#### I negate Resolved: Resolved: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### The value is Justice, defined as giving each their due, because the only reason to value anything else is because humans value it, which concedes that humans are valuable and deserving.

#### My value criterion is utilitarianism, which is to maximize expected well-being for the most amount of people.

#### Maximizing expected well-being is inherent to every action we take -- for example, if you put your hand on a hot stove, you’d pull it back before your brain sends a signal to pull it back—it’s scientifically proven.

### Contention 1: False Balance

#### Contention 1 – Subjective journalism sustains democracy and promotes free speech.

#### Objectivity leads to a false balance where unequally credible sides are propped up as having equally good points

Napoli 21 [Philip M. Napoli, educator at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University, 03-02-2021, “Back from the dead (again): The specter of the Fairness Doctrine and its lesson for social media regulation,” Wiley Online Library, https://sci-hub.se/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/poi3.253]/Kankee

Fairness, balance, and false equivalency Finally, it essential to address the problematic broader principle that underlies any governmental or voluntary efforts to impose fairness or balance requirements on media gatekeepers. The biggest problem with the Fairness Doctrine is what it does to our conception of journalism and to the notion of how responsible gatekeeping works. Over the past few years, there has been a substantial amount of criticism heaped upon the news media for engaging in “false equivalence”—that is, giving equal attention to competing claims on different sides of the political spectrum, regardless of the objective validity of the competing claims (see, e.g., Spayd, 2016). This sort of uncritical, nonevaluative approach to journalism—and to gatekeeping more broadly—simply is not the right path to cultivating an informed citizenry in this environment of nearly unprecedented political polarization and disinformation. Institutionalizing such a model allows falsity to be legitimized by being presented alongside truth. It creates a system where demands of fairness and balance neuter journalists' and other gatekeepers' ability (and responsibility) to differentiate fact from fiction, truth from conspiracy theories and hoaxes. Consider, for instance, recent research focusing on the content curation practices of Google News (Kawakami et al., 2020). This study found that “Because there are fewer right‐ leaning publications than center or left‐leaning ones, to maintain this ‘fair’ balance, hyper‐ partisan far‐right news sources of low trust receive more visibility than some news sources that are more familiar to and trusted by the public” (Kawakami et al., 2020, p. 59). Such findings help to empirically demonstrate the dangers of the application of Fairness Doctrine‐ like principles in the governance of digital platforms, as such approaches typically lead to the disproportionate and unwarranted (from an informed citizenry standpoint) prominence of sources that are more likely to disseminate disinformation. This critical gatekeeping function is more valuable than ever in today's vast and complex information ecosystem, where distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate sources of news and information is more challenging for the end user than it has ever been; and where efforts by bad actors to manipulate social media platforms have become commonplace and increasingly sophisticated. The Trump White House's (2020) executive order contended that social media platforms should operate as “passive bulletin boards.” They have virtually never operated in this way; nor should they. Even those platforms that have marketed themselves as completely unfiltered forums for public discourse (e.g., Parler) operate under a number of explicit content curation and moderation guidelines, and, ironically, have been found to be engaging in editorial decision‐making geared toward filtering out particular political viewpoints (Lerman, 2020). Any efforts at content‐based regulation of social media platforms need to move beyond the notion of fairness—or, at the very least decouple the notion of fairness from the notion of balance. Fairness and balance are not the same thing. There is a degree of passivity, of a lack of judgment, in the notion of balance that is not present to the same degree in the notion of fairness. A news story can be fair without necessarily being balanced if, in the fair and objective judgment of the journalist, giving greater prominence to a discredited or extreme viewpoint would misinform the public. Similarly, if a digital platform is systematically and objectively applying criteria to individual posts or accounts that result in one political perspective's posts being taken down or fact‐checked more than another's, this can be seen as the platform behaving fairly. The unbalanced outcome is not a reflection of unfairness on the part of the platform. It is a reflection of the behavior of the speakers. Frustratingly, this is a position that the representatives of the various digital platforms have refrained from expressing in any of the many instances in which they have been called before Congress and grilled about their bias against conservative viewpoints. As one recent reconsideration of the Fairness Doctrine noted, contemporary concerns should focus on “greater accuracy and completeness, but… not… balance” (Vandenbergh, 2020, p. 815). As one of the growing number of critics of the notion of balance in journalism has noted, “Although appealing on the surface, balance can easily be manipulated to create a false sense of equivalency” (Vandenbergh, 2020, p. 815). Along these lines, some critics of the Fairness Doctrine noted that it led to an emphasis on the presentation of “extremes of controversy” (Bolton, 1987, pp. 818–819). Neither policy nor professional practice should, in the pursuit of “fairness” or “balance,” prioritize opposing viewpoints independently of any concerns about accuracy or truthfulness. Unfortunately, many of today's advocates for “fairness” in the content curation and moderation practices of social media platforms appear concerned first and foremost with the availability of extreme viewpoints independent of whether they have any grounding in verifiable fact. This strategic conflation of diversity and falsity needs to be resisted. Passivity does not equal fairness; and so in this regard, what Republican policymakers are calling for is a far cry from the principles of the Fairness Doctrine which specifically extended protections to “all responsible positions on matters of sufficient importance to be afforded radio time” and to “the various positions taken by the responsible groups” (Federal Communications Commission, 1949, pp. 1250–1251, emphasis added). The term responsible seems particularly relevant to the current environment, in light of contemporary challenges related to hate speech and disinformation. The Fairness Doctrine's approach to gatekeeping did not—at least in theory—involve broadcasters serving as passive conduits; and so any current efforts to impose more “fairness” upon social media platforms that are ultimately about converting these platforms to passive or uncritically balanced conduits misrepresent what fairness should mean in regulatory approaches to media gatekeeping, as well as in the voluntary gatekeeping practices of news organizations and digital platforms. CONCLUSION

#### Regulatory capture and media co-option by the fossil fuel industry manufactures public consent in favor of devastating climate change inaction – media presupposes “objective facts” and reports them as news

MacLean 19 [Jason MacLean, educator at University of Saskatchewan’s College of Law, 12-1-2019, “Manufacturing Consent to Climate Inaction: A Case Study of The Globe and Mail ’s Pipeline Coverage,” DALHOUSIE LAW JOURNAL, https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1450&context=dlj]/Kankee

The normative dimension of the public interest in respect of any given area of regulation remains equally complex and difficult to establish even in statutory regimes where regulators are subject to a legal “public interest” standard. As the Supreme Court of Canada recently observed, the “public interest is a broad concept and what it requires will depend on the particular context.”10 For these reasons, the mainstream news media are attracting increasing scrutiny both as a means and as strategic sites in and of themselves of regulatory reform in the public interest. The media play a significant role in manufacturing public opinion, including public opinion about what constitutes the “public interest,”11 the starting point of regulatory analysis, including regulatory reform. A growing number of studies and commentaries, for example, are paying attention to how—and how often—the news media are covering climate change science and policy for precisely this purpose12: climate policy reform requires a sufficiently informed public motivated to press elected representatives and public decisionmakers to act in the public interest. Growing attention is also being paid to the ways in which powerful industry interests influence the media to shape public discourse and attitudes about climate change and climate change policy options. There is an intersection between the public interest in meaningful and effective climate change action and the mainstream news media as a mechanism of regulatory capture employed by entrenched special interests. Two US climate change commentators have described this intersection in the following terms: To save civilization, most of us would need to supplement our standard daily practices—eating, caring for family and community, faith—with a steady push on the big forces that are restraining progress, the most prominent being the fossil fuel industry’s co-option of government, education, science, and media. 13 To understand what such a “steady push” should consist of, it is necessary not only to identify media co-optation and distortion generally but also to shine a light on specific instances of such distortion with a view to exposing how they contribute to reshaping—and redirecting—the public interest. There has, for example, recently been a proliferation of educational initiatives designed to improve individuals’ evaluation of the quality of information presented by the news media and other information platforms.14 While such longer-term initiatives are laudable, it is also important to better understand how the media influence the construction and perception of the public interest in respect of regulatory issues that are pressing and urgent in the short-term, especially climate change mitigation, given the nature and degree of the threat posed by climate change. Moreover, because even well-educated individuals are susceptible to media bias and tend to default to pre-committed political ideologies, improved media literacy in itself is not a panacea.15 Research on the nature of how the media distort the public interest and that informs how best to respond to and counter such distortions is urgently required. With these broad and challenging considerations in mind, I critically examine how Canada’s leading newspaper, The Globe and Mail, has constructed the “public interest” in respect of the controversial Trans Mountain oil pipeline expansion project. My central argument is that The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the Trans Mountain pipeline serves to legitimize and sustain climate change policy inaction in Canada, to the short-term benefit of Canada’s oil and gas sector, and at the expense of the public and the environment. The article unfolds as follows: In the first section I briefly discuss the political economy of the mainstream news media in democratic societies, and describe the media “propaganda model” as a useful analytical lens to read The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the Trans Mountain project, specifically its editorial characterization of the “national interest” in approving and completing the project as soon as possible. I proceed in the second section by briefly introducing The Globe and Mail as Canada’s newspaper of record along with the history thus far of the Trans Mountain project, and then provide a critical account of The Globe and Mail’s editorial coverage of the project vis-à-vis Canada’s interests and obligations in respect of mitigating climate change. In the third section of the article I discuss the difficulties inherent in seeking to reform the news media as a means of countering this form of regulatory capture. I conclude by discussing the limitations of the analysis and suggesting avenues of future research.

