# Mid America R6

### 1

#### Interpretation the topic should determine the division of affirmative and negative ground – the aff should defend that member nations of the WTO ought to reduce IPP for medicines neg should be able to win by disproving the truth of that statement.

#### “Resolved:” refers to a legislative debate.

Louisiana State Legislature 16, “Glossary of Legislative Terms,” http://www.legis.state.la.us/glossary2.htm

Resolution: A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11, 13.1, 6.8, and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### The World Trade Organization is an international body that governs trade.

Tarver 21 (Evan Tarver has 6+ years of experience in financial analysis and 5+ years as an author, editor, and copywriter, “World Trade Organization”, Mar 1, 2021, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/wto.asp)

Created in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international institution that oversees the global trade rules among nations. It superseded the 1947 [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gatt.asp) (GATT) created in the wake of World War II.

#### Reduce means to make smaller.

Cambridge Dictionary ND (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/reduce)

to [become](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/become) or to make something [become](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/become) [smaller](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/small) in [size](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/size), [amount](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/amount), [degree](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/degree), [importance](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/importance), etc…

#### Intellectual property protection means protection for creative inventions.

UpCounsel 20 (Law journal, June 23, 2020,https://www.upcounsel.com/intellectual-property-protection)

Intellectual Property Protection is protection for inventions, literary and artistic works, symbols, names, and images created by the mind.

#### Violation –

#### Vote Negative –

#### [1] Limits – their interp explodes limits and allows affs to monopolize the moral high ground. The lack of a stable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg ground via perms. Fairness is good and prior – [A] debate’s a game that requires effective competition and negation, which makes their offense inevitable. [b] Internal link Turn – a limited debate promotes engagement which is necessary to access all education. Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters.

#### [2] Refinement **–** a well-defined allows the neg to refute the aff in an in-depth fashion. This process produces iterative testing which controls the internal link to education. Committees outweigh because they discuss the best topic for a stasis point – it is net better for a group to create a topic rather than an individual.

#### [3] TVA – [A] SSD – refusal to negate and affirm the resolution moots strategies through stepping in the shoes of the enemy can we equip ourselves with the tools to challenge the enemies’ view. [B] Defend the institution of a IPP reduction as a method to map out networks in the political to rupture. [C] *Extra* T bad – allows the aff to defend anything outside the rez, go for pre-fiat method, or post fiat – which skews strat.

#### Vote Neg on T – They’ve destroyed the round from the beginning and topicality’s key to set the correct model of debate which means it comes first – it has to be a voting issue because it disproves the 1AC.

#### Competing interpretations – Topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### No Impact Turns and RVIs – [A] Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T. [B] Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position. [C] Resolvability – It’s irresolvable since no 3n leaves the answer threshold up to the judge.

#### Theory before the K – A] Prior question. My theory argument calls into question the ability to run the argument in the first place. They can’t say the same even if they criticize theory because theory makes rules of the game not just normative statements about what debaters should say. B] Fair testing. Judge their arguments knowing I wasn’t given a fair shot to answer them. Prefer theory takes out K because they could answer my arguments, but I couldn’t answer theirs. Without testing their args, we don’t know if they’re valid, so you prefer fairness impacts on strength of link. Impact turns any critical education since a marketplace of ideas where we innovate, and test ideas presumes equal access.

### 2

#### Critiques of capitalism that don’t take enjoyment into account ultimately get comidified by the system and fails due to the strucutres of desire.

Stavrakakis 07 (Yannis, studied political science at Panteion University in Athens and received his MA degree from the Ideology and Discourse Analysis Programme at the University of Essex, “The Lacanian Left”, 2007, p. 249-251) EG

