### 1

#### Debate is structured by the agential fantasy – the plan substitutes actual politics for endless impotent demands. This ensures the continual avoidance of the traumatic realization that political prescription is not politics. The alternative is to say “no” to the aff – this intervention shatters their fantasy and allows for a new mode of subjectivity independent of the Symbolic Other’s response.

Lundberg ‘12 (Christian, Assoc. Prof. of Rhetoric @ UNC, Chapel Hill, “On Being Bound to Equivalential Chains”, *Cultural Studies* 26.2-3)

Laclau's On Populist Reason provides an elegant account of demand as the fundamental unit of the political, and by extension of politics as a field of antagonism. Laclau's basic goal is to define the specificity of populist reason, or, to give an account of populism as ‘special emphasis on a political logic which, is a necessary ingredient of politics tout court’, of ‘Populism, quite simply, as a way of constructing the political’ (Laclau 2005, p. 18). Here, a focus on demands replaces a now prevalent approach focused on various taxonomies of populism (which Laclau diagnoses as hopelessly unsystematic) with a more formal account of the political based on the logic of demands, which in turn provides a way of thinking about the political as the space of demand and politics as a practice of working through specific demands. Demands serve a number of functions that derive from the split between the universal and the particular that Laclau relies upon. Demands articulate a specific political claim at the level of the particular, and also imply a more generalized relationship to hegemony in the register of the universal. On this logic, demands represent the hegemonic order, creating an implicit picture of how it functions and might change. Simultaneously, demands create possible lines of equivalential affinity between others also making demands on the hegemonic order. Thus, the demand is more fundamental than the group, in that the operation of the split demand inaugurates all ‘the various forms of articulation between a logic of difference and a logic of equivalence’ that animate the social affinities that give groups their coherence (Laclau 2005, p. 20). The logic of the demand is in turn the logic of equivalence, and equivalence is as important for how it animates a group identity, as it is in positing claims on a hegemonic order. Although Laclau owes a significant debt to Freud and Lacan, it is not clear that his theory of demand is explicitly crafted from psychoanalytic categories. For example, how central is enjoyment to Laclau's relatively formal account of the demand? As Glynos and Stavrakakis have argued, there is a ‘complete and conspicuous absence in Laclau's work of Lacanian categories such as fantasy, and, perhaps more importantly, jouissance’ (Glynos and Stavrakakis 2006, p. 202). Glynos and Stavrakakis claim that there is ‘to [their] knowledge no reference in Laclau's work to the concept of jouissance’ (Glynos and Stavrakakis 2006, p. 209). On Populist Reason contains a brief discussion of the concept of jouissance as worked out by Copjec, which Laclau summarizes by saying: there is no achievable jouissance except through radical investment in an objet petit a. But the same discovery (not merely an analogous one) is made if we start from the angle of political theory. No social fullness except through hegemony; and hegemony is nothing more than the investment in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us. The logic of the objet petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar, they are simply identical. (Laclau 2005, p. 109) There is an elegance to Laclau's point about enjoyment, provided that enjoyment is reducible to a set of logical forms. This presupposition makes the lack of talk about jouissance in Laclau's work understandable. If jouissance and hegemony are identical, one does not need Lacan to say something that might be said more elegantly with Gramsci. Jouissance is simply hegemonic investment, an elevation of an object or identity to the level of a thing or a universal. Despite occasional caveats to the contrary, the greatest virtues of Laclau's version of the political stem from his relentlessly persistent application of a formal, almost structural account of the political. And, as is the case with many well executed structuralist accounts, Laclau's system can elegantly incorporate caveats, objections to and oversights in the original system by incorporating them into the functioning of the structure – jouissance can easily be read as nothing more than hegemony in this account without changing the original coordinates of the system too drastically. Yet, enjoyment provides one particularly difficult stumbling block for a dedicated formal account. To start with, enjoyment is never quite as ‘achievable’ as the preceding quotation might suggest. Far from being the consummation of a logic of structure and investment, enjoyment is a supplement to a failing in a structure: for example, Lacan frames jouissance as a useless enjoyment of one's own subjectivity that supplements the fundamental failings of a subject in either finding a grounding or consummating an authoritative account of its coherence. This ‘uselessness’ defines the operation of jouissance. Thus, for example, when Lacan suggests that ‘language is not the speaking subject’ in the Seminar on Feminine Sexuality, lodging a critique of structural linguistics as a law governing speech, jouissance is understood as something excessive that is born of the failure of structures of signification (Lacan 1977). Language is not the speaking subject precisely because what is passed through the grist mill of the speech is the result of a misfiring of structure as much as it is prefigured by logics of structure, meaning and utility. Therefore the interpretive difficulty for a structuralist account of enjoyment: the moment that the fact of enjoyment is recoded in the language of structure, the moment that it is made useful in a logic of subjectivization is precisely the moment where it stops being jouissance. Following Glynos and Stavrakakis's suggestion, one might press the question of the relationship between the demand and jouissance as a way of highlighting the differences that a purely Lacanian reading of demand might make for Laclau's understanding of politics. Framing enjoyment as equivalent with hegemony, Laclau identifies the fundamental ‘split’ in psychoanalytic theory between the universal and the particular demands of a group. Framing the split in this way, and as the privileged site of the political, Laclau occludes attention to another split: namely, the split within a subject, between the one who enters an equivalential relationship and the identitarian claim that sutures this subject into a set of linkages. This too is a site of enjoyment, where a subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence. The demand is relevant here, but not simply because it represents and anticipates a change in the social order or because it identifies a point of commonality. Here the demand is also a demand to be recognized as a subject among other subjects, and given the sanction and love of the symbolic order. The implication of this argument about the nature of enjoyment is that the perverse dialectic of misfirings, failure and surpluses in identity reveals something politically dangerous in not moving beyond demand. Put another way: not all equivalences are equally equivalent. Some equivalences become fetishes, becoming points of identification that eclipse the ostensible political goal of the demand. To extend the line of questioning to its logical conclusion, can we be bound to our equivalential chains? Freud, Lacan and the demand Demand plays a central role in Freud's tripartite scheme for the human psyche specifically in the formation of the ego. Although this scheme does not exercise the same hold over psychoanalytic thinking that it once did, the question of the ego still functions as an important point of departure for psychoanalytic thinking as a representative case of the production of the subject and identity. Even for critics of ‘ego psychology’, the idea of the ego as a representation of the ‘I’ of the human subject is still significant – the main question is what kind of analytical dispositions one takes towards the ego, the contingencies of its emergence and its continuing function. Despite the tendency of some commentators to naturalize Freud's tripartite schema of the human psyche, Freud's account of the ego does not characterize the ego as pre-existent or automatically given. Although present in virtually every human subject, the ego is not inevitably present: the ego is a compensatory formation that arises in the usual course of human development as a subject negotiates the articulation and refusal of its needs as filtered through demand. Hypothetically a ‘subject’ whose every need is fulfilled by another is never quite a subject: this entity would never find occasion to differentiate itself from the other who fulfils its every need. As a mode of individuation and subjectification, egos are economies of frustration and compensation. This economy relies on a split in the Freudian demand, which is both a demand to satiate a specific need and a demand for addressee to provide automatic fulfilment of need generally. The generative power of the demand relies on this split and on fact that some demands will be refused. This economy of need and frustration works because refusal of a specific need articulated as a demand on another is also a refusal of the idea that the addressee of the demand can fulfil all the subject's needs, requiring a set of individuation compensatory economic functions to negotiate the refusal of specific demands. ‘Ego’ is nothing more than the name for the contingent economy of compensatory subjectification driven by the repetition and refusal of demands – the nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfilment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the metaphor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of development, must not be fulfilled. Thus the logic of the pop-psychology observation that the incessant demands of children for impermissible objects (‘may I have a fourth helping of dessert’) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authoritative pronouncements (the game of asking a never-ending ‘whys’) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity producing effects of the distanciating parental ‘no’. In ‘The Question of Lay Analysis’, Freud argues: If … demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise … At that point … the ego begins to function. If all the driving force that sets the vehicle in motion is derived from the id, the ego … undertakes the steering, without which no goal can be reached. The instincts in the id press for immediate satisfaction at all costs, and in that way they achieve nothing or even bring about appreciable damage. It is the task of the ego to guard against such mishaps, to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world. (Freud 1986, p. 22) Later works move this theory from the narrow bounds of the parent/child relationship to a broader social relationship which was continually constituting and shaping the function of the ego – this is a theme of works such as Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, as well as Civilization and its Discontents. The latter repeats the same general dynamics of ego formation as ‘The Question of Lay Analysis’, but moves the question beyond individual development towards the entirety of social relations. For Freud, the inevitability of conflicts between an individual and the social whole is simply one of the facts of life among other people. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the individual's attempts to fulfil certain desires – some demands for the fulfilment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. Here frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes, and civilization as mode of functioning, though it does so at the cost of imposing a constitutively contested relationship with social mores (Freud 1989). Though there are many places to begin thinking the Freudian demand in Lacan, one of the best places to start is an almost accidental Lacanian rumination on demands. Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: ‘as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!’ Framing the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan's theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan's theory of the demand picks up at Freud's movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/child and individual/civilization towards a more general account of the subjects, sociality and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoretical movement transposes Freud's comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject's entry into signification. Lacan's goal is to rearticulate Freudian development processes as metaphors for a theory of the subject's production within signification. In Lacanian terms, what is at stake in this transposition is a less naturalized account of the subject by privileging supplementary practices of enjoyment that give a subject coherence as an agent, not in the sense of an ultimate ontological grounding, but rather as a mode of enjoying the repetition of retroactive totalities that name and produce subjects. This process is most famously worked out in Lacan's famous ‘Mirror Stage’ which details the trauma of the subject's insertion into the symbolic order, and the way that this constitutive dislocation generates the jouissance that sustains the production of subjectivity (Lacan 1982a). Looking in the mirror, Lacan's hypothetical infant does not yet have a concept of a unified self, puzzled by the fact that when it moves the image of the child in the mirror also moves. From the child in the mirror, Lacan infers the existence of two ‘I's underwriting processes of subjectivization: an ‘ideal I’, a statuesque projection of what it means to be an ‘I’ (in this case the image of the child) and a phenomenological experience of ‘I-ness’. Lacan treats the dialectic of misidentification in the mirror as a constant and constitutive performance of subjectivity as opposed to a specific developmental stage (Wilden 1982). In this interpretation, the child in the mirror stage is a metaphor for the constant production of the subject as a performance of the self in relation to a constitutive gap between the Symbolic and the subject, and the articulation of subjectivity as a category serves to repress the trauma produced in the margin between a nascent subject, its alienation from a projected external identity, and within the structure of signification. The paradoxical effect of this mode of subject formation is that not only does the child ‘discover’ that she is the child in the mirror, it also experiences a disorienting distance between itself and its image. Despite this fact, the child requires the an external image such as the one in the mirror to impose a kind of unity on its experience – the image of the other child provides an imaginary framing, a retroactive totality or a kind of narrative about what it means to be a self. The paradox of subjectivity lies in the simultaneity of identifying with an image of one's self that is given by a specific location within the symbolic order and the simultaneous alienation produced by the image's externality. Thus, the assumption of a frame for identity cannot ever completely effective, or, a subject is never completely comfortable inhabiting subjectivity – there is always an impossible gap between an experience of alienated subjectivity, a prefigured given image of one's subjectivity and the experience of being produced by the Symbolic. There is a famous Lacanian aphorism that holds that ‘the signifier represents a subject for another signifier’ (Lacan 1977, p. 142). This formulation of the subject's relation to language inverts the conventional wisdom that ontologically pre-given subjects use language as an instrument to communicate their subjective intentions. Signifiers are constituted by their difference, and subjects come into being in negotiating their entry into this realm of difference. Instead of articulating subjective states through language, subjects are articulated through language, within the differential space of signification. The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is simultaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. The mirror stage marks the excess of the demand as a mode of subject formation. Subjects assume the identity as subjects as a way of accommodating to the demand placed on them by the symbolic, and as a node for producing demands on the symbolic, or, of being recognized as a subject (Lacan 1982a, p. 4). Here jouissance is nothing more than the useless enjoyment of one's own subjectivity, surplus produced in negotiating a difficult gap between the phenomenological and ideal ‘I's, produced by a failure in relation between Lacan's phenomenological I and the Symbolic. Both the site of subject production and the site where this subject fills out an identity by investing in equivalential linkages and common demands are sites of enjoyment. In this sense, perhaps there is an excess of jouissance that remains even after the reduction of jouissance to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the conditions of possibility for investment, the defining point for Laclau's reduction of jouissance to hegemony. This specific site of excess, where the subject negotiates the terms on a non-relationship with the symbolic is the primary site splitting need, demand and desire. Need approximates the position of the Freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes ‘there is no adequation between need and demand’ (Sheridan 1982). The same type of split that inheres in the Freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, though in this case the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of fulfilling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of ever fully articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the Other. Since there is no adequation, the specificity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that demand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfil the demand. This impossibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: namely that the demand is less a way of addressing need than a call for love and recognition by this other. ‘In this way’, writes Lacan, ‘demand annuls (aufheht) the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (sich erniedrigt) to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love’ (Lacan 1982b, p. 286). The difficulty is that the Other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the constitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the symbolic – the mirror stage marks the constitutive split between the subject and the Symbolic. This paradoxical split, namely the structural impossibility of fulfilling demands, resonates with the logic of the Freudian demand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that ‘desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second’ (Lacan 1982b, p. 287). How might this subtraction occur? The answer to this question requires an account of the Other as seemingly omnipotent, and as simultaneously unable to fulfil demands. This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift which it does not have, namely the gift of love: It will seem odd, no doubt, that in opening up the immeasurable space that all demand implies, namely, that of being a request for love …. Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the Other … having no universal satisfaction … It is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed. (Lacan 1982c, p. 311) Transposed to the realm of political demands, this framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. In the classical iteration and contemporary critical theories that inherit its spirit, there is a presupposition that a demand is a way of exerting agency, and that the more firmly that the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfil it. Thus, demands ought to reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a re-evaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this ‘subtraction’ is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoidances or transposition, but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, this is a dialectical process, where at each moment the subject is either learning to reassert the centrality of its demands, or where it is coming to terms with the impotence of the other as a satisfier of demands: But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered …. Clinical experience has shown us that this test of the desire of the Other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a real phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it. (Lacan 1982b, p. 311) Thus, desire both has general status and a specific status for each subject. In other words, it is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments, but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: Lacan is sure that everyone's desire is somehow different and their own – lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language … passing through demand into desire, something from the real, from the individual's being before language, is retained as a trace enough to determine that I desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a … petit a is different for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which I try to refind it. (Easthope 2000, pp. 94–95) The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might ‘recognize and name’ their own desire, and as a result to become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. This naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented towards or determined by the locus of the demand, determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject towards others and a political order. As Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence, or in the register of this essay, a new political possibility: ‘That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given …. In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world’ (Lacan 1988, pp. 228–229). Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit the possibility of desire, or as Fink argues: ‘later, however, Lacan comes to see that an analysis … that … does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand … unable to truly desire’ (Fink 1996, p. 90). What does this have to do with hysteria? A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is definitionally a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire which is theirs. In the *Seminar on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, for example, Lacan argues that the hysteric's demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion towards one's desire: ‘the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centred on the object, in so far as this object, das Ding, is, as Freud wrote somewhere, the support of an aversion’ (Lacan 1997, p. 53). This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus the logic of ‘as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!’ At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought, but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. Here the fundamental problem of democracy is not in articulating resistance over and against hegemony, but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. The difficulty in thinking hysteria is that it is both a politically effective subject position in some ways, but that it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at least a politics of interruption: imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility, with no site for contest or reappropriation and everything simply the working out of a structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, hysteria is net politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Thus, though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affective affirmation of a hegemonic order, and therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization.