I. Democracy dies in darkness: The political economy of the fourth estate “Democracy dies in darkness” is the motto of the Washington Post newspaper.16 The motto signals the foundational public-interest role that a free and independent press plays in democratic societies by shining a light on the special interests and workings of power. As Edmund Burke reportedly remarked, “there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than them all.”17 And yet, the press and mass communications media more generally have always been bound up in the exercise of political-economic power, so much so that neither can be understood in isolation from the other.18 There is an apparent and abiding tension between the news media as watchdog and the news media as lapdog.19 Arguably the most powerful explanatory model of the media’s role in shaping democratic discussion and debate about public policy is the “propaganda model” developed by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky.20 Propaganda is a provocative term, but in its more nuanced formulation it has considerable explanatory power. Herman and Chomsky argue that the mainstream news media in democratic societies do not play an overtly oppressive function as they do in totalitarian states. The news media in democratic societies “permit—indeed, encourage—spirited debate, criticism, and dissent as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness.”21 In contrast to the popular perception that propaganda is exclusively state-based and operates principally through the use of intimidation and fear-mongering, the news media in democratic societies tend not to explicitly proclaim a particular party line (i.e. the narrow spectrum of debate acceptable to the political-economic elite), but rather they presuppose it, “thus helping to establish it even more deeply as the very precondition of discussion, while also providing the appearance of lively debate.”22 In the United States, for example, the Federal Communications Commission maintained an official policy from 1949 to 1987 requiring broadcast news providers to present controversial public interest topics in a “balanced” manner.23 Known as the “Fairness Doctrine,” this policy had the effect of ensuring that roughly equal time was accorded to each side of controversial subjects, independent of merit.24 The “Fairness Doctrine” has subsequently come to be understood by media and policy scholars as a vehicle of propaganda, one that has been effectively deployed by the tobacco industry and the fossil fuels industry.25 The following factors account for the news media’s distortional propaganda role in otherwise democratic societies: (a) concentrated corporate ownership of the news media; (b) advertising as the primary revenue source for media outlets; (c) political-economic elite perspectives as the predominant sources of news; (d) “flak,” or government efforts to suppress views critical of political-economic elites; and (e) “anticommunism” via the promotion of capitalism as an economic system, including the promotion of market-based governance and regulatory measures.26 Given these prevailing conditions of media ownership, concentration, and composition, perhaps it should not be surprising—let alone controversial—that the mainstream news media “serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity” through the strategic use of “choices, emphases, and omissions”.27 Subsequent empirical work on US news media bias strongly supports the media propaganda model.28 While Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model is based on the US news media, Canadian analyses have, mutatis mutandis, consistently arrived at substantially similar findings. Mainstream news journalism in Canada, according to one study focused on the relationship between the media and the prevailing normative order, “is concerned primarily with communications among elite, authorized knowers.”29 “We can begin to understand how news media circulate and reinforce dominant values and meanings,” another study explains, “by examining ownership of Canadian media, their dependence on advertising revenue and its implications, and some typical patterns of news presentation.”30 According to the Kent Commission, Canada’s Royal Commission on Newspapers, “it was leftwing viewpoints that tended to be under-represented as commercialism increased its hold.”31 And as Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson observed in 1996, “more [news media] commentators than ever are ideologues of the right.”32 Given the political and economic importance of the news media generally, a growing number of researchers based in democratic societies are investigating mainstream media representations of climate change, the most pressing public interest issue of our time.33 Of course, climate change is not a discrete public policy issue that can be meaningfully discussed in isolation from other public policy concerns, including issues of economic competitiveness, growth, and inequality. It follows that media representations of a number of important business and economic issues —e.g. domestic and foreign investment, international trade, job growth, natural resources extraction, infrastructure, energy costs, commodity prices, and many more—may have significant climate change implications, even if those implications are not always framed as such. This may help explain the curious finding that scholarly research on Canadian media representations of climate change appears to be declining. 34 While analyses of media representations of climate change are interesting and important in and of themselves,35 such analyses do not always directly connect the form and substance of those representations to the critically important issue of climate policy action (or inaction, as is more often the case) in political and economic context.36 This is particularly problematic in light of recent integrated assessment modeling suggesting that rapid and widespread changes in both individual behaviour and socioeconomic systems are urgently required to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial norm.37 Utilizing Herman and Chomsky’s media propaganda model, I analyze a contextually-important set of media representations in relation to a particular climate policy outcome. In the next section, I provide an account of The Globe and Mail’s editorial coverage of the controversial Trans Mountain oil pipeline expansion project. The analytical aim of this account is to conceptualize and expose mainstream media representations of climate policy as a means of fossil fuels industries’ capture of climate change policymaking, with the regrettable result being the legitimization of climate policy inaction in Canada. Before proceeding, however, a brief discussion of the article’s methodology, including an important methodological caveat, is in order.

#### False equivalence decreases overall science education – past empirics prove

Weatherall et al. 20 [James Owen Weatherall, Suppes Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University with a Ph.D. in Philosophy from UC Irvine and a Ph.D. in Mathematics and Physics from the Stevens Institute of Technology, Cailin O’Connor, Associate Professor in the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science at UC Irvine, member of the Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Science at UC Irvine, and co-author of the book The Misinformation Age,” and Justin P. Bruner, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Economy and Moral Science at the University of Arizona, 2020, “How to Beat Science and Influence People: Policymakers and Propaganda in Epistemic Networks,” British Society for the Philosophy of Science, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1093/bjps/axy062]/Kankee

5 Journalists as Unwitting Propagandists In the two treatments we have discussed so far, the propagandist has adopted strategies intended to influence the policymakers’ beliefs. In both cases, we found that the propagandist can succeed, at least under some circumstances. The basic mechanism at work in both strategies is that the propagandist endeavours to bias the total body of evidence that the policymakers see. They do not do this through fraud, or even by sampling from a different distribution than the other scientists (as in Holman and Bruner [2015]). Instead, they do it by choosing results so that the total evidence available, even though it was all drawn from a fixed distribution, does not reflect the statistics of that distribution. What these results show is that in many cases, particularly when evidence is relatively difficult to get or equivocal, it is essential that policymakers (and the public) have access to a complete, unbiased sampling of studies. This suggests that curation, or even partial reporting, of evidence can lead to epistemically poor results. But propagandists are not the only agents who regularly curate scientific results. Non-malicious actors can also play this role. For instance, journalists often select scientific studies to feature in articles. Few journalists are experts in the relevant science, and in any case, the goal is rarely to give a uniform and even-handed characterization of all available evidence. To the contrary, journalistic practices often encourage, or even require, journalists to share either only the most striking, surprising, or novel studies; or else, when they choose to share a study on a controversial topic, to endeavour to be ‘fair’ by sharing research that supports both sides. Indeed, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had an official policy, from 1949 to 1987, that required broadcast news to present controversial topics of public interest in a ‘balanced’ manner. In practice, this meant giving roughly equal time to multiple perspectives. The policy was known as the ‘fairness doctrine’. Oreskes and Conway ([2010]) argue that this doctrine became a tool of the tobacco industry’s propagandists, who used it to insist that pro-industry science get publicized. To study the effects of the fairness doctrine, we consider the following modification of the models we have considered thus far.27 The network structures remain the same, but in place of the propagandist, we have a ‘journalist’, who like the propagandist can see all of the scientists’ results and can communicate with all of the policymakers. In this case, we suppose that the policymakers receive all of their information from the journalist, and consider different ways the journalist might share that data. Suppose, for instance, that the journalist—abiding by the fairness doctrine—shares two results from the network of scientists each round, one of which supports theory B, and one of which supports theory A. More precisely: we suppose that each round, the journalist chooses randomly among all of the results that support theory A and all that support theory B. In rounds where no results support one of the two theories, the journalist shares the result they shared the previous round (capturing the idea that sometimes journalists need to search past data to find something to adequately represent the ‘other side’), unless there has never been a result favouring a given theory, in which case the journalist shares only one result. What we find is that this addition artificially slows the policymakers’ acceptance of theory B. To show this, it is most informative to compare the policymakers’ beliefs under the action of this journalist (fair) with what one would find if (a) the journalist shared two randomly selected pieces of data each round (random) and (b) the journalist simply shared all available evidence each round (all). We find that (on average across runs) the fairness doctrine never improves the epistemic performance of the policymakers, and for many parameter values, policymakers receiving evidence from a journalist abiding by the fairness doctrine end up with beliefs substantially less accurate than under conditions (a) or (b). In all cases we consider, the policymakers’ beliefs still tend towards the truth (whenever the scientists’ beliefs do), but they do so much more slowly.28 In this sense, then, the ‘fair’ journalist mimics the propagandist under the conditions where they are losing the tug of war for policymakers’ beliefs, but nonetheless slow the policymakers’ progress. Figure 9 shows average policymaker beliefs when scientists reach consensus on the true belief for complete networks under different parameter values.29 Data points are for simulations where journalists share fair, random, or all data as described above. The trend line shows the average beliefs across parameters under each condition. As is evident, when journalists share all the data, policymaker beliefs are very accurate. With less data available—two random sets of data—their convergence to true beliefs is slowed. Under fair reporting, policymakers converge to true beliefs much more slowly, since they see a result that supports theory A every time they see a result supporting B. The strength of this effect is dependent on parameter values, but, as mentioned, fair reporting only worsens, and never improves, policymaker beliefs in comparison to reporting randomly or reporting all data. Journalists are not the only actors who perform data curation. University faculty, when teaching courses, may endeavour to give a panoptic and even-handed view of a field, but they will not be able to share all available relevant data with a class. Literature reviews and survey articles also curate data, commenting on its quality and selecting what seems most relevant or significant. The mechanisms by which researchers and university instructors select material to present are arguably motivated by epistemic considerations—they seek to give a compact overview that supports the views they believe are best supported, given the total evidence that they have seen—but it is hard to see how they can do this without using their own beliefs—which may be influenced by various factors—to guide the choices. And so, it is not clear that even this sort of curation is certain to accurately track the statistics of the total available evidence. In this way, even independent researchers, in their teaching and writing, can unwittingly act as propagandists. In addition, it has been widely observed that scientists regularly fail to publish negative or null results. This ‘file drawer’ effect biases the pool of evidence available to the entire community, and has already been shown to potentially have negative effects on scientific beliefs (Romero [2016]).30 6 Conclusion We have now considered two aspects of the tobacco strategy as described by Oreskes and Conway. We take the results we have presented to provide strong evidence that the tobacco strategy can work, in the sense that biasing the total evidence presented to a group of agents can lead those agents to converge to the incorrect belief. Of course, modelling alone cannot establish that this did happen in the case of tobacco industry propaganda efforts. But when you combine the modelling results we have presented with the careful historical analysis and arguments offered by Oreskes and Conway ([2010]), there are strong reasons to believe that the tobacco strategy was an important causal factor in the long delay between when a link between cigarettes and cancer was established by the medical research community, and large-scale changes in regulation and public attitudes. Moreover, we take it that if these strategies have succeed in the past, they are very likely to succeed now and in the future.31 What is perhaps most interesting about the results we have presented is not that they show what can work, but rather the insight they provide into how those strategies work. As we have emphasized above, in our discussion on unwitting propagandists, the basic mechanism at play in our models is that the propagandist biases the total evidence on which the policymakers update their beliefs. The fact that each result that is shared is, in some sense, ‘real’ ends up being irrelevant, because it is the statistical properties of the total available evidence that matter. For this reason, we see that producing results favourable to industry—say, through industry funding—is not necessary to manufacture favourable public beliefs, at least in cases where the evidence is probabilistic and spurious results are possible. On this point: one might have expected that actually producing biased science would have a stronger influence on public opinion than merely sharing others’ results. But when one compares the two treatments we consider above, there are strong senses in which the less invasive, more subtle strategy of selective sharing is more effective than biased production, all things considered, particularly when the scientific community is large and the problem at hand is difficult (or the power of generic experiments is low). The reason is that such a scientific community will produce, on its own, plenty of research that, taken without proper context, lends credence to falsehoods. Merely sharing this already-available evidence is cost-effective, and much less risky than producing one’s own research—which, after all, can cost a great deal to produce, fail to generate the desired results, and ultimately be disqualified or ignored because of the association with industry. From this point of view, producing industry science (or even outright fraud) is simply not worth it. In many cases, another more effective, less expensive, and more difficult to detect strategy is available. Indeed, if industrial interests do wish to spend their money on science, perhaps rather than producing their own results and publishing them selectively, they would do better to adopt a different strategy, which Holman and Bruner ([2017]) have called ‘industrial selection’. The idea behind industrial selection is that there are many experimental protocols, methodologies, and even research questions that scientists may adopt, often for their own reasons. Some protocols may tend to produce more industry-friendly results than others.32 Industrial selection involves identifying methods already present among the community of scientists that tend to favour one’s preferred outcome, and then funding scientists who already use those methods. This extra funding works to amplify these scientists’ results, by allowing them to publish more, perform higher powered studies, and train more students who will go on to produce consonant results. Indeed, there is a strong potential feedback effect between industrial selection and selective sharing: by increasing the number of ambient industry-favourable results in a scientific literature, and then further amplifying those results by sharing them selectively, propagandists can have an even stronger effect. It is worth emphasizing that industrial selection does not require some scientists to have adopted bad or unreliable research methods; it may also just be that they have focused on research topics that promote an industrial agenda. For instance, Oreskes and Conway ([2010], p. 17) describe how the Tobacco Industry Research Council supported the work of noted asbestos researcher Wilhelm C. Hueper of the National Cancer Institute. Hueper’s research was not methodologically flawed; to the contrary, it very convincingly established the (real) link between lung cancer and asbestos. But for the tobacco industry, it was valuable to have evidence that other environmental factors played a role in lung cancer, since that could be used to obfuscate the role their own product played. Taken together, then, selective sharing and industrial selection suggest those interested in dampening industry influence should turn their attention to the more subtle ways propagandists can come to bias epistemic communities. This will to a certain extent require philosophers of science to reorient their focus, as extant work tends to address explicit, direct ways industry can impact inquiry. It is natural to ask given the past success of the tobacco strategy and the results we have described, whether there are ways policymakers or members of the public can protect themselves against a propagandist using the methods described. Of course, one natural suggestion is to stop listening to propagandists. But this is difficult to do, in large part because propagandists pose as (or, in some cases, are) credentialed scientists.33 Another possibility, perhaps more realistic, is to gather evidence from as many scientists as possible: as we discuss above, policymakers connected to more scientists tend to do better, because the propagandist has to produce more evidence to effectively influence such policymakers’ beliefs.34 Connecting to many scientists may also allow policymakers to identify propagandists on statistical grounds: indeed, as Holman and Bruner ([2015]) point out, in some cases it may be possible to identify biased agents by comparing the statistics of their results with those of other agents in their network. Finally, and along similar lines, it might also be possible, at least in some circumstances, for policymakers to adjust their updating rule to accommodate the possibility that some of the evidence they receive is exaggerated, filtered, or otherwise intended to mislead.35 On the other hand, as O’Connor and Weatherall ([2018]) show, some apparently reasonable heuristics for updating belief in light of unreliable sources can lead to bad epistemic outcomes, including stable polarization. We think that it would be valuable, in future work, to study how these latter two reactions might be implemented, and how and when they would be effective. We will conclude by noting a few ways the incentive structure of science contributes to the success of the would-be propagandist, particularly when employing the selective sharing strategy. As we noted above, selective sharing is most effective when (i) the problem is difficult (in the sense that pB is close to 0.5); (ii) the number of data points per scientist per round is small; (iii) there are many scientists working on a given problem; and (iv) policymakers are connected to few scientists. This situation interacts with how scientists are rewarded for their work in complex, troubling ways.36 For instance, although there are some incentives for scientists to make their work accessible and to try to communicate it with the public and policymakers, it continues to be the case that academic scientists are evaluated on the basis of their research productivity—and there are sometimes reputational hazards associated with ‘popularizing’ too much. This sort of effect can limit the number of scientists to whom policymakers are connected. But a more troubling way that propaganda and incentives intersect concerns the role of low-powered studies. Scientists are strongly encouraged to publish research articles, and to do so often. Moreover, publishing positive results is strongly preferred to null results. Finally, scientists work with limited funds that they must use to meet many demands. All of these considerations lead to strong incentives to run studies with relatively low power (particularly, fewer data points) whenever possible (Smaldino and McElreath [2016]).37 Of course, most scientific fields recognize that, all else being equal, higher powered studies are more rigorous, more reliable, and make for all-around better science. But there is little incentive, and often few resources, for individual scientists to produce consistently high-quality studies. And as we have seen, low-powered studies are more likely to spuriously support erroneous conclusions. In cases where industry is not involved, this is not as worrying: spurious results can be detected via meta-analysis. But in the presence of a propagandist, they become a powerful tool in shaping public belief. Discussions of low-powered science often focus on their role in controversies about particular results, in the context of the so-called replication crisis in the behavioural sciences (and especially psychology) (Open Science Collaboration [2015]). And the regular publication and acceptance of ultimately incorrect results is certainly worrying. But the arguments and results we have given here suggest that even more is at stake: the same sorts of conditions that lead to a replication crisis also provide extra fodder for industrial propaganda. This makes reshaping scientists’ incentives to publish many, low-powered ‘least-publishable units’ crucial to foiling propagandists. For instance, scientists should be granted more credit for statistically stronger results—even in cases where they happen to be null. Scientists should not be judged on the number of publications they produce, but on the quality of the research in those articles, so that a single publication with a very high-powered study, even if it shows a null result, should be ‘worth’ more than many articles showing surprising and sexy results, but with low power. Similar reasoning suggests that given some fixed financial resources, funding bodies should allocate those resources to a few very high-powered studies, rather than splitting it up into many small grants with only enough funding to run lower-powered studies. Or a more democratic alternative might involve scientists who work together to generate and combine smaller studies before publishing, making it more difficult for the propagandist to break off individual, spurious results.

