### 1

#### CP Text: States should

#### ban resource extraction and mineral mining within the ocean, rainforest, and other natural ecosystems

#### ban use of fossil fuels

#### declare that natural ecosystems have legal personhood

#### Solves the aff – the impact and internal link evidence describes the relationship between capitalism and the environment is fundamentally exploitative for-profit incentives, so it resolves the excess of neoliberalism.

### 2

#### America’s maintaining heg and countering China’s rise, but sustained innovation and private sector investment are key.

Harr 8/3 [Scott, Army Special Forces Officer and Ph.D. Candidate at the Helms School of Government, Liberty University. He holds an undergraduate degree in Arabic Language Studies from West Point and a Master’s degree in Middle Eastern Affairs from Liberty University. A trained Arabic and Farsi speaker with over four years of cumulative deployment time in the Middle East, his work has been featured in The Diplomat, RealClearDefense, The Strategy Bridge, Modern War Institute, Military Review, The National Interest, and Joint Force Quarterly among other national security-focused venues, “By Avoiding Arms Races, America Can Counter China’s Rise”, 08-03-2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/avoiding-arms-races-america-can-counter-china%E2%80%99s-rise-191094]//pranav

Rather than falling into the power projection arms race “trap“ that China desires, U.S. competitive strategies addressing China should adopt a framework based on “counter-punching.” As its name suggests, the counterpunch incorporates both defensive (“counter”) and offensive (“punch”) elements. Additionally, it is an adaptive maneuver that requires disciplined understanding and controlled strength that, effectively employed, offers better alternatives towards protecting and preserving U.S. power in the face of challenges from China. The defensive element of an American counterpunch towards China involves adopting military restraint and a revamped examination of deterrence. Classic deterrence strategy involves presenting the credible threat of force to adversaries to create undesirable risks for would-be aggressors. The key to deterrence, as Kenneth Waltz famously argued, is determining how much deterrence is “enough” to dissuade aggressors. That is, deterrence does not necessarily require the presentation of power projection assets capable of completely destroying an adversary, but only enough assets to make the risks of aggressive behavior not worth the projected losses involved. Seen in this light, a strategy that diligently examines how much deterrence is “enough” potentially eliminates the impulse to sustain the ever-increasing stakes in costly arms races while, critically, offering a chance to reinvest excess “deterrence” resources into areas that will preserve and protect U.S. power. The national resources freed up by foregoing an arms race with China represent the potent offensive element of the counterpunch. These resources can be reinvested in other areas such as the private sector which, besides being the hallmark of American prosperity and thus the critical reason for protecting American power in the first place, has historically played a decisive role in the United States’ successful war efforts. Buoyed by a strong and vibrant private sector where the United States remains a desirable global hub for innovation and technology, the needed capabilities for war (or intense competition) can be adaptively produced and rapidly called forward to tip the competitive (or combative) scales towards victory when required. Of course, the “punch” loses its effectiveness without clearly articulated triggers for employment. If China seeks to induce the United States into an uncontrolled arms race, then the current U.S. obsession with China—which seems to interpret every Chinese action in any sphere as a threat requiring a U.S. response—must be viewed as very encouraging in Beijing. An effective U.S. counterpunch requires clearly defined red lines that regulate and set behavior expectations between great powers and indicate when a Chinese competitive action warrants a U.S. response. Detractors of the counterpunch framework will immediately note the call for military restraint and interpret it as a reactive recipe for military weakness at precisely a time requiring proactive military strength. But military restraint does not imply weakness any more than eating fewer calories implies malnutrition. It simply means making smarter decisions that play to U.S. strengths and away from Chinese strategy. It also entails properly viewing the risks inherent in competition with China. The counterpunch skeptic incorrectly perceives greater risks in short-term military restraint (traded for economic investment and fortification) than in long-term arms races (traded for potential economic collapse). The counterpunch skeptic also fails to appreciate the United States’ historic strengths in adopting this approach. In fact, America has demonstrated exceptional skill as an adaptive counter-puncher—reacting and adapting to adversity and setbacks to rise above them and create positive effects preserving U.S. power and ideas. U.S. institutions have counter-punched their way to success in the political (from the failed Articles of Confederation to the Constitution), social (from abhorrent slavery to civil rights), and military (from disastrous Pearl Harbor to WWII victory) arenas to produce the stable and prosperous nation that exists today. As John Mearsheimer points out, China has the population size and economic capacity (the “sinew of power”) to pose unique and unprecedented challenges to U.S. power. Additionally, wasteful military exploits—often employed as a means of competing with rivals—have contributed to bringing down world powers again and again throughout history. China understands this apparent axiom and has woven its truth into its competitive strategy to displace the United States as the world’s preeminent power in the twenty-first century. U.S. competitive strategy against China must, therefore, resist the powerful (but seemingly prudent) urge to continually increase the stakes projecting power against China. Rather, the United States needs to adopt a disciplined counterpunch framework focused on protecting and preserving (not projecting) power. This framework leverages the elements of a successful counterpunch: it demonstrates a superior understanding of adversary strategy (China’s desire to economically exhaust the United States with power projection), it leverages smart defensive elements (adopting only “enough” deterrence to influence China’s actions), and it fortifies conditions of economic strength to ensure offensive actions can be brought to bear when required in competition or conflict (re-investing resources into a globally-leading private sector). Employing a counterpunch framework asks Americans to trust its institutions—which is a difficult task in the face of a rising China. But the ask is not for blind trust. As a country with less than one-sixth of the world’s population, the United States as a superpower has been punching above its weight for decades and has historically counter-punched successfully to muster adaptive and superlative responses whenever challenged with adversity. America must follow these historical impulses to remain a superpower in the twenty-first century.

