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### 1NC---Xi DA

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180---their ev.

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners.

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

## Case

#### Heg is unsustainable – China and Russia rise and Covid-19 prove that decline is inevitable which means it’s a try or die for multipolarity

Miller and Soklosky 5/21/20 – Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie endowment for international peace, focusing on U.S foreign policy. Richard Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. His work focuses on U.S. policy toward Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis.(5/21/20, accessed 6/4/20, “The United States and the New World Disorder: Retreat from Primacy”, Carnegie Endowment for international peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/21/united-states-and-new-world-disorder-retreat-from-primacy-pub-81876)//>Shreyas

CHINA AND RUSSIA: HERE TO STAY BUT NOT TO RUN THE WORLD Unless the United States, China, and Russia all make significant policy changes in 2020, a Biden administration is likely to have adversarial relations with both of these strategic rivals. Moscow and Beijing share a multipolar conception of global order with serious constraints on the United States’ capacity to throw around its geopolitical weight in the neighborhoods they regard as their own spheres of interest. Both have thwarted American designs to maintain hegemony in these areas. Both are led by strong and highly nationalistic leaders who have shown they cannot be pushed around and who use U.S. opposition to stoke nationalistic and anti-American feelings that bolster their own legitimacy. Moreover, the “bear hug” between the two countries, as Carnegie scholar Eugene Rumer has observed, will make it more difficult for the United States to shape their policies, let alone bend them to its will. This is not to say that either country yet poses a serious threat to take over leadership of the fragmenting liberal international order. Beijing’s bullying behavior abroad has made many countries more fearful of China, while its botched handling of the pandemic has inflicted enormous damage on the country’s international standing. Likewise, Russia’s more aggressive global activism—especially its efforts to erode democratic norms and institutions and undermine EU cohesion by stoking populist, nativist, and nationalist sentiments across Europe—have antagonized many countries. More importantly, neither country seems eager or able to perform the role of global steward. At a minimum, the Chinese government wants the global order—and the rules and institutions that undergird it—to reflect its superpower status and grant it more influence over how the rules are made. The Xi Jinping–led Chinese Communist Party “is nationalist rather than internationalist in outlook,” as one prominent expert on China has noted. “The party sees Washington as an obstacle to its goals of preserving its own rule and gaining regional dominance,” he goes on to say, “but it does not believe that the United States or its system of government has to be defeated in order to achieve these aims.” In contrast, Russian President Vladimir Putin is bent on weakening the West (especially the United States) and undermining democratic forms of government. Over the next several years, Russia’s and China’s accumulated grievances with the United States—as well as their profound divergences on values and a plethora of security, diplomatic, and economic issues—will all but guarantee a continued strategic rivalry for regional supremacy and global influence. Even so, a new U.S. administration may be able to improve the tone of relations, perhaps even finding common ground on climate change, nonproliferation, or cyber warfare. As Fareed Zakaria has argued, embracing a less confrontational stance toward China, could help the United States avoid the costs and risks of “a treacherous conflict of unknown scale and scope that will inevitably cause decades of instability and insecurity.” By the same token, U.S. willingness to engage with Russia in a comprehensive and sustained dialogue on the range of issues that divide them might start to chip away at the mutual suspicion and mistrust that plague them. But a major and sustained accommodation is unlikely any time soon, primarily because both Putin and Xi perceive the United States as an aggressive, hostile, and unilateralist nation that threatens their countries’ internal stability and what they regard as their legitimate geopolitical ambitions. China and Russia are not likely to surrender their vital interests, and most of the countries in their immediate neighborhoods have accepted that they are or will soon become the predominant regional powers. Any U.S. move toward reconciliation will also be difficult because the foreign policy establishment and the American public increasingly perceive both Russia and China as not just competitors but enemies. Meanwhile, the U.S. foreign policy debate has been missing a discussion of how the United States should adapt its relationships with both countries to the realities of a multipolar world that imposes greater limitations on the exercise of U.S. power. SMALL TRIBES, BIG POWERS Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran, small- to medium-range powers at best, have also pushed back successfully against the United States and will continue to do so unless Washington changes its approach. Despite U.S. campaigns of “maximum pressure” designed to isolate, punish, and sanction both countries, they are defiantly maintaining policies they consider essential to their security. North Korea, as UN experts have recently reported, can count on China and Russia to help it evade sanctions and avoid collapse. Washington has no viable military option to disarm North Korea or to topple the regime. Regime change in Iran is equally fabulist thinking. As U.S. officials have noted, sanctions may be forcing Tehran to retrench in Syria, but they will not compel the mullahs to capitulate to U.S. demands; in fact, they have counterproductively strengthened the security establishment’s power. U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve outstanding problems with both Iran and North Korea are at a standstill, largely because the United States has made unrealistic, maximalist demands and shown no willingness to compromise. The lesson should be clear: when countries see the United States as an existential threat, survival will always trump economic prosperity. THE UNITED STATES: WEAKER AT HOME The pandemic may be the most serious challenge to the world and to the United States since World War II. But unlike that conflict—the only war in U.S. history that made the country stronger at home and abroad—the coronavirus will leave America unquestionably weaker. That’s not to say the United States, resilient as it is, cannot recover. But that process will be gradual and painful. In addition to highlighting serious class and racial divisions and inequalities, the pandemic—made worse by President Donald Trump’s lack of leadership and disdain for science and expertise—has laid bare the nation’s unpreparedness, poorly stocked and thinly resourced public health system, and lack of trust in the government to make appropriately targeted interventions. Unemployment has reached Depression-era levels, retail sales took their steepest drop on record, and how and when consumer confidence will recover is completely unclear. Estimates suggest the U.S. economy will contract by as much as 14 percent this year alone, putting the country’s share of public debt to GDP at nearly 100 percent, as Kevin Rudd has pointed out. A giant deficit may be precisely what’s called for in a crisis. But it could also impede postpandemic recovery—risking higher taxes and lower future incomes and, as *The New York Times* put it, imperiling the American dream for “children to climb past their parents on the economic ladder.” A Biden administration would inherit the urgent domestic challenges exposed by the pandemic, which have created pressure for a much more ambitious and transformative agenda for the nation. Governing is really about choosing. How much time will the next president, preoccupied with the unprecedented challenge of national recovery, be willing and able to devote to international affairs? And what kind of resources will be available in a financially straitened and increasingly polarized country already inclined to question the value of projecting its economic and military might abroad? HOW WILL THE UNITED STATES LEAD? A leader without followers, the old saying goes, is someone just out for a walk. Based on the Trump administration’s self-centered approach to leading, few allies, let alone adversaries, are likely to follow. Rarely since 1945 has the United States been missing in action during a global crisis as much as it has during the coronavirus pandemic. A president of a more internationalist bent, instead of one tethered to America First retrenchment, might repair much of the damage and restore a measure of U.S. leadership. Biden has said that, if elected, he would be on the phone with allies around the world reestablishing relations and making clear that the country is back on track. But as Biden surely knows, leading abroad involves much more than making phone calls. It requires a strategy, a smart and effective way of balancing means and ends, achievable goals, and—perhaps more than anything else—opportunities to exploit and partners to work with. That may not be the kind of world Biden will inherit. If a Biden administration wants agreements and accommodations with U.S. adversaries like Iran, it will need to make painful choices of its own and recognize that these rivals have interests, too. As far as the world’s most intractable conflicts are concerned—from Kashmir and Syria to Israel-Palestine, Libya, Ukraine, and Yemen—none seem to offer many opportunities to even the most talented secretary of state. Quite appropriately, a new administration would likely focus first on low-hanging fruit: restoring relations and refurbishing traditional alliances; making greater use of multilateral diplomacy; energizing the U.S. role in the G7 and G20, perhaps with an emphasis on global economic reform; rejoining the Paris climate accord; testing the possibility of extending New START with Russia; pursuing a more conciliatory approach toward Cuba; and reinjecting into U.S. foreign policy the support for democratic values and human rights that Trump has largely disregarded, perhaps through a convocation of the world’s democracies. None of these aspirations are terribly revolutionary or heroic. But they are necessary. And that is both right and good, primarily because it’s an approach in line with domestic and global realities. Long gone are the days of an indispensable United States ready to rise to any challenge and tethered to a vision of primacy, dominance, and Pax Americana. The United States can still be a force for good and positive change in the world. But in the wise words of Charles Kupchan, it’s “no one’s world.” The United States will need to redefine its place, striving for a wise and effective foreign policy that balances the risks of doing too much abroad and doing too little.