#### False balance decreases trust in media and causes misinformation

Benham 19 [Janelle Benham, Adjunct Professor at Abilene Christian University and former reporter with a master’s degree in journalism from Ball State University, 2019, “Best Practices for Journalistic Balance: Gatekeeping, Imbalance and the Fake News Era,” Journalism Practice, https://sci-hub.se/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17512786.2019.1658538]/Kankee

Zelizer (2004) said journalism prides itself on its respect for truth and facts. However, public opinion of U.S. news outlets has an increasingly different view on if journalism truly reflects a truthful picture. In a 2016 Pew Research Center survey, 74% of U.S. adults surveyed said they believe news media tend to favor one side when reporting on political or social media issues, with only 24% saying media deal fairly with both sides (Mitchell et al. 2016). In the same year, a Gallup Poll revealed that trust in U.S. news organizations sunk to an all-time low, with only 32% saying that had a great or fair amount of trust in the news media “to report the news fully, accurately, and fairly” (2016, 1). In their most recent joint poll, Gallup and the Knight Foundation (2018) found that only 44% of respondents could name a news organization which they believe reports the news objectively. For institutions tracking public perception of US journalists’ bias and fairness there has been a steady decline over the last four decades (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2004). In 1985 the Pew Research Center found 45% of those U.S. adults surveyed thought news organizations to be politically biased, by 2002, that number jumped to 59% (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2004). Considering Pew’s latest survey has nearly three-fourths of respondents doubting the fairness of reports, the trajectory of U.S. journalism in the truth perception spectrum is grim. While the numbers are starkest in the U.S. this issue is relevant globally as well. In a 2017 Pew Research Center survey 75% of those surveyed in 38 nations said media bias, specifically favoring one political party over others while reporting, is not permissible (Mitchell et al. 2018). Globally 52% think their news media are doing a good job at fairly reporting different positions on political issues (Mitchell et al. 2018). These numbers indicated the audience’s decreasing perception of journalistic fairness in relation to bias. However, the problem does not lie in just bias perception but in the balance conundrum itself, Kovach and Rosenstiel said that balance is inherently subjective: Balancing a story by being fair to both sides may not be fair to the truth if both sides do not, in fact, have equal weight. And in those many cases where there are more than two sides to a story, how does one determine which side to honor? Balance, if it amounts to false balance, becomes distortion. (2014, 63) As a part of that, there should be a greater examination into this journalistic concept of balance, how it can be more concretely defined, and how to obtain balance within storytelling while avoiding the pitfalls of imbalance. A qualitative examination into this concept of balance is essential to frame this issue within the communication research profession. In her study on the impact of the Internet on news organizations, Robinson offered this support for qualitative research, “In-depth interviews with news producers would offer a chance to explore the nature of the press as an institution in the latest emergentmedia environment”(2007, 308). A qualitative approach will be enlightening for this topic of study as it allows for open-format discovery and expands beyond the content analysis approach of past balance and objectivity studies (Lazarfield, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Schaefer and Fordan 2015). Stavitsky and Dvorkin explained the historic difficulties of quantitative measurement for the concept of balance in journalism particularly with relation to campaign or candidate reporting: Quantitative analysis of balance—sometimes referred to as ‘stop-watch studies’—may point to important discrepancies in coverage and signal a lack of fair treatment. However, stopwatch analysis alone does not address questions of whether coverage favored a particular candidate or, for that matter, a political party or interest group. (2008, 6) Hearns-Branaman also utilized a qualitative approach in part for his work on the philosophy of truth in journalism practice: Unlike many philosophical discussions around truth and journalism, I will also use the discourse of journalists interviewed by myself to inform the discussion. This is not to take their statements at face value nor to associate their talk with their ‘beliefs.’ It is simply talk, talk that, however, illustrates how they are situated in the field of journalism. (2016, 4–5)

#### Only advocacy can overcome misinformation – squo focus on objectivity fails to convince the public

Froomkin 20 [Dan Froomkin, adjunct professor at the Poynter Institute for Media Studies at the American University School of Communications and Washington bureau chief for The Intercept, 7-28-2020, "Are we witnessing the final collapse of "objective" political reporting? Let's hope so," Salon, https://www.salon.com/2020/08/03/are-we-witnessing-the-final-collapse-of-objective-political-reporting-lets-hope-so/]/Kankee

