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#### Interpretation: the affirmative may only garner offense off the desirability of the hypothetical enactment of the resolution.

#### “Resolved:” refers to a legislative debate.

Louisiana State Legislature 16, “Glossary of Legislative Terms,” http://www.legis.state.la.us/glossary2.htm

Resolution: A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11, 13.1, 6.8, and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Failing to defend topical action decimates the quality of debate for two reasons—

#### 1. Competitive equity—any alternative to our model of the topic as a baseline for discussion wrecks it—it’s impossible to negate alternative frameworks with the ground allocated to us by the parameters of the resolution—all 1AR defense to this claim will rely on concessionary ground which isn’t a stable basis for a year of debate.

#### 2. Truth testing—they moot the role of the negative which is to force the aff to defend their core assumptions—allowing affs to reframe the debate around their terms makes engagement impossible—outweighs and turns the aff because clash is the only way to translate anything debate gives us outside of the activity.

#### Policy-oriented research paradigms are best for ensuring the reduction of the potential for inequality in space.

Weeks, 12 – PhD, Webster University Adjunct Professor of International Relations

Edythe Weeks, “Outer Space Development, International Relations and Space Law: A Method for Elucidating Seeds,” Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2012

The global knowledge community is made up of individuals, each with their own perspective and their own actual or potential areas of research. Individuals may become so attached to their research that they become oblivious to the connections between their work and the work of others. Realizing the opportunities that exist to construct bridges between our and others’ ideas through shared research can enable humankind to grow beyond the sum of our own personal research goals, agendas, and outcomes. We should work towards a global community by focusing on ways to connect ever more people, ideas, and fields of research.

Understanding international relations, the meaning of global citizenship, and the application of the social and behavioral sciences has led to a technological-scientific revolution, creating not only a new perspective on education, but an undeniable force that now functions in parallel to it. Education is a dynamic process and is not limited to one specific science. We as human beings have the intellect to consider, understand, and create our own choices in any aspect of our lives. However, if we limit ourselves to any domain of any science we thereby limit the infinite possibilities of thought.

Due to survival strategies and the urge to be the best in our fields, we, as human beings, tend to neglect and discount the valuable contributions that our competitors could make to our own work, thereby foreclosing the possibility of a true dialog of the intellects—a dialog which children need even without knowing that they need it. Children from the ages of 4 to 16 are taught not to use the entirety of their brain, just as if society as a whole were conditioned according to the divisions the child encounters between school, family, the workplace, athletics, etc.—these being just a few examples of activities that are used to socialize people into typical patterns of behavior.

Exposure to many different domains of knowledge—such as space medicine for medical students and physicians, for example—allows individuals, especially younger students, unrestricted scope to expand their aspirations. As technology advances so do the technological pathways that allow us to communicate. Any education project which is directed towards such an end promotes global communication. If we as a global community do not share our resources, we are closing crucial portals through which the insights of the future may make themselves available to us. On the other hand, if we do succeed so to share, we may come to constitute a true global community of human beings, which may be valued as the truest success with which our endeavors could be met.

It is the eve of outer space development, but few people are aware of this. In the absence of awareness, people cannot prepare for the opportunities that will arise; and so the vast wealth likely to flow to Earth from outer space will cause ever-greater inequality and instability in our already unequal and unstable world.

This book is a call to educators to factor equality and diversity into the process of outer space development by creating a widespread movement to teach outer space development studies to all students, especially those who study social and behavioral sciences. In calling for this, I am also putting out a call to visionary thinkers to increase public awareness that outer space is already in the process of being developed. My objective is to provide a pedagogical approach aimed at mending the knowledge gap. If we fail in this objective, we are more likely than ever before to witness ever-widening gaps of social and financial inequality.

The first question that will arise as we embark on this process, of course, will be: Why Outer Space Development?

People often ask where the money will come from to develop outer space. Platinum-group metals such as iridium and osmium, and various other valuable untapped natural resources, have been discovered in abundant quantities and are likely to be mined by companies. The discovery of natural resources has sparked development projects in the past. These historical patterns of human behavior are occurring again today, as companies speed up the process of private spaceship development.

A myriad of space laws and policies are already in place to support space commercialization. Recently, the 2010 NASA Authorization Act and various other laws and policies initiated by the U.S. government have placed on the agenda plans to build advanced space transportation systems; to privatize spacecraft development; to create commercial space habitats, space stations, and space settlements; to initiate commercial space mining; to investigate spacecraft trajectory optimization for landing on near-Earth asteroids; to engage in commercial spaceport construction and interstellar-interplanetary-international telecommunications; and to launch space exploration missions to near-Earth asteroids, the Moon, Mars, and Mars’s moons. U.S. initiatives have in the past been mirrored by the international community, and we can expect to see similar patterns arising on a global scale—indeed, as this book will demonstrate, they already are.

The global community is experiencing economic recession, natural disasters, lack of opportunity, employment anxiety, failing K-12 programs, widening inequality gaps, uprisings, revolutions, revolts, unmet educational goals, and a general failure to uplift, inspire, and provide meaningful opportunities for significant portions of our population. In the United States of America, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to jumpstart the economy; the Dow Jones failed; Wall Street failed; millions of working people lost their houses to foreclosure; tent communities and homeless populations are on the increase; many people are experiencing depression, anxiety, career anxiety; we see alarming rates of people dropping out of high school and college; and there is a general lack of opportunities, along with high rates of job loss. People need something that will allow them to focus anew their talents, energies, abilities, and gifts, and use this bleak climate as an opportunity for positive change. Outer space development is emerging as an answer to this state of crisis. The question is: To whom will the benefits accrue?

Many strategic decisions have already been taken regarding space development of which the global general public is unaware. Once legal rights to space resources are granted, only those with the capital to take advantage of new laws and policies will be in a position to profit from the new space industries. Only those who are in a position to “know” about outer space development will be in position to take advantage of the opportunities. It is important to remember that the global general public has for several decades being paying the start-up costs for space exploration research, science, and technology. It’s not too late to factor in equality before an infrastructure of inequality is forever with us as we venture to establish the final frontier.

I struggled for many years to find a framework for explaining what I observed was happening with respect to outer space development. Antonio Gramsci’s insights from his many writings provided a suitable all-overthe-place/messy analysis that was able to accommodate the myriad activities occurring within the working parts of the outer space development regime. Now that the battle between Communism and Capitalism is over, perhaps it’s safe to pick out select insights from Gramsci. It is not my intent here to promote either Communism or Capitalism. Rather, I aim to promote equality as outer space is developed.

The methodological framework used in this book relies on theories and concepts of international relations, with added insights from critical analytical theory. My research addresses the need to increase public awareness regarding outer space development. It also serves as a reminder that embedded inequality, feelings of subjugation, oppression, and of being left out of important development projects tend to produce discontent, and are eventually likely to produce international conflict. Equal opportunities tend to bring peace. We must design a model suitable for peace as we develop the final frontier.

The first step toward accomplishing this goal is to expose students, teachers, administrators, civic leaders, and public officials to cutting-edge research which highlights emerging industries in the field of outer space development. Exposing students to this type of cutting-edge knowledge while it is being created is likely to have a markedly positive impact on their future careers. Preparing them now to lead in newly emerging industries at a time when outer space settlements are being constructed can serve as a powerful motivating force to enable them to want to excel in school. Budding abilities, gifts, and talents can be recruited, nourished, and developed. Space has long been known to engage and interest students, and it is time to take these possibilities to a place beyond mere fascination. It is time to take students to a new level—to actual meaningful participation in outer space development resulting in tangible career opportunities.

Imagine outer space development themes being used to motivate and reinspire high school students who have lost their interest in school. Imagine outer space studies being added to the K-12 curriculum across the globe. Imagine universities providing students the opportunity to prepare themselves to lead as newly emerging industries take flight. Imagine outer space development sparking creativity and innovation. Imagine realizable opportunities made known to people from all walks of life within each nation so that we can all get ready to meet the challenges as humankind ascends into outer space. Imagine people being retrained for new job opportunities. This vision enables us to view outer space development as a means for solving the inequality gap problem that many scholars, activists, and academics have complained about. Outer space development can serve as an incentive for world peace and equality.

During a television interview in May 2002, Channel 2 News correspondent Joe Dana asked me if it bothered me that my research might not be relevant for 200 years; in fact my research became relevant approximately two years later, in December of 2004, when the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act was passed. This new law provided a legal framework for the newly emerging private spaceship industry.

There has been a pattern of articulation in my life. I’ve articulated phenomena that I suspected would happen, and I’ve watched as predicted phenomena occurred. People often have asked me how I knew that space tourism, space mining, private spaceships, and commercial space settlements would become newly emerging industries. This book represents my attempt to recount all of this “knowing” in the form of a methodology to assist students and scholars along their path towards understanding and explaining emerging phenomena.

Acting on intuition, I began researching space law and outer space development and imagined it becoming an emerging phenomenon. Imagine knowing or suspecting that something was going to happen, but not knowing how to prove it, or how to discuss it in meaningful ways. This need to know, prove, and discuss outer space development prompted me to pursue the Ph.D. path. On that journey, I learned how to develop a methodology for explaining and understanding social and behavioral phenomena. This was necessary, because without it I wasn’t able to talk about the topic without getting funny looks and weird reactions. It was common to think that because I had no experience in science, technology, engineering, math, or space science, that I had no right to think or speak about outer space development. However, the seeds of proof and expertise were scattered all around: I just needed to learn how to locate, compile, analyze, understand, explain, and so discuss the relevant data.

From 1998 to 2006 I read books, articles, news reports, films, documentaries, videos, podcasts, hearing transcripts, policy statements, dissertations, websites, speeches, documents, databanks, policies, laws, and international treaties. I also attended various space-related conferences and listened to relevant presentations and discussions. I observed social and behavioral phenomena, analyzed written and printed materials distributed during the conferences, and presented papers to the congresses of the International Astronautical Federation and International Institute of Space Law. Inadvertently, I became part of the outer space development process, and around 2004 I was able to observe as outer space development began to accelerate. Ideology and discourse related to outer space had always made it seem as part of a fantasy world to most people; but now a new global vision of outer space as the answer to many of the world’s problems is emerging. Commercial spaceports are being conceptualized and constructed, new types of spaceships are being designed and tested, and space colonies are being planned, designed, and discussed. In this real life scenario, the actors are drawn from a multitude of nations which are planning, testing, and evaluating mankind’s prolonged presence in outer space. I found myself right in the middle of all of this.

Here is my story.

#### Topicality is a voting issue because topicality indicts the aff’s entire advocacy--lack of agent specification -- kills neg ground cuz they can always shift out of CPs and delink from core DAs like infrastructure

#### Competing interpretations: reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom because the neg doesn’t know what constitutes a “reasonable” interp when doing prep. It also collapses to competing interps because you use offense defense to determine that reasonability is good.

#### No RVIs—T is an aff burden just like inherency. It also causes a chilling effect on legitimate topicality arguments which causes proliferation of questionably topical cases.

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#### Counterplan text: states except India should prohibit appropriation of space by private entities.