#### The affirmative’s reduction disincentivizes record setting innovation that causes spillover to other fields and destroys American hegemony and cedes dominance to China.

Iancu 8/11 [Andrei, American-Romanian engineer and intellectual property attorney, who served as the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office from 2017 to 2021, “Biden is trying to undermine America's world-leading IP protections”, https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/aug/11/biden-is-trying-to-undermine-americas-world-leadin/]//pranav

In May of this year, the Biden administration announced its support for a proposal at the World Trade Organization that would allow other countries to seize American intellectual property on COVID-19 technologies, including vaccines. On cue, those countries promptly modified their ask. Whereas the original proposal called for the waiver to last a limited number of years, the new proposal makes the waiver effectively permanent. And why not? If America is willing to hand over its crown jewels, it might as well demand to keep them forever. As a former Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, I know that America’s world-leading IP protections laid the foundation for our economic success and technological prowess. And as an immigrant from a communist nation, I know all too well how disrespect for private property rights undermines innovation and saps economic vitality. Since the Founding Fathers, Americans have understood that private property extends well beyond land, buildings, factories, and machines. The real source of America’s power and promise are ideas. Walls, locks, or guards can protect physical property, but the implementation of ideas — new songs, artificial intelligence, or medicines — requires special protections and trust in the rule of law. That’s why the Founders included intellectual property rights in the Constitution — in the form of an “exclusive right” for authors and inventors — to “promote the progress of science and useful arts.” Indeed, this is the only time the word “right” appears in the Constitution (amendments aside). The Founders knew that only the rule of law, and our respect for it, can protect and enable the development of these ideas. Yet, President Biden undermined that respect by signaling his support for the appropriation of America’s intangible assets. In doing so, he jeopardized America’s uniquely successful intellectual property system. The history of our nation — indeed, much of the history of the world — since 1789 has been the revolution in knowledge led by American ingenuity in agriculture, industry, medicine, and information technology. Progress like this does not just happen**. Indeed, it didn’t, for the millennia of the entire human history until our nation’s founding a couple of hundred years ago!** It’s not a coincidence that the last two centuries of uninterrupted, IP-driven innovation — up to and including the miraculous creation in a record time of the Covid vaccines themselves — began when one nation finally committed itself to protect intangible assets as much as physical property. **The reason is simple: knowledge is cumulative.** Every new discovery becomes the basis for new research. The revolutionary mRNA technology behind Pfizer and Moderna’s vaccines is, in fact, an evolutionary iteration of previous — patented — breakthroughs over the last two decades. Sen. Bernie Sanders, among others, turns up his nose at all this science, history, and progress. Like President Biden, he supports waiving vaccine patents because, he says, “We need a people’s vaccine, not a profit vaccine.” Ignore for a moment that many companies have agreed to sell their vaccines at non-profit prices for the duration of the pandemic, or that the vaccines are completely free for all patients at pharmacies nationwide, or that the federal government pays $19.50 per Pfizer dose, about $15 per Moderna dose, and $10 for the Johnson & Johnson shot — less than the cost of a pizza for medicines that are saving millions of lives and restoring our economy. **I**nstead, focus on the fact that intellectual property protections enabled the creation of “people’s vaccines” in the first place. The choice isn’t between cheap vaccines and even cheaper vaccines — it’s between shots that are protected by strong IP laws or no shots at all. The same goes for every industry. If President Biden doesn’t protect the IP behind new vaccines, investors and inventors will ask, what other technologies are next? Will similar takings be imposed on climate change technologies, for example? Food processing? Essential semiconductor technologies? Companies will scale back investments in medical devices, microchips, energy, and everything in between if they think the U.S. Government might waive IP protection after the fact so that others may copy their inventions with impunity. Of immediate concern is the need for more treatments for Covid-19, especially as the pandemic keeps raging with new variants. Knowing that their IP may be appropriated as soon as it is developed, private industry — especially start-ups and smaller businesses that depend heavily on outside capital — may not invest the resources necessary to develop these new technologies that are desperately needed right now. Here’s the reality: remove patents and other forms of intellectual property, and private-sector investment in innovation dries up. The government will then try to step in to fill the gap, inefficiently as always. Like the taking of factories to nationalize industry, this taking of intellectual property is effectively the nationalization of our innovation economy. The result will be the same as in every other socialist regime that nationalized its industries: the kind of poverty, corruption, and misery that my family escaped from decades ago. American innovation has cured diseases, enabled human flight, led to the development of computers, and made our nation the envy of the world. Waiving intellectual property rights could forfeit it all.