#### Not transitioning causes prolif.

Mearsheimer and Walt ‘16 (John J, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen M, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing)//cmr

Proponents of liberal hegemony also claim that the United States must remain committed all over the world to prevent nuclear proliferation. If it reduces its role in key regions or withdraws entirely, the argument runs, countries accustomed to U.S. protection will have no choice but to protect themselves by obtaining nuclear weapons. No grand strategy is likely to prove wholly successful at preventing proliferation, but offshore balancing would do a better job than liberal hegemony. After all, that strategy failed to stop India and Pakistan from ramping up their nuclear capabilities, North Korea from becoming the newest member of the nuclear club, and Iran from making major progress with its nuclear program. Countries usually seek the bomb because they fear being attacked, and U.S. efforts at regime change only heighten such concerns. By eschewing regime change and reducing the United States' military footprint, offshore balancing would give potential proliferators less reason to go nuclear. Moreover, military action cannot prevent a determined country from eventually obtaining nuclear weapons; it can only buy time. The recent deal with Iran serves as a reminder that coordinated multilateral pressure and tough economic sanctions are a better way to discourage proliferation than preventive war or regime change.

#### Hegemony unsustainable – income inequality, incomes, manufacturing outsourcing, populist backlash, shift to Asia

**Layne and their 1AC author Thayer 18** { Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, and, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. His fields of interest are international relations theory, great power politics, US foreign policy, and grand strategy. Professor Layne has written two books: The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Cornell University Press, 2006), and (with Bradley A. Thayer) American Empire: A Debate (Routledge, 2006). He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the editorial boards of Security Studies and International Security. He is a contributing editor to the American Conservative. He is a member of the Governing Council of the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association. In May/June 2014, he was a Visiting Fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo. , January, 2018, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana” pg. 89-92, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix249> }

Donald Trump's election in November 2016 sent a shiver down the collective spines of the foreign policy elites on both sides of the Atlantic, which view him as a dire threat to the durability of the liberal, rules-based international order (LRBIO). The morning after the election, David E. Sanger of the New York Times argued that Trump's victory ‘will plunge the United States into an era of unknowns that has little parallel in the nation's 240-year history’.1 Fearing that Trump's ‘America First’ policy would undo US security alliances in Europe and east Asia, the Washington Post columnist David Ignatius noted that ‘by putting America's interests first so nakedly, he may push many US allies in Europe and Asia to make their own deals with a newly assertive Russia and a rising China’.2 Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, worried that ‘Mr Trump's proposed policies threaten to take an axe to the liberal world order that the US has supported and sustained since 1945’.3 The FT's Philip Stephens stated that ‘“America First” promotes belligerent isolationism—an approach to international order rooted in power rather then a rule of law’. Indeed, Stephens asserted, Trump was ‘repudiating the basic organizing idea of the west: the notion that the world's democracies can oversee a fair and inclusive rules-based system to underwrite global peace and security’.4 As I explain below, the LRBIO actually is the international order—the Pax Americana—that the United States constructed after the Second World War: it is now fraying, but Donald Trump is a symptom of this, not the cause. There are both internal and external factors that explain why the Pax Americana is under stress. Internally, income inequality, stagnant real incomes, the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs and slow productivity growth have hollowed out the middle class.5 These trends have hit the white working class especially hard, and their effect has been amplified by rapid demographic changes taking place in the United States. By artfully employing ‘dog whistle’6 tactics, Trump was able to capitalize on the concern among blue-collar voters about America's changing national identity. The political blowback from these trends helped to fuel Trump's victory—a triumph that can be viewed as a populist backlash against globalization's effects, and against the elites—the ‘One Percent’—who are seen to have profited from it.7 Externally, the Pax Americana is imperilled by the shifting of the world's economic—and geopolitical—centres of gravity from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia, which presages the end of the West's five centuries of global dominance. As Financial Times chief economic commentator Martin Wolf notes, this change really is ‘all about the rise of Asia, and, most importantly, China’.8 To be precise, rather than Donald Trump's election, it is the big, impersonal forces of history—the relative decline of American power, and the emergence of a risen China—that explain why the Pax Americana's days are numbered. For good measure, both the paralysing effects of the US political system's polarization, and America's own policies—the mismanagement of its economy that led to the Great Recession in 2008, and the ‘forever wars’ in which it has become entrapped in the Middle East and Afghanistan—have given these big, impersonal forces of history a powerful shove forward.9

#### Extinction.

Kroenig ’16 (Matthew; June 2016; Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council; National Bureau of Asian Research, No. 58 “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia's Multipolar Nuclear Future,”)

The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia, of course, is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used. To be sure, the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but **the probability is not zero** and the consequences could be **catastrophic**. The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would overturn a **70-year tradition of nonuse**, could result in **large-scale death** and **destruction**, and might **set a precedent** that shapes how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may be **magnified** in a **multipolar nuclear order** in which small skirmishes present the potential to **quickly draw in multiple powers**, each with a finger on the nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear order.14 First and foremost, the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may **pit multiple nuclear-armed states against one another**. This may be the result of formal planning if a state’s strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may choose such a strategy if it believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both. Alternatively, in a war between state A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have also resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant in the precipitating dispute. In addition, conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may **inadvertently impinge** on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, **drawing them into conflict**. There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would **unintentionally cross a red line** for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis. Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena the “security trilemma.”15 For example, if the United States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China. There is also the issue of **“catalytic” war**. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists feared that multiple nuclear players could increase the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a third nuclear power, such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible and thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor. This outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the third state as a way of destroying the superpowers and promoting itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass during the Cold War. With modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major powers, it is more difficult to imagine such a scenario today, although this risk is **still conceivable** among less technologically developed states. In addition to acting directly against one another, nuclear powers could be **drawn into smaller conflicts** between their allies and **brought face to face in peak crises**. International relations theorists discuss the concept of **“chain ganging”** within alliance relationships, the dangers of which are **more severe** when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present.16 Although this was a potential problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present, the **greater the likelihood** of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the **more likely it is** that nuclear weapons **will be used**. Multipolar nuclear crises are **not without historical precedent**.17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United States and its European nuclear-armed allies, Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States, the Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear disputes, including the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and several crises in the past two decades on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, many of these crises stand out as among **the most dangerous of the nuclear era**.