#### Space is an intrinsic part of India’s soft power expansion and they’re set to rapidly scale now

Sarthak Kathayat, Sarthak Kathayat is a student at Jamia Millia Islamia, India., NIICE NEPAL, 11-1-2020, "Soft Power and India’s Space Diplomacy," https://niice.org.np/archives/6420 arnavvs

In international relations, soft power is the ability of any country to persuade other countries to do what it wants without the use of force. According to Joseph Nye Jr., soft power is – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them. As compared to hard power, soft power takes relatively longer to built as its intangible resources develop over a long time. Soft power tends to change other party’s attitude to the end where she acts voluntarily in a way which is different to her usual behaviour. Several characteristics of the current world order like globalisation driven economic interdependence, rise of transnational actors, resurgence of nationalism in weak states, the spread of military technology and the changed nature of international political problems have significantly reduced the effectiveness of hard power strategies. The most noteworthy example of a foreign policy misadventure based solely on hard power strategies is the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Soft power also has its own weakness. However, the ineffectiveness of soft power strategies is an exception. In longer-term, soft power strategies appear to be more effective in the contemporary world order than the hard power. One such tool of soft power is the space technology and space diplomacy. Space technology are increasingly viewed as a crucial instrument of soft power as states have now understood the direct relation between the technological feats and global prestige that follows. Expertise in rocket science puts a state on a higher pedestal than the countries who are still struggling in the domain. Moreover, expertise in rocket science ensues significant strategic implications. The output delivered has noteworthy social and economic relevance with a massive growth potential. In a broadening concept of security that encompasses other dimensions such as economic, environmental and political, Indian space programme has been distinctive and lucid in the way it simultaneously addresses the requirements of the Indian citizenry and the state collectively in all the dimensions. Despite being challenged by numerous embargoes and technology denial regimes during Cold War, Indian space programme has emerged as the most cost-effective and successful space programme in the world. India’s space programme has been a tremendous achievement for a developing country which despite being faced with many challenges used space as a crucial mechanism to lift its people out of poverty through education, social and economic programmes. With the course of time, India’s space policy has become an intrinsic part of India’s foreign policy to strengthen India’s position as a dominant power in South Asia. Indian Space Programme India’s space programme has been seen making efforts in projecting soft power which is especially evident through its new commitment to planetary exploration and human spaceflight. The Chandrayaan-1 and Mangalyaan-1 mission cleared the fact that India now looks at space as a standard of global standing. India’s soft power has witnessed a progression with an increasingly successful participation in global space economy through ISRO’s commercial arm, Antrix Corporation. India’s growing influence on the global space economy has been an indication of its changing stature in international arena. India has also been involved in capacity building initiatives. It has successfully established itself as a leader in terms of healthcare provisions through satellite-based telemedicine. India hosts the largest telemedicine network in South Asia which has also expanded to the African continent. A non-profit Indian organisation named Apollo Telemedicine Networking Foundation has been involved in telemedicine services with dedicated centres in Iraq, Yemen, Kazakhstan and Myanmar. India’s Space Diplomacy Further using space for diplomacy in order to project its soft power across the globe, India has assisted countries like Colombia in launching its satellite which boosted India-Colombia relations. Many Latin American countries are often dependent on the US for space and military matters. However, after the launch, many countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela have reached out to ISRO for launching or developing satellites. Similarly, India’s PSLV also launched Israel’s TecSar satellite in 2008 for remote sensing purposes. The launch boosted the political and strategic relations with Israel. Once a recipient of space technology from developed countries, India has demonstrated the robustness of its own space programmes by setting up joint projects and even providing assistance at the time of disaster to a number of countries. ISRO’s Oceansat-2 satellite played a pertinent role in monitoring Hurricane Sandy and helping the authorities to implement timely disaster mitigation and rescue strategies. Adding more feathers to its hat, ISRO has also launched dozens of satellites for US, Europe and Britain based companies. The recent launches of British reconnaissance satellites, NovaSAR and S1-4 are a sign of what could come next. Britain is one of the EU’s biggest spender in space sector. After Brexit, the dispute over Britain’s continued access to the European Union’s Galileo satellite navigation project will inevitably lead Britain look for alternatives and India’s space ambitions could offer a tempting proposition within the ambit of wider bilateral cooperation. As a part of India’s efforts in space diplomacy, ISRO undertook another capacity building initiative ‘Unispace Nanosatellite Assembly and Training (UNNATI)’. Under UNNATI, ISRO planned to train 45 countries in making Nano-satellites. Closer to home, India proposed a SAARC satellite in 2014 for the overall development of the region. The proposal was welcomed by SAARC nations but unfortunately the proposal couldn’t materialise as envisioned initially due to Pakistan’s backing out from the project. However, three years later, in 2017, ISRO launched the South Asia satellite or GSAT-9 to help India’s neighbouring countries in space communication. The idea of South Asia satellite ensured no political impediment as with the case of SAARC satellite. The positive spill over effect of the satellite’s launch on India’s “neighbourhood first” diplomacy was well demonstrated by the warm responses given by the leaders of South Asian countries. India’s space diplomacy with neighbours also extends on a bilateral basis. For instance, in Afghanistan, India included remote sensing satellite transmitters for acquiring space-based data in a USD 1.2 billion aid package. It is evident that soft power strategies are more relevant than the hard power strategies, especially in the contemporary world order. The rise of China as an emerging superpower is backed with its economic and military might leave less avenues for other developing nations such as India to contest China. However, soft power strategies open up another dimension for the interaction of the nations. India has utilised space as a tool of its soft power effectively in order to expand its clout. That space being an intrinsic part of India’s foreign policy has brought numerous achievements to the country, and is expected to remain an essential element for future course of India’s foreign policy.

#### Indian space power maturing now but it’s uncertain.

NARAYAN PRASAD, 8-8-20**19**, " India is a maturing space power, but can rival the US with an independent regulator," Brookings, https://theprint.in/opinion/india-is-a-maturing-space-power-but-can-rival-the-us-with-an-independent-regulator/273886/ // belle

High technology-driven industries in India have seen exponential growth in only two kinds of policy environments: 1. Where the government had a marginal presence, giving a free hand to competitive market-driven economics, such as the Information Technology (IT) services sector. 2. Where the government was an incumbent, but set up a regulator to let the sector attract more private investment and allow market forces to drive growth, such as the telecom industry. The success of both these sectors has led to immense socio-economic benefits, which have been passed on to citizens and contributed to India’s overall economic growth story. The space industry in India today is perhaps where IT was in the 1990s, with several entrepreneurs trying to enter the sector with their own products and services. The question is, how can the government ensure that they survive and thrive? Video Player is loading. PauseUnmute Fullscreen VDO.AI India is a maturing space power Today, the Indian space sector is witnessing exciting start-ups like Astrome, Exseed Space and Pixxel. The difference between them and the traditional industries that serve the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is that they are trying to build independent products and services, instead of being a cog in the ISRO supply chain. This transition is a sign of a maturing space power. It happened in the US several decades ago, when the government had to find a framework to regulate industry activity, so that entrepreneurs can easily do business in space. The goal in India should be to simply provide regulatory certainty for the start-ups. For example, if a start-up wants to launch its own satellite, it will need a set of frequencies to operate its satellite and communicate with it. Right now, ISRO interfaces with the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) for its satellite operations. However, there is no clarity on what basis such frequencies will be allocated for independently-functioning start-ups. Depending on the type of activity, there are a number of other areas in the space industry which need regulatory certainty for growth. These include licencing to distribute images acquired from satellites, supervising and coordinating potential tests by start-ups wanting to operate their own rockets, etc. Again, to give a sense of how this works in a mature space power like the US, companies do not go to NASA to get approvals for their activities. The US government has deputed independent agencies for the job — such as the Federal Communications Commission to coordinate the use of space frequencies, the Federal Aviation Administration to coordinate space launches and rocketry-related tests, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to licence those who want to provide imagery-related services, and the United States Department of Commerce to regulates any export-related issues. A single coordinating body could help leapfrog US In 2017, India’s Department of Space issued a draft space bill, which states that companies planning to independently pursue space activities need to apply for a government licence. The draft bill says the government will “put in place a mechanism”, but does not make it clear what timelines, processes or institutions will be involved. Given that the varied nature of activities and the several institutions within the government that need to be involved in providing regulatory clarity to the nascent space industry in India, the space bill should consider setting up of an independent coordinating body which can act as a single point of contact for all types of activities. By establishing a single coordinating body, India has a chance to leapfrog established space powers such as the US, where space entrepreneurs are struggling to deal with multiple agencies and institutions. This will also allow the government itself to effectively coordinate among its own ministries and departments as well. Setting up a body which can make the regulatory framework for this industry will also provide impetus for Parliament to pass the space bill. This would then allow the newly-created body to do all the necessary groundwork in setting the rules of the game for different activities, instead of the space bill having half-baked overarching clauses, which could take us back to the days of ‘Licence Raj’.

#### Private sector key to Indian space efforts

EdexLive, 06-25-2020, "Opening space sector will enable India to play important role in global space economy: ISRO chief," New Indian Express, https://www.edexlive.com/news/2020/jun/25/opening-space-sector-will-enable-india-to-play-important-role-in-global-space-economy-isro-chief-12874.html arnavvs

SRO chief K Sivan on Thursday stated that opening the space sector for private enterprises will help scale up benefits from space technology and enable Indian industry to be an important player in the global space economy. "If the space sector is opened (for private enterprises), the potential of the entire country can be utilised to scale up benefits from space technology. It will not only result in the accelerated growth of the sector but also enable Indian industry to be an important player in the global space economy," the Indian Space Research Organisation chief said. Sivan said that far-reaching reforms in space technology in India will put the country in the league of the select countries. "As part of longer socio-economic reform, space reforms will improve access to space-based services for India's development. Far-reaching reforms will put India in the league of few countries with efficient promotional and authorisation mechanism for private-sector space activities," he said. Talking about reforms that the government is planning to implement in the country's space sector, he said, "Space sector, where India is among a handful of countries with advanced space technology, can play a significant role in boosting the industrial base of India." "The government's decision is to implement reform measures to leverage ISRO's achievement by opening the space sector for private enterprises," he added. He further said that "Department of Space will promote sector space activities to enable it to provide end to end space services, including building and launching of rockets and satellites as well as providing space-based services on a commercial basis." "With this, there is an opportunity for large scale employment in the technology sector and India becoming a global technology powerhouse," ISRO chief added. Sivan also talked about the government's decision to establish an autonomous nodal agency for taking independent decisions for regulating the activities of private companies. "Government has approved the establishment of an autonomous nodal agency - Indian National Space, Promotion and Authorisation Centre - for taking independent decisions with respect to permitting and regulating the activities of private companies in the space sector," said ISRO chief. "It will act as a national nodal agency for handholding and promoting the private sector in space endeavours and for this ISRO will share its technical expertise as well as facilities," he added.

#### Indian soft power and international leadership key to global cooperation and tolerance through cultural diplomacy

**Gupta 20** [(Arunima, Arunima Gupta is Principal at Network of Indian Cultural Enterprises (NICE). She holds a Master’s in International Relations from Leiden University), “Celebrating Indian Soft Power”, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/celebrating-indian-soft-power>] KZ

India is a culture-driven soft power. One example is availability and appreciation of Indian cinema as a source of recreation in the conflict-ridden Afghanistan. Another major cultural export is Indian gastronomy, be it turmeric latte sold in cafés, jackfruits used in gourmet preparations or the Australian PM Scott Morison’s display of Samosa diplomacy. Arts, fashion and handicrafts, literary works, and performing arts and tourism are other key aspects of Indian soft power. To realize and maximize the potential of such traditions and practices, it is important to develop a robust cultural creative economy, giving more and more opportunities for creative entrepreneurs to take Indian culture across the globe. This can also lead to cross-cultural cooperation and mutual learnings between cultural experts, entrepreneurs and enthusiasts from across the world.

Dinesh Patnaik, the Director-General of ICCR speaking at Namaste 2020 [observed that](https://www.softpowermag.com/inaugural-session-namaste-2020/) “the soft power of a country is when its cultural assets become a subject of aspiration and admiration by the global community. India is blessed with immense cultural assets, be it Yoga, Ayurveda, literature, arts, heritage, culinary practices, sports and much more, along with being the largest democracy and, having strong institutions and leaders. When the propagation of soft power is done with the idea of fostering mutual respect, shared understanding and joint collaborations for cultural advancements between countries, it becomes the essence of cultural diplomacy.”

