## 1

### 1NC – OFF

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – anything else moots 7 minutes of the nc and exacerbates the fact that they get infinite pre-round prep since I should be able to compensate by choosing – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

#### They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Most educational since otherwise we wouldn’t use math or logic to approach topics. Scalar methods like comparison increases intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – T/F binary is descriptive and technical.

#### a priori’s 1st – even worlds framing requires ethics that begin from a priori principles like reason or pleasure so we control the internal link to functional debates.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional. I denied the truth of the resolution by disagreeing with the aff which means I’ve met my burden.

#### Answering TT proves it true – a) You attempt to prove it false which concedes into evaluating the truth or falsity of arguments b) everything collapses to TT since all ROBs assume the statements that provide them truth

#### Permissibility and presumption negate

#### 1] Obligations- the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation

#### 2] Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 3] Negating is harder – A] Aff gets first and last speech which control the direction of the debate B] Affirmatives can strategically uplayer in the 1ar giving them a 7-6 time skew advantage, splitting the 2nr C] They get infinite prep time

#### 4] Affirmation theory- Affirming requires unconditionally maintaining an obligation

Affirm: maintain as true.

That’s Dictionary.com- “affirm” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm

#### Now negate –

#### 1] The[[3]](#footnote-3) “(with a unit of time) the present; the current.” but appropriation has no specified time frame

#### 2] appropriation[[4]](#footnote-4) is a sum of money or total of assets devoted to a special purpose.” but outer space cannot own a sum of money

#### 3] of[[5]](#footnote-5) “expressing an age” but the rez is atemporal

#### 4] outer[[6]](#footnote-6) is “further from the center or inside..” but the resolution is aspacial and doesn’t specify distance

#### 5] space[[7]](#footnote-7) is to “the dimensions of height, depth, and width within which all things exist and move” but the rez doesn’t volume

#### 6] by[[8]](#footnote-8) is “indicating the amount or size of a margin.” but the resolution and entities doesn’t specify

#### 7] private[[9]](#footnote-9) is “(of a person) having no official or public role or position.” so entities have no authority over appropriation

#### 8] entity[[10]](#footnote-10) is “the existence of a thing as contrasted with its attributes” but the rez doesn’t spec

## 2

### 1NC – OFF

#### Every moral theory begins with modus ponens – when we make claims about the natural world and how we ought to exist within it, it is necessary to be correct about assumptions. If we made the claim that the Bald King of France ought to bake a cake, that statement is a contingent truth predicated on if the King is bald and is actually a King. That means it is necessary to justify outside assumptions on logic because we can’t universally apply an illogical belief.

#### Here’s the problem - External world skep is true.

**Neta**, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, **2014**, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, if you do have hands, then you are not merely a brain floating in a vat of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. But how could you know that you are not such a brain? If you were such a brain, everything would seem exactly as it does now; you would (by hypothesis) have all the same sensory experiences that you’re having right now. Since your empirical knowledge of the world around you must somehow be based upon your sensory experiences, how could these experiences—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.

## 3

### 1NC – OFF

#### Moral skep – justice requires us to act immediately since waiting in the face of injustice is itself an injustice. However, we need to be fully informed to avoid formulating a rule incorrecrly and unjustly, so obligations are internally contradictory.

**Derrida et al 02** Jacques Derrida was an French philosopher best known for developing a form of semiotic analysis known as deconstruction, which he discussed in numerous texts, and developed in the context of phenomenology. He is one of the major figures associated with post-structuralism and postmodern philosophy [“Acts of Religion” https://books.google.com/books?id=c\_kgAmFbvP0C&pg=PA255&lpg=PA255&dq=%22Even+if+time+and+prudence,+the+patience+of+knowledge+and+the+mastery+of+conditions+were+hypothetically+unlimited%22&source=bl&ots=PorjbB\_lFL&sig=ACfU3U2cEUeelL1I8dtLAuHyWNDFo7n5Tw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjir4SE5czoAhUvg3IEHaV5CGMQ6AEwAHoECAsQJw#v=onepage&q=%22Even%20if%20time%20and%20prudence%2C%20the%20patience%20of%20knowledge%20and%20the%20mastery%20of%20conditions%20were%20hypothetically%20unlimited%22&f=false]//Mberhe

But justice**,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It is that which must not wait.To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a just decision is always required immediately**, "right away**." It cannot furnish itself withinfinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions,rules or hypothetical imperativesthat could justify it. And even if it didhave all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, the moment of decision, as such, always remains a finite moment of urgencyand precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, **s**ince it always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it**,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. Even if time and prudence, the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions were

## 4

### 1NC – OFF

#### The aff recreates violence in an endless cycle through deliberation that makes solvency impossible.

**Mcnamara 06** McNamara Paul, 2-7-2006, "Deontic Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/index.html#4.3> //Massa recut Mberhe

The Good Samaritan Paradox (Prior 1958):[40] Consider: (1) It ought to be the case that Jones helps Smith who has been robbed. (2) It ought to be the case that Smith has been robbed. Now it seems that the following must be true: Jones helps Smith who has been robbed if and only if Jones helps Smith and Smith has been robbed. But then it would appear that a correct way to symbolize (1) and (2) in SDLs is: (1) OB(h & r) (2) OBr But it is a thesis of PC that (h & r) → r, so by RM, it follows that OB(h & r) → OBr, and then we can derive 2′) from 1′) by MP. But it hardly seems that if helping the robbed man is obligatory it follows that his being robbed is likewise obligatory.[41]

#### Thus, Premise 1—If the aff is true, it ought to be the case that the USfg enacts substantial criminal justice reform.