There are two main reasons why the leaders of America's elite newsrooms are so devoted to the journalistic practice commonly referred to as "objectivity," which precludes reporters from "taking sides" in their political coverage — even when one side is an obvious lie, or an affront to core journalistic values like pluralism and democracy. The official reason is that they sincerely believe that press neutrality leads to a more informed electorate. They argue that voters will trust their news sources more if those sources are "unbiased," and that accurate information is more likely to be accepted as the truth if readers come to their own conclusions rather than being told what to think. A news organization perceived as objective, they say, has an increased power to persuade. The unofficial reason, which New York University journalism professor Jay Rosen pithily calls "refuge seeking," is that the "objective" approach protects editors and reporters from criticism – specifically, from accusations of bias. It also allows them to feel superior to partisans and activists, because they remain "above the fray." OK, let's review. Our leading journalistic institutions engage in "objectivity" to achieve two major goals: An informed electorate Immunity from accusations of bias So, here's my question to New York Times executive editor Dean Baquet, Washington Post executive editor Marty Baron, Associated Press executive editor Sally Buzbee and the other proclaimed and self-proclaimed guardians of our biggest, finest news organizations: How's that working out for you? Not so great, huh? The obvious answer is that "objectivity" has failed miserably to achieve either goal — and is more likely having the opposite effect. Informed electorate? Some four out of 10 Americans currently believe all sorts of things that aren't remotely true, like that the Black Lives Matter protests have been mostly violent, or that voter fraud is a problem and that mail-in voting makes it worse, or — despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary — that Trump is doing a good job. Nearly three in 10 believe COVID-19 was made in a lab and that Bill Gates wants to use vaccination to implant trackable microchips in people. Immune from accusations of bias? Those misinformed voters believe these things because they heard them from Fox News or some other right-wing super-spreader of conspiracy theories, after having decided that the "mainstream press" is, as their president tells them, so biased that it has become "fake news" and the "enemy of the people." And before you simply blame social media and filter bubbles — which of course are factors here — ask yourself this: Could it be that the "objective" approach to covering major political issues is simply too anodyne to convince anyone who's on the fence? What if the mainstream, reality-based media armed its audience with facts as emphatically and effectively as Fox News arms its audience with misinformation? What if the New York Times aggressively advocated for the truth, rather than just putting it out there for the record? A large fraction of America has tuned out the elite media, treating it like so much white noise. What if the Washington Post more assertively said in its news stories: "Here's what we believe are the facts, and why"? What if they said: "Here's where we're coming from"? What if they said: "Here's our best explanation of why all this crazy stuff is happening and why you're so screwed"? And what if the mainstream media provided its audience with a true, overarching narrative in which to situate the day-to-day stories — true, evidence-based narratives as compelling as the false ones that Fox and OAN and others are selling — rather than throwing their hands up in the air and saying "you decide"? The only thing hard about this would be overcoming decades of self-censorship. Reality-based reporters know the truth: Economic stories exist within a narrative of grotesque inequality sustained by the people who benefit from it; the earth is in grave danger from climate change but fossil-fuel interests have blocked necessary action; law enforcement is only one of many institutions that devalue Black lives; and Donald Trump doesn't fix problems, he exploits them. People hunger for compelling, explanatory narratives — that's why they respond so strongly to people like George Conway and books like those by Mary Trump and Michael Wolff. My view is that journalism as it is currently practiced by our most elite organizations simply isn't persuasive. It frustrates the liars enough that they'll still try to delegitimize it — and succeed, in scary proportions. But printing the truth and the lies and letting the people decide just isn't working. You have to shout the truth from the rooftops, and fight the lies in the streets. And although Trump and Trumpism have brought these issues to a head, the failure of objectivity is not just a Trump-era phenomenon. Most notably, and fatally, the failure of the press to assertively call out the flaws in the case against Saddam Hussein — out of fear of appearing biased — arguably led to a devastating war. When a poll in late 2003 showed that a shocking 69 percent of Americans falsely believed that Hussein played a role in the 9/11 terror attacks, newsroom leaders across the country should have launched a major reassessment of their approach to fighting misinformation. Today, with Trump openly challenging the basic mechanics of democracy, the question is upon us: When it comes down to a choice between authoritarianism and democracy, will the elite media "take sides"? Or will they be afraid of appearing biased? The alternative: "moral clarity" In a seminal tweet early this summer, during the battle over a particularly abhorrent op-ed, journalist Wesley Lowery set down a marker: Some have depicted this view as radical, demanding some sort of uniform view on all issues. But what Lowery and others (including myself) are arguing for is not moral conformity, just clarity. Government "by the people" depends on voters being exposed to different points of view — but it also requires the media to fight misinformation. So that means journalists should strive to present a variety of political arguments to their audiences. But they need to be based in reality and presented honestly. Alternately, political arguments that gain currency but are made in bad faith — particularly those that are racist, or sexist, inhumane or anti-democratic — should be clearly identified as such. Moral clarity in news journalism isn't partisan or polemic. Journalists shouldn't pretend they know the answers. We should just stop pretending we don't know what the problems are. Heck, maybe "moral clarity" just means having an occasional open discussion in diverse newsrooms about how to do the work, rather than just doing it the way it's always been done. "What I argue for is a more deliberate process that acknowledges that there are morals and ethics at all," Lowery told newsletter journalist Luke O'Neil in early July. "All these folks get off on saying 'We don't make any decisions ever. This is what it's always been' as a way of shielding the fact that they are constantly making decisions, and those decisions are subject to their biases." Lowery noted: "I'll be honest, in my experience there is far less discussion than there should be. Everything operates on autopilot." Losing trust, not gaining it Objectivity is supposed to create a bond of trust between journalists and their audience. But I've often argued that an honest, transparent journalistic application of moral clarity would enhance trust a lot more than the transparently bogus application of strained euphemisms, flagrant false equivalence, amnesia and credulousness. As I wrote last month, editors like Baquet are pursuing a form of objectivity that encompasses a whole range of anachronistic attitudes and habits that actually reduce the accuracy and authenticity of news coverage, rather than enhance it — and the readers notice. Intelligent readers cringe when they read star New York Times reporter Peter Baker join the he's-changing-his-tone chorus by pronouncing that "denial no longer appears to be a viable strategy for Mr. Trump." (The Times itself published an unsigned and oddly short-lived item in its live news updates a few days later, headlined: "Trump Returns to Where He's Mostly Been on Coronavirus: Denying Reality". It started off: "Trump's supposed shift on the virus didn't last long.") Focusing on tactics rather than substance leads to horrors like this recent Washington Post article examining who will benefit politically from Republicans letting unemployment benefits run out for desperate Americans. It literally featured headers saying "Democrats say" and "Republicans say." The worst thing, however, is the hypocrisy. Reporters confidently describe Trump's thinking when they're making absurdly generous and incorrect assumptions — as when he recently restarted his daily briefings because he missed the TV ratings, which the Times somehow translated into "a tacit acknowledgment that the public health crisis he had hoped to put behind him was still ravaging much of the country." But they can't bring themselves to write that he's lying, or crazy, or stupid. Consider how the New York Times sometimes concludes that it's important not to tell people what they should think about a news story, but at other times concludes it is — and a key factor seems to be whether doing so will annoy the left. Don't want to take my word for it? In his interview on the Times's own Daily podcast in January, Baquet defended the paper's both-sides coverage of Trump by saying: "I think of the reader who just wants to pick up his paper in the morning and know what the hell happened. I'm beholden to that reader, and I feel obligated to tell that reader what happened." But defending an article about Bernie Sanders' entrance into the 2016 Democratic presidential primary, which framed Sanders as a long shot who at best might shift Hillary Clinton a bit to the left, Baquet said: "I think we got to tell the readers, in the moment, how should we think about this." He added: "I think the reader picks up The New York Times and says, Bernie Sanders, I've never heard of him. How should I think about him?" There's no consistency. "Objectivity" seems to be based on an oversensitivity to the imagined views of a mythical center-right white male who doesn't exist — and it pisses off readers who do. Taking the public's side Local journalism is dying, and to some extent I blame that on "objectivity," too. Here's the core argument I made in 2009, when I wrote that "'Playing it Safe' Is Killing the American Newspaper": But we're hiding much of our newsrooms' value behind a terribly anachronistic format: voiceless, incremental news stories that neither get much traffic nor make our sites compelling destinations. While the dispassionate, what-happened-yesterday, inverted-pyramid daily news story still has some marginal utility, it is mostly a throwback at this point — a relic of a daily product delivered on paper to a geographically limited community. (For instance, it's the daily delivery cycle of our print product that led us to focus on yesterday's news. And it's the focus on maximizing newspaper circulation that drove us to create the notion of "objectivity" — thereby removing opinion and voice from news stories — for fear of alienating any segment of potential subscribers.)… While we legitimately want to keep partisanship and polemics out of our news coverage, we need to stop banishing our humanity and the passions that made us become journalists in the first place. When we find a great story, why shouldn't we shout it from the rooftops? Maybe if local papers were pluckier and more assertive about advocating for the people in their communities, those people would be more willing to pay. If they want to take the public's side, local, regional and national newspapers should consider creating beats based not on how officialdom organizes itself, but on major areas where people are getting screwed. So maybe there should be a beat about struggles with poverty, and another on the effects of criminal justice. National news organizations are suddenly, finally, devoting resources to race issues. But what about creating beats for inequality, misogyny and official secrecy? There are signs of progress here and there. In regards to Trump's attempts to delegitimize the November election, the mainstream media has, effectively, taken sides (with some notable exceptions). Some news organizations are recognizing that taking sides is just fine sometimes. Here's the vice president of news at McClatchy: Am I hopeful that the industry can change? Not so much in the short run, no. That's because there's actually a third reason so many journalistic leaders cling to "objectivity": Abandoning it would require them to admit they were wrong — and that "liberals" like me were right. It would mean surrendering the moral high ground they treasure more than anything. That's why I don't expect much to change until there's a new generation of leadership in our newsrooms.

### Contention 2

#### Contention 2 – Journalistic Advocacy breeds social and political change.

#### Media journalism is a vessel that bridges personal and political—it creates critical readers and thinkers who are exposed to diverse sociopolitical perspectives

Ndidi Opara n.d. [Based in Eastside Seattle, Ndidi Opara (she/her) is a community organizer, journalist, and researcher. Her published work spans from research on the American Color-line in Rap Advocacy in the Journal of Student Research to op-ed's on educational inequality through being journalism fellow with StudentVoice. Her political beliefs are radically left, economically anti-capitalist and socially a radical progressive abolitionist.) “The Importance of journalistic advocacy”, Social Policy, Institute for Youth in Policy] RM

Media remains one of the most essential institutions in the United States. And at the same time, the media remains ever-changing. Take the increasingly politicized nature of more non-partisan forms of media such as television and film. This is not to refute the constant commentary on society that film and television pose, but to assert that television and film now push unabashedly political messages. For example, compare the way The Matrix showcases universal messages about truth and society to the way Get Out directly explores neoliberalism and racism.

At the same time, partisan media still plays a massive influence on how people learn about politics. The influence of Fox News and similar right-leaning news outlets remain a prominent force in American politics. During the Trump presidency, Fox News was often criticized for serving as a mouthpiece for the administration. Even the world of celebrities has become more political as celebrities are encouraged to use their large platforms to be political. However, some celebrities like Scarlett Johanssen argue that celebrities shouldn’t have to be political because it’s not their jobs.

This is just to say that there are many examples of how media as an institution has changed. Journalism is no different. The most notable change in journalism is its form: **one cannot deny the shift from print journalism to digital journalism**. But, no matter the form, journalism has mostly remained true to the institution's core values of integrity, public trust, and accountability. Some may argue that these values have been lost over the years, especially with the proliferation of journalism across social media. But notable journalistic publications like the Associated Press continue to uphold these values and standards. Not coincidentally, these publications are also distinctly centrist. Non-centrist publications, like the left-leaning New Yorker and Vox or the right-leaning Breitbart and New York Post, also have large followings, but they are not as objective when it comes to fact-based reporting as organizations like NPR.

Quality journalism, as pioneered by notable, historically significant news organizations like the Associated Press and the New York Times, is an important part of the United States government. **For example, the impact of the landmark Supreme Court New York Times Co. v. United States — the case that allowed the publication to publish the Pentagon Papers without the risk of government censorship during the Vietnam War — is an instance of journalism wielding serious influence on U.S. policy.**

Journalistic advocacy, journalism that takes a politically or socially charged view, is another way journalism is a powerful political tool. **Advocacy journalism rejects the prominent ideal of objectivity in journalism in favor of opinionated rhetoric to push a social agenda**. Political organizations may use advocacy journalism to write letters to the editors of local publications to persuade and mobilize people who read those publications. People also use journalism to write op-ed pieces that focus on combining personal stories with facts to push a political agenda.

**Advocacy journalism can seriously impact legislation, primarily through lobbying local officials and garnering local support for an issue or initiative. As more people are becoming politically involved, more advocates and organizers are turning to journalistic advocacy as a form of advocacy. In short: more advocates are becoming journalists.**

Right-wing journalists like Dennis Campbell argue that this journalism represents a complete disregard for truth post-Watergate. The right views this advocacy as propaganda, while the left views it as the advantageous merge between advocacy groups and media organizations. Mathew Ingram for the Columbia Journalism Review cites the ACLU revealing Amazon’s recent implementation of facial recognition software as an example of the way that advocacy groups have used — and continue to use — journalism to their advantage. People's views on advocacy journalism differ on whether it represents positive or negative deviance from the traditional values of journalism. The right may view the departure from traditional, objective journalism as a sign that journalism is becoming propaganda. The left may view the turn towards opinionated journalism as a new opportunity for advocacy and reform.

On the same political thread, op-eds — commentary rather than strictly fact-based reporting — have become a vessel for bridging the personal to politics. Op-eds have given a voice to the social issues that our nation is currently facing and have done this in a way that fact-based reporting cannot. **This personal element to politics is a new way that journalism can portray traditional journalistic ideals like integrity, public trust, and accountability, but at the expense of objectivity.**

Advocacy journalism must ask itself where facts and opinions meet. It must ask itself what kinds of opinions can be supported with facts, and what a fact means if it is put in an objective light. In turn, Americans must be more critical of the journalism they consume. Advocacy journalism presents a greater debate about the ethics of journalism. Is it good practice to publish stories with the expectation that readers will do the extra analysis of thinking critically about what they read? Can you expect the average reader to do their own fact-checking or understand what is objective and what is not? These are questions that journalistic advocates and journalists generally must consider as journalism continues to change and grow.