#### Primacy and allied commitments solve arms races and great power war – unipolarity is sustainable and prevents power vacuums and global escalation.

**Brands 18** [(Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump," Page 129-133]

**Since World War II, the United States has had** a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled **in key** overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. **policymakers committed to averting** a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further **advancing** liberal political values **and an open** international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, **and** catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances **would** lose credibility; **the stability of key** regions **would be** eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades **after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by** remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, **and** the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China **and** Russia—are **seek**ing regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end **conventional capabilities**, and rapid-deployment **and** **special op**erations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection **and** antiaccess/area denial (**A2**/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

#### Yes, if we win that the consequences of the general principle are bad and cause a nuclear war, then it takes out.

## Case

### Framing

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate consequences.

#### 1] Consequences first — anything else is irresponsible and escapes valuable discussions.

**Bracey 06** (Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318)

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### 2] Util good – Existential threats outweigh.

**GPP 17** (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater**. ...** The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in.Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided.The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks.Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. **74** Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large.Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude.A wide range of other cognitive biases

#### 3] We access their role of the ballot—nuclear war causes massive suffering and exasterbates the conditions of warming. Proves even if they win their framing nuke war and warming are still a tiebreaker.

#### 4] Don’t let them weigh the sum total of neoliberalism and commodification —they only get to weigh the unique amount solved by the affirmative. Filter the debate through scope of solvency—there’s no impact to root cause if they don’t solve it.

#### 5] Not a pre-req because the extinction mitigates the possibility of finding our own subjectivities. If debating means we have discovered our subjectivities then I found mine freshman year. Preformativity arguments are a fallacy of orgin because yes I need oxygen to debate doesn’t mean it should guide our framing.

### AT: Warming

#### 1] Turns case – regulated innovation solves climate.

Cohen 21 [(Steve, is the Senior Vice Dean of Columbia’s School of Professional Studies and a Professor in the Practice of Public Affairs at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs)"Kerry Was Correct: Decarbonization Will Require New Technology," 5-24-2021, https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/05/24/kerry-was-correct-decarbonization-will-require-new-technology/] TDI

It’s useful sometimes to ground analysis in fact. One environmental fact is that overall, the air and water in the United States are cleaner today than they were in 1970. America consumes more today and pollutes less than it did 50 years ago. How did that happen? In the case of air, regulation of motor vehicles and power plants resulted in new stack scrubbing technology, fuel switching and the mass adoption of the catalytic converter. Due to fuel milage standards, cars became lighter, more energy-efficient and cleaner. Power generation and vehicles (not heavy industry) have always been the largest sources of air pollution, and we use more cars and electricity today than we used 50 years ago. Technological innovation coupled with strong regulation resulted in improved air quality. We see similar results with sewage treatment and with the management of non-point sources of water pollution.