#### Premise 2—It ought to be the case that the USfg enacts substantial CJR if and only if there exists problems in the legal system. This is because standard logic would necessitate transferring the obligation predicate onto its necessary condition.

#### Thus, premise 3—if the aff is true, it ought to be the case that the legal system posses problems. This logically follows from “if P is Q and P is Q only if N, then N.”

## 5

### 1NC – OFF

#### 1] Overthinking paradox- the 1AR is a form of unnecessary overthinking that prevents decisions to be made so don’t evaluate it

**Wikipedia** [Brackets Original. “Analysis Paralysis”. Wikipedia. No Date. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonini%27s_paradox>]

Analysis paralysis (or paralysis by analysis) describes an individual or group process when overanalyzing or overthinking a situation can cause forward motion or decision-making to become [frozen] "paralyzed", meaning that no solution or course of action is decided upon. A situation may be deemed too complicated and a decision is never made, due to the fear that a potentially larger problem may arise. A person may desire a perfect solution, but may fear making a decision that could result in error, while on the way to a better solution. Equally, a person may hold that a superior solution is a short step away, and stall in its endless pursuit, with no concept of diminishing returns. On the opposite end of the time spectrum is the phrase extinct by instinct, which is making a fatal decision based on hasty judgment or a gut reaction.

#### 2] Vote neg because it’s simple – evaluating responses to this is complicated so don’t

Baker 04’ [Baker, Alan, 10-29-2004, "Simplicity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/>]

With respect to question (ii), there is an important distinction to be made between two sorts of simplicity principle. Occam's Razor may be formulated as an epistemic principle: if theory T is simpler than theory T\*, then it is rational (other things being equal) to believe T rather than T\*. Or it may be formulated as a methodological principle: if T is simpler than T\* then it is rational to adopt T as one's working theory for scientific purposes. These two conceptions of Occam's Razor require different sorts of justification in answer to question (iii). In analyzing simplicity, it can be difficult to keep its two facets—elegance and parsimony—apart. Principles such as Occam's Razor are frequently stated in a way which is ambiguous between the two notions, for example, “Don't multiply postulations beyond necessity.” Here it is unclear whether ‘postulation’ refers to the entities being postulated, or the hypotheses which are doing the postulating, or both. The first reading corresponds to parsimony, the second to elegance. Examples of both sorts of simplicity principle can be found in the quotations given earlier in this section.

#### 3] The holographic principle is the most reasonable conclusion

Stromberg 15[Joseph Stromberg- “Some physicists believe we're living in a giant hologram — and it's not that far-fetched” <https://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8847863/holographic-principle-universe-theory-physics> Vox. June 29th 2015] War Room Debate AI

Some physicists actually believe that the universe we live in might be a hologram. The idea isn't that the universe is some sort of fake simulation out of The Matrix, but rather that even though we appear to live in a three-dimensional universe, it might only have two dimensions. It's called the holographic principle. The thinking goes like this: Some distant two-dimensional surface contains all the data needed to fully describe our world — and much like in a hologram, this data is projected to appear in three dimensions. Like the characters on a TV screen, we live on a flat surface that happens to look like it has depth. It might sound absurd. But when physicists assume it's true in their calculations, all sorts of big physics problems — such as the nature of black holes and the reconciling of gravity and quantum mechanics — become much simpler to solve. In short, the laws of physics seem to make more sense when written in two dimensions than in three. "It's not considered some wild speculation among most theoretical physicists," says Leonard Susskind, the Stanford physicist who first formally defined the idea decades ago. "It's become a working, everyday tool to solve problems in physics." But there's an important distinction to be made here. There's no direct evidence that our universe actually is a two-dimensional hologram. These calculations aren't the same as a mathematical proof. Rather, they're intriguing suggestions that our universe could be a hologram. And as of yet, not all physicists believe we have a good way of testing the idea experimentally.

#### 4] Paradox of tolerance- to be completely open to the aff we must exclude perspectives that wouldn’t be open to the aff which means it’s impossible to have complete tolerance for an idea since that tolerance relies on excluding a perspective.

#### 5] Decision Making Paradox- in order to decide to do the affirmative we need a decision-making procedure to enact it, vote for it, and to determine it is a good decision. But to chose a decision-making procedure requires another meta level decision making procedure leading to infinite regress since every decision requires another decision to chose how to make a decision.

#### 6] The Place Paradox- if everything exists in a place in space time, that place must also have a place that it exists and that larger place needs a larger location to infinity. Therefore, identifying ought statements is impossible since those statements assume acting on objects in the space-time continuum.

#### 7] Grain Paradox- A single grain of millet makes no sound upon falling, but a thousand grains make a sound. But a thousand nothings cannot make something which means the physical world is paradoxical.

#### 8] Arrows Paradox- If we divide time into discrete 0-duration slices, no motion is happening in each of them, so taking them all as a whole, motion is impossible.

#### 9] Bonini’s Paradox- As a model of a complex system becomes more complete, it becomes less understandable; for it to be more understandable it must be less complete and therefore less accurate. Therefore no philosophical or political model can be useful.

#### 10] All analysis fails- substitution logic proves

Wikipedia Summarizes[Wikipedia - “Paradox of analysis” <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_analysis>] War Room Debate AI

A [conceptual analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceptual_analysis) is something like the definition of a word. However, unlike a standard dictionary definition (which may list examples or talk about related terms as well), a completely correct analysis of a concept in terms of others seems like it should have exactly the same meaning as the original concept. Thus, in order to be correct, the analysis should be able to be used in any context where the original concept is used, without changing the meaning of the discussion in context. Conceptual analyses of this sort are a major goal of [analytic philosophy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy).

