## 1

#### The aff begins from the premise of the failure of state solutions and a refusal of this world. Those state-based solutions are critical and necessary to win the transition to communism. The aff gives up on the transition and, ironically, hopes that things will work out in the meantime – they won’t.

Parenti ‘16 (Christian, Clinical Assistant Professor of Liberal Studies @ New York University, “Environment-Making in the Capitalocene Political Ecology of the State,” *Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism*, pp. 181-183)

The unacknowledged centrality of the state to the functioning of capitalism is especially relevant today, with a devastating climate crisis already upon us in the form of desertification, powerful storms, ocean acidification, melting glaciers, incrementally rising sea levels, and mass migrations. The crisis requires immediate action on a truly massive scale. I have laid out an analysis of the state rooted in a political ecological reading of value. As a central catalyst of social nature, the capitalist state does not have a relationship to "nature" – it is a relationship with nature. The state is not merely "part" of the Capitalocene but central to it. Why? Because the geopower of the capitalist state makes it possible for capital to treat the surface of the earth as a warehouse of Cheap Nature. As we have seen, the history of capitalist development is almost always the history of state-guided development. To reform capitalism - and to move beyond it – the Left needs to place the state front and center in its strategic considerations. Appeals to corporate social responsibility, attempts to shame capital into reform, strategies that declare politics "broken" and seek to circumvent the state, or escapist hyperlocalism – all hallmarks of American environmentalism – are fundamentally unrealistic. This argument has political implications. First, the state cannot be avoided, as scholars like Holloway suggest (2002). For Left politics to become effective, especially in the face of the climate crisis, they must come up with strategies that engage and attempt to transform the state. The idea of escaping the state is to misrecognize the centrality and immutably fundamental nature of the state to the value form and thus to capitalist society (Mazzucato 2013). The chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (the export credit agency of the federal government) tried to explain the centrality of the state to reporters after a business trip to the Czech Republic: "It's time to drop the fantasy that a purely free market exists in the world of global trade .... In the real world our private enterprises are pitted against an array of competitors that are often government-owned, government- protected, government-subsidized, government-sponsored or all of the above" (Economist 2013). In other words, the legal frameworks of property are territorially fixed and states remain the crucial political units of global capitalism. Managing, mediating, producing, and delivering nonhuman nature to accumulation is a core function of the modern, territorially defined, capitalist state. When we speak of capital having a metabolism, we must think of the state as an indispensable mediating membrane in that process. In that regard, the climate crisis does not require a new role for the state, but merely a different and better version of the environment-making that it already does. For that to happen, critical scholars need a renewed theoretical engagement with the state. I have suggested that we begin by considering the state as the central environmental actor within the larger world historical drama of capitalism. The state remains at the center of modern political struggle. More specifically, the state's seemingly new role as an economically crucial, environmental agent, which can appear to be merely a political by-product of climate change and the broader ecological crisis, is actually not new at all. Climate change brings disasters and emergencies that call forth the state. How the state responds is a different question: sometimes it fails, but always it is called.

#### Their liberal-individualist strategy of progress only serves to re-inscribe the conditions of hierarchy and fracture coalitions—vote negative to endorse a unified response spanning across classes which is the only way to solve the case

Fraser, Philosophy Prof, 17—professor of philosophy and politics at The New School for Social Research (Nancy, 1/2/17, “The End of Progressive Neoliberalism,” <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/progressive-neoliberalism-reactionary-populism-nancy-fraser>, Accessed 4/24/17, HWilson)

Progressive neoliberalism developed in the United States over the last three decades and was ratified with Bill Clinton’s election in 1992. Clinton was the principal engineer and standard-bearer of the “New Democrats,” the U.S. equivalent of Tony Blair’s “New Labor.” In place of the New Deal coalition of unionized manufacturing workers, African Americans, and the urban middle classes, he forged a new alliance of entrepreneurs, suburbanites, new social movements, and youth, all proclaiming their modern, progressive bona fides by embracing diversity, multiculturalism, and women’s rights. Even as it endorsed such progressive notions, the Clinton administration courted Wall Street. Turning the economy over to Goldman Sachs, it deregulated the banking system and negotiated the free-trade agreements that accelerated deindustrialization. What fell by the wayside was the Rust Belt—once the stronghold of New Deal social democracy, and now the region that delivered the electoral college to Donald Trump. That region, along with newer industrial centers in the South, took a major hit as runaway financialization unfolded over the course of the last two decades. Continued by his successors, including Barack Obama, Clinton’s policies degraded the living conditions of all working people, but especially those employed in industrial production. In short, Clintonism bears a heavy share of responsibility for the weakening of unions, the decline of real wages, the increasing precarity of work, and the rise of the two–earner family in place of the defunct family wage. As that last point suggests, the assault on social security was glossed by a veneer of emancipatory charisma, borrowed from the new social movements. Throughout the years when manufacturing cratered, the country buzzed with talk of “diversity,” “empowerment,” and “non-discrimination.” Identifying “progress” with meritocracy instead of equality, these terms equated “emancipation” with the rise of a small elite of “talented” women, minorities, and gays in the winner-takes-all corporate hierarchy instead of with the latter’s abolition. These liberal-individualist understandings of “progress” gradually replaced the more expansive, anti-hierarchical, egalitarian, class-sensitive, anti-capitalist understandings of emancipation that had flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. As the New Left waned, its structural critique of capitalist society faded, and the country’s characteristic liberal-individualist mindset reasserted itself, imperceptibly shrinking the aspirations of “progressives” and self-proclaimed leftists. What sealed the deal, however, was the coincidence of this evolution with the rise of neoliberalism. A party bent on liberalizing the capitalist economy found its perfect mate in a meritocratic corporate feminism focused on “leaning in” and “cracking the glass ceiling.” The result was a “progressive neoliberalism” that mixed together truncated ideals of emancipation and lethal forms of financialization. It was that mix that was rejected in toto by Trump’s voters. Prominent among those left behind in this brave new cosmopolitan world were industrial workers, to be sure, but also managers, small businessmen, and all who relied on industry in the Rust Belt and the South, as well as rural populations devastated by unemployment and drugs. For these populations, the injury of deindustrialization was compounded by the insult of progressive moralism, which routinely cast them as culturally backward. Rejecting globalization, Trump voters also repudiated the liberal cosmopolitanism identified with it. For some (though by no means all), it was a short step to blaming their worsening conditions on political correctness, people of color, immigrants, and Muslims. In their eyes, feminists and Wall Street were birds of a feather, perfectly united in the person of Hillary Clinton. What made possible that conflation was the absence of any genuine left. Despite periodic outbursts such as Occupy Wall Street, which proved short-lived, there had been no sustained left presence in the United States for several decades. Nor was there in place any comprehensive left narrative that could link the legitimate grievances of Trump supporters with a fulsome critique of financialization, on the one hand, and with an anti-racist, anti-sexist, and anti-hierarchical vision of emancipation, on the other. Equally devastating, potential links between labor and new social movements were left to languish. Split off from one another, those indispensable poles of a viable left were miles apart, waiting to be counterposed as antithetical. At least until the remarkable primary campaign of Bernie Sanders, who struggled to unite them after some prodding from Black Lives Matter. Exploding the reigning neoliberal commonsense, Sanders’s revolt was the parallel on the Democratic side to that of Trump. Even as Trump was upending the Republican establishment, Bernie came within a hair’s breadth of defeating Obama’s anointed successor, whose apparatchiks controlled every lever of power in the Democratic Party. Between them, Sanders and Trump galvanized a huge majority of American voters. But only Trump’s reactionary populism survived. While he easily routed his Republican rivals, including those favored by the big donors and party bosses, the Sanders insurrection was effectively checked by a far less democratic Democratic Party. By the time of the general election, the left alternative had been suppressed. What remained was the Hobson’s choice between reactionary populism and progressive neoliberalism. When the so-called left closed ranks with Hillary Clinton, the die was cast. Nevertheless, and from this point on, this is a choice the left should refuse. Rather than accepting the terms presented to us by the political classes, which oppose emancipation to social protection, we should be working to redefine them by drawing on the vast and growing fund of social revulsion against the present order. Rather than siding with financialization-cum-emancipation against social protection, we should be building a new alliance of emancipation and social protection against financialization. In this project, which builds on that of Sanders, emancipation does not mean diversifying corporate hierarchy, but rather abolishing it. And prosperity does not mean rising share value or corporate profit, but the material prerequisites of a good life for all. This combination remains the only principled and winning response in the current conjuncture. I, for one, shed no tears for the defeat of progressive neoliberalism. Certainly, there is much to fear from a racist, anti-immigrant, anti-ecological Trump administration. But we should mourn neither the implosion of neoliberal hegemony nor the shattering of Clintonism’s iron grip on the Democratic Party. Trump’s victory marked a defeat for the alliance of emancipation and financialization. But his presidency offers no resolution of the present crisis, no promise of a new regime, no secure hegemony. What we face, rather, is an interregnum, an open and unstable situation in which hearts and minds are up for grabs. In this situation, there is not only danger but also opportunity: the chance to build a new new left. Whether that happens will depend in part on some serious soul-searching among the progressives who rallied to the Clinton campaign. They will need to drop the comforting but false myth that they lost to a “basket of deplorables” (racists, misogynists, Islamophobes, and homophobes) aided by Vladimir Putin and the FBI. They will need to acknowledge their own share of blame for sacrificing the cause of social protection, material well-being, and working-class dignity to faux understandings of emancipation in terms of meritocracy, diversity, and empowerment. They will need to think deeply about how we might transform the political economy of financialized capitalism, reviving Sanders’s catchphrase “democratic socialism” and figuring out what it might mean in the twenty-first century. They will need, above all, to reach out to the mass of Trump voters who are neither racists nor committed right-wingers, but themselves casualties of a “rigged system” who can and must be recruited to the anti-neoliberal project of a rejuvenated left. This does not mean muting pressing concerns about racism or sexism. But it does mean showing how those longstanding historical oppressions find new expressions and grounds today, in financialized capitalism. Rebutting the false, zero-sum thinking that dominated the election campaign, we should link the harms suffered by women and people of color to those experienced by the many who voted for Trump. In that way, a revitalized left could lay the foundation for a powerful new coalition committed to fighting for all.