‘We bought its trashy dreams and now we can’t wake up . . .’ ‘Right, but there’s one problem about this trash society. The middle classes like it.’ ‘Of course they do’ . . . ‘They are enslaved by it. They’re the new proletariat, like factory workers a hundred years ago.’ (Ballard 2004: 63) The new (affluent) proletariat Ballard is sketching cannot easily feel its chains. But even when it becomes aware of them, it cannot re-act against a system of desire whose reproduction is supposed to serve their own enjoyment. Every form of protest is eventually shortcircuited: ‘The interesting thing is they are protesting against themselves. There’s no enemy out there. They know they are the enemy’ (p. 109). The world of consumption can incorporate almost everything, even the mini-revolution Ballard recounts: ‘An entire social class is peeling the velvet off the bars and tasting the steel. People are resigning from well-paid jobs, refusing to pay their taxes, taking their children out of private schools’. ‘Then, what’s gone wrong?’ Nevertheless, ‘“Nothing will happen” . . . “The storm will die down, and everything will peter out in a drizzle of television shows and oped pieces”’ (p. 170). The end was more or less expected: The infantilizing consumer society filled any gaps in the status quo as quickly as Kay had driven her Polo into the collapsing barricade. At the junction with Grosvenor Place, two ten-year old boys played with their airguns, dressed in camouflage fatigues and military webbing, part of the new guerrilla chic inspired by [the insurrection in] Chelsea Marina that had already featured in an Evening Standard fashion spread. A Haydn symphony floated gently through a kitchen window, below a protest banner whose damp slogan had dissolved into a Tachiste painting. (Ballard 2004: 234) Indeed, as long as no alternative structuration of enjoyment and desire emerges, the only options that remain open – even after one becomes conscious of the dialectics of power, domination and compliance grafted on consumerism – are basically three: The cynical enjoyment of subordination, a ‘cynical embrace’ of thesociety of commanded enjoyment (McGowan 2004: 6–7). What we encounter here is a kind of ideological reflexivity that often takes the following perverse form: ‘I know that consumerism is a trap, nevertheless . . . I enjoy it – in fact, I enjoy it even more now that I have already criticised it’. This is a stance that incorporates and, at the same time, annuls any critical reflexivity, reproducing thus the hegemonic economy of enjoyment. The obsolete ‘nostalgic attempt to return to a previous epoch’(McGowan 2004: 7) of real values based on sacrifice and prohibition, which informs a multitude of conservative and leftist projects to return ‘back to basics’. We are all familiar, for example, with the standard conservative cultural critique: we live in an era of unprecedented permissiveness, children lack limits and prohibitions, and thus what we need is a firm limit set by a strong symbolic authority (Žižek 2006: 295). The – equally dangerous and, besides, open to co-optation from the hegemonic system – violent acting out, acts of blind retribution without meaning, of the type described by Ballard and increasingly being observed in our cities. Is it possible to escape this vicious circle? And how? We have seen in this chapter how our interpellation as consumers in the society of commanded enjoyment manages to translate an apparently benign call to consume, desire and enjoy into a structuration of desire and enjoyment that sustains late capitalism and reproduces obedience and cynicism – operating simultaneously at the symbolic, imaginary and at the real register: through social construction, fantasy, and partial enjoyment. Can this state of affairs be de-legitimised? What could help in this process and in charting alternative formulations of desire and enjoyment, able to restore our lost faith in radical criticism and in the political? More precisely, can a radicalisation of democracy perform this task? This is what I will be discussing in the final chapter of *The Lacanian Left*.

#### Their deployment of debate is an agential fantasy – the affirmative is an investment into subjectivity as a entity dependent on recognition to satisfy its goals – turns case.

Lundberg 12 (Dr. Christian Lundberg, 2012, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” The University of Alabama Press, Dr. Lundberg is an associate professor and co-director of the University Program in Cultural Studies at UNC, he has a B.A. from the University of Redlands, a Master of Divinity from Emory University, and a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University) SJBE [Recut by Lex CH]

“Ego,” then,names the economy of compensatory subjectivization driven by the repetition and refusal of demands. The nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfillment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the meta- phor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of develop- ment, must not be fulfilled. Thus, pop psychology observations that the in- cessant demands of children for impermissible objects (“may i have a fourth helping of dessert”) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authori- tative pronouncements (the game of asking never ending “whys”) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity-producing effects of the pa- rental “no.” in “The Question of Lay Analysis,” freud argues that “if . . . demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise . . . [and] . . . the ego begins to function. . . . [T]he driving force that sets the vehicle in mo- tion is derived from the id, the ego . . . undertakes the steering. . . . The task of the ego [is] . . . to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world.”31 Later, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and Civilization and Its Discontents, freud relocates the site of the ego’s genesis beyond the parent/child relationship and in the broader social relationships that animate it. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the individual’s attempts to fulfill certain desires, since some demands for the fulfill- ment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. The frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes and, by ex- tension, civilization writ large, although it does so at the cost of imposing a contested relationship between desire and social mores.32 Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” under- standing the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan’s theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan’s theory of the demand picks up at freud’s movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/ child and individual/civilization toward a more general account of the sub- ject, sociality, and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoreti- cal movement transposes freud’s comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject’s entry into signification. As already noted, the Lacanian aphorism that “the signifier represents a subject for another signifier inverts the conventional wisdom that a pre-given subject uses language as an instrument to communicate its subjective inten- tions.”33 The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is si- multaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. An Es assumes an identity as a subject as a way of ac- commodating to the Symbolic’s demands and as a node for producing de- mands on its others or of being recognized as a subject.34 As I have already argued, the demand demonstrates that the enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity is useless surplus produced in the gap between the Es (or it) and the ideal I. As a result, there is excess jouissance that remains even after its reduction to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the subject and therefore conditions possibility for investment in an identitarian configuration. The site of this excess, where the subject negotiates the terms of a non- relationship with the Symbolic, is also the primary site differentiating need, demand, and desire. need approximates the position of the freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes, “there is no adequation between need and demand.”35 The same type of split that inheres in the freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, although in Lacan’s case it is crucial to no- tice that the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of ful- filling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the other. Thus, the specificity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that de- mand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfill the demand. This impossibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: the demand is less a way of addressing need to the other than a call for love and recognition by it. “in this way,” writes Lacan, “demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very sat- isfactions that it obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.”36 The other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the constitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the Symbolic. The struc- tural impossibility of fulfilling demands resonates with the freudian de- mand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that “desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second.”37 This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift that it does not have, namely the gift of love: “all demand implies . . . a request for love. . . . Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the other . . . having no universal satisfaction. . . . it is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed.”38 This framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an in- stitution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. in analytic terms, this is the moment of sub- traction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoid- ances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a re- sult, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or orga- nizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. it is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s de- sire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before lan- guage, is retained as a trace enough to determine that i desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is dif- ferent for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which i try to refind it.”40