#### Maintaining US hegemony makes war with China inevitable – rising military and economic capabilities, regional rivalries, alliances, will escalate to great power war – Multipolarity from US hege decline preserves some influence while allowing cooperation with China over mutual interest such as economic growth, international security and non-proliferation that ensure peace

Keay 18 (Leo Keay, a graduate in Modern History from Oxford University and a current MA applicant in International Relations, “Sleepwalking into Thucydides's Trap: The Perils of US Hegemony,” [Istituto Affari Internazionali], February 2018, accessed: 7/10/18, http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/sleepwalking-thucydidess-trap-perils-us-hegemony)//DCai

The threat of great power warfare is the defining geopolitical question of this age. The 2018 National Defence Strategy (NDS) describes the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition with revisionist great powers as “the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security”.[1] China is America’s chief competitor; seeking to rectify its “century of humiliation”, Beijing aspires to regional influence and power across East Asia. Its growing military capabilities, especially its anti-access/area denial technologies, are intended to achieve strategic dominance in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, it seeks geo-economic influence over the region (and beyond) by becoming the leading provider of infrastructural investment and advanced industrial products to its neighbours.[2] The most sophisticated analysis of this issue consists of Graham T. Allison’s notion of the “Thucydides’s trap”. Drawing on the Greek historian’s maxim that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable”, Allison contends that the growth of a rising power’s capabilities relative to those of a ruling power greatly increases the probability of war. This occurs for two reasons: “rising power syndrome”, whereby the ascending polity exhibits a hubristic sense of self-importance and aggression; and “ruling power syndrome”, whereby the established power suffers from a paranoid sense of insecurity at its own decline.[3] Nevertheless, Allison does believe that Thucydides’s trap can be avoided. In four out of his sixteen historical case studies, ruling powers did peacefully accommodate rising powers. One notable example was the “Great Rapprochement” between Britain and the US at the end of the nineteenth-century.[4] Britain conceded supremacy in the Western hemisphere to the US because it faced a more direct threat to its imperial possessions and naval supremacy from Germany. Britain therefore sacrificed its vested interests in one domain to preserve its vital interests in another.[5] Allison recommends that Washington pursue a similar course, prioritising the avoidance of nuclear war over its strategic and economic primacy in the Pacific.[6] While Professor Allison’s effort to draw lessons from history is praiseworthy, his analysis of the “Great Rapprochement” misses an important point. Unlike twenty-first century America, nineteenth-century Britain was not a hegemon. Despite its naval superiority, Britain was never a significant land power in continental Europe.[7] It was instead a leading member of a multipolar great power system. For this reason, London was used to making significant concessions to other states in order to protect its vital interests. In the 1880s, for instance, it sacrificed zones of informal influence in West Africa to France and East Africa to Germany, in order to safeguard its core possessions of Egypt and South Africa. Accordingly, the “Great Rapprochement” was yet another pragmatic trade-off which came naturally to British statesmen. The US’s position today is different. Since the end of the Cold War it has enjoyed global hegemony, underpinned by its unipolar military capacity and its extensive alliance network. Consequently, Washington is prone to regard any accommodation of Beijing’s ambitions as a unilateral retreat rather than a necessary compromise. President Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) exemplifies this outlook.[8]China’s ambitions are described as “antithetical to U.S. values and interests”. Both states are engaged in “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order”,[9] whereby China seeks to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region”.[10] Washington’s alliance commitments further intensify its rivalry with Beijing. Any failure to side with partners such as Japan and the Philippines in a confrontation with China would weaken the credibility of America’s security guarantees. The NSS therefore calls for “sustained U.S. leadership” against China, providing a “collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence”.[11] America, therefore, appears to be suffering from an acute case of “ruling power syndrome”: the stakes of hegemony are so high that any significant concession to Beijing would irrevocably compromise Washington’s position. This is not a unique situation, unipolarity led Napoleon to declare war against Russia in 1812. After coercing all other powers to participate in the continental blockade against Britain, he could not tolerate Russia’s refusal to cooperate. Despite his personal friendship with Tsar Alexander, Napoleon could only see Russian policy in hostile terms, concluding in 1811 that “war will come about, though I don’t want it, neither does he, and though it is equally against the interests of France and of Russia. I have seen this happen so often before”.[12] Rigid alliance structures also magnify the risks of great power conflict. On the eve of the First World War, Europe was divided between the “Dual Alliance” of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the “Triple Entente” of France, Russia and Great Britain. It was the unshakeable nature of each bloc’s security commitments that transformed Austria-Hungary’s invasion of Serbia into a global military conflict. The only way to avoid future conflagrations is to adopt an attitude of radical humility. America’s leaders must accept that the tectonic shifts of geopolitical power cannot be reversed, only managed so as to minimise friction. This is more profound than the distinction between vital and vested interests suggested by Allison. It requires the ruling power to fundamentally scale down its ambitions to those of a great power. The US must cease to aspire to global hegemony, and instead aim for limited dominance. President Obama had the foresight to appreciate this. As he explained in his 2015 NSS: “America leads from a position of strength. But, this does not mean we can or should attempt to dictate the trajectory of all unfolding events around the world […] our resources and influence are not infinite”.[13] One possible solution could be to return to the fundamentals of nineteenth-century US grand strategy, the Monroe Doctrine. Washington’s priority should be to preserve its strategic autonomy in the Western hemisphere. Consequently, it must continue to safeguard its security in the Pacific by maintaining its military bases and honouring its alliance commitments there. Nevertheless, Washington should ultimately be prepared to cede ascendancy in East Asia to Beijing. Chinese naval dominance within the First Island Chain should be accepted as a fait accompli. Furthermore, the US’s alliances should be defensive pacts providing limited support against unprovoked aggression, not blank cheques offering unconditional assistance. These decisions might appear to compromise the world order that Washington has long worked to sustain. Nevertheless, the costs of losing global hegemony must be weighed against the benefits of retaining limited dominance. Not only would the US avoid war with China, it would be better placed to secure Beijing’s cooperation over numerous issues of mutual interest, chiefly economic growth, international security and nuclear non-proliferation. The US would therefore retain immense influence over world politics, but less as a lone sheriff than a co-partner with China. Much will depend, however, on whether future American leaders embrace the wisdom of humility or yield to the arrogance of power.

#### Unipolarity is responsible for global terrorism – those continuted assymmetric responses make hegemony unsustainalbe

**Ibrahimi 18** a researcher and instructor of political science. Ibrahimi received his PhD from Carleton University. His research interests include international relations, international security, terrorism, conflict Analysis, political development in the Middles East and South Asia, and Afghanistan. His articles have appeared in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, and elsewhere. (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi; “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.