#### Focus on coloniality ignores material effects of capital

Lazarus, MA/Prof of English, 11

(Neil, *What postcolonial theory doesn’t say*, Race & Class 53(1))

However, we would be mistaken if we were to infer from all this that there was a congruence to be established between Frank’s ideas and those prevailing in postcolonial studies. For, what Frank goes on to say about postcolonial theory in this paper of 2001 is witheringly dismissive: The re-examination of reality [that I propose] … may [be imagined to] … parallel the denunciation of the received wisdom of both … ‘traditional’ and … dependence as well as world-system theory … by recent post-modernist, post-colonial, and subaltern textual ‘analysis’ as far as the latter go, which is not much. For they offer no examination and much less analysis of any political economic reality and its history. Most importantly they have and offer no global perspective, examination, nor political economic history and analysis of the one world economy and system whose own whole globe encompassing structure and dynamic is so determinant of the possibilities, options and therefore successes and failures of its ever changing geographic, political economic, social and cultural parts.21 Frank scorns the idea of a capitalist world system, but he retains and, indeed, heightens his longstanding commitment to systematicity in sociological analysis. His late work advances the radically continuist argument that while there is indeed a world system, it has been in existence for 5,000 years, not 500. I think Frank is quite wrong about this. His trivialisation of what his one-time intellectual confederate Immanuel Wallerstein has described as the ‘great structural changes’ that have ‘occur[red] in the world in the last several hundred years’, and which, on Wallerstein’s account, ‘make the world of today qualitatively different from the world of yesterday’,22 strikes me as refractory and unconvincing. But we can, at least, easily see the differences between Frank’s standpoint and what Homi K. Bhabha has influentially identified as ‘the postcolonial perspective’, and which, on Bhabha’s own formulation, ‘departs from the traditions of the sociology of underdevelopment or “dependency” theory’, not because the systemic logic underpinning these traditions is insufficiently global or comprehensive in its conception, but because postcolonial theory must ‘resist … the attempt at holistic forms of social explanation’.23 Frank moves towards the specification of a 5,000-year world system; the ‘postcolonial perspective’ abandons system altogether. As Bhabha writes, ‘it forces a recognition of … more complex cultural and political boundaries … ’ than those implicated by any systematic philosophy.24 This comparison tells very severely against postcolonial studies. The problem is that the postcolonialist attention to forms of politics and culture that are supposedly ‘more complex’ than the struggle-based models (now thought to be obsolete) has typically led to a wholesale neglect of the ground beneath their feet. Benita Parry makes just this point in her historical critique of postcolonial studies, writing that: [t]he institutionalization of postcolonial studies took place at a time when the linguistic turn was in the ascendant within philosophy and literary theory, and at the moment when cultural studies was in the process of turning its back on materialist beginnings. The stage was then set for the reign of theoretical tendencies which Edward Said, among others, has deplored for permitting intellectuals ‘an astonishing sense of weightlessness with regard to the gravity of history’. In the realm of postcolonial studies, where premises affording analytical priority to formations of discourse and signifying processes were already to the fore, discussion of the internal structures of texts, enunciations and sign systems became detached from a concurrent examination of social and experiential contexts, situations, and circumstances.25 We need to proceed carefully here, as Parry herself does in her incisive examination of the ‘countercurrents and tensions in Said’s critical practice’.26 For, while Edward Said himself clearly calls for a materialist countermanding of the idealism of mainstream postcolonial studies – with the gravity of history bringing the field’s giddy and unmoored intellectuals back to earth – his is never remotely an historical materialism. My claim in this essay is that postcolonial theory generally has failed to situate colonialism relative to the wider framing history of capitalist development. Even on the best postcolonialist accounts, such as Said’s own in Culture and Imperialism, ‘imperialism’ is typically cast as a political dispensation and referred, in civilisational terms, to ‘the West’ rather than to capitalism. Thus, Said holds ‘imperialism’ to implicate military conquest, alien governance, systematised top-down violence, social asymmetry, cultural and symbolic domination, and Eurocentrism as a set of deeply patterned ‘structures of attitude and reference’. He makes comparatively little of the fact that it centrally involves the imposition of a particular mode or modes of production and specific regimes of accumulation, expropriation and exploitation in the form of the extraction of surplus value, commodification and the generalisation of commodity production, and so on. Parry’s overview of the contradictions deriving from what she calls Said’s ‘deliberated disengagement’ from Marxism in Culture and Imperialism is altogether winning here. I quote from it at length: Said’s was the long view of ‘imperialism’ as ‘the practice, the theory and the attitude of a dominating centre ruling a distant territory,’ and because his interest was in the formation of ideologies underwriting an European hegemony, the study is not concerned with differentiating between mercantile-plantation colonialism, which stimulated the accumulation of capital in Europe, and the subsequent industrial-military interventions of metropolitan nation-states in overseas territories, an era known to historians and political scientists as ‘imperialism’ and austerely described by Rosa Luxemburg as ‘the political expression of the accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle for what remains still open of the non-capitalist environment’. Said wrote with passionate intensity about imperial aggression without referring to the analysis of Lenin or Luxemburg; he distinguished between anticolonial nationalism and liberation movements without alluding to the communist orientation of the latter or the class interests of either; and he placed economic and political machinery and territorial aggrandizement at the center of modern empire without specifying capitalism’s world system. At the same time he cited adherents of the Marxist critique such as Aimé Césaire, Fanon, C.L.R. James, Eqbal Ahmad, Amilcar Cabral, and Walter Rodney with respect, embracing them as comrades in the struggle against colonialism.27 Parry distinguishes pertinently here, in passing, between ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’, and we know that, especially within Marxist theory, there is a very specific deployment that sees ‘imperialism’ as referring narrowly to the process of capitalist accumulation on a world scale in the era of monopoly capitalism. But, as the example represented by Said’s Culture and Imperialism demonstrates, this is not where the blind spot in postcolonial theory is to be located. For our purposes here, in fact, there is no need to cavil at a relaxed usage that would regard the two terms as more or less interchangeable. While this might involve a little imprecision, it would have the advantage of connecting with both mainstream political philosophy and non-specialist convention.28 For the problem is not that postcolonial theory is inclined to conflate the categories of ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’, but that it tends to construe ‘colonialism’ as an exercise solely in political domination, of the global projection of power. It is, therefore, important to insist, in opposition to this emphasis, that whatever else it might have and, indeed, did involve – all the way from the systematic annihilation of whole communities to the cultivation of aesthetic tastes and preferences – colonialism as an historical process involved the forced integration of hitherto uncapitalised societies, or societies in which the capitalist mode of production was not hegemonic, into a capitalist world system. Over the course of a couple of centuries in some territories, mere decades in others, generalised commodity production was imposed: production for exchange rather than use; monetisation; private ownership; the development of specifically capitalist markets (involving ‘free’ wage labour and the buying and selling of labour power) or the appropriation, de- and re-centralising of existing markets and of ancillary systems and institutions designed to enable and facilitate the consolidation, extension and reproduction of capitalist production and capitalist class relations. Along the way, existing social relations and modes of existence were undermined, destroyed, reconfigured; new social relations and modes of existence were brought into being. Existing circuits of production, distributions of power, universes of meaning, were disturbed, appropriated, reoriented. Peasantries were destroyed, along with subsistence, tributary and market economies (some of them vast and elaborate), to be replaced by capitalised agriculture in one location, proletarianisation in another, with waves of migratory labour (more or less regulated, sometimes not at all) in between. Ruling elites were made, unmade and remade, the basis of their power thoroughly transformed.(9-11)

#### Capitalism’s drive to accumulate compels environmental catastrophe and nuclear warfare

Eagleton 11[Terry, Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, *Why Marx Was Right*, 2011, Yale University: New Haven, CT, p. 224-6]

The two great threats to human survival that now confront us are military and environmental. They are likely to converge more and more in the future, as struggles over scarce resources escalate into armed conflict. Over the years, communists have been among the most ardent advocates of peace, and the reason for this is ably summarized by Ellen Meiksins Wood. ‘‘It seems to me axiomatic,’’ she writes, ‘‘that the expansionary, competitive and exploitative logic of capitalist accumulation in the context of the nation-state system must, in the longer or shorter term, be destabilizing, and that capitalism . . . is and will for the foreseeable future remain the greatest threat to world peace.’’≤Σ If the peace movement is to grasp the root causes of global aggression, it cannot afford to ignore the nature of the beast that breeds it. And this means that it cannot afford to ignore the insights of Marxism. The same goes for environmentalism. Wood argues that capitalism cannot avoid ecological devastation, given the antisocial nature of its drive to accumulate. The system may come to tolerate racial and gender equality, but it cannot by its nature achieve world peace or respect the material world. Capitalism, Wood comments, ‘‘may be able to accommodate some degree of ecological care, especially when the technology of environmental protection is itself profitably marketable. But the essential irrationality of the drive for capital accumulation, which subordinates everything to the requirements of the self-expansion of capital and so-called growth, is unavoidably hostile to ecological balance.’’ The old communist slogan ‘‘Socialism or barbarism’’ always seemed to some a touch too apocalyptic. As history lurches towards the prospect of nuclear warfare and environmental catastrophe, it is hard to see how it is less than the sober truth. If we do not act now, it seems that capitalism will be the death of us.

#### Reject Dalley—our reps identify a shared threat stemming from the settler present, the avoidance of which opens plural futures for the making---which is good

