# Columbia R3 v2

# 1NC

### 1

#### Interpretation – 1ACs must use the three-tier process to justify the plan’s policy

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The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence. As Green argues, their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”57 In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledge-making practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making 83 practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59 Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the double-octo-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.”60 The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education.61 The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks. Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.

#### Only we are topical.

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Definition of topical 1a: referring to the topics of the day or place : of local or temporary interest a topical novel topical references b: of, relating to, or arranged by topics set down in topical form 2: designed for or involving local application and action (as on the body)

#### Violation – They don’t

#### Vote Neg –

#### [1] Distancing DA – Privileged debaters are forced to acknowledge the advantages of their social location and encouraged to mobilize their underprivileged accomplices to how their experience shapes knowledge – their model instills a view from nowhere that encourages passing privilege.

#### [2] Regurgitation DA – their research paradigm encourages a repetition of expertise instead of producing new knowledge – which disconnects arguments from reality – that produces bad skills – only we preserve debate as an activity in the future

#### [3] TVA – defend your advocacy but focus on the way the politics you defend are influenced by your personal experience and with organic intellectuals.

#### Inclusion outweighs and is a voter –

#### DTD – best form of deterrence to norm the space for better futures

#### No RVIs – a) you should not win for meeting a guideline that debate is inclusive b) even if there is unfairness from the shell, it’s valuable as it tries to enforce liberatory engagement. c) being disabled already makes it hard to engage – by forcing RVIs you skew our time and exclude us d) RVIs is just a form cancellation politics of harshly punishing disabled people for small mistakes – that’s violent.

#### Competing Interps – a] reasonability’s arbitrary because we don’t know your bs Brightline b] reasonability collapses—you use offense/defense on paradigm.

### 2

#### Abled subjectivity is tied up in a two-tiered affective response that explains disabled life – primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status – which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 2 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. **The denial** is understandable: who wants **to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of** another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of **disability‟s** transferability, the possibility that this **suffering** could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone?

#### The 1AC’s belief of a better world becomes complicit in the logic of rehabilitative futurism that is threatened by the disabled Child.

Mollow 3 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

“Let us begin our reexamination of Tiny Tim with a discussion of No Future, a text in which Tiny Tim takes a prominent position. No Future is a text with a target: the book takes aim at “the Child whose innocence solicits our defense,” a trope that Edelman names as the emblem of an ideology that he terms “reproductive futurism” (2). According to Edelman, commonplace cultural invocations of the figure of the Child (“not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children”) uphold “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (11, 2). Defying pronatalist social imperatives, Edelman names queerness as “the side of those not fighting for the children‟” (3) and urges queers to accept the culture‟s projection of the death drive onto us by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we‟re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. (No Future 29) Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman‟s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### The alternative is to affirm crippessimism – only a refusal of the world can disrupt the current notion of optimism to validate the fragmented subject. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best disrupts notions of progress within civil society.

Selck 16 [Selck, Michael L. "Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn't." (Jan 2016) // WHSRS and Lex VM]

