## 1

#### We’re going to ! turn the aff get ready – capitalism is good and sustainable

#### [1] Sustainability: Capitalist growth is good for the environment, sustainable, and resolves inequality – This is probably the best sustainability card you will hear

Harry Saunders 16, Managing Director, Decision Processes Incorporated, “Does Capitalism Require Endless Growth?” Summer, https://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/issue-6/does-capitalism-require-endless-growth

The modern notion that capitalism harbors the seeds of its own ecological destruction owes its provenance to a most unlikely duo of canonical economic thinkers. The Reverend Thomas Malthus claimed in the eighteenth century that a collision between the growing number of mouths to feed and the capacity to add productive agricultural land was inevitable. Karl Marx argued in the nineteenth century that technological change would bring with it falling wages, declining profits, and hence, ultimately, the collapse of capital formation. The argument of Malthus was famously resurrected in the early 1970s in the Club of Rome report The Limits to Growth.1 Around the same time, ecological economists Nicholas Georgescu-Rosen, Herman Daly, Robert Costanza, Robert Ayres, and others advanced the idea that all human economic activity fundamentally relies on a limited planetary endowment of what they call “natural capital.” On the other side, Marxist scholars like Paul Sweezy2, Fred Magdoff, and John Foster3 have extended Marx’s insight, directing our attention to what they call the “growth imperative of capitalism,” by which they mean the indispensable necessity of capitalism to continually accumulate capital and generate a reserve of unemployed workers if it is to remain viable. Without continual economic growth, they argue, capitalism will collapse. Or, as Giorgos Kallis recently so succinctly put it, “Growth is what capitalism needs, knows, and does.”4 Taken together, the dilemma is evident: An economic system that requires perpetual economic growth on a spherical planet with finite resources simply cannot last. Merging Marx and Malthus in this way has made Malthusian arguments accessible to elements of the global left that had historically rejected them. Capitalism and environmental sustainability simply could not be reconciled. Constraining the economy to keep it within a safe margin of ecological limits would only hasten capitalism’s collapse, while allowing capitalism to grow unconstrained would result in ecological collapse. Either way, the choice was clear: abandon capitalism or risk the end of the human project. But Marx and Malthus are not so easily reconciled. Marx’s central insight was that capitalism would collapse of its own contradictions, including rising inequality and immiseration of labor that would ultimately destroy the market for the goods that capitalists produced. As it turns out, the mechanism by which this would occur, technological change driving greater economic productivity, was precisely the mechanism that Malthus failed to anticipate when he predicted that food production would fail to keep up with population growth. In Marx’s crisis lay precisely the mechanism that would prevent Malthus’ prophecy. We see much evidence for this today. Improving technologies have driven a major expansion in food availability, along with continuing production efficiencies across the global economy more generally. The world faces no shortage of ecological challenges — species extinctions, collapsing fisheries, depleted aquifers, poisoned land, and, of course, the inexorable rise of global temperatures as atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases increase. And economists today concern themselves with the threat of “secular stagnation,” chronically low growth rates that threaten long-term prosperity. But it is important to distinguish these challenges from the sweeping claims made originally by Sweezy, Magdoff, and Foster and repeated today by prominent intellectuals and activists such as Naomi Klein and Bill McKibben. In the pages that follow, I will demonstrate that both neoclassical growth theory and empirical evidence suggest that capitalist economies do not require endless growth but are rather much more likely to evolve toward a steady state once consumption demands of the global population have been satisfied. Those demands demonstrably saturate once economies achieve a certain level of affluence. For these reasons, a capitalist economy is as likely as any other to see stable and declining demands on natural resources and ecological services. Indeed, with the right policies and institutions, capitalist economies are more likely to achieve high living standards and low environmental impacts than just about any other economic system. 1.From the window of his Manchester home in the mid-1840s, Marx’s colleague and contemporary Friedrich Engels looked out on a horrifying microcosm of what was happening in England and throughout the newly industrializing world — a stark imbalance between the luxurious wealth of capital owners and the miserable poverty of the workers they employed. Marx himself had witnessed firsthand this same imbalance, and over several decades of intense study came to propose that a core flaw of capitalism resides in excessive claims placed by privately owned capital as against labor on the economic value created by their combination. Herein lay the fundamental contradiction, in Marx’s view, which would bring an end to capitalism. As capitalists invested in ever-newer technologies, Marx predicted that their dependence on labor would decline. As this occurred, returns to labor in the form of earned wages would decline. If there were no return to households for their labor, there would be no income with which to consume goods produced by capital owners, nor savings that households might reinvest in new capital. An economic system in which declining returns to labor due to technological change immiserated most households was a system in which the market for goods sold by capital owners could not long survive.Notably, Marx did not dispute the necessity of capital for producing what households need, only who in society need control this resource. The problem, as Marx saw it, was that the surplus value created by labor was being unfairly conscripted by capital owners. In the first decades of the twenty-first century, a number of prominent analyses have suggested that Marx’s prophecy is perhaps coming true. MIT economists Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee5 in recent years have suggested that continuing automation and rising labor productivity threaten mass unemployment, a problem foreseen by Keynes in 1930.6 Thomas Piketty, in his much-lauded book Capital in the Twenty-first Century7, finds that returns to capital have exceeded real economic growth in the industrialized world in recent decades, attributing that shift to ever-increasing concentration of limited capital in the hands of the few. The economist Robert Gordon8,9 finds that growth rates slow dramatically as societies become wealthier. The growth associated with the enormous rise in economic productivity and output associated with the transition from agrarian to industrial societies cannot be sustained as societies shift from industrial to post-industrial economies. Meanwhile, Paul Mason and others in the “post capitalism" movement contend that “an economy based on the full utilization of information cannot tolerate the free market.”10 His argument is that capitalist corporations will not prove capable of capturing value from the technology they deliver, value adequate to sustain them over time. Before considering whether these various challenges to advanced capitalist economies portend their collapse, it is important to note what none of these analyses suggest, which is that capitalism’s unquenchable demand for growth has run up against fundamental biophysical limits. If anything, these analyses suggest the opposite: that the limits to continuing growth in capitalist economies are social or technological, not biophysical. Brynjolfsson and McAfee, and Piketty, through technically different mechanisms, ultimately raise concerns that center around the immiseration of labor. Whether due to technological change, growing returns to capital, or both, all three centrally focus on declining wages and employment as the central challenge that threatens robust and equitable growth in capitalist economies. Mason, conversely, projects that technological change threatens returns to capital. The commodification of everything — material goods, knowledge, and information — ultimately brings with it an end to profits and hence both capital accumulation and capital reinvestment.11 Gordon, meanwhile, observes that there is simply no further techno-economic revolution that can replicate the one-time boost in economic productivity that comes with the shift from agrarian to industrial economies.12 If there is a common theme in these challenges to capitalist economies it is that all find their way, to one degree or another, back to Marx, not Malthus. The long-term challenge for capitalist economies, these analyses suggest, is too little growth, not too much. 2. The headwinds facing advanced industrial economies — stagnant growth and rising inequality — tell us something about the prospects for low- or zero-growth capitalist economies. Gordon’s analysis suggests that industrialized economies in relatively short order achieve a “satisficing” level of household consumption. Once that level is achieved, and once societies have built out the basic infrastructure of modernity — cities, roads, electrical grids, water and sewage systems, and the like — the growth rates characterized by the early stages of industrialization cannot be sustained by the knowledge and service sectors that increasingly dominate post-industrial societies. World Bank data clearly show this. Economic growth rates decline as countries become richer. Growth in GDP per capita in OECD countries slowed from an average of about 3 percent per year in the period 1961–1985 to about half of that in the period 1986–2014.13 Gordon’s analysis is supported not only by the long-term slowing of growth in industrialized economies but also by saturating household consumption in those economies. According to the World Bank, OECD growth in real household consumption per capita (consumption of both goods and services) has shown steady decline each decade from around 3 percent per year in the 1970s to around 1 percent per year since 2000.14 Brynjolfsson and McAfee, and Piketty, suggest that declining returns to households from their labor will drive worsening inequality and stagnant or declining wages. But that does not imply a declining material standard of living. The same technology gains and capital mobility that have eroded the power of labor in developed world labor markets have also persistently reduced the real prices of goods and services, making them ever more affordable.Even as nominal wage growth has slowed or stagnated in the US and other advanced developed economies, households are able to buy more with less of their incomes. This is because the cost of goods and services has grown even more anemically, inflation nearly disappearing in these countries over the same time period, meaning wages have grown in real terms. OECD data show that real wages OECD-wide have grown by about 1 percent per year between 2000 and 2014, including real growth in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.15 Growth in the Scandinavian economies (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) has exceeded this.16 This is true even at the bottom of the income distribution. Virtually all low-income homes in the United States today boast a refrigerator, modern heating and cooling, and electricity. Large majorities have dishwashers, washers and dryers, computers, cable television, and large-screen displays. Consumer goods and services once considered luxuries in the United States and other developed countries are today widely available and utilized by all citizens. That is mostly because home appliances and other goods today cost a small fraction, measured in the work time necessary to purchase them, of what they did thirty years ago.17,18 Of course, rising economic inequality raises a range of concerns beyond those related to access to goods and services. Higher rates of inequality may threaten social mobility, social cohesion, and perhaps even democratic governance. Even so, inequality appears to decline as nations industrialize and become wealthier. In rich Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark), inequality has essentially halved since World War II.19 Declines recently are less impressive in the United States, United Kingdom, and other parts of Europe20, but, nonetheless, inequality remains reliably lower than in most developing economies21, where aggressive but still insufficient capital formation in the presence of large labor forces tends to result in higher levels of inequality. Moreover, increased capital mobility has driven declining inequality between countries, even as it may be worsening inequality within them. Thanks to global trade and international supply chains, firms have become increasingly able to locate production facilities in the developing world, where labor with the requisite skills can be employed at lower wages. As might be expected, labor in industrialized countries is not happy with this turn of events. But the result has been a long-term convergence of wages between producing and consuming countries, declining inequality globally, and a dramatic decline in absolute levels of poverty. The ILO reports that between 2000 and 2011, real average wages approximately doubled in Asia.22 In Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa they also rose substantially, well above the developed world average23, while in developed economies they increased by only about 5 percent, far below the world average24, leading to what leading ILO observer Patrick Belser has dubbed “the great convergence”25 — a dynamic that was incidentally predicted many decades ago on theoretical grounds by famed economist Paul Samuelson.26 Meanwhile, according to the World Bank, the global share of people living on less than $1.90 per day (the World Bank definition of extreme poverty) fell from 44 percent in 1981 to 13 percent in 2012.27 Taken together, then, the dynamics transforming the global economy, while not without challenges, paint an interesting picture of slowing growth, converging global incomes, falling cost, and saturating demand for goods and services. Should these dynamics hold, it is not hard to imagine a future in which the global economy gravitates toward a prosperous and equitable zero-growth economy placing relatively modest demands on the biocapacity of the planet. But getting from here to there will require a number of further conditions.