Joseph J. Z. Weiss 15. Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, University of Chicago. December 2015. “Unsettling Futures: Haida Future-Making, Politics and Mobility in the Settler Colonial Present.” p.216-232, https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/bitstream/handle/11417/1121/Weiss\_uchicago\_0330D\_13139.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Conclusion: “What’s next? Just guess.” Signs of the Future One of the more recent additions to the socio-landscape of Old Massett, which I noticed on a return visit in 2014, was a series of blue signs that had appeared in many of the lawns on reserve and a good few uptown. The sign was a good two feet high and emblazoned with capitalized text: UNITED AGAINST ENBRIDGE. Below the text was a picture of a salmon. The salmon and the first word, “UNITED,” were in stark, attention-grabbing white, while the other text was in black. The signs, I later discovered, were distributed for five dollars each by the “Friends of Wild Salmon,” a coalition of northern British Columbia residents – including both First Nations and non-First Nations members – working together to oppose the Enbridge Gateway Pipeline Project.1 Perhaps appropriately, then, I noticed the sign on the lawns of both Haida and non-Haida, in Old Massett, (New) Masset, and out by Towtown. The signs may have been new, but their message is one that should have become familiar to us at this point: The people of Haida Gwaii oppose “Enbridge;” that is, The Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines Project. The project, first proposed in the mid-2000s, seeks to construct two pipelines to transport crude oil and condensate from northern Alberta to Kitimat on the coast of British Columbia.2 The oil would then be transported via “super-tanker” from the coast, through the Hecate Straight that passes between the west coast and the islands of Haida Gwaii before being exported to other nations (particularly China). Enbridge has received heavy support for the project from Canada’s current Conservative government, headed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and in 2013 the Enbridge Joint-Review Panel – despite the words of hippies and Haida alike, alongside fierce opposition from all over the northwest coast - approved the pipelines, albeit with 209 required conditions.3 As a partnership between Canadian federal and corporate interests, the Enbridge Pipelines Project promises a future horizon of economic prosperity, one that unequivocally justifies any environmental risk in the present. On Haida Gwaii, Enbridge presages a rather different future, one in which the unpredictable waters of the Hecade Straight all but guarantee a tanker spill. Such a spill would devastate the waters and lands of the islands and the neighbouring coastline of British Columbia, destroying the fish and poisoning the plants that currently draw on ocean waters and the animals that feed thereon. Neither eagles nor ravens could survive, living as they do on a diet that consists primarily of marine life, a fact which all but guarantees the disappearance of Eagles and Ravens, the Haida people whose lifeways as such are so fundamentally tied to the islands of Haida Gwaii. Haida Gwaii could no longer be home. A song recorded in protest again Enbridge by Aboriginal artist Kinnie Starr and animated as a music video by Haidawood, a team of Haida and non-Haida stop-motion artists and animators, makes this threat explicit, asking in its opening lines “Who will save these waters, save them for our great granddaughters, save them for our great grand-daughter’s sons, […] save them before all is dead and gone?”4 This nightmare future, this future that is no future, is one that looms large over the whole of this dissertation. It is familiar because it is a reiteration of the horror of ecological cataclysm that the CHN formed itself in opposition against, that the “hippies” risk metonymically bringing about by taking from the lands and waters without respect. But it is also familiar because in a broader sense it is the future that settler colonialism attempted to give to Native peoples; indeed, to render as their already given destiny. This is the future of indigenous erasure, of ultimate disappearance, of a closed temporality which can only end in “all dead and gone.” As I have also hopefully shown in each of my chapters, however, the future of “no future” is never taken as inevitable or already determined by Haida people. The work of future-making instead always acts to ward off the nightmare future of Haida erasure, always puts in its place instead multiple possible futures in which Haida people continue. Take the blue signs on the lawns of the Masset(t)s, Old and New, implicitly answering Kinnie Starr’s question with the bold declaration that the islands (will) stand “UNITED” against Enbridge. But the social significances of these futures are never encompassed solely by the ways in which they respond to the threat of nightmare futures. As we saw in Chapter 3, for instance, the production of a future of Haida and non-Haida unity is considerably more complicated than the declaration of shared solidarity, speaking back to a particular history of Haida and settler relations and fantasy schemas, looking forward towards finding productive ways in which non-Haida can be integrated into Haida systems of sociality and responsibility. To speak of a future united against Enbridge is thus necessarily to speak of many other things, just as it is the case when speaking of a future of Haida return, a future of care-full leadership, or a future of traditional authority. Larger social worlds unfold out of the constitution of particular futures. This is why, more than anything, I want to make clear in the final, concluding chapter of this dissertation that the political (if not the existential) significance of Haida future-making does not lie simply in the specific ways in which individual futures respond to particular dilemmas of the settler colonial present. Rather, what is most crucial about future-making as a way of thinking out from within the temporal brackets of settler colonialism’s deferred erasure is simply the fact of future-making itself. What matters the most is the capacity to say, as Haida rapper Ja$e ElNino does in a guest appearance in Starr’s song, “Now expect the best from the northwest/ What’s next? Just guess.” ElNino asserts the openness of the future, challenging his listeners to even attempt to predict the field of possibilities still to come. This does not mean, though, that this openness is unmoored. Quite the opposite, ElNino asks us to “expect the best of the northwest,” in response to the threat of Enbridge and, I think, more generally. In this spirit, in what follows I highlight the significance of location to indigenous futurity, exploring how Old Massett, its neighbouring communities along Masset Inlet, and the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii act as locations around which the very openness of Haida futures can be articulated. My discussion will be largely synthetic, reading together my previous chapters to attempt to arrive at a few conclusions for this dissertation at a whole. I begin with a discussion of Haida Gwaii, once again, as “home,” asking what it means to consider the islands as a Haida homeland (and one that requires “care” as such) in the light of the futures I have sketched out. I then draw on this to pose a few suggestions for the political anthropology of indigenous peoples and its abiding contemporary concern with sovereign rights and territoriality. Finally, I conclude by drawing out the multiple meanings of my titular phrase, “unsettling futures,” in the context of Haida futuremaking. Homeland Haida Gwaii is in at least some sense at the center of each of the futures I have discussed in this dissertation. It is the home to which Haida are expected (and expect) to return, the “cornucopia” of off-the-grid fantasy, the ongoing historical space of complex social and material relations that these fantasies elide, the perpetually at risk ecological landscape which demands (and authorizes) the CHN’s care and respect. And, as we have seen, these various futures for the islands are not isolated from one another. Quite the opposite, futures proliferate in response to each other. The potential for non-Haida homing necessitates strategic forms of future-oriented social integration to bring these new arrivals into respectful relations with the Haida world, the nightmare non-future of ecological collapse is warded off by the attempt to constitute care-full futures under Haida control. What all these Haida futures have in common – at least as they relate to the islands - is that they work to preserve Haida Gwaii, and the community of Old Massett in particular, as spaces in which Haida futures remain possible. This fact, as I have already begun to suggest in Chapter 2, might help us to resolve some of James Clifford’s dilemmas in relation to indigenous mobility. As I pointed towards then, the notion that “place” is significant to indigenous peoples – politically, socially, affectively, culturally – has become one of the essential components of how “indigeneity” is understood as a global phenomenon and a strategic identity from which rights claims can be advanced. Take Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their *distinctive spiritual relationship* with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard (Assembly 2007:10, emphasis mine). But what precisely does it mean to have a “distinctive, spiritual relationship” to a place, and who determines what might constitute that relationship? Here one of the perils of Povinelli’s “cunning of recognition,” as indigenous rights to territory become conflated with - and evaluated against - essentialized settler notions of Native ecological spirituality and/or emplacedness (cf: Raibmon 2005; Nadasdy 2003). If indigeneity thereby takes on the significance of being “rooted” in a particular place, of having certain identifiably “distinctive” cultural relationships to that place that others might lack, then the fact of indigenous mobility would indeed pose a profound dilemma for the category of indigeneity on the one hand and the capacity to make claims to territorial rights *qua* one’s indigeneity on the other. But there is a remarkable temporal shallowness to all this. To give a representative example, the Australian state criteria for what constitutes “cultural rights to territory” that Povinelli interrogates function solely in the past and the present, mandating that Aboriginal people show continuity of occupation and of the cultural practices associated with “Aboriginal occupation” in the mind of the court in order to be recognized as possessing a rightful claim to their home territories (Povinelli 2002). Erased in this is the possibility that a territory could be the site of departure and return, that it could have a future horizon that is flexible, subject to transformation alongside the transformations of the people(s) who call it home, without thereby necessarily losing its integrity as a rightful space of indigenous occupation. Such a possibility is not controversial for my Haida interlocutors. Rather, it has the status of an already-given certainty, community common sense - though there is without doubt much social work that goes into the production of that certainty. What makes indigenous mobility fraught, then, might have rather more to do with the constitution of settler polities than it does with the actual practices of indigenous peoples. Consider the various ways in which we have already seen colonial authorities attempt to control Haida movement, from the forced expulsions of 19th century Victoria to the removal of Haida children from the islands for residential schools less than a century later. Consider too the manufacture of the reserves themselves, the fixing of two Haida “Bands” with their own federally determined territories, beyond which Haida people could claim no rights over land, waters, or resources (cf: Harris 2002). This is a logic of containment, of isolation. In leaving their assigned spaces, Native peoples were assumed by colonial authorities to be leaving the space of their Nativeness behind, assimilating into settler society on its terms. Indeed, this was the motivating logic of the residential schools program, which took as its premise the idea that “Indians” could always “backslide” into “savage customs” as long as they remained in their homes and with their families. Aboriginal children thus had to be brought somewhere else to learn how to join “civilized,” that is, white Christian, society (Miller 1996). Reserves could thus be rendered as the last bastions of a “weird and waning race,” to quote Scott, their inhabitants temporally foreclosed and spatially fixed. The notion that indigenous people could move without ceasing to be (or ceasing to fight for their rights to self-determination and Title to their lands) unsettles this narrative, just as does the intertwined possibility of indigenous futurity. The relationship to Haida Gwaii that we’ve seen sketched out by the Haida futures explored in this dissertation does not preclude the possibility of “distinctive spiritual relationships” between Haida and their home territories. Quite the opposite, the ineffable quality of homing alone suggests that many of my interlocutors feel a connection to their home that goes beyond the kinds of practices that are only possible on the islands, their beauty or their history. Indeed, when considered as home, when considered as a site that requires care, there is little doubt that Haida Gwaii can encompass a wide range of phenomenological, affective, social, and cultural ways of relating to its lands and waters by Haida people (and their neighbours, at times for good, at times for ill). But it is not these relations as such that encompass the totality of Haida Gwaii’s significance. Rather, what is of greatest concern to my interlocutors is the continuing future possibility that relations like that *could be* formed, that people *could continue* to be called home to Haida Gwaii once they’ve fully explored the world off-island, that the qualities that precisely *make* Haida Gwaii home *could* be preserved. This is what it means, I think, to “take care” of Haida Gwaii, to allow it to continue as a homeland for uncounted future generations. Though they certainly emphasize the need for Haida Gwaii to be maintained as a location for Haida futurity, this does not mean that the futures we have seen expend all the possible ways in which such future forms of Haida social, material, ecological, and relational life could be formed. Recall Ja$e ElNino’s challenge of a future so open that its possible contents can only be guessed at. What Haida future-making demonstrates is that there are a set of potentialities which are worth protecting so that Haida people can continue to access them, to come home to them, even as continuing forms of mobility and political processes can also shape and reshape Haida social and cultural life on and off the islands. Homeland is not a regimented place where Haida people *must* always live in order to be authentically Haida. Rather, it is a location where they should always be able to, in their own (necessarily multiple, often contested, sometimes even contradictory) terms. Sovereignty At the same time, there is an inescapably political dimension to the attempt to render Haida Gwaii as the homeland of a still open Haida future. The assertion of the (located) openness of the future does not necessarily make it so. As I noted in the first part of this dissertation, the flow of Haida departures and returns unfold in the broader context of the settler, capitalist state; indeed, they are made necessary in part by the current absence of economic opportunity on island, just as the arrival of potentially threatening strangers is a result of their privileged position in the very capitalist economy they seek to escape. Constituting futures in which Haida people have the freedom to engage with that economy (and settler society more generally) as they see fit while retaining the capacity to come home (complicated as that process might be) also reiterates the inescapability of some form of engagement with that socio-economy. Likewise, the notion of Haida Gwaii as Haida homeland cannot be separated from current Haida struggles to assert their rights to the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii, the resources found therein, and their sovereign capacity to govern themselves