The technology of air, water and waste management has advanced dramatically since we created the EPA back in 1970. I believe that decarbonization is in the early stages of the same process. The technology we have now can get us started, but if it was really where it needed to be, it would already be in use. Electric cars are a good example. Yes, we need more charging stations and public policy should do even more to encourage early adoption. But what we really need is a battery so good that it can deliver a charge for 500 or 1,000 miles. We need an electric vehicle that costs less than today’s internal combustion vehicles. Those electric vehicles will require technological innovation that I am certain we will see but is not yet available. Those technologies will make the internal combustion engine obsolete. We are close. In fact, Ford recently announced the electronic version of its best-selling truck. According to Ford’s press release:

“The truck of the future is here. The F-150 Lightning is the smartest, most innovative truck Ford has ever built. From near instant torque to intelligent towing, seamless connectivity to software updates, plus power for your home, a power frunk and a digital screen that’s larger than any currently offered on a full-size truck – F-150 Lightning is a driving and ownership experience unlike any other.”

With federal tax incentives, the cost of the truck is competitive with the gasoline-powered version. The Ford F-150 is an indicator of technological process, and we will soon learn if it is able to win over truck-buyers.

Solar technology is also improving, but current technology is expensive, toxic, and large. Smaller, less toxic, and cheaper solar cells are now being invented. During the debate after John Kerry’s recent interview on BBC One’s Andrew Marr show, I kept hearing from climate experts and advocates that we have the technology we need and the search for new technology is just an excuse for inaction. I’m reminded of the pictures of people with the first cell phones in the 1980s. They were the size of a brick, cost about $10,000 (in 1980 dollars) and had very limited battery life. In 2004 we got the flip phone with seven hours of battery life, and a few years later, Apple invented the iPhone, which led to the small computers we keep in our pockets today. Sure, we had cell phones 40 years ago, but they were not ready for prime time. The need for additional research and the development of new technology is not an excuse for inaction today but an argument for a broader set of actions than simply using off-the-shelf technology. A key action is research leading to new technologies.

The transition to renewable energy and electronic vehicles has begun, but additional technological innovation and infrastructure investment will be needed to succeed. The larger problem will be the greenhouse gases produced when we manufacture steel, cement, and food. These industrial processes must also reduce their production of greenhouse gasses and developing the technology needed for these changes will be a massive national undertaking. As Ula Chrobak observed in a recent issue of Popular Science:

#### 2] No extinction from warming – 12 degrees and intervening actors check.

**Farquhar 17** [(Sebastian, leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism) “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf] TDI

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

#### 3] Cap solves climate change and alternatives only accelerate it.

---dismantling systems isn’t easy takes time, means warming accelerates in the interim

---causes wars because it forces political upheaval and people will fight to keep capitalism which is both offense and means alt fails

---US has decreased emissions now, sustainable energy like wind, solar, and hydro solve, our ev cites a report that looked at over 7000 cases says sustainable is competitive and will be adopted universally in 10 years

---during transition in order to beat the system, the movement would have to massively ramp up emissions to build weapons which locks in warming

**Smith 19** [Noah Smith Noah Smith is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He was an assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University, and he blogs at Noahpinion, “Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet”, April 5, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism, DOA: 8/20/19] Ian M