#### [2] War: Multilateral economic ties forged through capitalism are key to interdependence which sets a cap on conflict – Robust models prove

Jackson and Nei 15 – Matthew O. Jackson, William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford, and PhD in economics from Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stephen Nei, Economics PhD candidate at Stanford University (“Networks of military alliances, wars, and international trade,” *Proceedings of the National Academies of Science of the United States*, December 15th, 112(50), pp. 15277–15284, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4687585/)

We provided a model of networks of military alliances and the interactions of those with international trade. We showed that regardless of military technologies and asymmetries among countries, nonempty stable networks fail to exist unless trade considerations are substantial. Moreover, the network perspective gives us an understanding of how trade might prevent conflict, by discouraging countries from turning against their allies and encouraging countries to defend their trade partners. Although this points to trade as a necessary condition for stability, whether it is sufficient for stability depends on size of the costs and benefits of war. In closing, we comment on several other features of international relations that are part of the larger picture of interstate war. A notable change in alliances during the Cold-War period was from a “multipolar” to a “bipolar” structure, something which has been extensively discussed in the Cold-War literature (e.g., see ref. 12 for references). Although this lasted for part of the postwar period, and was characterized by a stalemate between the Eastern and Western blocs, such a system of two competing cliques of alliances is only war-stable if there are sufficient trade benefits between members of a clique, as shown in our second theorem. Moreover, it is more of a historical observation than a theory, and it does not account at all for the continued peace that has ensued over the last several decades. Thus, this fits well within the scope of the model and does not account for the overall trend in peace. Another institutional observation regarding the post-WWII calm is that institutions have allowed for coordination of countries onto a peaceful “collective security” equilibrium where any country disrupting international peace is punished by all other countries, so that war against one is war against all. However, as shown by ref. 34, this equilibrium is in some sense “weak”: It relies heavily upon the assurance that a country tempted to join an attacking coalition will refuse and that all countries will follow through on their punishment commitments, so that far-sighted expectations of off-equilibrium behavior are correct. Given that various small conflicts since WWII did not precipitate a global response, such doubts of some countries’ commitment to follow through on punishments seem reasonable.§§§§ Although collective security does not seem to explain the lasting peace, it nonetheless does suggest an interesting avenue for extension of our model: taking a repeated games approach to networked conflict and trade. One more relevant observation regarding changes in patterns of conflict is the so-called democratic peace: Democracies rarely go to war with each other. This coupled with a large growth of democracies might be thought to explain the increase in peace. However, once one brings trade back into the picture, it seems that much of the democratic peace may be due to the fact that well-established democracies tend to be better-developed and trade more. Indeed, studies (38, 39) indicate that poor democracies are actually significantly more likely to fight each other than other countries, and that paired democracy is only significantly correlated with peace when the countries involved have high levels of economic development, which is consistent with trade’s playing the major role rather than the government structure. Our model abstracts from political considerations, which still could be significant, and so this suggests another avenue for further extension.

#### [3] Space colonization: Capitalism is key to drive private investment and research

Spring 16 (Todd, 6/3/16, The Policy, “A Case for Capitalism, In Regards to Space Travel,” https://thepolicy.us/a-case-for-capitalism-in-regards-to-space-travel-d77e50f8116e#.q49v6pqm2, 9/7/16, SM)

As of now, N.A.S.A. does not plan on sending a ~~manned~~ mission to Mars until the 2030s — assuming, of course, they get the government funding they need to undertake such a massive project. Considering the recent cuts to deep space exploration, down nearly $300 million from 2016, I am not certain what the condition of the program will look like in another two years…much less the gap between now and the 2030s. Where, then — if the government and its agencies will not provide us with the money for exploration — will we turn to slake our thirst for cosmic space travel? SpaceX. Private corporations. Capitalism. Seeing this article in the news, reading day after day the story of budget cuts to N.A.S.A. in regards to deep-space exploration and other related programs, got me thinking about just how important it will be for private companies and corporations to undertake these projects…such as Elon Musk’s SpaceX, and countless others (read the full list here). The problem is that we have gotten it into our heads that Capitalism is the root cause of our economic woes in the United States, perhaps failing to understand that such policies are something like a double-edged sword: they could also be our salvation. This article provides a great list of the pro’s and con’s of Capitalism. I would recommend you take the short passing of time it requires to read it through-and-through before continuing. Now then. I have never been for fully-unhindered Capitalism. I do not believe that the government should stay out of economic affairs entirely, for as provided in the article many of the con’s relate to improper regulation (monopolization) as opposed to something fundamentally wrong, but I do not believe that any government should be going about shoving their claws into every economic affair either. There must be a healthy balance, especially if Capitalism is to work as it is supposed to work. The same goes for any policy. The government should be there to bolster competition between businesses…not favor one or bail-out the other. The more regulation, the more interference or amendment, the less it works…but this mix of regulation and free market must fall in the “goldilocks zone” if the citizens of said society are to reap its full benefit. If not, like planets about a star, the society shall either burn or freeze. One of those benefits is highlighted by Elon Musk’s SpaceX: the intervention of privately-funded companies to do things that a traditional government agency cannot. Namely, the exploration and eventual colonization of Mars in a reasonable, step-by-step timeframe…unlike the “we will get to it eventually” mindset plaguing the bowels of the United States government. Were not the policies in place to foster the growth of private companies, our best chance at getting people out of Earth-orbit — the Bush-approved, now-cancelled, insanely-expensive Constellation program — would have gone the way of promises and well-wishes. It is my hope that Elon Musk and space entrepreneurs like him are not simply blowing steam, and that one day — perhaps even within my lifetime — I could be on my way to a space hotel on the Moon, flying aboard a space airliner with the name of a private company plastered across the side. Regardless, if we humans are to truly become a multi-planet species we must not hinder economic growth with narrow thoughts. We must not become confused that the “problems down here” and the “problem of getting out there” must be in conflict; they do not need to, and we must not suppose they should. They are two separate issues with two unique sets of problems, and thus this policy of taking resources from one to give to the other will only ensure that neither issue is given that which it needs, or enough to fix what must be solved. Therefore I propose that we support these pioneers of space travel in any way that we are able. Let us not forget that solving the issue of “how do we get there” might just lead to the end of our “problems down here”.

#### They can’t win any offense – Getting off the rock solves every single extinction threat

Smith and Davies 2012 (Cameron M., Anthropology Professor, Evan T., Writer; "A Choice of Catastrophes: Common Arguments for Space Colonization", Emigrating Beyond Earth: Human Adaptation and Space Colonization, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4614-1165-9\_4)

These limits are not entirely mythological. Even if humanity were to end war,¶ overpopulation, disease and pollution, ensure global justice and build a network¶ of defenses against such cosmic dangers as solar eruptions and wandering comets¶ and asteroids, the Sun cannot be prevented burning out, at which time its plasma¶ shell will expand and incinerate the Earth and all human works. The Sun's¶ expansion is not expected to occur for another five billion years, and may be¶ thought of in a somewhat mythical way. But there are certainly serious and¶ immediate threats to the human species that, we argue, make a compelling case¶ for beginning the migration from Earth sooner rather than later.¶ We are not the first to point these out, of course; in his 1979 book A Choice of¶ Catllstrophes3 Isaac Asimov discussed a variety of plausible natural and culturally caused¶ events that could cause the extinction of humanity, or at least collapse¶ global civilization. While humanity has taken action on some of these threats -¶ for example, an international effort now scans the sky for 'civilization-killer'¶ comets and asteroids4 - many of Asimov's proposed calamities could still occur¶ today. Unfortunately, some are more likely today than in the past, such as the¶ use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons by individuals or small¶ organizations, and the already-apparent effects of global over-consumption of¶ natural resources, which defense organizations worldwide already recognize as¶ likely leading to resource wars in the relatively short term.¶ Asimov made many of these points nearly 40 years ago, but more recent¶ surveys of the possibility of relatively near-term human catastrophe have been¶ published, and they are not encouraging. A context for these projections has¶ been forwarded by philosopher Robert Heilbroner, who has argued in the book¶ Visions of the Future that from the time of early humans to the 17th century AD,¶ most of humanity saw its future as essentially changeless in its material and¶ economic conditions, a position that paints with quite a broad brush. Perhaps¶ more perceptively, he also argues that from the 18th century AD to the mid-¶ 1900s, Western civilization (at least) saw its future as essentially bright and¶ positive, to be achieved through the application of science, whereas since the¶ mid-1900s (significantly, after two World Wars and the invention of nuclear¶ weapons) there has been a more varied conception involving negatives resulting¶ from "impersonal, disruptive, hazardous and foreboding" factors,' though¶ including some positive hope.¶ Technology figures large in these conceptions, and it is clear that science and¶ the technologies that derive from it can yield great opportunities as well as¶ terrible risks. These were important issues to Asimov, and are more important¶ today. A recent review by Oxford University philosopher and futurist Nick¶ Bostrom points out that three recent discussions of the near human future by¶ prominent thinkers have highlighted significant threats to human existence within the next 1-5 centuries; John Leslie gives humanity a 30% chance of¶ becoming extinct in the next five centuries, Astronomer Royal Martin Rees has¶ weighed in with a figure of a 50% chance of extinction within the next 90 years,¶ and Bostrom himself giving humanity a greater than 25% chance of extinction¶ in the next century. Of course, these are speculations, but they are informed¶ speculations and they reflect technological and other realities that could not¶ have informed earlier, mythical doomsday concepts we discussed above.¶ 6¶ Natural threats to humanity include impacts on Earth from extraterrestrial¶ objects such as asteroids and comets. Human-caused threats to humanity, or at¶ least civilization (defined and discussed in Chapter 2), include ecological¶ overexploitation and conflicts using nuclear, biological and/or chemical¶ weapons. The magnitude of threats to humanity range widely (e.g. from¶ extinction to substantial reduction of the species population); we focus on the¶ levels of (a) the extinction of Homo sapiens sapiens or (b) the collapse of modem¶ civilization.¶ Extinction¶ Extinct species are those whose members have all died out; they may be known¶ to humanity in the fossil and/or DNA record of ancient life forms, but are no¶ longer living at present. Humanity has only been scientifically aware of the 4.5-¶ billion-year age of the Earth for about 100 years, and for much of humanity's¶ more recent history we have considered Earth to be a relatively safe and benign¶ home, at least between cyclic catastrophes. But palaeoenvironmental and fossil¶ records show that calamities and extinctions have been common through time.¶ In a comprehensive survey of the paleontological record paleontologist David¶ Raup has documented that over 99% of all species that have ever lived on Earth¶ have become extinct, and that most species (e.g. sapiens) have a duration of¶ about four million years, while most genera (e.g. Homo) have a duration of about¶ 20 million years. 7 While these are fascinating figures, we must recall that, as we¶ will see through this book, such figures apply to life forms that do not know they¶ are evolving in the first place, and can therefore do nothing proactively about¶ significant threats to their selective environments- their habitats. Humanity, as¶ we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, however, is unique in its ability to both perceive¶ such changes and, if time allows, adapt to them. We return to this important¶ point at the end of this chapter.¶ Extinction normally takes place over multiple generations; millions of¶ generations for faster-reproducing species, thousands for slower-reproducing¶ species. It often results from changes in selective environments that are too rapid¶ for a given species to adapt biologically. For example, when a comet (or asteroid) struck the Earth around 65 million years ago , selective environments changed¶ due to the cloud of debris that was spewed into the atmosphere; the cloud¶ blocked sunlight, which caused changes in temperature, vegetation regimes and¶ so on. This was a change of selective environment so rapid that dinosaurs were¶ unable to adapt with the biological evolution of novel traits suitable to their new¶ selective pressures. Species can also become extinct if they are out-competed by¶ other life forms that are more proficient at life in a given selective environment,¶ as when North American mammals migrated south and replaced many South¶ American marsupials, starting around 3 million years ago.¶ The history of life on Earth includes several well-documented mass-extinction¶ events in which large percentages of Earth life - or some segment of Earth life -¶ became extinct. These events are so distinctive in the fossil record that the¶ disappearance of an established life form and the appearance of new one in the¶ paleontological record are often used to define the beginnings and ends of the¶ geological periods. Such events could occur again and it is clear that most¶ would either cause human extinction at least the collapse of modern¶ civilization.¶ Some mass extinctions occurred over millions of years due to gradual¶ changes in the environment, and some - as in the well-known comet or¶ asteroid impact that ended the reign of the dinosaurs - occurred, from the¶ perspective of life form adaptation, instantly. In each case, full recovery of the¶ Earth's biodiversity took tens of millions of years. We will examine some such¶ extinction events after considering another possible scenario: not extinction,¶ but civilization collapse. ¶