and the islands in the ways they find appropriate. This is, recall, the very crux of the CHN’s own commitment to the assurance of futurity, as it is only by positioning itself as the rightful, sovereign government of the Haida Nation and its homeland of Haida Gwaii that it can adequately care for the islands and protect them from external threat. And the continuing advance of the Enbridge project despite fierce opposition from CHN, the Old Massett Village Council, their Haida constituents, and the non-Haida actors with whom they are “united against Enbridge” (and this alongside protest all over the northwest coast) gives the nightmare futures of environmental collapse – pushed through by corporate interests and Canadian politicians - a frightening immanence. The assertion of the openness of the future is made, in short, in (and against) a context in which closures remain endemic. And yet, something has changed in this landscape from the initial erasures of Native futurity we drew out in the first chapter. In the narratives of colonial actors like Duncan Campbell Scott, it was absolutely clear that “Indians” were disappearing because their social worlds were being superseded by more “civilized” ways of living and being, ones that these Native subjects would also, inevitably, in the end, adopt (or failing that, perish outright). There was a future. It was simply a settler one. But the nightmare futures of that my Haida interlocutors ward against in their own future-making reach beyond Haida life alone. Environmental collapse, most dramatically, threatens the sustainability of all life; toxins in the land and the waters threaten human lives regardless of their relative indigeneity, race, or gender (e.g. Choy 2011; Crate 2011). Put another way, the impetus for non-Haida (and non-First Nations subjects more generally) to be “united against Enbridge” with their indigenous neighbours comes in no small part because an oil spill also profoundly threatens the lives and livelihoods of non-Aboriginal coastal residents, a fact which Masa Takei, among others, made clear in Chapter 3. Nor is the anxiety that young people might abandon their small town to pursue economic and educational advantage in an urban context limited to reserve communities. Instead, the compulsions of capitalist economic life compel such migrations throughout the globe. The nightmare futures that Haida people constitute alternative futures to ward against are not just future of indigenous erasure under settler colonialism. They are erasures of settler society itself. There is thus an extraordinary political claim embedded in Haida future-making, a claim which gains its power precisely *because* Haida future-making as we have seen it does not (perhaps cannot) escape from the larger field of settler-colonial determination. Instead, in Haida future-making we find the implicit assertion that Haida people can make futures that address the dilemmas of Haida *and* settler life alike, ones that can at least “navigate,” to borrow Appadurai’s phrasing, towards possible futures that do not end in absolute erasure. If Povinelli and Byrd are correct and settler liberal governance makes itself possible and legitimate through a perpetual deferral of the problems of the present, then part of the power of Haida future-making is to expose the threatening non-futures that might emerge out of this bracketed present, to expose as lie the liberal promise of a good life always yet to come and to attempt to constitute alternatives. It is no coincidence that we find this in the midst of a struggle over sovereignty. And this not just in the sense of the Council of the Haida Nation’s ongoing assertion of its sovereign right to govern the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii on behalf of all Haida people, as we saw in Chapter 5. Rather, as Joanne Barker has argued, over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century sovereignty has emerged as a: particularly valued term within indigenous scholarship and social movements and through the media of cultural production. It [is] a term around which analyses of indigenous histories and cultures were organized and whereby indigenous activists articulate their agendas for social change (Barker 2005:18). Through the assertion of sovereignty, indigenous political leaders, activists and scholars refute “the dominant notion that indigenous people [are] merely one among many ‘minority groups’ under the administration of state social service and welfare programs.” Instead, “sovereignty defines indigenous people with concrete rights to self-government, territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy under international law” (18). The trouble is, of course, that indigenous claims to sovereignty are always made within the context of colonial nation-states, ones whose own legitimacy is put at considerably risk both by the prospect of self-determining indigenous Nations (re)-emerging within their boundaries and the troubling of their own historical narratives of sovereign rights (cf: Comaroff and Comaroff 2003b). (One of these narratives, which reinterpreted indigenous lands as *terra nullius* and thus open to occupation, we’ve encountered already in Chapter 3). Thus, while sovereignty might indeed “define” indigenous peoples with concrete rights to territorial Title and self-determination, in theory equal under international law to the states who also lay claim to their territories, that definition does not in and of itself make possible the *practice* of this sovereignty. In this regard settler states such as Canada have shifted in their response to First Peoples’ sovereignty claims from outright rejection to a set of policies of selective recognition,5 but even the latter still positions Native nations as being subject to the authority and oversight (if not the structural forms) of the state. This means, as we have seen in Chapter 5, that indigenous governments such as the Council of the Haida Nation are in a precarious position, attempting to constitute their own sovereign authority without access to many of the conventional means of sovereignty in Western political thought – e.g., the monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber 1946), decisive authority to make and enact law (Schmitt 2005), or exclusive territorial control (Brown 2010; cf: Hobbes 1994). Alongside this precarity is the equally anxious question of whether or not sovereignty is even an appropriate analytical to center indigenous rights around precisely because it is historically a Western concept, one that had been drawn on to dispossess indigenous peoples over the course of settler colonial history (Barker 2005:18–19). (Indeed, the very next essay in Barker’s edited volume, by Mohawk scholar Taiake Alfred, categorically rejects sovereignty as an inappropriate tool for indigenous political assertions for these reasons and, also, because it draws attention away from developing and furthering “genuinely” Aboriginal political modes of thought (Alfred 2005; cf: Alfred 2009). The fact that sovereignty remains such a preeminent concept in the struggle for indigenous rights even though it is both epistemologically problematic and politically constrained has meant that there has been a recent push in both anthropology and indigenous studies to “widen” the definition of sovereignty, so that it might encompass multiple forms of indigenous social, political and legal practice outside of the conventional purview of “sovereign power” (e.g. Cattelino 2008; Richland 2011; Simpson 2000; Simpson 2014). Or, as Joanne Barker puts it: There is no fixed meaning for what *sovereignty* is – what it means by definition, what it implies in public debate, or how it has been conceptualized in international, nation, or indigenous law. Sovereignty – and its related histories, perspectives, and identities – is embedded within the specific social relations in which it is invoked and given meaning. How and when it emerges and functions are determined by the “located” political agendas and cultural perspectives of those who rearticulate it into public debate or political document to do a specific work of opposition, invitation, or accommodation. It is no more possible to stabilize what *sovereignty* means and how it matters to those who invoke it than it is to forget the historical and cultural embeddedness of indigenous peoples’ multiple and contradictory political perspectives and agendas for empowerment, decolonization, and social justice (Barker 2005:21, emphasis original). The opening up of sovereignty as flexible, multiple, and subject to all manner of diverse rearticulations carries particular weight (and, perhaps, ambiguity) since, as a historical concept in Western political theory, sovereignty was overwhelmingly concerned with closure. As Wendy Brown argues in her Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, the classic vision of sovereign power rests in the capacity to divide the inside from the outside, to make borders around a people – a “nation” – and separate that people from those outside it. Thus Schmitt’s “friend-enemy” distinction, for instance, or even John Locke’s consistent preoccupation with fences as a way of marking the existence of territory (Brown 2010; cf: Schmitt 1996; Locke 1988). The historical conditions of indigenous sovereignty claims in the context of settler colonialism make such absolute closures impossible for indigenous peoples. We might add, though, that their persistent presence also challenges the closure of the settler nation-state. Indeed, this is part of Brown’s point. The very fact that we see ever more spectacular performances of sovereign power on the part of contemporary nation-states – e.g., the titular “walls” that are being constructed along the borders of an increasing number of states - is a sign of the very insecurity of their political authority (Brown 2010).6 The conditions of settler colonial sovereignty, in other words, may be rather more “open,” and thus closer to those of indigenous “nation-within-nations,” then they may at first appear. If this means, in turn, that the future of settler political life is becoming as uncertain as the future for indigenous life has always been since the advent of settlement, then this means only what we have already begun to see: the dilemmas that Haida people confront in their future-making practices are also the dilemmas facing settler society. Take Chapter 4, in which the absence of any “one” definitive governing entity compels the constitution of an aspirational framework of accountability which could, were it realized, render navigable Haida relations to the many governments that claim their loyalties. As I hinted at there, such dilemmas are not restricted to the Haida sociopolitical world; rather, they may in fact be endemic to contemporary democratic societies and the multiple forms of governance (licit and otherwise) that emerge therein. In suggesting that there are Haida ways of refiguring a shared Haida-settler set of contemporary problematics, we might think of Haida future-making as simultaneously an instantiation of the multiple, flexible and always contingently located practices of sovereignty to which Barker points and a different way of thinking about indigenous political potentiality. In the former sense, Haida future-making is without doubt concerned with carving out spaces in which Haida existence can continue, expand, and change without losing the capacity to reproduce itself as, precisely, Haida existence. Thus the processes of homecoming we explored in Chapter 2, or Chapter 5’s explicitly political attempts to establish control over the islands for future generations. If the absence of indigenous sovereignty is the absence of the capacity of an indigenous people to (self)-determine their own futures, then the constitution of Haida futures can be seen exactly as sovereign work, whether in the overt sense of the Council of the Haida Nation’s assertions or the somewhat more implicit mode of Alice Stevens’ proposed mass adoptions. Significant here, though, is the fact that these acts of future-making carry meanings beyond their status as “responses” to the social and political dilemmas of contemporary Haida life. Thus Alice Stevens’ adoptions bring “hippie” children into the framework of Haida kinship relations, in one sense neutralizing their potential threat, but also constituting a complex new network of social relations between Haida and non-Haida whose potential significances go well beyond the protection of Haida territory and resources; thus the Council of the Haida Nation emerges as a “state-like” governing entity through its authorizing promise to “take care” of the islands, but in so doing takes on a series of new roles in Haida political life whose full consequences remain to be seen. If it is a sovereign action to envision an opening of possible futures for Haida people, then this very openness might also exceed the boundaries of sovereignty as a problematic for indigenous people even as it responds to them. Which is also, perhaps, why Haida futures seem so consistently to sketch out social, ecological, and political fields that encompass non-Haida; more, that are futures for Canada as well as for the Haida people living within the nation-state’s borders. Or, at least, futures that have the capacity to be so. What would it mean to figure an indigenous sovereignty that speaks beyond itself, one that promises to invert the order of settler domination through reconfiguring the shared futures of indigenous and settler peoples? This would not be a sovereignty premised on territorial closure, or even absolute political autonomy. It would, however, decisively overturn any settler colonial anticipations of the inevitable erasure of Native peoples. Quite the opposite, it would position indigenous practices of anticipation, aspiration, certainty, and anxiety at the forefront of contemporary modes of political imagination. Unsettling Futures A question remains, however. Could such a refiguring of the temporal and political horizon of settler and indigenous relationships remain possible even if the futures that indigenous people work to constitute remain unrealized in the settler colonial present? Or, put another way, we must always be careful not to conflate a capacity *to* form new futures for settler nation-states with the actual materializations of these futures. The Haida futures that I have discussed, even as they promise possible ways of navigating – of restructuring, even – the settler-Haida present, remain firmly bound by the colonial constraints of this present. But perhaps the stakes here have never been about overthrowing the Canadian colonial order outright. Rather, what I hope this dissertation has shown is that Haida future-making has the capacity to *unsettle* the settler colonial present, to challenge its received categories and demonstrate how, slowly, gradually, Haida people are reconfiguring its terms thrugh the work of producing the future. Certainly, the sheer fact of Haida futurity should put to the lie any further notion that Haida people exist only to replicate their past or live only in the deferral of their eventual disappearance. The future is alive and well in Old Massett, although this does not meant that it is not also a site of profound anxieties. In working to ward off those anxieties through the juxtaposition of nightmare futures against their more desirable alternatives, then, Haida people unsettle the epistemological foundations of the forms of settler colonialism and liberalism against which Byrd and Povinelli write. At the same time (if you’ll pardon the pun), I think we can see the social work that futuremaking does iteratively, as a gradual reshaping of the actual conditions of Canadian society. Here I borrow Judith Butler’s suggestion, following Foucault, that the regulatory norms of society function only through their consistent and unstable reiteration (and materialization) in everyday social life.7 From this perspective, the ways in which Haida people work within and even reiterate the constraints and demands of Canadian settler mainstream society can also slowly and strategically *shift* those very constraints and demands, materializing a HaidaCanadian future that might in fact be quite different from the present even as it does not ever fully “escape” from its dilemmas. Perhaps the most unsettling potential of all here lies simply in the ways in which Haida people incorporate the conditions of the settler colonial present as being paths towards Haida futures. Not vanished, or vanquished. Ongoing.