#### Pure unipolarity fails and guarantees conflict – their examples of declines in war are results of leadership within international dynamics.

Karkour ’18 (Haro; 2018; PhD in International Relations, Professor at the University of Leicester; SAGE Publications; “Unipolarity’s unpeacefulness and US foreign policy: consequences of a ‘coherent system of irrationality’”; <http://journals.sagepub.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117817726363>; DT)

The question of durability was therefore debated in length in the literature on the stability of the unipolar order. But was this ‘stability’ peaceful? A quick glance at the conflicts in **Iraq** (1990–1991), **Somalia** (1993), **Iraq** (1998), **Kosovo** (1999), **Afghanistan** (2001), **Iraq** (2003), **Libya** (2011) and **Syria** (2011–present) shows that **the answer is no**. If not, why did the explanation of the unpeacefulness of the unipolar order receive little attention then? Despite its empirical significance, the question of the un/peacefulness of unipolarity was overshadowed by its durability, and the line between the two concepts was blurred in the general discussion of stability. The only exception in providing a systematic attempt at explaining the unpeacefulness of post–Cold War unipolarity in this case can be found in Nuno Monteiro. In response to Wohlforth’s argument that the unipolar order is both durable and peaceful, Monteiro argues that although unipolarity renders great power war impossible, it ‘provide[s] **incentives for** two other types of **war**: those pitting the sole great power **against another state** and those **involving** exclusively **other states’**.14 Monteiro thus argues that unipolarity is **unpeaceful**, and explains the reasoning behind his argument: in attempting to maintain the status quo through a defensive dominance strategy or to revise the status quo through an offensive dominance strategy, the unipole **finds itself in war**. Meanwhile, in disengaging the unipole finds others in war. But these strategies are ones of either war or inaction. In 1999, for instance, a defensive dominance strategy was a bombing campaign against Belgrade. And disengagement meant inaction. Were these the only two available options in US foreign policy? Should the reader on this basis accept Monteiro’s deterministic explanation?15 To accept such inevitability, as Ken Booth forcefully argued in Kosovo, would be a mistake, for there were also engaging non-military strategies available.16 The intention here is not to investigate the available non-military strategies in post– Cold War US foreign policy adventures, but to explain why they largely remained a nonoption. The explanation situates the overall argument of the article in Hans J. Morgenthau’s late juxtaposition of a ‘coherent system of irrationality’ with his notion of rationality in foreign policy.17 It argues that a **key contributor to the unpeacefulness** of the unipolar order was **irrationality** in post–Cold War US foreign policy. Irrationality in this case explains the unpeacefulness of unipolarity in terms of a **failure to formulate** a US **foreign policy** that bases its strategy on the prudent evaluation of the empirical facts in the social and political context in which it is formulated. Central to this evaluation is Morgenthau’s distinction between ‘essential’ and ‘desirable’ interests, on one hand, and ‘desirable’ and ‘possible’ interests, on the other. Essential interests are interests that concern the survival of the state. Their urgency **justifies** the use of **military force** as a national security strategy. Desirable interests, on the contrary, are interests that do not concern the survival of the state. They thus do not necessarily justify the use of military force. The task for a rational foreign policy is to engage in a prudent evaluation of the empirical facts in the social and political context in which it is formulated in order to decide whether the interests are essential or desirable, and if desirable, whether they are possible to pursue and what strategy is best to pursue them given the presence of other conflicting interests. Post–Cold War US foreign policy, by contrast, was irrational in the sense that it failed to engage in this evaluation. Instead, it reinterpreted reality to fit a **simplistic picture** of the world as accepted by US policymakers a priori and in the abstract, and **sought** the use of **military force** as the sole national security strategy to impose the inviolability of the ideals entailed in this picture. This turned post–Cold War US foreign policy into a **self-contradictory endeavour** as far as the results were concerned: not only did it confuse desirable for essential interests, but it also opened a gap between the desirable and the possible. For one thing an irrational post–Cold War US foreign policy failed to accommodate or annul was the empirical reality of conflicting interests in the social and political context upon which it sought to **impose its a priori picture**. The latter, this article argues, resulted in moral and political consequences that were **untenable** from the standpoint **of** US objectives and **international peace** and security, contributing, overall, to the **unpeacefulness** of the post–Cold War unipolar order.

#### Attempting to sustain unipolarity in an already-multipolar world causes great power war.

Pillar ’18 (Paul; 3/3/18; Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and Nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution; The National Interest; “Unipolar Strategy in a Multipolar World”; <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/unipolar-strategy-multipolar-world-24745>; DT)

Some of what these documents express reflects long-established thinking of a Washington national security establishment, a.k.a. The Blob, one of whose tenets is the maintenance of worldwide U.S. hard-power superiority. But a total disregard for how others might respond assertively rather than submissively to what the United States does is more distinctively Trumpian. The same blithe disregard for such responses is glaringly displayed in Trump’s declaration of a trade war. With a new Cold War developing with Russia, and perhaps another one with China, it would once again behoove U.S. policymakers to acquaint themselves with some of the doctrine dating from the earlier Cold War that stemmed from long study by political scientists and strategists. Two phenomena in particular, both of which are disadvantageous to U.S. interests when they occur and both of which the Trump administration’s posture ignores, are worthy of note. One is the security dilemma, in which what one state does for defensive reasons, another state perceives as offensive and threatening—and is likely to respond in kind. This situation is increasingly applicable to much of what the United States is doing with its hard power, given that it is the most powerful player in the world and that it plays at least as much in other people’s neighborhoods as it does in its own. Security dilemmas can arise not only vis-à-vis Russia and China but also with other states that the United States has defined as adversaries. The other phenomenon is arms racing: the responding to an adversary’s military build-up with a build-up of one’s own, in an attempt to restore the previous balance. And then the adversary builds up some more to try to regain its version of a balance—and so on. Putin’s show-and-tell was part of an arms race already under way. Russia explicitly cites the George W. Bush administration’s withdrawal from the ballistic missile defense (ABM) treaty as a reason for developing the kind of defense-circumventing advanced strategic weapons of which Putin spoke. His government is not making such efforts just because it is “determined” to do so, even when taking into account Putin’s domestic political equities. The ingredients for similar security dilemmas and arms-races, at the conventional as well as nuclear level, between the United States and China is considerable. And insofar as domestic sentiment in China may influence the actions of Chinese leaders during an international crisis, those leaders are less, not more, likely to back down in the face of a military threat from the United States. The multipolarity of today’s world exacerbates security dilemmas and arms races, in ways that extend beyond great powers to middle-level ones. The Bush administration explained its withdrawal from the ABM treaty in terms of a need to defend against “rogue” states. The United States explained the later installation of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe in terms of protecting Europe from Iranian missiles, but Russia saw it as a threat to itself and as an effort to negate the capability of Russian strategic weapons. Some of those who give thought to the original Cold War may think longingly of how Ronald Reagan declared an arms race with the USSR and “won” in the sense of what happened a few years later to the USSR. But that is a wrong lesson to draw, because similar events are not about to recur. Russians already have lived through their history of the break-up of the union, the disarray of the Yeltsin years, and finding a nationalist vibe that Putin skillfully expresses and exploits. Putin isn’t going anywhere soon. Neither, evidently, is Xi Jinping in China, which shows no sign of becoming like the Soviet Union in 1991. The Trump administration is on course, through disregard for the rest of the world’s responses to its own policies, to keep adversaries adversarial, if not more so, and to keep the world just as threatening as ever, if not more so. The military spending may become higher and the bluster may become louder, but Americans will be no safer.