“The disabled are dying and with them dis/abled culture is being eradicated. In the time between formulating this project and its completion already too many disabled souls have been taken from this world, including pivotal disability studies influences for this research. I barely had enough time to mourn the loss of disability advocate and inspiration porn critic Stella Young before grieving the loss of disability studies exemplar Tobin Siebers. Attached to the grief I feel as a result of the fading disability studies community is the perpetual grief I harbor since my disabled Father’s suicide and in turn the grief concomitant to the claiming of a disabled identity. I choose to start out this project with grief because it communicates the tenor of this research; this is not the disability studies project of inspiration or utopia. My entry point to the disability studies dialogue is riddled with grief, anger, and pain and it is as such that this project plots a course of disability research that attempts to make a space free from the ideological constraints of optimism. The language surrounding dis/ability is highly political. Entire words, phrases, and identities are stretched between, in, and out of the nexus of dis/ability. The choice, for instance, to include a backslash in the word dis/ability represents for Goodley (2014) a desire to delineate and expand each of the categories in the face of global neoliberalism. My initial research inquired about the impact of dis/abled terms and phrases. I went to interrogate rhetoric like “special education”, “handicapable”, and one of the most glaringly overused insults in the American education system “retard”. The scholarship I was coming up with was plentiful but was for the most part located entirely outside of intercultural communication programs like the one I was attending. For the most part the few and far between intercultural communication projects about dis/ability I was able to locate were without modal complexity and didn’t bear semblance to so many of my own experiences. I was beginning to notice a layer of optimism that has been communicatively imprinted upon the negotiation of dis/abled identity. The angst started to manifest as I questioned if I was in the correct field or if dis/ability even was ‘cultural’. I felt a very real cultural erasure of dis/ability in academia and ultimately that glaring lack of consideration is what pushed me to performance studies. I first worked to close the apparent research gap by crafting a collaborative performance titled Under the Mantle (UTM), which put dis/ability, communication scholarship, and pessimist philosophy on stage. The larger purpose of this research report is to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability from communication studies by autoethnographically analyzing the crip-pessimist performance art project Under The Mantle.” (1-2) This research report will first detail the components of the theoretical work that was drawn on to create UTM. Next I offer a literature review to demonstrate the combination of optimism and neglect dis/ability has undergone in intercultural communication models. Following that section I mark my shift to performance methods as I explain how narrative autoethnography can illuminate cultural misconceptions regarding the dis/abled. In the last sections of this report I offer a textual analysis of the performance UTM and analyze three significant arguments of the instillation before concluding. Contextualizing Critical Dis/Ability Theory Often used interchangeably, critical disability theory (CDT) and critical disability studies (CDS) contest dis/ablism (Goodley, 2011, 2014; Devlin & Pothier, 2006; Hosking, 2008). There are several unique additions made to CDS with every new instantiation. Scholars in European countries and Canada attend to the theory, with United States academics often underrepresented. There are three concurrent themes of CDT that I will synthesize in this section with some dis/ability studies authors claiming there are as many as seven themes of CDT (Hosking, 2008). In the introduction to their edited collection of dis/ability essays, Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier (2006) present three themes of CDT as, first, to highlight the unequal status to which persons with disabilities are confined; second, to destabilize necessitarian assumptions that reinforce the marginalization of persons with disabilities; and third, to help generate the individual and collective practical agency of persons with disabilities in the struggles for recognition and redistribution. (p. 18, emphasis mine) Already the connections between the CDT and the critical communication paradigm are visible as each respectively forefronts notions of power, privilege, identity, and agency. Outlined in more detail, the first theme of CDT argues that there is systemic micro and macro level discrimination against bodies with disabilities. To some critical communication scholars, this theme might be obvious, but it seldom is when “the resulting exclusion of those who do not fit able-bodied norms may not be noticeable or even intelligible” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). As the bumper sticker on my laptop proudly disclaims, “Not all disabilities are visible,” which necessarily adds a level of nuance and complexity to the way that dis/ability studies attend to the prospect of discrimination and violence. Often times, “social organization according to able-bodied norms is just taken as natural, normal, inevitable, necessary, even progress” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). It might be true that the lack of collaborative work between critical communication studies and dis/ability studies is because neoliberalism is supremely effective at rebranding marginalized oppression as a marker of its progress. The implications of this assertion are dire but essential to the basis of crip-pessimism. Theoretical approaches based in pessimism and skepticism are often necessary to distinguish the instruments of self destruction that have been mistaken for those of self betterment. Thus, a key question remains, what is regarded as progress and to whom does it count? The politics of progress call for the second tenet of CDT, which is a destabilization of neoliberal practices that strip power and agency from bodies with disabilities. Devlin and Pothier (2006) use the language of “anti-necessitarian” (p. 2), which refers to the efficacy of social organizations and an unflinching skepticism of liberalism. For Shildrick and Price (1999), “disabled bodies call into question the ‘giveness’ of the ‘natural body’ and, instead, posit a corporeality that is fluid in its investments and meanings” (p. 1). Anti-necessitarian logics ask questions that remain innocuous to the critical communication paradigm. Can the architectural proliferation of stairs and multiple levels on buildings be attributed to neoliberalism and active disablism? If stairs seem to focus too exclusively on physical impairments, then what about the sensitivity of the building’s lighting, acoustics, and spatiality? Finally, if neoliberalism fights to protect its grand narrative of progress then is the social exclusion of bodies with disabilities necessary for the day-to-day operation of our globalized world? As Donaldson (2002) posits: “theories of gendered, raced, sexed, classed, and disabled bodies offer us critical languages for ‘denaturalising’ impairment’” (p. 112) at the level of the subjective and inter-subjective. The third theme of CDT is to attend to the agency of bodies with disabilities in the struggle for recognition. One key element of extending agency to the disabled is the use of social experience. Experience is subjective “but experience remains intimately connected to political and social existence, and therefore individuals and societies are capable of learning from their experiences” (Siebers, 2008, p. 82). Though absolutely necessary, it is not enough to write treatises on the oppression of the disabled over time. Academics, theorists, intercultural trainers, and storytellers alike should be aware of the constant risks of representation. Representation and context are at the core of critical disability studies. The notion of agency is as unstable as the notions of dis/ability. There is no one-size-fits-all human rights based approach that will be suitable to address all disabled experiences, as the theoretical call for crip-pessimism will remind us. Instead of a universal abstract Rawlsian concept of social justice, CDS “attend(s) to the relational components of dis/ablism” (Goodley, 2011, p. 159). By a Rawlsian concept of social justice I mean a model that relies on distributive justice with utopist equality at its core. Where utopist equality projects highlight human sameness to the point of purity. CDT unavoidably invites a discussion about difference into the folds as postmodern and post-structural thinkers position the self as defined constantly in relation to others. Therein lies the difference between an equality model and a justice model of social identity. Often in the attempt to open up spaces for reconsidering self and other, CDS celebrates disability as a positive identity marker. This essay offers a strong argument of caution that the inclusion of CDS in critical communication studies might rely too heavily on celebrations of disabled identity. Nothing better demonstrates that reliance on celebrating identity than the myriad language choices used to describe a disabled identity including: differently-abled, special needs, person with disability, disabled person, temporarily able-bodied, and others. Often, able- bodied audiences have a tendency to sensationalize the presence of disability in a space that has not traditionally welcomed it. Examples of this are highlighted by the increasingly popular discussion of ‘inspiration porn’ (Young, 2014) and Hollywood’s representation of disability. The tendency is to inspirationalize the disabled for achieving tasks that would not be celebrated if they were accomplished by an unimpaired body. Crossing the street, showing up on time, entering a building by oneself are all tasks profoundly routine to the non-disabled and yet simultaneously cherished as markers of progress for the disabled. Philosophical pessimism is articulated next as a way to temper the risk of sensationalizing dis/ability. The theories ultimately fuse together like orchids and wasps to generate the larger theme of crip-pessimism. Philosophical Pessimism Throughout the 19th century pessimism was one of the most popular intellectual and philosophical strains, crossing countries and continents. Authors such as Rousseau, Leopardi, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche overwhelmingly created and lead the spirit of pessimism. Contemporarily however, the word ‘pessimism’ is pejorative and describes a body’s emotional discontent rather than intellectual engagement with the world. Dienstag (2009) writes, “Since pessimism is perceived more as a disposition than as a theory, pessimists are seen primarily as dissenters from whatever the prevailing consensus of their time happens to be, rather than as constituting a continuous alternative” (p. 3). Power is responsible for ontological shifts, and during shifts some populations benefit while others are harmed. The turn in thinking about pessimism from an intellectual position to an emotional state has been particularly gratuitous for bodies with disabilities. I come to pessimism because of my experience with disability. My anxiety disorder comes with an exteriority of anti-social behavior that has branded me pessimistic. The concern for my anxiety in public situations is often commented on as overly critical, negative, narcissistic, and most often pessimistic. I experience an anxious state of becoming different, and after years of failing to rehabilitate my sameness to able-bodied standards, I have come to a comfort with pessimism. I choose to include pessimism as a theoretical crutch to avoid communication studies’ sensationalism of disability. I imagine that when critical communication studies does bridge the dis/ability research gap that it might, at least initially, extend some neoliberal logics at the expense of CDS. This might manifest by scholars simply asserting disabled personhood where it does not institutionally, culturally, or individually exist. I find that CDT and philosophical pessimism combine in unique and valuable ways, particularly around tensions of personhood, abstract ideal humanism, and neoliberalism. Neoliberalism should be understood as “the superiority of individualized, market-based competition over other modes of organization. This basic principle is the hallmark of neo-liberal thought— one with old roots that lay partly in Anglo economics and partly in German schools of liberalism” (Mudge, 2008, p. 706-707). There are four components of pessimism outlined by Joshua Foa Dienstag (2006) in his book Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit that I wish to explore difference through. They are as following that: (1) time is a burden, (2) history is ironic, (3) human existence is absurd, and finally (4) resignation or affirmation. To write about pessimism necessarily involves questions of time, temporality, and history. The development of philosophical pessimism, specifically, the theories regarding the burden of time-consciousness, begins with difference. For the pessimist, the concept of time begets a differentiation between human and animal. Being a dog-owner myself, I have heard the colloquial aphorism that dogs, as all animals, have no concept of time. Pessimists understand time consciousness as a unique, but ultimately loathsome, trait of the human condition. Even in projects that appear to be geared toward sameness there are always unperceived and neglected populations. For example, even the U.S. constitution alleges persons of color were (and still are often) racially subjugated as property instead of considered to be fully human. The notion of difference is at the center of the pessimist’s position on time-consciousness because the philosophy accepts that the conditions of our existence are subject to relentless unpredictable change. “To the pessimists, however, the human condition is existentially unique— its uniqueness consisting precisely in the capacity for time-consciousness” (Dienstag, 2009, p. 20). For the pessimist nothing is ever the same, everything is always different, and to inhabit linear time means that everything in existence is always rushing off into the past. The advent of human time consciousness is also what leads the pessimist to find the course of history to be ironic. History is ironic for the pessimist because progress is always related to a greater set of unperceived consequences. As suggested above, philosophical pessimism acknowledges that change occurs; technologies develop and improve over time. Pessimists ask if those improvements are related to a greater set of costs that are not immediately recognizable. (Dienstag, 2006, p. 25) Similar to critical disability theory, pessimism interrogates power and privilege. Pessimists rely on the logic of difference to chart consequences. Consequences go unperceived because they occur across populations with disproportionate access to power, populations that are often culturally unintelligible. For instance, the massive boom in mobile technologies like cell phones and laptops has created vast pits of ‘e-waste’ in Africa, surges in child labor, and conflict over rare earth minerals (Vidal, 2013). Pessimists use difference to tease out the distinction between the instruments of suffering and those of betterment. The third philosophical pessimistic position is that human existence is absurd. The absurdity of existence “is illustrated by the persistent mismatch between human purposes and the means available to achieve them: or again, between our desire for happiness and our capacity to encounter or sustain it” (Dienstag, 2006, p. 32). Difference is built upon exanimations of power, which is both fluid and transferable but ultimately permanent. Classical western philosophy has an optimistic pragmatism built into it that posits there must be an answer to our questions. Alternatively, the pessimist embraces uncertainty, ambiguity, and intersubjectivity. Pessimism encourages a sense of comfort around the idea of multiple, coexistent, and perhaps competing histories. Neoliberal optimism is the logic of conflict as materially reconcilable, rather than antagonistically irreconcilable. The fourth and final tenet of pessimism that we are to examine asks what we are to do about our dire human condition. There are multiplicities of rationales that ultimately inform the pessimistic dualism to either resign from life or affirm it entirely. I defer to an existential or Nietzschean pessimism that recognizes suffering is inevitable for two reasons. First, human time-consciousness necessitates an awareness of our impending death. Second, mutually assured value systems will always intersubjectively exist. The choice to affirm life in its entirety is a pessimistic choice. Embracing life as both miserable and beautiful, fleeting and enduring, validates the perpetually fragmented subject seeking a world that exists beyond good and evil and instead just is.