However, if such an analysis is to be useful, it should be informative. That is, it should tell us something we don't already know (or at least, something one can imagine someone might not already know). But it seems that no conceptual analysis can both meet the requirement of correctness and of informativeness, on these understandings of the requirements.

To see why, consider a potential simple analysis:

(1) For all x (any given member of a class or set), x is a brother if and only if x is a male sibling One can say that (1) is correct because the expression "brother" represents the same concept as the expression "male sibling," and (1) seems to be informative because the two expressions are not identical. And if (1) is truly correct, then "brother" and "male sibling" must be interchangeable: (2) For all x, x is a brother if and only if x is a brother Yet (2) is not informative, so either (1) is not informative, or the two expressions used in (1) are not interchangeable (because they change an informative analysis into an uninformative one) so (1) is not actually correct. In other words, if the analysis is correct and informative, then (1) and (2) must be essentially equal, but this is not true because (2) is not informative. Therefore, it seems an analysis cannot be both correct and informative at the same time.

#### 11] Aff has an absolute burden of proof – any doubt means you negate since a claim not that claim can’t be true so any risk of falsity is entirely false.

## Case

#### Death is not terminal OR a side constraint to value – quantum physics verifies both life after death AND infinite universes that simulate ALL possible realities, regardless of any EVENT – means moral concerns distanced from well being outweigh. Don’t evaluate 1AR ev it won’t assume addition of micro-tubles to study.

**Daily Galaxy 20** The Daily Galaxy is citing Max Goldberg, via Nautil.us, Robert Lanza and Sunday Guardian Live are all cited at the bottom of the article Robert Lanza is an American medical doctor, scientist and philosopher. He is currently Head of Astellas Global Regenerative Medicine, and is Chief Scientific Officer of the Astellas Institute for Regenerative Medicine and Adjunct Professor at Wake Forest University School of Medicine. [“Quantum Death –“Human Cells Carry Quantum Information That Exists as a Soul” <https://dailygalaxy.com/2020/03/quantum-death-human-cells-carry-quantum-information-that-exists-as-a-soul-weekend-feature/> March 14 2020]//Mberhe

The physical universe that we live in is only our perception and once our physical bodies die, there is an infinite beyond. Some believe that consciousness travels to parallel universes after death. “The beyond is an infinite reality that is much bigger… which this world is rooted in. In this way, our lives in this plane of existence are encompassed, surrounded, by the afterworld already… The body dies but the spiritual quantum field continues. In this way, I am immortal,” suggest researchers from the Max Planck Institute for Physics in Munich The Max Planck physicists are in agreement with British Physicist Sir Roger Penrose who argues that if a person temporarily dies, this quantum information is released from the microtubules and into the universe. However, if they are resuscitated the quantum information is channeled back into the microtubules and that is what sparks a near death experience. “If they’re not revived, and the patient dies, it’s possible that this quantum information can exist outside the body, perhaps indefinitely, as a soul.” Steve Paulson writing for Nautil.us describes the 88-year-old Penrose’s theory as an “audacious—and quite possibly crackpot—theory about the quantum origins of consciousness. He believes we must go beyond neuroscience and into the mysterious world of quantum mechanics to explain our rich mental life. No one quite knows what to make of this theory, developed with the American anesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff, but conventional wisdom goes something like this: Their theory is almost certainly wrong, but since Penrose is so brilliant (‘One of the very few people I’ve met in my life who, without reservation, I call a genius,’ physicist Lee Smolin has said), we’d be foolish to dismiss their theory out of hand.” While scientists are still in heated debates about what exactly consciousness is, the University of Arizona’s Hameroff and Penrose conclude that it is information stored at a quantum level. Penrose agrees –he and his team have found evidence that “protein-based microtubules—a structural component of human cells—carry quantum information— information stored at a sub-atomic level.” It was Hameroff’s idea, writes Paulson, “that quantum coherence happens in microtubules, protein structures inside the brain’s neurons. And what are microtubules, you ask? They are tubular structures inside eukaryotic cells (part of the cytoskeleton) that play a role in determining the cell’s shape, as well as its movements, which includes cell division—separation of chromosomes during mitosis. Hameroff suggests that microtubules are the quantum device that Penrose had been looking for in his theory. In neurons, microtubules help control the strength of synaptic connections, and their tube-like shape might protect them from the surrounding noise of the larger neuron. The microtubules’ symmetry and lattice structure are of particular interest to Penrose. He believes “this reeks of something quantum mechanical.” “Somehow, our consciousness is the reason the universe is here,” Penrose told Paulson during an interview. There’s intelligent life—or consciousness—somewhere else in the cosmos, Penrose added. “But it may be extremely rare.” But if consciousness is the point of this whole shebang, wouldn’t you expect to find some evidence of it beyond Earth Paulson asked? “Well, I’m not so sure our own universe is that favorably disposed toward consciousness,” Penrose replied. In “Beyond Biocentrism: Rethinking Time, Space, Consciousness, and the Illusion of Death,” Robert Lanza asks does the soul exist? The new scientific theory he propounds says we’re immortal and exist outside of time. Biocentrism postulates that space and time are not the hard objects we think. Death does not exist in a timeless, spaceless world. His new scientific theory suggests that death is not the terminal event we think. “There are an infinite number of universes, and everything that could possibly happen occurs in some universe. Death does not exist in any real sense in these scenarios. All possible universes exist simultaneously, regardless of what happens in any of them. Although individual bodies are destined to self-destruct, the alive feeling—the ‘Who am I?’- is just a 20-watt fountain of energy operating in the brain. But this energy doesn’t go away at death. One of the surest axioms of science is that energy never dies; it can neither be created nor destroyed. But does this energy transcend from one world to the other?”