#### Multipolarity solves multiple scenarios for extinction—heg inevitably fails because of imperial overstretch

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Jeffrey Sachs (Professor of Sustainable Development and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University, is Director of Colombia’s Centre for Sustainable Development and of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network). “Learning to Love a Multipolar World.” Project Syndicate. December 29th, 2016. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/multipolar-world-faces-american-resistance-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2016-12>

NEW YORK – American foreign policy is at a crossroads. The United States has been an expanding power since its start in 1789. It battled its way across North America in the nineteenth century and gained global dominance in the second half of the twentieth. But now, facing China’s rise, India’s dynamism, Africa’s soaring populations and economic stirrings, Russia’s refusal to bend to its will, its own inability to control events in the Middle East, and Latin America’s determination to be free of its de facto hegemony, US power has reached its limits. One path for the US is global cooperation. The other is a burst of militarism in response to frustrated ambitions. The future of the US, and of the world, hangs on this choice. The Year Ahead 2017 Cover Image Global cooperation is doubly vital. Only cooperation can deliver peace and the escape from a useless, dangerous, and ultimately bankrupting new arms race, this time including cyber-weapons, space weapons, and next-generation nuclear weapons. And only cooperation can enable humanity to face up to urgent planetary challenges, including the destruction of biodiversity, the poisoning of the oceans, and the threat posed by global warming to the world’s food supply, vast drylands, and heavily populated coastal regions. Yet global cooperation means the willingness to reach agreements with other countries, not simply to make unilateral demands of them. And the US is in the habit of making demands, not making compromises. When a state feels destined to rule – as with ancient Rome, the Chinese “Middle Kingdom” centuries ago, the British Empire from 1750 to 1950, and the US since World War II – compromise is hardly a part of its political vocabulary. As former US President George W. Bush succinctly put it, “You’re either with us or against us.” Not surprisingly, then, the US is finding it hard to accept the clear global limits that it is confronting. In the wake of the Cold War, Russia was supposed to fall in line; but President Vladimir Putin did not oblige. Likewise, rather than bringing stability on US terms, America’s covert and overt wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, South Sudan, and elsewhere created a firestorm stretching across the greater Middle East. China was supposed to show gratitude and deference to the US for the right to catch up from 150 years of abuse by Western imperial powers and Japan. Instead, China has the audacity to think that it is an Asian power with responsibilities of its own. There is a fundamental reason, of course, for these limits. At WWII’s end, the US was the only major power not destroyed by the war. It led the world in science, technology, and infrastructure. It constituted perhaps 30% of the world economy and formed the cutting edge of every high-tech sector. It organized the postwar international order: the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, the Marshall Plan, the reconstruction of Japan, and more. Under that order, the rest of the world has closed much of the vast technological, educational, and infrastructural gap with the US. As economists say, global growth has been “convergent,” meaning that poorer countries have been catching up. The share of the world economy represented by the US has declined by roughly half (to around 16% currently). China now has a larger economy in absolute terms than the US, though still only around one-fourth the size in per capita terms. None of this catching up was a perfidious trick against the US or at its expense. It was a matter of basic economics: given peace, trade, and a global flow of ideas, poorer countries can get ahead. This tendency is to be welcomed, not shunned. But if the global leader’s mindset is one of domination, the results of catch-up growth will look threatening, which is how many US “security strategists” view them. Suddenly, open trade, long championed by the US, looks like a dire threat to its continued dominance. Fear-mongers are calling for the US to close itself off to Chinese goods and Chinese companies, claiming that global trade itself undermines American supremacy. My former Harvard colleague and leading US diplomat Robert Blackwill and former State Department adviser Ashley Tellis expressed their unease in a report published last year. The US has consistently pursued a grand strategy “focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power over various rivals,” they wrote, and “primacy ought to remain the central objective of US grand strategy in the twenty-first century.” But “China’s rise thus far has already bred geopolitical, military, economic, and ideological challenges to US power, US allies, and the US-dominated international order,” Blackwill and Tellis noted. “Its continued, even if uneven, success in the future would further undermine US national interests.” US President-elect Donald Trump’s newly named trade adviser Peter Navarro agrees. “Whenever we buy products made in China,” he wrote last year of the US and its allies, “we as consumers are helping to finance a Chinese military buildup that may well mean to do us and our countries harm.” With just 4.4% of the world’s population and a falling share of world output, the US might try to hang on to its delusion of global dominance through a new arms race and protectionist trade policies. Doing so would unite the world against US arrogance and the new US military threat. The US would sooner rather than later bankrupt itself in a classic case of “imperial overreach.” The only sane way forward for the US is vigorous and open global cooperation to realize the potential of twenty-first-century science and technology to slash poverty, disease, and environmental threats. A multipolar world can be stable, prosperous, and secure. The rise of many regional powers is not a threat to the US, but an opportunity for a new era of prosperity and constructive problem solving.

#### No regional rebalancing or security dilemmas—the only empirical data goes our way.

Fettweis 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Seattle, WA, September 2011, pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902154]

The final and in some ways most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the United States at the center of the current era of relative peace. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Kaplan and Kristol, “is American power.”68 This belief is a variant of what is known as the “hegemonic stability theory,” which proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability.

First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris: It overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global stability. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined belligerents. **The U.S. military** may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Self-policing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The five percent of the world’s population that lives in the United States simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so.

Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is magnified by hubris: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The ego-centric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, the United States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

Third, if U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of **trust** in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that would be **without precedent in** international **history**. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naiveté and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed it is hard to think of a similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests? It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the United States does. If there was danger out there, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower—if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction.

Furthermore, in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must not only be fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they must also trust that the hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently. As discussed above, the allies do not feel that the United States consistently demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look with confused eyes upon our behavior, and are unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly.

Finally, while believers in hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense fairly substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan.”73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in conflict and violence.

The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.74 No state believed that its security was endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No defense establishments were enhanced** to address power vacuums; **no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred** after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated.

These figures will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

However, two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if, as many suspect, this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending.75 Abandoning the mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

Second, it is also worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God’s gladiator on earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.

### 1NC---AT: Sino-Russian Alliance

#### No war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS.

Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals.

Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted.

The Reality

The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space.

That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern.

More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do.

However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space.