#### Our alternative is to organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics

McLaren 6—Distinguished Fellow of Critical Studies at Chapman University, Professor of Urban Schooling at UCLA

(Peter, *“Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration,”* in *Journal of Advanced Composition*, Volume 21. Issue 3, 2006, <http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm>)

Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (*Totalitarianism* 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality* (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without revolution; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

## 2

#### Interpretation: The affirmative should instrumentally defend the implementation of a topical governmental action—They don’t.

#### Real world interpretation agrees — the resolution demands legislation

**Hurd, 81** – Justice for the Supreme Court of Kansas (J., State v. Kearns, 2/11/1981, 623 P.2d 507)

The language in Article 2, § 20 of the Kansas Constitution is clear, unambiguous and incapable of any interpretation other than prescribing mandatory wording for the enactment of a bill into law. The words "resolved" and "enacted" are words of art having acquired a very special meaning in the legislative process. We will not attempt to change or alter the definition of those words and thus render them meaningless.

#### Vote neg on fairness – their interp explodes limits and allows affs to monopolize the moral high ground. The lack of a stable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg ground via perms. Fairness is good and prior – debate’s a game that requires effective competition and negation, which makes their offense inevitable. Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters.

#### Self-questioning – the process of researching, thinking about, and reflecting on a topic prior to debating it changes minds. Without a predictable, limited resolution teams will resort to gut reactions that entrench biases.

Goodin & Niemeyer ‘3 (Robert; Simon; 2003; Australian National University; “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy”; Political Studies; Vol. 50; p. 627-649)

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had **become** entrenched, and unreflective public opinion **polarized** around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to **brush away** those highly polarized attitudes, **dispel** the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and **liberate** people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – **before the formal discussions** (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. **Talking among themselves**, as a jury, **did very little** of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s **engaging** with the issue – focusing on it, **acquiring information** about it, **thinking hard** about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking **cognitive shortcuts** or arriving at **‘top of the head’ conclusions** or even simply **following the lead** **of others** believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 199[4]. These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be **inconsistencies** in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or **incomplete information processing**. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more **deeply reflective deliberation** is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for **fixing one’s attention on a topic**, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the **shaping and reshaping** of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of **focusing attention on a topic**, providing information about it and inviting people to **think hard** about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they **think about the issue**. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be **open** to argument and counter-argument, with talk **actually changing minds**. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably **matter more** than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a **considerable impact** on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent **common ground** on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for **debate** **and** **resolution**, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (200[2] proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in **real-world politics** in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Civic engagement is key to redefine relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous people to create structural improvements

Lynne Davis 16, Associate Professor, Indigenous Studies at Trent University, “Fostering Citizen Engagement in Indigenous/Non-Indigenous Relations,” Presented at ‘Sharing the Land, Sharing a Future: A National Forum On Reconciliation,’ from 11-2 to 11-4, 2016, http://www.queensu.ca/sps/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.spswww/files/files/Events/Conferences/RCAP/Papers/LynneDavisRCAP%20Backgroundpaper.pdf

The TRC Calls to Action

In its Calls to Action, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission challenged different sectors of Canadian society to step up in bringing about changes in the lives of Indigenous peoples and in Indigenous-non-Indigenous relationships.2 Not only are various levels of governments seen to be initiators of structural, policy and program change, but also institutions and professional groups in sectors such as education, health, child welfare and justice. Diverse parties are called upon to respond to longstanding barriers and inequities that have served to perpetuate racism, discrimination and inequalities in the lives of Indigenous individuals and in Canadian society more generally. Governments, institutions, non-governmental organizations and faith communities are called upon to work in concert with Indigenous peoples and organizations to challenge the structural and attitudinal fabric of Canadian society. A broad program of public education is proposed to bring about changes in the education of youth, civil servants, professionals in different fields, and Canadian society as a whole. In Calls to Action #43 and #44, the TRC declares that the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the appropriate framework for reconciliation.

These calls to action echo the findings of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples whose final report released two decades earlier, concluded that a new relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people must be built based on mutual recognition, mutual respect, sharing and mutual responsibility.3 Despite the careful analysis that these recommendations represented, their transformative potential has not been realized. In their specificity, the TRC’s calls to action have provided concrete starting points for different parties to mobilize around particular goals. Indeed, it might be said that the TRC has issued a challenge to which institutions and organizations have felt a moral imperative to respond. As will be discussed in this paper, there has been a surge in initiatives from governments, educational institutions, arts organizations, faith communities and NGOs who have seen this invitation to action as a critical and perhaps redemptive moment in a history marked by cultural genocide, stolen lands, ignored sovereignty, broken treaty promises and racism.

In reflecting on the momentum of the present moment, however, it must be recognized that prior to the TRC report, there have been a long history of political mobilization by Indigenous peoples to assert their sovereignty and their rights and to change relationships with non-Indigenous peoples. 4 In response, Indigenous peoples have often been met with settler ignorance, racism, and active denigration of their rights. At the same time, some settler-allies have worked under the leadership of Indigenous peoples or through collaborative processes in support of specific issues or in defense of Indigenous territories. Through relationships of joint action, there has been significant learning over time that provides a foundation for the citizen engagement that is emerging in the wake of the TRC report.

“Citizen engagement” or the related phrase “civic engagement” have numerous definitions, but a common thread is the idea that citizens are actively engaged in organizing to bring about change in their communities.5 These phrases are often used in the context of promoting citizen participation within the context of liberal democracy and in ways that are generally sanctioned by the state (e.g. voting, signing petitions, demonstrations, participating in organizations). Such understandings are very appropriate to describe many of the activities in which Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples come together. At the same time, in discussing Indigenous-non-Indigenous solidarities, it is important to include also those solidarities that challenge the legitimacy of Canada’s imposition of its settler colonial sovereignty over Indigenous sovereignty. The discussion in this paper has sought to be as inclusive as possible in assessing the “fostering of citizen engagement in Indigenous-non-Indigenous relations”.

## Case

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the better debater—anything else is self-serving and arbitrary.

#### Vote neg on presumption –

#### [1] Process turn – using debate as a mode of advocacy ensures the failure of deconstruciton] – competition means debaters ally themselves with individuals who vote for them and alienate those who are positioned with the burden of rejoinder and forced to negate – at worst you vote negative on presumption because they don’t use debate as a stepping stone for their advocacy outside the space and don’t have a net benefit to affirming the 1ac

#### [2] Academia turn – the 1ac is a regurgitation of knowledge that already exists within academia which proves they aren’t a departure from the status quo and voting aff is not intrinsic to affirming their method

#### [3] Competition turn – competition ensures they refine the aff according to what best wins them ballots from judges not according to what actually best resolves violence for individuals outside debate – ensures their method can’t scale up and gets coopted by problematic norms in the debate community

#### Calls for refusal reproduce the colonial academic ways of knowing they criticize – the 1AC reinforces the status quo and produces academic distancing which merely masquerades as personal accountability

Heather Love 15, R. Jean Brownlee Term Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary”, differences 2015 Volume 26, Number 1: 74-95

Today, queer studies—prestigious but unevenly institutionalized—still signals absolute refusal or criticality—all anti- and no normativity. In their influential 2004 essay, “The University and the Undercommons” (and in the 2013 book that followed from it), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney rely on such an understanding of queer (as well as concepts borrowed from black studies, feminism, ethnic studies, and anticolonial thought). They call for betrayal, refusal, theft, and marronage as modes of resisting the iron grip of the academy, pointing to an uncharted, underground, and collective space they call the undercommons. “To enter this space,” they write, “is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons” (103). Moten and Harney speculate whether the “thought of the outside” (105) is possible inside the university and suggest that if there is an outside, it is along the margins and at the bottom. Yet their imagination of that outside is indebted to the inside, in particular to the conception of deviance produced within sociology. Their account of the undercommons reads like a rap sheet, a list of the traditional topics of deviance studies: theft, homosexuality, prostitution, incarceration. Moten and Harney do not describe the undercommons, but rather ask their readers to join it, to participate in active revolt against professional and disciplinary protocols. To offer an objective account of the social position of radical academics would be to further business as usual in the academy; dwelling in the undercommons requires giving up on the usual protocols of description. Moten and Harney argue against the traditional role of the “critical academic” (105), which they see as just another turn of the professional screw, since work that opposes the academy does not challenge its basic structure or everyday operations. They argue that “to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and to be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of the internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions” (105). In contrast to the figure of the critical academic, they forward the image of the “subversive intellectual” who is “in but not of” the academy (101). Without dismissing the galvanizing effect of such a call to the undercommons, it is important to consider the limits of the refusal of objectification as a strategy. To be unlocatable, to be nowhere, to be in permanent revolt: Moten and Harney describe the path that queer inquiry laid out for itself. Objectification—recognition, description, critique—can be a way to reinforce the status quo, but it is also a way of acknowledging one’s institutional position and the real differences between inside and outside. Even the most subversive intellectuals in the academy are “on the stroll” in a metaphorical but not a material sense. The fate of those who came “under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love” (101), if they survive, is to become “superordinates” in Becker’s sense. Whose side are we on? Can we hold onto the critical and polemical energy of queer studies as well as its radical experiments in style and thought while acknowledging our implication in systems of power, management, and control? Will a more explicit avowal of disciplinary affiliations and methods snuff out the utopian energies of a field that sees itself as a radical outsider in the university? To date, both the political and the methodological antinormativity of queer studies have made it difficult to address our implication in the violence of knowledge production, pedagogy, and social inequality. Such violence is inevitable, and critical histories of the disciplines—and the production of knowledge about social deviance—are essential. Undertaking such work, however, will not allow escape into a radically different relation to our objects because we are (as Moten and Harney also argue) part of that history—we are its contemporary instantiation. To imagine a social world in which those relations are transformed—in what Moten and Harney refer to as the “prophetic organization” (102)—may be crucial for the achievement of social justice, but to deny our own implication in existing structures is also a form of violence.