#### [4] Environment: Capitalism fosters growth and trade that reduce CO2 emissions – It also facilitates the transition to renewables – We cite the most conclusive studies

Ozturk et al 15 – Ilhan Ozturk, senior lecturer in the Faculty of Business and Economics at Cag University, Slim Ben Youssef, Manouba University, ESC de Tunis, Mehdi Ben Jebli, Amen Bank, Kef Agency, Tunisia, 2015 (“Testing environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis: The role of renewable and non-renewable energy consumption and trade in OECD countries,” *Ecological Indicators*, September 2nd, Available To Subscribing Institutions Through Science Direct)

For both models we show that increasing renewable energy consumption reduces CO2 emissions in the long-run. Thus, encouraging renewable energy use by granting research and development (R&D) programs, reinforcing regulatory framework, etc. is a good policy for OECD countries to combat global warming. This result is consistent with that of Ben Jebli and Ben Youssef (2015a) for the export model. However, our result is not similar to that of Apergis et al. (2010) as they show that more renewable energy consumption increases CO2 emissions for the panel of 19 developed and developing countries they consider. We show that increasing exports or imports reduces CO2 emissions. This result could be explained by the fact that most countries of our considered panel are developed countries. Since trade has a positive effect on per capita GDP and knowing that the inverted U-shaped EKC hypothesis is verified for this panel of OECD countries, the increase in per capita trade leads to a reduction in per capita CO2 emissions in the long-run. This result is similar to that of Shahbaz et al. (2014) who show that the EKC hypothesis is verified in UAE and that increasing exports in UAE reduces CO2 emissions in the long-run. This result is contrary to that found by Ben Jebli and Ben Youssef (2015a) as they show that increasing trade increases CO2 emissions. Their result is due to the fact that the inverted U-shaped EKC hypothesis is not verified in Tunisia considered as a developing country. In addition, our result differs from that of Halicioglu (2009) showing that increasing the trade openness ratio in turkey increases per capita CO2 emissions in the long-run, whereas the EKC hypothesis is verified analytically but not graphically. It is evident from these empirical studies that when the EKC hypothesis is verified, there is a great chance that trade has a beneficial and reducing impact on CO2 emissions. 4. Conclusion and policy implications In this paper, we use panel cointegration techniques to investigate the short and long-run causal nexus between per capita carbon dioxide emissions, economic growth, renewable and non-renewable energy consumption and trade (exports or imports) for a panel of 25 OECD countries over the period 1980–2010. We also try to test the validity of the inverted U-shaped EKC hypothesis for this panel of countries. Our short-run Granger causality tests show the existence of a unidirectional causality running from trade to CO2 emissions, a unidirectional causality running from exports to renewable energy consumption, bidirectional causality between imports and renewable energy consumption, and bidirectional causality between renewable and non-renewable energy consumption. This last causality is indicative of short-run substitutability between the two energy sources. In the long-run however, there is evidence of bidirectional causal relationships between per capita CO2 emissions, real GDP, renewable and non-renewable energy consumption, real exports (or imports). The FMOLS and DOLS long-run estimates support the inverted U-shaped EKC hypothesis between per capita CO2 emissions and GDP. This result is not surprising as most of the considered countries in our panel are developed countries. As expected, increasing non-renewable energy consumption increases CO2 emissions in the long-run. However, increasing renewable energy consumption reduces CO2 emissions in the long-run. Therefore, and because of the substitutability between non-renewable and renewable energy, increasing the consumption of renewable energy leads to a reduction in CO2 emissions and may reduce the dependency of these OECD countries on fossil energy. Long-run estimates show also that increasing trade reduces CO2 emissions. Thus, increasing international commercial exchanges, which has been shown to be increasing economic growth in most empirical studies, is actually helping in combating global warming for this panel of OECD countries.

#### Any alternative to capitalism is terrible for the environment – Leads to inefficiencies, deforestation, increased land use and more emissions

Phillips 15 (Leigh Phillips is a science writer and European Union affairs journalist. Writing for Nature, the Guardian, the Daily Telegraph, the New Statesman, Jacobin, Scientific American, amongst other outlets, “Austerity Ecology & the Collapse-porn Addicts A defence of growth, progress, industry and stuff” ebook) DAH

But the Kool-Aid of the cult of localism is not just being drunk by Rob and Tony and Naomi. Localism is pushed by Bill McKibben—the ex-New Yorker journalist, initiator of the 400,000-strong People’s Climate March outside the UN climate talks in New York in the fall of 2014, and supremo of international climate-change activist group 350.org—in his latest book, Eaarth: Making a Life on a Tough New Planet (yes, that’s spelt correctly—McKibben added an extra ‘a’). Localism is the focus of novelist Barbara Kingsolver’s Animal, Vegetable, Miracle, a memoir of her family’s efforts to eat only food that they had grown themselves or obtain locally for a full year; as it is of The 100-Mile Diet by Alisa Smith and James MacKinnon, and most of food writer Michael Pollan’s oeuvre. There’s Local: The New Face of Food and Farming in America by Douglas Gayeton; The Locavore’s Handbook by Leda Meredith and Sandor Ellix Katz; cookbooks like Local Flavors: Cooking and Eating from America’s Farmers’ Markets by Deborah Madison. Twee little signs hand-calligraphed or rubber-stamp-printed on moss-green parchment and lavender-blush vellum card-stock in cafes, farmers’ markets and high-end grocery stores declare the localist virtue and upstandingness of their muffins, cranberry horseradish and herbal alternatives to deodorant. Busybody Facebook commissars enforce localist doctrine criticising the consumer choices of their friends (when they’re not judging their parenting choices). The local food movement has achieved such ubiquity that it became the mocking subject of satirical comedy series Portlandia in a sketch called ‘Is it Local?’, in which a pair of ethical restaurant-goers grill their waitress about the sustainable pedigree of the dish they are thinking of ordering, which involves a woodland-raised, heritage-breed chicken that has been fed a diet of sheep’s milk, soy and hazelnuts, from 30 miles south of Portland, and is named Colin. It seems so simple: food (or anything else) produced locally will not require the carbon-spewing transportation of such items via cargo ship or truck or plane from far away. It appears to be an easy rule of thumb enabling consumers to do the right thing. But the reality is a great deal more complicated. Instead of the crude heuristic of ‘food miles’, if we are genuinely concerned about greenhouse gas emissions, we need to make sure we are actually doing good, not just feeling good. That means that we need to base such decisions on full life-cycle assessment (LCA) studies—a method of analysis that takes into account all aspects of the production and distribution of a product. And when we do look at LCAs, for some products, it turns out that yes, indeed, it does make sense to relocalise production, but for many, many other items, the economies of scale involved make the amount of energy employed and thus greenhouse-gas emissions per item far less than an item that is locally produced, despite the thousands of ‘food-miles’. According to a 2005 UK Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs analysis,64 tomato farmers in sunny Spain produce less CO2 than tomato farmers in frequently overcast Britain employing heated greenhouses (630 kg of CO2 vs 2,394 kg of CO2 per tonne). The same is true of Kenyan versus Dutch rose growers, with the former producing six tonnes of CO2 per 12,000 roses cut, and the latter producing 35 tonnes of CO2 for the same amount.65 It is the production of food that that has the largest energy appetite, rather than transportation. Again, it is simply more efficient to have the roses grown where flower production depends almost entirely on the warmth of the sun in equatorial Kenya rather than on the heating and lighting systems of the temperate Netherlands. A similar investigation in 2008 by Carnegie Mellon researchers Christopher Weber and Scott Matthews,66 covering the American situation, found that 83 percent of an average household’s carbon footprint came from emissions during the production phase, with just four percent of full life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions coming from transport from producer to retailer. Weber and Matthews found that due to the different carbon-intensity of the production and distribution of different items, with red meat on average roughly 150 percent more carbon-intensive than chicken or fish, a far more effective rule of thumb than “buying local” would be a dietary shift away from beef and milk. “Shifting less than one day per week’s worth of calories from red meat and dairy products to chicken, fish, eggs or a vegetable-based diet achieves a greater greenhouse gas reduction than buying all locally sourced food,” they conclude. In a similar fashion, in terms of the amount of water used, it can be far more sensible to produce food in areas with heavy precipitation than in arid zones, reducing the need for irrigation, disruption of natural river flows, and piercing of aquifers. Some 70 percent of our freshwater use occurs in agriculture, so this should be a key concern of the localist eco-defenders. Geographer Pierre Desrochers and public policy analyst Hiroko Shimizu describe how agriculture that is local, small-scale, less-technology-intensive—and crucially, by definition, low in productivity—is necessarily more extensive, that is, it uses up much more land for the same amount of food. There is a very simple reason for this. Not every plot of land, with its particular climate, soil type, geology, topography and so on—its terroir, if you will (and I use that term fully aware of the irony of its presence in an essay arguing against localism)—is equally well suited to all types of plant and animal. Specialisation and a division of labour between different regions that are better at growing different items is thus a more efficient use of land: you’ll get more calories produced per hectare.67 The inverse of this process—disintensification, which localism requires—means turning more forest, wetlands and grasslands into agricultural space, releasing vast quantities of carbon in the immediate term and, in the future, eliminating the carbon sinks that forests would have represented. This process of indirect land-use change is essentially why biofuels have proven to be no climate solution. The defenders of localism are in thus little different to the biofuels industry, clinging to a particular agricultural practice long after the evidence has shown it to actually exacerbate climate change. A focus on local seasonality fails for the same reason. If we say: Buy as seasonally as possible, the first question that must be asked in response is: Which region’s seasonality are we talking about? New Zealand’s apple harvest season happens when it’s winter in the UK, making it more sensible to ship fresh granny smiths all the way from the Antipodes to Europe than to keep British apples in cold storage for six months. The same goes for New Zealand lamb, dairy products and onions, according to a trio of researchers at Wellington’s Lincoln University.68 Meanwhile another 2003 study from German researchers Elmar Schlich and Ulla Fleissner69 found via a full life-cycle assessment that large-scale Brazilian orange juice producers shipping their product around the world had lower per-unit energy demands than small-scale German apple juice squeezers driving their truck just ten kilometres to market. If the advice instead is not local seasonality, but ‘global seasonality’, picking things to eat when they’re in season wherever they come from, then yes, in principle, you may see some carbon emission reductions due to shorter storage periods. But in the modern era, most food items are always in season somewhere in the world. This isn’t true for all items, and for such products, a preference for their seasonality might make sense, but then again, this should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, using an LCA to take into account all the other variables related to carbon emissions. To do this would require something like a very detailed spreadsheet comparing all the different products and their component inputs, transport, storage requirements and packaging rather than the clumsy heuristic of “Buy seasonal!”, which, as demonstrated, in a number of cases is actually detrimental in terms of mitigating climate change. Such Excel Hell might make sense for more rational agricultural planning, but as far as an individual consumer is concerned, it would be far more effective to expend one’s time fighting for clean energy infrastructure than on this sort of faff.

