and farms; they also tended to improve the neighborhoods in which they settled. Moreover, there was no evidence of a disproportionate Chinese role in gambling and prostitution. In fact, statistics showed that the Irish were more of a charge on the city’s hospital and almshouse than the Chinese. Nevertheless, a powerful coalition of “laboring men and artisans,” small businessmen and “grangers” (the term used to describe those who aimed to shift the burden of taxation onto big business and the rich) rallied to Kearney’s cause. As one shrewd contemporary observer noted, part of his appeal was that he was attacking not just the Chinese, but also the big steamship and railroad companies that profited from employing Chinese labor, not to mention the corrupt two-party establishment that ran San Francisco politics: Neither Democrats nor Republicans had done, nor seemed likely to do, anything to remove these evils or to improve the lot of the people. They were only seeking (so men thought) places or the chance of jobs for themselves, and could always be bought by a powerful corporation. Working men must help themselves; there must be new methods and a new departure […] The old parties, though both denouncing Chinese immigration in every convention they held, and professing to legislate against it, had failed to check it […] Everything, in short, was ripe for a demagogue. Fate was kind to the Californians in sending them a demagogue of a mean type, noisy and confident, but with neither political foresight nor constructive talent. Kearney may have lacked foresight and “constructive talent,” but there is no gainsaying what he and his ilk were able to achieve. Beginning with the Page Law (1875) prohibiting the immigration of Asian women for “lewd or immoral purposes,” American legislators scarcely rested until Chinese immigration to the United States had been stopped altogether. The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) suspended immigration of Chinese for 10 years, introduced “certificates of registration” for departing laborers (effectively re-entry permits), required Chinese officials to vet travelers from Asia, and, for the first time in American history, created an offense of illegal immigration, with the possibility of deportation as a part of the penalty. The Foran Act (1885) banned all contract laborers from immigrating to America. Legislation passed in the Scott Act (1888) banned all Chinese from travel to the United States except “teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for pleasure.” In all, between 1875 and 1924, more than a dozen pieces of legislation served to restrict and finally end altogether Chinese immigration. No one should therefore underestimate the power of populism. For all his coarseness and bombast, Denis Kearney and his allies effectively sealed the American border along the Pacific coast of the United States; indeed, one cartoon of the time depicted them constructing a wall across the San Francisco harbor. In the 1850s and 1860s, as many as 40 percent of all Chinese emigrants had travelled beyond Asia, though the numbers arriving in the United States had in fact been relatively small (between 1870 and 1880, a total of 138,941 Chinese immigrants came, just 4.3 percent of the total, a share dwarfed by the vast European exodus across the Atlantic in the same period). What exclusion did ensure in the late nineteenth was that Chinese immigration would not grow, as it surely would have, but instead dwindled and then ceased. Ironies Populism, then, is not just a form of political entertainment. One sometimes hears it said of Donald Trump: “Ah, he says wild things on the campaign trail, but when he is president it will be fine.” History suggests otherwise. It suggests that men who threaten to restrict immigration—as well as to impose tariffs and to discourage capital export, as populists generally do—mean what they say. Indeed, populists are under a special compulsion to enact what they pledge in the campaign trail, for their followers are fickle to begin with. In the case of Trump, most have already defected from the Republican Party establishment. If he fails to deliver, they can defect from him, too. Of course, populists are bound eventually to disappoint their supporters. For populism is a toxic brew as well as an intoxicating one. Populists nearly always make life miserable for whichever minorities they chose to scapegoat, but they seldom make life much better for the people whose ire they whip up. Whatever the demagogues may promise—and they always promise “jam today”—populism tends to have significantly more economic costs than benefits. Restricting immigration, imposing tariffs on imported goods, penalizing firms for investing abroad: such measures, if adopted by an American government in 2017, would be almost certain to reduce growth and employment, rather than the reverse. That has certainly been the Latin American experience—and few regions of the world have run the populist experiment more often. The foreign dimension brings us to a final irony. Despite their habitual insistence on narrow national self-interest, populists are nearly always part of a global phenomenon. Globalization had been making enormous strides prior to 1873, with world trade, migration, and international capital flows growing at unprecedented rates. But the crisis of that year generated a populist backlash against globalization that was itself global in its scope. Then, just as now, the principal targets of the demagogues were immigration, free trade, and high finance. Just as the United States excluded immigrants and raised tariffs, so did European countries by adopting similar discriminatory measures. In Bismarck’s Germany, populism was often antisemitic—as it was in the France of the Dreyfus Affair—while in late Victorian Britain it was anti-Irish. Tariffs went up almost everywhere except in Britain. Populism today has a similarly global quality. In June, the British vote to leave the European Union was hailed by populists right across the European continent as well as by Donald Trump in the United States and, implicitly, by Vladimir Putin in Russia. Yielding to the Complicators Let me conclude with a note of qualified optimism. Because populism is not fascism, populist victories should not be construed as harbingers of war—if anything, the opposite is true. In the 1870s and 1880s, populists did achieve significant reductions in globalization: not only immigration restrictions, but also higher tariffs. But they did not form many national governments, and they did not subvert any constitutions. Nor were populists much interested in starting wars; if anything, they lent towards isolationism and viewed imperialism as just another big business racket. In most countries, the populist high tide was in the 1880s. What came next—in many ways as a reaction to populism, but also as an alternative set of policy solutions to the same public grievances—was Progressivism in the United States and socialism in Europe. Perhaps something similar will also happen in our time. Perhaps that is something to look forward to. Nevertheless, we would do well to remember that World War I broke out during the progressive not the populist era. The world today is, as I observed at the outset, in much less turmoil than one might infer from television news. Nevertheless, the economic and social consequences of globalization and the most recent financial crisis sowed the seeds for the populist backlash that we now see. Populists are not fascists. They prefer trade wars to actual wars; administrative border walls to more defensible fortifications. The maladies they seek to cure are not imaginary: uncontrolled rising immigration, widening inequality, free trade with “unfree” countries, and political cronyism are all things that a substantial section of the electorate have some reason to dislike. The problem with populism is that its remedies are wrong and, in fact, counterproductive. What we most have to fear—as was true of Brexit—is not therefore Armageddon, but something more prosaic: an attempt to reverse certain aspects of globalization, followed by disappointment when the snake oil does not really cure the patient’s ills, followed by the emergence of a new and ostensibly more progressive set of remedies for our current malaise. The “terrible simplifiers” may have their day then. But they will end up yielding power to well-intentioned complicators, those more congenial to educated elites, but probably every a bit as dangerous, if not more so.