#### The affirmative destroys the possibility for finding ethical truths, politics, and value to life that is the internal link to every other impact in the round – we control uniqueness.

Ruti 14 (Mari, English, Toronto, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 297–314) Harvard BoSu

On the other hand, Lacan – again like Marcuse – recognizes that the symbolic order is repressive beyond the demands of subject formation, that it includes forms of violence that exceed the ubiquitous violence of the signifier. Indeed, even the violence of the signifier is not equally distributed, so that some of us are much more vulnerable to its injurious effects than others (consider, for instance, hate speech). Lacan does not necessarily talk about the unequal distribution of resources in the manner Marcuse does, but there is no doubt that his analysis of symbolic law as the Law of the Father elucidates a historically specific, deeply heteropatriarchal and hierarchical organization of social life. In point of fact, one reason I have taken a detour through Marcuse is to illustrate the obvious ways in which Lacan’s portraiture of the symbolic mirrors that of Marcuse’s explicitly historical account: what Marcuse calls “the performance principle,” Lacan calls the “service of goods.” Both thinkers identify the underpinnings of a social order dominated by the ideal of productivity – an ideal that is, moreover, placed in direct opposition to the pleasure principle. Both emphasize that the dominant morality of this symbolic – what Lacan calls “the morality of the master” – measures the merit of lives based on largely pragmatic criteria. And both acknowledge that the model citizen of this symbolic is a subject who shows up at work reliably every morning, performs its duties with a degree of diligence, does not let its desires get the better of its productivity, and seeks satisfaction (“enjoys”) in moderate, socially sanctioned ways. “Part of the world has resolutely turned in the directions of the service of goods,” Lacan writes, “thereby rejecting everything that has to do with the relationship of man to desire” (318). This, he adds, “is what is known as the postrevolutionary perspective” (318). In other words, the service of goods reflects the mindset of the levelheaded utilitarian subject who has deemed revolutionary change to be unrealistic. Lacan is here referring to the kind of depoliticization that is arguably the hallmark of Western subjectivity under capitalism. Lacan’s point is by no means, as critics such as Butler have suggested, that a different kind of symbolic is intrinsically impossible but rather that the configuration of subjectivity that Western modernity has produced – a subjectivity that has been subjected to a particular form of surplus-repression (the performance principle, the service of goods) – makes it virtually impossible for us to entertain the idea that the symbolic could be organized differently, that it could be centered around a different version of the reality principle. As Marcuse remarks, one reason the performance principle is so powerful is that it has managed to convince us that all alternatives to it are either utopian or otherwise unpalatable. Yet, for Marcuse, the fact that this principle has been so successful also points to the possibility of transcending it. As he states, “The very progress of civilization under the performance principle has attained a level of productivity at which the social demands upon instinctual energy to be spent in alienated labor could be considerably reduced. Consequently, the continued repressive organization of the instincts seems to be necessitated less by the ‘struggle for existence’ than by the interest in prolonging this struggle – by the interest in domination” (pp. 129–130). This is to say that there is really nothing besides social power that keeps us invested in the notion that our welfare demands relentless toil. The performance principle has outlived its usefulness in the sense that our collective productivity these days surpasses what is necessary for the provision of food, clothing, housing, and other basic amenities. The fact that these amenities have not yet reached all corners of the world, or even all corners of our own society (the homeless, innercity dwellers, etc.), is a function of domination (the unequal distribution of resources) rather than of any deficiencies of productivity. As a result, in Marcuse’s view, all we would need to do to bring about a more “non-repressive civilization” (p. 134) would be to refuse the parameters of the current symbolic; even something as simple as reducing the length of the working day would immediately realign our priorities, perhaps even impacting the very organization of our psychic lives. Our standard of living might drop somewhat, but we might also learn to assess the value of our lives according to other, less performance-oriented, measurements. Psychoanalysis, particularly Lacanian analysis, does not have a normative goal; it does not seek to tell us how we should desire but merely to explore the idiosyncratic contours of our desire. But this does not change the fact that Lacan, at least as a theorist, was exasperated by people’s inability to make their way out of the maze of the master’s morality, including its performance principle; he was frustrated by individuals who were so out of touch with the truth of their desire that they were willing to sacrifice this desire for the sake of social conformity and that they were, furthermore, willing to do so to the point of self-betrayal. As he explains, “What I call ‘giving ground relative to one’s desire’ is always accompanied in the destiny of the subject by some betrayal – you will observe it in every case and should note its importance. Either the subject betrays his own way, betrays himself, and the result is significant for him, or, more simply, he tolerates the fact that someone with whom he has more or less vowed to do something betrays his hope and doesn’t do for him what their pact entailed” (p. 321). Such a betrayal invariably results in the reassertion of the status quo, sending the subject back to the service of goods, what Lacan in this context calls “the common path” (p. 321). And given that desire, for Lacan, is “the metonymy of our being” (p. 321), betraying it in this way leads to the kind of psychic death that extinguishes the subject’s sense of agency. To use Lacan’s wording, “Doing things in the name of the good, and even more in the name