#### [5] Living Conditions: Globalization and capitalism have empirically reduced inequality and drastically improved living conditions

Economist 16 —[“Why they’re wrong,” *The Economist*, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21707926-globalisations-critics-say-it-benefits-only-elite-fact-less-open-world-would-hurt, accessed 4 Dec 2016]

The backlash against trade is just one symptom of a pervasive anxiety about the effects of open economies. Britain’s Brexit vote reflected concerns about the impact of unfettered migration on public services, jobs and culture. Big businesses are slammed for using foreign boltholes to dodge taxes. Such critiques contain some truth: more must be done to help those who lose out from openness. But there is a world of difference between improving globalisation and reversing it. The idea that globalisation is a scam that benefits only corporations and the rich could scarcely be more wrong. The real pro-poor policy Exhibit A is the vast improvement in global living standards in the decades after the second world war, which was underpinned by an explosion in world trade. Exports of goods rose from 8% of world GDP in 1950 to almost 20% a half-century later. Export-led growth and foreign investment have dragged hundreds of millions out of poverty in China, and transformed economies from Ireland to South Korea. Plainly, Western voters are not much comforted by this extraordinary transformation in the fortunes of emerging markets. But at home, too, the overall benefits of free trade are unarguable. Exporting firms are more productive and pay higher wages than those that serve only the domestic market. Half of America’s exports go to countries with which it has a free-trade deal, even though their economies account for less than a tenth of global GDP. Protectionism, by contrast, hurts consumers and does little for workers. The worst-off benefit far more from trade than the rich. A study of 40 countries found that the richest consumers would lose 28 [percent] of their purchasing power if cross-border trade ended; but those in the bottom tenth would lose 63 [percent]. The annual cost to American consumers of switching to non-Chinese tyres after Barack Obama slapped on anti-dumping tariffs in 2009 was around $1.1 billion, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics. That amounts to over $900,000 for each of the 1,200 jobs that were “saved”. Openness delivers other benefits. Migrants improve not just their own lives but the economies of host countries: European immigrants who arrived in Britain since 2000 have been net contributors to the exchequer, adding more than £20 billion ($34 billion) to the public finances between 2001 and 2011. Foreign direct investment delivers competition, technology, management know-how and jobs, which is why China’s overly cautious moves to encourage FDI disappoint (see article). What have you done for me lately? None of this is to deny that globalisation has its flaws. Since the 1840s advocates of free trade have known that, though the great majority benefit, some lose out. Too little has been done to help these people. Perhaps a fifth of the 6m or so net job losses in American manufacturing between 1999 and 2011 stemmed from Chinese competition; many of those who lost jobs did not find new ones. With hindsight, politicians in Britain were too blithe about the pressures that migration from new EU member states in eastern Europe brought to bear on public services. And although there are no street protests about the speed and fickleness in the tides of short-term capital, its ebb and flow across borders have often proved damaging, not least in the euro zone’s debt-ridden countries. As our special report this week argues, more must be done to tackle these downsides. America spends a paltry 0.1% of its GDP, one-sixth of the rich-country average, on policies to retrain workers and help them find new jobs. In this context, it is lamentable that neither Mr Trump nor Mrs Clinton offers policies to help those whose jobs have been affected by trade or cheaper technology. On migration, it makes sense to follow the example of Denmark and link local-government revenues to the number of incomers, so that strains on schools, hospitals and housing can be eased. Many see the rules that bind signatories to trade pacts as an affront to democracy. But there are ways that shared rules can enhance national autonomy. Harmonising norms on how multinational firms are taxed would give countries greater command over their public finances. A co-ordinated approach to curbing volatile capital flows would restore mastery over national monetary policy. These are the sensible responses to the peddlers of protectionism and nativism. The worst answer would be for countries to turn their backs on globalisation. The case for openness remains much the same as it did when this newspaper was founded to support the repeal of the Corn Laws. There are more—and more varied—opportunities in open economies than in closed ones. And, in general, greater opportunity makes people better off. Since the 1840s, free-traders have believed that closed economies favour the powerful and hurt the labouring classes. They were right then. They are right now.

#### [6] Epistemology DA to all of their scholarship - they don’t get offense - their evidence is futile and biased intellectual pride

**Saunders 7** (Peter, Adjunct Professor at the [Australian Graduate School of Management](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Graduate_School_of_Management), Why Capitalism is Good for the Soul, <http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/summer%2007-08/saunders_summer07.html> //shree)

Andrew Norton notes that disaffected **intellectuals** since Rousseau **have been attacking capitalism** for its failure to meet ‘true human needs.’[(26)](http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/summer%2007-08/saunders_summer07.html#26) **The claim is unfounded**, so what is it about capitalism that so upsets them?  Joseph Schumpeter offered part of the answer. He observed that **capitalism has brought into being an educated class that** has no responsibility for practical affairs, and that this class can only make a mark by criticising the system that feeds them.[(27)](http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/summer%2007-08/saunders_summer07.html#27) Intellectuals **attack capitalism because that is how the**y sell books and **build careers**.   More recently, Robert Nozick has noted that **intellectuals spend their childhoods excelling** at school, where they occupy the top positions in the hierarchy, **only to find later in life that their market value is** much **lower than they believe they are worth**. Seeing ‘mere traders’ enjoying higher pay than them is unbearable, and it generates irreconcilable disaffection with the market system.[(28)](http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/summer%2007-08/saunders_summer07.html#28)  But the best explanation for the intellectuals’ distaste for capitalism was offered by Friedrich Hayek in The Fatal Conceit.[(29)](http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/summer%2007-08/saunders_summer07.html#29) Hayek understood that **capitalism offends intellectual pride, while socialism flatters it**. Humans like to believe they can design better systems than those that tradition or evolution have bequeathed. **We distrust evolved systems, like markets**, which seem to work without intelligent direction according to laws and dynamics that no one fully understands.   **Nobody planned the global capitalist system**, nobody **runs it, and** nobody really **comprehends it**. **This** particularly **offends intellectuals**, for capitalism renders them redundant. It gets on perfectly well without them. It does not need them to make it run, to coordinate it, or to redesign it. The intellectual critics of capitalism believe they know what is good for us, but millions of people interacting in the marketplace keep rebuffing them. This, ultimately, is why they believe capitalism is ‘bad for the soul’: it fulfils human needs without first seeking their moral approval.

## 2

#### Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.

Moen 16 [(Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo) “An Argument for Hedonism,” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9506-9>] TDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### Util good – Existential threats outweigh.

**GPP 17** (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater**. ...** The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in.Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided.The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks.Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. **74** Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large.Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude.A wide range of other cognitive biases

#### We don’t ignore structural oppression---preventing existential risk and framing it as a “we” claim is good.

Coles and Susen 18—Research Professor at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University AND Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Romand and Simon, “The Pragmatic Vision of Visionary Pragmatism: The Challenge of Radical Democracy in a Neoliberal World Order,” Contemporary Political Theory May 2018, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 250–262)

Visionary pragmatism is driven by a political ethos that accents radical receptivity and a sense that a greater degree of wildness in our efforts is indispensable for transformative democratic movements. While some of my earlier works accented the ethical character of receptive generosity in political life, Visionary Pragmatism argues that receptivity is indispensable for generating democratic power – precisely because receptivity involves vulnerability, relationship formation, capacities to modulate, and learning in unexpected ways amidst difficult differences. Drawing on my engagements with the movement for democratic action research in Northern Arizona, I argue that receptive practices engender remarkable capacities for fostering grassroots critique and alternatives, powerful political assemblages across differences, and transformative dynamics in the face of what otherwise appear to be intractable problems. Our best and most powerful possibilities for co-creating urgent democratic change almost always advance along pathways engendered partly through relationships of careful attentiveness to what we initially took to be oblique, unintelligible – or, perhaps, even odious.

For these reasons, my political, theoretical, and pedagogical engagements move across many different configurations and a wider range of situations, ideologies, modes, and commitments than most. Eschewing a single subject position, in Visionary Pragmatism, I experiment with first-person plurals in which the ‘we’ morphs in relation to the different loci of initiative that animate my reflections. Sometimes ‘we’ refers to proponents of radical and ecological democracy very broadly, sometimes to scholars in higher education, sometimes to political theorists, sometimes to the action research movement that formed among people at Northern Arizona University and its community partners, sometimes to a specific action research team, sometimes to all people facing the possibility of planetary ecological collapse. Among the many things I find compelling about the writing of James Baldwin is how he shifts his pronouns without notice – for example, sometimes using ‘we’ to represent black people, sometimes as an uncanny member of the white-majority United States. This rhetorical shiftiness encroaches upon and pulls his readers – especially white readers – beyond the ‘innocence that constitutes the crime’ of their assumed individual and collective white subjectivities in ways that work in visceral, relational, and conceptual registers (Baldwin, 1992, p. 6). Such uncertainty has significant capacity to erode habits and defences, as one finds oneself unexpectedly drawn into perspectives, locations, energies, and tendencies that unsettle and reorient one’s own subjectivity. Much of my work has theorized ‘moving democracy’, and my rhetorical shifting of the first-person plural is a textual practice that aims to enhance this in ways that facilitate reflection.

Throughout Visionary Pragmatism, I argue that there are powerful reasons for active hope. At the same time, we do not live far from tipping points beyond which planetary ecological collapse, globalizing neoliberal fascism, and violent chaos may overwhelm our efforts. I do not think so much in terms of pessimism or optimism as I do about seizing and co-creating opportunities for catalysing dynamic changes in theory and practice that foster a powerful movement of receptive democracy, for complex democratic commonwealth and ecological flourishing. In one sense, as Walter Benjamin’s discussion of Paul Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’ makes poignantly clear, it is always ‘too late’ for so much and so many, as catastrophic history keeps piling wreckage at our feet. At the same time, there are what Benjamin (1968) calls ‘weak messianic powers’ that emerge as the retroactive force of salvaged aspects of past struggles ignite sparks with emerging struggles to explode the continuum of progress. In this sense, up to our day, it is never altogether too late. With the language of ‘game-transformative practice’, I argue that a visionary-pragmatic movement of radical democracy must do something analogous in response to the fierce urgency of now, to avoid a sixth extinction in which this possibility could well become a casualty.

## 1NC - Case

### 1NC – Presumption

#### The rob is to evaluate the hypothetical consequences of the resolution—anything else is arbitrary, self-serving, and deviates from the only pre-determined stasis point for clash.

