### 1NC

#### Interpretation: The Member nations of the World Trade Organization refers to all member states acting in accordance with the World Trade Organization, the aff may not defend a subset of “the member nations of the WTO” reducing intellectual property protections for medicines.

#### Violation: They spec Jordan

#### 1] WTO decisions taken by consensus – states don’t act on their own.

WTO [“Understanding the WTO - Whose WTO Is It Anyway?” *WTO*, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/tif\_e/org1\_e.htm]//Lex AKu

The WTO is run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers (who meet at least once every two years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who meet regularly in Geneva). Decisions are normally taken by consensus. In this respect, the WTO is different from some other international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In the WTO, power is not delegated to a board of directors or the organization’s head. When WTO rules impose disciplines on countries’ policies, that is the outcome of negotiations among WTO members. The rules are enforced by the members themselves under agreed procedures that they negotiated, including the possibility of trade sanctions. But those sanctions are imposed by member countries, and authorized by the membership as a whole. This is quite different from other agencies whose bureaucracies can, for example, influence a country’s policy by threatening to withhold credit. Reaching decisions by consensus among some 150 members can be difficult. Its main advantage is that decisions made this way are more acceptable to all members. And despite the difficulty, some remarkable agreements have been reached. Nevertheless, proposals for the creation of a smaller executive body — perhaps like a board of directors each representing different groups of countries — are heard periodically. But for now, the WTO is a member-driven,  consensus-based organization.

This is the most likely interpretation of the topic – why would the topic arbitrarily say WTO member states instead of just “states” if the WTO had nothing to do with it and wasn’t the agent of the aff.

#### AND Interps of the topic that make every word relevant are most correct.

Eig 14 [Larry M. Eig, September 24, 2014, “Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends”, Specialist in American Public Law [https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/97-589.pdf]//Lex](https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/97-589.pdf%5d//Lex) AKu

A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.”84 The modern variant is that statutes should be construed “so as to avoid rendering superfluous” any statutory language: “A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant....”85 A related principle applies to statutory amendments: there is a “general presumption” that, “when Congress alters the words of a statute, it must intend to change the statute’s meaning.”86 Resistance to treating statutory words as mere surplusage “should be heightened when the words describe an element of a criminal offense.”87

#### 2] “The” indicates all member states.

Merriam-Webster [Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the, ]//Lex AKu

used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole

#### Means the noun must be interpreted generically

Webster’s 9 (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, “The”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the)

3 a—used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically <the dog is a domestic animal> b—used as a function word before a singular substantivized adjective to indicate an abstract idea <an essay on the sublime>

#### “Of” means whole

CJS 78 (Corpus Juris Secundum, 67, p. 200)

Of: The word "of" is a preposition. It is a word of different meanings, and susceptible of numerous different connotations. It may be used in its possessive sense to denote possession or ownership. It may also be used as a word of identification and relation, rather than as a word of proprietorship or possession. "Of" may denote source, origin, existence, descent, or location, or it may denote that from which something issues, proceeds, or is derived. The term may indicate the aggregate or whole of which the limited word or words denote a part, or of which a part is referred to, thought of, affected, etc.

#### -- Belonging to

Collins 10 (Collins English Dictionary, “of”, http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed= False&action=define&homonym=-1&text=of)

[of](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=of) prep   
1. [belonging](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=belonging) [to](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=to), [situated](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=situated) [in](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=in) [or](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=or) [coming](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=coming) [from](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=from), [because](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=because) [of](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=of), [the](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=the) [inhabitants](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=inhabitants) [of](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=of) [former](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=former) [East](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=East) [Germany](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=Germany), [I](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=I) [saw](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=saw) [five](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=five) [people](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=people) [die](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=die) [of](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=of) [chronic](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=chronic) [hepatitis](http://www.collinslanguage.com/results.aspx?context=3&reversed=False&action=define&homonym=0&text=hepatitis),

Standards

#### 1] Limits – you can pick any one of 160+ countries ranging from India to the US to China, Israel, and France and there’s no universal disad since each one has different intellectual property laws and political or public health situations – explodes neg prep and leads to random nation of the week affs which makes cutting stable neg links impossible

#### 2] Precision outweighs – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution, no one researches non WTO states since they aren’t in the resolution which is the only stasis point.

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.

#### Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) baiting – incentivizes good debaters to be abusive, bait theory, then collapse to the 1AR RVI, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

Evaluate T before 1AR theory – a) norm uniqueness – we only have a couple months to set T norms but can set 1AR theory norms anytime, b) abuse is self-inflicted – your AC is abusive which is why the NC might be abusive, c) NC theory is introduced earlier – you should evaluate things in sequence

Neg theory comes lexically prior – a) any abuse is in response to an abusive aff which means it’s just self-imposed, and complying with my interp would solve the abuse on theirs, b) lack of 2N theory means they have 10min to my 7 to make theory args, c) 2AR persuasive spin is sufficient to beat back any skew since 2Ns on theory inevitably way undercover substance

### 1NC—OFF

#### Counterplan Text: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ought to enter prior and binding text-based negotiations and consultation with the United States Federal Government concerning amendments to the JUSFTA and TRIPS-Plus agreements as per the Barqawi evidence. Upon conclusion, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should implement said mutually-agreed reforms with the assistance of the United States Federal Government and utilize existing clauses to issue compulsory licenses for all relevant COVID-19 medicines, waive data exclusivity protections, and regulate parallel importation.

Defying US IP mandates decks international credibility and financial assurance—postdates 1AC Younes. 1AC Barqawi 19 “The access to medicine puzzle: scaling back the negative effects of the Jordan–US Free Trade Agreement” Laila Barqawi [Lecturer of University of Central Lancashire, Preston (UCLAN)]. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Volume 14, Issue 9, September 2019, Pages 678–686, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpz080> SM//Recut Aanya

* 1AC younes says economic dependence on US bad- this article cites yours as a reason why coninuted support is key-see footnote 12

The Jordanian government should implement the recommendations in this article with backing from the USA, because the USA is the main financer to Jordan’s economy.12 Furthermore, defying the USA means that countries such as India, which challenge the USA on IP, feature regularly on the USA’s ‘Priority Watch List’ in its 301 Reports. For example, the USTR’s 2018 Special 301 Report clearly states that India has ‘Longstanding IP challenges facing US businesses in India’.

12 A Younes, ‘Jordan’s Economic Crisis Threatens Political Stability’, 14 February 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/jordan-eco nomic-crisis-threatens-political-stability-180214112245542.html> accessed 1 May 2019

#### Lenient clauses create exceptions for compulsory licensing. Barqawi 19

“The access to medicine puzzle: scaling back the negative effects of the Jordan–US Free Trade Agreement” Laila Barqawi [Lecturer of University of Central Lancashire, Preston (UCLAN)]. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Volume 14, Issue 9, September 2019, Pages 678–686, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpz080> SM//Recut Aanya

Lenient clauses in JUSFTA? Compulsory license and parallel importation JUSFTA contains more lenient clauses when compared with other Arab-US FTAs. For example, the language used in JUSFTA contains terms which are less formal than BUSFTA, with phrases such as ‘desiring to strengthen the bonds of friendship’.63 JUSFTA’s articles dealing with IP is 4-page long, whereas BUSFTA’s IP Chapter is 24-page long.64 Article 4.20 of JUSFTA permits the usage of compulsory licensing: (1) as a remedy to an anti-competitive process, (2) ‘in cases of public non-commercial use or in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency’, or (3) ‘on the ground of failure to meet working requirements’.65 This article allows Jordan to utilize compulsory licensing and parallel import to other countries suffering from epidemics. Compulsory licenses and parallel importation, however, have been limited by Jordan’s patent laws. Article 22 of Jordan’s National Law on issuing a compulsory license66 resembles the wording in Article 31(k) of TRIPS.67 However, Jordan’s Article 22 could be amended to allow further access to issue a compulsory license. Article 20(c) of JUSFTA states that ‘failure to meet working requirements’ means that a compulsory license could be issued. It is not clear what is meant by working requirements and the only ‘utilization’ that is stipulated is importation.68 The ‘non-working’ requirement of a patent could be defined so that Jordan’s national law is clear on what does not constitute ‘working’ or ‘utilising’ a patent. Furthermore, no time limit is set to meet these ‘working requirements’ within JUSFTA and Jordan could repeal the requirement to exploit the patent within 3 or 4 years. Jordan could also follow the Australian example by providing separate provisions for pharmaceutical compulsory licensing to further widen the scope of compulsory licensing for patented drugs.

#### Solves COVID, the biggest i/l--distributes medicines during times of urgent need as stipulated in the clauses— but keeps data exclusivity in all other instances.