#### “Rejecting settler thinking” conceives of a singular, collective settler agency—this is false.

Tim ROWSE 14, former Professorial Fellow in the School of Humanities and Communication Arts and is Emeritus Professor in the Institute for Culture and Society, Western Sydney University [“Indigenous Heterogeneity,” Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2014, p. 297-310]

My third point has to do with the evocation of settler colonial collective agency as tactical, shape-shifting, never absent, but variously manifest. There seem to be two quite different versions of this settler colonial agency. On the one hand, one evokes its adaptive fluidity, as the structure of settler colonial society somehow finds and invents the agents that perform the myriad tasks of elimination, erasure and repressive recognition; the settler colonial structure is always tactically resourceful in the agencies of its deployment. On the other hand, settler colonial agency is evoked as a collective agent, an enduring national psyche that is anxious, divided, ambivalent, troubled by unresolvable tensions within its project. The attribution of affect to the settler colonial mentality or archive preserves the idea of a singular collective settler agency, as if settler colonies were persons. It would be easy to exaggerate the idea that settler colonial ambivalence can be narrated as ‘anxiety’. While I have no doubt that there have been anxious agents, the characterisation of particular settler colonial agents as ‘anxious’ is not easy to support empirically, and as a reader I have often had the feeling that the writer depicting ‘anxiety’ is ‘presentist’: ‘From the standpoint of my values, what you did and said back then should have made you anxious’. A more impersonal analysis enables us to move from anxious agents to contending structures. It is more productive, I suggest, to account more impersonally for ‘settler colonial society’, to evoke it in terms of structures and tendencies to which agents get recruited; I am sympathetic to Wolfe’s structuralism. However, I am not persuaded by his presentation of a singular structure’s relentless consistency, its inexorable logic (of ‘elimination’ or of anything else). Wolfe’s emplotment of settler colonialism interpellates the historian/reader in a compact of epistemological and political certainty: we know what’s going to happen because it always does. My contrary preference is to see history as less predictable, messier, more surprising and occasionally more hopeful. The recent contention of ‘Indigeneities’ has invigorated my uncertainties. Settler colonial projects give rise to many different kinds of institutions and ethical cultures, and in the duration and physical size of settler colonies (particularly Australia, a vast space whose colonial occupation remains a work in progress) there are many opportunities for diverse settler colonial formations to co-exist. I emphasise ‘contending structures’ in order to distance my approach from the search for the single ‘structure’ that seems to drive Patrick Wolfe towards seeing so many different phenomena as manifestations of the structure of elimination. The tensions structured within the settler colonial project interest me because they seem to me to offer a better chance of understanding historically the diverse ‘Indigeneities’ that we now can see.

#### Their political nihilism spreads beyond the classroom – it empowers violent conservatives like Trump – forsaking compromise is a dangerous, academic luxury

Claudio, 16 --- assistant professor of development studies and southeast Asian studies at the Ateneo de Manila University (7/1/2016, Lisandro, “Intellectuals have ushered the world into a dangerous age of political nihilism,” qz.com/721914/intellectuals-have-ushered-the-world-into-a-dangerous-age-of-political-nihilism/)

On the surface, it would seem that intellectuals have nothing to do with the rise of global illiberalism. The movements powering Brexit, Donald Trump and Third-World strongmen like Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte all gleefully reject books, history and higher education in favor of railing against common enemies like outsiders and globalization. And you’ll find few Trump supporters among the largely left-wing American professoriate. Yet **intellectuals are accountable** for the rise of these movements—albeit indirectly. Professors have offered stringent criticisms of neoliberal society. But they have failed to offer the public viable **alt**ernative**s**. In this way, they have promoted a **political nihilism** that has set the stage for new movements that reject liberal democratic principles of tolerance and institutional reform. Intellectuals have a long history of critiquing liberalism, which relies on a “philosophy of individual rights and (relatively) free markets.” Beginning in the 19th century, according to historian Francois Furet, left-wing thinkers began to arrive at a consensus “that modern liberal democracy was threatening society with dissolution because it atomized individuals, made them indifferent to public interest, weakened authority, and encouraged class hatred.” For most of the 20th century, anti-liberal intellectuals were able to come up with alternatives. Jean-Paul Sartre famously defended the Soviet Union even when it became clear that Joseph Stalin was a mass murderer. French, American, Indian, and Filipino university radicals were hopelessly enamored of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution in the 1970s. The collapse of Communism changed all this. Some leftist intellectuals began to find hope in small revolutionary guerrillas in the Third World, like Mexico’s Subcomandante Marcos. Others fell back on pure critique. Academics are now mostly gadflies who rarely offer strategies for political change. Those who do forward alternatives propose ones so vague or divorced from reality that they might as well be proposing nothing. (The Duke University professor of romance studies Michael Hardt, for example, thinks the evils of modern globalization are so pernicious that only worldwide love is the answer.) Such thinking promotes political hopelessness. It rejects gradual change as cosmetic, while patronizing those who think otherwise. This nihilism **easily spreads from the classroom** and academic journals to op-ed pages to Zuccotti Park, and eventually to the public at large. For academic nihilists, the shorthand for the world’s evils is “neoliberalism.” The term is used to refer to a free market ideology that forced globalization on people by reducing the power of governments. The more the term is used, however, the more it becomes a vague designation for all global drudgery. Democratic politics in the age of neoliberalism, according to Harvard anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff, is “something of a pyramid scheme: the more it is indulged, the more it is required.” They argue that our belief that we can use laws and constitutional processes to defend our rights is a form of “fetishism” that is ultimately “chimerical.” For the University of Chicago literary theorist Lauren Berlant, the democratic pursuit of happiness amid neoliberalism is nothing but “cruel optimism.” The materialist things that people desire are “actually an obstacle to your flourishing,” she writes. According to this logic, we are trapped by our own ideologies. It is this logic that allows left-wing thinkers to implicitly side with British nativists in their condemnation of the EU. The radical website Counterpunch, for example, describes the EU as a “neoliberal prison.” It also views liberals seeking to reform the EU as “coopted by the right wing and its goals—from the subversion of progressive economic ideals to neoliberalism, to the enthusiastic embrace of neoconservative doctrine.” Across the Atlantic, Trump supporters are singing a similar tune. Speaking to a black, gay, college-educated Trump supporter, Samantha Bee was told: “We’ve had these disasters in neoconservatism and neoliberalism and I think that he [Trump] is an alternative to both those paths.” The academic nihilists and the Trumpists are in agreement about a key issue: The system is fundamentally broken, and liberals who believe in working patiently toward change are weak. For the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “indifference” is the “the hallmark of political liberalism.” Since liberals balance different interests and rights, Santos writes, they have no permanent friends or foes. He proposes that the world needs to “revive the friend/foe dichotomy.” And in a profane way, it has: modern political movements pit Americans against Muslims, Britain against Europe, a dictatorial government against criminals. Unfortunately, academic anti-liberalism is not confined to the West. The Cornell political scientist Benedict Anderson once described liberal democracy in the Philippines as a “Cacique Democracy,” dominated by feudal landlords and capitalist families. In this system, meaningful reform is difficult, since the country’s political system is like a “well-run casino,” where tables are rigged in favor of oligarch bosses. Having a nihilist streak myself, I once echoed Anderson when I chastised Filipino nationalists for projecting “hope onto spaces within an elite democracy.” Like Anderson, I offered no alternative. The alternative arrived recently in the guise of the Duterte, the new president of the Philippines. Like Anderson and me, Duterte complained about the impossibility of real change in a democracy dominated by elites and oligarchs. But unlike us, he proposed a way out: a strong political leader who was willing to kill to save the country from criminals and corrupt politicians. The spread of global illiberalism is unlikely to end soon. As this crisis unfolds, we will need intellectuals who use their intellects for more than simple negation—professors like the late New York University historian Tony Judt, who argued that European-style social democracy could save global democracy. Failing that, we need academics who acknowledge that liberal democracy, though slow and imperfect, enables a bare minimum of tolerance in a world beset by xenophobia and hatred. For although **academics have the luxury of imagining a completely different world, the rest of us have to figure out what to do with the one we have**.

#### Coloniality is not a metaphor, not a joint struggle for human rights, and not a fight against whiteness – it cannot be incorporated or encapsulted into some new form of scholarship – you cannot decolonize land by voting affirmative at a highschool debate tournament – there is no way to graft the struggle into this space, and their attempt to do so only decenters decoloniality

Eve Tuck is an assistant professor of educational foundations at the State University of New York at New Paltz. Her writing, which has been concerned with Indigenous theories, qualitative research, research ethics, and theories of change, has appeared in the Harvard Educational Review, the Urban Review and several edited volumes, including Ethical Futures in Qualitative Research and the Handbook of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies. and K. Wayne Yang is an assistant professor at UC San Diego. Ph.D., 2004, Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley. 2012 [“Decolonization is not a metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-­‐40, http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/download/18630/15554]