#### The aff is a desire for recognition that resists the master of whiteness without resisting mastery, producing a perpetual quest for the Other’s jouissance that dooms the aff’s politics to endlessly perfecting the signifier.

Rogers 15 (Juliet Brough Rogers, professor of political science at the University of Melbourne (Australia), “A Stranger Politics: Resistance in Psychoanalytic Thought and Praxis” in Jacques Lacan: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics, Routledge, 2015: 186)

The conundrum of change in psychoanalysis (and beyond) highlights the first of two particular problems of, and with, resistance that appear when the subject attempts such a change of rules. First, change rarely (if ever) involves the creation of what Douzinas (2013: 141) calls ‘a new political subject’. That is, subjects are always already subjected – let us say occupied – a priori and thus all imaginations of resistance are framed in a priori discourse. As such, the subjects’ imaginations, including their imaginations of the results of revolution – or of a new mode of being – are always colonized with what is available to them. This is why – for Žižek (2007) and for Lacan (2007) – in post-revolutionary states, what the subject will get is more of the same. The second problematic that haunts acts of resistance, and of more specific concern to psychoanalytic practice, is that any employment of violence as a means to an end, and particularly as an effort toward a violent unsettling of the regime, can only be understood as the effort to capture a definitive answer to the insistent and formative question to the Other, expressed by Lacan (2006) as,‘che vuoi Autre?’ – ‘what do you want from me?’ In some cases this may be a violent effort toward capture, exercised to the point of a defiance of the existence of the question. What this means is that one acts, violently, in order to produce a known future, as the answer. The two problematics of resistance overlap because the answer is always imagined in the terms/signifiers available from the past. That is, the answer appears in the frame of the categories which produce the subject, and thus recruits the first problematic: ‘you are (always) already subjected’. I’ll tackle these problematics in turn. First, ‘you are already subjected’. If we even partially accept Judith Butler’s (1997: 6) treatise on the formation of subjectivity as a series of ‘passionate attachments’ to ‘subjection’,10 then it is difficult to understand how the subject might be what Douzinas (2014) described as ‘re- or de-subjectivised’ in the first site of becoming a resisting subject.11 For the political subject of democracy, recognition is, as Claude Lefort (1989) has told us well, the condition of being a subject. This means recognition within the signifiers – let us call them biopolitical categories – allocated to the identity of the subject of democracy. The stage of political recognition is populated by signifiers which broker little dissent – by others and even by the self. In Butler’s terms, we are ‘passionately attached’ to our gender, imaginations of health, rights, and, in Lacan’s terms, the ‘goods’ – as objects and as ideas – which offer us the imagination of recognition. We are occupied as subjects through our own occupation with a recognizable identity before democracy, with the qualities (objects) that reflect that identity. This occupation allows for little, if any, dissent as to the naturalness, goodness, and reality of the signifiers that produce the subject – as signifiers which adhere fundamentally to economies of desires: as desires for recognition of identity and rights, as desires for capital. That is, the subject is occupied a priori with these categories and recognizes (and demands recognition) via these categories. If we accept the premises of subjection framed above then the argument follows that the resisting subject is still a subject, but one who looks for recognition beyond the common political forms. That is, we can say that the resisting subject is still ‘passionately attached’ to the ideas and objects which offer recognition, but these may be recognition by an alternative political party, a Cause or, in Lacanian psy- choanalysis, we would say s/he attaches to (another) Master’s discourse. They may resist one Master, but they chose another Master. They do not resist mastery. And here we have the basic difficulty with theories and actions of resistance. These difficulties are that somehow, in some way, any acts of resistance always become modes of, in Lacan’s terms, the desire for (another) Master (2007). Resistance, understood this way, is a state of being that is always already subjectivized within the parameters of its own claims, or within the parameters of the subject’s imagination of its goals. This is the obvious reference made by Lacan in his comments to the students who participated in the ‘resistances’ of 1968 in France (and elsewhere). As he says, ‘What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a Master. You will get one’ (Lacan 2007: 207).14 The provocative comment to the students – some of whom have come to listen to him and some who have come to (apparently) resist him – is a comment on their acting out the discourse of the Master that they imagine they can overcome, through listening (or even objecting) to another Master, namely, Lacan. In this attempt at resistance which falls prey to its own conditions of subjection, we can say that the subjectivity of the resisting subject – the student – is preoccupied with the signifiers available to resist, where the best they can hope for is to be re-occupied by the imagination of securing (another) truth. This hope, at least for the students in France at this time – understood through Lacan (and his discussions in 1969) – is the hope for the Other’s knowledge. A knowledge which the subject presumes the Other has. A knowledge which is imagined to be able to be accessed and had. A knowledge which is presented as the answer to the question ‘che vois Autre?’ And here appears the second psychoanalytic concern with resistance: resistance as a belief in an access to an answer, or, in its most extreme or crude terms, resistance as psychosis. Resistance, understood as a desire for a Master, becomes a performance of what the subject imagines is the answer. The answer as a closed course of action with a fixed teleological imagination, such that the resisting subject might say: ‘If I do this I will be this’, or ‘if I do this then the final result will be this’, or, in its psychotic form, ‘if I do this the world will be this’. It is important to stress, however, that this may not follow for all acts of resistance – which I will postulate later – but when Lacan says of the students in France that what they want is a Master, this form of psychotic achievement of an answer is precisely what he is referring to. Theirs is the desire for a discourse that holds within it the knowledge that the subject imagines is required (and can be acquired/obtained/had) to achieve a perfection of the signifier, an imagination that the subject can acquire, what Lacan (2007: 14–15) describes as the ‘Other’s jouissance’. The students, in Lacan’s suggestion, want to resist in order to obtain the answer when it is the existence of an answer at all they are supposedly resisting.