#### 1AC NASA proves there’s NO extinction BUT only transformation – their theory assumes disappearing energy, which is faulty.

**Kettley 20** Sebastian is a science reporter at express written at a variety of newspapers and cites NASA rocket pioneer Wernher von Braun [“Life after death: NASA's chief rocket scientist believed science proves afterlife is REAL” <https://www.express.co.uk/news/science/1240806/Life-after-death-NASA-scientist-proof-of-afterlife-Wernher-von-Braun-life-after-death-real> LIFE after death and the prospect of a heavenly afterlife is guaranteed by science, at least according to NASA rocket pioneer Wernher von Braun. Nov 26 2020]//Mberhe

NASA's controversial rocket engineer Wernher von Braun, who helped the US beat Russia in the space race, believed in life after death. In the book The Third Book of Words to Live By, the rocket engineer claimed the fundamental laws of the Universe support the existence of God and the afterlife. Von Braun argued nothing truly disappears from the universe and the human soul is equally immortal. The engineer even claimed belief in an afterlife gives people the moral strength to better and more ethical people. He said: “In our modern world many people seem to feel that science has somehow made such ‘religious ideas’ untimely or old-fashioned. “But I think science has a real surprise for the sceptics. Science, for instance, tells us that nothing in nature, not even the tiniest particle, can disappear without a trace. “Think about that for a moment. Once you do, your thoughts about life will never be the same. “Science has found that nothing can disappear without a trace. Nature does not know extinction. All it knows is transformation. “Now, if God applies this fundamental principle to the most minute and insignificant parts of His universe, doesn't it make sense to assume that He applies it also to the masterpiece of His creation – the human soul? “I think it does. And everything science has taught me – and continues to teach me – strengthens my belief in the continuity of our spiritual existence after death. Nothing disappears without a trace. In the same passage, the rocket scientist quoted US President Benjamin Franklin, who said: “I believe that the soul of man is immortal and will be treated with justice in another life respecting its conduct in this.”

#### BUT don’t use util:

#### Universes are infinite, so aggregative consequentialism is incoherent since impact to human extinction or anything imaginable is finite and can’t alter the infinite sum.

Bostrom 2008 Nick is a Professor at University of Oxford, PhD from London School of Economics. [“The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics”. <http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf> 2008]//Mberhe