These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

### 1NC---Sino-Russia Alliance Good

#### China-Russia coop solves nuclear war

Artyom Lukin 20 {Artyom Lukin is Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University. He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. 6-13-2020. “The Russia–China entente and its future.” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7}//JM

China and Russia are the two largest—and neighboring—powers of continental Eurasia. Can two tigers share the same mountain, especially when one great power is rapidly gaining strength and the other is in relative decline? And there seems to be a pattern in the history of international relations that two ambitious major powers that share a land border are less likely to make an alliance, while they are more likely to engage in territorial disputes with one another as well as rivalry over primacy in their common neighborhood. There are at least three major parts of Eurasia—East Asia, the post-Soviet space (mainly Central Asia), and the Arctic—where China’s and Russia’s geopolitical interests intersect, creating potential for competition and conflict. But, on the other hand, if managed wisely, overlapping interests and stakes can also generate opportunities for collaboration. The following sections examine how Russia and China are managing to keep their differences in key Eurasian zones under control while displaying a significant degree of mutual cooperation.

East Asia This is China’s ‘home region’, but also one where Russia, by virtue of possessing the Far Eastern territories, is a resident power. Moscow, which has traditionally been concerned with keeping sovereignty over its vulnerable Far East, does not at present see China as a major security risk on Russia’s eastern borders. All border delimitation issues between Moscow and Beijing were resolved in the 1990s and 2000s, while the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty explicitly states that the two countries have no territorial claims to each other. Furthermore, Moscow is well aware that Chinese military preparations are directed primarily toward Taiwan, the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, not against the Russian Far East. There is the cliché, persistent among the Western media and commentariat, of a Chinese demographic invasion of the Russian Far East. For example, a Wall Street Journal article claimed recently that ‘about 300,000 Chinese, some unregistered, could now be settled in Russia’s Far East’ (Simmons 2019). In reality, the actual number of the Chinese who live more or less permanently in the Russian Far East is far lower, and there are very few cases of illegal Chinese migration. There is no imminent risk of the Russian Far East falling under Chinese control demographically or otherwise.

Not sensing any major Chinese menace to the Russian Far East, Russia has refused to engage in rivalry with China in East Asia. On the most important issues of contemporary East Asian geopolitics Moscow has tended to support Beijing or displayed friendly neutrality. On the Korean Peninsula, Moscow has largely played second fiddle to Beijing. On the South China Sea disputes, although Russia’s official stance is strict neutrality, some Russian moves may be seen as favoring Beijing. For example, following the July 2016 Hague tribunal ruling that rejected China’s claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea, Putin expressed solidarity with China, calling the international court’s decision ‘counterproductive’ (Reuters 2016).

Russia shares with China the objective of reducing American influence in East Asia and undermining the US-centric alliances in the region. Russian weapon sales are helping China alter the military balance in the Western Pacific to the detriment of the USA and its allies. Russia’s decision to assist China with getting its own missile attack early warning system may have also been partly motivated by the desire to strengthen China vis-à-vis the USA in their rivalry for primacy in East Asia. The Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov hinted as much by saying that this strategic system will ‘cardinally increase stability and security in East Asia’ (TASS 2019c).

Russian deference to China on East Asian issues, albeit somewhat hurting Moscow’s great-power pride, makes geopolitical sense. The Kremlin treats Pacific affairs as an area of lower concern than Europe, the Middle East, or Central Asia. Mongolia, which constitutes Siberia’s underbelly, is the only East Asian nation that can count on Russian security protection in case it finds itself in danger of external aggression, at any rate a purely theoretical possibility so far.

It would be incorrect to say that Russia has completely withdrawn from East Asian geopolitics. In some cases, Russia does act against Chinese wishes in the Asia–Pacific. One recent example is Russia’s quiet determination to keep drilling in the areas of the South China Sea on the Vietnamese continental shelf over which China lays sovereignty claims. The Russian state-owned energy company Rosneft operates on Vietnam’s shelf, despite Beijing’s displeasure and periodic harassment by Chinese ships (Zhou 2019). Apart from the desire to make profits from the South China Sea’s hydrocarbons, Russia may be seeking to support its old-time friend Vietnam—to whom it also sells weapons—as well as demonstrate that it is still an independent actor in East Asia. Through such behavior on China’s Southeast Asian periphery, the Kremlin could also be sending the signal to Beijing that, if China gets too closely involved in Russia’s backyard, such as Central Asia or the Caucasus, Russia can do similar things in China’s. Albeit a friction point between Beijing and Moscow, the activities by Russian energy firms in the South China Sea are unlikely to destabilize the Sino-Russian entente, since Moscow and Beijing need each other on much bigger issues.

The post-Soviet space Russia has vital stakes in the geopolitical space formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and is willing to go to great lengths to defend those interests. It was, after all, a perceived brazen attempt by Brussels and Washington to draw Ukraine into the EU’s and NATO’s orbit that induced Moscow to take drastic action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, causing a rupture with the West.

When it comes to Moscow–Beijing politics over the post-Soviet space, the most problematic question is certainly about Central Asia, a region composed of five former Soviet republics which shares borders with both Russia and China. Since the nineteenth century, Russia has traditionally considered Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, in the 2000s China began its economic expansion in the region. It is now by far the biggest trade partner for Central Asian states (Bhutia 2019) as well as its largest source of investments. China also set up a small military presence inside Tajikistan, apparently to secure a sensitive area which borders China’s Xinjiang region and Afghanistan (Lo 2019).

#### It's the only thing keeping the Russian economy afloat.

Alexander Gabuev and Temur Umarov 20 {Gabuev is a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. Temur Umarov is an expert on China and Central Asia, and a consultant at Carnegie Moscow Center. 7-8-2020. “Will the Pandemic Increase Russia’s Economic Dependence on China?” https://carnegie.ru/2020/07/08/will-pandemic-increase-russia-s-economic-dependence-on-china-pub-81893}//JM

The coronavirus pandemic and the accompanying economic crisis are impacting Russia-China relations just like the 2014–2015 crisis unleashed by the war in Ukraine did: the bilateral relationship is not fundamentally changing, but existing trends are picking up speed. Russia’s economic and technological development will become increasingly dependent on China, and U.S.-China tensions, which are worsening as a result of the pandemic, may soon make Moscow’s balancing act more precarious.

Since 2014, far-reaching U.S.-EU sanctions have pushed the Kremlin to deepen Sino-Russian cooperation in multiple domains. Ever since, Russia’s asymmetrical dependence on the Chinese economy has grown continuously. China’s share in Russia’s trade turnover increased from 10.5 percent ($88.8 billion) in 2013 to 15.7 percent ($108.3 billion) in 2019. Meanwhile, Russia’s central bank has increased the proportion of the Chinese yuan in its foreign currency reserves from 0.1 percent in 2015 to the current 13.2 percent. Moscow is also increasingly relying on Chinese technology, and firms like Huawei are set to make major inroads in the Russian market as key decisions on 5G approach. In 2016, China for the first time surpassed Germany as the number one source of industrial equipment and other technology-related imports in the Russian market. This trend continued in 2019, as Russia imported $30.8 billion worth of equipment and technology-related products from China (28 percent of all technology-related imports that year), while imports from Germany dropped to $12.9 billion, or just 12 percent.