Our goal in this article is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization. Decolonization brings about the repatriation of Indigenous land and life; it is not a metaphor for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. The easy adoption of decolonizing discourse by educational advocacy and scholarship, evidenced by the increasing number of calls to “decolonize our schools,” or use “decolonizing methods,” or, “decolonize student thinking”, turns decolonization into a metaphor. As important as their goals may be, social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches that decenter settler perspectives have objectives that may be incommensurable with decolonization. Because settler colonialism is built upon an entangled triad structure of settler-native-slave, the decolonial desires of white, nonwhite, immigrant, postcolonial, and oppressed people, can similarly be entangled in resettlement, reoccupation, and reinhabitation that actually further settler colonialism. The metaphorization of decolonization makes possible a set of evasions, or “settler moves to innocence”, that problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. In this article, we analyze multiple settler moves towards innocence in order to forward “an ethic of incommensurability” that recognizes what is distinct and what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. We also point to unsettling themes within transnational/Third World decolonizations, abolition, and critical spaceplace pedagogies, which challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors, making room for more meaningful potential alliances. Keywords: decolonization, settler colonialism, settler moves to innocence, incommensurability, Indigenous land, decolonizing education 2 E. Tuck & K.W. Yang Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a natural shock, nor of a friendly understanding. Decolonization, as we know, is a historical process: that is to say it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content. -Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1963, p. 36 Let us admit it, the settler knows perfectly well that no phraseology can be a substitute for reality. -Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1963, p. 45 Introduction For the past several years we have been working, in our writing and teaching, to bring attention to how settler colonialism has shaped schooling and educational research in the United States and other settler colonial nation-states. These are two distinct but overlapping tasks, the first concerned with how the invisibilized dynamics of settler colonialism mark the organization, governance, curricula, and assessment of compulsory learning, the other concerned with how settler perspectives and worldviews get to count as knowledge and research and how these perspectives - repackaged as data and findings - are activated in order to rationalize and maintain unfair social structures. We are doing this work alongside many others who - somewhat relentlessly, in writings, meetings, courses, and activism - don’t allow the real and symbolic violences of settler colonialism to be overlooked. Alongside this work, we have been thinking about what decolonization means, what it wants and requires. One trend we have noticed, with growing apprehension, is the ease with which the language of decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social sciences, supplanting prior ways of talking about social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives. Decolonization, which we assert is a distinct project from other civil and human rights-based social justice projects, is far too often subsumed into the directives of these projects, with no regard for how decolonization wants something different than those forms of justice. Settler scholars swap out prior civil and human rights based terms, seemingly to signal both an awareness of the significance of Indigenous and decolonizing theorizations of schooling and educational research, and to include Indigenous peoples on the list of considerations - as an additional special (ethnic) group or class. At a conference on educational research, it is not uncommon to hear speakers refer, almost casually, to the need to “decolonize our schools,” or use “decolonizing methods,” or “decolonize student thinking.” Yet, we have observed a startling number of these discussions make no mention of Indigenous peoples, our/their1 struggles for the recognition of our/their sovereignty, or the contributions of Indigenous intellectuals and activists to theories and frameworks of decolonization. Further, there is often little recognition given to the immediate context of settler colonialism on the North American lands where many of these conferences take place. Of course, dressing up in the language of decolonization is not as offensive as “Navajo print” underwear sold at a clothing chain store (Gaynor, 2012) and other appropriations of Indigenous cultures and materials that occur so frequently. Yet, this kind of inclusion is a form of enclosure, dangerous in how it domesticates decolonization. It is also a foreclosure, limiting in how it recapitulates dominant theories of social change. On the occasion of the inaugural issue of Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society, we want to be sure to clarify that decolonization is not a metaphor. When metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future. Decolonize (a verb) and decolonization (a noun) cannot easily be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even if they are critical, even if they are anti-racist, even if they are justice frameworks. The easy absorption, adoption, and transposing of decolonization is yet another form of settler appropriation. When we write about decolonization, we are not offering it as a metaphor; it is not an approximation of other experiences of oppression. Decolonization is not a swappable term for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. Decolonization doesn’t have a synonym. Our goal in this essay is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization - what is unsettling and what should be unsettling. Clearly, we are advocates for the analysis of settler colonialism within education and education research and we position the work of Indigenous thinkers as central in unlocking the confounding aspects of public schooling. We, at least in part, want others to join us in these efforts, so that settler colonial structuring and Indigenous critiques of that structuring are no longer rendered invisible. Yet, this joining cannot be too easy, too open, too settled. Solidarity is an uneasy, reserved, and unsettled matter that neither reconciles present grievances nor forecloses future conflict. There are parts of the decolonization project that are not easily absorbed by human rights or civil rights based approaches to educational equity. In this essay, we think about what decolonization wants. There is a long and bumbled history of non-Indigenous peoples making moves to alleviate the impacts of colonization. The too-easy adoption of decolonizing discourse (making decolonization a metaphor) is just one part of that history and it taps into pre-existing tropes that get in the way of more meaningful potential alliances. We think of the enactment of these tropes as a series of moves to innocence (Malwhinney, 1998), which problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. Here, to explain why decolonization is and requires more than a metaphor, we discuss some of these moves to innocence: 1 As an Indigenous scholar and a settler/trespasser/scholar writing together, we have used forward slashes to reflect our discrepant positionings in our pronouns throughout this essay. 4 E. Tuck & K.W. Yang i. Settler nativism ii. Fantasizing adoption iii. Colonial equivocation iv. Conscientization v. At risk-ing / Asterisk-ing Indigenous peoples vi. Re-occupation and urban homesteading Such moves ultimately represent settler fantasies of easier paths to reconciliation. Actually, we argue, attending to what is irreconcilable within settler colonial relations and what is incommensurable between decolonizing projects and other social justice projects will help to reduce the frustration of attempts at solidarity; but the attention won’t get anyone off the hook from the hard, unsettling work of decolonization. Thus, we also include a discussion of interruptions that unsettle innocence and recognize incommensurability.

#### Settler-colonialism not a root cause of all violence or ontological – this overdetermines the geographical and historical dimensions of systems

Ribeiro 11 – (2011, Gustavo Lins, PhD in Anthropology, Ángel Palerm Chair of the Autonomous Metropolitan University of Iztapalapa (Mexico City) and is a Distinguished Scholar at the Iberoamericana University, “Why (post)colonialism and (de)coloniality are not enough: a postimperialist perspective,” Postcolonial Studies, 14:3, 285-297)

In this section, I will make a few general concluding remarks and will draw conclusions that are specific to the Brazilian scenario but that relate to the need to further develop post-imperialist perspectives.

In spite of the power of structuration of colonialism, it cannot be seen as an overall force determining all current sociological, economic, political and cultural scenarios in previously colonized nation-states. The duration of the post-colonial period and the prominence of the coloniality of power vary in different historical settings. The definition of such moments needs to be found on a case-by-case basis. I would argue that in Bolivia, for instance, the moment of shift from the prominence of the coloniality of power to the beginning of the construction of the nationality of power happened only with the election of Evo Morales as president in 2006. This leads me to think that the close relation between the formulation of the theory on the coloniality of power and the political life of Andean countries such as Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, is an index of the relative strength of the power of structuration of colonialism in these countries. In view of the variability of glocal historical experiences, the ‘nationality of power’ cannot be subsumed under colonial frameworks of analysis, nor under globalized ones; it is a specific object of enquiry. Therefore a more complete framework of analysis includes causal hierarchies that are sensitive to the different geographies and histories of colonialism and of nation-building, the power of structuration of which varies over time according to the outcome of different historical conflicts in different nation-states. In sum, former colonies are differently subject, today, to the diverse powers of structuration stemming from the coloniality of power, the nationality of power (which includes the histories, specificities and contradictions of the local and regional levels) and the globality of power. All of the latter needs to be understood within the framework of an ever expanding capitalist political economy with its dynamics and contradictions.

Throughout the postcolonial and national history of Brazil, a strong ideology of the ruling elites developed, according to which the country is destined to become a world power. The construction and consolidation of Brasilia as the country’s new capital was a most important step in the development of the Brazilian nationality of power; it reassured the ‘great destiny of Brazil’ to nationalist ideologues and reinforced the discursive matrix of a powerful future. In the current moment of the world system, especially after the 20082009 crisis when the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) became the most publicized examples of fast response to the crisis, the sense that the ‘sleeping giant’ is about to wake up has increased within Brazilian political and economic elites. It is already possible to see that Brasilia will become in the near future the capital city of a major global player with part of its elite with (sub)imperialist pretensions.29 The role of critical thought in Brazil in this regard is to make a preemptive move in order to go beyond such pretensions and favour the rise not only of a post-imperialist capital city but also of a post-imperialist country. By this I mean a kind of cosmopolitics that imagines a world system without imperialisms and fosters national formulations and actions in international arenas that stress and truly promote cooperation and peace at the same time that it criticizes inequality and war. To do that there is a need to dedicate more time to a post-imperialist imagination, critique and programme; to dedicate, in sum, more time to utopian struggles than to ideological ones. Post-imperialism would thus be a cosmopolitics capable of pointing to new moments of the world system and its unfoldings.

#### The aff is an analytically useless category – fails to explain violence – focus and reform upon the nation-state’s policies is more productive

Ribeiro 11 – (2011, Gustavo Lins, PhD in Anthropology, Ángel Palerm Chair of the Autonomous Metropolitan University of Iztapalapa (Mexico City) and is a Distinguished Scholar at the Iberoamericana University, “Why (post)colonialism and (de)coloniality are not enough: a postimperialist perspective,” Postcolonial Studies, 14:3, 285-297)

The stress on colonialism, neo-colonialism, internal colonialism, postcolonialism and the coloniality of power is welcome. No one doubts the power of structuration of colonialism. However, I would like to explore the idea that we cannot think of the ‘structural power’ of colonialism as a lasting force that always overruns others, especially those that are unleashed by what might be called ‘the nationality of power’. 21 For me, postcolonialism and the coloniality of power coexist in different forms and intensities, in different national scenarios, with the nationality of power as well as with the globality of power. On the one hand, however strong transnational forces may be, we cannot diffuse the power of nation-states in global entities such as the world system, nor can we reduce them to mechanic responses to supranational dynamics. On the other hand, colonialism cannot become an interpretive panacea, nor the latest example of historical determinism. The fact that peripheral countries are the privileged scenario for postcolonial and decolonial interpretations becomes a problem when we realize that the most powerful nation-state of current times, the United States, is a former British colony. If the explanation for this exception is that there are different colonial experiences that may result in different postcolonial and decolonial experiences then subalternity within the world system is not a necessary result of the colonial experience or an intrinsic quality of postcoloniality and decoloniality. What I am saying is that an overemphasis on colonialism and on coloniality can curiously (re)generate precisely what needs to be criticized and surpassed: an explanation that accepts subalternity as a destiny of former colonies. My argument calls for a sharper consideration of the ‘causal hierarchies’ among colonialism and other historical processes in diverse concrete scenarios.22 I am implying that by transforming colonialism and not capitalism into the primordial focus of analysis we underestimate the current importance of nation-states and their elites, as well as deviate from understanding the particular characteristics of the power relations of the current relationships between nation-states and the world system. In some places, these relationships are 200 years old or more, if we include in our list the US, the first politically independent modern republic. Isn’t this a sufficient amount of time to create particular interests and dynamics that are central to the construction of any future scenario? If one of the aims of critical theory is to overcome an unjust past and contribute to the construction of a different future, then utopias are a most important object of desire in the progressive intellectual scene. While I am favourable to ideological struggles\*without them it wouldn’t be possible to denaturalize the naturalized present\*I want to advocate for more utopian struggles in a juncture where there is a dearth of future scenarios strong enough to galvanize the imagination of a great number of political actors. This is one of the reasons why I offered the notion of post-imperialism. Living in a world region that has a longstanding experience with imperialism\*in its soft and hard expressions\*the imagining of life after imperialism can prove to be an exercise in creativity and audacity\*qualities many times denied to the ‘subalterns’.