public-private cooperation will do more to limit climate change than eco-socialism. It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines. The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major political upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare. Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards have improved substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher). **Doubting the Carbon-Capitalism Equation** In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power. The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free cement production and so on. The best [climate](https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/15/how-to-decarbonize-america-and-the-world/) policy [plans](https://www.dataforprogress.org/green-new-deal) all involve technological improvement as a key feature. Recent developments show that the technology-centered approach can work. A recent report by Bloomberg New Energy Finance analyzed about 7000 projects in 46 countries, and found that large drops in the cost of solar power from photovoltaic systems, wind power and lithium-ion batteries have made utility-scale renewable electricity competitive with fossil fuels. A 76 percent decline in the cost of energy for short-term battery storage since 2012 is especially important. In a blog post, futurist and energy writer Ramez Naam underscores the significance of these developments. Naam notes the important difference between renewables being cheap enough to outprice new fossil-fuel plants, and being inexpensive enough to undercut existing plants. The former is already the case across much of the world, which is among the reasons for an 84 percent decrease in the number of new coal-fired plants worldwide since 2015. But when it becomes cheaper to scrap existing fossil-fuel plants and build renewables in their place, it will allow renewables to start replacing coal and gas much more quickly. Naam cites examples from Florida and Indiana where this is already being done. He cites industry predictions that replacing existing fossil-fuel plants with renewables will be economically efficient almost everywhere at some point in the next decade. Electricity is far from the only source of carbon emissions — there’s also transportation, manufacturing (especially of steel and cement), home and office heating, and agriculture to worry about. But the rapid advance of solar technology is a huge victory in the struggle against climate change, because it will allow people all over the world to have electricity without cooking the planet. And how was this victory achieved? A combination of smart government policy and private industry. Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers Goksin Kavlak, James McNerney and Jessika Trancik in a recent paper evaluated the factors behind the solar-price decline from 1980 to 2012. They concluded that from 1980 to 2001, government-funded research and development was the main factor in bringing down costs, but from 2001 to 2012, the biggest factor was economies of scale. These economies of scale were driven by private industry increasing output, but with government subsidies helping to increase the incentive to ramp up production. It’s apparent, therefore, that both government and profit-seeking enterprises have their roles to play. Government funds the development of early-stage technology and then helps push the private sector toward adopting those technologies, while private companies compete to find ever-cheaper methods of implementation. Instead of eco-socialism, it’s eco-industrialism. If there’s any system that can beat climate change, this looks like it.

#### 4] The aff’s reliance on scientific data and discoveries to policy expands the capitalist project of the affirmative to be predicated on profit motives.

Baskin 15 [(Jeremy, Senior Fellow at the Melbourne School of Government where he focuses on the legitimacy and accountability of knowledge) Paradigm Dressed as Epoch: The Ideology of the Anthropocene, 2015, Environmental Values] TDI

Even the limited examples from the literature already cited suggest that the assumptions of proponents of the Anthropocene about managerialism, technology and expertise are transparent and explicit. In almost all major accounts of the concept it is assumed that responding to the end of nature, and the challenges of the Anthropocene, requires a trinity of techniques: clear management of the Earth and Earth-systems, guided by experts (and scientists/engineers in particular), using the most advanced technology possible (including large- scale technology).

The challenges themselves are typically framed by a sense of emergency. The great weight of accumulating scientific data is recruited, to show how the human species and its planet are at risk. Landscapes and seascapes are being transformed, boundaries are being breached, non-linear processes have been unleashed, system pressures are rising and tipping points are either happening or looming; and all of this is both unprecedented in human history and fundamentally anthropogenic in cause.

Certainly recognition of the made-ness of the natural world means acknowledging that this carries responsibilities for the relevant human socie- ties, even a degree of conscious management. For leading proponents of the Anthropocene, the scale of management required is commonly seen, implicitly or explicitly, as global: since we face global problems, global management is needed to run the Earth in the Anthropocene. But what does it mean to frame policies within a global, universalist goal of ‘running the Earth’, and what condition are we trying to manage it towards?

Those of a more Aidosean inclination have spoken of the need to manage a return to the Holocene, or Holocene-like conditions, since this is ‘the only global environment that we are sure is “safe operating space” for the complex, extensive civilization that Homo sapiens has constructed’ (Steffen et al., 2011b: 747). This is the best way to manage the risks we face as we increasingly cross the planetary boundaries. The Prometheans, by contrast, argue that we should manage our way towards ‘a better Anthropocene’ (Ellis, 2011). The internal logic of the argument surely lies with the Prometheans. If humanity acknowledges and embraces its role as Earth-manager, and if we are indeed ‘post-nature’ and ‘nature is us’, then it is clearly impossible to return the Earth to the Holocene (or at least it would take millennia to do so). Why not aim for a ‘better’ Earth, or a more benign climate in which Norwegians are less cold, and Saudi Arabians less hot? For our purposes, however, the point is that the Aidosean and Promethean versions differ over the direction and goals of plan- etary management, rather than the need for it.