#### The K OW and turns the aff –

#### [1] Form over Content – the K indicts the rhetoric the aff is exported through which means any nitpicky tech arguments are offense for us because they prove your view of disability ability to act as something beautiful.

#### [2] Epistemology – ontology imposes that our knowledge production is formed through out desires of jouissance which get disturbed with pity, futurism and disfiguration which means the 1AC “skills” are irrelevant and the exportation of their pedagogy is ableist

#### [3] Error Replication – Focusing purely on materiality allows for structural forces that contribute to violence to go unquestioned – if someone is keeps getting beat up – material reforms can temporarily solve that but the forces that caused that violence won’t be solved.

#### Lnks

#### [1] Futurism Link – fiat, save future lives, debate produces advocacy skills, legal implementation

#### [2] Utils Link –

#### a) their focus on pleasure is a prime example of secondary pity i.e. when our ability status is threatened and our ability to obtain pleasure is threatened, able bodies invoke secondary pity to defend the ego and heal the rupturing effects of primary pity – that’s Mollow 2.

#### b) Util justifies curing disability to increase the disabled’s “welfare”.

Stein 01 [(Yale University Press, 2006) Stein, Mark S. “Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Life.” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 27, no. 4, 2001, pp. 561–578. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/23559190. Accessed 23 Nov. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23559190.%20Accessed%2023%20Nov.%202020).] //Lex AKo

If the disabled have on average less welfare than nondisabled people, it seems to follow that the disabled benefit less from continued life than do nondisabled people. Utilitarianism would therefore place a lower value on disabled life than on nondisabled life, and if a choice had to be made between saving the lives of disabled people and saving the lives of nondisabled people, utilitarianism would counsel us to give less preference to the disabled. So, for example, disabled people would receive less preference, in the distribution of life-saving organ transplants, than nondisabled people. Moreover, the utilitarian preference against disabled people in the distribution of life would appear to be exactly proportional to the utilitarian preference in favor of disabled people in the distribution of resources. However morally urgent it might be to cure a given disabled person, increasing her welfare, it would seem that the same moral ur gency must attach to a decision to preserve the life of a nondisabled person in preference to that disabled person, assuming that only one of them 13Mark Stein, "Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Resources," Bioethics 16 (2002), forthcoming. 14See ibid.

#### [3] Debate is governed through fluency which excludes semiotic disturbances to maintain stability. It consistently tries to maintain equal ground that forces the disabled object to keep up with modes of compulsive able-bodiedness.

St. Pierre 17 (Becoming Dysfluent: Fluency as Biopolitics and Hegemony Joshua St. Pierre Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, Volume 11, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 339-356 (Article) Published by Liverpool University Press) //Lex VM

“Given that compulsory able-bodiedness emanates from everywhere and nowhere, it is perhaps more fruitful to parse this consensus through the mode by which compulsory able-bodiedness circulates and is translated across different ideas, practices, and institutions rather than isolating the specific sites where this consensus, this hegemony, is produced. For McRuer, “the experience of the able-bodied need for an agreed-on common ground” is a common experience that “links all people with disabilities under a system of compulsory able-bodiedness” (8), and I suggest that this “common ground” of disability oppression is a how as much as a where or a what. That is, a common ground is never just found, but must be cleared away and maintained with effort through time. “Fluency” can accordingly be understood as a technology operating at the intersection of biopower and hegemony that smooths over and straightens discontinuous semiotics, temporalities, and materialities to eliminate frictions within productive, biopolitical systems and thus secure social order within the material realm. An attention to fluency moves beyond the orthodox focus on ideology as the essential vehicle of hegemony to locate, alongside Jon Beasley-Murray’s notion of “posthegemony,” the production of consensus and the security of social order not within the realm of representation but the governance of bodies and life itself. Fluency attempts to regulate and collapse not merely the time between encounters, but the embodied time of encounter and access and judgment. Fluency attempts to cover over political spaces—to mitigate (when it cannot eliminate) interruption and disruption—thus facilitating in one move the rationalization and naturali- zation of embodied difference that seems to emanate from everywhere and nowhere, as if everyone agrees. But whatever else it may be, fluency is first a process enacted and lived within the material and corporeal**.** Here I start from the semiotic and expand outwards. The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes, tempos, dictions, and (racialized or disabled) accents that constitute practices of aural “communication” have become the objective domain of the biomedicalizing industry of Speech-Language Pathology. Barry Guitar, in his well-used textbook on speech impediments, offers an exemplary definition of fluency: “simply as the effortless flow of speech” (13). Yet there is hardly anything simple about this definition, which is offered amid caveats and backtracking. Guitar readily admits (12) that fluency is difficult to pin down and that researchers within Speech-Language Pathology often focus on what it is not—namely, dysfluency. There are a few characteristics:Fluent speech is marked by a lack of hesitation, and Speech-Language Pathology is forced to make (dubious and highly arbitrary) distinctions between “normal” and “abnormal” hesitations (Goldman-Eisler) since breaks and hesitations crop up in all speech. Fluent speech is marked by rhythmical (read: thoroughly normalized) patterning. Fluent speech is similarly marked by the lack of “extra sounds” interjected into culturally dominant phonetic patterns. Fluency is defined by the overall rate of speech, which includes not just the rate of vocal flow but of information flow (Starkweather). And lastly, fluency is often defined by a lack of “effort” on the part of the speaker; a conceit of mastery over language that highlights the twinned meaning of “fluency.” Transposing this definition into a critical register, the “effortless flow of speech” can be read as a coordinated—yet often strained—performance of bending the energies and capacities of bodies toward stable and univocal futures. Autistics are compelled to restrict stimming, to sit on their hands (to have “quiet hands,” Bascom), and thereby reroute bodily capacities to the smooth performance of so-called intelligible communication. Dyslexic bodies that process information piecemeal and slowly are forced out of social time (Cosenza 7). As Zach Richter has argued, the facial tics and erratic gestures of dysfluent speakers are likewise never communicative inflections, but are made abject and cast out of the communicative realm altogether by what I am here calling technologies of fluency. Tics of loud cursing and grunting from a public speaker with Tourette’s are imagined as an interruption to communication. Dysfluencies are erased from closed captions and courtroom transcripts. What is thus left is a univocal and fluid semiotic operation that instrumentalizes our relations with others.Or more precisely, if fluency is a type of Foucauldian technology, then the function of this biopolitical strategy is to regulate and focus the communicative event toward specific, technical ends through the logic of optimization and closure.” (342-344)