Barqawi 2 “The access to medicine puzzle: scaling back the negative effects of the Jordan–US Free Trade Agreement” Laila Barqawi [Lecturer of University of Central Lancashire, Preston (UCLAN)]. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Volume 14, Issue 9, September 2019, Pages 678–686, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpz080> SM//Recut Aanya

‘Waive data exclusivity protection in cases of compulsory licensing: in case of the issuance of a compulsory license, the generic company is still required to submit clinical trials. Therefore, data exclusivity should be waived in such cases’. 51 Jordan’s regulations could provide that ‘data exclusivity shall have no effects against a compulsory licensee granted for any of the grounds established under the applicable patent law, or against persons authorized to undertake a governmental non-commercial use of the patented product’.52 Furthermore, Malaysia adopted similar stances to mitigate the effects of data exclusivity as per section 5 of Malaysia’s 2011 Directive of data exclusivity, entitled ‘Non-Application of Data Exclusivity’, according to which: ‘Nothing in the Data Exclusivity shall: (i) apply to situations where compulsory licenses have been issued or the implementation of any other measures consistent with the need to protect public health and ensure access to medicines for all; or (ii) prevent the Government from taking any necessary action to protect public health, national security, non-commercial use national emergency, public health crisis or other extremely urgent circumstances declared by the government.’53 10. ‘Waive data exclusivity in cases of emergency and public interest.’54 Colombia succeeded in including a clause in its Decree 2085 of 2002 which states that ‘protection does not apply to: [...] 4. Information whose disclosure is necessary to protect the public interest’.55 This is an important waiver to include in Jordanian legislation because access to medicine is a human right, as stipulated within various international documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 at Article 25,56 the preamble57 and Article 158 of 1946 Constitution of the World Health Organisation and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.59 It is arguable that TRIPS and TRIPSplus clauses are in conflict with human rights clauses; however, this issue is beyond the scope of this article. 11. ‘Waive data exclusivity for products intended for the treatment of life-threatening diseases.’60 The above waivers in the JFDA’s recommendations could be included in Jordan’s national legislation laws as exceptions to limit the effects of data exclusivity.61 Similar waivers are embodied within the Chilean legislation, which excluded certain areas from the scope of protection. One example is Article 91 of the Chilean Industrial Property Law, which states: The protection of this Paragraph shall not apply when: [...] (b) For reasons of public health, national security, noncommercial public use, national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency declared by the competent authority, ending the protection referred to in Article 89 shall be justified.

#### FTA agreement proves weakening IPR and reversing clauses without joint resolution abdicates the sanctity of the agreement

USTR 00’ — (United States Trade Representative, Available Online at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Jordan%20FTA.pdf, accessed 10-1-2021, HKR-AR)

22. Pursuant to Article 39.3 of TRIPS, each Party, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical entities,10 the submission of undisclosed test or other data, or evidence of approval in another country,11 the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such information against unfair commercial use. In addition, each Party shall protect such information against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the information is protected against unfair commercial use.

It is understood that protection for “new chemical entities” shall also include protection for new uses for old chemical entities for a period of three years.

It is understood that, in situations where there is reliance on evidence of approval in another country, Jordan shall at a minimum protect such information against unfair commercial use for the same period of time the other country is protecting such information against unfair commercial use.

23. With respect to pharmaceutical products that are subject to a patent: (a) each Party shall make available an extension of the patent term to compensate the patent owner for unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result of the marketing approval process. (b) the patent owner shall be notified of the identity of any third party requesting marketing approval effective during the term of the patent.

Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights

It is understood that protection for “new chemical entities” shall also include protection for new uses for old chemical entities for a period of three years.