#### That culminates in extinction.

Themi, Philosophy PhD, 8 (Tim, Prof @ Deakin U, “How Lacan’s Ethics Might Improve Our Understanding of Nietzsche’s Critique of Platonism: The Neurosis & Nihilism of a ‘Life’ Against Life,” *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy* 4.1-2, 2008, bosu)

For to circle in too close to the Thing which is ethically forbidden by our reality principles––yet too the real truth of much desire––does hardly give us pleasure at all but anguish of the heaviest kind. Even if done so only as a thought experiment; as a free-association. So go there we generally don’t, and our ‘realities’ reflect as much. But henceforth when desire builds up, damns and flares return of the Thing: this is how Lacan specifically characterises the move we might make that goes beyond the pleasure principle, whose other name for Freud is ‘death-drive’. There where there is no, not pleasure yet jouissance in the transgression that the Thing would bring, a jouissance of transgression which Lacan suggests is the most direct satisfaction of a drive humanly possible[48]. But it’s also one perhaps unconsciously masochistic, that which Freud writes up as being only preliminarily sadistic, in eventually expressing itself as an “unconscious need for punishment”[49]. And if indeed we are feeling guilty, then we may yet still seek to pay the price. Why? For unknowingly possessing and inadvertently re-accessing this Thing in our real, beyond the pleasure-reality principle, our moral transgressions casting shadow long into the unconscious we know next to nothing about, and refuse even to acknowledge.

Could it not be thusly then that our time is behind now a sadomasochistic, wilfully ignorant drive towards death for nigh the entire species? Such punishment would too overly suffice, to be sure, for even a two-millennium length in repression…

But with our advancements in technological power outmatching by far any correlative advance in the awareness gained as a whole of our prehistoric Thing within: the great 21st century ecological disaster that too many academics and activists now increasingly predict, seems more than just a little possible. But to this increasingly macabre scenario, we must also add the renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons which occurs, no less, amidst a world where vital resources for energy and democracy are wearing thin[50]. For just such reasons, wilful ignorance of the Thing now bares results which Lacan’s Ethics reveals as far too terrifyingly possible to rationally accept; given that we have the Thing armed to the teeth now from that primitive id-like part of the brain, with no Sovereign Good, and all the way into a nuclear age.

CONCLUSION: THE NEUROSIS & NIHILISM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE.

This is why Lacan proposes that his enquiry into ethics must be one to go “more deeply into the notion of the real”(LE:11). Further into what he would rather call the real, given that previous notions of ‘nature’ have been too far ‘different’––from being far too Platonic––than his own; and because it’s the very exclusions in these previous notions which upon return, as return of excess, are yielding our most tragic problems.

Today when faced with problems of the magnitude of global warming––a special but by no means solo case of adverse environment change at present due to our physical treatment of the planet––we often think the answer is to be more moral, more good, and we are thankful when exponents of the Good in some way bring attention to the problem. However, the idea of the Good as introduced by Plato, and nigh all of its descendants whether secular, rationalist, religious or not, continue to predicate themselves on a radically false picture of the human-condition: if not still of the entire cosmos––which only then lines itself up aside of an age-old repression, a repression of das Ding, that Freudian Thing in our inner real which, when it returns after being disavowed and denied in the name of the Good too long, is even more devastating.

Presently we are accelerating along the path of what Lacan discloses as our civilisation’s “race towards destruction”, a “massive destruction”, “a resurgence of savagery”, snaking the paths traced out before us by the centuries long dominion of Western morality [51]; and the nihilism detected by Nietzsche before the turn of the 20th has never threatened to reach such the grand finale. But what I would have us take from this enquiry here is that this is not because we aren’t in accordance enough with a moral ideal of the Sovereign good, but rather, it’s because we aren’t in accordance enough with a proper understanding of the real. It’s because we still at some level think that being more moral, in accordance with the Good’s inherited repressive structures towards our drives, desire, and truthfulness about the real, is actually the answer to––rather than the source of––our most tragic problems.