## Case

### ADV

#### Discourse of large scale impacts and militancy exclude epistemologies of disability and magnify their own impacts

Soldatic & Biyanwila 06 [Karen and Janaka Graduate School of Education; Organisational and Labour Studies;University of Western Australia, disability and Development: A Critical Southern Standpointon Able-Bodied Masculinity, T ASA Conference 2006, University of Western Australia & Murdoch University, 4-7 December 2006 TASA 2006 Conference Proceedings] //Lex AKo

Although most of the world’s disabled population lives in the South, there is higher“incidence of reported impairment” in the North (Barnes and Mercer, 2005: 2).According to the World Bank (2005), there are 600 million disabled people globally, of whom 400 million live in the South. As opposed to the North, life expectancies areshorter in the South, there are limited health and support services, and some conditions(such as dyslexia) are not considered as impairments (Barnes and Mercer, 2005). Thereare a range of preventable impairments that are caused by lack of access to basicamenities such as safe water, sanitation, electricity, and health services. The limits of state capacities to regulate and extend social provisions depict how the promotion of international competitiveness has enhanced the power of private insurance and drug(pharmaceutical) companies in driving disability policy (Albrecht and Bury, 2001).Disability in the South is situated in a subordinated status within the global disabilitymarketplace. The market for rehabilitation goods and services related to disability isdominated by the interests of TNCs, particularly insurance and drug (pharmaceutical)companies. Major drug and medical supply companies are expanding into the Southpromoting deregulation and privatization of the health sectors. The current North-Southtensions over intellectual property issues and prices of essential medicines, particularlyHIV/AIDS drugs, highlight the role of TNCs as well as the WTO in shaping the globaldisability market place. While **subordinating the needs of disabled people**, culturalpractices and the national sovereignty of the South, the **profit driven disability market is 6 also influenced by capitalist economies** recurrent crisis. Not only is the South particularlyeffected by the changes in the global market place, there is a generalized **amplification of risk through food sources, genetic modification and accumulated drug** resistance as wellas from the environment, **climate change, unknown hazards in the workplace and unregulated proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons** (Albrecht andBury, 2001). This **relationship between the global disability market and the militarization of the globe is of particular interest for disability** in the South.The outbreak and the maintenance of civil wars in the South relate to nation-state strategies which are interdependent with imperialist efforts to expand and protectmarkets. The **post-second world war global system under U.S hegemony has promoted an international system of "imperialism** by invitation” (Panitch and Gindin, 2003). While **inviting "self-governing" states to participate in the international trading** regime, the new hegemony is sustained by “political and military coordination with other independent governments” (Panitch and Gindin, 2003). The global **trade in military weapons plays a key role in maintaining market friendly governments** while militarising conflicts in theSouth. Disability in the South is intertwined with civil wars, where both state and insurrectionarygroups use maiming rather than killing to undermine resistance and socialise fear (Barnesand Mercer, 2005). The global military industrial networks, including international armstrade, dominated by Northern countries and often invisible in World Bank ‘development’discourse, illustrates the coercive dimension of market-led ‘development’. Northerncountries accounted for about 75 per cent of world military spending in 2004 butcontained only 16 per cent of the world population. The U.S accounts for nearly half of world military spending. In 2004, the military spending of the U.S accounted for nearlyUS$ 400 billion, compared with US$ 6.4 billion in Indonesia and US$ 19.1 billion inIndia (Global Issues, 2006). The GDP of Sri Lanka in 2004 was around US$ 21 billion,while military spending was nearly US$ 560 million. The role of the Indonesian militaryin protecting the interests of Exxon Mobil, one of the major U.S oil TNCs, illustrates hownational politics of resource rich Southern countries are interconnected with geopoliticsof imperialism. Moreover, the productive, docile, bodies that the World Bank and nation 7 state strategies promote for ‘development’ are also Southern bodies faced with humanright abuses (Amnesty International, 2001).Global market forces shape and are reshaped by underlying social structures and culturesof disability primarily in the terrain of national politics. Disability in the South is **positioned within a neo-liberal ‘development’ discourse, which prioritises international competitiveness through trade liberalisation** where under market-driven politics the state promotes the interests of capital through privatisation and deregulation (Leys, 2001).Consequently, government regulation or social provisioning is seen not only favouringsectional interests and encouraging inefficiencies, but also state bureaucracies are seen asinherently acting to maximise their own interests. Thus, privatisation under public-privatepartnerships are promoted, blurring the public-private distinction. As for disability policy,the retraction of state social provisioning and the privatization of health services haveamplified household care labour, particularly women’s care work.Under market-driven politics, disabled people are located in the periphery of labourmarkets, where able-bodied labour constitutes the valourised core. In order to attractinternational investors, the active **promotion of a skilled and docile labour force alsomeans creating a labour market which restricts basic worker rights, such as freedom of association and collective bargaining**. In effect, more people are disabled by the lack of decent work, safety and health regulations and poverty level wages. However, there are other recruits from a pool of underemployed and unemployed workers, in urban slums and impoverished rural communities. This **marginalisation also feeds into the proliferation of ethno-nationalist counter movements, in hope of gaining recognition and redistribution.**

#### Anti-nuclear organizing is contingent on the reduction of disability to a metaphor for tragedy and misfortune.

**Mashimo 18.** Yayoi Mashimo, Japan Lutheran College and Tokyo Union Theological Seminary “If Lessons Are to Be Learned Depiction of Disability in Mienai Bakudan (The Invisible Bomb)” in the Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, Volume 12(3), pages 269-285 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/700966 “///” indicates paragraphs NT 18