Beyond cultural and civilizational heritage, India has been recognized for its role in addressing global challenges and being at the forefront of various development-related initiatives. Though India’s international engagement is guided by its security and strategic interests, it is also underpinned by the values of inclusivity, plurality and welfare for all. The establishing of International Solar Alliance, for example, demonstrated India’s commitment towards mitigating environmental risks through multilateral cooperation. Similarly, Indian offers humanitarian aid to smaller mainland and island economies in times of calamity, while its contributions to the UN Peacekeeping forces are amongst the highest in the world. The country’s cooperation at bilateral and multilateral forums for fighting COVID-19 through supplying hydro-chloroquine to the world as well as directing R&D efforts towards vaccine development highlight India’s contribution in the global pharmaceutical and wellness sector.

Owing to these and many other contributions towards the greater good for all, India is ranked 44th out of 160 countries in the [Good Country Index](https://www.goodcountry.org/) (GCI). According to Anholt, the creator of GCI, the underlying idea is that in the ongoing contest for soft power in the world where countries increasingly seek to lead and steer conversations around power dynamics, there is an increasing desire and necessity to connect with each other’s culture and communities. Speaking on the theme India’s Global Connect at Namaste 2020, Anholt [explained that](https://www.softpowermag.com/event/indias-global-connect/) the ‘goodness’ of a country is determined by its multilateral engagement and cooperation in addressing common global challenges. Higher levels of involvement build positive perceptions about the country that in turn invite greater foreign investment and visitors, thus contributing to the country’s soft power and reputation in the eyes of common citizens.

#### International cooperation key to solving bioterror and health crises

**Roffey et al 02** [(Roger, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Division of NBC-Defense, Umeå. Kurt Lantorp, Department of Infectious Disease Control, Jönköping. Anders Tegnell, Center for Microbiological Preparedness, Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control (SMI), Solna. Frederik Elgh, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Division of NBC-Defense, Umeå.) “Biological weapons and bioterrorism preparedness: importance of public-health awareness and international cooperation”, ScienceDirect, 8/2002 [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1198743X14626410#](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1198743X14626410)!] KZ

Coordination and communication also need to be strengthened, to minimize response times. If a bioterrorist event is suspected, established communication must be among hospital personnel, local and central healthcare departments, specialized laboratories, central and regional authorities for disease surveillance, and police and rescue services. A biological attack will also require of preservation evidence (at the scene of a crime), a unified command system, and the need to protect emergency responders against possible secondary devices intentionally placed to maim or injure them [19,20]. The management of the disease might not follow normal procedures, since diagnostic laboratory confirmation might take too long. Instead, it will be necessary to initiate a response based on the recognition of high-risk syndromes. Epidemiologic principles must be used to assess whether a patient’s presentation is typical of an endemic disease or is an unusual event that should raise concern [21]. There should also be specialist teams on standby that can rapidly analyze any potential threat and give recommendations to responsible authorities. After an incideSic. xnt, there might be a need for decontamination of the affected area, depending on the type of agent and the quantity released; this is also an area for international cooperation, as expertise is not always available in the country under attack. From a European perspective, it can be questioned whether each country can afford or be motivated to set up qualified rapid response teams that could, at short notice, be deployed to the scene of a bioterrorist attack. Perhaps this could be one area for cooperation between countries. What could be a realistic goal for such teams in a European context? In the area of research and development, to enhance our knowledge of agents of concern and to develop rapid methods for identification and detection of agents, international cooperation is vital, given today’s scarce economic resources. Another area for cooperation across borders is the training of personnel in handling situations involving the threat or use of biological warfare agents.

#### Bioterror causes extinction, terrorists love bioweapons lol

Krstić '17 [Marko; January 2017; assistant professor of microelectronics and physics at the University of Belgrade, PhD in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the University of Belgrade; "Tendency of using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes," Military Technical Courier, Vol. 65, No. 2, p. 481-498] SC SD

The studies of a few cases of earlier CBRN actions have led experts to identify the key characteristicsof terrorist groupsthat could potentially have an interest to use theseweapons. It is thought that conservatism is inherent in terrorist organizations, but it must not be forgotten that some terrorists are inclined toinnovationsin weapons and tactics**,** as well as to taking risksin actions or in the choice of weapons**.** Many experts agree that most terrorist organizations want to use proven methods to achieve desired effects. Innovations, especially in the field of CBRN weapons, often indicate terrorists are likely to be led by other factors rather than by pure curiosity and desire to experiment. For some individuals, repression and democratic and strong rule of law are positive determinants of the emergence of CBRN actions which points to a new and more complex global security environment with an increasing risk of terrorists trying to perform a CBRN attack. It is a frightening fact that a single terrorist or isolated terrorist group could improvise a biological weaponor use other ways to spread anthrax, smallpoxor other biological agents and thereby cause mass casualties and destroy the health care system of a state. CBRN weapons are secretly shipped to terrorists or hostile governments and represent a significant and growing threat to many countries. Although the threat of CBRN attacks is widely recognized as the central issue of national security, most analysts assume that the primary danger is a threat of the military use of these weapons in conventional wars with traditional military means while the threat of covert attacks, which include terrorism**,** is rashly and unfairly neglected. Covert attacks are difficult to deter or prevent and CBRN weapons suitable for this type of attack are available to a growing number of enemy states and groups. At the same time, restrictions on their use appear to be diminishing, and so-called new terrorists do not always escalate and become apparent only by using unconventional weapons. These weapons are easily spread or transmitted from person to person, have a high mortality rateand a potential impact on public health, causing mass casualties that can crush health systems and cause public panic and social disruption, thus requiring special efforts to suppress them. When assessing the threat of CBRN weapons, we should take into account the change in capacity to carry out terrorist attacks that are on the rise among countries and non-government elements. Analysts believe that the fear of chemical and biological terrorist attacks is excessive, they point out that, in the past, very few attacks involved these weapons, and even those few attempts that have occurred were mostly thwarted by the authorities. A relative ease with which biological weapons can be obtained, along with other current changes and turbulences in the world, sets the stage for another type of warfare in the 21st century. The potential for CBRN terrorism has widely grown since 11 September, when some of these materials were used. The danger of terrorist use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction represents a very serious threat for many countries; if a terrorist group could gain access to this weapon, it is highly likely it would use it, or threaten to use it. Although there is very little information on terrorists and their ability to come into possession of nuclear weapons or on their intentions to get them, the risk of CBRN weapons has certainly increased since the terrorists started to become more familiar with these agents and their harmful consequences. Discovering the nature of the threat of biological weapons, as well as the appropriate response to them requires an emphasis on the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. Preparing for a terrorist attack may seem daunting and there are a small number of people with practical experience and a good knowledge of CBRN weapons, because until recently there was no need to own them. In the past, most of the planning regarding emergency response to terrorism concentrated on the concerns of open attacks (bombing). However, the threats of CBRN weapons are taken seriously, especially in the USA, where media, fascinated by new weapons of mass destruction, encourage a growing fear for public safety. Terrorists who have significant human and material resources are much more likely to realize their intentions than lone perpetrators or small terrorist groups. A CBRN terrorism threat is certainly a matter of concern; however, terrorists will face many obstacles in the implementation of an attack of this kind. This includes the acquisition of materials and preparation for spreading them as well as a selection and a survey of a chosen objective and a correct dose required to achieve a desired effect. The growing threat of CBRN terrorism Terrorism can be defined as a deliberate act of violence intended to cause damage, but also to create an appropriate political and ideological situation, so that the use of these non-traditional weapons of terror outside the context is obvious, and the goals will not be military, but civilian ones (Bioterrorism, chemical weapons, and radiation terrorism, nd). Toxic substances, regardless of whether they are of animal, vegetable or mineral origin, were used throughout the history for political assassinations and sabotage; despite the risk of severe penalties, the prospects for success favoured the use of toxic substances. Such use has always been reduced, however, since only a small number of people had access to substances and possessed the ability of learn how to use them (Pascal, 1999). CBRN weapons are rightly viewed with a special sense of horror, their effects can be devastating and indiscriminating, and they take the most stringent toll among the most vulnerable population, non-combatants (e.g. a biological attack cannot be detected sufficiently fast after the disease spreads through the population). Moreover, chemical and biological weapons are a particularly attractive alternative for groups that do not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons, and this risk raises complex but important ethical issues (London, 2003). The common name for CBRN terrorism which causes the death of a large number of people, large scale damage and a strong echo worldwide is post-industrial or hyper-terrorism. This means that non-state elements possess and dispose of assets that were previously held only by states, but unlike them, which often fear reprisals after WMD attacks, terrorists, having no geographical location, are ready to use WMD with much less scrupulousness and fear (Kurmnik, Ribnikar, 2003). Some authors have described the factors that make chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks in many ways unique and demanding, such as an element of surprise, invisible agents, ordnance, the risk of repetition and new types of risks (Ruggiero, Voss, 2015). In the past 30 years, the use of CBRN weapons has become a major concern for many nations around the world. The public has become insensitive to traditional terrorist attacks that seem to be a less efficient way for terrorist organizations to achieve their goals. What causes shock and fear is actually presenting the properties of weapons which can be used by terrorist organizations to enhance their efforts and the effectiveness of attacks. CBRN terrorism is often a synonym for weapons of mass destruction, although this form of terrorism and related incidents do not require attacks and inflicting harm to large numbers of people they do not even require deadly attacks at all. The number of studies on this type of terrorism is limited due to the lack of available data on this terrorism type. There is a very small number of databases of CBRN incidents, and even the existing ones have relatively little to do with them and they are compared to conventional terrorism (Jesse, 2012). Some experts emphasize the factors that promote such attacks and these factors include the availability of information and expertise, increased frustration of terrorists, demonization of the target population, as well as a millennial, apocalyptic or messianic vision. Experts also differ in opinion when it comes to possible perpetrators of CBRN incidents, and include religious fundamentalists and cults1 as possible perpetrators of such attacks, especially when these groups address to ethereal audience, emphasizing the hatred of unbelievers (Ivanova, Sandler, 2007). Concerns about super terrorism which involves the use of CBRN weapons are mainly focused on what terrorists can do in the context of our social reality, with an emphasis on terrorist motivations, initiatives and limitations. When considering which terrorist groups may be inclined to commit CBRN terrorism, it is important to recognize the spectrum of these acts, as well as to analyze the following categorization: (a) massive casualty events produced by conventional weapons; (b) CBRN scams; (c) conventional attack on a nuclear facility; (d) limited-scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; (e) large scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; and (f) CBRN strikes (super terrorism) that can lead to thousands of victims. In addition to the motivation and willingness to inflict mass casualties in any way, terrorists must have technical and financial capabilities to come into possession of material and acquire skills for these types of weapons and materials and carry out a successful attack. Chemical and biological weapons can pose a risk to terrorists thus deterring them from using such weapons (Post, 2005, pp.148-151). The possibility that terrorists use chemical or biological substances may increase over the next decade, according to US intelligence agencies. According to CIA2, an interest among non-state actors, including terrorists, for biological and chemical materials is real and growing, and the number of potential perpetrators is increasing. The agency also noted that many of these groups had developed an international network and did not need to rely on state sponsors for financial and technical support. However, it is believed that it is less likely that terrorists would choose chemical and biological weapons over conventional explosives, because these weapons are difficult to control and their results are unpredictable (Condesman, Burke, 2001). The risk of CBRN weapons is growing since terrorists are better acquainted with these agents and their potential for causing harm3. These agents possess desirable characteristics as **weapons** of terror; they are biologically invisible to the naked eye, odorless and potentially lethal in the form of particles; natural organisms are so readily available, and can be "camouflaged" in natural disasters and used to spread fear and various diseases. Chemical agents quickly attack the critical physiological centers of the body, disabling or killing the victim. Biological and chemical weapons require the application of huge amounts of resources and result in different effects, causing fear and panic in the contaminated areas. Often referred to as "weapons of mass destruction", but, in medical terms, they are weapons of potential mass casualties because they can lead to massive death toll in the absence of preventive measures and timely response (Meyer, Spinella, 2014, pp.645-656). "Bioterrorism is the intentional use of microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms used for hostile purposes intended to cause disease or death in man, animals and plants, on which they depend". The threat of bioterrorist attacks is real, and each individual is a potential terrorist, when terrorists are "invisible" prior to an attack which also can be "invisible" in the form of causing infectious diseases or epidemics. Citizens who are not aware they are infected are potential safety hazard and so-called dangerous bodies (Mijalković, 2011). In the last ten years, the issue of CBRN weapons has attracted the attention of experts, but a list of priorities by the heads of states has never been established. Biological weapons almost became forgotten after they had been banned by the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. A significant attention was paid to them during the 90s of the last century. The important thing is that biological weapons attract much less attention than other similar weapons, but probably represent the greatest danger, and in addition to their use in war, they are available as instruments of terror in peace. Some countries showed willingness to use such weapons against defenseless populations to achieve strategic objectives, and in this regard, some analysts believe that those who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993 applied cyanide on their bombs (this was not confirmed, but a large amount of cyanide was found in possession of the perpetrators). Such a group will prove to be less inefficient, because if terrorists decide to shock and surprise the government by inflicting enormous damage, CBRN weapons will become more attractive and more accessible (Bettis, 1998). Motives and forms of behavior of individuals and groups who acquired or used CBRN weapons have existed since long ago and there is no doubt that modern society is vulnerable to such attacks (Tucker, 2000). Fear of biological terrorism is certainly greater than the fear of the conventional forms of terrorism; some of these fears are justified and some are often exaggerated. Some agents are really very contagious and deadly, and if used properly, have a potential to result in casualties similar to those in a nuclear attack. Perhaps the scariest aspect of biological weapons is that the body is attacked without warning, people are afraid of the threat as it is invisible, and cannot be heard or felt. The history of warfare, terrorism and crime involving biological agents in the last century is considerably less dangerous and more deadly than the history of conventional warfare (Parachini, 2001). Today, some states and some terrorist groups can more easily overcome technological barriers due to the increased flow of information and access to previously unavailable technologies. Along with nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are part of an unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction (Davis, Johnson-Winegar, 2000, pp.15-28). The society is now faced with the threat of anapocalyptic and asymmetric war **scenario** in which kamikaze attackers are able to arm themselves with WMD4 without even having to have a "physical" weapon to create fear; they probably still prefer simple, proven methods: a stampede in an enclosed place, or just an explosive device, which will kill many people5 (Palmer, 2004, pp.3-9). Early detection and response to biological or chemical terrorism are crucial to solving this problem (U.S. Congress House, 2003, p.117).