24. Each Party shall provide that, at least in cases of knowing infringement of trademark, copyright and related rights, its judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered as a result of the infringement and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement that are not taken into account in computing such damages. Injury to the right holder shall be based upon the value of the infringed-upon item, according to the suggested retail price of the legitimate product, or other equivalent measures established by the right holder for valuing authorized goods. 25. Each Party shall ensure that its statutory maximum fines are sufficiently high to deter future acts of infringement with a policy of removing the monetary incentive to the infringer, and shall provide its judicial and other competent authorities the authority to order the seizure of all suspected pirated copyright and counterfeit trademark goods and related implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offense, and documentary evidence. 26. Each Party shall provide, at least in cases of copyright piracy or trademark counterfeiting, that its authorities may initiate criminal actions and border measure actions ex officio, without the need for a formal complaint by a private party or right holder. 27. In civil cases involving copyright or related rights, each Party shall provide that the natural person or legal entity whose name is indicated as the author, producer, performer or publisher of the work, performance or phonogram in the usual manner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed to be the designated right holder in such work, performance or phonogram. It shall be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the copyright or related right subsists in such subject matter. Such presumptions shall pertain in criminal cases until the defendant comes forward with credible evidence putting in issue the ownership or subsistence of the copyright or related right. 28. Each Party shall provide that copyright piracy involving significant willful infringements that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain shall be considered willful copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Transition Periods 29. Each Party shall implement fully the obligations of this Article within the following time periods: (a) With respect to all obligations in paragraphs 1(c), 1(d), and 10 through 16, two years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. In addition, Jordan agrees to accede to and ratify the WCT and WPPT within two years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. (b) With respect to all obligations in paragraph 1(b), six months from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. In addition, Jordan agrees to ratify the UPOV Convention within one year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. (c) With respect to all obligations in paragraph 22, except the obligation in footnote 10, immediately from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. (d) With respect to all obligations under this Article not referenced in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), three years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. ARTICLE 5: ENVIRONMENT 1. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing domestic environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws as an encouragement for trade with the other Party. 2. Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws, each Party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws. 3. (a) A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement. (b) The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental matters determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand that a Party is in compliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources. 4. For purposes of this Article, “environmental laws” mean any statutes or regulations of a Party, or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the prevention of a danger to human, animal, or plant life or health, through: (a) the prevention, abatement or control of the release, discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental contaminants; (b) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, substances, materials and wastes, and the dissemination of information related thereto; or (c) the protection or conservation of wild flora or fauna, including endangered species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas in the Party's territory, but does not include any statutes or regulations, or provision thereof, directly related to worker safety or health. ARTICLE 6: LABOR 1. The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up. The Parties shall strive to ensure that such labor principles and the internationally recognized labor rights set forth in paragraph 6 are recognized and protected by domestic law. 2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing domestic labor laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws as an encouragement for trade with the other Party. 3. Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly its labor laws and regulations, each Party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for labor standards consistent with the internationally recognized labor rights set forth in paragraph 6 and shall strive to improve those standards in that light. 4. (a) A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement. (b) The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other labor matters determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand that a Party is in compliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources. 5. The Parties recognize that cooperation between them provides enhanced opportunities to improve labor standards. The Joint Committee established under Article 15 shall, during its regular sessions, consider any such opportunity identified by a Party. 6. For purposes of this Article, “labor laws” means statutes and regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to the following internationally recognized labor rights: (a) the right of association; (b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (d) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. ARTICLE 7: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1. Recognizing the economic growth and opportunity provided by electronic commerce and the importance of avoiding barriers to its use and development, each Party shall seek to refrain from: (a) deviating from its existing practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions; (b) imposing unnecessary barriers on electronic transmissions, including digitized products; and (c) impeding the supply through electronic means of services subject to a commitment under Article 3 of this Agreement, except as otherwise set forth in the Party’s Services Schedule in Annex 3.1. 2. The Parties shall also make publicly available all relevant laws, regulations, and requirements affecting electronic commerce. 3. The Parties reaffirm the principles announced in the U.S.-Jordan Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce. ARTICLE 8: VISA COMMITMENTS 1. Subject to its laws relating to the entry, sojourn and employment of aliens, each Party shall permit to enter and to remain in its territory nationals of the other Party solely to carry on substantial trade, including trade in services or trade in technology, principally between the Parties. 2. Subject to its laws relating to the entry, sojourn and employment of aliens, each Party shall permit to enter and to remain in its territory nationals of the other Party for the purpose of establishing, developing, administering or advising on the operation of an investment to which they, or a company of the other Party that employs them, have committed or are in the process of committing a substantial amount of capital or other resources.12 ARTICLE 9: GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT Pursuant to Jordan’s July 12, 2000, application for accession to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the Parties shall enter into negotiations with regard to Jordan’s accession to that Agreement. ARTICLE 10: SAFEGUARD MEASURES 1. If as a result of the reduction or elimination of a duty13 under this Agreement, an originating good of the other Party is being imported into the territory of a Party in such increased quantities, in absolute terms or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions that the imports of such good from the other Party constitute a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to a domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive product, such Party may: (a) suspend the further reduction of any rate of duty provided for under this Agreement for the good; or (b) increase the rate of duty on the good to a level not to exceed the lesser of (i) the most-favored-nation (MFN) applied rate of duty in effect at the time the measure is taken; and (ii) the MFN applied rate of duty in effect on the day immediately preceding the date of entry into force of this Agreement; or (c) in the case of a duty applied to a good on a seasonal basis, increase the rate of duty to a level not to exceed the lesser of the MFN applied rate of duty that was in effect on the good for the immediately preceding corresponding season or the date of entry into force of this Agreement. 2. The following conditions and limitations shall apply to a measure described in paragraph 1: (a) a Party shall take the measure only following an investigation by the competent authorities of such Party in accordance with Articles 3 and 4.2(c) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards; and to this end, Articles 3 and 4.2(c) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards are incorporated into and made a part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis; (b) in the investigation described in subparagraph (a), a Party shall comply with the requirements of Article 4.2(a) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards; and to this end, Article 4.2(a) is incorporated into and made a part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis; (c) a Party shall notify the other Party upon initiation of an investigation described in subparagraph (a) and shall consult with the other Party prior to taking the measure; and, if a Party takes a provisional measure pursuant to paragraph 3, the Party shall also notify the other Party prior to taking such measure, and shall initiate consultations with the other Party immediately after such measure is taken; (d) no measure shall be maintained: (i) except to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment; (ii) for a period exceeding four years; or (iii) beyond the expiration of the transition period, except with the consent of the Party against whose originating good the measure is taken; (e) no measure may be applied against the same originating good on which a measure has previously been taken; (f) where the expected duration of the measure is over one year, the importing Party shall progressively liberalize it at regular intervals during the period of application; and (g) on termination of the measure, the rate of duty shall be the rate that, according to the Party’s schedule in Annex 2.1 to this Agreement, would have been in effect one year after initiation of the measure. Beginning on January 1 of the year following the termination of the action, the Party that has applied the measure shall: (i) apply the rate of duty set out in its schedule in Annex 2.1 to this Agreement as if the measure had never been applied; or (ii) eliminate the tariff in equal annual stages ending on the date corresponding to the staging category set out in its schedule in Annex 2.1 or its schedule to Annex 2.1. 3. In critical circumstances where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, a Party may take a measure described in paragraph 1(a), 1(b), or 1(c) on a provisional basis pursuant to a preliminary determination that there is clear evidence that imports from the other Party have increased as a result of the preferential treatment under this Agreement, and such imports constitute a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry. The duration of such provisional measure shall not exceed 200 days, during which time the requirements of subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b) shall be met. Any tariff increases shall be promptly refunded if the investigation described in subparagraph 2(a) does not result in a finding that the requirements of paragraph 1 are met. The duration of any provisional measure shall be counted as part of the period described in subparagraph 2(d). 4. The Party applying a measure described in paragraph 1 shall provide to the other Party mutually agreed trade liberalizing compensation in the form of concessions having substantially equivalent trade effects or equivalent to the value of the additional duties expected to result from the measure. If the Parties are unable to agree on compensation, the Party against whose originating good the measure is applied may take tariff action having trade effects substantially equivalent to the measure applied under this Article. The Party taking the tariff action shall apply the action only for the minimum period necessary to achieve the substantially equivalent effects. However, the right to take tariff action shall not be exercised for the first 24 months that the measure is in effect, provided that the measure has been applied as a result of an absolute increase in imports and that such a measure conforms to the provisions of this Article. 5. The Parties recognize that, because it has recently begun to produce a like or directly competitive product described in paragraph 1, an infant industry may face challenges that more mature industries do not encounter. Each Party shall ensure that the procedures described in paragraph 2 do not create obstacles to infant industries that seek the imposition of such measures. 6. At its regularly scheduled session for the year commencing 14 years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Joint Committee shall conduct a review of the operation of this Article. Based on the results of this review and on the agreement of the Joint Committee, the transition period may be extended. 7. For purposes of this Article: domestic industry means the producers as a whole of the like or directly competitive product operating in the territory of a Party, or those whose collective output of the like or directly competitive products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products; serious injury means a significant overall impairment of a domestic industry; substantial cause means a cause which is important and not less than any other cause; threat of serious injury means serious injury that, on the basis of facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility, is clearly imminent; and transition period means the 15-year period beginning on January 1 of the year following entry into force of this Agreement, except if such period is extended in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article. 8. Each Party retains its rights and obligations under Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. This Agreement does not confer any additional rights or obligations on the Parties with regard to actions taken pursuant to Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards, except that a Party taking a safeguard measure under Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards may exclude imports of an originating good from the other Party if such imports are not a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof. ARTICLE 11: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS Should either Party decide to impose measures for balance of payments purposes, it shall do so in accordance with the Party’s obligations under the WTO Agreement. In adopting such measures, the Party shall strive not to impair the relative benefits accorded to the other Party under this Agreement. ARTICLE 12: EXCEPTIONS 1. For purposes of Article 2 of this Agreement, Article XX of GATT 1994 and its interpretative notes are incorporated into and made a part of this Agreement. The Parties understand that the measures referred to in GATT 1994 Article XX(b) include environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and that GATT 1994 Article XX(g) applies to measures relating to conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources. 2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: (a) to require any Party to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; (b) to prevent any Party from taking any actions that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests: (i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services and technology undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or other security establishment, (ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, or (iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or (c) to prevent any Party from taking action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. 3. Except as set out in this paragraph, nothing in this Agreement shall apply to taxation measures. (a) Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of either Party under any tax convention. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any such convention, that convention shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency. (b) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a), Article 2.3 and such other provisions of this Agreement as are necessary to give effect to Article 2.3 shall apply to taxation measures to the same extent as does Article III of the GATT 1994. (c) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a), the national treatment commitment under Article 3.2 shall apply to taxation measures to the same extent as under the GATS, and the national treatment commitment under Article 3.2(b) shall apply to taxation measures to the same extent as if the Party had made an identical national treatment commitment under Article XVII of the GATS. ARTICLE 13: ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE To realize the objectives of this Agreement and to contribute to the implementation of its provisions: (a) the Parties declare their readiness to foster economic cooperation; and (b) in view of Jordan’s developing status, and the size of its economy and resources, the United States shall strive to furnish Jordan with economic technical assistance, as appropriate. ARTICLE 14: RULES OF ORIGIN AND COOPERATION IN CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION 1. The Parties recognize that the rules regarding eligibility for the preferential tariff treatment afforded by this Agreement, as set out in Article 2 and Annex 2.2, are crucial to the functioning of this Agreement, and each Party shall strive to administer such rules effectively, uniformly, and consistently with the object and purpose of this Agreement and the WTO Agreement. 2. The Parties shall consult as appropriate, through the Joint Committee or through the consultative mechanism established in Article 16: (a) to agree upon the means to cooperate and provide administrative assistance to achieve the commitments in paragraph 1; and (b) to address situations pertaining to claims of preferential treatment under this Agreement for imported goods that do not satisfy the requirements in Annex 2.2. 3. The Parties, within 180 days after the entry into force of this Agreement, shall enter into discussions with a view to developing interpretative and explanatory materials on the implementation of Annex 2.2. ARTICLE 15: JOINT COMMITTEE 1. A Joint Committee is hereby established to supervise the proper implementation of this Agreement and to review the trade relationship between the Parties. 2. The functions of the Joint Committee shall include, inter alia: (a) reviewing the general functioning of this Agreement; (b) reviewing the results of this Agreement in light of the experience gained during its functioning and its objectives, and considering ways of improving trade relations between the Parties, and furthering the objectives of the Agreement, including through further cooperation and assistance; (c) facilitating the avoidance and settlement of disputes, including through consultations pursuant to Articles 17.1 (b) and 17.2 (a); (d) considering and adopting any amendment to this Agreement or modification to the commitments therein, provided that the adoption of such amendment or modification shall be subject to the domestic legal requirements of each Party; (e) developing guidelines, explanatory materials, and rules on the proper implementation of this Agreement, as necessary, and particularly: (i) guidelines and explanatory materials on the implementation of Annex 2.2, and (ii) rules for the selection and conduct of members of panels formed under Article 17, and model rules of procedure for such panels; (f) at its first meeting, discussing the review performed by each Party of the environmental effects of this Agreement. 3. Structure of the Joint Committee (a) The Joint Committee shall be composed of representatives of the Parties and shall be headed by (i) the United States Trade Representative and (ii) Jordan’s Minister primarily responsible for international trade, or their designees. (b) The Joint Committee may establish and delegate responsibilities to ad hoc and standing committees or working groups, and seek the advice of non-governmental persons or groups. 4. The Joint Committee shall convene at least once a year in regular session in order to review the general functioning of the Agreement. Regular sessions of the Joint Committee shall be held alternately in each country. Special meetings of the Joint Committee shall also be convened within 30 days at the request of either Party and shall be held in the territory of the other Party, except as the Parties may otherwise agree. The Joint Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure. All decisions of the Joint Committee shall be taken by consensus. 5. Recognizing the importance of transparency and openness, the Parties reaffirm their respective practices of considering the views of interested members of the public in order to draw upon a broad range of perspectives in the implementation of this Agreement. 6. Each Party shall designate an office to serve as the contact point with regard to this Agreement. That office shall receive official correspondence related to this Agreement and provide administrative assistance to the Joint Committee and to dispute settlement panels established under Article 17. ARTICLE 16: CONSULTATIONS 1. The Parties shall at all times endeavor to agree on the interpretation and application of this Agreement, and shall make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter that might affect its operation. 2. Either Party may request consultations with the other Party with respect to any matter affecting the operation or interpretation of this Agreement. If a Party requests consultations with regard to a matter, the other Party shall afford adequate opportunity for consultations and shall reply promptly to the request for consultations and enter into consultations in good faith. ARTICLE 17: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1. (a) The Parties shall make every attempt to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution through consultations under Article 17, whenever (i) a dispute arises concerning the interpretation of this Agreement; (ii) a Party considers that the other Party has failed to carry out its obligations under this Agreement; or (iii) a Party considers that measures taken by the other Party severely distort the balance of trade benefits accorded by this Agreement, or substantially undermine fundamental objectives of this Agreement. (b) A Party seeking consultations pursuant to subparagraph (a) shall submit a request for consultations to the contact point provided for under Article 15.6. If the Parties fail to resolve a matter described in subparagraph (a) through consultations within 60 days of the submission of such request, either Party may refer the matter to the Joint Committee, which shall be convened and shall endeavor to resolve the dispute. (c) If a matter referred to the Joint Committee has not been resolved within a period of 90 days after the dispute was referred to it, or within such other period as the Joint Committee has agreed, either Party may refer the matter to a dispute settlement panel. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, the panel shall be composed of three members: each Party shall appoint one member, and the two appointees shall choose a third who will serve as the chairman. (d) The panel shall, within 90 days after the third member is appointed, present to the Parties a report containing findings of fact and its determination as to whether either Party has failed to carry out its obligations under the Agreement or whether a measure taken by either Party severely distorts the balance of trade benefits accorded by this Agreement or substantially undermines the fundamental objectives of this Agreement. Where the panel finds that a Party has failed to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, it may, at the request of the Parties, make recommendations for resolution of the dispute. The report of the panel shall be non-binding. (e) (i) If the dispute settlement panel under this Agreement or any other applicable international dispute settlement mechanism under an agreement to which both Parties are Party has been invoked by either Party with respect to any matter, the mechanism invoked shall have exclusive jurisdiction over that matter. (ii) If a mechanism described in subparagraph (e)(i) fails for procedural or jurisdictional reasons to make findings of law or fact, as necessary, on a claim included in a matter with respect to which a Party has invoked such mechanism, subparagraph (e)(i) shall not be construed to prevent the Party from invoking another mechanism with respect to such claim. 2. (a) After a dispute has been referred to a dispute settlement panel under this Agreement and the panel has presented its report, the Joint Committee shall endeavor to resolve the dispute, taking the report into account, as appropriate. (b) If the Joint Committee does not resolve the dispute within a period of 30 days after the presentation of the panel report, the affected Party shall be entitled to take any appropriate and commensurate measure. 1. The Parties, within 180 days after the entry into force of this Agreement, shall enter into discussions with a view to developing rules for the selection and conduct of members of panels and Model Rules of Procedure for panels. The Joint Committee shall adopt such rules. Unless the Parties otherwise agree, a panel established under this Article shall conduct its proceedings in accordance with the Model Rules of Procedure. 4. (a) A Party may invoke a panel under paragraph 1(c) of this Article for claims arising under Article 3 only to the extent that a claim arises with regard to a commitment that is inscribed in the Party’s Services Schedule to Annex 3.1 to this Agreement, but is not inscribed in the Party’s schedule of specific commitments annexed to the GATS. Such commitment may include a market access or national treatment commitment in a sector, a horizontal commitment applicable to a sector, or additional commitment. (b) Except as otherwise agreed by the Parties, a Party may invoke a panel under paragraph 1(c) of this Article for claims arising under Article 4 only to the extent that the same claim would not be subject to resolution through the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. (c) If a dispute involves both a claim described in subparagraph (a) or (b) and another claim, subparagraph 1(e) shall not prevent a Party from invoking another international dispute settlement mechanism with regard to such other claim. Nothing in this subparagraph shall allow a Party to invoke the dispute settlement mechanism of both this Article and another international dispute settlement mechanism with regard to the same claim. ARTICLE 18: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 1. Neither Party may provide for a right of action under its domestic law against the other Party on the ground that a measure of the other Party is inconsistent with this Agreement. 2. For purposes of Articles 5 and 6, “statutes and regulations” means, (a) with respect to Jordan, an act of the Jordanian Parliament, or by-law or regulation promulgated pursuant to an act of the Jordanian Parliament that is enforceable by action of the Government of Jordan; and (b) with respect to the United States, an act of the United States Congress or regulation promulgated pursuant to an act of the U.S. Congress that is enforceable, in the first instance, by action of the federal government. 3. The Annexes and Schedules to this Agreement are an integral part thereof. 4. All references in this Agreement to GATT 1994 are to the GATT 1994 in effect on the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 19: ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