Mienai Bakudan is an allegorical verse, an anecdotal chronicle of the construction and subsequent failure of a nuclear power plant built in a rural area to provide energy to the cities. Years after the plant has broken down, the deleterious and lasting impacts of radioactivity on the community and on subsequent generations are described as an “invisible bomb.” This free verse first appeared in May 20111 on the blog of Yoshiko Takahashi, an author, photographer, and lifestyle advisor. Using plain language, Takahashi identifies her target audience as adults. She wrote the text in response to the ambiguous and unsettling announcements released by politicians, bureaucrats, and scholars regarding the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, which amounted to them repeating “there is no immediate effect.” The verse promptly spread through Twitter, and she created an illustrated version with the help of an illustrator friend and released it via YouTube. In this slideshow, the text was presented as captions with instrumental piano music playing in the background. The slideshow recorded more than 800,000 views, and the text was translated into six languages, including English, by volunteers and also made available online (Takahashi 28). /// The widely circulated online slideshow received mixed reactions from viewers, including praise for the author’s courage in revealing and facing difficult truths, and reproach for a depiction that could lead to bias and stigmatization of the area and residents affected by the nuclear disaster. The latter reproach included criticism of the depiction in the concluding passage. In this scene, which takes place decades after the nuclear disaster, a young girl whose parents who were children at the time of the nuclear power plant accident asks her grandparents why she was born with a “hand of different shape” from those of her classmates. The girl tells her grandparents that her foreign friends told her it was because of the “invisible bomb” that her country had scattered in the past. There is a close-up of the crying girl’s face with teardrops. The verse ends with the phrase, “That grandma!/Or/That grandpa!/Reading this story for your grandchild./Might be you!”.2 /// By the end of the year, the illustrated verse of the popular online slideshow was published as a picture book by Shogakukan, one of Japan’s biggest publishers. In December 2011, 6,000 copies of the book were printed and released to stores.3 Due to the plain language and colorful illustrations, the publisher categorized it as a children’s book. The print version had some updated illustrations, and significant revisions were made to the concluding text in response to criticism regarding the depiction of disability (Takahashi 28): the three references to the “hand of different shape”4 were changed to “disease/illness” (byouki in Japanese), and the references to the medical condition of the newborn baby girl and other infants were removed or changed. The latter revisions are as follows: /// The original version: When “the Thing to become a bomb” became the real bomb, One resident was the child. Twenty years later, That child gave the [sic] birth. That baby had slightly strange shape’s [sic] hands, but has [sic] no any [sic] diseases. The mother was relieved, “thank [sic] you!”. But many other sick children were born. (Translation: Kurosawa, Takemoto, and Ueoka) /// In the revised print version: When “the Thing to become a bomb” became [T]he real bomb, [o]ne resident was the child. Twenty years later, [t]hat child gave birth. It proved that The baby had a slight disease. Around that time, There are many more babies Who were born with More serious diseases. The newborn baby was so cute, And Dad and Mom Cared about her so much. (Translation: author) /// Criticism Regarding the Depiction of Disability /// It is rather intriguing to trace the discussion regarding this work. Currently accessible online comments are mainly positive, while some harsh rebukes also exist. Some see the book as “inappropriate for children” because of the “discriminatory” description of the girl with a disability. In this allegorical illustrated narrative, **the girl with the deformed hand, or the girl living with illness** in the print version, **represents the detrimental results of radioactive contamination** caused by the nuclear power plant accident. The accident in turn was a consequence of people’s pursuit of power for better and more convenient living based on the sacrifice of the community where the power plant was built. Combined with the image of her crying face, **the girl becomes a remorseful and tragic symbol of disability**. **The narrative ends without any specific account of life with disability**, and the image of the physical difference/ illness is not presented. A strong sense of distaste regarding the “use of an image of disability as an icon of terror and nuclear power plants” (DPI Women’s Network; Yonezu 1) is frequently expressed in critical online book reviews from both disabled and non-disabled readers. At the same time, reviewers often stress that they understand that the message of the book is about the controversies of nuclear power plants and that the author does not intend to humiliate disabled people (SOSHIREN #298 2–10). /// The **pessimistic tone expressed in Mienai Bakudan toward** being born and **living with a disability may be traced to** persistent personal or **medical models of disability** and witnessing of the difficulties that people with impairments and disabilities face in their daily lives. People’s unconscious **normative gaze toward bodies that are different**—that is, bodies that are “not ordinary” compared to the “standard” of their peers—plays a vital role in creating this tragic tone. **The state of being sound and healthy**, in other words, **free from disability and/or illness, is set as an implicit standard**, and the disabled girl in the story is deemed to be outside this standard. /// This estranging gaze is also turned toward to flora and fauna. Prior to the disabled girl’s final plea, both the text and the illustrations delineate flowers with unusual color combinations, and “2 meters long” dandelions in the girl’s childhood home garden (Takahashi 22–23). Such abnormal images of flowers are rooted in journalists’ reports on the after-effects of past nuclear power plant failures such as the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the United States and the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union. The images of mutated flowers were widely circulated through photojournalist magazines (Hirose and Hirokawa v–vi). They were often referred to as “monster plants” and “giant dandelions” and, along with striking images of deformed farm animals born near the accident sites became icons of the devastating impact of radiation on nature. These plants and animals, which **deviated from “normal” and “natural” growth, were deemed controversial and undesirable**. /// In the postscript of the printed book, Takahashi apologizes that her text “has hurt many people,” and explains why she “made a decision to revise it.” She states that she opposes nuclear power plants, not because they may cause illness and disease but, rather, because they are “essentially unnatural entities” beyond the control of human capability accompanied by multiple risks, including the potential to stir serious conflicts among people, and cites these reasons as her driving force to write the verse, with the goal of exposing the potential risks and to start discussion (Takahashi 28). While the physical difference was changed to an unspecified illness in the print version, the unconscious normative gaze still persists, viewing disabilities as undesirable physical and social conditions that depart from implicit standards. /// Physical Difference in Preceding Children’s Books: Sacchan no Mahou no Te (1985) and Marshall no Kodomo-tachi (1996) /// Released more than a quarter century prior to Mienai Bakudan, Sacchan no Mahou no Te (Sacchan’s Miracle Hand) places physical difference appearing in a hand as a core theme of the story. The protagonist, Sachiko, affectionately called Sacchan, loves playing house with her kindergarten friends. Sachiko does not have fingers on her right hand. One day, she insists she wants to play the role of mother, but one of her peers declares, “You can’t be a mom because it’s weird for a mom to not have fingers!” (Nobe, Shizawa, and Association of Parents and Children with Congenital Limb Disabilities 13). Sachiko runs home from the kindergarten, upset and angry, and asks her pregnant mother, “Why is my hand different from everyone else’s? Why don’t I have fingers like the other kids? Why?” (18). /// Sachiko’s abrupt question to her mother parallels the nameless girl’s question to her grandparents in Mienai Bakudan. They both ask about their deformed hands, crying, and both contain strong expressions of denial of their own hands because of the different shape. However, the answers that the two girls get from their guardians contrast quite strikingly. In Mienai Bakudan, the grandparents do not respond to their grandchild’s question, and the narrative concludes in silence—at least for the readers. In Sacchan, the story and conversation continue. The mother hugs Sachiko and explains, “You were injured when you were growing in my tummy. We still don’t know why some babies get injured in their mom’s tummy” (22). The young girl continues her questions, asking if her fingers will grow out from her palm when she is older and enters elementary school. After a slight pause, the mother replies no and says, “But Sacchan, this is your hand, your invaluable hand. My loving Sachiko’s hand, cute and lovely hand” (24). Sachiko replies, crying, “No, no, I don’t want a hand like this” (24). From that day on, she refuses to go to kindergarten. /// In the first half of the story, Sachiko experiences a series of unreasonable, hurtful incidents regarding her hand—cruel words from her classmates coming from the thoughtless ignorance that is typical of children that age. She also receives incomprehensible and unacceptable answers to her questions. Her immediate hope that she will have fingers in the future is dashed abruptly. She does not, cannot, calmly accept this irreversible fact on the spot. The text carefully avoids describing Sachiko’s disheartening-but-unavoidable challenges as a pitiable tragedy or exaggerated drama but, rather, simply follows the flow of Sachiko’s emotions, including anger, sorrow, anxiety, and many other indescribable feelings. /// The story never provides a specific reason for the disability in Sachiko’s hand simply because, as Sachiko’s mother explains, “it is unknowable.” In Mienai Bakudan, the connection between the disability or illness and radiation is suggested by the disabled girl’s conversation, descriptions of the people who became ill after the disaster, and the mutant flowers. Meanwhile, in Sacchan, the reason for Sachiko’s disability does not come up in the argument between Sachiko and her kindergarten classmates. At this point, Sachiko is not yet subjected to the dogmatic gaze, which seeks to find a cause-and-effect connection between her disability and detectable factors; and this motif does not appear later in the story. /// Such questions and comments are some of the challenges that children with limb disabilities and their families encounter. Parent members of the Association of Parents and Children with Congenital Limb Disabilities (APCCLD), co-authors of Sacchan, describe