### 1nc

#### The aff is not a break from dualistic thinking but reifies it. Appeals to space as being the dominion of all humankind, free to explore for the benefit of our common heritage, promote an image of humanity unburdened by its material environment.

Ferrando 16 [(Francesca, Ph.D. in philosophy, M.A. in Gender Studies, Professor.@ NYU) “Why Space Migration Must Be Posthuman”, 2016, http://ndl.ethernet.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/76546/1/147.pdf.pdf#page=136yperlink] TDI

In 2008, NASA released an official Statement on the Environmental Impact (PEIS), which takes into consideration the environmental impact of space tech- nology on Earth, but it does not acknowledge its impact on other celestial bodies, such as the Moon or other planets of the Solar System. Critical to this type of anthropocentric and Earth-centric approach, William Kramer underlines: “there is no comprehensive process required...for assessing human impacts on those extraterrestrial environments” (2014, 216). Space technology and space-based human activity shall be analyzed from a view which takes into account their effects not only on humans and on Earth, but on outer space as well. In order to address this issue, we first need to engage with the question asked by Reinman (2009): is (outer) space an environment? If so, it shall be regulated under specific environ- mental conditions. In Reinman’s opinion, “space at large should not enjoy a moral status equal to Earth” (ibid., 86), as she grants a primacy to Earth based on bio-centric values: “In many ways Earth, with its unique, abundant life, is special. There is nothing quite like it in the Solar System” (ibid.). Although the point raised by Reinman is of key importance to our discussion, from a posthuman perspective, regarding the Earth as “special” because of its life abundance is problematic, being supported by an Earth-centric, bio-centric and quantitative principle which supremacy is not inherently justified; life itself, in fact, is a slippery concept.

The current understanding of life is merely descriptive, not definitive: the border between animate/inanimate is difficult to mark and is often transgressed.24 Viruses, for instance, exhibit some of the characteristics which are common to organic life, while they are missing others, challenging the biological concept of life itself.25 More in general, it can be stated that life is not a clearly defined notion; instead, as Michel Foucault noted: “Life...is a category of classification, relative, like all the other categories, to the criteria one adopts” (1966; Engl. Transl. 1970, 161). Going back to Reinman’s conclusions, she underlines an aspect of strategic relevance for a posthumanist sensitivity: “humans’ actions towards their surroundings will continue to affect people whether we live on Earth or in space” (2009, 86). Let’s reflect further upon this point. The non-human agency of matter (Barad 2007), as high- lighted within the frame of New Materialism, plays a key role in allowing us to recognize agency to planets, stars and asteroids. The relational onto-epistemological approach of New Materialism makes us think on the possible astro-ecological impacts of Moon mining, or of terraforming in Mars,26 on the balance of the solar system and, eventually, on their orbits. Even the environmentally-sound concept of space-based solar power (cf. Ernst 2013) should be considered from perspectives others than Earth. Object-Oriented Ontology, and in particular the notion of “Hyperobjects” (Morton 2013), highlights the material viscosity of objects whose performance exceeds both a particular space and a particular time: reading the current opening of the space market from this perspective will unmask the long-term irreversible consequences of our present actions.

Space is the next frontier, where new resources, habitats and life forms are currently being sought: in November 2015, the United States Government passed the “Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act “[t]o facilitate a pro-growth environment for the developing commercial space industry by encouraging private sector investment” (U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 2015). Although approaching outer space as a resource may spark interest and funding, from an heideggerian perspective, it is ontologically limiting and epistemologically partial, based on an Earth-centered policy sustained by an anthropocentric Weltanschauung. Furthermore, the “Space Act” may contravene the international regulations laid down by the “Outer Space Treaty” (1967), a key document ratified by 104 countries, including the US, which still represents the legal framework for space activity. The Office for Outer Space Affairs of the United Nations summarizes the following principles as the main ones sustaining the Treaty:

the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind; outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States; outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means; States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner; the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind; States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by gov- ernmental or non-governmental entities; States shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies. (Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 1967)

As we can see, this document is based on the principle of the common heritage of humankind, according to which “outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty”. Conceived during the Cold War, the Treaty inaugurates a post-nationalistic post-bellic approach to space, setting a new paradigm which has departed from the dualistic imprinting of “us” against “them”. Although still within an anthropocentric schemata focussed on the interests of “mankind”, the step is huge. For instance, celestial bodies shall be used “for peaceful purposes” and shall not be contaminated; astronauts are considered the “envoys” of humankind.27 The human frame has been opened and expanded: posthumanism has entered the gates to the heavens.

It is now time to consider the impact of space encountering on human identity and existential insights, by delving into the specific change of perspective brought along by space traveling. This radical shift, known as the overview effect, consists of a series of epiphanies experienced by astronauts looking at the Earth from outer space. In his book The Overview Effect: Space exploration and human evolution (1998), Frank White relates such a shift in consciousness to that specific geographical perspective, stating: “Mental processes and views of life cannot be separated from physical location” (3). Humans are embodied beings; their materiality is a process supported and deeply affected by their surroundings. White further asserts this point by emphasizing the fact that the astronauts in Earth orbits and the lunar astronauts have different types of epiphanies: “The orbital astronaut sees the Earth as huge and himself or herself as less significant. The lunar astronaut sees the Earth as small and feels the awesome grandeur of the entire universe...Both pro- grams change the astronaut’s perception of the Earth and of his or her own identity, but in quite different ways” (ibid., 36). To White, the overview effect is so significant, that he affirms: “It is possible to grasp the true implications of this evolutionary process only by seeing it from the viewpoint of the universe as a whole, and from that perspective, the Overview Effect may point to humankind’s purpose as a species” (ibid., 5). The overview effect is of key importance to space ethics, allowing us to approach the topic of space migration not only from the usual utilitarian perspective, but also from an onto-epistemological standpoint: resonating with Heidegger, space physically becomes “a way of revealing”.

#### The aff’s distinction between humans and technology is a form of dualism—mechanic can not be separated from machine

Coonfield 6 (Gordon, (Ph.D., Michigan Technological University, 2004), is Assistant Professor of Communication at Villanova University.) "Thinking machinically, or, the techno-aesthetic of Jackie Chan: Toward a Deleuze-Guattarian media studies." Critical Studies in Media Communication 23.4 (2006): 285-301.] TDI

Third, Deleuze notes that beginning ‘‘in the middle’’ with relations forces us to move from a logic of attribution encumbered by the problem of essence (the human IS, the tool IS) to a logic of conjunction and becoming (... human AND tool ...). Here ‘‘the AND is not even a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends all relations, the path of all relations, which makes relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set of their terms’’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 57). What matters, then, is not what happens on one or another side of the human-tool dualism. To posit that the essence of one is either procured or at stake because of something essential to the other is to make the ‘‘in between’’ opaque. The logic of attribution places the human and the tool in a black box. But beginning in the middle and proceeding by a logic of conjunction focuses on the relation between them, not as a constant with a predetermined outcome, but as a more-or-less probable occurrence under particular conditions. Beginning in the middle means considering the affective capacities produced in the relation between elements (human or otherwise). What happens that is significant is not what a spool does to a television chef, or what the trench rammer does to a thug, but what happens in the middle of these terms, how each communicates something under particular conditions. Subtract even the smallest element, like the plastic tie on the thug’s thumb, and the assemblage changes, because that space of the middle is now elsewhere, in between others.

So far, it might be argued, the position elaborated here continues to sidestep the Human-technology distinction while simply leaving the underlying dualism uninterrogated. But considered from Deleuze’s propositions, the conceptual problem of the proliferation of ‘‘hybrids’’ or ‘‘cyborgs,’’ our due under the Modern Constitution Latour describes, becomes irrelevant. Under the terms of the ‘‘settlement’’ of the Constitution, we must believe either a myth concerning the possibility of a human nature completely unspoiled by technology or, alternatively, a myth that defines humans as tool-using animals, thus making us always already technological hybrids. However, it is necessary simply to push the propositions concerning relations further in order to address the a priori distinction between human and tool. This can be accomplished by considering the implications of these propositions for bodies.

The reconsideration of the body by Deleuze and his collaborators (Deleuze, 1988; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Deleuze & Parnet, 1987) begins with Spinoza’s ‘‘radical’’ observation: ‘‘We do not know what the body can do’’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 17). This observation is significant because, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) insist, ‘‘we know nothing about a body until we know what it can do’’ (p. 257). ‘‘It’’ is not something given or determined in advance. ‘‘It’’ is not the body, but ‘‘a body’’ determined by the relations of movement and relative speed, as well as the capacities to affect and be affected in which it is comprised. In this view, bodies are not determined by an essence (terms). There is no ‘‘model’’ or ‘‘molar’’ body of which each is a more or less perfect instance. There are only more or less stable relations established along two axes or lines: the (intensive) latitudinal line of a body’s capacity to affect and be affected, and the (extensive) longitudinal line of a body’s ‘‘particle aggregates,’’ the elements, however large or small, in recurrent communication with one another in extensive relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness.