#### The press can use a form of advocacy reporting called “movement journalism” to ensure authentic stories are being told in their entirety. Advocacy propels social justice to challenge systemic inequities

Nicole Froio 2021 [Nicole Froio is a writer and researcher currently based in York, United Kingdom. She is working on a PhD on masculinity, sexual violence, and the media. She writes about women's rights, Brazilian politics, books, and many other topics.) "How journalists are challenging ideas of objectivity while empowering their communities," Current, 5-20-2021, https://current.org/2021/05/how-journalists-are-challenging-ideas-of-objectivity-while-empowering-their-communities/] SM

DaLyah Jones didn’t think of herself as a movement journalist when she worked in public radio. But she had a feeling that her newsroom was failing to cover the communities that needed the most attention.

During her time at KUT in Austin, Texas, from 2016 to 2019, Jones said, she often pressed for more coverage of marginalized communities, including Black Austinites who were leaving the city’s historic side for rural and suburban areas. “I was covering everyday stuff, but I would try to push folks,” said Jones, who now works for the Texas Observer.

Yet she felt that her superiors didn’t share her priorities. Jones didn’t understand why she was running into resistance. That changed when she was introduced to a new concept — “movement journalism.”

Movement journalism aligns with goals of social change and liberation from oppression. Its proponents strive to work with underserved communities affected by injustice, particularly those of color.

Because it questions objectivity and other pillars of traditional reporting, movement journalism remains outside of the mainstream. But some journalists in public radio are finding that it can provide a valuable framework for deepening coverage of local issues. Meanwhile, Jones and others have chosen to leave public radio entirely to devote themselves to the principles of movement journalism.

During her time at KUT, Jones learned more about movement journalism when she got a Freedomways fellowship with Press On, a Southern media collective that aims to catalyze change and advance justice through the practice of movement journalism. The Freedomways program supports journalists and storytellers in the South.

Lewis Raven Wallace, co-founder and education program director of Press On, describes movement journalism as an alignment with community grassroots organizing and movements for social justice. For journalists, this means diversifying their sources and scope of reporting to encompass the realities of racial, classed and gendered oppression in society and making their journalism more collaborative and community-centered, rather than extractive.

Wallace said he believes that movement journalism holds promise for what public media could achieve through working with communities that have been left behind by corporate media. Harnessing this promise could be a valuable asset for journalists and communities alike.

“There’s been a lot of conflation with this idea that we are talking about advocacy journalism, or writing that always takes a stance. And I think that reporting always takes a stance,” he said. “Movement journalism is not so much taking a stance on a given issue — it’s about aligning with grassroots community organizing and movements for justice, trying to make things better, and recognizing that there are going to be debates within that. So it’s really about asking, how do we align ourselves and our ethical practices with communities and movements for justice?”

After receiving training in movement journalism, Jones tried to work on her investigative Freedomways project at KUT, focusing on wildfires in the rural community of Bastrop southeast of Austin. But she felt that the station wasn’t hospitable to her exploration of movement journalism.

This felt especially frustrating because of Jones’ background. “I’m a person who comes from a rural background, and I know and understand the importance of not having information, not being able to share it in a very succinct way, as well as what happens to a community when they don’t know much about their own community,” she said.

KUT was then grappling with internal dysfunction and a toxic newsroom culture that journalists of color pressed management to address. Jones said that she became burned out and disillusioned with public media.

Against the background of protests following the murder of George Floyd, Jones shared some of her experiences with racism at KUT in a Twitter thread. At the Texas Observer, she now runs a Google News–funded engagement initiative focused on communities of color across Texas, letting marginalized communities lead the way on what to report. While the Observer doesn’t explicitly endorse movement journalism, Jones said that she feels it’s more accepting of the practice.

The larger problem with public radio journalism, Jones said, is that reporters see themselves as “not a part of our communities.”

“I feel like we get this very hierarchical standpoint within journalism,” she said. “We think we are above the communities we report on and that’s what public radio is to me. … It’s very snobby. And if you don’t feel like the things you’re reporting on will affect you, then that’s coming from a place of privilege, for one. And also, you’re sadly mistaken.”

‘Neutrality is impossible for me’

The term “movement journalism” and the concept was formalized in a 2017 report by Project South, a Southern organization dedicated to cultivating strong social movements in the region. But Project South noted that a tradition of alternative media in the U.S. that seek to advance social movements goes back to at least 1827, when free African Americans in New York founded the newspaper Freedom’s Journal.

Movement journalism also has roots in Hispanic movements for emancipation (the first Hispanic-owned newspaper in the U.S., El Mensagero Luisianés, was established in 1909), Indigenous struggles (The Cherokee Phoenix, the first Indigenous newspaper, debuted a year after Freedom’s Journal) and labor movements in the 1820s (labor journalism gave a platform to unions and people fighting for better working conditions). The work of investigative journalist and anti-lynching activist Ida B. Wells also foreshadowed the development of movement journalism.

More recently, proponents of movement journalism have identified noncommercial radio as a potential seedbed for the practice. In its 2017 report, Project South pointed to low-power FM stations in the South as “a promising platform.” At the time, two Project South board members sat on the board of WRFG, a community radio station in Atlanta. The organization also had a relationship with WMXP, a low-power FM station in Greenville, N.C.

Since 2016, Project South has planned a news outlet for social justice coverage that would syndicate programs to community radio. It has yet to launch that platform, but as a first step, Project South has started working with more than 50 Black-owned noncommercial radio stations in the South. The Black Radio Project gives the stations technical assistance, informational spots and public service announcements, according to Angela Oliver, Project South’s communications coordinator. PSAs have covered topics such as COVID prevention, voting rights and the need for civic engagement beyond elections.

In addition, Project South is working on a database of experts to help producers in the network find diverse sources for stories. It is also organizing events to bring together DJs, artists and activists to strategize about movement building.

“The idea is to create a space for them to be able to strategize and help each other — how can radio help get the message out?” Oliver said. “How can activists provide content to the radio based on whatever work they’re doing at the time?”

While public media may offer a forum for movement journalism to grow, Wallace risked his job in the system to highlight the shortcomings of traditional newsgathering.

Shortly after President Trump’s inauguration, Wallace published a blog post titled “Objectivity is dead, and I’m okay with it.” In the post, Wallace reflected on his position as a white transgender journalist in public media — he was a reporter for Marketplace at the time — and pointed out journalistic objectivity’s failure to address the rise of “alternative facts.”

“Neutrality is impossible for me, and you should admit that it is for you, too,” Wallace wrote. “As a member of a marginalized community (I am transgender), I’ve never had the opportunity to pretend I can be ‘neutral.’ And right now, as norms of government shift toward a ‘post-fact’ framework, I’d argue that any journalist invested in factual reporting can no longer remain neutral.”

At the request of his Marketplace supervisors, who told him he had violated the show’s ethics code, Wallace took down the post. He was suspended for the rest of the week. On Friday of the same week, Wallace reconsidered his decision and told his bosses he would republish it.

“Part of what I wanted to highlight in that blog post was the kind of doublespeak around diversity that happens in public media, where there’s a lot of conversation about wanting more diversity or wanting to include people of color, wanting to include trans people, but a complete ban on advocating for yourself as a trans person or as a person or color,” Wallace said. “… I ended up going public with that story largely for the purpose of highlighting this contradiction.”

He learned the following Monday that he had been fired. Wallace publicly disclosed that he was dismissed for a blog post rejecting journalistic objectivity. He ultimately wrote a book on the myth of objectivity and co-founded Press On.

Public media journalists are in a unique position to do journalism differently from their corporate counterparts but refuse to for fear of seeming partisan, Wallace said.

“There is this idea that public media in particular serves the public and wants to represent a diverse public but refuses to stand up against racism and white supremacy because that might not be considered objective. And not only is that untenable, but it’s also not really in line with the original intent of public media,” he said. “The original intent was grounded in what you might now call a ‘media justice framework,’ of trying to counterbalance corporate monopoly in media and create platforms that would be able to represent folks who are underrepresented because of systemic exclusion.”

In his book The View From Somewhere: Undoing the Myth of Journalistic Objectivity, Wallace challenges traditional approaches to journalism that fail to recognize the context of oppression and racial hatred in the U.S. He argues that the conversation about objectivity cracks open uncomfortable truths about how journalists practice cultural dominance in newsrooms.

“You cannot have a successful career in public media as somebody who publicly takes a stance on racial hostility or publicly takes a stance on patriarchy or abuse, and that is obviously messed up at a moral level,” Wallace said. “But it also creates this just ridiculous conundrum for the efforts in public media to be more representative and to be more driven by the public.”

During the protests that followed the killing of George Floyd, some public media organizations made clear to their employees that they could take a stance on racial injustice on their social media accounts. That may indicate change in some newsrooms, but Wallace also advocates for challenging the very concept of objectivity in journalism.

“To me, the conversation about objectivity is just a wedge conversation that opens all these other issues that are really about cultural white supremacy, and cultural racism, and cultural dominance, and oppression in these spaces,” he said. “But we really can’t have an honest conversation about oppression if we are still attached to the myth that it’s possible to be neutral, so it comes out over and over, every single time.”

While Wallace was working on The View From Somewhere, he met Ramona Martinez, who at the time was working as a producer for the podcast BackStory. During a conversation about journalism, Martinez said something that stuck with Wallace: “Objectivity is the ideology of the status quo.”

Two years later, Martinez started producing Wallace’s podcast about the history of movement journalism, also titled The View From Somewhere. In the first episode, Martinez explained her assertion about objectivity: “… What is considered objective or neutral is really only a matter of social agreement, or the ideological consensus of the majority or the status quo.”

Martinez told Current that her perspective on the myth of neutrality stems in part from her experience as an associate producer at NPR from 2012 to 2016, where she came to see the tradition of journalistic objectivity as an obstacle to news coverage. Much like Wallace, Martinez said, she believes that her colleagues’ investment in neutrality didn’t leave space for honest conversations about race and power.

“Younger journalists are being courageous about speaking up about how race and power are affecting journalistic coverage,” she said. “But I don’t have a lot of faith that the people in power are going to be able to divorce themselves from these ideas, which to them is the foundation of being a good journalist. And movement journalism is a completely different way of perceiving journalism.”

‘This process is never finished’

For some public media reporters and organizations, the alternative lens of movement journalism points to a potential new way forward. These outlets have started to explore ideas within movement journalism and have adopted antiracist stances.

Stations have contacted Wallace’s Press On to learn more about movement journalism and “talk about oppression through an intersectional lens,” he said. A workshop Wallace offers through Press On uses “popular education” techniques that aim to teach participants how individuals’ personal experiences are connected to larger societal problems. Titled “Transforming Journalism: Beyond Diversity,” the workshop contextualizes power dynamics in newsrooms around the history of racism and oppression in the U.S.

KUOW in Seattle is among the stations that have contacted Wallace. The Press On workshop was one of 19 sessions KUOW organized “to better understand how to invite communities into our coverage as content collaborators, challenge notions of traditional journalistic objectivity, identify who is not represented in our coverage, and understand the role media must play in dismantling systemic racism,” said CCO Jennifer Strachan.

All staffers were required to attend the sessions. Strachan estimates that around 80 to 100 participated in the Press On workshop.

“Our speaker series is one component of a vast, multiyear initiative to transform KUOW into an antiracist organization,” Strachan said. “We do believe this work is changing our journalism for the better and also that this process is never finished.”

Strachan said she found that KUOW’s journalism already aligned with many concepts shared in the Press On workshop. “We’ve embraced the concept that journalism has a role to play in amplifying underrepresented voices in our community and challenging narratives that normalize systemic racism,” Strachan said. “This is difficult work, and we’re grappling with how best to change how we work while also maintaining the journalistic standards and ethics that maintain our audience’s trust.”