The goal here is by no means then to encourage all to let their Things run wild––which would probably be nothing short of an instant conflagration––but this is why and precisely why we must desist from deluding ourselves under the tightening grip of a Sovereign Good, for this is precisely the move which cuts the Thing loose after pressing down for far too long, a slippery hand’s palming on the coils of a spring, forever readying the subsequent explosion. For when that which is really real––as opposed to what Christian-Platonism falsely called the ‘real’––is forced from mind, it can’t really disappear because it is real, and it tends to end up only in our gun-sights as an imaginary overlaying of an external other, when the signifier ‘enmity’ appears. The earth itself can even seem like the enemy after while, one which like Plato in his Phaedo, we might think then to escape from “as if from a prison”, and especially from “the bonds of the body”, in the hope that we may live one day without the earthly altogether[52]. Following such negations to their logical conclusion, life itself becomes enemy too, for as being made up of the earthly and organic, life could never be free of what it is in essence. And what is the death-drive Freud tells from the start, if not to return us sundry to that dust-bowl of the inorganic; as per that “second death”[53] fantasm Lacan salvages from the Monstre de Sade, which wills to go beyond the destruction of mere beings, by destroying too the principle from which fresh sets could emerge. Such negative devaluations of our earthly, organic life though are really of our own construction: as de Sade, like any pervert, is only the mirror which shows expressed what Platonic-neurotics are but hide inside––a cess-pit of loathing contempt for life, built up from the unconscious and disowned, distorted and damned up, built up, instinctual-ideational elements of their own subjective psyches, phobically ferocious of that Thingly real lying not so dormant, and readying within…

But is it now still possible as Nietzsche teaches to say ‘Yes’ to the real of nature both without and within––to return to it!––even though it is more frightful and we are less guaranteed protection of it than the Platonic history of metaphysicians taught? For with the further disclosures of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis––Lacan’s following up and extension of the meta-ethical implications of Freud: perhaps even Nietzsche, our great intellectual übermensch, may too have bitten off more snake-head than he could chew? From certain moments in Nietzsche’s texts we can perhaps interpret that he may have had this Thing in his sights, but saw nothing much to come of it, so instead, elected to turn away, though not without some perhaps hinted at self-amusement.[54]

But with psychoanalysis, rightly or wrongly, such truths are out. It doesn’t seem all positive at first, and perhaps it never entirely will. But we must not let this deeper disclosure desist us now from the core Nietzschean project of locating and overcoming the nihilism which begs us to take cover in idealising fictions, as if life as life is not worth living. Not because nihilism and the annihilation of the species is wrong in the sense of being immoral, but rather because it is bad art, mediocre art, and the ‘knowledge’ claims it trumpets on should only make us flare. If we are at our full intellectual and creative will to power, we can only consider such cultural-civil regressions as we saw on display with that whole propaganda comedy that surrounded the war for more oil in Iraq as infantile; the hapless results of sibling rivalries gone too far astray. But we must also resist being caught up in the imaginary of those who would only re-preach to us now of a return to the Good, who would only redeploy such versions of nihilism’s precursory defensive fictions, the pernicious ones, which would only then re-falsify our data, and leave us disappointed when the truth then re-emerges. Doing more harm than good does Platonism in the end by leaving us untrained for the real, with the habit instead to take some truth as ‘error’, and error as ‘truth’––as ‘real’––to the point even of epistemic dysfunction. Take the grotesque intellectual poverty of that whole Christian middle-ages for example, whence put into relation with the heights of Aristotle and his fellow Greeks, as Augustine and Aquinas amplified some of the worst bits of Platonism, and threw the rest into abyss.

The overcoming of the moralising good of Christian-Platonism though does by no means imply then a subsequent affirmation of all that brutal Roman like greed, slavery, decadence, circus-bread corruption and mindless colonial expansion that we’ve heard all about, and are hardly so free of with our corporate today––just ask a Latin-American for instance![55] For it is possible within the perspectives opened up by Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, as Silvia Ons puts it, to view a social-historical or individual neurosis of any kind: including the expressed acted-out, perverse-sadistic form that escapes when the Good is temporarily loosed of its repressive grip––and say to the would be Platonist: ‘No, not that, that’s not a cure, that’s a mirage; that’s sheer fantasy, resentment, spite; that’s not a cure it will only make things worse; worse in a different way, but worse nonetheless!’

By greater mindfulness then, with guided affirmation towards even that fearsome Freudian Thing that *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* has us find now in our inner natures: we can eventually again say ‘Yes’-to-life in such the way that it overcomes the nihilism of not caring too much whether we as individuals or species live or die, whether we as culture or civilisation advance or decline. But we can only do this with fullest efficacy by freeing ourselves of all that wasted neurosis sickness that feels it must deny our Thing like aspect of the real: because from all those Christian-Platonic prejudices of the Good, it has been taught that such ‘things’ are too far beneath it. We must continue instead to train ourselves to stare the real directly in the face, without flinching, and that’s all we can do at least to start. For unless we can continue to utilise, sublimate, enjoy and get a positive, well-guided jouissance out of all aspects of life––including that Freudian Ding in our real––then the chances are we’re going to be at least in part, happy enough in no longer living it: offering not even a puff of genuine political praxis! We either face up to the death-drive snaking long beneath the dank, hidden history of the un-real, anti-real Good of Platonism––or let the disowned, un-understood drive resurge of its own volition until it accidentally finishes us!

### 2

#### The Debt Ceiling expansion gives Democrats two months to finalize and pass Biden’s spending package – every moment is necessary to resolve intraparty disputes.

Cochrane 10/7 Cochrane, Emily. Emily Cochrane is a correspondent based in Washington. She has covered Congress since late 2018, focusing on the annual debate over government funding and economic legislation, ranging from emergency pandemic relief to infrastructure. "Senate Leaders Agree to Vote on Short-Term Debt Ceiling Increase." N.Y. Times, 7 Oct. 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/us/politics/debt-ceiling-senate.html.

Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the majority leader, announced that he reached an agreement with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the minority leader, to raise the federal borrowing limit through early December. “We have reached agreement to extend the debt ceiling through early December, and it’s our hope that we can get this done as soon as today.” “Republican and Democratic members and staff negotiated through the night in good faith. The pathway our Democratic colleagues have accepted will spare the American people any near-term crisis.” Video player loading Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the majority leader, announced that he reached an agreement with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the minority leader, to raise the federal borrowing limit through early December.CreditCredit...T.J. Kirkpatrick for The New York Times Oct. 7, 2021Updated 3:17 p.m. ET WASHINGTON — Top Senate Democrats and Republicans said on Thursday that they had struck a deal to allow the debt ceiling to be raised through early December, temporarily staving off the threat of a first-ever default on the national debt after the G.O.P. agreed to temporarily drop its blockade of an increase. Senator Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New York and the majority leader, announced that he had reached an agreement with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the minority leader, to clear the way for a vote as early as Thursday on a short-term extension, with potentially as few as 11 days left before a possible default. The movement came the day after Mr. McConnell partly backed down from his refusal to allow any such increase to move forward, offering a temporary reprieve as political pressure mounted to avoid being blamed for a fiscal calamity. “It’s our hope that we can get this done as soon as today,” Mr. Schumer said on Thursday morning on the Senate floor. But one day after Mr. McConnell indicated that Republicans would stand aside and allow the short-term increase to advance, he and his top deputies were laboring on Thursday to ensure his members will put aside their objections and clear the path for a vote. “We gotta see if the deal is done,” President Biden told reporters during a trip to Illinois. “I’m not sure of that yet.” The agreed-upon bill would boost the legal debt cap by $480 billion, which the Treasury Department estimates would be enough to allow the government to continue borrowing through at least Dec. 3. The current debt limit was reinstated at $28.4 trillion on Aug. 1, and the Treasury Department has been using so-called extraordinary measures to delay a breach of the borrowing cap since then. The agency estimated that the government would no longer be able to pay all of its bills by Oct. 18, once those fiscal accounting maneuvers were exhausted. Without congressional action before then, economists and lawmakers have warned of catastrophic economic consequences, including the U.S. government having to choose between making payments on the interest on its debt or sending out Social Security checks and other crucial assistance. The legislation under consideration on Thursday did not offer a hard deadline for when cash would run out, and it would not restart the Treasury Department’s ability to employ extraordinary measures, such as curbing certain government investments, a Treasury official said. Some Republicans said they thought the set dollar figure would ensure the limit would not be reached again until at least January. The actual “X-date” will be determined by tax revenues that the government receives and expenditures that it must make near the end of the year. Making such projections has been especially difficult this year because the pandemic relief programs that are in place have made it harder to predict when money is coming and going. “There is no way to predict with any precision exactly how much you would need to increase the debt limit by to get to a certain date,” said Shai Akabas, the director of economic policy at the Bipartisan Policy Center, an independent think tank. But in aiming for Dec. 3, the deal may position the next debt limit fight to overlap once again with negotiations over avoiding a government shutdown, as funding is set to lapse on that same day if Congress does not approve new spending legislation beforehand. Democrats hope nearly two additional months will give them space to focus on finalizing and enacting most of President Biden’s domestic agenda, including hammering out an array of intraparty disagreements over an expansive multi-trillion-dollar social safety net and climate change package. In raising the prospect of a stopgap extension on Wednesday, Mr. McConnell had said that Republicans would allow Democrats to use normal procedures to consider it. But that commitment appeared in doubt on Thursday afternoon, as Republicans privately objected and leaders toiled to line up the votes needed. Should even one senator demand a recorded vote, at least 10 Republicans would be needed to join every Democrat to muster the 60 votes needed to move the bill forward. Image The movement on debt ceiling negotiations came the day after Senator Mitch McConnell backed down partially from his refusal to allow any such increase to move forward. Credit...T.J. Kirkpatrick for The New York Times “We’re having conversations with our members and kind of figuring out where people are, but, as you might expect, this is not an easy one to whip,,” said Senator John Thune of South Dakota, the No. 2 Republican. He added that, “in the end we’ll be there, but it will be a painful birthing process.” Some Republicans were wary of angering their base by allowing the bill to move forward, especially after former President Donald J. Trump issued a statement on Wednesday that attacked Mr. McConnell for “folding to the Democrats.” Mr. Trump seemed to be pressuring Republicans to force a showdown in the face of a looming default, saying that Mr. McConnell had “all of the cards with the debt ceiling, it’s time to play the hand.” Even if Republicans clear the way to allow the measure to pass, it does nothing to address the crux of the partisan stalemate over the debt. Most notably, Republicans have not dropped their demand that Democrats ultimately use an arcane and time-consuming budget process known as reconciliation to lift the debt ceiling into next year. Democrats are currently using that process to steer around Republican opposition and push through a sprawling domestic package that would address climate change, expand the social safety net with more health care and education benefits, and increase taxes on the wealthy and corporations. “The pathway our Democratic colleagues have accepted will spare the American people any near-term crisis,” Mr. McConnell said on the Senate floor. The extension, he added, also means “there’ll be no question they’ll have plenty of time” to use the reconciliation process to approve a long-term increase.

#### Pushing a WTO takes floor-time, energy, and political capital away from domestic legislation – big pharma and EU allies.

Bhadrakumar 5/9 M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat. "Biden’s talk of vaccine IP waiver is political theater." Asia Times, May 9, 2021, asiatimes.com/2021/05/bidens-talk-of-vaccine-ip-waiver-is-political-theater.

On the other hand, Biden, whose political life of half a century was largely spent in the US Congress, is well aware of the awesome clout of the pharmaceutical companies in American politics. From that lobby’s perspective, the patent waiver “amounts to the expropriation of the property of the pharmaceutical companies whose innovation and financial investments made the development of Covid-19 vaccines possible in the first place,” as a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security puts it. The US pharmaceutical industry and congressional Republicans have already gone on the offensive blasting Biden’s announcement, saying it undermines incentives for American innovation. Besides, the argument goes, even with the patent waiver, vaccine manufacturing is a complex process and is not like simply flipping a switch. Senator Richard Burr, the top Republican on the US Senate Health Committee, denounced Biden’s decision. “Intellectual property protections are part of the reason we have these life-saving products,” he said. “Stripping these protections only ensures we won’t have the vaccines or treatments we need when the next pandemic occurs.” The Republican senators backed by Republican Study Committee chairman Jim Banks propose to introduce legislation to block the move. Clearly, Biden would rather spend his political capital on getting the necessary legislation through Congress to advance his domestic reform agenda rather than spend time and energy to take on the pharmaceutical industry to burnish his image as a good Samaritan on the world stage. Conceivably, Biden could be counting on the “text-based negotiations” at the WTO dragging on for months, if not years, without reaching anywhere. The US support for the waiver could even be a tactic to persuade pharmaceutical firms to back less drastic steps like sharing technology and expanding joint ventures to boost global production quickly. So far Covid-19 vaccines have been distributed primarily to the wealthy countries that developed them, while the pandemic sweeps through poorer ones such as India, and the real goal is, after all, expanded vaccine distribution. Biden is well aware that there will be huge opposition to the TRIPS waiver from the United States’ European allies as well. The British press has reported that the UK has been in closed-door talks at the World Trade Organization in recent months along with the likes of Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Singapore, the European Union and the US, who all opposed the idea.