### 1NC – Econ Turn

#### Increased strikes sabotage the economy – they cause major disruptions and lower income for workers.

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Labor strikes can cause major disruptions to industry, commerce and the lives of many people who aren't even connected to the strike itself. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association strike in 1981 resulted in the firing of thousands of air traffic controllers, and the New York City transit strike in late 2005 affected millions of people. The history of strikes and labor unions is a key chapter in the story of the Industrial Revolution.

While the reasons behind strikes can be complex, they all boil down to two key elements: money and power. In this article, we'll find out how labor strikes have affected the balance of power between corporations and workers, what laws regulate strikes and learn about some important strikes in history.

It's difficult to say when the first real labor strike occurred. The word "strike" was first used in the 1700s, and probably comes from to notion of dealing a blow to the employer [ref]. In 1786, a group of printers in Philadelphia requested a raise and the company rejected it. They stopped working in protest and eventually received their raise. Other professionals followed suit in the next few decades. Everyone in a city who practiced the same profession agreed to set prices and wages at the same rate. Members would shun anyone who diverged from the agreement, refusing to work in the same shop and forcing employers to fire them. By the 1800s, formal trade societies and guilds began to emerge.

To have a strike today, you must have a union (though not necessarily an official union) -- an organization of workers that bargain collectively with an employer. Workers form unions because an individual worker is powerless compared to an employer, who can set low wages and long working hours as long as it adheres to labor laws. When workers combine to form a union, they collectively have enough power to negotiate with the employer. The main weapon the union has against the employer is the threat of a strike action.

At its most basic level, a strike occurs when all the workers in the union stop coming to work. With no workers, the business shuts down. The employer stops making money, though it is still spending money on taxes, rent, electricity and maintenance. The longer the strike lasts, the more money the employer loses. Of course, the workers aren't getting paid either, so they're losing money as well. Some unions build up "war chests" -- funds to pay striking workers. But it isn't usually very much, and it's often not enough for a prolonged strike.

Strikes help explain why unions are more powerful than individuals. Imagine if an employer refuses to give a raise to an individual worker. She then decides to stop coming to work in protest. The employer simply fires her for not coming to work. That one worker has no power to influence the employer. However, it can be very costly for an employer to fire every single worker when a union goes on strike (though it has happened).