of the good of the other, is something that is far from protecting us not only from guilt but also from all kinds of inner catastrophes” (p. 319). It is precisely such inner catastrophes that Lacanian clinical practice was designed to counter, though it may be Julia Kristeva – rather than Lacan himself – who has most clearly developed this interpretation of analytic work. Kristeva depicts psychoanalysis as a means of restoring the subject’s psychic aliveness, as an explicit revolt against the numbing impact of what she calls “the society of the spectacle” (2002, p. 4). This society of the spectacle – of technology, image, and speed – shares many parallels with Adorno’s “culture industry”: a flattened surface of the life world, a constriction of psychic space, a death of critical thought, the worship of efficiency over intellectual curiosity, and the incapacity to revolt. Against this backdrop, psychoanalysis – along with art, writing, and some forms of religious experience – offers, for Kristeva, a gateway to revolt, a way of resurrecting “the life of the mind” (a phrase Kristeva borrows from Hannah Arendt) through ongoing questioning, interrogation, and psychic recreation. “Freud founded psychoanalysis as an invitation to anamnesis in the goal of a rebirth, that is, a psychical restructuring,” Kristeva writes: “Through a narrative of free association and in the regenerative revolt against the old law (familial taboos, superego, ideals, oedipal or narcissistic limits, etc.) comes the singular autonomy of each, as well as a renewed link with the other” (2002, p. 8). In the context of my overall argument in this essay, it is worth stressing that it is “the desire of the subject” that, in Kristeva’s view, reserves a place “for initiative, autonomy” (2002, p. 11). This is in part because the “Freudian journey into the night of desire was followed by attention to the capacity to think: never one without the other” (2010, p. 41). In other words, the exploration of desire, in psychoanalysis, is akin to the critical (or at least curious) movement of thought – the very movement that Arendt also saw as vital to the life of the mind. This is why psychoanalysis has, Kristeva asserts, “the (unique?) privilege today of accompanying the emergence of new capacities of thinking/representing/thinking, beyond the frequent and increasingly noticeable disasters of psychosomatic space – capacities that are so many new bodies and new lives” (2010, pp. 41–42). Kristeva therefore draws the same link between desire and autonomy (in this instance, the capacity for critical thought) as Lacan does. Furthermore, to translate Kristeva’s point into Marcuse’s terminology, one might say that psychoanalysis, at least the kind of analysis that refuses to uphold social adaptation as a therapeutic goal, presents the possibility of sidestepping, or at the very least diminishing, the effects of surplus-repression. This, in turn, creates space for the truth of the subject’s desire in the Lacanian sense. This does not mean that repression as such is defeated. Quite the contrary, as we will see shortly, the truth of the subject’s desire is inextricable from the primary (constitutive) repression that accompanies subject formation. But as I have already suggested, the lifting of surplus-repression renders the imprint of primary repression more clearly discernable, for when surplus-repression is removed, what remains are the always highly singular outlines of primary repression. And if Lacan – like Marcuse – sought to remove surplus-repression, it was because he understood that it was on the level of primary repression (fundamental fantasies) that one could find the most basic building blocks of the subject’s psychic destiny; primary repression was the layer of psychic life that expressed something essential about the distinctive ways in which the pleasure principle, in the subject’s life, had become bound up with the repetition compulsion. This is why Lacan states, “If analysis has a meaning, desire is nothing other than that which supports an unconscious theme, the very articulation of that which roots us in a particular destiny, and that destiny demands insistently that the debt be paid, and desire keeps coming back, keeps returning, and situates us once again in a given track, the track of something that is specifically our business” (p. 319).According to Lacan, analysis aims to enable us to understand something about the eccentric specificity (or truth) of our most fundamental desire as well as about the track of destiny that this desire carves out for us (and that is therefore “specifically our business”). If it is indeed the case, as I have conceded, that most of us tend to be alienated from our desire, Lacanian analysis strives to undo this alienation by familiarizing us with the truth of this desire. This process entails, among other things, recognizing that the destiny we owe to this desire can never be definitively overcome, that the debt of desire can never be fully redeemed (for how are we to compensate the signifier for having brought us into being as subjects of desire?). Our destiny – which might initially coincide quite seamlessly with our repetition compulsion – consists of recurring efforts to pay off this debt, which is why it keeps ushering us to the same track of desire, the same nexus of psychic conundrums, our unconscious hope being that if we wear out the track of our desire by incessant reiteration, one day we might be able to absolve ourselves of our debt. But since we cannot, the only thing to be done is to “own” our destiny even as we might seek to mitigate its more painful dimensions. That is, the only way to arrive at the kind of psychic rebirth Kristeva is talking about is to take full responsibility for our (unconsciously generated) destiny. In the ethical act, our impulse is to embrace this destiny wholesale regardless of consequences (this is one way to understand what it means to plunge into the jouissance of the real). In analysis, the exploration of our destiny is more gradual, more self-reflexive. But in both cases, the point is not to obliterate our foundational destiny (or fundamental fantasies) but merely to elaborate it in more satisfying directions, away from the incapacitating effects of the repetition compulsion and toward the rewards of subjective autonomy. And, if we are to achieve this goal, nothing is more important than staying faithful to the truth of desire that, on the most elementary level, determines our destiny.