#### Now refuse their call for the ballot –

#### A – Ballots as social change bad

Karlberg 3 (Michael, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE & CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left\*\* under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facng us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

#### B – Ballot isn’t a currency, you are neither changing the state nor the state of debate – debates are insulated, makes judges the authorities to decide the validity of struggle and acceptableness of their deviance which’s oppressive, and excludes those who don’t win by assuming their grievances are illegitimate sans ballots – turns case.

Bankey 13 (BRENDON BANKEY – A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Communication August 2013 – Bankey holds an BA from Trinity and now holds an MA from Wake Forest. This thesis was approved by: Michael J. Hyde, Ph.D., Advisor; Mary M. Dalton, Ph.D., Chair; R. Jarrod Atchison, Ph.D. THE “FACT OF BLACKNESS” DOES NOT EXIST: AN EVOCATIVE CRITICISM OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC IN ACADEMIC POLICY DEBATE AND ITS (MIS)USE OF FRANTZ FANON’S BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS – From Chapter Two – footnoting Atchison and Panetta and consistent with Bankey’s defense of an aspect of their position – http://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/39020/Bankey\_wfu\_0248M\_10473.pdf)

For Atchison and Panetta , “the ballot” a judge casts at the conclusion of a debate should signify nothing more or less than that person’s decision “to vote for the team that does the best debating.” This understanding encourages judges to limit their analysis of a debate to the arguments presented within each team’ s allotted times to speak. It would exclude decisions focused on resolving external abuses such as: determining the appropriateness of statements or events between a team or program that occurred outside of the immediate debate; challenging a school’s succ ess at “recruiting minority participants”; criticizing the civil rights legacy of participants’ academic institutions; or increasing the presence of underrepresented bodies in elimination debates. By contrast, some non - traditional teams interested in challenging the marginalizing effects of policy debate formats have begun to advocate what I call a “ballot as currency” model for judges to evaluate debates. While the specific terminology is not universally employed, the “ballot as currency” approach establis hes that a judge’s ballot signifies what bodies and practices she deems appropriate for policy debate. Within this model, a non - traditional team’s ability to accumulate wins is a referendum on the perceived acceptableness of their bodies for academic spaces. Beyond the structural factors that limit the visibility of any individual debate, Atchison and Panetta identify two problems with the “ballot as currency” method for evaluating debates. First, the “ballot as currency” approach presents the dilemma of “ asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem ” with very “few participants ” (generally the other people in the room) allowed to take a stake in the process. This places the course of community change on the shoulders of those who judge debates between traditional and non - traditional teams and excludes those “coaches and directors who are not preferred judges and, therefore, do not have access to many debates.” Furthermore, it excludes those “who might want to contribute to community conversation, but are not directly involved in competition.” Prioritizing the “ballot as currency” approach fails to recognize that “debate community is broader than the individual participants” of a given debate and risks the creation of “an insulated community that has a ll the answers” without ever engaging those concerned individuals who do not attend every competition. The result is that a very narrow set of judges, usually those that often judge Framework debates, are granted the authority to determine the outcome of communal change. 21

#### C– Turns Case – over-investing in the ballot’s “political force” renders challenges to their impacts into local self help – the ballot only decides win or loss

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

Constructivism and the Malleable World.Presumably drawing on the work of Judith Butler (1993, p. 28),5 **Foss, Waters, and Armada argue that orienting oneself as the ‘‘director’’ of one’s life is in tune with a tenet acknowledged by a number of diverse perspectives, ranging from social constructionism to quantum physics. Simply put, it is that symbols create reality*. . . .* Symbolic choices *. . .* can and do affect the structural world*. . . .*** Although the reality of everyday life appears prearranged, ordered, and objective, and therefore outside of agents’ sphere of influence *. . .* the structural world not only ‘‘bears cultural constructions’’ but is itself a construction. (p. 220) **Because the structural world is itself a construction, individuals are capable of changing that world by thinking and making choices about it.** Although the authors acknowledge that ‘‘agents cannot *. . .* lay out precisely the routes through which their desires will be fulfilled,’’ they nevertheless believe that ‘‘desires are realized in outcomes that align with agents’ choices’’ because of the ontological status of the structural world as a construction (p. 220). The key to understanding the ideal of agentic orientation is *full consciousness*: In order to change the construction of the world, one must understand what options are available and put faith in unforeseen possibilities yet to come (pp. 220–221). **Such a position is entirely in keeping with the ‘‘core concept’’ of magic: ‘‘that mind affects matter, and that *. . .* the trained imagination can alter the physical world’’** (Luhrman, p. 7).6 Not surprisingly, Rhonda Byrne also aligns ‘‘The Secret’’ with quantum physics (p. 156); however, constructivism appears in *The Secret* most conspicuously in the guise of ‘‘the law of attraction,’’ which Bob Doyle, ‘‘author and law of attraction specialist,’’ defines simply as ‘‘like attracts like’’ at ‘‘a level of thought.’’ Byrne elaborates: The law of attraction says *like attracts like*, and so as you think a thought, you are also attracting *like* thoughts to you*. . . .* Your life right now is a reflection of your past thoughts. That includes all the great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life . . . Until now! Now you are learning The Secret, and with this knowledge, you can change everything. (pp. 8–9) Changing everything depends on understanding the ontological primacy of attraction, which is best grasped as a form of magnetism (even though magnetism is, in physics, the attraction of *opposites*): ‘‘Thoughts are magnetic, and thoughts have a frequency,’’ explains Byrne. ‘‘As you think, those thoughts are sent out into the Universe, and they magnetically attract all *like* things that are on the same frequency’’ (p. 10). Nevertheless, as with Foss, Waters, and Armada, Byrne and her army of specialists insist on the constructedness of reality and the mutability of structure. ‘‘Time,’’ for example, is just an illusion: Einstein told us that. If this is the first time you have heard it, you may find it a hard concept to get your head around*. . . .* What quantum physicists and Einstein tell us is that everything is happening simultaneously*. . . .* It takes no time for the Universe to manifest what you want. Any time delay you experience is due to your delay in getting to the place of believing, knowing, and feeling that you already have it. (p. 63) The concept of temporality is used here to teach readers a certain version of constructivism, which is similar to the version Foss, Waters, and Armada advance in their reading of *Run Lola Run*: all three runs in the film happen at the same time, but reflect different levels of believing, knowing, and feeling. Once Lola understood the mutability of reality and the power of her manipulation of symbols, she could magically bend the laws of the Universe for money**. Similarly, Byrne writes, ‘‘[i]t’s as easy to manifest one dollar as it is to manifest one million dollars’’ if you simply have the right mindset (p. 68). Although we do not dismiss certain forms of constructivist thought, it is important to detail the consequence or ‘‘outcome’’ of choosing magical voluntarism. Both *The Secret* and Foss, Waters, and Armada invoke physics to argue that structural change is possible for *anything you desire* through conscious thought and choice.** Hence, magical voluntarism denies that some material and social conditions are not changeable: Agentic orientations *. . .* are achieved within, rather than simply given by, the conditions of individuals’ lives. Thus, individuals may be in a dominant position as defined by economic and other structural conditions or in a subordinate position as defined by a lack of access to such resources, *but they may choose any agentic orientation and produce any outcome they desire*. We acknowledge that such a view may be difficult to accept in extreme cases such as imprisonment or genocide; even in these situations, however, agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency. Even in these situations, adoption of the agentic orientation of director opens up opportunities for innovating in ways unavailable to those who construct *themselves* as victims. (p. 223, emphasis added) In other words, the starving prisoner in a concentration camp should choose the director orientation and dream-up the possibility of her liberation or escape.7 Aside from the offensiveness of such a perspective on imprisonment and genocide, what is **the *outcome* of adopting this ontological view about ‘‘structural’’ conditions? *The Secret* is quite clear on the answer: *narcissistic complacency*. ‘‘Anything we focus on we do create,’’ explains Hale Dwoskin, ‘‘so if we’re *really angry*, for instance, at a war that’s going on, or strife or suffering, we’re adding our energy to it’’ (pp. 141–142). So although the rhetoric of magic exemplified by *The Secret* acknowledges structural injustice, it gets explained away in mystical terms that urge the reader to turn her back to the world and seek within.** The video and book openly discourage social protest, invoking Carl Jung’s phrase, ‘‘what you resist persists’’ (p. 142). ‘‘Don’t give energy to what you don’t want,’’ intones one of the video’s ‘‘teachers.’’ For example, the DVD segment on wealth begins with black-and-white footage of sweatshop laborers in dreary factories, but sweatshops are a mere blip on the screen. Immediately, the text explains that today one can be free from such exploitation and drudgery simply by wishing for money.8 The real world outcome of the constructivism that supports magical voluntarism is ultimately selfish inaction. ‘‘You cannot help the world by focusing on the negative things,’’ says Byrne. ‘‘When I discovered The Secret I made a decision that I would not watch the news or read newspapers anymore, because it did not make me feel good’’ (pp. 144–145). Although professional scholars in the United States may be buffered from some of the vagaries of economic crisis and barriers to achievement, there are, in fact—as opposed to the fantasy of a filmic game or magnetizing your desires into reality—millions of people around the world who cannot wish away the ‘‘conditions, people, or events external to them’’ (p. 209). Nongovernmental organizations, grassroots banks and crafts projects, and other forms of *localized ‘‘self-help’’* can do little to curtail the broader abuses of *capitalist globalization*. But Foss, Waters, and Armada chastise critical postcolonial scholars Radha Hegde and Raka Shome, as if the (magical) options available to a fictional Lola actually apply to sweatshop workers in India (p. 223). Similarly, The Secret encourages readers to turn on to the law of attraction and stop resisting injustice: ‘‘The antiwar movement creates more war,’’ explains Jack Canfield (quoted in Byrne, p. 142). Shockingly, however, Foss, Waters, and Armada carry their magical voluntarism beyond the fuzzy magnetism of The Secret to a most extreme conclusion: Symbolic choices, Run Lola Run argues, can and do affect the structural world. We acknowledge that a belief in this tenet is disputable in the presence of certain kinds of conditions, but **we ask our readers to consider seriously** for a moment . . .**the possibility that it might be true under all conditions.** (p. 220) **Even in the contexts of *famine and genocide***, Foss, Waters, and Armada believe that **changing one’s interpretation of events is the correct strategy**, especially because ‘‘what you resist, persists.’’ While demonstrably different, both their article and ***The Secret* counsel passivity**—implicitly and explicitly respectively—in the face of the most brutal exploitation and oppression, letting the *purveyors* of inequality off the hook for **their actions, urging millions to think positively in the face of their immiseration.9**

#### Vote neg to vote aff - their call for a ballot is to breathe life into the system that consumes all beings for dead labor which is turned on its head for more and more production

Bifo 11 – (Franco “Bifo” Berardi, *After the Future* pg 106-108)

\*\*\*We don’t endorse the author’s use of suicide metaphors

Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.