#### Objectivity is a tool to silence black voices and issues in media

Schneider 20 [Gabe Schneider, political journalist with a degree in Political Science and Urban Planning from University of California San Diego, 12-21-2020, "Journalism outlets need new social media policies," University of Missouri Reynolds Journalism Institute, https://rjionline.org/reporting/journalism-outlets-need-new-social-media-policies/]/Kankee

What should they look like? Pittsburgh Post-Gazette journalist Alexis Johnson was barred from protest coverage after joking about a Kenny Chesney concert on Twitter. She tweeted: “Horrifying scenes and aftermath from selfish LOOTERS who don’t care about this city!!!!! …. oh wait sorry. No, these are pictures from a Kenny Chesney concert tailgate. Whoops.” Johnson, a Black journalist, was punished for making a joke about the media framing of “riots” and “looting.” While one of her white colleagues called one alleged looter a “scumbag,” it was Johnson who was punished. “I was told it violated our social media policy. They kept calling it an educational conversation, but there was no warning, no ‘Hey can you take the tweet down?’ By Monday morning, they had decided I would no longer be able to cover it,” Johnson told CBS2. The harsh reactionary punishment applied to Johnson is ridiculous, but not unique. Other Black journalists have faced similar repercussions: Wesley Lowery was punished by the Washington Post for correctly framing the Tea Party as a racist reactionary movement. So was Kendra Pierre-Louis, who was punished by the New York Times for saying white supremacy is racist. The trend line is that reporters, often Black, are punished for their perspective, even if it’s rooted in reporting and facts. Punishment can mean being barred from covering a topic that is close to the reporter’s identity, like Johnson was, or an implied threat of being fired. The dynamic is so crystalized that, instead of individually challenging The New York Times for their op-ed calling on the president to use force against civilians, Black New York Times employees and their allies responded as a collective on Twitter, all tweeting: “This puts Black New York Times staff in danger.” But even in the wake of massive protests, even as management at many legacy newspapers committed to better social media policies, and even as journalism has shifted to a mostly online workforce, there’s been a lack of movement in newsrooms to craft a social media policy that allows journalists of color to just do their jobs. “Since the events of January 2020 and the summer, there’s been zero further conversation,” said B, a social media producer at a large legacy newspaper. “It’s just a standstill right now.” Journalists and social media managers I spoke with, like B, did not want their names published out of concern for how their managers might react to them being candid or because press requests required approval from newsroom leadership. But all of them, all younger reporters of color, had extensive thoughts on how newsrooms are failing to craft good social media policies and move the conversation beyond humanizing reporters of color. While social media has become a driving force for digital readership, and therefore ad revenue or donors, many legacy newsrooms have barely pushed the envelope in changing their social media policies. The New York Times adopted a new policy in 2017, which makes the blanket statement: “Our journalists should be especially mindful of appearing to take sides on issues that The Times is seeking to cover objectively.” The Washington Post also updated its policy in 2017, with many of the same themes. R, who recently interned for a different large legacy newspaper, said that they received clear instructions from management when they started: “They asked us not to tweet about Black Lives Matter, but didn’t address the complexity of that issue.” R said it is problematic to frame supporting a human rights issue, like Black Lives Matter, similarly to taking an open political stance. R doesn’t believe any reporter should be explicitly partisan (“don’t tweet about ‘blue’ or ‘red’”), but they do believe it makes you a better reporter if you’re able to be empathetic to readers who are affected by human rights issues, like police violence. “At the end of the day, it makes me a better reporter,” R, who is non-Black, said of saying “Black Lives Matter.” “I’m being empathetic to a movement that’s affecting my Black brothers and sisters. So therefore it would help me connect to readers who identify with that. And two: [It] just makes me more of a human, because I don’t think that people of another race should be shot and killed by police for no reason. I think that makes me a better reporter.” Z, an audience engagement editor at a newer digital publication, said the false equivalencies and double standards in current social media policy are exacerbated by the fact that racist readers are more willing to flag tweets for newsroom management. “It’s always been easier for white reporters to get away with saying things like that is because they’re white,” she said. “People automatically assume they don’t have any ties to a community and they don’t have any reason to say that thing other than it’s a fact.” Z said that the current conversation is way behind the times, in that newsrooms are still trying to figure out how to humanize their own Black and brown reporters. Instead, she’s looking to the future and thinking about the ways in which newsrooms should be expanding their audience. “I don’t see why more newsrooms aren’t sending out tweets in native languages,” she said. “I think that there is a huge population of people on the internet that are not being properly served; readers and persons of the community that don’t have access or can’t understand tweets that are coming from newsrooms because they’re not accessible.” Ultimately, B said that the divide in newsrooms is clear: on one side, there’s management, which is often whiter and older; on the other is the younger journalists, who are often more diverse. She said that management believes that you can separate your humanity from your work and younger journalists do not (although some editors, like The New York Times Dean Baquet, do not believe “there is a big gap”). “It’s like two schools of thought. And they’re both clashing in really ugly, really ugly ways. And one of the schools of thought is almost in every leadership position in the newsroom.” Newsrooms, especially older institutions, need to move on from the conversation of whether or not these social media policies are racist: if journalists of color are saying that the current structure of social media policies are applied unevenly and are racist, then they are racist. If journalists and social media managers from around the newsroom, especially those who are most impacted by these policies are given space to craft these policies, then perhaps we’ll soon see the necessary changes. If B were in charge of social media, she said her changes across the board are easy to articulate: No more penalizing reporters for the experiences they bring to the table. Instead: “Be honest, be truthful, be transparent when you get things wrong and just don’t be a bad person online. It’s very simple. It’s very short.”

#### No affirmative turns - only advocacy-based journalism can solve systemic racism

Liederman 21 [Mack Liederman, reporter with a master’s degree in journalism from Northwestern, 02-01-2021, "Let’s rethink objectivity," Redacted Magazine, https://redactedmagazine.com/2021/02/01/lets-rethink-objectivity/]/Kankee

In an op-ed that gained traction this summer in The New York Times, “A Reckoning Over Objectivity, Led by Black Journalists,” two-time Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Wesley Lowery attempts to use the momentum of Black Lives Matter to debunk the myth of objectivity. For Lowery, the stakes of objectivity are heavy. In fact, the Golden Rule may be better labeled as Thinly Veiled Racism. Lowery writes in summary, “The views and inclinations of whiteness are accepted as the objective neutral.” Look no further than the names spilling down any masthead (even this one), or to the TV newsrooms of The Wire, Spotlight, The Post and even Anchorman, and an essential reality becomes unavoidable: Journalism has been owned, operated, curated and defined by white people. The dogma of “quality journalism” has rested on the idea that the truth can stem only from objectivity, one that is defined by white reporters, their white editors, and their white bosses. The ones editing pages in red ink, assigning articles, hiring writers and framing the larger media narratives are the ones that ultimately get to decide what is and what is not objective journalism. While objectivity may be a powerful method of reporting, spurring journalists to strive toward factual accuracy, it is not an achievable goal. There is nothing objective about the subliminal and not-so-subliminal biases that seep into any given piece of journalism. How we interpret objectivity is inherently opinionated. And what’s objective about an opinion? Even your wiry professor, your wholesome English teacher and your loud gum-chewing colleague would know the clear answer to that one. Yet it is the sacred myth of objectivity that has long left it unquestioned, untouched and under-scrutinized in predominantly white spaces. The promises of objective reporting allow for white journalists to cover Black communities from a safe distance, supplying a baseline of journalistic credibility where none should be assumed. The consequence of white-framed objectivity has been an underserving of coverage on Black issues and a general silencing of reporters that dare to challenge the conventions of their profession. Objectivity is not an ideal — it’s a racial issue. Lowery chooses to look forward. While America can never truly uproot itself from the enduring appeal, familiarity and continuously consequential history of white supremacy, journalism stands in a strong position to challenge the status quo. The democratization of information through the internet has allowed for more Black voices to be heard and more Black stories to be told. The changing demographics and increasingly diverse readerships of major publications have leveraged its most powerful galvanizing agent — C.R.E.A.M. (Cash Rules Everything Around Me) — toward hiring and promoting the work of non-white staff. These favorable trends are not nearly enough. Our collective reckoning on race calls for a reckoning on our media — the total dismantlement of objectivity. Redacted Magazine hopes to play its (albeit small) part in a new direction forward. As pre-professional writers and editors, we believe that we have the runway and the independence (from potential future employers) to build a platform that begins with a socially equitable ethos. And when we fall short, we ask to be called out. This is how we become not objective journalists — but fair journalists. Let’s ditch the Golden Rule and forget objectivity. That’s the only way we can begin to tell the truth.

#### Systemic incentives to favor the accounts of police over victims means pro-police narratives will always be deemed objective

Mattar 20 [Pacinthe Mattar, Martin Wise Goodman Canadian Nieman Fellow at Harvard University 8-21-2020, "Objectivity Is a Privilege Afforded to White Journalists," Walrus, https://thewalrus.ca/objectivity-is-a-privilege-afforded-to-white-journalists/]/Kankee