how another group wanted to use an image of their child in a sensational way. An advocacy group for dioxin-poisoning victims asked the parents for permission to use a photo of their child as an icon of their activities, under the assumption that the child’s limb disability must be caused by dioxin, like many infants in postwar Vietnam (APCCLD, Gotai-manzoku 240–41).5 The association, initially founded with the aim of promoting the self-affirmation and empowerment of children with congenital disabilities and their families, was asked to respond to the stigmatizing differences directly linked to chemicals and to oppose chemical pollution and the eugenics-tinged conventional view towards disabilities. Boku no Te Ochawan Taipu ya (My Hand Makes a Perfect Fit with a Rice Bowl!) (1984), an APCCLD publication targeting adult audiences, lists and explains possible causes of disability, including hereditary transmission, genetic mutation, chemical effects, and various accidents during fetal development. However, the conclusion is that the cause is not always traceable and may be impossible to eliminate even with the most advanced medical technology. Based on this conclusion, they argue that the birth of children with physical variations is not an unusual phenomenon and that variations of the body should be affirmed as they are (APCCLD Ochawan 130–37). According to the booklet enclosed in Sacchan, the underlying idea is for parents to explain their own and/or family member’s disability to young children through an illustrated story. It aims to liberate children by encouraging them to embrace themselves and their bodies as they are, whatever the cause of the difference. /// Suibaku no Shima: Marshall no Kodomo-tachi (Children of the Marshall Islands: The Aftermath of the US Nuclear Test) was created in a totally different context from Sacchan. Published as a monthly children’s book series, this non-fiction account, originally illustrated by the author’s photographs, was written by a photo journalist, Kosei Shimada, who had followed the lives of migrant people in the Marshall Islands since the 1970s. The book focuses on the everyday life of Marshallese children who are approximately the same age as the book’s target audience. The book is based on the author’s most recent visit in 1995 to the islands of Utlik and Mejato with pictures by the experienced children’s book illustrator Rotoh Tsuda.6 /// Ten-year-old Eminita is one of the children Shimada met during his stay on Mejato Island. He asked Eminita if he could take a photo of her, then “instead of the answer, she presented her right hand. At the base of her thumb, she had a scar from the operation to remove her sixth finger” (Shimada Kodomo-tachi 30). She was born with six fingers on her right hand. In the picture book, the description is accompanied by a portrait of the girl showing her right thumb to the photographer, with a schoolyard in the background. In the bottom corner of the same photo, there is a black-and-white archival photograph taken in 1985 of the newborn Eminita with two thumbs. /// On 1 July 1946, the first hydrogen bomb test in the Marshall Islands was conducted by the United States, which had taken control of the island nation from Japan after the end of the Second World War. In all, sixty-six tests were carried out by 1958. High yield bombs were exploded at the Bikini Atoll on 1 March 1954 as a part of Operation Castle (Shimada Kodomo-tachi 17; Daigo Fukuryu-maru Peace Association 18–20). A number of ordinary citizens, including the international crew of the Japanese fishing vessel Daigo Fukuryumaru (Lucky Dragon No. 5) and native residents of neighboring islands were affected. /// Eminita’s family was originally from Rongelap Island, located 170 km east of the Bikini Atoll. During the H-bomb test on 1 March 1954, the island and eighty-six residents, including Eminita’s grandparents, were exposed to the extraordinary heat blast and subsequent radioactive fallout produced by the explosion. The affected residents suffered from acute and severe burns and body aches. Three days after the test, the US military relocated all the residents to its base in the Kwajalein Atoll, then to another island in the Majuro Atoll, where the capital is located. Three years later, the US government declared Rongelap Island to be safe, and the residents returned to their home island in June 1957. However, their new life on their home island, with bifurcated palm trees and abnormal seabirds, included unusually high incidences of stillbirths and miscarriages as well as unprecedented high rates of cancer, leukemia, and thyroid diseases. In 1985, the islanders decided to leave Rongelap and migrate en masse to the smaller and infertile Mejato Island (Shimada, Kodomo-tachi 22–27; Shimada, Furusato ha Poison no Shima 66–67). Eminita’s parents were not yet born at the time of the H-bomb test, but they later moved to Rongelap Island, where Eminita’s mother lived for ten years. Eminita was born soon after her parents moved from Rongelap to Mejato (Shimada, Kodomo-tachi 30; Shimada, Kaerazaru Rakuen 124–25). The birth of a baby girl with six fingers made the islanders wonder, “Could children be affected by radiation even though their parents were not exposed to the fallout but lived in Rongelap for a certain period of time?” (Shimada, Kodomo-tachi 30). /// The Rongelapese people’s forty years of experience corresponds in many ways to the “foreboding blueprint of our future” delineated in Mienai Bakudan (Takahashi 28), including increased illness, disease, and disability in people and plants as well as unwanted displacement from their home islands. However, the Rongelapese people’s story is not fiction and not a metaphorical anecdote like Mienai Bakudan. In addition to Eminita, many other children and adult Rongelapese migrants and Utlik residents living with disabilities and chronic illnesses appear in Kodomo-tachi, as a part of the landscape of the island life. The possible connection between lasting harmful effects of radiation and the islanders’ compromised health is repeatedly explained in the text (Shimada, Kodomo-tachi 19, 24–25 and 40). The description of this 1996 publication, based on facts witnessed and photographed by the author on remote Pacific islands, may be interpreted as being much more striking and sensational than the somewhat controversial Mienai Bakudan. /// It should be noted that, on the same two pages of the description and image of Eminita’s hand before and after the surgery, there are three more photographs showing the everyday life of the child, helping her mother in the outdoor kitchen, and playing and laughing with her brothers and sisters. The author stays focused on the everyday, ordinary life of the children and their families who also embrace a troublesome past. Eminita and the other children and adults on the island are not used as props to explain the negative effects of radiation or the island’s controversial history but, rather, are presented as individuals with names, individual family histories, and futures. The islander’s poor diet consisting of distributed canned foods and flours, and the islanders’ sense of unease and anxiety before and after regular health exams by the US government, frequently appear in the photos and text, as part of the sketches of ordinary life (Kodomo-tachi, 10–11, 18–20, 26–27, 32–33). Their current lifestyle is the product of the unwanted migration and displacement forced by radioactive contamination of their home islands and their unequal relationship with the controlling nation. The author keeps the gaze focused on the ongoing structural unfairness imposed upon the Rongelapese and other islanders, rather than on the islanders’ disabilities as sensational evidence, thereby separating these factors from the individuals and the community. /// Unlike Sacchan, Kodomo-tachi was published with little connection to the disability community and their campaigns to gain empowerment, but the author, through more than twenty years of his repeated trips to the Marshall Islands, invites the young readers to become neighbors and friends of the Rongelapese children. In this book, the island children with disabilities are not staged as “others” that are different. In so doing, it resists the dynamic that often alienates and renders individuals with disabilities invisible. /// The creation of Mienai Bakudan was largely unrelated to the foregoing books. The conclusion the two long-selling children’s books reached in common, to accept and embrace physical differences as they are, was not successfully transmitted to the latest work. Yet the result cannot be solely attributed to the author. Society at large has failed to face and overcome prevalent and invisible ableism and eugenic ideas. /// Recurring Debate, Coping with a Dilemma/// **Images of disabilities as shocking and tragic icons have frequently been employed in** protests and **activist campaigns against controversial uses of tech**nology and often in the context of defending social justice (Hori). Demonstrating awareness in creative fields of nuclear power and the detrimental effects of radiation in postwar Japan, a 1957 science documentary film Sekai ha Kyofu suru: Shi no Hai no Shoutai (The World Is Terrified: The Truth about Fallout) warns of the perils and controversial aspects of radiation, presenting an array of picturesque images of the latest science experiments with sophisticated music and narration. At the time, repeated atomic bomb tests fueled Cold War tensions, and the Genshiryoku Nenryo Kosha (Nuclear Fuel Corporation) of Japan, whose task was to prepare for the launch of nuclear power plants in Japan, had just been established in the previous year (Fukufuku and TUFS). At the same time, the film features images of stillborn infants with a variety of physical disabilities and a young girl with an intellectual disability who was born in Hiroshima after the atomic bomb attack in 1945. They **serve as terrifying and pitiable victims** of controversial technology. The classic monster film series Godzilla also employs the motif of mutation due to radiation.7 The Fuchu Art Museum, Tokyo, recently held a retrospective exhibition of Kakuo Shinkai, the local artist committed to fighting for social justice in his neighborhood community by protesting the construction of an US military base and organizing labor from the 1930s through 1970s. This exhibition included two lithographs of anti-nuclear weapon campaigns from the 1960s. The prints depicted infants with disabilities and conjoined twins next to a crouching adult woman in obvious distress. These prints were widely shown in travelling peace promotion exhibitions at the time (Fuchu Art Museum). /// Later, skepticism and a strong sense of unease regarding negative images of disability started to emerge within the activist and the disability communities, particularly in anti-nuclear power protest movements in the late 1980s stirred by the Chernobyl disaster (Tateiwa 48–49). Yonezu points out that the **invalidation of disabled people in postwar social justice rhetoric is underpinned by the** widespread and persistent **stigma that regards disabilities as futile tragedies** for the individual affected, their families, and society, and, therefore, **something to be eliminated**. This stigma was represented by the Yusei Hogo hou (Eugenic Protection Act) of Japan, newly adopted in 1948. The idea that such eugenics policy is a serious violation of the human rights of disabled people did not appear until the late 1970s (Fukufuku and TUFS). ///