Framing issue is theres no i/l as to why space is intrinsically unintell

#### Vote neg on presumption –

#### [1] Process turn – using debate as a mode of advocacy ensures the failure of [insert 1AC method] – competition means debaters ally themselves with individuals who vote for them and alienate those who are positioned with the burden of rejoinder and forced to negate – at worst you vote negative on presumption because they don’t use debate as a stepping stone for their advocacy outside the space and don’t have a net benefit to affirming the 1ac

#### [2] Academia turn – the 1ac is a regurgitation of knowledge that already exists within academia which proves they aren’t a departure from the status quo and voting aff is not intrinsic to affirming [insert thing]

#### [3] Competition turn – competition ensures [insert team] refines [insert 1AC method] according to what best wins them ballots from judges not according to what actually best resolves violence for individuals outside debate – ensures their method can’t scale up and gets coopted by problematic norms in the debate community

#### Now refuse their call for the ballot –

#### A – Ballots as social change bad

Karlberg 3 (Michael, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE & CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left\*\* under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facng us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

#### B – Ballot isn’t a currency, you are neither changing the state nor the state of debate – debates are insulated, makes judges the authorities to decide the validity of struggle and acceptableness of their deviance which’s oppressive, and excludes those who don’t win by assuming their grievances are illegitimate sans ballots – turns case.

Bankey 13 (BRENDON BANKEY – A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Communication August 2013 – Bankey holds an BA from Trinity and now holds an MA from Wake Forest. This thesis was approved by: Michael J. Hyde, Ph.D., Advisor; Mary M. Dalton, Ph.D., Chair; R. Jarrod Atchison, Ph.D. THE “FACT OF BLACKNESS” DOES NOT EXIST: AN EVOCATIVE CRITICISM OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC IN ACADEMIC POLICY DEBATE AND ITS (MIS)USE OF FRANTZ FANON’S BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS – From Chapter Two – footnoting Atchison and Panetta and consistent with Bankey’s defense of an aspect of their position – http://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/39020/Bankey\_wfu\_0248M\_10473.pdf)

For Atchison and Panetta , “the ballot” a judge casts at the conclusion of a debate should signify nothing more or less than that person’s decision “to vote for the team that does the best debating.” This understanding encourages judges to limit their analysis of a debate to the arguments presented within each team’ s allotted times to speak. It would exclude decisions focused on resolving external abuses such as: determining the appropriateness of statements or events between a team or program that occurred outside of the immediate debate; challenging a school’s succ ess at “recruiting minority participants”; criticizing the civil rights legacy of participants’ academic institutions; or increasing the presence of underrepresented bodies in elimination debates. By contrast, some non - traditional teams interested in challenging the marginalizing effects of policy debate formats have begun to advocate what I call a “ballot as currency” model for judges to evaluate debates. While the specific terminology is not universally employed, the “ballot as currency” approach establis hes that a judge’s ballot signifies what bodies and practices she deems appropriate for policy debate. Within this model, a non - traditional team’s ability to accumulate wins is a referendum on the perceived acceptableness of their bodies for academic spaces. Beyond the structural factors that limit the visibility of any individual debate, Atchison and Panetta identify two problems with the “ballot as currency” method for evaluating debates. First, the “ballot as currency” approach presents the dilemma of “ asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem ” with very “few participants ” (generally the other people in the room) allowed to take a stake in the process. This places the course of community change on the shoulders of those who judge debates between traditional and non - traditional teams and excludes those “coaches and directors who are not preferred judges and, therefore, do not have access to many debates.” Furthermore, it excludes those “who might want to contribute to community conversation, but are not directly involved in competition.” Prioritizing the “ballot as currency” approach fails to recognize that “debate community is broader than the individual participants” of a given debate and risks the creation of “an insulated community that has a ll the answers” without ever engaging those concerned individuals who do not attend every competition. The result is that a very narrow set of judges, usually those that often judge Framework debates, are granted the authority to determine the outcome of communal change. 21

#### C – Ballot Link – Debate is distinct from academia, in that deliberation starts with the timer and ends with the ballot.  Impacts about debate and the assumption the ballot has political force to remedy anti-queerness and presence subaltern knowledges is bougie ideology – to think that ballots at the Harrison RR change material conditions of violence is inseparable from magical voluntarism

#### D – Turns Case – over-investing in the ballot’s “political force” renders challenges to their impacts into local self help – the ballot only decides win or loss

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

Constructivism and the Malleable World.Presumably drawing on the work of Judith Butler (1993, p. 28),5 **Foss, Waters, and Armada argue that orienting oneself as the ‘‘director’’ of one’s life is in tune with a tenet acknowledged by a number of diverse perspectives, ranging from social constructionism to quantum physics. Simply put, it is that symbols create reality*. . . .* Symbolic choices *. . .* can and do affect the structural world*. . . .*** Although the reality of everyday life appears prearranged, ordered, and objective, and therefore outside of agents’ sphere of influence *. . .* the structural world not only ‘‘bears cultural constructions’’ but is itself a construction. (p. 220) **Because the structural world is itself a construction, individuals are capable of changing that world by thinking and making choices about it.** Although the authors acknowledge that ‘‘agents cannot *. . .* lay out precisely the routes through which their desires will be fulfilled,’’ they nevertheless believe that ‘‘desires are realized in outcomes that align with agents’ choices’’ because of the ontological status of the structural world as a construction (p. 220). The key to understanding the ideal of agentic orientation is *full consciousness*: In order to change the construction of the world, one must understand what options are available and put faith in unforeseen possibilities yet to come (pp. 220–221). **Such a position is entirely in keeping with the ‘‘core concept’’ of magic: ‘‘that mind affects matter, and that *. . .* the trained imagination can alter the physical world’’** (Luhrman, p. 7).6 Not surprisingly, Rhonda Byrne also aligns ‘‘The Secret’’ with quantum physics (p. 156); however, constructivism appears in *The Secret* most conspicuously in the guise of ‘‘the law of attraction,’’ which Bob Doyle, ‘‘author and law of attraction specialist,’’ defines simply as ‘‘like attracts like’’ at ‘‘a level of thought.’’ Byrne elaborates: The law of attraction says *like attracts like*, and so as you think a thought, you are also attracting *like* thoughts to you*. . . .* Your life right now is a reflection of your past thoughts. That includes all the great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life . . . Until now! Now you are learning The Secret, and with this knowledge, you can change everything. (pp. 8–9) Changing everything depends on understanding the ontological primacy of attraction, which is best grasped as a form of magnetism (even though magnetism is, in physics, the attraction of *opposites*): ‘‘Thoughts are magnetic, and thoughts have a frequency,’’ explains Byrne. ‘‘As you think, those thoughts are sent out into the Universe, and they magnetically attract all *like* things that are on the same frequency’’ (p. 10). Nevertheless, as with Foss, Waters, and Armada, Byrne and her army of specialists insist on the constructedness of reality and the mutability of structure. ‘‘Time,’’ for example, is just an illusion: Einstein told us that. If this is the first time you have heard it, you may find it a hard concept to get your head around*. . . .* What quantum physicists and Einstein tell us is that everything is happening simultaneously*. . . .* It takes no time for the Universe to manifest what you want. Any time delay you experience is due to your delay in getting to the place of believing, knowing, and feeling that you already have it. (p. 63) The concept of temporality is used here to teach readers a certain version of constructivism, which is similar to the version Foss, Waters, and Armada advance in their reading of *Run Lola Run*: all three runs in the film happen at the same time, but reflect different levels of believing, knowing, and feeling. Once Lola understood the mutability of reality and the power of her manipulation of symbols, she could magically bend the laws of the Universe for money**. Similarly, Byrne writes, ‘‘[i]t’s as easy to manifest one dollar as it is to manifest one million dollars’’ if you simply have the right mindset (p. 68). Although we do not dismiss certain forms of constructivist thought, it is important to detail the consequence or ‘‘outcome’’ of choosing magical voluntarism. Both *The Secret* and Foss, Waters, and Armada invoke physics to argue that structural change is possible for *anything you desire* through conscious thought and choice.** Hence, magical voluntarism denies that some material and social conditions are not changeable: Agentic orientations *. . .* are achieved within, rather than simply given by, the conditions of individuals’ lives. Thus, individuals may be in a dominant position as defined by economic and other structural conditions or in a subordinate position as defined by a lack of access to such resources, *but they may choose any agentic orientation and produce any outcome they desire*. We acknowledge that such a view may be difficult to accept in extreme cases such as imprisonment or genocide; even in these situations, however, agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency. Even in these situations, adoption of the agentic orientation of director opens up opportunities for innovating in ways unavailable to those who construct *themselves* as victims. (p. 223, emphasis added) In other words, the starving prisoner in a concentration camp should choose the director orientation and dream-up the possibility of her liberation or escape.7 Aside from the offensiveness of such a perspective on imprisonment and genocide, what is **the *outcome* of adopting this ontological view about ‘‘structural’’ conditions? *The Secret* is quite clear on the answer: *narcissistic complacency*. ‘‘Anything we focus on we do create,’’ explains Hale Dwoskin, ‘‘so if we’re *really angry*, for instance, at a war that’s going on, or strife or suffering, we’re adding our energy to it’’ (pp. 141–142). So although the rhetoric of magic exemplified by *The Secret* acknowledges structural injustice, it gets explained away in mystical terms that urge the reader to turn her back to the world and seek within.** The video and book openly discourage social protest, invoking Carl Jung’s phrase, ‘‘what you resist persists’’ (p. 142). ‘‘Don’t give energy to what you don’t want,’’ intones one of the video’s ‘‘teachers.’’ For example, the DVD segment on wealth begins with black-and-white footage of sweatshop laborers in dreary factories, but sweatshops are a mere blip on the screen. Immediately, the text explains that today one can be free from such exploitation and drudgery simply by wishing for money.8 The real world outcome of the constructivism that supports magical voluntarism is ultimately selfish inaction. ‘‘You cannot help the world by focusing on the negative things,’’ says Byrne. ‘‘When I discovered The Secret I made a decision that I would not watch the news or read newspapers anymore, because it did not make me feel good’’ (pp. 144–145). Although professional scholars in the United States may be buffered from some of the vagaries of economic crisis and barriers to achievement, there are, in fact—as opposed to the fantasy of a filmic game or magnetizing your desires into reality—millions of people around the world who cannot wish away the ‘‘conditions, people, or events external to them’’ (p. 209). Nongovernmental organizations, grassroots banks and crafts projects, and other forms of *localized ‘‘self-help’’* can do little to curtail the broader abuses of *capitalist globalization*. But Foss, Waters, and Armada chastise critical postcolonial scholars Radha Hegde and Raka Shome, as if the (magical) options available to a fictional Lola actually apply to sweatshop workers in India (p. 223). Similarly, The Secret encourages readers to turn on to the law of attraction and stop resisting injustice: ‘‘The antiwar movement creates more war,’’ explains Jack Canfield (quoted in Byrne, p. 142). Shockingly, however, Foss, Waters, and Armada carry their magical voluntarism beyond the fuzzy magnetism of The Secret to a most extreme conclusion: Symbolic choices, Run Lola Run argues, can and do affect the structural world. We acknowledge that a belief in this tenet is disputable in the presence of certain kinds of conditions, but **we ask our readers to consider seriously** for a moment . . .**the possibility that it might be true under all conditions.** (p. 220) **Even in the contexts of *famine and genocide***, Foss, Waters, and Armada believe that **changing one’s interpretation of events is the correct strategy**, especially because ‘‘what you resist, persists.’’ While demonstrably different, both their article and ***The Secret* counsel passivity**—implicitly and explicitly respectively—in the face of the most brutal exploitation and oppression, letting the *purveyors* of inequality off the hook for **their actions, urging millions to think positively in the face of their immiseration.9**