I came out of my executive producer’s office with a look on my face that caught the attention of an older white male colleague, who asked me if I was okay. I told him what had happened. He spoke to the executive producer on my behalf. She relented. I’ve since faced several such roadblocks in my journalism career. Combined with the experiences of other racialized journalists, they represent a phenomenon I’ve come to think of as a deep crisis of credibility in Canadian media. There is the lack of trust toward the Black, Indigenous, and other racialized people whose stories we are supposed to cover as a reflection of the world we live in. Then there is the mistrust of the Black, Indigenous, and other racialized journalists who try to report on those stories. Our professionalism is questioned when we report on the communities we’re from, and the spectre of advocacy follows us in a way that it does not follow many of our white colleagues. There is a reckoning underway that has spared almost no industry, sparked by an alarming succession of killings of Black people in the US: Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and many more. The violence of those deaths, and the inescapable racism that underpinned them all, incited a tidal wave of anger and fatigue from Black people who had long been calling out the discrimination that they face in their daily lives. From academia to theatre, the beauty industry to major tech corporations, Black and other racialized employees are publicly coming forward and detailing how their organizations have perpetuated racism against them. Newsrooms in the US and Canada, for their part, have been forced to acknowledge that they have to do better: in who they hire, who they retain, who gets promoted, what they cover, and how they cover it. This moment has resurrected a question that’s haunted me since I returned from Baltimore: How can the media be trusted to report on what Black and other racialized people are facing when it doesn’t even believe them? IN MANY AMERICAN CITIES, the protests calling for justice following the killings of Black people like Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, and Breonna Taylor have been met with violent responses from police, who have tear-gassed, chased, shoved, beaten, and arrested protesters and journalists. In May, Omar Jimenez, a Black CNN reporter, was handcuffed and led away by police while the cameras rolled. Watching the recent police violence against protesters unfold reminded me of how my interview with the two men in Baltimore had ended. It was 10 p.m., meaning the city-wide curfew was now in effect, and we were standing just outside a subway station in the Penn North neighbourhood. Lonnie Moore, the young Black man who had first approached me, had just left. I was putting my recorder away when police came rushing into the block. They told Jarrod Jones and me we had to leave. We tried to enter a nearby subway station, but a police officer blocked the entrance. We tried to turn down a side street, but another officer told us we couldn’t go that way either. We tried every escape we could think of, but we were boxed in. Suddenly, one officer began charging at us, his baton out, swinging, shoving Jones and cursing at him. We ran away from him as fast as we could, my bag with my recording equipment bouncing clumsily behind me. None of this made it to air. I had made the rookie mistake of turning off my radio recorder as soon as the interview ended. But I probably would not have worked it into the documentary anyway; as a journalist, you want to avoid becoming part of the story. One of the core elements of journalism is for reporters to maintain a distance from those they cover, which is meant to provide a sense of objectivity. For many white journalists, that distance is built in to their very life experiences. But, for many other journalists, there is no distance between what happened to George Floyd and what could have happened to them. Distance is a luxury. When I got back to Toronto, I told my deskmates about my time in Baltimore in hushed tones. I felt at the time that to speak of it more openly would somehow implicate me, that my story could be seen through the lens of advocacy instead of hard-and-fast reporting. I also knew you never want to end up on the wrong side of police, especially as a racialized person, and leave it up to others to decide how your actions may have justified violence against you. In journalism, as in predominantly white societies at large, questioning police narratives is complicated. “The police play a very powerful role in defining what the nature and extent of crime is in our society,” says Julius Haag, a criminologist and sociology professor at the University of Toronto’s Mississauga campus. “Police also recognize that they have a powerful role in shaping public perceptions, and they use that ability within the media to help . . . legitimize their purpose and their responses.” A. Dwight Pettit, a Baltimore-based lawyer I interviewed for my documentary in 2015, told me something about why police accounts are rarely questioned by the media that stayed with me. Juries seem to have trouble confronting the violence in police-brutality cases, he said, because so often, people have grown up seeing police doing right by them and have trusted police with their safety. This is especially true for white people, who are less likely to be treated unfairly by police. Putting police on trial would be asking people to challenge their lifelong beliefs. Anthony N. Morgan, a racial-justice lawyer in Toronto, says this same dynamic plays out in Canada in both “obvious and indirect ways.” Racialized people can tell you about water cooler conversations they’ve had with white colleagues about racism they’ve experienced and witnessed, which “often end up in the ‘Did that really happen? What were they doing? Maybe we need to see more of the video?’ territory,” he says. “These kinds of frankly absurd ways of justifying and excusing murder or harm done to Black and Indigenous people play out in society more generally, and I think they play out in journalism too.” ON MAY 27, a twenty-nine-year-old Black Indigenous woman named Regis Korchinski-Paquet fell from a twenty-fourth floor balcony in Toronto while police were in her apartment, responding to the family’s call for help with her mental health crisis. Police were the only ones there during the fall, and questions about the moments before her death remain unanswered. The tragedy has also boosted calls from racialized journalists to challenge the media’s overreliance on police narratives. It wasn’t until the next day that media reports included any of her family members’ voices or began questioning the role of police in Korchinski-Paquet’s death. Not because the family didn’t want to talk to the media: the family’s social media posts are what had raised initial awareness about Korchinski-Paquet’s death. One journalist described arriving at the scene to talk to family members and seeing other reporters there. (This gap in the reporting may have stemmed from some family members’ initial social media posts, which effectively accused the police of killing Korchinski-Paquet and would have been impossible to independently verify at the time. The family’s lawyer later clarified their initial statements, saying they believed police actions may have played a role in Korchinski-Paquet’s death.) Instead, the very first news stories about Korchinski-Paquet’s death were based solely on a statement from the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), the civilian-oversight agency in Ontario that is automatically called to investigate circumstances involving police that have resulted in death, serious injury, or allegations of sexual assault. Some journalists asked their newsrooms and organizations to explain why early coverage excluded the family’s narrative. I know one journalist whose editor questioned her for reporting what the family had told her in the early hours. Korchinski-Paquet’s death is just the latest reminder of why some journalists have long been arguing that police versions of events—whether their own actions or the actions of those they police—should be subject to the same levels of scrutiny other powerful bodies garner, and that their accounts cannot be relied on as the only source. “The police are not, in and of themselves, objective observers of things,” said Wesley Lowery—who was part of a Washington Post team that won a Pulitzer Prize for its coverage of fatal shootings by police officers—in a Longform Podcast interview in June. “They are political and government entities who are the literal characters in the story.” Nor do police watchdogs offer a sufficient counternarrative. The SIU has long been plagued with concerns about its power and credibility. Former Ontario ombudsman André Marin released a 2008 report stating that Ontario’s system of police oversight has failed to live up to its promise due to a “complacent” culture and a lack of rigour in ensuring police follow the rules. More recently, the limited powers of the SIU have been made clear in the aftermath of the fatal shooting of D’Andre Campbell, a twenty-six-year-old Black man with schizophrenia, who was shot by a Peel police officer in April after he called the police for help. So far, that officer has refused to be interviewed by the SIU and has not submitted any notes to the police watchdog—nor can the officer be legally compelled to do so. In 2018, I would see these obstacles play out in my own reporting. I had helped produce a series of live town halls on racism across the country. The Vancouver edition focused on racism in health care, with one conversation centring the experiences of two Indigenous nurses. Diane Lingren, provincial chair for the Indigenous leadership caucus of the BC Nurses’ Union, recounted how she often saw non-Indigenous people who appeared to be intoxicated be “told to settle down, and then they get a cab ride” to an overnight shelter. With Indigenous people, she said, “I see the RCMP called. . . . I see them handcuff their ankles to their wrists so they can’t walk. . . . I see those people get taken away in the police cars.” The RCMP denied that account; their response included a statement about their practice of a “bias free policing policy.” In response to that statement, the executive producer on the series wanted to cut the Indigenous nurses’ anecdotes from the show entirely. (The producer could not be reached for confirmation.) My co-producers and I fought to retain them, to present them along with the RCMP’s statement. This shouldn’t have been a battle: our very role as journalists is to present all the facts, fairly, with context. But, in many newsrooms, police narratives carry enough weight to effectively negate, silence, and disappear the experiences of racialized people. That it’s racialized journalists who have had to challenge police narratives and counter this tradition is an immense burden—and it’s risky. “The views and inclinations of whiteness are accepted as the objective neutral,” Wesley Lowery wrote in a June op-ed in the New York Times. “When Black and Brown reporters and editors challenge those conventions, it’s not uncommon for them to be pushed out, reprimanded, or robbed of new opportunities.” That last point rings entirely too true for me. IN JULY 2017, I was guest producing on a weekly show for a brief summer stint. One story I produced was an interview with Ahmed Shihab-Eldin, an Emmy-nominated journalist who was in Jerusalem covering protests that had sprung up at the al-Aqsa mosque. Worshippers were praying outside the mosque, instead of inside, in an act of civil disobedience against the installation of metal detectors following the killing of two Israeli police officers by Israeli Arab attackers. In the interview, he explained the source of the tension, what the front lines of the protests looked like, and also touched on press freedom—Shihab-Eldin himself had been stopped, questioned, and jostled by Israeli security forces while he was reporting. From the moment I pitched having him on the show, the acting senior producer showed keen interest in the story. This enthusiasm made what happened next all the more confounding. We recorded the interview on a Friday. Shortly afterward, that same senior producer told me the segment was being pulled from the show and that she would not have the time to explain why. She had consulted a director, and together they had ultimately decided to kill it. The story never went to air. I spent a week trying to get an explanation. It wasn’t lost on me that the interview would have included criticism of Israeli security forces and that I was coming upon the intersection of two issues here: the media’s aversion to criticism of law enforcement coupled with its deeply ingrained reluctance to wade into the conversation about Israel and Palestine, especially if this means critiquing the Israeli government’s policies or actions. Bias or one-sidedness shouldn’t have been a concern: I had planned on incorporating the Israel Defense Force press office’s response into the story. The story couldn’t, and wouldn’t, have run without it. In the end, the director, who had been the one to make the final call to not run the interview, wrote an apologetic email to Shihab-Eldin and me, which read, in part: “Our hope was that further work on our end would allow us to give our audiences more context so that they would not leave your interview with unanswered questions. . . . We ran into unexpected difficulties in doing so.” I had heard nothing about the story needing more context, or about questions that the director and senior producer felt were unanswered, before the decision was made. Nor did I have a clear understanding of what these “unexpected difficulties” were. (The senior producer and director say they felt the interview was too opinionated.) For his part, Shihab-Eldin responded to the senior director with: “Unfortunately I’m all too familiar with ‘unexpected difficulties’.” It was the first and only time in my ten years of journalism that a story was pulled—let alone without an open editorial discussion or transparency. And I did not realize just how much this experience would mark me and my future in this profession. TO BE A JOURNALIST in any media organization or newsroom is to navigate the crush of the daily news cycle; the relentlessness of deadlines; and the pressure, care, and complexity it takes to craft a story well. To be a racialized journalist is to navigate that role while also walking a tightrope: being a professional journalist and also bringing forward the stories that are perhaps not on the radar of the average newsroom but are close to home for many of us. And it takes a toll. The stories I’ve recounted are the ones that stood out the most over my ten years in journalism. There are countless other, smaller fights that took place. When asked to comment for this article, Chuck Thompson, head of public affairs at the CBC, wrote in an email: “We are actively reviewing our journalistic standards to ensure we are interpreting policies and practices through a more inclusive lens. . . . It is just one of several recommitments we have made including hiring more Black, Indigenous and people of colour within our teams but also into leadership positions. We can point to a half dozen recent hires and promotions that show that pledge to do better, is both authentic and genuine.” His email also referenced existing initiatives, such as the CBC’s Developing Emerging Leaders Program, “which identifies and trains people of colour, as well as Black and Indigenous people, who are indeed taking their rightful place at our leadership tables.” (I am a graduate of the inaugural cohort of that program.) Diversity is a feel-good term that is often held up as a goal and priority by industries from media to law to academia and beyond. It’s supposed to be the antidote to the experiences I’ve described and a signal that employers value and seek a range of perspectives, backgrounds, world views, and experiences that run the spectrum of age, gender, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, race, and ability. If that feels like a massive umbrella of goals and classifications, that’s because it is. Just take a look at any Canadian newsroom, even in Toronto, a city that is over 50 percent nonwhite. As a starting point, our newsrooms do not reflect the world outside of them—which does not bode well for accurately representing the breadth of stories playing out every day. As a result, from the second so many racialized journalists walk into news organizations, we are still often the Only Ones in the Room. And, where there are racialized journalists at all, there are even fewer Black and Indigenous journalists. As you go higher up the ladder of these organizations, it’s not long before Black, Indigenous, and racialized journalists aren’t in the room at all. Meanwhile, news organizations regularly see our mere presence in their newsrooms as successful examples of so-called diversity even if our roles are overwhelmingly junior and precarious. This setup often ends up placing the responsibility on the Only Ones in the Room to guarantee a spectrum of experiences and stories in news coverage and to point out where coverage misses the mark, including when there is a story involving the actions of police. The responsibility is heavy. It’s a dynamic that Asmaa Malik, a professor at Ryerson University’s school of journalism, sees playing out regularly. Her research focuses on race and Canadian media as well as on the role of diversity in news innovation. “There’s an idea in many Canadian newsrooms that, if you have one person who checks the box, then you’re covered,” she says. “So the burden that puts on individual journalists is huge.” Everyone who’s been the Only One in the Room knows what it’s like. The silence that falls when a story about racism is pitched. The awkward seat shifting. The averted stares. We’ve felt it, and internalized it, and expected it. We know that there is often an unspoken higher burden of proof for these stories than for others, a problem that has long been exacerbated by the fact that race-based data is rarely collected in policing, health care, and other fields. Yet it is on us to fill this void and “prove” the existence of racism. As a result, we overprepare those pitches. We anticipate your questions. We get used to having the lives of our friends and families and the people who look like them discounted, played devil’s advocate to, intellectualized from a sanitized distance. A long-time producer at a major news organization, a Black woman whose name I agreed not to use because of fear for her job security, bristled at the suggestion that to cover stories that hit close to home, including anti-Black racism, police brutality, and the Black Lives Matter movement, is to somehow engage in advocacy. “There seems to be the assumption that we cannot coexist with the journalistic standards of being fair and balanced and impartial. Really, what we are fighting for, what we’ve always been fighting for, is just the truth.” In the meantime, when race and racism feature heavily in headlines, we are relied on to become sensitivity readers for our organizations, suddenly asked if things can be run past us or whether the show is hitting the right marks or whether we can connect other journalists to racialized communities and sources that are harder to reach. “This is in addition to the regular reporting that we do day-to-day. There’s just a level of work that goes unseen and unacknowledged,” the producer told me. “And the future of our institutions depends on us doing the work.” Under the banner of diversity, we are told to bring ourselves and our perspectives. But, if we bring too much of them, we are marked and kept back. I once applied to a senior editorial position after taking a leadership course only to be told I needed more training. I ended up taking on this role for nine months anyway, to fill in for a maternity leave. After that stint, in a meeting with a manager in which I expressed wanting to take on more leadership opportunities, I was told that I had to bide my time. (The manager remembers discussing other job opportunities but does not recall this part of the conversation.) At this point, I’d been at the organization for ten years, eight of which were at the specific show whose senior leadership I was applying for. The writing was on the wall for me. I left the organization less than two months later. For many of us, that kind of coded language—about needing more training, about biding our time—is proof that we will never be deemed qualified enough to lead the news that is often not made with us in mind, as audiences or as creators. In June, Kim Wheeler, an Anishinabe/Mohawk reporter, took to Twitter to write that she had left her job at the CBC after a network manager said she would never be a senior producer at the show she worked on. A Black producer described regularly being asked to fill more senior roles, but only on a temporary basis. It was only after I left my job that someone who had been on the hiring committee for the senior editorial role told me the reason I had been turned down. The director who had decided not to run the 2017 interview from Jerusalem had also been part of the hiring committee and had expressed concerns that I was biased and therefore should not be promoted, an opinion shared by some of the other committee members. And that was that. There’s no way of knowing this with absolute certainty, but I can’t help but imagine how things might have been different if the hiring committee, which had been made up of predominantly white women, had had another set of eyes, experiences, and world views. The presence of someone else in that room might have challenged the notion that I was biased. “Diversity” is a word that’s held up as a solution to the obvious gaps and inequities in media and other industries—in its most generous and naive interpretation, it’s supposed to encapsulate my experience, and yours, and hers, and his, and all of ours. Instead, the language of diversity and inclusion, to us, ends up feeling like we are being invited to a table as guests, but there are conditions to keeping our seats. Shake that table just a little bit, and you’ll soon find that your invitation has been rescinded. Many racialized journalists have had enough with the diversity talk. It’s long been clear that Black, Indigenous, and other racialized people must be at the forefront of the change in leadership that newsrooms so desperately need—at the decision-making tables, with enough power and security to sit in their seats comfortably, shake the tables, or flip them entirely. ON AN UNUSUALLY HOT, still day in June, while the world was in the early stages of the reckoning that remains underway, I sat with four women, all Black journalist friends of mine, on my back patio. Many of us had been fielding “Are you okay? Thinking of you” texts, phone calls, and emails for the past week and consulting one another on how to respond, if at all. We sat outside and talked as the sun set. It had been two weeks at least since we had been furiously keeping in touch in a frantic group chat, trying to keep abreast of all the world’s events and the shifting media landscape, but this was the first time I’d seen them in months, given the pandemic. We talked, ate, raged, commiserated, ranted, shared, and had tea until almost midnight. As it got dark, I brought out candles and looked at my friends’ faces in the glow. Everyone was so tired, so spent, so on edge, but so happy to see one another. The furrowed brows gave way to laughter, calm, relief. We dreamt of what it would be like if we all got to work together. We dreamt, naively, about creating our own news organizations. We dreamt, perhaps more realistically, about getting to do the work we wanted to do in newsrooms that are truly reflective of the worlds we live in. It reminded me of what the Black producer whose name I agreed not to use had told me: “It feels like such a weight to just make sure that the coverage we are doing on race and racism is good. We don’t have the luxury of pitching things that are just meant to bring us joy.” It’s true. There is so much more to us, if only there were space. There’s so much more we want to talk about, so much more we want to do. But the burden is now on the Canadian media industry and its leaders to enable that work instead of questioning it. To get out of the way so it can happen. Many of us have long been lectured to about journalistic standards and practices: verification, balance, objectivity, and accuracy. I find it ironic. In an industry that loves to talk to its racialized employees about accuracy when we pitch and cover experiences that mirror ours, what’s become clear is that media organizations themselves have failed these tests of accuracy. Their very existence and makeup has long been an inaccurate reflection of the world we live in. The accuracy problem was never ours to fix. It’s time newsrooms admit that they regret the error and put real work into correcting a historical mistake.