1. The entry into force of this Agreement is subject to the completion of necessary domestic legal procedures by each Party.

#### Military aid to Jordan is a standalone impact, which dampens Jordanian instability and solves global crises

Fishman and al-Omari 18 — (Ben Fishman and Ghaith al-Omari, Ben Fishman is a Senior Fellow in The Washington Institute's Geduld Program on Arab Politics. Ghaith al-Omari is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Irwin Levy Family Program on the U.S.-Israel Strategic Relationship.,“The Jordan Exception in U.S. Foreign Assistance“, Washington Institute, 3-7-2018, Available Online at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/jordan-exception-us-foreign-assistance, accessed 10-1-2021, HKR-AR)

The MOU outlines a new five-year, $6.375 billion commitment ($1.275 billion per year) beginning in fiscal year 2018 and ending in FY 2022—a $275 million annual increase over the previous three-year agreement. At a time when the Trump administration is cutting foreign assistance, Jordan remains among the top five recipients, along with Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, and Egypt. The MOU pushes Jordan past Egypt's total aid for the first time, showing just how high Washington prioritizes the kingdom's continued stability.

At the same time, Jordan's budget remains in perennial debt, the population is changing with the continued refugee influx, and pressures at home and abroad pose an ongoing threat. The MOU therefore remains only one piece of the comprehensive policy required to support one of Washington's most stalwart allies in the Middle East.

HISTORY OF THE MOU

The latest MOU follows two others that covered FY 2009-2014 and FY 2015-2017. These are not legally binding documents, but they hold considerable symbolic value by emphasizing the enduring nature of U.S. strategic commitment to Jordan. They also help Amman plan for a minimum amount of assistance from the United States—an annual tally that has increased with each MOU, from $660 million to $1 billion and now $1.275 billion.

In addition to the baseline level of assistance laid out by the MOUs, Washington has provided supplemental funds for specific projects beyond the original allotment. For example, since 2013, the Defense Department has allocated an additional $100 million from its Cooperative Threat Reduction account to help install security barriers and detection equipment along Jordan's borders with Syria and Iraq, in part to watch for weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, the U.S. government has given several hundred million dollars since 2011 to help Jordan with its massive Syrian refugee population, funding projects implemented primarily by UN agencies and international NGOs. Washington also guaranteed $3.75 billion in loans in 2013-2015 (at a cost of $413 million to the United States), for which Jordan would not otherwise have qualified given its poor credit status. In other words, although the previous MOU specified $1 billion in annual assistance, the United States has actually provided closer to $1.5 billion in each of the past few years.

WHERE THE MONEY GOES

In general, U.S. foreign assistance is divided between Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Whereas assistance to some of Jordan's neighbors countries consists mainly of FMF (e.g., 100 percent in Israel's case, and 85 percent in Egypt since military aid was restored after the 2013 coup), Amman's aid package has evolved over the past decade from a near-even ESF/FMF split to a strong emphasis on economic assistance.

In that vein, the new MOU sets minimum annual ESF to Jordan at $750 million and FMF at $350 million, leaving a cushion of $175 million to be allocated where needed. This change signals the administration's assessment that existing support for the Jordan Armed Forces is adequate, and that the real threat to regional stability is economic volatility and pressure from the surge of Syrian refugees.

#### US-Jordan relationship key to prevent great power competition, resource wars, and a slew of existential threats

Carafano and Milstein 21 — (James Carafano and Adam Milstein, James Carafano is Vice President at the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute. Adam Milstein is Co-Founder of Israeli-American Council and Adam and Gila Milstein Family Foundation , “America Needs Jordan, Jordan Needs an Engaged America“, Heritage Foundation, 7-19-2021, Available Online at https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/america-needs-jordan-jordan-needs-engaged-america, accessed 10-1-2021, HKR-AR)

America can’t afford to squander key bilateral relations in the Middle East. Jordan would be near the top of any list of important partners. Recently, Jordan’s King Abdullah II and President Joe Biden had an upbeat meeting in Washington. But even better than smiles and handshakes would be a concerted action plan that better serves the interests of both nations.

The meeting suggests there is plenty of opportunity for that. Both sides should get to it.

While China demands an increasing amount of attention, the U.S. cannot afford to disengage from the Middle East. For one, the competition with China is global. If Washington reduces its focus and influence in the Middle East, Beijing will be happy to step into the gap. China is anxious to build out a hard-sphere of influence that will dominate routes of trade, resources, energy, food supplies, and markets from the Asian mainland to the heart of Europe. The Middle East is a piece that fits nicely into their new imperial puzzle.

The Greater Middle East is of inherently strategic importance to any global power. It is the “middle” of everything important to the globe—sea routes, energy supplies, commercial air travel and financial networks, capital flows, and migration routes.

No one benefits more from a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Greater Middle East more than the United States.

American influence in the region is built on the foundation of bilateral ties and military, economic, diplomatic, and security cooperation linkages. It’s a package deal. The ability to project both hard and soft power is what earns our partners’ respect.

Israel is America’s anchor in the region, the indispensable ally. But that’s never been enough. With no strategic depth, the U.S. benefits when Israel is surrounded by good neighbors. In turn, collective security and cooperation among them strengthens all of them—and that is a great benefit to the U.S.

Few nations in the region sit in a more strategic spot than Jordan. The profits of U.S.-Jordanian relations are long—from intelligence cooperation to serving as a critical mediator in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and hosting a vast displaced population.

There is no question the U.S. values the relationship. “The United States is Jordan’s largest source of bilateral assistance,” notes Heritage Foundation analyst Nicole Robinson, “providing billions of dollars of aid over the years to strengthen Jordan’s military capabilities and aid Jordan’s ailing economy.” But if Jordan and the U.S. are going to work together to build a better Middle East, Washington will need to do more than just throw money at the problem.

Here is what rolling up the sleeves really looks like.

Jordan has few developed resources. It does, however, enjoy an important strategic position, significant human capital, and potential—albeit thus far untapped—energy reserves, and the capacity to develop renewable energy infrastructure. What Jordan needs is a strong dose of economic freedom. Jordan lags behind the regional leaders in the Heritage Foundation’s “Index of Economic Freedom.” Its score on “business freedom,” for example, is a dismal 58.9%.

#### 1AC Solomon is describing ongoing crises that they can’t possibly solve—refugees, COVID, factionalism—also, the end proves military aid is the only dampener on complete internal conflict—inserted in blue

Solomon 4/6 “Instability in neighboring Jordan is ‘bad news’ for Israel” Ariel Ben Solomon [Middle East Correspondent for the Jerusalem Post], Apr 6, 2021 <https://www.jns.org/instability-in-neighboring-jordan-is-bad-news-for-israel/> SM//recut HKR-AR

Instability in neighboring Jordan is ‘bad news’ for Israel

For the past several years, Jordan has come under increasing strain due to wars in bordering Iraq and Syria, which has led to many refugees resettling in Jordan. Combine a population holding divergent loyalties with a poor economic situation, and the result has been unrest.