#### Baeden’s anti-institutional politics seek a purified negation that is impossible – their dangerous romanticism paves over fluid signifiers of straight and queer that offer a road ahead

**Baker ’18** (Baker, Medway. “Queer Theory.” COSMONAUT, 16 Dec. 2018, cosmonaut.blog/tag/queer-theory/. Accessed 2/7/2020) //ZL

There comes a “negative turn” beginning in the early years of the millennium, which some would argue is a clean break from Queer Theory, that does seek to address some of the inadequacies of conventional Queer Theory in describing both queer history and the politics of the neoliberal era. This was first popularized by the controversial Lee Edelman, and then further examined and critiqued by nihilists Baeden. Our Baeden friends (and forgive us for the tragedy that is summarizing their positions) explain that Edelman does not go far enough in his magnum opus No Future, and the author of this piece cannot but agree with them. Edelman restricts a queer anti-social project to the cultural and ideological spheres, while Baedan envisions a project in which is a “queer opposition” to the whole of civil society. We can affirm them here and draw a few lines as well. Baedan goes on to describe how a great deal of the existing “positivist institutions of queerness” (which they designate as the “dance parties, community projects, activist groups, social networks, fashion, literature, art, festivals”) reproduce the relations of capital in a “queer” way, which doesn’t equate as closely to revolt as it does to the reconciliation of the queer with class society.[27](https://cosmonaut.blog/2018/12/16/shame-and-misery-a-materialist-history-of-gay-politics/#easy-footnote-bottom-27-907) A major distinction should be made between the anti-politics of Baedan and the anti-politics of Marxism, in that we are aware that we are inescapably and inevitably political, first and foremost. A pure anti-politics is not conceivable or possible, and only the most advanced and vanguardist sections of the generally oppressed population will ever “embrace” this. Of course, sacrificing your politics for the sake of being sellable to the masses is something we don’t endorse either. Marxism provides a politics to end all politics, and in that sense it is essentially anti-political, but in a very political way. A queer politics cannot be anything that it is not from the vantage of the present, which is entirely consistent with a history of shame, defeat, and failure. There is a romanticism of triumphant revolt in Baedan, fueled by a dangerous unity of purity and negativity. This is ultimately idealist, and therefore the best wishes should be with them. It is worth entertaining the idea that just as they are inescapably political, Baedan’s is both a fringe of (and sine qua non to) the “positivist institutions of queerness” which form the material basis of civilization. Between the bricks and molotovs that form Baedan’s jouissance and the most imperatively radical pamphlets of queer politics we can produce, we will make history, but it will not be just as we please. We will do so under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. Baedan wants to deny these circumstances or purify their politics of them, which is an impossibility as much as they should be appreciated for what they are. Baedan seeks the absence and negation of capital, but without a viable communist politics they are at best a Bonapartism in the streets by the rule of propaganda. The above doesn’t prevent Marxists from falling into the pitfalls that Baedan actually manages to avoid. Peter Drucker’s 2015 “Warped: Gay Normality and Queer Anti-Capitalism” seeks to address a lot of the same questions as this text. However, we want to be clear on our differences in conclusions from those of Drucker. Drucker’s general summary of queer theory thus far and the theory on the development of gay politics as we know them from the current vantage point is insufficient. It is indeed a thorough and well-researched work of scholarship. Drucker is, rightfully so, an open critic of the backwardness of queer politics in the Marxist Left; he’s not afraid to critique Sherry Wolf’s politics, the head of an institution that distributes his books.[28](https://cosmonaut.blog/2018/12/16/shame-and-misery-a-materialist-history-of-gay-politics/#easy-footnote-bottom-28-907) Drucker depends heavily on rooting the development of the gay middle-class status-post 1970’s economic trends in the notion of “homonormativity”. We appreciate what is the best attempt yet to make this period of gay life clearer to Marxists such as ourselves, but we find that the framing of things around the factor of “normativity” obscures the understanding of all the victories and failures of gay politics to be contained within (for better or worse) the confines of class struggle. Drucker here is more Queer Theoretical than Marxist. It’s certainly not beneficial to “reduce” struggles to “class” struggles. This is not what is being asked for here; rather we are calling for a better historical method. Before there were proletarians on this continent, there was the murder of homosexuals and gender non-conformists. What we ask of Drucker here is to take the perspective of the millions and not the millionaires (or any other heads), as what we have today is the result of what millions of everyday gay people did yesterday. Class struggle provides explanations to history, the framework of normality (or normalcy, normativity, etc.) might also be completely off. Why would the ruling class ideology, the domineering ideas of the social epoch, seek to normalize gayness, when it could rather de-normalize bourgeois society as a whole? The latter explanation appears more likely. After all, capital needs only value production to survive; there is truly nothing “abnormal” enough to make the capitalists shake in their boots. Drucker depends heavily on the use of “queer” as a verb, speaking of the “queering” of movements, trade unions, and the various organizations of the left as if simply existing with greater visibility in these contexts will lend us better politics. “But in a heteronormative society, the statement ‘I am straight’ means both less and more than these other, specific statements. It means less because many people who call themselves ‘straight’ have experienced same-sex attraction or sex. And it means more because it conveys to fellow straights that ‘I’m not one of them’, and conveys to people open to same-sex possibility that ‘I am off limits’. In short, ‘straightness’ is a denial of queer possibility. The question thus arises: in a sexually free society, why would even someone who happened to be engaging exclusively in cross-sex sexual relationships have any need or desire to say, ‘I am straight’? Why would the category even exist?” Peter Drucker [29](https://cosmonaut.blog/2018/12/16/shame-and-misery-a-materialist-history-of-gay-politics/#easy-footnote-bottom-29-907) Drucker has only the lens of Queer Theory here with which to see straightness. There can be no critical understanding of gayness without a critique of the world in which gayness arises. We can ask questions about the essence of gayness all day (this is a much more difficult matter) but we can also through history verify easily the essence of homophobia and straightness. Homophobia and straightness are first and foremost a social relationship between so-called, would-be, or have-been straight people; either those who have lived this once or lived it always or lived it never. It is clearly and unmistakably an artifact of class struggle. It is what some would describe as a privilege, but it also might be better described as a wage or a bonus. The origins of this bonus result directly from state-repression and anti-gay violence in the fallout of struggling classes. As an agreement more like that of a wage, straightness gives merit to the straight man but obscures that he is also being burdened by this as well. It is a sad, almost pathetic thing. It should be a problem for straight people as it is for all of humanity because it precludes an unequivocal participation in a struggle for a better humanity which includes them. We know that this relationship bears the same burdensome and miserable essence as the gay man, although for many different reasons. The end result is the same: everyone ends up with inauthentic, fragmented and confused humanity (or lack thereof). A better treason can and should be offered. Drucker also neglects the rapid rate at which “queer” sections of the class that “do not fit into gay normality” are being quickly subsumed into generalized capital relations, quickly following the dreaded “gay” normality. Time magazine, with its often controversial weekly covers, dubbed trans liberation the “Next Frontier” as Laverne Cox pushes an envelope further. What we are sad to say, with no disregard to the centrality and urgency that trans struggles present us with, is that whatever the horrors brought upon by the gay political class in the form of “normality” will soon come to pass for our trans comrades. “To queer” as a verb has become the last ditch effort of a little boy with the big secret to flex his pubescent manhood for the world to see, that the betrayal to the old regime and all his faggotry is not irreconcilable with the dominant regime of current social order. That is, the “queer everything” model offers nothing but a redux of its opposite, the deficient “gay.” Drucker closes Warped, a text which truly was a pleasure to examine, with an immensely disappointing conclusion which does not offer much to the gay man other than what might be concluded by reading Gender Trouble and The Communist Manifesto back to back, which gay militants who are indeed still suffering might also closely conclude. This crude and vulgar synthesis of queer theory and Marxism simply comes out insufficient. The “Gay Normality” in essence isn’t explained in Marxist terms and to great disappointment. The information contained within Warped is certainly abundant and Drucker does demonstrate the premises of its development. However, he fails to argue why this best describes the situation of a gay politics in their specificity, and more so why this abstraction is Marxist, and therefore historically and categorically correct. “To that end, a few opening questions: What is the nature of a form of being that presents a problem for the thought of being itself? More precisely, what is the nature of a human being whose human being is put into question radically and by definition, a human being whose being human raises the question of being human at all? Or, rather, whose being is the generative force, historic occasion, and essential byproduct of the question of human being in general? How might it be thought that there exists a being about which the question of its particular being is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility for any thought about being whatsoever? What can be said about such a being, and how, if at stake in the question is the very possibility of human being and perhaps even possibility as such? What is the being of a problem?” – Jared Sexton [30](https://cosmonaut.blog/2018/12/16/shame-and-misery-a-materialist-history-of-gay-politics/#easy-footnote-bottom-30-907) We ask a similar set of questions to the Queer Theorist in Drucker concerning the gay man in any specificity, even if perhaps Drucker, Sexton and this author might each produce different answers. We don’t have to turn necessarily towards Marxists or Queer Theorists for which basic and fundamental questions should be raised when concerning “essence”, but methodologically we must be consistent. Queer Theory views essence as a static thing and language as that which shapes homosexual life. Rather, it is homosexuality as an activity that necessitates and shapes the discourse of language. The gay man means a rethinking of the social organization of humanity as a whole, and what it means to be human. And still, we lack politics with which to offer the gay man in any specificity in Drucker’s book. It is almost strange the punishment he receives in Drucker’s texts. Regardless, Drucker’s text remains perhaps the best examination of gay politics as they exist today. Still, there is not in Drucker’s text a thorough analysis of the relationship between sexuality and labor, and what a Marxist perspective for this means.