### Space War

#### No space war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS.

Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals.

Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted.

The Reality

The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space.

That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern.

More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do.

However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space.

These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

#### Won’t go nuclear – seen as a normal conventional attack because of integration with ground forces

Firth 7/1/19 [News Editor at MIT Technology Review, was Chief News Editor at New Scientist. How to fight a war in space (and get away with it). July 1, 2019. MIT Technology Review]

Space is so intrinsic to how advanced militaries fight on the ground that an attack on a satellite need no longer signal the opening shot in a nuclear apocalypse. As a result, “deterrence in space is less certain than it was during the Cold War,” says Todd Harrison, who heads the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, a think tank in Washington, DC. Non-state actors, as well as more minor powers like North Korea and Iran, are also gaining access to weapons that can bloody the noses of much larger nations in space.

#### Space wars don’t cause escalation

James Pavur 19, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### No space war miscalc

Bragg et al, July 2018 - \*Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI’s Chief Analytics Officer (CAO) and Executive Vice President, PhD in IR @ NYU \*\*Dr. Robert Elder, PhD @ Emory, BA @ Clemson, Assistant prof of History @ Baylor \*\*\*Dr. Belinda Bragg, principle research scientist at NSI, Inc. Lecturer in polisci @ Texas A&M.;“Contested Space Operations, Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting: Summary Findings and Integration Report,” NSI, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Space-SMA-Integration-Report-Space-FINAL.pdf

Everyone needs space

While the US may be relatively more dependent on space for national security than are other states, it is far from alone in relying on space. Nuclear armed states are dependent on space for important command and control functions, and major powers are increasingly using space for battlefield situational awareness and communications. China and Russia were identified as having significant (and fairly equal) levels of strategic risk in space (ViTTa Q16), although their regional security priorities and (to date) less spacedependent economies place them at an advantage to the US. They may, therefore, see the strategic risk of conflict is space as lower than does the US. Still, space capabilities remain a source of economic expansion and national pride for both, and their calculations of the cost of conflict involving space may include consideration of these factors. Even now, there is a general consensus that the US and other actors have more to gain from space than they have from the loss of space-based capabilities (ViTTa Q3). This suggests that, although the US is more vulnerable in the space domain than are other states, the likelihood that aggressive action against an adversary’s space assets would be reciprocated may provide a degree of security. It also creates another incentive for actors to use diplomacy and international law to reduce risk and increase transparency in the space domain.

#### No one’s going to war over a downed satellite

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

### Debris

#### No debris cascades, but even a worst case is confined to low LEO with no impact

Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/

Kessler Syndrome is overhyped. A chorus of online commenters great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are wrong.

What is Kessler Syndrome?

Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites.

It is a dark picture.

Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen?

I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit.

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions.

Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over.

High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue.

Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here.

GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here.

How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be?

Let’s imagine a worst case scenario.

An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space?

I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000.

So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space.

Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits.

In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment.

* Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely.
* Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner.
* Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided.
* The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler.
* Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting)

So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect.

I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.

#### It takes centuries and adaptation solves

Ted Muelhaupt 19, Associate Principal Director of the Systems Analysis and Simulation Subdivision (SASS) and Manager of the Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies at The Aerospace Corporation, M.S., B.S. Aerospace and Aeronautical Engineering & Mechanics, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities, Senior Member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, “How Quickly Would It Take For the Kessler Syndrome To Destroy All The Satellites In LEO? And Could You See This Happening From Earth?”, Quora, 2/28/2019, https://www.quora.com/How-quickly-would-it-take-for-the-Kessler-Syndrome-to-destroy-all-the-satellites-in-LEO-And-could-you-see-this-happening-from-Earth

The dynamics of the Kessler Syndrome are real, and most people studying it agree on the concept: if there is sufficient density of objects and mass, a chain reaction of debris breaking up objects and creating more debris can occur. But the timescale of this process takes decades and centuries. There are many assumptions that go into these models. Though there is still argument about this, many people in the field think that the process is already underway in low earth orbit. But others, including myself, think we can stop it if we take action. This is a slow motion disaster that we can prevent.

But in spite of hype to the contrary, we will never “lose access to space”. Certain missions may become impractical or too expensive, and we may decide that some orbits are too risky for humans. Even that depends on the tolerance for the risk. But robots don’t have mothers, and if we feel it is worthwhile we will take the risk and fly the satellites where we need to.