(April 6, 2021 / JNS) The arrest last weekend of nearly 20 people, including former Crown Prince Hamza bin Hussein, by Jordanian authorities in what is being viewed by some as a coup attempt has led to fears over the stability of the strategic Arab state.

Jordan, a key U.S. and Israeli ally, is important for Israel’s national security because it serves as a buffer against radical forces from within the country as well as those further east, Israeli Middle East experts told JNS.

“The border with the Hashemite Kingdom is Israel’s longest, and Jordan serves as a friendly buffer on the east,” affirmed Efraim Inbar, president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies. “We should not forget that the territories east of Jordan until the border of India are in the hands of rulers under Islamist influence.”

On Saturday, Jordan’s official media outlet denied reports that Prince Hamza had been arrested, claiming that the prince had instead been asked to stop “movements and activities that are used to target” the kingdom’s stability and security. Other key figures were also detained, including at least one other Jordanian royal, as well as tribal leaders and members of the country’s political and security establishment.

Prince Hamza, the eldest son of the late King Hussein and his American-born fourth wife, Queen Noor, and the half-brother of King Abdullah, said he would defy his house arrest conditions, adding to the intrigue behind what was reported as an attempt to destabilize the country.

“For sure, I won’t obey when they tell you that you cannot go out or tweet or reach out to people but are only allowed to see the family. I expect this talk is not acceptable in any way,” Hamza said on Monday in a recording released by Jordan’s opposition, reported Reuters.

According to the report, Prince Hamza had visited tribal gatherings in recent weeks, where the government and the king had been openly blasted.

Middle East expert Hillel Frisch, a professor at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan, told JNS, “I don’t think this is the beginning of the fall of King Abdullah. All the key actors are behind him.”

“Nevertheless, this is the first serious fissure in the royal family, which if it did not enjoy total unity was always sufficiently disciplined to keep major differences within the family,” he said. “What happened in Jordan seems to be a result of dynastic struggles within the ruling royal family.”

“A mainstay of Hashemite rule always lay in that it was more united than any other political actor in Jordan,” added Frisch. “This may no longer be the case.”

Indeed, Abdullah has ruled the country since King Hussein’s death in 1999 and has cultivated a very close relationship with the United States.

Hamza has had a strained relationship with his half-brother, who stripped him of his title in 2004 and later appointed his own son as crown prince. Nevertheless, Hamza has held multiple positions within the monarchy, including in the army, and commands a loyal following in Amman, where he often styles himself after his late father.

At the same time, for the past several years, Jordan has come under increasing strain due to wars in bordering Iraq and Syria, which has led to many refugees resettling in Jordan. The country has most recently has been hard-hit by the coronavirus pandemic.

The United States is “closely following” the situation in Jordan following reports of an alleged coup plot involving the former Jordanian crown prince, U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price said on Sunday.

The action against Hamza comes a few weeks after the Jordanian government publicly acknowledged a new defense agreement with the United States that allows free entry for American forces. It boosts Israel’s unstable eastern neighbor, providing a base from which U.S. forces can potentially act in Syria, Iraq and Iran.

The defense pact’s timing—coming soon before the government crackdown—shows how dependent Jordan is on outside support.

Weak national identity leads to instability

Jordan is estimated to have more than half of its population of Palestinian origin, with many from the West Bank, which Jordan occupied between 1949 and 1967, in addition to a significant Muslim Brotherhood presence. These are ingredients for instability.

Add to this the fact that the Jordanian state has a weak sense of national identity, as it and other Arab states were created by Western European powers after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire.

A journal article by Linda L. Layne titled “The Dialogics of Tribal Self-Representation in Jordan,” published in 1989 in the American Ethnologist, explains how the state sought to cultivate a national identity around disparate tribes.

“The symbolization of tribes has been facilitated by the Jordanian government’s policy over the last several decades to unify and integrate individual tribal identities into one broad tribal identity, that is, to promote Bedouinism in a general way rather than encouraging each tribe to maintain and develop its own individual identity,” she wrote.

One question that gets to the root of the matter is how “Jordanian” its citizens actually feel. Palestinian, tribal and Islamist elements are less loyal to the state than their ideology or kinship networks. In the Middle East, loyalty tends to be to one’s family and tribe.

**The Jordanian regime keeps its grip on power thanks to military and economic aid, mainly by the United States and the Gulf states.**

**Indeed, America is Jordan’s biggest supporter with more than $1.5 billion in aid in 2020, including $425 million in military assistance.**

The poor economic situation combined with a heterogeneous population with divergent loyalties has led to frequent unrest among a vehemently anti-Israel population.

As Frisch noted, “even though the rise of a radical regime was not in the offing, instability in Jordan is bad news for Israel.”

Only consultation overhauls streamlined, harmonized patent law reform. Barqawi 2 “The access to medicine puzzle: scaling back the negative effects of the Jordan–US Free Trade Agreement” Laila Barqawi [Lecturer of University of Central Lancashire, Preston (UCLAN)]. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Volume 14, Issue 9, September 2019, Pages 678–686, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpz080> SM//Recut Aanya

Overhauling Jordan’s IP system Overhauling Jordan’s IP system means that Jordan could examine and update its laws to achieve greater access to medicine. Australia has updated its laws and focused on six key areas which it considered essential. Jordan’s Patent Law No 32 of 1999 has been amended twice, in 2001 and in 2007. In an effort to streamline IP laws, it may be beneficial to have one legal document with all the amendments to Jordan’s Patent Law, rather than three separate pieces of law which repeal certain articles and add other articles into Jordan’s Patent Law. Australia’s Patent Act has been consolidated and a simplified outline of the laws was produced to assist Australian courts. Similarly, Singapore’s Patent Act produced a revised edition of its patent laws which incorporates amendments.76 A consolidated streamlined approach will make it easier for the Jordanian courts to make necessary decisions, especially at times of emergencies. The author contends, however, that a more robust exercise of overhauling Jordan’s IP system and updating all of Jordan’s national laws will happen as a result of a consultation with the USA. The USA seems to be the catalyst for Jordan’s IP decisions. For example, Jordan JFDA partnership agreement with USAID, which reduces the registration time by twelve months, was forecasted to ‘boost pharmaceutical exports by as much as JD 17 million, yielding an additional JD21.6 million in revenue over the same period’.77 The partnership also streamlined the process of drug testing and building of JFDA staff so that drugs reach the Jordanian market.78 This partnership ensures that the USA’s agenda remains prominent but, at least, it increases access to medicine without impairing Jordan’s relationship with the USA.

#### Yes Competition—

#### [a] Immediacy – Resolved is in the present tense, not future

**AHD ‘3**

[The American Heritage Dictionary at Dictionary.com]

Full Definition of RESOLVED¶ 1¶ : fixity of purpose : resoluteness¶ 2¶ : something that is resolved¶ 3¶ : a legal or official determination; especially : a formal resolution

#### “Should” means the aff has to be immediate

**Summers 94** - Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 11-8-1994, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver s

Food Warehouse of Durant,” online: <http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14>

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "**should**"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phraseni, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16) ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.[17](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn17) The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.[18](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn18) When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.[19](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn19) True minutes[20](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn20) of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. [Continues – To Footnote] [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally **"at the present time**." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in **law** is presently or **immediately effective**, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### [b] Certainty – should is certain

**Nieto 9** – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

**"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation**, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts  [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although **the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense**. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. **In the courts of other states**in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that **the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood**by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).  Notably, **courts interpreting the word "should**" in other types of jury instructions  [\*\*16] **have** also **found that the word conveys** to the jury **a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion**. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), **the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should"** in an instruction on circumstantial evidence **as synonymous with the word "must"** and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, **the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction** on witness credibility **which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning**. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958).   [\*318]  In applying a child support statute, **the Arizona Court** of Appeals **concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation**. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be

## Case

#### Top-Level—the advantage is missing uniqueness—TRIPS-plus, WTO terms, and JUSFTA control the strength of their internal links—and are all agreements outside the plan’s scope.

#### Oxfam study wrong—flawed methodology and inaccurate data. Abbott et al 12

Abbott, R. B., Bader, R., Bajjali, L., ElSamen, T. A., Obeidat, T., Sboul, H., Alabbadi, I. (2012). The price of medicines in Jordan: the cost of trade-based intellectual property. Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector, 9(2), 75–85. doi:10.1177/174113431244749//Aanya [Note: this passage is comparing the shortfalls of the Oxfam study to the study conducted in the article, but we haven’t cited that- just the analysis of Oxfam.]

The Oxfam study estimated that, between 2002 and mid-2006, enforcement of data exclusivity resulted in additional expenditures between 6.3 and 22.04 million USD in Jordan. This study estimates a loss of 18 million USD in 2004, which is larger than the impact found by the Oxfam study. The Oxfam study identified 260 medicines available in Jordan with no generic equivalent from IMS Health data, and then based calculations on 108 of these medicines launched by the 21 largest multinational pharmaceutical companies. Oxfam excluded 152 medicines from their analysis due to ‘the difficulty of identifying patent applications and interpreting patent data’.15 This exclusion was not adjusted for in later calculations. Five of the 108 medicines found to be under patent were also excluded. The present study based its calculations on 110 NCE registrations from 2000 to 2004. The Oxfam study estimated 21% of medicines would not be available in a generic form regardless of data exclusivity because of technology barriers. It based this estimate on the availability of generics in India and elsewhere. This study relied on a determination by the JFDA that 35% of medicines would not be available in a generic form because of technology barriers. Finally, the Oxfam study estimated a difference in price of 30–80% between originators and generics. It based this determination on Jordan’s pricing policies and earlier studies of generic competition. This study based its calculations on an actual price difference of 55% between originator medicines and their generic equivalents. The Oxfam study did not consider the impact of patent protection. The study authors reported that they found only three medicines were under patent protection. However, they noted that patent applications were being filed for medicines not yet on the market, and they felt that patents would eventually have a significant impact on medicines prices. Because none of the medicines selected in this study had patent protection, this study also did not consider that impact.