#### The aff gets stuck in calcified opposition to state power---they should lose if they can’t identify how queerness is translated into political praxis

Noys 8 [Benjamin, Reader in English at the University of Chichester, Through a Glass Darkly: Alain Badiou’s critique of anarchism]

Alongside this critique, we can also see other signs of the rejection of the tendency of the movement to mirror the power that it opposes. Recent discussions in the journal Voices of Resistance from Occupied London, subtitled the Quarterly Anarchist Journal of Theory and Action from the British Capital after Empire, raise the question of the limits of the counter-summit – precisely because it remains locked into shadowing the summits of those in power. The article ‘For a Summit Against Everything’ by the Comrades from Everywhere asks the question: ‘Sure we need to meet – and our counter-summits are an excellent opportunity for doing so. But why follow them around in their summits, why give them the tactical advantage of selecting where and when our battles are to take place?’ (2007: 44). Arguing for a new form of counter-summit, autonomously organised, they note: ‘Rather than waiting for them to decide where and when to meet, no longer running behind them, we’ll jump on the driver’s seat and decide this for ourselves.’ (2007: 44) This suggests a strategic recognition of not only the successes of the anti-globalisation movement (which Badiou does not recognise), but also its failures or limitations. The limitation of the counter-summit is being answered with the proposal that a new independent and autonomous form of summit take place. Whether or not this is successful the suggestion implies the recognition of the problem that Badiou had earlier identified: whether ‘anti-capitalist’ politics finds itself mirrored in its own self-definition as a movement of opposition (‘anti-‘). One of the strategic questions posed to anarchism, or anarchist practice, will be its negotiation of this different form of autonomous ‘power’, especially in distinguishing itself from more usual ‘leftist’ or ‘radical’ forms of organisation or ‘counter-power’.¶ The second point to consider is Badiou’s claim that anarchism takes up a position of perpetual opposition without really believing or acting in such a way as to change the existing situation. The journal cum-newspaper Turbulence (2007), developed for reflection within the movement of movements, titled its first issue ‘What would it mean to win?’ Thus it posed to the movement the question Badiou suggested that libertarian or anarchist thought has tended to evade. What is interesting is that some of the articles in the issue do reflect a sense of crisis or failure in the movement that links to the problem of ‘organisation’, or the development of struggles. Ben Trott posits the need for ‘directional demands’, which ‘aim to produce a point around which a potential movement could consolidate’ (2007: 15). Similarly the group The Free Association argue that what is required are ‘problematics’, shared problems that involve ‘acting and moving’ (2007: 26). The Argentinean group Colectivo Situaciones argues for the need to develop a ‘non-state institution of that which is collective’ (2007: 25). While it would obviously be foolish to take this as representative of ‘the movement’, even less as particularly anarchist, it is a sign that the problem of ‘winning’ seems to lead on to the fundamental criticism Badiou poses: how would anarchists go about achieving there desired egalitarian collective social forms?¶ To ‘win’ is, of course, not only a matter of proposing alternative social forms, but also of the means by which these might be achieved. Of course this problem arises in part because Marxist or ‘leftist’ critics often cannot identify what anarchist practice does as having ‘real’ effects because it does not conform to their idea of what politics is or should be. Anarchist thought and practice has always been concerned with the critique of politics, as the separation of one realm of human activity from all others and a separation which helps create an expert political class and professional politicians or militants. That said, as the ‘movement of movements’ starts to look beyond the limits of the counter-summit it does begin to encounter the problem of strategy and practice outside of the ‘mass’ protest or ‘temporary autonomous zone’.¶ Although not coming from an anarchist position, but rather from the tradition of post-autonomist thinking, Sandro Mezzadra and Gigi Roggero raise the problem of organisation directly in their article in Turbulence. They point to the difficulty that the ‘movement of movements’ has had intervening into the relations of production and that there is a danger of simply repeating statements concerning the exhaustion of the party form and the promotion of the new form of the network. Taking the case of EuroMayDay they point out that although it posed problems, especially concerning migration, and transmitted ‘explosive images’ it ‘did not did not manage to generate common forms of organisation and praxis’ (2007: 8). This raises the question of the relation of movements to institutions – not only in terms of existing institutions but also in terms of the creation of new institutions (Mezzadra and Roggero 2007: 9). In particular they consider the case of what they call ‘laboratory Latin America’: the multiplicity of movements and institutions emerging in a range of countries, especially Venezuela. That complex situation offers potential answers to the questions of how we might form a space in common, and ‘how can one employ the relations of power without ‘taking power’?’ (2007: 9).3¶ We should note that the wider ‘left’ does not speak with a unified voice on these matters; nor has it promoted any successful solutions even in terms of its own models of ‘revolution’ or ‘reform’. At the moment the struggle is to find a way between what seems like a sterile opposition: between ‘changing the world without taking power’ (as suggested by John Holloway) and ‘taking power to change the world’ (a more ‘traditional’ left position). Anarchist sympathy rest with the first ‘option’. But if anarchists are to answer the type of criticism posed by Badiou and acknowledge the limits currently being experienced by the ‘movement of movements’, the implication appears to be the need for a new strategic thinking that can engage with and against power to make a new world.

#### Queer rejection of the state absent a commitment to actual political change results in nothing

Eric Kerl 10, Contemporary anarchism, http://isreview.org/issue/72/contemporary-anarchism

By the end of the decade, anarchism had established itself as a provocative, radical opposition to the hegemony of pop culture and the suburban conservatism of Reagan and Thatcher’s worldview. At the same time, anarchist ideas were reduced to a tiny cultural milieu, stripped of virtually all class politics. In this context, anarchism emphasized the politics of the personal; veganism, interpersonal relations, and lifestyle choices, rather than revolutionary class politics.¶ The failure of anarchism to convincingly offer a coherent strategy for fighting oppression meant that many turned to variants of identity politics. Rather than a unified movement, this resulted in an increasingly disjointed residue of identity-based anarchisms; green anarchism, anarcha-feminism, anarchist people of color, queer anarchism, etc. Just as the new global justice movement was chalking up some early victories, anarchist organizations were disappearing.¶ A new global struggle—a new anarchism?¶ In 1994, the Zapatista uprising marked the beginning of a worldwide fight against the excesses of global capitalism. The growth of neoliberalism and global resistance had a profound effect on anarchism internationally. In the United States, where the few workplace fightbacks were largely isolated and beaten, the 1999 Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization offered a militant, dynamic way of fighting and immediately became a touchstone for a revived anarchist movement. In this new context, the central discussion within anarchism was no longer about the nature of oppression. Instead, protest tactics became the immediate focus—how to recreate the success of Seattle during other meetings of world capitalist elites.¶ ¶ This new emphasis on street tactics marked a significant turn from debates on the roots of oppression. In fact, much of the global justice movement fostered an atmosphere hostile to political debate. Under the guise of building consensus, minority perspectives were systematically buried. While much of the movement was preoccupied with a “diversity of tactics,” little room was left to discuss the very real diversity of politics and ideas that existed in the movement. “The new movement did arrive, first in the pentecostal appearance of the Zapatistas in 1994, then in 1999 and after at Seattle, Quebec, Genoa, and Cancún,” explains Staughton Lynd in Wobblies and Zapatistas.¶ ¶ Moreover, mirabile dictu, it arrived not exactly with a theory, but at least with a rhetoric: the vocabulary of anarchism. Far be it from me...to tell these splendid and heroic young people that they need more and better theory. I will just say that I am worried that in the absence of theory, many of those who protest in the streets today may turn out to be sprinters rather than long-distance runners.9¶I will just say that I am worried that in the absence of theory, many of those who protest in the streets today may turn out to be sprinters rather than long-distance runners. 9¶ ¶ This evolving emphasis on practice over theory—and in some cases the elevation of tactics to the level of principle—exposes two problems for contemporary anarchism. First, the anarchist method was transformed into its raison d’être. The tactic itself became the goal.¶ ¶ Second, this represented a retreat from any goals-based, long-term strategy. As a result, anarchism was chiefly expressed in the concept of prefigurative politics, where anarchism’s method sought to prefigure an anarchist ideal of social relations.¶ ¶ In this scenario, the classic anarchist goal of destroying the state receded into the background. Instead, as Lynd describes the approach, the anarchist project “should be to nurture a horizontal network of self-governing institutions down below, to which whoever holds state power will learn they have to be obedient and accountable.”10¶ ¶ Prefigurative politics, of course, have always been part of the anarchist creed. “No revolution can ever succeed as a factor of liberation unless the means used to further it be identical in spirit and tendency with the purposes to be achieved,” wrote Emma Goldman.11 What is different about the new anarchism is that it ignores rather than challenges state power; instead of the means prefiguring the ends, the means have become the ends.

#### Queer rejection of the state absent a commitment to actual political change results in nothing

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#### State-based politics are critical to subvert heteronormativity

**Chambers and Carver 8** Samuel Allen and Terrell, Judith Butler and Political Theory: Troubling Politics, pg. 156-157

Finally, heteronormativity can also be subverted at the level of **public policy.** The trend in recent years, particularly in the US, has been to make heteronormativity more explicit by **writing it into the law**, where it previously was not mentioned (and for potentially subversive countertrends, see Carver 2007). The Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and the dozens of state DOMAs all serve to **codify** the presumption of heteronormativity by announcing it plainly. In one sense, this is a dramatic setback in the struggle for equal civil rights for lesbian and gay citizens – a fact that should not be downplayed. Nevertheless, in the politics of norms **the very effort required to defend heteronormativity outwardly suggests a certain weakening of the norm**. And legislators across the US have made it clear that they see themselves as responding to an **imminent threat.** This threat is certainly not, as those legislators would have it, against the 'sacred institution of marriage', but it may well be **a threat to heteronormativity, to the easy presumption of heterosexuality**. Perhaps the legalisation of gay marriage will prove subversive on this front, if and when it happens. Perhaps it will not (Warner 1999). However, and in any event, from within the theory of subversion that we have articulated here, the most subversive move of all would come, on the level of national public policy, in simply eliminating state-sactioned marriage altogether.

#### Legal control over subjectivity is inevitable but so are strategic demands on the law—radical queer anti-statist politics are possible within the law

Peter **Campbell 13**, faculty member in the Program in Composition, Literacy, Pedagogy, and Rhetoric at the University of Pittsburgh, JUDICIAL RHETORIC AND RADICAL POLITICS: SEXUALITY, RACE, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/45352/Peter\_Campbell.pdf?sequence=1