#### The alternative is a “NO” to the affirmative. Only this intervention can crack open the symbolic coordinates that allow the aff to name and claim what it wants without calling on an inaccessible symbolic other.

Lundberg 12 (Christian, Associate Prof. of Rhetoric @ UNC Chapel Hill, “On Being Bound to Equivalental Chains,” *Cultural Studies*, Volume 26, Issue 2-3, 2012)

The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might ‘recognize and name’ their own desire, and as a result to become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. **This naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented towards or determined by the locus of the demand, determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject towards others and a political order.** As Lacan argues, **this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence, or in the register of this essay, a new political possibility:** ‘That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given . . .. In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world’ (Lacan 1988, pp. 228 229). **Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit the possibility of desire, or as Fink argues: ‘later, however, Lacan comes to see that an analysis ... that ... does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire’** (Fink 1996, p. 90). What does this have to do with hysteria? A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is definitionally a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire which is theirs. In the Seminar on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, for example, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion towards one’s desire: ‘the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centred on the object, in so far as this object, das Ding, is, as Freud wrote somewhere, the support of an aversion’ (Lacan 1997, p. 53). **This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands.** **On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency**, even authority over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus the logic of ‘as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!’ **At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from a**n **ostensibly repressive order** **than a claim for change.** The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought, but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. **Here the fundamental problem of democracy is not in articulating resistance over and against hegemony, but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire.**

#### This the ROB is to traverse the fantasy – that means exposing drives.

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” [University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London]) SJBE