A Deleuze-Guattarian conception of bodies asks not ‘What IS it?’ Instead it asks ‘‘What can it do?’’ Of what effects and relations is it capable under particular conditions, given the assemblage of which it is part? As Gaitens (1996) notes, in this ‘‘ethological’’ approach bodies are not to be ‘‘categorized’’ in advance according to distinctions between subject and object, cause and effect, human and technological, species and genus. For ethology ‘‘does not claim to know, in advance, what a body is capable of doing or becoming,’’ nor does it ‘‘impose a place of organization’’ a priori on matters. Rather, it ‘‘posits a plane of experimentation, a mapping of extensive relations and intensive capacities that are mobile and dynamic’’ (p. 169). Extended to the problem of technology, rather than beginning from the assumption of two planes of being\*a human and a technological\*we begin with one plane of immanent consistence on which encounters between elements, forces, and bodies happen as events unfold. ‘‘Human being’’ is thus conceived ‘‘as part of a dynamic and interconnected whole, distinguishable from other bodies only by means of the speed and slowness, motion and rest, of the parts which compose it ... . The human body is radically open to its surrounding and can be composed, recomposed and decomposed by other bodies’’ (Gaitens, 1996, p. 165). The machinic, as a mode of organizing or assemblage, is one map for ordering the relations and affects which obtain on this plane of encounters and events. Thus, a biological body, too, can be viewed as operating machinically.

Such an approach to bodies and other machines does not spell the end of human agency, nor does it presage technological colonization of the plane of human being (which is a return to the logic of attribution characteristic of instrumentalism). It does spell the end of a particular model of human agency, one always guaranteed in advance by an essentialist and problematic human-tool distinction. If we know a body only when we know ‘‘what it can do,’’ then knowledge of a body is directly tied to doing. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is only by encountering other bodies that we can determine what a body’s affects are, how it ‘‘can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy or be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body’’ (1987, p. 257). Agency, then, is not determined in advance but only by way of a knowledge gained from encountering other bodies, entering into relations of composition that allow the formation of an assemblage more potent than that which the parts alone could achieve, or entering into relations of decomposition that destroy the cohesion and unity of one or the other body’s parts (Deleuze, 1988, p. 19).

#### The impact is a state of permanent war—their political discourses surrounding space make militarization inevitable and turns the case.

Dickens and Ormrod 16 [(Peter Dickens, Senior Research Associate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge, member of the Red-Green Study Group in London, James S Ormrod, Principal Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton), “The Future of Outer Space”, *The Palgrave Handbook of Society, Culture and Outer Space*] TDI

An argument can be made that the conquest of outer space has represented the ultimate victory of abstract space (see also Shaw, 2008, p. 115). Any meaningful distinction between terrestrial space and the rest of the cosmos has been eroded. This is not to say that the whole of outer space has been humanized, which of course it has not, but that space has come to be reconceptualized and re-experienced as a space for accumulation like any other. It is a space thoroughly colonized by terrestrial knowledge and practice (whether considered primarily capitalist, male, white or anything else).

For Benjamin and a host of others (from Klerkx, 2005, to Parker, 2009), the disinvestment in outer space exploration and development came as a result of the bureaucratization of NASA, and its engulfment within the military-industrial complex. With the development of the International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle (which according to some accounts were each the rationale for the development of the other), space exploration became routine and unexciting. Nothing fundamentally new appeared to be happening in space. Whether or not this is seen as true depends a great deal on perspective. Even if NASA budgets were being cut, this volume has hopefully made clear that a great deal was still happening in space. New space technologies continued to be developed, and these technologies were being integrated into terrestrial life in innumerable ways. But we believe it is also true (and this has been the emphasis of our work elsewhere, see Dickens and Ormrod, 2007) that these developments represent the continuation of terrestrial power relations and social dynamics. Space development is, to put it one way, business as usual. And crucially, any novelty to these developments was undermined by the representation of outer space in similar terms to the representation of terrestrial space. As evidenced in this book, political scientists, geographers and legal scholars had begun to talk about outer space as a knowable, if not actually known, space. The origins of this representation of space can be traced to Copernicus (MacDonald, 2009) and/or Kepler (Zubrin, 1996). But with the routinization of outer spatial practices (from increasing launch rates to the proliferation of satellite-receiving terminals, to the everyday use of satellite services to underpin military operations, communications, entertainment, navigation and so on), these representations were made manifest in the creation of a new social space.

The central problem with the final victory of abstract space was that it obliterated the very ‘absolute spaces’ on which it was founded, and from which it derived its emotional appeal. It is in a way surprising that the development of modern spaceflight was from its inception anchored in a religious or spiritual cosmology. This was true of both Russian and American contexts (see also Geppert, 2007, p. 599). The Russian programme has long roots in the tradition of Russian cosmism (Kohonen, 2009; Siddiqi, 2010). And, as Pop notes, Richard Nixon said to the Apollo 11 astronauts; ‘Because of what you have done, the heavens have become a part of man’s world.’ Pop goes on:

‘Are we today turning mythology into fact?’ – asked Joseph Campbell on the occasion of the Apollo programme. The astronauts walked on the real astronomical moon, as it was; but they walked on the mythical moon of each culture, as thought to be, as imagined. Their trip was physical and metaphysical. They walked through different cosmogonies; through different models of the universe.

(Pop, 2012, personal communication, see also ‘High Flight: A Spiritual History of the Space Age’, in preparation)

This continued relationship was not coincidental. As a number of contributions here show, the appeal of outer space lay in the promise of conquering the wondrous or Godly and hence the elevation of the status of humanity (or, rather more specifically, white men). This is not necessarily that dissimilar to the process Sims describes in his chapter, whereby myths ‘record time’. Ormrod illustrates this in his chapter through analysis of Tsiolkovsky’s science fiction in which the best human beings are able to fly like angels in space. As Kilgore notes in his chapter, Carl Sagan owed his continued appeal to his simultaneous reproduction of wonder as well as knowledge. The British celebrity cosmologist Brian Cox (see Mellor, this volume, for more on him) has arguably taken this even further, such that his popular shows and writing dedicate more time to what is unknown than to knowledge itself. These lacunae became spaces for wild imaginative projects – projects more captivating than any empirical knowledge. It is no wonder that the continued disenchantment and re-enchantment of the universe have become a major theme in recent work. Based largely on studies of astronauts’ experiences, Kilbryde (2015) argues that space exploration can potentially be a means of overcoming the dualism through which outer space is constructed as an object, and thus of experiencing unity. This is provided that the sense of awe and wonder it engenders is not sought as a ‘possession’ of the individual or as something to be subsequently rationalized.

It is the invocation of obstacles that produces space as something potentially unconquerable, and hence worth conquering. And yet the obliteration of the irrational or wondrous sweeps the ground from underneath such a project. To the extent that outer space has become an abstract space, it has been foreclosed as a frontier. It is a frontier, but a frontier without a future. In removing the possibility of an elsewhere, it serves only to secure terrestrial hegemony. In their own ways, both Baudrillard and Virilio present such a view of outer space. For Baudrillard, it was in any case a frontier that served as a model for terrestrial life, which set the permissible limits for struggle and confrontation within it. He concludes,

Through the orbital inscription of a spatial object, it is the planet earth that becomes a satellite, it is the terrestrial principle of reality that becomes eccentric, hyperreal, and insignificant. Through the orbital installation of a system of control like peaceful coexistence, all the terrestrial microsystems are satellized and lose their autonomy. (p. 35)

Everyone on Earth is neutralized and homogenized. The proliferation of space technology since he was writing, and the blurring of civilian and military technologies, has only broadened the potential of such an understanding. Parks and Schwoch (2012, p. 4), in the context of the ‘satellization’ of global security, refer to the satellites as ‘the ultimate rationalization and instrumentalization of the quest for global security and domination’.

For Virilio, there was such a homology between the technologies of war, the image of space as a battlefield and the political discourses about space that the future seemed equally foreclosed. He makes the claim that any space is constituted ‘from the outside’ (cited in Bormann, 2009, p. 80). That is to say, it is perceived on the basis of that which precedes it. Bormann is therefore able to argue that ‘nothing about outer space is “out there”, what we get to know about outer space is always socially, spatially and locally embedded’ (p. 80). Bormann, following Virilio, seems to believe that this is especially true of the vacuum of outer space:

[O]ther than the view there is no physical or physiological contact. No hearing, no feeling in the sense of touching materials, with the exception of an actual Moon landing. Thus the conquest of space, of outer space – isn’t it more the conquest of the image of space?

(Virilio & Ujica, 2003, cited in Bormann, 2009, p. 84)

Bormann reaches the pessimistic conclusion that ‘the perpetuation of outer space as a sphere of permanent war and its claims to weaponization will soon make no alternative possible’ (p. 84). This is the product, in the large part, of her assumption that ‘[w]hat we get to know about the space of outer space is dominated by information provided through the possibilities (and limits) of military technology’ (p. 81).

#### The alternative is to see that nature is us—recognizing the logic of the 1AC as the primary barrier to overcoming challenges to our environment and beyond.

Baskin 15 [(Jeremy, Senior Fellow at the Melbourne School of Government where he focuses on the legitimacy and accountability of knowledge) Paradigm Dressed as Epoch: The Ideology of the Anthropocene, 2015, Environmental Values] TDI

Even the limited examples from the literature already cited suggest that the assumptions of proponents of the Anthropocene about managerialism, technology and expertise are transparent and explicit. In almost all major accounts of the concept it is assumed that responding to the end of nature, and the challenges of the Anthropocene, requires a trinity of techniques: clear management of the Earth and Earth-systems, guided by experts (and scientists/engineers in particular), using the most advanced technology possible (including large- scale technology).

The challenges themselves are typically framed by a sense of emergency. The great weight of accumulating scientific data is recruited, to show how the human species and its planet are at risk. Landscapes and seascapes are being transformed, boundaries are being breached, non-linear processes have been unleashed, system pressures are rising and tipping points are either happening or looming; and all of this is both unprecedented in human history and fundamentally anthropogenic in cause.

Certainly recognition of the made-ness of the natural world means acknowledging that this carries responsibilities for the relevant human socie- ties, even a degree of conscious management. For leading proponents of the Anthropocene, the scale of management required is commonly seen, implicitly or explicitly, as global: since we face global problems, global management is needed to run the Earth in the Anthropocene. But what does it mean to frame policies within a global, universalist goal of ‘running the Earth’, and what condition are we trying to manage it towards?

Those of a more Aidosean inclination have spoken of the need to manage a return to the Holocene, or Holocene-like conditions, since this is ‘the only global environment that we are sure is “safe operating space” for the complex, extensive civilization that Homo sapiens has constructed’ (Steffen et al., 2011b: 747). This is the best way to manage the risks we face as we increasingly cross the planetary boundaries. The Prometheans, by contrast, argue that we should manage our way towards ‘a better Anthropocene’ (Ellis, 2011). The internal logic of the argument surely lies with the Prometheans. If humanity acknowledges and embraces its role as Earth-manager, and if we are indeed ‘post-nature’ and ‘nature is us’, then it is clearly impossible to return the Earth to the Holocene (or at least it would take millennia to do so). Why not aim for a ‘better’ Earth, or a more benign climate in which Norwegians are less cold, and Saudi Arabians less hot? For our purposes, however, the point is that the Aidosean and Promethean versions differ over the direction and goals of plan- etary management, rather than the need for it.