ABSTRACT Aggregative consequentialism and several other popular moral theories are threatened with paralysis: when coupled with some plausible assumptions, they seem to imply that it is always ethically indifferent what you do. Modern cosmology teaches that the world might well contain an infinite number of happy and sad people and other candidate value-bearing locations. Aggregative ethics implies that such a world contains an infinite amount of positive value and an infinite amount of negative value. You can affect only a finite amount of good or bad. In standard cardinal arithmetic, an infinite quantity is unchanged by the addition or subtraction of any finite quantity. So it appears you cannot change the value of the world. Modifications of aggregationism aimed at resolving the paralysis are only partially effective and cause severe side effects, including problems of “fanaticism”, “distortion”, and erosion of the intuitions that originally motivated the theory. Is the infinitarian challenge fatal? 1. The challenge 1.1. The threat of infinitarian paralysis When we gaze at the starry sky at night and try to think of humanity from a “cosmic point of view”, we feel small. Human history, with all its earnest strivings, triumphs, and tragedies can remind us of a colony of ants, laboring frantically to rearrange the needles of their little ephemeral stack. We brush such late-night rumination aside in our daily life and analytic 2 philosophy. But, might such seemingly idle reflections hint at something of philosophical significance? In particular, might they contain an important implication for our moral theorizing? If the cosmos is finite, then our own comparative smallness does not necessarily undermine the idea that our conduct matters even from an impersonal perspective. We might constitute a minute portion of the whole, but that does not detract from our absolute importance. Suppose there are a hundred thousand other planets with civilizations that had their own holocausts. This does not alter the fact that the holocaust that humans caused contributed an enormous quantity of suffering to the world, a quantity measured in millions of destroyed lives. Maybe this is a tiny fraction of the total suffering in the world, but in absolute terms it is unfathomably large. Aggregative ethics can thus be reconciled with the finite case if we note that, when sizing up the moral significance of our acts, the relevant consideration is not how big a part they constitute of the whole of the doings and goings-on in the universe, but rather what difference they make in absolute terms. The infinite case is fundamentally different. Suppose the world contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically infinite world contains an infinite quantity of positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: none whatsoever. Aggregative consequentialist theories are threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that if the world is canonically infinite then it is always ethically indifferent what we do. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause another holocaust or prevent one from occurring. If any non-contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is. Is the world canonically infinite or not? Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite.1 Moreover, if the totality of physical existence is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite 3 number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets then there is, with probability one, an infinite number of people.2 Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person-states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations—there are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc. It therefore appears likely that the actual world is canonically infinite. We do not know for sure that we live in a canonically infinite world. Contemporary cosmology is in considerable flux, so its conclusions should be regarded as tentative. But it is definitely not reasonable, in light of the evidence we currently possess, to assume that we do not live in a canonically infinite world. And that is sufficient for the predicament to arise. Any ethical theory that fails to cope with this likely empirical contingency must be rejected. We should not accept an ethical theory which, conditional on our current best scientific guesses about the size and nature of the cosmos, implies that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause or prevent another holocaust.3 1.2. Which theories are threatened? Infinitarian paralysis threatens a wide range of popular ethical theories. Consider, to begin with, hedonistic utilitarianism, which in its classical formulation states that you ought to do that which maximizes the total amount of pleasure and minimizes the total amount of pain in the world. If pleasure and pain are already infinite, then all possible actions you could take would be morally on a par according to this criterion, for none of them would make any difference to the total amount of pleasure or pain. Endorsing this form of utilitarianism commits one to the view that, conditional on the world being canonically infinite, ending world hunger and causing a famine are ethically equivalent options. It is not the case that you ought to do one rather than the other. The threat is not limited to hedonistic utilitarianism. Utilitarian theories that have a broader conception of the good—happiness, preference-satisfaction, virtue, beautyappreciation, or some objective list of ingredients that make for a good life—face the same problem. So, too, does average utilitarianism, mixed total/average utilitarianism, and prioritarian views that place a premium on the well-being of the worst off. In a canonically infinite world, average utility and most weighted utility measures are just as imperturbable by human agency as is the simple sum of utility. Many non-utilitarian ethical theories are also imperiled. One common view is that in determining what we ought to do we should take into account the difference our acts would make to the total amount of well-being experienced by sentient persons even though we 4 must also factor in the special obligations that we have to particular individuals (and perhaps various deontological side-constraints). If our actions never make any difference to the amount of well-being in the world, the maximizing component of such hybrid theories becomes defunct. Depending on the structure of the theory, the components that remain in operation may—or may not—continue to generate sensible moral guidance. Moorean views, which claim that value resides in “organic unities”, are also vulnerable. If the relevant unities supervene on some medium-sized spacetime regions, such as societies or planets, then there might well be infinitely many such unities. If, instead, the relevant unity is the universe itself, then it is unclear that we could change its total value by modifying the infinitesimal part of it that is within our reach.4 For simplicity, we will focus most of the discussion on purely consequentialist theories (even though, as we have seen, the problems affect a much larger family of ethical systems). However, not all consequentialist theories are threatened. The vulnerability infinitarian paralysis arises from the combination of two elements: consequentialism and aggregationism. By “aggregationism” we refer to the idea that the value of a world is (something like) the sum or aggregate of the values of its parts, where these parts are some kind of local phenomena such as experiences, lives, or societies. By consequentialism we refer to the idea that the rightness or wrongness of an action is (somehow) determined on the basis of considerations about whether its consequences increase or decrease value. We shall later explore how various more precise explications of “aggregationism” and “consequentialism” fare in relation to the threat of infinitarian paralysis and associated challenges. The challenge addressed in this paper is related to—but also crucially different from—Pascal’s wager, the St. Petersburg paradox, the Pasadena problem, the Heaven and Hell problem, and kindred prudential “infinite” decision problems. 5 Related, because in each case there is, purportedly, the prospect of infinite values to be reckoned with. Different, because one important escape route that is available in the prudential cases is blocked in the ethical case. This is the route of denying that infinite values are really at stake. One way of responding to Pascal’s wager, for instance, is by taking it to show that we do not in fact have an infinitely strong preference for spending an eternity in Heaven. The attractiveness of this response would be enhanced by the finding that the alternative is to accept highly counterintuitive consequences. In a revealed-preference paradigm, this is anyway a perfectly natural view. If we accept a theory of rationality that grounds what we have reason to do in our preferences (whether raw or idealized) then we have a simple and plausible answer to Pascal: Yes, if one had an infinitely strong preference for eternal life in Heaven, then it would be rational to forego any finite pleasure on Earth for any ever-so- 5 slight increase in the odds of salvation (at least if one assumes that there would be no chance of obtaining an infinite good if one did not accept the wager, and no chance that accepting it might backfire and result in an infinite bad). However, if one does not have an infinitely strong preference for Heaven, then Pascal’s argument does not show that one is irrational to decline the wager. The fact that most people would on reflection reject the wager would simply show that most people do not place an infinite value on Heaven. The analogous response is not available to the ethical aggregationist, who is committed to the view that the total value of a world is the aggregate of the value of its parts, for this entails placing an infinite value on certain kinds of world. If a world has an infinite number of locations, and there is some finite value v such that an infinite number of the locations have an ethical value greater than v, then that world has an infinite ethical value. This is a core commitment of aggregationism; giving it up means giving up aggregationism. So the possibility of an infinite world presents a graver problem for aggregative ethics than it does for prudential rationality

#### Util is not morally guiding 1. Naturalistic fallacy – it needs another framework to define “good” – as theirs collapses to pleasure is good because good is pleasure 2. Aggregation is impossible A. Relies on non-falsifiable intuitions B. Assumes pain can be defined univocally, which is circumvented by artificial, sadistic desires and the pleasure machine.