But—following Matsuda—I think that Butler seems to miss an important point. Given the material force of the fantasy of legal sovereignty in the margins, “‘at the point[s]’” where power is “‘completely invested in its real and effective practices,’” 31 I argue that resistance to the idea of legal sovereignty must not preclude what Cathy Cohen might call a “practical”32 understanding of the **presently inevitable reality of the sovereign rhetorical operations of the law.** The political project of resistance to the performative sovereignty of judicial rhetoric in the United States must not deny (as Matsuda and Richard Delgado said in 1987 to the “crits” of Critical Legal Studies) the need to construct **strategically informed and tactically sound responses** to those **“formal” structures of law that already act as** and **with the material power of sovereign authority**––authority over the constraints that **legal forms of subjectivity already impose** on personhood.33 As Butler herself acknowledges in 2004,34 the **absolute critique** of legal sovereign performatives **does not adequately consider how the effects of the fantasy of legal sovereignty are most often (and most often most terribly) felt** by “those who have” actually “seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise”35 of the U.S. judiciary as a shield against domination.¶ My experience of the law has occurred through my own participation in and observation of judicial sovereignty––both from a majoritarian perspective. I teach argumentation in a prison, a setting that emphasizes the paradoxical and simultaneous vitality and uselessness of rhetorical and argumentative interaction with those persons charged with enforcing the reasoned justification of judicial decision through coercive violence. In our present democratic state of laws, the production of legitimacy for judicial sovereignty through argument, and the production of legitimacy through force, work together in explicit and mutually supportive fashion. More happily, I was recently invited by two friends to officiate their wedding, at a ceremony in Rehoboth, Massachusetts. I agreed, and asked whether I should purchase an ordination online, so that I could legally perform the ceremony. There was no need— Massachusetts is unusual among U.S. states in maintaining a category of officiant called a “solemnizer.” Any person, with little qualification, can apply to be a solemnizer. The dichotomy between the “republican style”36 of the application process, and the quotidian ease with which I was granted the certificate made me think about the “sovereign performative”37 that I would stage in Rehoboth. The “I do” statement in a marriage ceremony is one of Austin’s core examples38 of an “illocutionary” performative, an utterance which “has a certain force” in the “saying” of it,39 but this example itself performs an interesting elision of the role of a state representative in a civil marriage ceremony. In Rehoboth, my friends would not be married until I pronounced them so publicly. That pronouncement would of course require other performative statements (“I do”) from my friends as a pre-requisite to its validity.40 But on the date and in the location specified by the solemnization certificate, I had, as a feature of the designation “solemnizer” bestowed on me by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, absolute power over whether they would be married or not—on that date and in that location. In the narrow context of the two possible realities of my friends becoming married or not on that day and in that location, my role was to exercise the sovereign performative power of the Commonwealth as its judge-like representative. ¶ But in that exercise, I would also be performing two arguments: one for the sovereign legitimacy (and successful performativity)41 of my utterances and the illegitimacy of any others; and one for the value and significance of “married” as a position of legal subjectivity in Massachusetts and the United States. I bring up this example to emphasize the specifically illocutionary power of the judicial rhetorical constitution of subjects before law. Austin describes illocution as “‘in saying x I was doing y’ or ‘I did y,’”42 but judicial illocution might more accurately be described as “in saying x I did x.” When I said that these people were married, I made them married. The statement and the doing were one and the same. If a judge sentences a person to death, she does not depress the needle; the pronouncement of sentence is an illocutionary act in the first sense (x and y). But in pronouncing the sentence, the judge does redefine the convicted (of a death-eligible crime) person’s subjectivity before law from “convicted” and/or “criminal” and/or “felon” and/or “murderer” and/or “traitor” to, more primarily, “condemned.” This is an illocutionary act in the second sense (x and x).¶ If a judge rules that it is unconstitutional to require a trans\* person’s passport to list their gender contrary to that person’s “self-understanding,”43 this is a “perlocutionary” act (where the utterance effectively causes something to happen)44 in that the ruling enables the person who is trans\* to change the official designation of their gender. But it is also an x and x illocutionary act in the context of the petitioner’s subjectivity before law—the utterance of the ruling has changed their self-understanding of their own identity from “not real” to “real” in the eyes of the law. This would be even more evident if the ruling did not merely realize the truth of a trans\* person’s self-understanding as male or female, but went so far as to create, in the moment of the utterance itself, a legally recognized trans\* identity category. ¶ All of these examples are performatives enabled by the fantasy of the sovereign location of power in law. When asked, I considered (given my own views on marriage as an institution) declining to perform the ceremony—even in Massachusetts, whose marriage laws mean that the sexual orientation identity of the two people I married cannot be discerned from this story. I understood that my performative and the discourse of the ceremony surrounding it would contribute in a small way to the sovereign power of the state over human relational and sexual legitimacy. But this refusal would not have made the present sovereignty of the state over the determination of legally legitimate and illegitimate forms of relation any less inevitable.¶ **Petitions to the law are inevitable**; they will be made, **often by people with no other recourse to save their life,** or to preserve their life's basic quality. As Butler demonstrates, any such petition will have performative effect. I do not offer this brief critique of Butler’s theory of “sovereign performatives” to dispute the facticity of her arguments. I begin this project with the stipulation that politics of resistance to the “sovereign performative” must include actions of resistance to statist law itself—that is, the **specific articulation of opposition,** within progressive social movements, **to strategies that privilege appeals for help from judges**. But these politics must also acknowledge that those who undertake such strategies do not always do so without knowledge of the sovereign performative function of their actions—“recourse to the law” does not always or even usually “imagine” the law “as neutral.”45 These radical politics must also be undertaken with knowledge of the effects of the petitions to law-as-sovereign that **will inevitably be made**—and particularly with knowledge of the effects that flow from the (also performative and also inevitable) judicial rhetorical responses to these inevitable petitions. ¶ Austin teaches us that it is in the nature of performatives to not always work, and to produce effects in excess of their explicit ones. The judicial rhetorical constitution of subject and abject forms of being-in-relation to law operates through legal performatives that contain the possibilities for their own future “infelicity.”46 My project is an attempt to explore some future possibilities for the counter-sovereign articulation of subjectivity before U.S. law—possibilities that are both foreclosed and engendered in the argumentative justifications for judicial decisions. Specifically, I examine some key Supreme Court cases relating to sexual practice, race in education policy, and marriage. I perform a legal rhetorical criticism of critic-constructed “meta”-texts47 that form argumentative frameworks through which judges apply various legal doctrines to questions of sexual, racial, educational, and relational freedom.¶ Following Perelman, I understand judicial argument to be the explanatory justifications offered for judges’ authoritative interpretive application of legal doctrine to problems of public concern––problems that have been framed as legal, either by jurists themselves, petitioners to the courts, or both. In the United States, judicial arguments about constitutional interpretation have the privileged function of delimiting the grounds on which the authority of all other statist legal argument is based. **Given the overwhelming salience of constitutional legal discourse in U.S. everyday life**,48 this means that the judicial rhetoric of constitutional law plays a significant role in delimiting the grounds on which a person can base their claim—literally49––**to existence and legitimacy in the U.S. polity.**50 Jurists’ arguments from and about the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution in particular perform a final arbitration function in the ongoing and generally contentious process of the statist determination of what forms of **racialized queer identity and relation will be eligible for recognized and legitimated status in U.S. public life**. ¶ In this dissertation, I focus on the Fourteenth Amendment—due process and equal protection—rhetoric of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. I read this rhetoric in terms of “genealogies of precedent,” or the argumentative possibilities for queer subjectivity before law that are brought into being by the doctrinal frameworks Kennedy and other judicial rhetors use in a given opinion. Each chapter offers a case study of opinions in several Federal and Supreme Court cases that are foundational to Kennedy’s development of a new constitutional jurisprudence of substantive due process and equality. I demonstrate that this jurisprudence is both productive of and violent to possibilities for practical and strategic sexually “progressive”51 interactions with U.S. constitutional law. These interactions, **despite their practical or strategic formulation**, can be undertaken and/or **framed in terms of anti-statist and institutional radical queer political goals**. Possibilities for the success of such radical framing of practical interaction are partially delimited in the argumentative choice of U.S. judicial opinions.

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#### Performance is not a mode of resistance – it gives too much power to the audience because the performer is structurally blocked from controlling the (re)presentation of their representations.

Phelan 96—chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, 146-9) 146

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivityproposed here, becomes itself through disappearance. The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to thelaws of the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressedby the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occursover a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, butthis repetition itself marks it as “different.” The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present. The other arts, especially painting and photography, are drawnincreasingly toward performance. The French-born artist Sophie Calle,for example, has photographed the galleries of the Isabella StewartGardner Museum in Boston. Several valuable paintings were stolen fromthe museum in 1990. Calle interviewed various visitors and membersof the muse um staff, asking them to describe the stolen paintings. She then transcribed these texts and placed them next to the photographs of the galleries. Her work suggests that the descriptions and memories of the paintings constitute their continuing “presence,” despite the absence of the paintings themselves. Calle gestures toward a notion of the interactive exchange between the art object and the viewer. While such exchanges are often recorded as the stated goals of museums and galleries, the institutional effect of the gallery often seems to put the masterpiece under house arrest, controlling all conflicting and unprofessional commentary about it. The speech act of memory and description (Austin’s constative utterance) becomes a performative expression when Calle places these commentaries within the 147 representation of the museum. The descriptions fill in, and thus supplement (add to, defer, and displace) the stolen paintings. The factthat these descriptions vary considerably—even at times wildly—onlylends credence to the fact that the interaction between the art objectand the spectator is, essentially, performative—and therefore resistantto the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. While the art historian of painting must ask if thereproduction is accurate and clear, Calle asks where seeing and memoryforget the object itself and enter the subject’s own set of personalmeanings and associations. Further her work suggests that the forgetting(or stealing) of the object is a fundamental energy of its descriptiverecovering. The description itself does not reproduce the object, it ratherhelps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost. Thedescriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and generatesrecovery—not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers.The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; itrehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs alwaysto be remembered. For her contribution to the Dislocations show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1991, Calle used the same idea but this time she asked curators, guards, and restorers to describe paintings that were on loan from the permanent collection. She also asked them to draw small pictures of their memories of the paintings. She then arranged the texts and pictures according to the exact dimensions of the circulating paintings and placed them on the wall where the actual paintings usually hang. Calle calls her piece Ghosts, and as the visitor discovers Calle’s work spread throughout the museum, it is as if Calle’s own eye is following and tracking the viewer as she makes her way through the museum.1 Moreover, Calle’s work seems to disappear because it is dispersed throughout the “permanent collection”—a collection which circulates despite its “permanence.” Calle’s artistic contribution is a kind of self-concealment in which she offers the words of others about other works of art under her own artistic signature. By making visible her attempt to offer what she does not have, what cannot be seen, Calle subverts the goal of museum display. She exposes what the museum does not have and cannot offer and uses that absence to generate her own work. By placing memories in the place of paintings, Calle asks that the ghosts of memory be seen as equivalent to “the permanent collection” of “great works.” One senses that if she asked the same people over and over about the same paintings, each time they would describe a slightly different painting. In this sense, Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing. 148 I Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive. It is this quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital. Perhaps nowhere was the affinity between the ideology of capitalism and art made more manifest than in the debates about the funding policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).2 Targeting both photography and performance art, conservative politicians sought to prevent endorsing the “real” bodies implicated and made visible by these art forms. Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present—and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only spends. While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.3 To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter the event itself. Just as quantum physics discovered that macro-instruments cannot measure microscopic particles without transforming those particles, so too must performance critics realize that the labor to write about performance (and thus to “preserve” it) is also a labor that fundamentally alters the event. It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing toward disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself. This is the project of Roland Barthes in both Camera Lucida and Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. It is also his project in Empire of Signs, but in this book he takes the memory of a city in which he no longer is, a city from which he disappears, as the motivation for the search for a disappearing performative writing. The trace left by that script is the meeting-point of a mutual disappearance; shared subjectivity is possible for Barthes because two people can recognize the same Impossible. To live for a love whose goal is to share the Impossible is both a humbling project and an exceedingly ambitious one, for it seeks to find connection only in that which is no longer there. Memory. Sight. Love. It must involve a full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence. In the field of linguistics, the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated. “Being an individual and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. Each reproduction is a new act performed by someone who is qualified. Otherwise, the reproduction of the performative utterance by someone else necessarily transforms it into a constative utterance.”4 149 Writing, an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same(the three letters cat will repeatedly signify the four-legged furry animalwith whiskers) for the production of meaning, can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive. Themimicry of speech and writing, the strange process by which we put words in each other’s mouths and others’ words in our own, relies on a substitutional economy in which equivalencies are assumed and re-established. Performance refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy fundamental to it. Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward. Writing about it necessarily cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this performative promise. Performance’s independence from mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength. But buffeted by the encroaching ideologies of capitaland reproduction, it frequently devalues this strength. Writing aboutperformance often, unwittingly, encourages this weakness and falls inbehind the drive of the document/ary. Performance’s challenge to writingis to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than, as Benveniste warned, constative utterances.