Managing the Anthropocene is also understood to come with special responsibilities for the scientific and engineering community (Crutzen, 2002). Only they are likely to have the knowledge, data and skills required in this new Age of Humans. At one level, one should not read too much into this, since the key proponents of the concept happen to be scientists and, not surprisingly, are more alert to the extent of their own knowledge and insights. Certainly sci- entists in the Anthropocene would have a key role as diagnosticians and, with engineers, as generators of specific technologies. But there is something troubling in the idea of scientists as both informants and saviours. Whilst policy needs to be informed by science, experience teaches that we should remain wary of the idea that policy can or should be guided by the science (Jasanoff, 1990; Pielke, 2007). As we know from the ‘climate wars’, the barriers to bringing down carbon-dioxide concentrations are almost entirely related to global and local politics, vested interests, deep-rooted values, economic structures and so on. For well over a decade they have been almost entirely unrelated to there being a lack of scientific data or new technologies (see Pielke, 2007: 71–2).

Proponents of the Anthropocene almost always draw a link between the concept and the need for (or, at least, the need to research and consider) large-scale technological interventions, and, in particular, geo-engineering. Geo-engineering, or climate engineering, involves the large-scale, intentional manipulation of the climate system, to regulate the Earth’s chemistry and the global temperature. The most commonly cited scheme involves solar radia- tion management by stratospheric aerosol injection: in practice, shrouding the upper atmosphere of the planet in a fine layer of sulphuric particles, on an ongoing basis, with the aim of cooling the earth to offset the warming effects of rising greenhouse-gases. Most key articles from the scientific community which advocate the Anthropocene concept either endorse geo-engineering, call for the capability to be developed, or simply make it imaginable (for example: Crutzen, 2002, 2006; Ellis and Haff, 2009). A minority clearly find the idea uncomfortable and incompatible with planetary stewardship, even whilst re- taining it as an option (for example: Steffen et al., 2011a).

A LEGITIMATING IDEOLOGY?

We now see the emerging shape of the mainstream Anthropocene paradigm, and its narrative. The idea (and the evidence) that humanity is now the dominant earth-shaping force combines with the data showing that the condition of the patient is serious, possibly terminal. Humanity and its planet are now in a critical and exceptional state. This both generates and draws upon an attrac- tion to global-scale technological ‘solutions’ and earth management, under the guidance of the scientists/engineers best placed to understand, interpret and help shape the necessary interventions. These are responses aimed either at bringing us back from the brink, or at taking us to a new and better-managed future Earth. In both versions, the Anthropocene is both diagnosis and cure, both description and prescription.

It is important to note the deeply authoritarian and de-politicising tendencies of Anthropocene discourse. Proponents regularly talk of a ‘global sustainability crisis’ (Steffen et al., 2011b: 740) and a ‘climate emergency’, and suggest that humanity and its planet are now in ‘operating in a no-analogue state’ (Crutzen and Steffen, 2003: 253). This is not uncommon in much envi- ronmental discourse. But its effect, in the context of the Anthropocene, is that framing through exceptionality can legitimate the need for exceptional rule and authoritarian responses. This is enhanced by the promise of technology (machines, techniques, human-centred risk management) as the basis of action and ‘salvation’. The emphasis on ‘the rule of experts’, and the associated endorsement of a technocratic consciousness, depoliticises society and tends to reduce the political to the technical, justifying decisions on technical grounds. It also helps explain a related interest by many Anthropocene proponents in notions of Earth governance, which is not explored here.

This Promethean version is the one likely to be most attractive to the powerful and the privileged in the event that nature starts tipping, and as ‘the period of consequences’, to use Churchill’s memorable phrase, becomes in- creasingly apparent. It can also be thought of as ‘full-belly Anthropocene’, or the ‘Anthropocene of the rich’, to adapt Guha and Martinez-Alier’s resonant phrase (1997).7

Discourses of the Anthropocene certainly may have some ability to chal- lenge the notion of human ‘progress’ and ‘the belief systems and assumptions that underpin neo-classical economic thinking, which in turn has been a major driver of the Great Acceleration’ (Steffen et al., 2011a: 861–2). But, as a con- cept, it appears overall to legitimate the dominant order, even if unintentionally. In my argument, it does this in three major ways: by universalising/normalisng the affluent contemporary consumer as the human of the Anthropocene (thereby obscuring the social reality of unequal responsibility for impacts, and the pathological pursuit of endless and unequal growth); by its elevation and sacralisation of this particular humanity (reinserting it into nature only to reelevate it within and above it as a force of nature); and by its ability to legitimise a range of major and potentially highly dangerous interventions into the workings of the earth, and some deeply authoritarian state practices, none of which are likely to be exercised in the interests of most of the world’s people.

### Case

#### Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.

Moen 16 [(Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo) “An Argument for Hedonism,” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9506-9>] TDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.

Bostrom 12 [(Nick Bostrom, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford) “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy, 2012] TDI

These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

#### Regulated innovation solves climate.

Cohen 21 [(Steve, is the Senior Vice Dean of Columbia’s School of Professional Studies and a Professor in the Practice of Public Affairs at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs)"Kerry Was Correct: Decarbonization Will Require New Technology," 5-24-2021, https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/05/24/kerry-was-correct-decarbonization-will-require-new-technology/] TDI

It’s useful sometimes to ground analysis in fact. One environmental fact is that overall, the air and water in the United States are cleaner today than they were in 1970. America consumes more today and pollutes less than it did 50 years ago. How did that happen? In the case of air, regulation of motor vehicles and power plants resulted in new stack scrubbing technology, fuel switching and the mass adoption of the catalytic converter. Due to fuel milage standards, cars became lighter, more energy-efficient and cleaner. Power generation and vehicles (not heavy industry) have always been the largest sources of air pollution, and we use more cars and electricity today than we used 50 years ago. Technological innovation coupled with strong regulation resulted in improved air quality. We see similar results with sewage treatment and with the management of non-point sources of water pollution.

The technology of air, water and waste management has advanced dramatically since we created the EPA back in 1970. I believe that decarbonization is in the early stages of the same process. The technology we have now can get us started, but if it was really where it needed to be, it would already be in use. Electric cars are a good example. Yes, we need more charging stations and public policy should do even more to encourage early adoption. But what we really need is a battery so good that it can deliver a charge for 500 or 1,000 miles. We need an electric vehicle that costs less than today’s internal combustion vehicles. Those electric vehicles will require technological innovation that I am certain we will see but is not yet available. Those technologies will make the internal combustion engine obsolete. We are close. In fact, Ford recently announced the electronic version of its best-selling truck. According to Ford’s press release:

“The truck of the future is here. The F-150 Lightning is the smartest, most innovative truck Ford has ever built. From near instant torque to intelligent towing, seamless connectivity to software updates, plus power for your home, a power frunk and a digital screen that’s larger than any currently offered on a full-size truck – F-150 Lightning is a driving and ownership experience unlike any other.”

With federal tax incentives, the cost of the truck is competitive with the gasoline-powered version. The Ford F-150 is an indicator of technological process, and we will soon learn if it is able to win over truck-buyers.

Solar technology is also improving, but current technology is expensive, toxic, and large. Smaller, less toxic, and cheaper solar cells are now being invented. During the debate after John Kerry’s recent interview on BBC One’s Andrew Marr show, I kept hearing from climate experts and advocates that we have the technology we need and the search for new technology is just an excuse for inaction. I’m reminded of the pictures of people with the first cell phones in the 1980s. They were the size of a brick, cost about $10,000 (in 1980 dollars) and had very limited battery life. In 2004 we got the flip phone with seven hours of battery life, and a few years later, Apple invented the iPhone, which led to the small computers we keep in our pockets today. Sure, we had cell phones 40 years ago, but they were not ready for prime time. The need for additional research and the development of new technology is not an excuse for inaction today but an argument for a broader set of actions than simply using off-the-shelf technology. A key action is research leading to new technologies.

The transition to renewable energy and electronic vehicles has begun, but additional technological innovation and infrastructure investment will be needed to succeed. The larger problem will be the greenhouse gases produced when we manufacture steel, cement, and food. These industrial processes must also reduce their production of greenhouse gasses and developing the technology needed for these changes will be a massive national undertaking. As Ula Chrobak observed in a recent issue of Popular Science:

“… making electricity is only about a third of global emissions and a quarter of US emissions, explains Zeke Hausfather, director of climate and energy at the Breakthrough Institute. There are other energy-intensive sectors that can’t readily switch to sustainable alternatives. Industrial processes—including steel, cement, and chemical production—are not straightforward to clean up. One reason is that many rely on temperatures of around 1,000°C, which can be easily produced through a fossil-powered furnace, but doing the same with an electric heater requires a prohibitively expensive amount of energy. The process of turning atmospheric nitrogen into fertilizer, for instance, produces 1.4 percent of all global CO2 emissions. For these industries, hydrogen and carbon capture technologies may be needed to help remove all emissions.”

#### Life is a prerequisite to generate value and ponder secondary questions of ethics

Elizabeth Burns 17. Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### The aff is bad politics—technological progress is the route to liberation, not boring Luddism.

Hughes 4 [(James, Executive Director of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut in the United States. Citizen cyborg: Why democratic societies must respond to the redesigned human of the future. Basic Books, 2004.] TDI

Luddism is a political dead-end for progressive politics. Left-wing Luddism is boring and depressing, and has no energy to inspire people to create a new and better society. The Left was built by people inspired by millennial visions, not by people who saw only a hopeless future of futile existential protest against the juggernaut of fascist Progress. If there is to be a future for progressive politics it has to come from a rebirth of a sexy, high-tech vision of a radically democratic future, a rediscovery of the utopian imagination. As Russell Jacoby says in The End of Utopia, “in an era of political resignation and fatigue the utopian spirit remains more necessary than ever. It evokes neither prisons nor programs, but an idea of human solidarity and happiness. . . . Something is missing. A light has gone out. The world stripped of anticipation turns cold and grey.” What is missing, the light that has gone out for the Left, is the idea that the human condition can be radically transformed, that we can accomplish more than a defense of the status quo against a capitalist version of the future. To rekindle a progressive utopianism, the Next Left, the twenty-first-century Left, needs visionary projects worthy of a united transhuman world, projects like guaranteeing health, intelligence and longevity for all, building world government, eliminating work and colonizing the Solar System.

Luddism is also bad political sociology. Left Luddites inappropriately equate technologies with the power relations around those technologies, and try to fight capitalism or patriarchy or hierarchy by fighting technologies instead of by liberating the technologies for free and equal use. Technologies may make certain kinds of power more likely than others, but they do not determine power relations. Each new technology creates a new terrain for organizing and democratic struggle, new possibilities for expanded liberty and equality, or for oppression and exploitation. Technological innovation needs to be democratically regulated and guided, not fought or forbidden.

Progressives need to reembrace the Enlightenment insight that liberating each individual’s potential requires not only political liberation, but also technological liberation from nature. Marx referred to technological progress as the move from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. The more powerful our technology, and our political and economic empowerment, the more we are freed from the necessity of labor.

Democratic transhumanism combines this old strain of progressive optimism about reason, science and technology with a strong defense of individual liberty. The assertion of individual liberty was also a central cause of the radical democrats, and only became identified with the libertarian Right because of the rise of communism. By embracing the right of each person to control their body and mind and freely use technology to realize their fullest potential, the Next Left can decisively break all associations with authoritarianism.

A political movement based on both technological progress and individual liberty will then see ways that democratically regulated and distributed, freely exercised technology can create a more equal, empowered and united world. One way is by reducing the biological bases of social inequality. Contrary to the vacuous assertions of Francis Fukuyama and Bill McKibben that we are all biological equals, a lot of social inequality is built on a biological foundation, and enhancement technology makes it possible to redress that source of inequality. FM–2030 wrote in Optimism One that transhumans are no longer content simply striving for social, economic, and political equality. What do these rights mean so long as people are born biologically unequal? So long as some are born strong others weak, some healthy others sickly, some beautiful others ungainly, some tall others short, some brilliant others dumb—in other words so long as we do not have biological equality—all social equalities mean very little. We will settle for nothing less than [the conquest of] this basic biological inequality which is at the very root of all human inequalities.