#### Bothsideism also shifts the “Overton Window” to the right, normalizing racist behaviors and beliefs

Shoaf 17 [Amanda Leeann Shoaf, Gardner-Webb University graduate with a Master of Arts in the Department of English, 2017, “Colorblind: How Cable News and the “Cult of Objectivity” Normalized Racism in Donald Trump’s Presidential Campaign,” Digital Commons at Gardner-Webb University, https://digitalcommons.gardner-webb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=english\_etd]/Kankee

From the very first days of our nation, we had a thriving press, envisioned and imbued by the founders, those children of the Enlightenment, with the “right and duty…to serve as an extralegal check on the government” (Siebert et al 56). Of course, it was also full of “partisanship, invective, and unrestraint” and incredibly diffuse, with a multitude of presses across the original colonies (Siebert et al 76). This fostered the libertarian principles of a free press that originated during the Enlightenment, rooted in unrestrained access to all viewpoints, but as time went on and technology advanced, the power of the press became concentrated in just a handful of powerful publishers and the mainstream press remains so today. However, then as now, libertarianism remained a tremendous influence and thus created the “cult of objectivity,” a kind of offshoot of its parent theory and one which I am focused on here. And what about those norms I referenced? Well, Webster’s Dictionary defines them as “standards of proper or acceptable behavior,” and indeed, the norms of political campaigning have acted as a stabilizing force for decades. When Klansman David Duke broke with these norms in his quest for higher office in Louisiana in the late 1980s, then President George H.W. Bush offered a strong rebuke, and Duke eventually met his fate at the ballot box. Yet, for the last year, one presidential candidate has consistently thrown the most basic norms of campaigning, and arguably morality, out the window rhetorically speaking. In conjunction with the majority of the press, and in particular cable news, he’s set a dangerous precedent, validating and normalizing, simply by making them partisan and therefore up for debate, xenophobic, racist, sexist, ableist, and anti-Semitic stances, along with other, perhaps less dangerous but still destabilizing conspiracy theories. That candidate’s name is Donald Trump. From the time it became clear that Donald Trump would be the Republican nominee for President, his aforementioned racist, sexist, etc. comments took on new meaning. While they had begun as early as his campaign announcement in July of 2015, assuming the mantle of defacto Republican nominee gave weight to his words. They stopped being outlandish statements from a flash-in-the-pan primary contender, ala Herman Cain in 2012, and became representative of the Republican Party, or at least their leadership. That’s why, when it comes to the specific examples I’ll be analyzing here, I’m focusing on the late spring of 2016, going into the final presidential debate in October. Those blatantly racist statements and actions, from calling Mexican immigrants murderers and rapists to suggesting (and not in jest, as we now know) banning all Muslims from entering the country, were often regarded as gaffes, a political term used to categorize “missteps, miscalculations, and misstatements” (Graham), in the lead-up to his nomination. Such classification though is not the only, or even the primary form of normalization, which can also be understood in this context as treating each of the aforementioned statements as if it is merely “the latest blip in the news cycle,” to be quickly answered for, then forgotten (Garfield). Veteran journalist Bob Garfield explains the idea in detail, saying, “Look, by its nature, journalism subordinates old news to the latest development. But, in this case, being slave to the fresh angle is simple malpractice because every moment spent on Trump policy and process buries the lead.” Essentially, he’s arguing that normalization is two-fold, encompassing both the initial coverage of Trump’s outlandish statements, the partisan debates referenced earlier, as well as how they are subsumed into the twenty-four hour news cycle. To put it rather bluntly, with Trump, “the lead is that a man who wants to build a wall, who wants to ban Muslims, who sees women only as potential vessels for his—“no problem there, I assure you”—could be the president of the United States. It was the lead in July. It is the lead now. It will be the lead in November” (Garfield). The media and press, but again, particularly cable news, thus normalize these statements; resulting in a reality where they are regarded as commensurate with Hillary Clinton’s handling of her e-mail controversy, which the news media’s coverage of could itself encompass a thesis of its own. In doing so, media outlets like CNN facilitate the breaking of long-held norms, destabilizing long-held structures. But how specifically is the press normalizing Donald Trump’s candidacy? Yes, they try to balance coverage of his outrageous statements with Clinton scandals or, failing that, give airtime to Trump campaign surrogates who will defend anything he says, but the specific ways they accomplish this balance is another matter. That is the purpose of my analysis, and it begins by talking about bias. While it might oftentimes be more accurate to ask how the media is biased rather than if it is biased, the prevailing question to my mind is how one medium’s attempt to be unbiased can actually result in the far more problematic, even dangerous, coverage. In the case of Donald Trump and cable news, though here I’ll be focusing exclusively on CNN, this is the question. Through an in-depth rhetorical analysis of the coverage of multiple instances of Trump’s most notorious incidences of racism, rooted in the principles of classical rhetoric as well as visual rhetoric and placed within the context of the broader defining, genre-specific characteristics of cable news, that question of “how?” can be answered. That begins with libertarian journalistic principles, which were referenced above and will be expanded on in later chapters. These principles birthed the “cult of objectivity” that has dominated the news media since the mid-century, dictating the reporting practices of the socalled “Big Three” networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS, and which are wholly unsuitable for covering Donald Trump because they are wholly unsuitable to tackling issues of race, which are themselves deeply embedded in the candidacy, from its successes and controversies to the coverage, of Donald Trump. That is because when it comes to discussing racism, the “the conventions and normative standards that supposedly ensure the proper output of information that can be deemed journalistic,” encompassing such standards “as objectivity, fairness, accuracy, verification and editorial judgement, as well as those that should be absent from the practice, such as sensationalism, partisanship, bias, speculation and assertion” by their very nature lend credence to the side espousing racist viewpoints that cannot and should not be countenanced in a moral society (Jones, The ‘New’ News… 147). Or as journalist Jamelle Bouie more colorfully puts it, “For every display of ‘pro-truth’ bias, there are a dozen examples of mindless coverage, as reporters present racist rhetoric as simple ‘controversy’ or frame anti- Semitic propaganda as a ‘he said/she said’ dispute.” The danger of that kind of coverage and the animus behind this project is that it is “how ideas and symbols that were once considered beyond the pale become less so. They leave the realm of taboo and enter the world of partisan combat, where ethics and meaning are a function of tribal identity” (Bouie). Allowing Jeffery Lord to defend his preferred candidate’s ambivalent acceptance of prominent white nationalists’ support and praise is doing precisely that, and normalizing white nationalism is nothing short of imperiling our democracy. Of course, neither Trump’s candidacy nor the accompanying coverage occurs in a vacuum, so a full exploration requires one to go beyond journalism, cable news as a genre, and CNN as a network, despite both subjects’ centrality to my overall argument, and into the history of race-based coverage in America. Focusing on the Civil Rights Movement and its press coverage illuminates important parallels between the coverage then and now. Though perhaps more importantly, it also illuminates where the coverage diverges, highlighting the constraints and failures of the cable news genre in regards to race and other fundamental social issues. Understanding how we got to where we are with Trump is contingent on understanding what came before.