**Grisez 98** Germain Gabriel Grisez was a French-American philosopher. Grisez's development of ideas from Thomas Aquinas has redirected Catholic thought and changed the way it has engaged with secular moral philosophy.[“Against Consequentialism” [https://watermark.silverchair.com/ajj-23-21.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW\_Ercy7Dm3ZL\_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAp0wggKZBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKKMIIChgIBADCCAn8GCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQM31I2JRwpIDRMtBt4AgEQgIICUPGnXFsM-WpZTMmjsvPLgy3q8l5rnkIxDz81T0kEBIIzW5Nl3pF8mNA43HdB9X\_X38CzovhZPn5cahx2BsTf9yMoI3YXXP2w0YAzTL1vLtZ86q-GyT8dkvPxR4jZtfjuqM6z\_DJkDfjWAbcJi1ElcDBv3t\_VUqIXkXL5TLX\_VtR5738SYkQ--sdWQTG2VtWgtGXkHg6lXoxgosAyI\_eoOroAakJcUGfQc-fORn8mmJcLd3pe0MJAtLD9eEZs1-cqSQM8g4LUPB94U2pMM9fB8G6fvVrgJS60x8lF\_tMcdD3CFq\_2A1SKcb68PD8Fdihp9r60W-NBbxOkUw22CTS3BZWyEAt63QxKQTi931W3O4BJ-tLiRwXtohTj-osNXkPSSKFuzMzRxQdcfgeWzLrwOhezKs7j8kPd4JyHdgEwC\_CdZhbK22TKsMAfKBqxCwU2wA\_lbtm7K0g9jCIpV6JZgXL3zNZ0He4elP3cFwj5noKSz6SMlCpOGvwe3UOvT5LXL\_punPbCC-F-66WIZG5qCyjY3kzSLITP9ocRgBYIYKgRmyd5fXO16k1GkvVwFVWf4pehQVUpmi637gCzxtmSdIbSa\_EI3Q1Qnev-tQI7-I4MUpNBUa20umMsNrDOMJsgzWHZXFapm93GHP92FTrs5N-2TCe3h7dszGU\_0DikR1HPKA3jHVbXQgK2wLATRIu0ajpT05qSl57rbOdeC\_bZJ00udDxm35tfPYEb\_5P6VlZVFqnB5cYR60rCIVbHJ2IU1RW17YfF1-cqbac-X-lNYXI](https://watermark.silverchair.com/ajj-23-21.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAp0wggKZBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKKMIIChgIBADCCAn8GCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQM31I2JRwpIDRMtBt4AgEQgIICUPGnXFsM-WpZTMmjsvPLgy3q8l5rnkIxDz81T0kEBIIzW5) 1978]//Mberhe