#### Alt causes thump—regional instability, binding international agreements, and refugees. We read blue

Cochrane 16 “Jordan's Pharmaceutical Sector Punches Above Its Weight” June 6, 2016 [Paul Cochrane is an independent journalist. He has written for over 80 publications worldwide, covering business, media, politics and culture in the Middle East, Africa and the Indian subcontinent. He is the co-director of a documentary on the political-economy of water in Lebanon - We Made Every Living Thing from Water (on Vimeo). He is also a media commentator, and has appeared on Al Jazeera Arabic, Al Jazeera English, CBS-NYC radio, Canada's CTV and CBC Radio, Press TV, Etejah TV, Future TV, Al Manar, Sahar TV, Today FM Ireland, and South Korea's TBS eFHM radio. Paul has a BA in International History and International Politics from Keele University, UK, and a MA in Middle Eastern Studies from the American University in Beirut (AUB), Lebanon.] <http://backinbeirut.blogspot.com/2016/06/jordans-pharmaceutical-sector-punches.html> SM//Recut Aanya

Jordan may be small in population terms, but it packs a hefty punch in the Middle East pharma manufacturing sector

With a population of just 6.6 million, Jordan may be a small country but it is one of the largest pharma manufacturers in the Middle East. A key reason for this is that production is export focused, particularly in the generics sector.

The country’s manufacturing sector, with an annual turnover of US$500m, had been steadily growing at 8–10% per year until 2012, according to the Jordanian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Medical Appliances (JAPM). But since the ‘Arab Spring' of 2011, exports have slowed due to instability in the region, notably the conflict in neighbouring Syria.

Development is also being hindered because Jordan, unlike some of its regional competitors, notably Iraq and Iran, abides by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and data exclusivity. Since becoming a member of the WTO in 2000 and signing a free trade agreement with the USA in the same year, Jordanian companies have not developed any significant new medicines.

That said, Jordan’s domestic pharma market is growing. According to UK- based BMI Research, the total market, including imports, reached Jordanian Dinars JOD643m ($905m) in 2014, and is forecast to grow by 6.4% in 2015, to JOD683m ($962m). Samer Al-Ansari, Marketing Director for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at Hikma, one of the region’s leading pharma manufacturers and exporters, established in Jordan and listed on the London Stock Exchange, says the total market grew by 9.4% in 2014, while according to BMI generic growth was 10.5%.

Driving sales is burgeoning population growth, at 4.2%, further boosted by the influx of Syrian refugees: 937,830 were registered as of 2015, according to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Demand comes from the UN and other agencies supporting the refugees, and the market’s value is increasing due to the entry of patented products with high prices as well as an increase in generics, said Al-Ansari.

However, aid agencies import medicines and individual refugees have low purchasing power. ‘Bluntly, demand for pharmaceuticals did not reflect the 15% rise in the population. Refugees are buying in small quantities, and only the essentials,’ said Mohammad Shahin, CEO of the Jordan Sweden Medical and Sterilisation Company (JOSWE), and Chairman of JAPM.

The Jordanian healthcare sector is heavily supported by the government, with the ministry of health providing insurance to 40% of the population, followed by state health services organisation Royal Medical Services (RMS) covering 27.5%, according to the Jordan Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences (JJPS). Government healthcare spending is on the rise, projected to go from JOD1.86bn ($2.62bn) in 2014, to JOD1.97bn ($2.78bn) in 2015, a 6.2% increase, according to BMI Research.

In 2016, compulsory health insurance is scheduled to be introduced to cover all Jordanians. If such a move happens, it is expected to be a boost for pharmaceutical sales. ‘The goal is to have local insurance companies support the private sector, but so far it has been only discussions, nothing has been agreed on yet. But you see that Jordan is moving towards the privatisation of healthcare, and wants to boost medical tourism,’ said Al-Ansari.

Jordan has 16 pharmaceutical firms, which manufacture mostly generics or branded generics, bulk antibiotics and cancer-related treatments. The market is dominated by Hikma, followed by Dar Al Dawa, Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, JOSWE, Pharma International and United Pharmaceutical Manufacturing. ‘Local companies supply around 20% of total domestic consumption, and the rest is imported,’ said Shahin. More than 70% of Jordanian pharma production is for export, to more than 65 countries, primarily in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

Regional instability has had a negative impact on exports, affecting the country’s overall economy, which is expected to grow by just 2.5% in 2015, according to the International Monetary Fund. ‘Our export markets are challenged to Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as to Yemen and Sudan. You can anticipate issues in one or two countries but not four surrounding countries all having problems,’ said Hana Uraidi, CEO of the Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation (JEDCO).

Financing has also been complicated by the instability, while credit lines are under pressure. ‘It’s hard to get extended credit lines as insurance companies are seeing Jordan as higher risk, so traders have to pay up front, and we have a cash problem. If we take out loans it affects overall costs and profits. Before, we thought the situation would calm down after two or three years, but the government is now forecasting problems for 10 years,’ she added.

The closure of the Syrian border has hit the pharmaceutical sector particularly hard, as it was a major transit route for exports to Lebanon, and on to Turkey and northern Iraq, while the western Iraqi border has also been closed due to the presence of Islamic State. Companies are managing, however, to export to Kurdish Iraq and Baghdad, avoiding areas controlled by IS, while the central Iraqi government is still delivering drugs.

‘Overall exports are down by around 10–15% on 2014. It is not only neighbouring countries that have affected us, the whole region is affected, and in certain countries it is not clear who is in control. Payments are another problem,’ said Shahin. JOSWE expects a drop of 10% in its sales this year, with its business evenly split between local sales and exports.

Syria was not an export market for Jordanian manufacturers prior to the conflict as the country was practically self-sufficient in pharmaceutical production. But although the Syrian sector has been ravaged by war it has started exporting to the Arab Gulf and north Africa, according to Shahin, which has detracted from Jordan’s export competitiveness due to low prices.

Looking ahead, it may be generics that really underpin the Jordanian pharma sector’s success. WTO membership and its US trade deal have forced the country’s pharma sector to be transparent about producing generics and original research is still at an emerging stage due to a lack of investment, according to a 2015 article in the JJPS. The Jordanian Scientific Research Support Fund inked four agreements with public and private universities to develop pharmaceutical and medical research projects, worth $479,660 in September 2015, but it is not expected to cause any major upturn in the overall sector given the large investments elsewhere in the world.

‘We had hoped when we signed the WTO and IPR agreements that there would be a transfer of technology and know-how from multinationals to the local industry, but it’s been an unfulfilled promise,’ said Shahin.

Currently, local producers engage in contract manufacturing for global majors, which contributes to less than 5% of the sector’s overall revenue, according to the JJPS. The rest of production is generics under licence, with most licensing agreements still in effect signed before 1999.

Heightened competition

Due to data exclusivity and a lack of diversification, there is heightened competition among manufacturers, while JAPM estimates that few companies are operating at more than 40% of installed capacity. ‘Pharmaceutical companies are all making the same product, and each product has 15 or 20 competitors, while some have 50 or even 100 if we include imports as well,’ said Shahin. Such products include second-, third- and fourth-generation generics. To bolster business, JOSWE has started producing generics not in the market, but few others have followed the same route.

‘JAPM is trying to advise companies not to add more similar generic products but to create variety and products not in the market,’ added Shahin. The overcrowded generics market has led to a domestic price war, with companies trying to sell the same generics at a price 20% lower than the originator drug.

Companies are also having to make their generic products known in the market. ‘In the EU or the US you can sell a generic by its scientific name, but in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) it is branded generics, so you have to build up a brand name,’ said Al- Ansari.

The fact that the writ of TRIPS does not run across Jordan’s region is a problem: ‘You find firms in such countries registering more products than us as they are not as strict in protecting IPR agreements,’ said Shahin. Egypt, for instance, has no TRIPS-Plus provisions, mandating more data exclusivity in its IPR law, yet it has had more foreign investment in its pharma industry, boosting competition for Jordan.

Price controls in Saudi Arabia to protect domestic production, and protectionism in Algeria to encourage pharmaceutical manufacturing are also affecting Jordanian exports.

The JJPS noted that data exclusivity related to TRIPS affected Jordanian exporters, as they ‘will be out of their export markets for at least seven years – five years’ protection due to data exclusivity, one year registration time in Jordan and at least one year registration in the export market’.

#### 1AC Wolf proves Jordanian instability is inevitable absent continued US support for domestic governance and economic management—coups, mismanagement, royal feuds—inserted in blue

Wolf 4/14 “A Hashemite Family Reunion Can’t Hide Jordan’s Woes” Albert B. Wolf, an associate research fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS and an assistant professor of political science at the American University of Central Asia. April 14, 2021 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/14/jordan-abdullah-hamzah-hashemite-family-reunion-cant-hide-economic-woes/> SM/recut HKR-AR

­­A Hashemite Family Reunion Can’t Hide Jordan’s Woes

Making nice after an alleged coup attempt obscures serious challenges, including water scarcity, a refugee crisis, and unhelpful neighbors.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is no stranger to royal intrigues and attempted coups. The first 20 years of the late King Hussein’s rule was wracked with coup plots, assassination attempts, and a civil war with the country’s large Palestinian population. Most recently, the former crown prince and half-brother of King Abdullah II, Prince Hamzah, was accused of engaging in sedition and placed under the “protection of the king” (i.e., house arrest) until the two made a joint appearance on Sunday.