Managing the Anthropocene is also understood to come with special responsibilities for the scientific and engineering community (Crutzen, 2002). Only they are likely to have the knowledge, data and skills required in this new Age of Humans. At one level, one should not read too much into this, since the key proponents of the concept happen to be scientists and, not surprisingly, are more alert to the extent of their own knowledge and insights. Certainly sci- entists in the Anthropocene would have a key role as diagnosticians and, with engineers, as generators of specific technologies. But there is something troubling in the idea of scientists as both informants and saviours. Whilst policy needs to be informed by science, experience teaches that we should remain wary of the idea that policy can or should be guided by the science (Jasanoff, 1990; Pielke, 2007). As we know from the ‘climate wars’, the barriers to bringing down carbon-dioxide concentrations are almost entirely related to global and local politics, vested interests, deep-rooted values, economic structures and so on. For well over a decade they have been almost entirely unrelated to there being a lack of scientific data or new technologies (see Pielke, 2007: 71–2).

### AT: Warfare

#### 1] Multilateral economic ties forged through capitalism are key to interdependence which sets a cap on conflict.

**Jackson and Nei 15** – Matthew O. Jackson, William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford, and PhD in economics from Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stephen Nei, Economics PhD candidate at Stanford University (“Networks of military alliances, wars, and international trade,” *Proceedings of the National Academies of Science of the United States*, December 15th, 112(50), pp. 15277–15284, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4687585/)

**We provided a model of networks of military alliances and the interactions of those with international trade**. We showed that **regardless of military technologies and asymmetries** among countries, **nonempty stable networks fail to exist unless trade considerations are substantial**. Moreover, the network perspective gives us an understanding of how **trade might prevent conflict**, **by discouraging countries from turning against their allies and encouraging countries to defend their trade partners**. Although **this points to trade as a necessary condition for stability**, whether it is sufficient for stability depends on size of the costs and benefits of war. In closing, **we comment on several other features of international relations that are part of the larger picture of interstate war**. A notable change in alliances during the Cold-War period was from a “multipolar” to a “bipolar” structure, something which has been extensively discussed in the Cold-War literature (e.g., see ref. 12 for references). Although this lasted for part of the postwar period, and was characterized by a stalemate between the Eastern and Western blocs, such **a system of** two **competing cliques of alliances is only war-stable if there are sufficient trade benefits between members of a clique, as shown in our second theorem**. Moreover, it is more of a historical observation than a theory, and it does not account at all for the continued peace that has ensued over the last several decades. Thus, this fits well within the scope of the model and does not account for the overall trend in peace. Another institutional observation regarding the post-WWII calm is that **institutions have allowed for coordination of countries onto a peaceful “collective security” equilibrium where any country disrupting international peace is punished by all other countries**, so that war against one is war against all. However, as shown by ref. 34, this equilibrium is in some sense “weak”: **It relies heavily upon the assurance that a country tempted to join an attacking coalition will refuse and that all countries will follow through on their punishment commitments, so that far-sighted expectations of off-equilibrium behavior are correct**. Given that various small conflicts since WWII did not precipitate a global response, such doubts of some countries’ commitment to follow through on punishments seem reasonable.§§§§ Although collective security does not seem to explain the lasting peace, it nonetheless does suggest an interesting avenue for extension of our model: taking a repeated games approach to networked conflict and trade. One more relevant observation regarding changes in patterns of conflict is the so-called democratic peace: Democracies rarely go to war with each other. This coupled with a large growth of democracies might be thought to explain the increase in peace. However, once one brings trade back into the picture, it seems that **much of the democratic peace may be due to the fact that well-established democracies tend to be better-developed and trade more**. Indeed, studies (38, 39) indicate that poor democracies are actually significantly more likely to fight each other than other countries, and that paired **democracy is only significantly correlated with peace when the countries involved have high levels of economic development, which is consistent with trade’s playing the major role rather than the government structure**. Our model abstracts from political considerations, which still could be significant, and so this suggests another avenue for further extension.

#### 2] They don’t have evidence that implicates why alternatives are able to solve their warming and warfare impacts so err neg.

### AT: Contention

#### 1] IP is key to recognizing agents through the personality in their work. There is a distinction between recognition and commodification. Recognition is necessary for agents.