The subject as such emerges through the experience of loss. It is the loss of a part of the subject — an initial act of sacrifice — that creates both subject and object, the object emerging through this act as what the subject has lost of itself. The subject takes an interest in the object world because it forms this world around its lost object. As Jacques Lacan notes, “Never, in our concrete experience of analytic theory, do we do without the notion of Obviously, no one literally creates objects through an initial act of sacrifice of an actual body part. This would be too much to ask. But the psychical act of sacrifice allows for a distinction to develop where none existed before and simultaneously directs the subject’s desire toward the object world. In his breakthrough essay “Negation,” Freud describes this process as follows: “The antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the first. It only comes into being from the fact that thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there**.** The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to find an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there.”6 Though Freud doesn’t use terms from linguistics, it is clear that he is making refer- ence to the subject’s alienation in language and that he sees this alienation as the key to the emergence of both the subject and the object. When the subject submits to the imperatives of language, it enters into an indirect relation with the object world. The speaking being does not relate to books, pencils, and paper but to “books,” “pencils,” and “paper.” The signifier intervenes between the subject and the object that the subject perceives. The subject’s alienation into language deprives it of immediate contact with the object world. And yet, in the above passage from “Negation,” Freud conceives of the subject’s entrance into language — its “capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there” — as the event that produces the very distinction between subject and object. This means that the indirectness or mediation introduced by language deprives the subject of a direct relation to the object world that it never had. Prior to its immersion in the mediation of language, the subject had no object at all — not a privileged relation to objects but a complete absence of relationality as such due to its autoeroticism. In this sense, the subject’s willingness to accede to its alienation in language is the first creative act, a sacrifice that produces the objects that the subject cannot directly access. Language is important not for its own sake but because it is the site of our founding sacrifice. We know that the subject has performed this act of sacrifice when we witness the subject functioning as a being of language, but the sacrifice is not an act that the subject takes up on its own. Others always impose the entry into language on the subject. Their exhortations and incentives to speak prompt the emergence of the speaking subject. But the subject’s openness to alienation in language, its willingness to sacrifice a part of itself in order to become a speaking subject, suggests a lack in being itself prior to the entry into language. That is, the act through which the subject cedes the privileged object and becomes a subject coin- cides with language but is irreducible to it. The subject engages in the act of sacrifice because it does not find its initial autoeroticism perfectly satisfying — the unity of the autoerotic being is not perfect — and this lack of complete satisfaction produces the opening through which language and society grab onto the subject through its alienating process. If the initial autoerotic state of the human animal were perfectly satisfying, no one would begin to speak, and subjectivity would never form. Speaking as such testifies to an initial wound in our animal being and in being itself. But subjectivity emerges only out of a self-wounding. Even though others encourage the infant to abandon its autoerotic state through a multitude of inducements, the initial loss that constitutes subjectivity is always and neces- sarily self-inflicted. Subjectivity has a fundamentally masochistic form, and it continually repeats the masochistic act that founds it. The act of sacrifice opens the door to the promise of a satisfaction that autoerotic isolation forecloses, which is why the incipient subject abandons the autoerotic state and accedes to the call of sociality. But the term “sacrifice” is misleading insofar as it suggests that the subject has given up a wholeness (with itself or with its parent) that exists prior to being lost. In the act of sacrifice, the incipient subject gives up something that it doesn’t have. The initial loss that founds subjectivity is not at all substantial; it is the ceding of nothing. Through this defining gesture, the subject sacrifices its lost object into being. But if the subject cedes nothing, this initial act of sacrifice seems profoundly unnecessary. Why can’t the subject emerge without it? Why is the experience of loss necessary for the subject to constitute itself qua subject? The answer lies in the difference between need and desire. While the needs of the human animal are not dependent on the experience of loss, the subject’s desires are. It is the initial act of sacrifice that gives birth to desire: the subject sacrifices nothing in order to create a lost object around which it can organize its desire. As Richard Boothby puts it in his unequaled explanation of the psychoanalytic conception of the emergence of desire, “The destruction and loss of the object . . . opens up a symbolic dimension in which what was lost might be recovered in a new form.”7 He adds: “Sacrifice serves to constitute the very matrix of desire. The essential function of sacrifice is less do ut des, I give so that you might give, than do underside: I give in order that I might desire.”8 The subject’s desire is oriented around this lost object, but the object is nothing as a positive entity and only exists insofar as it is lost. This is why one can never attain the lost object or the object that causes one to desire.9 The coming-into-being of this object originates the subject of desire, but, having no substance, the object can never become an empirical object