On Monday, the prince pledged his allegiance to the incumbent monarch and seemingly defused the latest royal tempest. But his display of deference doesn’t mean the end of instability in Jordan.

This episode is a symptom of the challenges Abdullah has faced since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, not the problem itself. It is unlikely to be the last challenge the king faces to his rule unless Jordan’s economy undergoes significant economic reforms—quickly.

Jordan has experienced multiple bouts of protests that were brought on by economic downturns (including during the Arab Spring and the COVID-19 pandemic) and were met with a combination of changes in economic tactics and giveaway programs, repression, and government reshuffles.

This plot supposedly came from within the royal court, giving a tabloid quality to a security threat, especially after the prince made his house arrest all the more unusual by issuing a personal statement online. However, Hamzah’s alleged plan to overthrow Abdullah is a distraction from Jordan’s ongoing strategic and economic problems that do not have readily apparent solutions.

Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, described the latest royal feud as the “most serious political crisis” Jordan has **faced in 50 years.** Regional experts have heard these warnings before. However, Abdullah’s combination of political savvy and luck in negotiating the challenges he has faced since the outbreak of the Arab Spring does not mean he will continue be lucky in the future.

Domestic stability cannot be taken for granted. Tourism, Jordan’s biggest industry, ground to a halt after the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. It had accounted for $5.8 billion in revenues in a $43 billion economy in 2019, but Jordan could not allow tourists back into the country as COVID-19 spread. Furthermore, remittances, which had accounted for $3.7 billion in 2018, were estimated to drop by nearly 20 percent for the entire region in 2020.

Two weeks ago, protests broke out in Amman along with other cities because of the deaths of six people from COVID-19 at government hospitals. The cause was low oxygen supplies. However, the literature on comparative authoritarianism shows that protests may provide elites with opportunities to reveal their preferences and split from the incumbent regime.

Should more protests occur due to the worsening economic situation, water shortages, the coronavirus crisis, or the strains of hosting a large refugee population, a window of opportunity may open for Prince Hamzah or another opportunistic contender for the throne. (According to Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 34 percent of the population are refugees, most of whom are Palestinian. The U.N. refugee agency counts 663,210 Syrians who have registered as refugees—while the Jordanian government counts more than 1.3 million.)

Many commentators and Jordan watchers have expressed shock and surprise at Hamzah’s open criticism of Abdullah. However, the more shocking display has been the public outpouring of criticism of the incumbent monarch. Popular radio programs have reported regular call-ins criticizing Abdullah, blaming him for the country’s poor economic performance and corruption.

Prior to the pandemic, the country had less than 2 percent annual growth, and nearly 1 in 4 adults were unemployed. Some Jordanians who have been left behind economically felt that Hamzah used the language of the Arab street to speak to people’s needs in order to advance his own interests. Even Jordanian Finance Minister Mohamad al-Ississ reportedly said, “Unemployment is this country’s greatest problem.” Official figures put unemployment at 24 percent currently.

#### Middle east instability spikes oil prices globally

Cyril Widdershoven 5/12, [Cyril Widdershoven, Widdershoven is a long-time observer of the global energy market. Presently, he holds several advisory positions with international think tanks in the Middle East and energy sectors in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 5-12-2019, New Middle East Proxy War Could Jolt Oil Prices, OilPrice, https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/New-Middle-East-Proxy-War-Could-Jolt-Oil-Prices.html]//Lex RA

U.S. sanctions on Iran are now really starting to bite. In contrast to what European media portray, Iran’s oil and gas exports are plunging. Tehran’s ability to supply its Asian customer base has been largely blocked, as Washington has decided not to extend the waivers given to China, India or others to keep on signing crude contracts. U.S. president Trump still boasts that Iranian exports will be falling to zero, but some tankers are still going to slip through the cracks. ‘Illegal’ crude oil trade will be almost negligible, however, as Iran’s main customers have realized that Washington’s wrath will be real. The mullah regime in Iran also put its trust in a possible European answer, but European companies have chosen to be very cautious, and not to rely on the EU to mitigate potential U.S. sanctions against their operations. The more robust line taken by Washington, supported by Arab allies, seems to be working, as long as analysts are keeping an eye on Iranian oil sector options. Oil analysts are also not yet worried by the negative impact of the sanctions as the global markets are still reasonably well supplied. This picture, however, could be changing extremely quick, if several underestimated factors begin to play out. In contrast to the overall reporting, in which a direct Iran-U.S. confrontation seems to be in the making, reality shows that a surprising risk lies in Iraq. Analysts are focusing on the Arab/Persian Gulf, due to the announcement made by Washington that a significant U.S. naval force is steaming up to the region, partly to project U.S. military power and to counter a possible Iranian move to block the Strait of Hormuz. But the real conflict could play out in Iraq. Washington admitted that it has been warned of possible attacks by Iraqi militias or IRGC proxy groups in Iraq on U.S. forces. The latter, as indicated by Tehran officials, would not only be in Iraq but potentially in the whole region. This proxy-war approach by Tehran has been expected for a long time, as Iran understands that a full-blown military confrontation with the U.S., and potentially its Arab allies, would not end well for the mullahs. Even if the conflict would be costly for both sides, the outcome is clear. This strategy, as already has been employed by Iran’s IRGC troops in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and parts of Iraq, would however be much harder to quell. Not only would the U.S. be forced to spread its forces, but low-level intensive military operations in mainly civilian areas would also constrain a U.S. response. It would also be very hard for Washington to compel European allies and the international community to form a united front against Iran. Several analysts have already suggested that the first possible battleground of this looming conflict will be in Iraq. U.S. Central Command spokesman Urban reiterated previously that “the USCC has seen preparations by Iran and its proxies to attack U.S. forces in the region”. U.S. forces based in Iraq are the easiest to attack. Iraqi Shi’a militias are spread over the whole country, and more often than not are operating under the flag of the Iraqi government. Taking into account the presence of hardline fundamentalist groups in the area, Tehran can mount a strong force without officially taking part in attacks against the U.S. The same could be done in Syria or Yemen, targeting U.S forces and its allies in the area. By using Hezbollah or Hamas, Tehran would even be able to instigate a full-scale regional war, forcing Israel to take part in the conflict. Proxy wars in several countries in the Middle East could have a detrimental effect on global oil and gas markets. Any disruption to oil and gas flows cannot be countered by increased OPEC output or even U.S. shale oil. The market may seem well supplied, and inventories are still at relatively high levels, but this reality could soon change. Until now, the market is behaving like an ostrich. By putting its head under the surface, and convincing itself that there is enough crude supply, or that ‘turning on the taps could rapidly add the missing barrels. The looming war in the Persian Gulf is only assessed on the merits of a US military invasion of Iran, which is unlikely to happen. If the Iranian regime realizes it is heading for the brink, its proxies will do its bidding. On the global oil market, volumes are no longer the only factor of importance. It is quality and crude grades. These two factors are not being recognized, and it seems that traders and analysts believe Trump’s version of reality at present. OPEC’s spare production capacity is not sufficient, as Iran and Venezuelan heavy crudes are in short supply. The U.S. is not able to substitute any of this in the short-to-mid-term. When the market hits the brick wall at the end of this year, this quality problem, in combination with increased instability in the Middle East, will not only create a nightmare scenario for consumers but could also push crude oil above the current $70-85 per barrel range. Proxy wars and sanctions could create the perfect storm for oil. A possible spike to $90 seems within reach.

#### High prices keep the Russian economy stable – empirics prove

Alican Tekingunduz 18, [Alican Tekingunduz, 11-29-2018, How oil prices impact Russia’s economy, How oil prices impact Russia’s economy, https://www.trtworld.com/europe/how-oil-prices-impact-russia-s-economy-22067]//Lex RA