In an extensive survey of work in utilitarianism from 1961-1971, Dan W. Brock points out that utilitarianism requires that utility be calculable. After suggesting that there are obvious difficulties in making such measurements, Brock adds: More important and perplexing, however, is how the necessary calculations can, even in principle, be made and whether the logical foundations necessary to the intelligibility of these calculations exist. Moral philosophers have paid surprisingly little attention to these two problems. Most discussions of utilitarianism in recent books and journals simply assume that it is possible to determine in any situation what is required by utility-maximization, and then go on to consider whether this always coincides with what is required by morality.7 Brock's remarks might be discounted as the view of an unsympathetic student of utilitarianism. But this would be a mistake. J. J. C. Smart, a leading proponent of unrestricted, direct utilitarianism, admitted in an article published in 1967 that because of obstacles to calculation . . . the utilitarian is reduced to an intuitive weighing of various consequences with their probabilities. It is impossible to justify such intuitions rationally, and we have here a serious weakness in utilitarianism.8 Similarly, A. J. Ayer, who defends a form of consequentialism with respect to the formation of social policies, criticizes Bentham's attempt to apply consequentialism to the moral judgment of individuals. Ayer concludes: In virtue of what standard of measurement can I set about adding the satisfaction of one person to that of another and subtracting the resultant quantity from the dissatisfaction of someone else? Clearly there is no such standard, and Bentham's process of "sober calculation" turns out to be a myth.9 It also is worth noticing that Bentham himself recognized difficulties in an area related to that considered by Ayer, for in an unpublished note Bentham wrote that the . . . addibility of the happiness of different subjects, however when considered rigorously it may appear fictitious, is a postulation without the allowance of which all political reasonings are at a stand: nor is it more fictitious than that of the equality of chances to reality on which the whole branch of the Mathematics which is called the doctrine of chance is established.10 In other words, Bentham regards the postulation of commensurability as one necessary for practical purposes. He justifies the interpersonal comparisons challenged by the objection he is considering by saying that when there is no reason to consider incommensurable goods more or less than one another, it is quite rational to consider them equal. Bentham's position is unassailable, provided that "equal" can be used meaningfully in this context. This I deny. If "greater good" is to be meaningful in the formulation of a criterion of morality, three conditions must be fulfilled: 1) "good" must have a single meaning; 2) what is good in this unique sense must be measurable; and 3) the result of measurement must settle moral issues either directly or indirectly. Clearly, the necessary meaning of "good" cannot be specified in moral terms. What Rawls says of utilitarianism is true of all consequentialism: Its point is to define "good" independently of "right" and to define "right" in terms of "good." And, in general, consequentialists see this requirement and try to meet it.11 If consequentialists said that ethical considerations determine what a good consequence is, they would either be going in a circle or setting off on an infinite regress. If the single meaning of "good" which consequentialism needs cannot be specified by moral principles, how can it be specified? If human persons have a single, well-defined goal or function, set for them by nature or by God, then "good" has the necessary, univocal meaning. Acts are right or wrong insofar as they do or do not bring one to this goal or fulfill this function. On one interpretation, Aristotle's ethics are of this sort. But Aristotle's ethics, understood thus, have been challenged. Most modern philosophers deny that humankind has a definite goal or function. In this dispute, the moderns seem to be in the right. If persons are ends in themselves, they cannot be ordered to a good as any part to a whole or any means to an end. Aristotle either subordinates the lives of the many to the actualization of a few, or he admits the intrinsic value of lives other than the contemplative. If the latter, "good" lacks the univocal meaning consequentialism needs.12 Many Christians have thought of personal salvation as a single, well-defined goal. Consequentialist thinking based on this conception of the good led to the abuses for which modern humanists condemn Christianity: excessive otherworldliness, religious fanaticism, inhuman asceticism, and so on. Of course, these abuses are not entailed by the view that personal salvation is a single, well-defined goal. But this view does entail that the goodness of a Christian's acts is specified by their efficiency as means of getting to heaven. Those who accept this moral theory face a dilemma. If they consider human acts in and of themselves to be effective means of salvation, they are pelagians. If they consider human acts to be effective means of salvation by divine fiat, they are voluntarists. The latter position implies that this life is inherently meaningless, but is meaningful as a time of temptation. This concept respects divine power, but ignores divine wisdom.13 Anyone who holds that all human persons have a single goal which defines "good" univocally also confronts facts one cannot easily explain. People who seem equally able, intelligent, and healthy have different goals in life. If one says that all humans have the same goal, one will find almost everyone else disagreeing as soon as the goal is specified. Even those Christians, who in theory take an otherworldly and voluntaristic position, in practice treat an incommensurable variety of goods as determinative of the moral goodness of human acts, for they admit the legitimacy of a variety of Christian life styles and they try to show the immorality of various kinds of acts, not only by their incongruity with holiness and grace, but also by their incompatibility with goods immanent in human persons — goods such as life, truth, justice, love, and peace. Shortly after World War II, a British economist, Lionel Robbins, reflected upon the simplifications introduced into the making of socioeconomic policy during wartime. A single objective counts; all else is instrumental. If there is no victory, there is no future. All decisions are technical. Unity of purpose "gives a certain unity to the framework of planning which at least makes possible some sort of direct decision which is not wholly arbitrary. "1A Robbins is correct about the wartime psychology of Britain and the United States. The unconditional surrender of the enemy became a fixation with the leaders and people of both nations. This fixation partly explains the adoption of ethically questionable tactics, such as obliteration bombing. It also helps to explain why Soviet leaders, who took a longer view, were more prudent than Anglo-American leaders in gaining post-war advantages before the war ended. Most philosophical consequentialists have been liberals. Instead of saying that all humans have the same goal, they have tried to define "good" univocally, to leave room for differing concrete goals, but to make them commensurable with one another. Many utilitarians, following Bentham, define "good" in terms of happiness. Others define "good" in terms of the maximum satisfaction of desires, less the minimum of unavoidable frustration. Since different people have different enjoyments and desires, either approach allows for differing goals. To ensure commensurability, those who take either approach must deny that any sort of pleasure or desire differs from any other sort in a way which would make their inherent goodness differ. Desire theorists, for example, often say that all human desires have the same initial claim to satisfaction. If happiness is used to define "good" univocally, "happiness" itself must be used univocally. If it is, the theory becomes implausible.15 For example, if happiness is taken to be a certain quality of consciousness, how can one explain certain people's dedication to causes which are irreducible to states of consciousness. For them, happiness is participation in something bigger than themselves. A consequentialist can use "happiness" in a very wide sense to allow for the diverse life styles people regard as intrinsically good. But if this maneuver makes it plausible to say that everyone desires happiness, "happiness" ceases to be univocal and thus becomes useless for the consequentialist. People not only get happiness by different means, but "happiness" as an end is different things to different people. Attempts to define "good" univocally in terms of satisfaction of desire also fail. Do all human desires really have the