of desire. We may see an object of desire as embodying the lost object, but whenever we obtain this object, we discover its emptiness. The lost object is constitutively rather than empirically lost. Eating Nothing In this light, we can see the anorexic as the model for all desiring subjectivity. Most cultural critics justifiably see anorexia as the product of oppressive definitions of femininity that abound in contemporary society and force wom[x]n to starve themselves in order to fit the ideals of feminine beauty. According to Naomi Wolf ’s classic popular account in The Beauty Myth, the ideal of thinness became a way of controlling wom[x]n — disciplining their bodies — after the idea of natural female inferiority began to evanesce.10 The anorexic embodies female victimization: she has internalized a patriarchal ideal and does violence to her own body in order to live up to this ideal. But the problem with this analysis is that the anorexic doesn’t just try to embody the ideal of feminine beauty.11 She goes too far in her pursuit of thinness and comes to inhabit a body far from the ideal. Even when everyone tells her that she no longer looks good, that she is too thin, the anorexic continues to lose weight. It is for this reason that many feminists have seen her as a subversive figure. As Elizabeth Grosz puts it, “Neither a ‘disorder’ of the ego nor, as popular opinion has it, a ‘dieting disease’ gone out of control, anorexia can, like the phantom limb, be a kind of mourning for a pre-Oedipal (i.e., pre-castrated) body and a corporeal connection to the mother that wom[x]n in patriarchy are required to abandon. Anorexia is a form of protest at the social meaning of the female body.”12 Grosz accounts for the excessiveness of anorexia by aligning it with feminist resistance to patriarchy rather than obsequious submission to it. But she aligns the anorexic with wholeness and the maternal bond rather than with the lost object. In this sense, she misses the true radicality of the anorexic, a radical- ity that stems from the power of the anorexic’s desire. The anorexic doesn’t simply refuse to eat but eats nothing, the nothing that is the lost object. While all positive forms of food fail to address the subject’s lack, nothing does speak to the subject’s desire and allows that desire to sustain itself. The anorexic starves not because she can’t find, in the mode of Kafka’s hunger artist, any food that would satisfy her but because she has found a satisfying food, a food that nourishes the desiring subject rather than the living being. The logic of anorexia lays bare the hidden workings of desire that operate within every subject. Subjects believe that they pursue various objects of desire (a new car, a new house, a new romantic partner, and so on) and that these objects have an intrinsic attraction, but the real engine for their desire resides in the nothing that the subject has given up and that every object tries and fails to represent. Objects of desire are desirable only insofar as they attempt to represent the impossible lost object, which is what the anorexic reveals. Still, the anorexic is exceptional; most nonanorexic subjects imagine that their lost object can be found in something rather than nothing. Despite its resonances with the structure of desire, anorexia cannot be dissociated from the imposition of the ideal of thinness as a mode of control- ling female subjectivity. Though this ideal distorts the anorexic’s relationship to her own body, it also renders the nature of desire itself apparent. The impossible ideal of perfect thinness allows the anorexic subject to avow, albeit unconsciously, the structural impossibility of desire itself. Unlike male subjects (or other female subjects who manage to distance themselves from the ideal), the anorexic cannot avoid confronting the impossibility of her object. The oppressive ideal of perfect thinness allows the anorexic to bear witness with her body to the truth of desire.13 Understanding the impossible nature of the lost object — what the anorexic makes clear — allows us to rethink the nature of the political act. Rather than being the successful achievement of some object, the accomplishment of some social good, the political act involves insisting on one’s desire in the face of its impossibility, which is precisely what occurs in the death drive. The key to a politics of the death drive is grasping, in the fashion of the anorexic, the nothingness of the object and thereby finding satisfaction in the drive itself. But the subject’s relationship to its object inherently creates an illusion that makes this possibility almost impossible.Though the lost object that initiates subjectivity has no substance, its status for the subject belies its nothingness. For the subject, the originary lost object is the object that seems to hold the key to the subject’s very ability to enjoy. Subjects invest the lost object with the idea of their own completion: the loss of the object retroactively causes a prior state of comple- tion to arise — a state of completion that never actually existed — and the object itself bears the promise of inaugurating a return to this imaginary prior state.14 In short, it promises to fill in the subject’s lack and answer its desire. As a result of this investment on the part of the subject, the initial lost object becomes the engine for all the subject’s subsequent desiring. Without the initial act of sacrifice, the would-be subject neither desires nor enjoys but instead suffocates in a world of self-presence, a self-presence in which one has no freedom whatsoever. Through the loss of the privileged object, one frees oneself from the complete domination of (parental or social) authority by creating a lack that no authority can fill. Ceding the object is thus the founding act of subjectivity and the first free act. Every subsequent effort by authority to give the subject what it lacks will come up short — or, more correctly, will go too far, because only nothing can fill the gap within the subject. For this reason, dissatisfaction and disappointment are correlative with freedom: when we experience the authority’s failure to give us what we want, at that moment we also experience our distance from the authority and our radical freedom as subjects.