Russia is the second biggest oil exporter in the world, making its economy vastly dependent on the global oil market. Oil and gas exports constitute 40 percent of the total federal budget revenue of Russia. A dip in oil prices between 2014 and 2016 caused big losses to the Russian economy. The price of crude oil decreased more than 30 percent from $75 to $51 between October 2 and November 29. This is the first declining trend since February 2016, the lowest price level in the last decade. How vulnerable is Russia? Russia is missing, or has already missed, the chance to transform how it generates revenue by investing instead on military expansion, economy consultant Yakup Kocaman told TRT World. The effect of Russia’s military expansion policy will be seen in the long-term, he said, commenting on the country's dependence on oil. “The revenue from oil and gas is also very important for Russia as the country is carrying out military activities in several regions such as Ukraine, Crimea and Syria,” Kocaman told TRT World. Yet in May, when the Russian Finance Ministry announced the federal budget 2018-2019, it seemed economic prospects were looking brighter. The country’s estimated oil and gas revenue was revised from $8.5 billion to $44.4 billion. The estimated increase in revenue from oil and gas nearly equalled the increase in total revenue. The country’s resilience is often credited to low oil production costs and a weakening rouble which allows for attractive exports. But oil trade, vital for Russian economy, is conducted in US dollars, a “monopoly” Russia’s President Vladimir Putin wants to end. "Certainly, we are thinking about what we need to do in order to get free of this burden,” Putin said in May. “Furthermore, our partners are helping us by introducing all these unlawful restrictions and violating principles of the global trade, because the whole world sees the dollar monopoly is unreliable; it is dangerous for many, not only for us," he said. The top three crude oil producers — Russia, the United States and Saudi Arabia — will be at the G20 Summit this weekend, raising expectations that oil policy will be discussed. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will meet on December 6 in Vienna to discuss output policy with some non-OPEC producers, including Russia. Why do oil prices fluctuate? There are several factors that have an impact on oil prices: supply, market anxieties, political impact on trade, the use of technology in production and natural disasters. Future contracts of oil trade among countries in any given price also can affect the market. Investments on pipelines to transport oil reduce transportation costs together with the price of oil. However, one of the most important determinants of oil prices is OPEC. The OPEC-Trump tangent OPEC is a consortium of 14 oil exporter countries: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Venezuela. The consortium controls nearly 40 percent of the world’s total oil supply. The organisation sets production volume to meet the demand for oil in negotiation with countries outside OPEC, such as the US and Russia. If OPEC decides to increase production, prices can fall. If they achieve a coordinated cut, prices can rise. US President Donald Trump asked Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s de-facto leader, this summer to raise oil production to compensate for lower crude exports from Iran after sanctions and to ensure no spike in oil prices before midterm elections. Saudi Arabia raised oil production to a record high in November, an industry source said on Monday, pumping 11.1 million to 11.3 million barrels per day (bpd). But the US also offered generous waivers to allies who imported Iranian crude and might have struggled to find other supplies quickly when US sanctions kicked in on November 4. This kept more Iranian crude in the market instead of driving exports from Riyadh’s arch-rival down to zero and bringing down the price per barrel to $51.18. “Even if Russia and Saudi Arabia reach an agreement at the G-20 to decrease output,” other countries might respond by increasing their output, Kocaman said. Average cost of oil and production per barrel Average cost of oil and gas production per barrel changes from country to country according to differences on capital spending, production cost, administrative and transportation cost and gross taxes. Saudi Arabia benefits by drilling the cheapest oil in the world because of low capital spending and absence of gross tax on oil. The energy resources, pooled in vast oil fields, are near the surface of the desert. It costs the kingdom only $3.50 to pull a barrel from the ground. The average cost of oil per barrel for Saudi Arabia is less than $9 according to data collected by Rystad Energy in 2016 In Russia, nearly half the cost of production per barrel is gross tax — $8.44 of the total cost of $19.21 per barrel, even though the production cost is $2.98, which is lower than Saudi Arabia’s. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, a key Trump administration ally, wants prices at $80 or more for his economic reforms. When the Saudi crown prince — as is expected — asks Putin to cut down output in a bid to drive up oil prices, some speculate Russia could have the upper hand in the negotiations. Putin has reflected his comfort at oil prices hovering around $60 per barrel. Yet Russia is becoming increasingly convinced it needs to reduce oil output in tandem with OPEC even though it is still bargaining with Saudi Arabia over the timing and volume of any reduction. "We are in contact with OPEC, and we are ready to continue our joint efforts if needed," Putin said on Wednesday.

#### Russia econ decline causes global nuclear war

Thompson, Chief Operating Officer @ Lexington Institute, 15

(Loren, Former Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program @ Georgetown University, Why Putin's Russia Is The Biggest Threat To America In 2015, [https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2015/01/02/why-putins-russia-is-the-biggest-threat-to-america-in-2015/#711522f74636](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-economy-blows-away-jobs-expectations--and-eases-fears-of-a-recession/2019/02/01/e24cb0f0-263c-11e9-ad53-824486280311_story.html#711522f74636))

A collapsing economy. Much of Putin's popularity within Russia is traceable to the impressive recovery of the post-Soviet economy on his watch. Since he came to power in 2001, the country's gross domestic product has grown sixfold, greatly increasing the size and affluence of the Russian middle class. But that growth has been based in large part on the export of oil and gas to neighboring countries at a time when energy prices reached record highs. Now the price of oil has fallen at the same time that economic sanctions are beginning to bite. The ruble lost nearly half its value against the dollar last year, and the economy has begun to shrink. Putin blames sanctions for 25-30% of current economic hardships. Many Westerns believe a prolonged recession would weaken Putin's support, but because he can blame outsiders, economic troubles might actually strengthen his hand and accelerate the trend toward authoritarian rule. A deep sense of grievance. Blaming outsiders for domestic troubles has a long pedigree in Russian political tradition, and it feeds into a deep-seated sense that Russia has been deprived of its rightful role in the world by the U.S. and other Western powers. Russia may have little past experience with democracy, but it was a major power for centuries prior to the collapse of communism. Like authoritarian rulers in other nations, Putin has built his political base by appealing to nationalism, fashioning a revisionist view of recent events in which Russia is the victim rather that the author of its own misfortunes. He has called the break-up of the Soviet Union a tragedy of epic proportions, and apparently really believes it. By tapping into a deep vein of resentment in Russian political culture, Putin has created a broad constituency for standing up to outsiders even if it means prolonged economic hardship and the danger of war. A vulnerable antagonist. Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen says America faces little danger from Russia's current troubles, but that's because she thinks in economic terms. In a broader sense, America potentially is in great danger because Putin and his advisors really believe they are the target of a Western plot to weaken their country. The biggest concern is that some new move by Russia along its borders degenerates into a crisis where Moscow thinks it can improve its tactical situation by threatening local use of nuclear weapons, and then the crisis escalates. At that point U.S. policymakers would have to face the reality that (1) they are unwilling to fight Russia to protect places like Ukraine, and (2) they have no real defenses of the American homeland against a sizable nuclear attack. In other words, the only reason Washington seems to have the upper hand right now is because it assumes leaders in Moscow will act "rationally." The unspoken wisdom in Washington today is that if nobody gives voice to such fears, then they don't need to be addressed. That's how a peaceful world stumbled into the First World War a century ago -- by not acknowledging the worst-case potential of a crisis in Eastern Europe -- and the blindness of leaders back then explains most of what went wrong later in the 20th Century. If we want to avoid the risk of reliving that multi-generation lesson, then U.S. policymakers need to do something more than simply wait for Putin to crack. That day will never come. In the near term, Washington needs to work harder to defuse tensions, including taking a more serious look at the history that led to Moscow's move on Crimea. Over the longer term, Washington needs to get beyond its dangerous aversion to building real defenses against long-range nuclear weapons, because it is just a matter of time before some dictator calls America's bluff.

#### 1AC Lazaroff starts from the assumption Netanyahu annexes the West Bank because of Israeli anger at Palestinian protests—the aff cannot solve the Israel-Palestine conflict anyway– inserted in blue

Lazaroff 20 “Will annexation destroy Israeli-Jordanian peace, set kingdom aflame?” Tovah Lazaroff is the Deputy Managing Editor of The Jerusalem Post May 1, 2020 <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/will-annexation-destroy-israeli-jordanian-peace-set-kingdom-aflame-626104> SM

The possible collapse of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty and potential destruction of a stable regional ally, the Hashemite Kingdom, is one of the stronger arguments against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to annex West Bank settlements this year.

The 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, as well as the 1979 treaty signed with Egypt, have been a foundation cornerstone of Israeli regional security and gateway to the Arab world.

The value of the two treaties, in an otherwise hostile region, has only increased in relation to the growing threats from Iran and ISIS and other Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups.

So the idea of an Israeli plan, either unilateral or in conjunction with the US, that would risk those treaties and the stability of Israel, after a decade of regional turmoil, has to give one pause.

“Unilateral annexation will damage stability in the Middle East” and harm Israel, said former Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) director Ami Ayalon.

“The peace treaty with Egypt and the peace treaty with Jordan are in a way the two cornerstones of our [regional] policy and our security for the last 30 to 40 years,” he said.

A retired admiral, Ayalon is among a group of more than 220 former security officers who have embarked on a campaign against the move through the group Commanders for Israel’s Security.

Last week, he and two other high-level former security officials, Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Gadi Shamni and former Mossad director Tamir Pardo, published an article in US-based Foreign Policy magazine, warning about the implications to Jordan and Egypt.

There are many rational reasons for the two countries to maintain ties with Israel, Ayalon told The Jerusalem Post.

Egypt relies on Israel for intelligence and security cooperation when it comes to fighting al-Qaeda and ISIS in Sinai. Jordan has water and gas deals with Israel. Both countries also rely heavily on financial assistance from the United States, which is tied to the peace deals.

Still, those factors would not be enough to offset the danger to the Kingdom from the street, Ayalon said.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, however, regional leaders cannot afford to ignore public opinion, particularly on a topic where emotions run high, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he said.

Rulers in both Egypt and Jordan “have to listen to the voices of the street because they understand that power,” he said.

Egyptian President Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has more flexibility than Jordan’s King Abdullah, Ayalon said.

Jordan is home to a large number of Palestinians, and there are also many young people who are radicalized, Shamni said.

“**They will never accept Jordanian silence with regards to annexation**,” he said. “To survive, the king will have to take extreme steps that might even severely damage the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement.”

Throughout the years, Israeli actions in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza have had a destabilizing influence, Ayalon said.

“But there is a huge difference between incremental change” and a large unilateral act, such as annexation, particularly one that is against the declared will of all Arab leaders, he said.

Shamni, who was also Israel’s former military secretary to the US and a military adviser to former prime minister Ariel Sharon, said the plan creates unnecessary turmoil and security problems.

At issue is Israel’s eastern border, which is its calmest out of the five borders, he said. There are hostilities along the Lebanese, Syrian and Gaza borders, and even the Egyptian border can be problematic because of terrorist groups in the Sinai Desert, he said.

But the combined efforts of Israeli and Jordanian security forces have kept violence at bay, Shamni said.

Jordan acts as an additional security buffer for Israel and provides a strategic safeguard against terrorism and other security threats, he said. Jordan’s location, bordering Iraq on the other side, makes peaceful relations with Israel particularly significant, he added.

Coordination with Jordan is crucial for Israel’s safety along this critical stretch, Shamni said.