To the specifics of the question, it will take many decades. It will not destroy all satellites in LEO. You won’t be able to see it from the ground unless you were extraordinarily lucky, and you happened to see a flash from a collision in the instant you were looking, with just the right lighting.

#### Squo tracking, shielding, and removal plans solve

Dr. Brian Koberlein 16, Professor of Physics at the Rochester Institute of Technology and PhD in Astrophysics from the University of Connecticut, “Cascade Effect”, 5-4, https://archive.briankoberlein.com/2016/05/04/cascade-effect/index.html

In the movie Gravity the driving force of the plot is a catastrophic cascade of space debris. An exploding satellite sends high speed debris into the path of other satellites, and the resulting collisions create more space debris until everything from a space shuttle to the International Space Station faces an eminent threat of destruction. Not unexpectedly, the movie portrayal of such a situation is not particularly accurate, but the risk of a debris cascade is very real.

It’s known as the Kessler syndrome, after Donald Kessler, who first imagined the scenario in the 1970s. The problem comes down to the fact that small objects in Earth orbit can stay in orbit for a very long time. If an astronaut drops a bolt, it can stay in orbit for decades or centuries. Because the relative speed of two objects in orbit can be quite large, it doesn’t take a big object to pose a real threat to your spacecraft. On the highway a small pebble can chip your car windshield. In space it can be done by a chip of paint traveling at thousands of kilometers per hour. In the history of the space shuttle missions, there were more than 1,600 debris strikes. Because of such strikes, more than 90 space shuttle windows had to be replaced over the lifetime of shuttle missions.

While that might sound alarming, it’s actually quite manageable. Upgrades and maintenance were quite common on the shuttle missions, and we tend to err on the side of caution when it comes to replacing parts. Modern spacecraft also have ways to mitigate the risk of small impacts, such as Whipple shields made of thin layers of material spaced apart so that objects disintegrate when hitting the shield rather than the spacecraft itself. We also have a tracking system that currently tracks more than 300,000 objects bigger than 1 cm, so we can make sure that most spacecraft avoid these objects.

But the risk of big collisions isn’t negligible. In 2009 the Iridium 33 and Kosmos-2251 satellites collided at high speed, destroying both spacecraft and creating more dangerous debris. It wouldn’t take many collisions like this for the debris numbers to rise dramatically, and more debris means a greater risk of collisions. In Gravity the cascade happens very quickly, triggered by a single event. The reality is not quite so grave. Instead of happening overnight, Kessler syndrome would occur gradually, raising collision risks to the point where certain orbits become logistically impractical. It could occur so gradually that we might not notice it early on, and there are some that argue it’s already underway.

The good news is that we’re aware of the threat. And, as the old saying goes, knowing is half the battle. Already we take steps to limit the amount of debris created. New spacecraft include end of life plans to remove them from orbit, either by sending them into Earths atmosphere to burn up, or sending them to a “graveyard orbit” that poses little risk to other spacecraft. There are also plans on the drawing board to clear orbits of debris, particularly in low-Earth orbit where the risk is greatest. The cascade effect is a real risk, but it’s also one we can likely manage with a bit of ingenuity.

#### Monitoring networks are robust and ensure no collisions

Dave Mosher 9-3, Deputy Editor of Science Coverage and Senior Correspondent at Business Insider, Former Contributor at Wired, “Satellite Collisions May Trigger A Space-Junk Disaster That Could End Human Access To Orbit. Here's How.”, Business Insider, 9/3/2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/space-junk-kessler-syndrome-chain-reaction-prevention-2018-3

The Kessler syndrome plays center-stage in the movie "Gravity," in which an accidental space collision endangers a crew aboard a large space station. But Gossner said that type of a runaway space-junk catastrophe is unlikely.

"Right now I don't think we're close to that," he said. "I'm not saying we couldn't get there, and I'm not saying we don't need to be smart and manage the problem. But I don't see it ever becoming, anytime soon, an unmanageable problem."

There is no current system to remove old satellites or sweep up bits of debris in order to prevent a Kessler event. Instead, space debris is monitored from Earth, and new rules require satellites in low-Earth orbit be deorbited after 25 years so they don't wind up adding more space junk.

"Our current plan is to manage the problem and not let it get that far," Gossner said. "I don't think that we're even close to needing to actively remove stuff. There's lots of research being done on that, and maybe some day that will happen, but I think that — at this point, and in my humble opinion — an unnecessary expense."

A major part of the effort to prevent a Kessler event is the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The project, led by the US military, uses 30 different systems around the world to identify, track, and share information about objects in space.

Many objects are tracked day and night via a network of radar observatories around the globe.

Optical telescopes on the ground also keep an eye out, but they aren't always run by the government. "The commercial sector is actually putting up lots and lots of telescopes," Gossner said. The government pays for their debris-tracking services.

Gossner said one major debris-tracking company is called Exoanalytic. It uses about 150 small telescopes set up around the globe to detect, track, and report space debris to the SSN.

Telescopes in space track debris, too. Far less is known about them because they're likely top-secret military satellites.

Objects detected by the government and companies get added to a catalog of space debris and checked against the orbits of other known bits of space junk. New orbits are calculated with supercomputers to see if there's a chance of any collisions.

Diana McKissock, a flight lead with the US Air Force's 18th Space Control Squadron, helps track space debris for the SSN. She said the surveillance network issues warnings to NASA, satellite companies, and other groups with spacecraft, based on two levels of emergency: basic and advanced.

The SSN issues a basic emergency report to the public three days ahead of a 1-in-10,000 chance of a collision. It then provides multiple updates per day until the risk of a collision passes.

To qualify for such reporting, a rogue object must come within a certain distance of another object. In low-Earth orbit, that distance must be less than 1 kilometer (0.62 mile); farther out in deep space, where the precision of orbits is less reliable, the distance is less than 5 kilometers (3.1 miles).

Advanced emergency reports help satellite providers see possible collisions much more than three days ahead. "In 2017, we provided data for 308,984 events, of which only 655 were emergency-reportable," McKissock told Business Insider in an email. Of those, 579 events were in low-Earth orbit (where it's relatively crowded with satellites).

When a space company receives a SSN alert, they typically move their satellite into a different orbit — and out of harm's way — by burning a little propellant.

Although companies like SpaceX are launching more and more objects into space, McKissock said "our everyday concern isn’t something as catastrophic as the Kessler syndrome."

d to vacuum instead of allowing fuels to stew for years. SpaceX has its upper stages de-orbit most of the time.

#### Hoots is inevitable – 1AC Fabian says most satellites are active by the airforce and the past 20 years has seen a rise in state-satellite deployments

#### No retal or escalation from satellite attacks

Eric J. Zarybnisky 18, MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, PhD in Operations Research from the MIT Sloan School of Management, Lt Col, USAF, “Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space”, 3/28/2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062004.pdf

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE

While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used high-powered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.

#### Accidental war or miscalc is impossible

--self-deterrence – basic assumption of survival interest doesn’t require assumption of broader rationality

--opportunity for revising judgments – can “undo” escalation

--physical safeguards – Permissive Action Locks

--organizational checks – layers of communication and control double-checks

--overwhelming empirics – hundreds of near-accidents demonstrate safety, not risk

Michael **Quinlan 9**. Distinguished Former British Defence Strategist and Former Permanent Under-Secretary of State. 2009. “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons.” p. 63-69

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear-weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesis, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. 11 vital interests have been defined in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is 'If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events

stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.