The deepening of Sino-Russian ties following the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions extended beyond trade. To highlight only a handful of key examples, in 2018 Russia’s armed forces carried out the biggest military exercises in the country’s history in which they were joined by a 3,200-strong contingent from China’s People’s Liberation Army. President Vladimir Putin announced in October 2019 that Moscow is helping Beijing create its own missile early warning system, thus tying China’s strategic nuclear deterrent to a Russian technological backbone.

Crises aside, however, there are several objective reasons for the Sino-Russian rapprochement. The structures of their economies naturally complement each other. The political regimes are similar, which frequently inspires joint approaches on issues like human rights, NGOs, and the future of the internet. The strategic imperative to spend once-scarce resources on a heavily fortified, 4,200-kilometer border has given way to new forms of cross-border cooperation and trade. For all of these reasons, Moscow and Beijing were well-inclined toward each other and likely to become closer partners even without a well-timed nudge from recent crises. But their actions scarcely would have been as coordinated as they are now.

The pandemic is accelerating a wide-ranging set of processes and incentives inside both Russia and China that are helping pull the two largest Eurasian powers toward each other. Unprecedented synchronized global economic turbulence and the drop in oil and gas demand from locked-down economies set the stage for a period of painful adjustment for the Russian economy. Trade with Beijing becomes increasingly important to offset the immediate shocks, as China appears to be the first major economy to recover after the pandemic.

#### Nuke war.

Dr. Benjamin Ståhl 15, CEO of the Blue Institute, PhD in Business Studies and Economics from Uppsala University, MA in International Relations from the University of Kent, and Johan Wiktorin, Founder and CEO of the Intelligence Company Brqthrough, Licensed Master of Competitive Intelligence and Former Member of the Swedish Armed Forces, “What’s At Stake?: A Geopolitical Perspective on the Swedish Economic Exposure in Northeast Europe”, Swedish Growth Barometer, 7/1/2015, https://blueinst.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/whats-at-stake\_geopolitical-perspective.pdf

Scenario 1: Disintegration

If the Russian economy continues to deteriorate and the regime continue to distance themselves from the West, the centre may not be capable to maintain legitimacy and keep the periphery together. Already, some regions and counties are highly indebted. In other parts, ethnic Russians are a minority. Regions in eastern Russia, rich in raw materials, may look to China for funding. It is, however, probable that Beijing will not want to undermine the stability in Russia.

Closer to the region in focus in this report, Kaliningrad is an area that could distance itself from the Kremlin. Economic problems and security concerns form a background that could lead to a political uprising. A “Kaliningrad-Maidan” development is at the heart of this scenario. Triggers could also come from outside Kaliningrad, in or in the immediate surrounding of the Russian Federation, or from other factors such as severe pollution.

The other countries in the region would in all probability remain cool in this situation, considering the county’s military importance for the Russian government. However, a mutiny like the ones in Kroonstad in June 1917, March 1921 or on the frigate Storozjevoj in November 1975 cannot be excluded.

Economic and political tensions in Europe could weaken the EU and worsen the development at the same time. A Greek withdrawal from the EU, triggered by its exit from the Eurozone, could set such a movement in motion. A Podemos-led government in Spain could undermine confidence for the single market, at a time when Europe also faces the consequences of a highly unstable North Africa, with a large flow of migrants.

Attempts by Russia to influence certain members in the EU, such as Hungary and Cyprus, could sow further discord in the EU. At the most severe levels of disintegration, France could adopt policies effectively blocking EU and NATO response in a time of increased tensions. Britain may opt out of the union altogether, or be forced out if their demands for special status is rejected by the other member states.

In all varieties of disintegration, uncertainty concerning the control over the nuclear arsenals will increase. The US will become involved both diplomatically and financially in order to bring clarity and establish control over the arsenals. Should Russia, in that situation, ask for military support for this, it is highly probable that the US would acquiesce: such operations in other parts of the world were the object of joint US-Russian exercises just a few years ago.

Scenario 2: Ultra-nationalism

If Russian domestic and international policy continues to become more radicalised, it might take ever more drastic forms. As the economy deteriorates, wages fall and shortages become common, a focus on nostalgic nationalism, using belligerent rhetoric and demonstrations of military power, could be used to deflect growing discontentment.

A logical target would be to “protect” zones which are perceived as Russian, e.g. where there are Russian ethnic minorities or even just Russian-speaking areas. Such rhetoric was and is used in the Ukraine.

The coming years will tell what the Russian ambitions are in the Ukraine. Offensives to secure and expand their supply lines, and weakening those of the Ukraine, are probable, and more ambitious plans, such as the opening of new directions in Kharkiv or Odessa, are possible. As a distraction, conflicts in Moldavia can be fuelled.

If the West, primarily the US, UK and Poland, support Ukraine with military means, the risk increases for further escalation of the conflict. Remaining passive, on the other hand, runs the risk that Russia perceives that it could act against other targets.

A second country that could be the target of Russian nationalism is Belarus. Judging by president Putin’s justification of the annexation of Crimea, Belarus would similarly be a legitimate candidate for “re-inclusion” in Russia.

There are indications that the regime in Belarus are worried about such a development and acting to thwart it. In late 2014, Lukashenko appointed a new government, and has increased the emphasis on “Belorussian”. The fragmented (and thoroughly infiltrated) opposition has declared that it will not field candidates in elections this autumn, since they deem the threat of president Putin to be greater than of Lukashenko himself.

Belarus has also passed laws permitting prosecution of non-regular armed troops, as a consequence of the Russian method employed in the annexation of Crimea. In the economic sphere, Russia has complained that Belarus is profiting from sanctions against Russia.

Any attempts from Russia to enter Belarus’ with military means would probably not be met by any effective resistance from the Belorussian security apparatus. The opportunities for Russia are in some ways more favourable here than in Ukraine, due to the close cooperation between the countries’ armies and intelligence services. Passive resistance cannot be ruled out but would not mean much in a short-term.

However, tensions with other former Soviet Union republics, with the EU and with NATO would surely increase. Polish and Lithuanian forces would probably mobilize to counteract spillover effects. EU policy would be substantially revised. Belorussian citizens would attempt to flee, primarily to neighbouring Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.

The Russian government would also threaten the Baltic states, in order to undermine their economies and try to influence policy in these countries. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be in a precarious situation. While they need to strengthen their civil and military defence, they must retain credibility with their allies and not be perceived as to exaggerate the Russian threat. The higher the tensions, the more sensitive the world is to psychological influence.

Russia would, in this scenario, also fan nationalism in other parts of Europe through political and financial support. West Balkan is particularly vulnerable, as the EU and the US have invested considerable political capital in the region with only mixed success. Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia have stagnated in their political and economic development with high levels of unemployment, political polarisation and even the establishing of Islamic fundamentalist cells: a fertile ground for nationalist movements.

Finally, Russian ultra-nationalism would also be directed inwards, with an escalated persecution of the domestic political opposition, independent media, and nationalisation of foreign assets. This will be combined with attacks on minority groups, especially on Jews.

This scenario could happen separately or as a precursor to the final, and most dangerous, scenario.