**Hughes 2 -** "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) by Justin Hughes [https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html] // ahs emi

At first blush, this economic rationale seems far removed from the concerns of personality theory, [n244](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n244) yet it can be recast into the framework of the personality theory. From the Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition. These payments acknowledge the individual's claim over the property, and it is through such acknowledgement that an individual is recognized by others as a person. [n245](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n245) "Recognition" involves more than lip service. If I say "this forest is your property" and then proceed to flagrantly trespass, cut your timber, and hunt your deer, I have not recognized your property rights. Similarly, verbal recognition of an intellectual property claim is not equal to the recognition implicit in a payment. Purchasers of a copyrighted work or licensees of a patent form a circle of people recognizing the creator as a person. Furthermore, this generation of income complements the personality theory in as much as income facilitates further expression. When royalties from an invention allow the inventor to buy a grand piano he has always wanted, the transaction helps maximize personality. But this argument tends to be too broad. First, much income is used for basic necessities, leading to the vacuous position that life-sustenance is "personally maximizing" because it allows the personality to continue. Second, this approach could justify property rights for after-the-fact development of personality interests without requiring [\*350] such interests in the property at the time the property rights are granted. The personality theory provides a better, more direct justification for the alienation of intellectual property, especially copies. The alienation of copies is perhaps the most rational way to gain exposure for one's ideas. This is a non-economic, and perhaps higher, form of the idea of recognition: respect, honor, and admiration. Even for starving artists recognition of this sort may be far more valuable than economic rewards. Two conditions appear essential, however, to this justification of alienation: first, the creator of the work must receive public identification, and, second, the work must receive protection against any changes unintended or unapproved by the creator.VARA Hegel's prohibition of "complete" alienation of intellectual property appears to result from his recognition of the necessity for these two conditions. While he would permit alienation of copies, and even the rights to further reproduction, [n246](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n246) he disapproves alienation of "those goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which constitute . . . private personality and the universal essence of . . . self-consciousness." [n247](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n247) Such alienation necessarily occurs if the recognition of the connection between a creator and his expression is destroyed or distorted. When the first condition is violated, this recognition is destroyed; when the second condition is violated, it is distorted.

#### 2] There is no internal link between commodication via intellectual property rights and fueling warming and the “neoliberal project.”

#### 3] Waiving IP enforcement results in rampant increase in counterfeit vaccines causes more commodification of others medicines and ideas via false production – turns case

Mercurio 21 (Bryan Mercurio is a Professor and Vice-Chancellor's Outstanding Fellow of the Faculty of Law at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, February 21, 2021, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3789820&download=yes>) CS

6. IP enforcement is of vital importance to maintaining safety standards.

The protection of IP not only provides incentives to innovators to create, but also plays a crucial role in ensuring the safety of vaccines and helping to prevent the importation **of fraudulent and dangerous goods**. Unlike the typical pharmaceutical industry, the vaccine market is not a free and open market.69 Vaccines contain biological products made from living organisms and the risk of failure in vaccine development and production is high. 70 Moreover, the manufacturing process for vaccines is much more complex as it requires the use of facilities and equipment with a high degree of specialization.71 The complexity of vaccine products implies that more time and regulatory requirements are needed in order to make or “copy” the vaccine production process. Therefore, the innovator should be expected to make conscious and meticulous decisions as to when and to whom to issue licences, as this is the most responsible way to bring their technologies to the world and safeguard global health.

In addition, as the COVID-19 pandemic continues there has been a **noticeable increase in the circulation of fake medicines** around the world. According to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), **organized crime groups** have been producing fake drugs and medical products and selling them for **lucrative profits in developing countries**.72 With the development of COVID-19 vaccines on the market, a rapid rise in the illegal sale of fake items is expected, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).73 Counterfeits of the legitimate products provide false promises of protection and could lead to **disastrous consequences**, including **worsened illness and** **death** for the individual and the retardation of herd immunity for the population at large. Effective and proactive **IP** procurement is **essential** and useful in mitigating the risks of counterfeit and substandard medicines. IP enforcement measures play a significant role in preventing these fake and illicit medicines from circulating in the market. While important during normal times, IP enforcement can take on an enhanced role of safeguarding the public during this critical period of time. Waiving all COVID-19 related IPRs raises the risk of unsafe or fake vaccines circulating in supply channels and being sold to unsuspecting governments, **putting millions of human lives at risk** and reducing trust in vaccines.