same initial claim to satisfaction? Some people desire sadistic pleasure. Many people desire death for criminals. Pornography sells better than the best literature; more people desire the former than the latter. Some people desire feminine deodorant spray. It sells. Most people have what some economists call "artificial desires." Keynes, for instance, distinguishes the needs people have of themselves from the needs they have in ofar as they wish to get ahead of others. Galbraith talks of wants created by production and advertising. He points out that the desire for increased expenditure may be stronger than any need which can be satisfied by it.16 Are all these desires to be counted uncritically in calculating moral right and wrong? A desire theorist can answer that desires must be criticized. If someone desires what is logically impossible, his desire should be ignored. If someone has a desire which would go away if her false belief about matters of fact were corrected, the error ought to be corrected. But these criteria do not dispose of all the examples mentioned in the previous paragraph. The desires of sadists, of proponents of capital punishment, of dirty old men, and of status seekers are not for anything logically impossible. Nor is it always the case that such desires arise from errors about matters of fact. The desire theorist must find additional principles of criticism. Since moral criteria cannot be invoked without circularity or infinite regress, the desire theorist might seek a scientific criterion from psychology. Clearly, the desires of the ~~insane~~ do not have the same initial claim to satisfaction as do the desires of the mentally healthy. Sadists, proponents of capital punishment, dirty old men, and status seekers need not be insane, but perhaps they are not mentally healthy. Therefore, let mental healthfulness of desires be the criterion. But there are just as many schools of psychology as there are philosophical and religious conceptions of the good life. Psychologists are not proceeding as scientists when they go beyond the consensus about insanity to give a full account of "mental health." Opinions about the good life do not become science simply because they happen to be the opinions of Freud, Jung, Adler, Allers, Horney, Maslow, Allport, Erikson, Fromm, Menninger, or some other person of scientific competence. If the opinions of such persons about the good life were science, they would offer a common, detailed account of "mental health." They do not. Attempts to define "good" either in terms of happiness or desire also must fit in pain and frustration. If the disvalues are the same in kind as the values, merely negative in degree, the value and its opposite can be measured on a single scale as one measures heat and cold with the same thermometer. But this assumption has been questioned.17 It is not at all obvious that a disvalue is simply a low level of a value, as cold is lack of heat. Disvalues such as pain and frustration are not mere privations; they have a positive character of their own. Thus, "good" is not univocal if it is defined either in terms of happiness and avoidance of pain, or in terms of satisfaction and frustration of desire. The calculation of the "greater good" is blocked by the incommensurability of the opposites in either pair. Another difficulty with these theories of value is that enjoyments and desires differ in kind, not only in degree. As I said above, "happiness" means different things to different people. One can compare the enjoyment of drinking a Coke with that of eating a candy bar or the desire for the one with that for the other.18 But how many appetizing meals in a French restaurant give enjoyment comparable to that of a happy marriage? How many satisfactions of desires for particular objectives are comparable to the satisfaction of one's desire to be a good father, an excellent philosopher, or a faithful follower of Jesus? Jeremy Bentham, who took calculation seriously, dealt with the problem of commensurability in a characteristically straightforward way: Money is the instrument for measuring the quantity of pain or pleasure. Those who are not satisfied with the accuracy of this instrument must find out some other that shall be more accurate, or bid adieu to Politics and Morals. Let no man therefore be either surprised or scandalized if he find me in the course of this work valuing every thing in money. Tis in this way only we can get aliquot parts to measure by. If we must not say of a pain or a pleasure that it is worth so much money, it is in vain, in point of quantity, to say anything at all about it, there is neither proportion nor disproportion between Punishments and Crimes.19 Since one must calculate, one can. So "good" is reduced to pleasure and avoidance of pain, and these are reduced to money. Bentham's leap-of-faith is breathtaking.20 He is no cynic saying that every person has his or her price. He is a moralist saying that the best things in life simply cost more than a Coke or a candy bar. The definition of "good" in terms of enjoyment faces another objection. Enjoyment is a conscious experience which normally arises but is distinct from some activity which extends beyond consciousness. Let us imagine a device which could record total experiences as they were being lived and then play them back in the brains of other persons. One might enjoy receiving such a recorded experience—for example, of one's favorite athlete winning one's favorite game. But would one wish to spend the rest of one's life receiving such recorded experiences, however enjoyable they might be? This thought-experiment isolates enjoyment as a conscious experience from the whole of real life which one enjoys. If one agrees that one would not wish to spend the rest of one's life receiving recorded enjoyable experiences, one can still value enjoyment, but only insofar as it is part of a real life in which goods transcending consciousness also are participated.21 Those who define "good" in terms of desire can point out that the preceding argument does not touch them. "Satisfaction" is said of whole persons interacting with their total environment. Moreover, while "desire" often is used in a wider sense than "enjoyment," it also is used in a more precise sense than "happiness." . But even if desire theorists can solve other difficulties, they still must admit incommensurable kinds of desires if they are to avoid something like Bentham's postulate that the best things in life merely cost more. If desire theorists admit incommensurable kinds of desires, then in the present matter I have no quarrel with them. The goods remain incommensurable, and consequentialist calculation is blocked.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.google.com/search?q=the+definitino&oq=the+definitino&aqs=chrome..69i57j0i67i433j0i67l2j46i433i512j69i60l3.1308j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> [Definition #3] [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.google.com/search?q=appropriation&sxsrf=AOaemvKQemU4kDt9dtiwQnUVUU7LW9GCoQ%3A1639410269344&ei=XWq3YbTHFI-tqtsPs_eviAo&ved=0ahUKEwj06fqVj-H0AhWPlmoFHbP7C6EQ4dUDCA4&uact=5&oq=appropriation&gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyCQgjECcQRhD5ATIECCMQJzIECCMQJzINCAAQgAQQhwIQsQMQFDIFCAAQkQIyBQgAEJECMgUIABCRAjIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDoHCAAQRxCwAzoRCC4QgAQQsQMQgwEQxwEQ0QM6BQguEIAEOg4ILhCABBCxAxDHARCjAjoLCAAQgAQQsQMQgwE6CAguELEDEIMBOggIABCABBCxAzoICAAQsQMQkQJKBAhBGABKBAhGGABQ3wNY4gxgiQ5oA3ABeACAAbsBiAHTDZIBBDAuMTKYAQCgAQHIAQjAAQE&sclient=gws-wiz> [Definition #2] [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i61l3.1473j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://www.google.com/search?q=outer+definition&sxsrf=AOaemvIhqFMqUlofS44KTL7ifSUoUpqMpg%3A1639410214502&ei=Jmq3YdOBHpeAqtsP386owAY&ved=0ahUKEwjTrOf7juH0AhUXgGoFHV8nCmgQ4dUDCA4&uact=5&oq=outer+definition&gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyCggAEIAEEEYQ-QEyBggAEBYQHjIGCAAQFhAeMgYIABAWEB4yBggAEBYQHjIGCAAQFhAeMgYIABAWEB4yBggAEBYQHjIGCAAQFhAeMgYIABAWEB46BwgjELADECc6BwgAEEcQsAM6BwgAELADEEM6CgguEMgDELADEEM6EAguEMcBENEDEMgDELADEEM6BAgjECc6BAgAEEM6BwguELEDEEM6DQgAEIAEEIcCELEDEBQ6CAgAEIAEELEDOggILhCABBCxAzoPCAAQgAQQhwIQFBBGEPkBOgUIABCABDoFCC4QgAQ6CAgAEBYQChAeSgQIQRgASgQIRhgBUKUEWKULYNYMaAFwAngAgAG7AogB1gySAQc0LjMuMi4xmAEAoAEByAEUwAEB&sclient=gws-wiz> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
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8. https://www.google.com/search?q=bydefinition&sxsrf=AOaemvIC6dSnVeMkZO0wlH47wbNgFcIzjQ%3A1639411091334&ei=k223YeLmE4e4qtsPtbK\_wAw&ved=0ahUKEwii\_PSdkuH0AhUHnGoFHTXZD8gQ4dUDCA4&uact=5&oq=bydefinition&gs\_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyBggAEAcQHjIHCAAQsQMQQzIGCAAQBxAeMgYIABAHEB4yBggAEAcQHjIGCAAQBxAeMgYIABAHEB4yBAgAEAoyBggAEAcQHjIGCAAQBxAeOgcIABBHELADOgcIABCwAxBDSgQIQRgASgQIRhgAUMIDWI0EYNsFaAJwAngAgAFmiAG6AZIBAzEuMZgBAKABAcgBCsABAQ&sclient=gws-wiz [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
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