#### Package is sufficient, necessary, and the last opportunity to solve climate change---extinction

Leber 10/7 Leber, Rebecca. Rebecca Leber covers climate change for Vox. Before joining Vox, she was an environmental reporter at Mother Jones, where her investigations exposed government corruption and fossil fuel industry disinformation. She has worked as a staff writer at Grist, The New Republic, and ThinkProgress. A dozen more outlets have published her work over her decade as a climate journalist. "A last chance for US climate action: Democrats’ Build Back Better and infrastructure bills." Vox, 7 Oct. 2021, www.vox.com/22685920/democrats-infrastructure-build-back-better-climate-change.

The United States — the largest carbon polluter in history — is closer than it’s ever been to taking sweeping and lasting action on the climate crisis. The bad news is that if Democrats can’t pull it off, they may never get another opportunity like this — and the planet certainly won’t. Democratic leaders are trying to pass two major pieces of legislation — the $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill and the up to $3.5 trillion Build Back Better Act — that they say can slash US pollution by up to 45 percent in the coming decade. In the outlined Build Back Better Act, Congress would flex its power to transform the electricity sector so that it runs on mostly clean energy, steer the transportation sector toward electric vehicles, and finally take action on methane pollution, one of the most harmful greenhouse gases. But there have been many recent moments when the precarious dealmaking in Congress seemed close to falling apart. One of the biggest sticking points has been with West Virginia Sen. Joe Manchin, who has questioned the party’s approach to passing both bills simultaneously. “What’s the urgency that we have?” Manchin asked on CNN’s State of the Union in late September. In part because of Manchin’s opposition, even progressive leaders have begun to manage expectations, signaling the ultimate bill will be less ambitious. Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont suggested that the $3.5 trillion figure would see some “give and take.” The package is likely to shrink to $2.3 trillion or less, the New York Times reported on Wednesday. So what is the urgency? Democrats only have one year before midterm elections could take away their narrow majorities in the House and Senate. That would leave them powerless to pass any legislation without help from Republicans. At the same time, the planet faces a rapidly closing window to avert the worst catastrophes of global warming. Every fraction of a degree will translate into lives and livelihoods lost. The world can’t afford another decade of American inaction, and what Congress does next will help determine the future of the climate. A last chance for Democrats Historically, the president’s party loses seats in Congress in midterm elections. Next November, Democrats could lose their narrow control of Congress if they lose even one Senate seat or more than a few House seats. “The middle of that Venn diagram — when we have leaders who care about science and we still have that window of opportunity — is now,” said Lena Moffitt, campaign director at the climate advocacy group Evergreen Action. Democrats in Congress are also relying on a roughly once-a-year process, known as budget reconciliation, to try and push the Build Back Better Act through the Senate. Reconciliation allows them to pass a budget with a simple majority, instead of the 60 votes that are usually required in the Senate. There might not be time or political will to make a similar move in 2022. And some Democrats remain unwilling to eliminate the Senate filibuster, which is the other way they could pass progressive policies. In short, if the historical pattern holds, Democrats may not get another chance under President Biden — or even this decade — to take serious action on climate. Some Republicans have been hinting at taking climate change more seriously, but much of the party’s leadership continues to downplay and deny climate science. The next time the US has an opening like this, climate change will likely be dramatically worse — and that much harder to stop. A flooded street of shops at night reflecting the lights in the water. Hurricane Ida caused record flooding in New Jersey in September. Climate change is already intensifying extreme weather such as tropical storms and heat waves. Anadolu Agency via Getty Images The best chance for the global climate Climate scientists have warned that once the atmosphere warms more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, we will live in a drastically changed world. If countries, corporations, and individuals don’t take immediate action to reduce pollution, the world may hit that grim milestone in just 10 years. Over the long term, if the world continues on its current polluting path, the world will warm more than double that amount, risking catastrophes humanity has never had to confront. The window to chart a new course is rapidly closing. And the world’s “last, best chance” to take decisive collective action is less than a month away, as John Kerry, who serves as President Biden’s climate envoy, has said. In early November, world governments will gather in Glasgow for the United Nations climate conference, COP26. Following up on the Paris climate accord, countries will pledge more ambitious pollution targets and tackle the challenge of financing a worldwide transition to clean energy. The US bears the most responsibility of any country for global warming, having released 20 percent of the world’s greenhouse pollution since 1850. Today, the country ranks second in emissions behind China. But the US also has the power to magnify its impact if it leads by example, or if it flexes its influence on the global economic system, for example by affecting global prices of fossil fuels by ending government subsidies. Climate experts say progress at the COP26 conference depends on the United States proving it can do its part, for symbolic as well as practical reasons. This is the first year the US officially returns to global negotiations after former President Donald Trump withdrew the country from the Paris climate accord. Now, Biden has to lead by example by showing that the country can swiftly change direction for good, demonstrating progress on its national pledge of cutting emissions 50 to 52 percent by 2030. “There is this sense of exhaustion about how long is it going to take for one of the biggest emitters in the world to do its fair share,” said Rachel Cleetus, the clean energy policy director at the Union of Concerned Scientists. It’s unclear whether Congress will deliver on climate-change legislation by the time the international community meets in Glasgow. But any steps forward would send “a very important signal that can really help catalyze more ambition from other countries,” Cleetus said.

### 3

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate consequences.

#### 1] Consequences first — anything else is irresponsible and escapes valuable discussions.

**Bracey 06** (Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318)

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### 2] Util good – Existential threats outweigh.

**GPP 17** (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater**. ...** The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in.Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided.The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks.Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. **74** Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large.Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude.A wide range of other cognitive biases

#### 3] We access their role of the ballot—nuclear war and warming causes massive suffering and disproportionately affects minorities that prevents the possibility to freak whiteness or engage in a process of reconstructing our subjectivities. Proves even if they win their framing nuke war and warming are still a tiebreaker.

#### 4] Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else *regresses* – robust neuroscience.

**Blum et al. 18** (Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/>) R.S.

**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10].

Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14].

Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals.

Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D

Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it.

It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring.

Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding.

There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health.

Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage.

Finding happiness is different between apes and humans

As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure.

Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered.

Desire and reward centers

It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation.

In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41].

Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42].

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45].

Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations.

Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50]

In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders.

In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS.

Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

## Case

### Underview

#### You get 1AR theory but you only get 1 shell---Norming—multiple shells create no risk outs that spread out the 2nr and make testing each of them impossible—if they have 4 minutes on a frivolous shell like spec status they can win on it via brute force even though it’s a bad norm

#### It isn’t dtd---abuse is contextual and you shouldn’t giev me the death penalty for j-walking.

#### AT: Probability First

#### A] best frame is probability x magnitude---it’s the best of both worlds because it accounts for the strength of link you are winning an argument and the magnitude of an impact

#### C] warming is a proxatime impact that affects many now

### Framing

#### 1] Blum hijacks their framing----even if there is multiple facets of a subject the only ones that guide actions and ethics is pleasure and pain due to reactions to stimuli.

AT: Todoroff --- a] evidence doesn’t justify their framing for medicine accessibility OR IPR, it is descriptive of blockchain technologies and how neoliberalism has infiltrated itself there b] cost-benefit analysis is key for breaking down colonial structures because we don’t know what actions to take in communities of care if divorced from hypothetical eval

### Offense

#### 1] The aff is just word salad---what does it mean to freak whiteness? How does the affirmative invoke the use of psychedic drugs that does this? How does the affirmative solve their impacts.

#### 2] Turns case – the plan licenses counterfeits and undermines quality control for production, aff decks possibility of distribution---start aff solvency at zero.

Roberts 6/25/21 [James M. Roberts is a Research Fellow for Economic Freedom and Growth at the Heritage Foundation. Roberts' primary responsibility as one of The Heritage Foundation's lead experts in economic freedom and growth is to edit the Rule of Law and Monetary Freedom sections of [Index of Economic Freedom](https://www.heritage.org/index/). An influential annual analysis of the economic climate of countries throughout the world, the Index is co-published by Heritage and The Wall Street Journal.) “Biden’s OK of Global Theft of America’s Intellectual Property is Wrong, Dangerous.” 6/25/2021, The Heritage Foundation, Commentary—Public Health] RM

Last month, President Biden advocated removing international intellectual property rights (IPR) protections for American-made COVID-19 vaccines.

**Foreign companies may take the president’s policy as a green light to produce reverse-engineered, counterfeit substitutes**.

The best way to prevent and treat new diseases is to ensure that private American pharmaceutical companies continue their innovative research and vaccine production.

Three U.S. companies—Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson—created and manufactured the world’s most effective mRNA COVID vaccines in record time. An increasing majority of Americans have now been inoculated, but much of the developing world remains in desperate need of vaccines. Americans naturally want to help. The question is how.

Last month, President Biden advocated removing international intellectual property rights (IPR) protections for American-made COVID-19 vaccines. This, he said, would help make the vaccines more plentiful and available in needy countries. **It’s a short-sighted approach and doomed to fail.**

Mr. Biden wants to waive the World Trade Organization’s “Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (TRIPS) agreement for U.S. vaccines and let foreign countries issue “compulsory licenses“ allowing their domestic pharmaceutical companies to manufacture the medicines without adequately compensating the companies that invented them.

Practically speaking, countries such as India and South Africa are unlikely to manufacture the vaccines. They lack an advanced infrastructure for cold supply-chain distribution and many other crucial resources required by these products’ capital-intensive, state-of-the-art manufacturing process.

But the Biden policy is bad for many other reasons.

Developing breakthrough medications takes tremendous ingenuity and immense financial investments. **It’s an extraordinarily high-risk endeavor, and the prospect of making a profit is what convinces private companies to undertake those risks.**

Signaling that the United States will not fight to defend their intellectual property rights **actively undermines innovation and manufacturing** in American health care and medicines.

It also erodes patient protections by **undermining quality control**. Foreign companies may take the president’s policy as a green light to produce reverse-engineered, counterfeit substitutes. Already there are reports of ineffective and even dangerous counterfeit COVID-19 vaccines being sold around the world.

Those pushing to break U.S. pharmaceutical patents say they want to do so for altruistic reasons. Consequently, they also insist that the prices for the medications be set far below their actual value.

But history shows us that forcing private companies to provide vaccines at an “affordable price,” regardless of the cost to the companies, actually impedes the manufacture of high-quality vaccines. Moreover, it inhibits the **future development of vaccines** needed to meet as-yet-unknown diseases.

#### 3] Lemmens doesn’t reference medical IPR and says IPR once. BUT IPR is a self-expression of the subject. When it’s used in a way that doesn’t reflect the framer’s intent, it is alienating.

Justin Hughes 98, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) [https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html] AHS//MAK recut emi Accessed 8/10/21

"On the Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition." 3. Intellectual Property Under Hegel. For Hegel, intellectual property need not be justified by analogy to physical property. In fact, the analogy to physical property may distort the status Hegel ascribes to personality and mental traits in relation to the will. Hegel writes: Mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even things ecclesiastical (like sermons, masses, prayers, consecration of votive objects), inventions, and so forth, become subjects of a contract, brought on to a parity, through being bought and sold, with things recognized as things. It may be asked whether the artist, scholar, &c., is from the legal point of view in possession of his art, erudition, ability to preach a sermon, sing a mass, &c., that is, whether such attainments are "things." We may hesitate to call such abilities, attainments, aptitudes, &c., "things," for while possession of these may be the subject of business dealings and contracts, as if they were things, there is also something inward and mental about it, and for this reason the Understanding may be in perplexity about how to describe such possession in legal terms. . . . n205**.** Intellectual property provides a way out of this problem, by "materializing" these personal traits.Hegel goes on to say that "[a]ttainments, eruditions, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and not external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody [\*338] them in something external and alienate them." n206.Hegel takes the position that one cannot alienate or surrender any universal element of one's self. Hence slavery is not permissible because by "alienating the whole of my time, as crystallized in my work, I would be making into another's property the substance of my being, my universal activity and actuality, my personality." n207 Similarly, there is no right to sacrifice one's life because that is the surrender of the "comprehensive sum of external activity." n208 This doctrine supplies at least a framework to answer the question of intellectual property that most concerns Hegel. It is a question we ignore today, but one that is not easy to answer: what justifies the author in alienating copies of his work while retaining the exclusive right to reproduce further copies of that work. A sculptor or painter physically embodies his will in the medium and produces one piece of art.When another artist copies this piece Hegel thinks that the hand-made copy "is essentially a product of the copyist's own mental and technical ability" and does not infringe upon the original artist's property. n209 The **problem arises when a creator of intellectual property does not embody** his **will in an object** in **the** same **way the artist does**.