Scenario 3: Test of strength

In this scenario, Russia would attempt to break NATO through challenging of one or more of the Baltic states. The objective would be to demonstrate to alliance members that NATO’s response is too late and too weak.

A precondition for success is a distraction through a crisis by an intermediator, which would tie down especially American attention and resources. The distraction could come in many forms, e.g. by partnering with North Korea, fanning war in the Middle East, or even hidden support for terrorists.

If the current polarisation in US domestic politics continues, any reaction will be obstructed and delayed. An especially vulnerable window of opportunity is in the period between the presidential elections in November 2016 and the installation of the new president in January 2017, which could create a legitimacy problem for the American political system when it comes to the possibilities of directly confronting Russia quickly.

An attack on any Baltic state would directly affect Swedish territory and air space. In the worst-case scenario, it will happen immediately before open conflict with NATO.

The Baltic states each offer different opportunities for Russia, but they all have in common that they lack any strategic depth, which means that an open invasion would be accomplished in a few days, unless support from other alliance members is forthcoming.

Estonia, which is the most powerful of the three, both economically and military, poses as a potential threat to the trade over St Petersburg. To control the maritime traffic through the Gulf of Finland is an important motive for Russia to influence Estonian politics. The population of Estonia, with 25 percent ethnic Russians, could be used to legimize action and as grounds for destabilisation, especially around the border town Narva where more than 90% of the population is ethnic Russian.

Latvia is the most vulnerable of the three states. The economy is weaker; the Russian minority is about the same as in Estonia; and Russian organised crime has a strong hold. Especially the eastern parts of the country are vulnerable to Russian influence.

Lithuania only have about six percent ethnic Russians and a stronger military tradition. On the other hand, Lithuania offers access to Kaliningrad. Lithuania’s attempts to decrease their dependence on energy from Russia has annoyed the Russian regime, as is evident in the harassments by the Russian navy of the cabling operation which will connect the Lithuanian grid to Sweden. There are also some tensions surrounding the Polish minorities in the country which Russia could exploit.

How fast Sweden will become involved depends on the extent of open, armed actions against one or all of the Baltic States.

If a confrontation occurs with non-regular or paramilitary means, maintaining dominance over Swedish territory and territorial waters will be in focus. The same will be the case for Finland, but Finnish action could be influenced by Russian fabrication of tensions in Karelia, that Helsinki could be blamed for.

NATO would try to respond in a controlled manner, i.e. prioritizing transports by air and sea. This would mean greatly increased traffic in and over the Baltic Sea. Tensions will rise drastically, with increased risks of miscalculations on both sides. Sweden and Finland are expected to act together with the rest of the EU and the US. If no direct military threat emerges against Sweden, then Sweden cannot count on any enforcements from the rest of the world apart from mutual information exchange.

The instance that the citizens in the Baltic states perceive a risk of a Russian incursion, the probability is high that a flow of refugees will commence. From Lithuania, the biggest flow will be to Poland while Latvian will flee to Sweden, mainly Gotland. Refugees from Estonia can be expected to flee towards Finland or Sweden depending on where in the country they live and where they have relations or connections.

In the worst-case scenario, Swedish and Finnish territory will become an arena for hostilities. As Russian readiness exercises have shown, airborne and marine infantry could rapidly and with surprise occupy parts of Gotland and Åland. A possible option is also to mine the Danish Straits in connection with this.

By supplies of surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, Russian forces can temporarily extend their air and coastal defence in the Baltic Sea, protecting an incursion by land into the Baltic states. NATO would be faced with a fait accompli. The invasion does not need to happen in all three states nor include the entire territory of a country. The only thing that is needed is a demonstration of NATO’s inability to defend alliance members. This would establish a new security order.

Depending on the level of conflict that Russia would be willing to risk, air and navy bases in Sweden and Finland could be struck with missiles from the ground, air and sea. It is, however, likely that the governments would be issued an ultimatum to remain neutral, with only a few hours to comply.

Public announcement of the ultimatum would put immense pressure on the political system and weaken resistance. Such diplomatic tactics could be reinforced by forced cyber attacks on the electricity and telecommunication networks. During the coldest months of the year, the vulnerability would be the highest.

At the same time, Sweden would be expected to support their Western partners’ need for transports into the theatre of action. If Russia would close the Danish Straits, any military support to the Baltic states would need to move over Swedish territory; such as air support Norwegian air bases or aircraft carriers in the Norwegian Sea. There would also be demands to clear of mines in Oresund, and possibly for allowing equipment and troop transports to harbours on the east coast for further transport across the Baltic Sea. The Swedish to such demands would have consequences for generations to come.

If Gotland would not be occupied by Russian forces, NATO would demand to set up bases on the island. The smallest indication of acquiescing to such demands would have the Russians racing to the island.

Furthermore, Russia would coordinate activities in the far north, with submarines of all kinds and possibly even direct action in northern Finland and even in northern Sweden, in order to expand Russian air defence.

Faced with the risk of direct confrontations between Russian and American forces, Russia could mount land-based as well as amphibian operations in the north of Norway and on Svalbard, to improve the defence of Murmansk. Following a similar strategy, occupying parts of Bornholm would make it more difficult for NATO to support their members. This is probably not necessary, but it is a possible option.

In most people’s minds, there is a sharp line between the Baltic states’ eastern borders and Russia, the crossing of which is unconceivable. By first gaining the control over Gotland and Åland, the Russian General Army Staff could circumvent a mental Maginot line, in the same way as Germany attacked France through Benelux in May 1940.

Russian success in this scenario hinges on speed and the ability to contain the conflict. The first message to Washington will entail the understanding that this is not a direct conflict between the US. For Russia, the uncertainty is therefore how US interests are perceived from an American perspective.

For the US, it is not just the credibility of NATO that is at stake but also the unity of the EU. This has global connotations since allies (and enemies) in the Middle East and Asia will also form assumptions regarding the willingness and ability of the US to act in order to protect their allies. The risk is obviously that Russia miscalculates and underestimates the difference between, for instance, the departing presidential administration perceptions of US security interests on the one hand with the wider US security establishment’s perception of these on the other.

During the whole process, the threat of nuclear strikes would hover over all decision makers, which increases the degree of uncertainty. Nuclear tests in the period before a test of strength cannot be ruled out, especially since Russian emphasis on nuclear deterrence could lose credibility over time. Direct threats of using the nuclear weapons is, however, completely excluded in this scenario.

### 1NC---AT: ASAT

#### Zero risk of escalation from ASATs

**Pavur and Martinovic 19** [James Pavur and Ivan Martinovic, May 2019, "The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space," ResearchGate, 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334422193\_The\_Cyber-ASAT\_On\_the\_Impact\_of\_Cyber\_Weapons\_in\_Outer\_Space accessed 12/10/21](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334422193_The_Cyber-ASAT_On_the_Impact_of_Cyber_Weapons_in_Outer_Space%20accessed%2012/10/21)]Adam

A. Limited Accessibility

Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420].

Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23].

B. Attributable Norms

There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit.

Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly.

One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime.

C. Environmental Interdependence

A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space de