#### Their condemnation of privatization stands in the way of transhumanism—we should fear government control of technology, not corporations

Bailey 5 [(Ronald, the science correspondent for Reason) 5-11-2005 Trans-Human Expressway Reason https://reason.com/2005/05/11/trans-human-expressway/] TDI

Where Hughes goes wrong is in fetishizing democratic decision-making. He fails to recognize that the Enlightenment project that spawned modern liberal democracies began by trying to keep certain questions about the transcendent out of the public sphere. Questions about the ultimate meaning and destiny of humanity are private concerns. Worries about biotechnological progress must not to be used as excuses to breach the Enlightenment understanding of what belongs in the private sphere and what belongs in the public. Technologies dealing with the birth, death and the meaning of life need protection from meddling—even democratic meddling—by others who want to control them as a way to force their visions of right and wrong on the rest of us. Your fellow citizens shouldn't get to vote on whom you have sex with, what recreational drugs you ingest, what you read and watch on TV and so forth. Hughes understands that democratic authoritarianism is possible, but discounts the possibility that the majority may well vote to ban the technologies that promise a better world.

However, even as he extols social democracy as the best guarantor of our future biotechnological liberty, Hughes ignores that it is precisely those social democracies he praises, Germany, France, Sweden, and Britain, which now, not in the future, outlaw germinal choice, genetic modification, reproductive and therapeutic cloning, and stem cell research. For example, Germany, Austria and Norway ban the creation of human embryonic stem cell lines. Britain outlaws various types of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to enable parents to choose among embryos. (Despite worrisome bioconservative agitation against this type of biotech research, in the United States, private research in these areas remains legal.)

Hughes also favors not only social democracy but global governance centered on the United Nations with the "authority to tax corporations and nations," and a "permanent standing international army," and with UN agencies "expanded into a global infrastructure of technological and industrial regulation capable of controlling the health and environmental risks from new technologies." This is the same UN that just voted for an ambiguous resolution calling on nations to ban all forms of human cloning which are incompatible with human dignity and the protection of human life. Fortunately, the resolution leaves some wiggle, but the next time the UN makes one of these democratic decisions, transhumanists may not like the result.

Furthermore, Hughes's analysis is largely free of economics—he simply ignores the processes by which wealth is created and gets busy redistributing the wealth through government health care and government subsidized eugenics. After reading Citizen Cyborg, you might come away thinking that Hughes believes that corporations exist primarily to oppress people. While acknowledging that the last US government involvement in eugenics—a project that involved sterilizing tens of thousands of people—was a bad idea, Hughes fails to underscore that it was democratically elected representatives, not corporations, who ordered women's tubes tied and men's testicles snipped.

#### Space privatization is good—it prevents war and ensures sustainably-sourced space projects for public good.

Frankowski 17 [(Paweł, assistant Professor at the Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian University) “Outer Space and Private Companies: Consequences for Global Security,” 2017, pg. 144-145] TDI

In the terms of privatization and space security, space remains relatively untapped, but commercial and military benefits from space exploration/exploitation could even lead to ‘privatization of space’. Such privatization will result from growing pressure on spacefaring countries to defect from cooperation, since is less viable with good number of multiple actors who entered the space.36 However, space policy and space research are characterized by very high costs, which are rather impossible to bear by private companies, limited by economic calculation. As pointed out earlier, under-investment in technological development by private companies it is related to the fact that these actors are not focused on profits of a social nature, such as improving the quality of life of the recipient of the product.37 This makes some technology, potentially beneficial to society, not developed or introduced into use, because the profit margin is too small to make this viable for commercial players.

To conclude, privatization of space security can develop in unexpected way, but in today’s space environment private actors would rather play the role of security regulators than security providers. When investment in space technologies is less profitable than other areas of economy, private actors would focus on soft law and conflict prevention in space, and new private initiatives will appear. For example, apart from important space companies, as SpaceX or Blue Origin active in outer space, other private actors as Secure World Foundation (SWF), who focus on space sustainability, will play more important role in crafting international guidelines for space activities.38 This path the way for future solutions and projects, as cleaning the space debris, extracting resources from asteroids and planetoids, refuelling satellites, providing payload capabili-ties for governmental entities on market-based logic, will be based on activity non-state actors, providing soft law and regulatory solutions, where space faring states are unable to find any compromise. Therefore private companies will be in fact global (or space) regulators, as part of UNCOPUS, being involved in space activities.39

The last argument for private involvement in space security comes from an approach based on common good and resilience of space assets, emphasized by the Project Ploughshares, as an important part of space security. As of 2017 there are more than 700,000 man-made objects on the Earth’s orbit bigger than 1 cm, while 17,000 of them are bigger than 10 cm.40 Some of them are traced by SSA systems, both American and European, but these systems are public-military owned, and private operators are not granted any access to this data. Any collision of space object with space debris, even with small particles, might result in a chain reaction, called Kessler’s syndrome, and not only private but public, and military assets will be destroyed or impaired. In such conditions, a reluctant cooperation between the public and private sector, and unwillingness to share vulnerable data by public actors seem to confirm that private space activity is more than necessary. This is an apparent case when logic of mistrust between state powers must be overcome by private actors, perhaps by suggesting common preferences for debris mitigation, and space situational awareness. In the case of space debris, Space Data Association, an initiative supported by private sector, with its main aim to enhance data sharing between commercial satellite operators, could be an example of nascent public good provided by private actors for the sake of global security.

#### It also solves military readiness.

Frankowski 17 [(Paweł, assistant Professor at the Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian University) “Outer Space and Private Companies: Consequences for Global Security,” 2017, pg. 133-134] TDI

Literature on privatization of military services has expanded, especially after 2002 and involvement of private companies in Iraqi operation. When appreciating an outlook of different scholars dealing with private military companies it is worth to follow Prado7 and argue that transferring provisions of services to private hands or acquiring from private entities without developing independent system on state’s behalf can be beneficial for the state for at least four reasons. First reason is price, and cost of private provisions could be lower because private companies can provide services with fewer people, with outsourced services, also to third countries. Price of military service, to far extent depends on costs of trained personnel, when private companies hire former soldiers, with completed training before. Moreover, the cost of public security services is based on the benefits coming to soldiers after their years of service. For example for overall military budget of the United States (1 trillion USD), more than 200 billion USD, has been spent for pensioners, veterans’ benefits or retiree health services.

Secondly, the push for private security may result in more efficient usage of financial and human resources, and soldiers may perform more valuable duties.8 Therefore, PMCs can provide better service for the same price or the same services lowering the price. This will allow moving financial resources to another public service or arguing that public money has been better spent. Thirdly, with private security providers, states can avoid lengthy red tape procedures, with for example standardization of military procurements, time for mobilization and deployment. While such problems are important during armed conflict, they have also become more and more important during the planning of infrastructure, using assets, and regulating activity. The demand for more flexible and less troublesome activity in security realm is constantly increasing, both in Europe and in the Western Hemisphere.

Finally, governments may turn for private resources for the lack of choice, when the state does not have necessary technical or material capabilities to provide security services in a timely fashion.9 However, some authors suggest that looking for private solutions in security cannot be analysed in isolation from pressure coming from political processes in larger scale.10 Nevertheless, distinguishing between economic power of private actors, and lack of capacity on behalf of the state, as driving factors for privatization of security services not necessarily answers the question why space assets, crucial for power of any important state in the world politics, are developed by private actors, being to some extent neglected by governments.

#### Post-humanism re-capitulates to colonial capitalism by erasing the Global South.

**Cornell and Seely 2015** (Drucilla, Professor of Women’s Studies, Political Science, and Law @ Rutgers University and the Director of the uBuntu Project; and Stephen, PhD Candidate in Women’s and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, *The Spirit of Revolution: Beyond the Dead Ends of Man*)