#### Form over content – [A] their speech-act controls the way that we understand and interpret their content, [B] it shouldn’t matter how correct you are if you engaged in unethical practices along the way, both of these mean that you should evaluate the K as a side-constraint on how we view things like the aff.

## Case

### Case

#### [1] You should vote negative on presumption – the affirmative’s advocacy has no solvency

#### [A] Systems – the 1AC argues that material institutions create social realities that replicate violence but ceding the state refuses to alter these conditions

#### [B] Spillover – the aff assumes its advocacy is sufficient to result in the liberation of the flesh BUT they are missing a internal link to solving oppression inside OR outside the round

#### [C] Alliance DA – using debate as a mode of advocacy ensures the failure of their project – competition means debaters ally themselves with individuals who vote for them and alienate those who are forced to negate – at worst you vote neg on presumption because they don’t use debate as a stepping stone for their advocacy outside the space and don’t have a net benefit to affirming the AC

#### [D] Ballot turn – tying ballots to survivability means the aff is violent as it forces the judge to determine whether their method of survival was “good enough” to get the ballot, which causes self-hatred given the loss

#### [1] The ballot is an illusory moment of possibility – turns the aff

Brown 95 [1995, Wendy Brown is a professor at UC Berkeley, “States of Injury,” pp. 21-23]

For some, fueled by opprobrium toward regulatory norms or other mo- dalities of domination, the language of "resistance" has taken up the ground vacated by a more expansive practice of freedom. For others, it is the discourse of “empowerment” that carries the ghost of freedom's valence ¶ 22¶. Yet as many have noted, insofar as resistance is an effect of the regime it opposes on the one hand, and insofar as its practitioners often seek to void it of normativity to differentiate it from the (regulatory) nature of what it opposes on the other, it is at best politically rebellious; at worst, politically amorphous. Resistance stands against, not for; it is re-action to domination, rarely willing to admit to a desire for it, and it is neutral with regard to possible political direction. Resistance is in no way constrained to a radical or emancipatory aim. a fact that emerges clearly as soon as one analogizes Foucault's notion of resistance to its companion terms in Freud or Nietzsche. Yet in some ways this point is less a critique of Foucault, who especially in his later years made clear that his political commitments were not identical with his theoretical ones (and un- apologetically revised the latter), than a sign of his misappropriation. For Foucault, resistance marks the presence of power and expands our under- standing of its mechanics, but it is in this regard an analytical strategy rather than an expressly political one. "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet. or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power. . . . (T]he strictly relational character of power relationships . . . depends upon a multiplicity of points of resis- tance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations.\*39 This appreciation of the extent to which resistance is by no means inherently subversive of power also reminds us that it is only by recourse to a very non-Foucaultian moral evaluation of power as bad or that which is to be overcome that it is possible to equate resistance with that which is good, progressive, or seeking an end to domination. ¶ If popular and academic notions of resistance attach, however weakly at times, to a tradition of protest, the other contemporary substitute for a discourse of freedom—“empowerment”—would seem to correspond more closely to a tradition of idealist reconciliation. The language of resistance implicitly acknowledges the extent to which protest always transpires inside the regime; “empowerment,” in contrast, registers the possibility of generating one’s capacities, one’s “self-esteem,” one’s life course, without capitulating to constraints by particular regimes of power. But in so doing, contemporary discourses of empowerment too often signal an oddly adaptive and harmonious relationship with domination insofar as they locate an individual’s sense of worth and capacity in the register of individual feelings, a register implicitly located on some- thing of an other worldly plane vis-a-vis social and political power.

### AT: Fiat Bad

#### Lack of political praxis turns the aff – discussions about competing proposals for implementation reinvigorate agency and spill over to broader activism. The alternative is dogmatic assertions of opinions.

Lu ‘13 (Catherine Associate Professor of Political Science, McGill University, July 2013, “Activist political theory and the challenge of global justice,” Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2, <http://www.ethicsandglobalpolitics.net/index.php/egp/article/view/21627/28587>)

Which of these various international, state, corporate and civil society responses and proposals should we support? What political institutional changes are required to halt these repeated scenes of human wreckage produced by grave injustices such as the Rana Plaza building collapse? Is progress in breaking the vicious pattern of workplace catastrophes in the global apparel industry possible? What can political theorists contribute to these ongoing debates about global justice and responsibility? The main objective of Lea Ypi’s first book, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency, is precisely to provide an account of the role of political theory and political theorists in the struggles of contemporary political agents for global justice. For Ypi, the purpose of normative political theory in its ‘activist mode’ is to identify and assist contemporary ‘avant-garde political agents’ to realise progressive political change by formulating coherent and plausible normative views about the function and purpose of our social practices and institutions. This is