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union it would seem that the idea of revolution has been swept into the dustbin of history, or at least into the dustbin of the Euro-American academy. Even within feminist and queer theory, two of the academic discourses ostensibly most devoted to sweeping transformation, the word scarcely appears in most of the work written over the past three decades. Our purpose here is not to offer an extensive investigation into the reasons for this post-revolutionary “turn.” Certainly part of it is a general air of pessimism that has swept through critical theory in the face of the failures of the so-called Communist states to actualize the great socialist aspirations and the ruthlessness of advanced capitalism that has created inequalities of world historical proportions, let alone the never-ending war, horrific structural violence, and brutal suppression of revolutionary movements that plague our world today (see Cornell 2008). The Marxist dream of a revolution toward an emancipated humanity and a classless planetary society is, we are told even by supposedly leftist thinkers, a hopelessly romantic and impossible metanarrative that relies on bad pretensions to scientific truth and problematic assumptions of an originary “human nature.” Moreover, revolution, the story goes, is inextricably connected to a hubris of humanism that cannot survive the “death of Man” in late-twentieth century European philosophy, a hubris that sees Man as the maker of his own world and therefore as having the power to change it. Feminist and queer theory, of course, have long highlighted and critiqued the phallocentrism and heteronormativity inherent to all forms of humanism and, as such, for several decades now they too have largely relinquished revolution as a necessary part of overcoming Man. Unfortunately, however, such reports of the death of Man seem, paraphrasing Mark Twain, to have been greatly exaggerated. This is not, to be sure, for lack of trying. Indeed, there have been countless assaults on Man over the past centuries: from the attack on his false universalism by early feminists and abolitionists (Wollstonecraft 1992, Cugoano 1999) to Nietzsche’s (1968) blistering assault on the nihilism he brings, from to the late twentieth century critique of his metaphysical presuppositions (Derrida 1984, Foucault, 1994, Heidegger 2008a) to more recent feminist and de-colonial challenges to the violent exclusions he relies on for his perpetuation (Irigaray 1985, Spivak 1999, Wynter 2003, Fanon 2004). This death of Man rhetoric has taken on an especially apocalyptic tenor in light of what climate scientists have named the “Anthropocene,” that is, the geological epoch of the “human dominance of biological, chemical, and geological processes on Earth” (Crutzen & Schwägerl 2011). The immense threat posed by climate change, coupled with the limited ability of “traditional” frameworks in the humanities and sciences (including Marxism) to appropriately address it, has called for a fundamental reconsideration of the place of “the human” within nature and history and laid bare the profound vulnerability of Man (see Chakrabarty 2009). If centuries of violent exploitation of his many Others has not been strong enough cause for his deposing, perhaps his now-too-obvious destruction of the planet might be. That is, of course, if the planet doesn’t get him first. (As always, we hardly need to point out, Man will be the last casualty of his own destructive boomerang and, thus, we feminists should not revel too much in watching him wince in the face of his own impending doom.) This seismic shift in the geopolitical—better, cosmopolitical—scene has provoked some thinkers to call for a merciful end to Man. We cannot possibly hope to address the monumental problems facing us today, they suggest, with the “traditional” philosophy of Man—“Humanism.” As such, “posthumanist” theorists have sought to move beyond the many boundary projects of Humanism, which work to reconsolidate Man as the sovereign subject of rational mastery, and to reconceptualize our place in the material universe in a more egalitarian and sustainable way (Braidotti 2013). One can certainly see why posthumanism might be a palatable alternative to the old Humanism for many feminist and queer theorists, given feminism’s birth as a challenge to the “universal” philosophy of Man, and indeed, there is much recent work that seeks to use posthumanism as a way of freeing us from any lingering attachment to the humanist subject (Man) as crucial to feminist and queer politics and from an enduring human exceptionalism in relation to animals and other forms of matter. Often juxtaposed to the so-called linguistic turn (which is usually said to include both psychoanalysis and Foucauldian “discourse analysis” as residual Humanisms), these thinkers in feminist-queer science studies, “new” materialism, and affect theory, attempt to reconfigure humans as dynamic open systems embedded in a vital universe characterized by the constant flux of matter-energy, perpetual transformation, and unpredictable forms of entanglement (see Barad 2007, Giffney & Hird 2008, Coole & Frost 2010, Gregg & Seigworth 2010, Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2012). From this perspective, it might seem that by even thinking about revolutionary socialism as absolutely necessary for a cosmopolitical feminist and queer theory and politics, we are embracing an old-fashioned Humanist dream, or what Rosi Braidotti refers to as Marxism’s “humanistic arrogance of continuing to place Man at the centre of world history” (2013: 23). While we wholeheartedly affirm the end of Man and the rethinking of our relationships with the other forms of matter, both living and non, with which we share the universe, we do question the increasing effort put into debunking “the human” and “human agency” at a time when neo-colonial and neoliberal capitalism have perhaps never been more destructive to the vast majority of the world’s inhabitants (human and non). Why does it seem, in other words, that posthumanism is necessarily post-revolutionary? While the joyous vitality that seems to characterize much of this posthumanist theory and its celebration of our connectedness with the universe (including technology) would seem to put these thinkers very far afield from Martin Heidegger’s “pessimism” about our ensnarement in modern technoscientific rationality (2008b), in the end we are often left with something quite similar to Heidegger’s conviction that there is nothing humans can actively do to make things better without intensifying our ensarement and we must therefore patiently hope that Being (or the planet in this case) chooses to spare us in spite of our past sins. For posthumanism, any focus on specifically human agency (such as that involved in the struggle against capitalism and colonialism) always risks a reinstatement of the old humanist subject, effectively smuggling in the Man who fucked everything up in the first place through the back door. Thus many posthumanist critics are engaged in a hypervigilant search for Man in every form of theory and politics, and any trace of him must be sussed out and rejected in the name of “life itself” and the future of the planet. When not a call for a more ecologically sustainable way of living based on a reassessment of the integral linkages between all scales of existence, then, the most “political” (or, perhaps better put, polemical) of posthumanisms are typically directed at deflating the “humanistic arrogance” of other academics and political theories rather than at any forms of systemic violence such as capitalism, colonialism, racism, or phallocentrism. We are not the first, to be sure, to register uneasiness over the often-blithe repudiation of Man and his premature burial in much posthumanist theory, especially considering how spectacularly Man’s handiwork is presently on display. Claire Colebrook (2014a, 2014b), for example, has put the brakes on any celebratory posthumanism that would claim to have abdicated Man’s throne atop the great chain of being. According to Colebrook, posthumanism is a recuperative gesture which enables Man to continue surviving vampirically by appearing to be dead while appropriating his previously excluded Others as his now-proper domain. As she convincingly argues, we should not buy so easily into the sham of Man’s self-effacement. While making atonement for his past exclusion and exploitation of the rest of the universe (i.e., women, the colonized, nonhuman animals, “life itself,” the Earth), Man redeems himself while simultaneously annexing these prior exclusions. Thus, when posthumanists and feminists turn to something like “life itself” or to our interconnectedness with the material universe as a way of overcoming Man, and while they spend their efforts diligently hunting down Man in all his former guises, Man has made off with the “goods” once again. For Colebrook, then, posthumanism is actually an “ultrahumanism,” which simply takes the world as Man had always made it in his (Euro-American, Bourgeois, White) image and supposedly “subtracts” Man, leaving Man’s old world masquerading as a new “posthuman” one. As she puts it: “Humanism posits an elevated or exceptional ‘man’ to grant sense to existence, then when ‘man’ is negated or removed what is left is the human all too human tendency to see the world as one giant anthropomorphic self-organizing living body” (2014a: 164). Because it was always Man who had given the world its sense, pronouncing Man dead ironically allows him to live on stronger than before because the world continues on in his image while his former critics—feminists, for example—now content themselves with his “vacated” world and devote themselves to tracking him down only in his old clothes (which he of course discarded long ago). So far, so good. We agree that posthumanism is a bit too self-congratulatory in its self-conferred status as the undertaker of Man. We also agree that it is often politically distracting—despite its best intentions—and that while many of its theorists are busy having contests over which of quantum nonlocality or bacterial sex is “queerer” and castigating the ancien régime (i.e., Marxists and “poststructuralists”) for its humanist dementia, Man is laughing all the way to the bank. This point, however, is also where we part company with Colebrook. For Colebrook, while the urgent possibility of human extinction is not the occasion for posthumanism, neither is it the occasion for revolutionary struggle. To quote her: What if social political revolution among human beings were still to leave the relation between the human species and life in the same place? Today’s frequently cited Marxist cry—it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism—should be read as symptomatic. Should we not be more concerned with the world’s end than the relations among markets and individuals? The Marxist premise that we cannot save the world ecologically until capitalism is dealt with, should be questioned, and reversed: as long as we imagine life and the world to be primarily anthropogenic, or emerging from human meaning and history, we will not confront the disjunction between the human species (in all its modes) and the life that it regards as its own. A new mode of critique that would not be political would be required. Indeed, it is the political gesture, or the understanding of conflicts as ultimately intra-human, that needs to be questioned. One needs a hypo-Marxism or counter-Marxism whereby the very premise of Marxism—man as a laboring animal who furthers his own life—needs to be recognized as the limit of thinking. For what ‘we’ cannot accept is the obvious counter to this assumption: man is not an animal who furthers his own survival (2014a: 197-8). As such, Colebrook asks us not to imagine a more just world, but rather “what life would be like if one could abandon the fantasy of one’s own endurance….for beyond ‘man’ one cannot figure the good life but only contingent, fragile, insecure, and ephemeral lives” (2014b: 22). **Frankly, we have had quite enough of “contingent, fragile, insecure, and ephemeral lives.” Indeed, this sounds not like the imagination of living beyond Man, but rather like a meticulous description of the lives of the majority of the world under conditions of advanced capitalism right now.** Of course, her point here is that “Man” (and presumably capitalism) is an apotropaic charm that ensures (the fantasy of) survival for certain members of the human species—an immunological protection against the contingency, fragility, insecurity, and ephemerality inherent to our existence as animals in an indifferent universe. For Colebrook, Man has convinced himself through this fantasy that the Earth is his “home.” And it is precisely this fantasy, this protective bubble that Man bought himself at the expense of all his others, that is now being burst by the impending climatological catastrophe. Despite her astute critique, however, Colebrook ultimately leaves us in what is perhaps a worse position than the posthumanists: dispossessing ourselves of our arrogant fantasy of survival and giving ourselves back over to the volatility of the universe, since any idea of enduring (and certainly flourishing) involves the reinstatement of an anthropomorphic enframing of the world’s “inhuman” forces.

Meanwhile, back at the ranch…

• Approximately 95% of the world population (6.7 billion) lives on less than $10 a day and 3.14 billion live on less than $2.50 a day (Ravallion, Chen & Sangraula 2008).

• The richest eighty-five individuals (0.000001%) possess as much wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population (i.e. 3,500,000,000 people) (Oxfam 2014).

• Anywhere from five to twenty thousand Africans have died in the latest Ebola outbreak (S. Leone Ebola Outbreak 2014) and the average annual mortality rate from malaria is 650,000 (90% of which are from sub-Saharan Africa) (Centers for Disease Control 2014).

• Current animal extinction rates are one-thousand times higher than the Earth’s historical average and one-third of all animal species are now either threatened or endangered as a result of what has been called “Anthropocene defaunation” (Dirzo et al. 2014).

• One in fifteen black men in the U.S. is imprisoned (Pew 2008) and thirty percent of all U.S. black men will be imprisoned at least once in their lifetime (Sentencing Project 2013). Black men in the U.S. are twenty-one times more likely to be killed by a police officer than white men (Gabrielson et al. 2014).

• 780 million people live without access to clean water and 3.4 million die annually due to water and sanitation-related causes. Ninety-nine percent of these deaths occur in the global South. (Prüss-Üstün et al. 2008, WHO/UNICEF 2012)

• Approximately 21 million people are victims of forced labor and 1.2 million children are trafficked annually (International Labour Organization 2012).

It is unclear how, without any ideal of collective survival or flourishing, we might be able to begin to address these (and countless other) crises (see Cornell 2004). For us, it is not (as Colebrook perhaps rightfully characterizes certain Marxist positions) that the ecological disaster cannot be addressed until after we have ended capitalism, but rather, that the relentless pursuit of profit inherent to capitalism will never permit us to address issues of the climate and ecology in any substantive way because all attempts to do so must remain compatible with the dictates of surplus accumulation. The crises of advanced capital and of the climate (as well as the others to which we have referred) are fundamentally linked—a point not lost on billions in the global South. Furthermore, we refuse the “forced choice” (to borrow a phrase from Jacques Lacan) offered by Colebrook and other posthumanist theorists. For Lacan, a “forced choice” is a result of the “alienating or” that makes us see a choice when there really is not one. His example, quite pertinent here, is a thief’s threat: “Your money or your life!” Either way, the victim loses the money (Lacan 1981: 212). By implying that we must choose either to save life (our lives, endangered species’ lives or “life itself”) or to struggle against capitalism, these theorists have accepted the “alienating or” of advanced capitalism. We insist on both life (human and non) and an end to capitalism. And indeed this is precisely the position being taken by climate scientists and activists around the world who are explicitly linking climate politics to counter-capitalist movements (see Klein 2013, 2014). As geophysicist Brad Werner has suggested (in a lecture at the American Geophysical Union entitled “Is Earth Fucked? Dynamical Futility of Global Environmental Management and Possibilities for Sustainability via Direct Action Activism,”) the only “dynamic” in his statistical modeling that is cause for “hope” is “resistance [or, movements of] people or groups of people [who] adopt a certain set of dynamics that does not fit within the capitalist culture…[including] environmental direct action, resistance taken from outside the dominant culture, as in protests, blockades and sabotage by indigenous peoples, workers, anarchists and other activist groups” (quoted in Klein 2013). In on-the-ground movements against and serious scientific research into climatological catastrophe, in other words, there is neither a call to renounce old “Humanist” fantasies of agency or survival nor any pretense that capitalism must not be ended in order to “save” life and the planet. What there is, however, is the idea that collective human action can transform the situation. “Bad” redemptive vision? Of course it’s possible. But perhaps we ought to try it first before being so sure that embracing ephemerality and fragility is the best left for us. Surely we owe it to those who were forcibly made to subsidize (often with their lives) Man’s fantasy of survival over the last five centuries—those who do not need academics to help them divest themselves of their arrogant survival fantasies because they never had them in the first place, and those who bear the least responsibility for the destruction that they now face most imminently (while Man plans his next colonial vacation in the deep sea or in “outer” space). To us, all of this renunciation of survival and transformative possibility by Euro-American academics sounds a little too much like the older sibling who refuses to share his toy and then purposefully destroys it before being forced to hand it down: “Oh you want this? I never liked it anyway.” To be clear, we are not suggesting that either the posthumanist theorists or Colebrook do not know or care about the “obvious disparity between those who benefit economically from the processes leading to climate change and those who will have to pay for most of the environmental and social costs” (Mora et al. 2013). Nor are we engaged in a simple exercise in demystification in which we purport to reveal the workings of capital behind all of today’s contemporary problems to those who did not previously see it. We do wonder why, however, for many posthumanist thinkers the claim that the destructivity of Man has reached its pinnacle seems to necessarily involve a simultaneous refutation of revolutionary desires and possibilities rather than a more urgent call for collective action. It should, perhaps, at least give us pause when scientists are more forcefully expressing the political implications of their research and calling for collective responses than feminists and other political theorists (see Mora et al 2013; Klein 2013, 2014). And on that note, neither is our point here a doomsday jeremiad lamenting the lack of global political response at such a crucial moment; indeed, there is no dearth of collective struggles against neo-colonialism, advanced capitalism, and ecological destruction around the world today. In light of this, academics in the Euro-American humanities risk being more out of touch than ever.