## 1

#### Our Interpretation is the affirmative may only derive offense from the hypothetical implementation of the resolution as a policy action – hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet – anything new in the 1AR is either extra-T since it includes the non-topical parts of the Aff or effects-T since it’s a future result of the advocacy which both link to our offense.

#### Recognition is defined as legal authority in the context of international law.

**Britannica N.D**, world- renowned encyclopedia//Aanya https://www.britannica.com/topic/recognition-international-law

Recognition is a process whereby certain facts are accepted and endowed with a certain legal status, such as statehood, sovereignty over newly acquired territory, or the international effects of the grant of nationality.

#### “Ought to be” indicates a state of affairs and obligates an actor with the ability to bring about that state of affairs.

Hage 01 Jaap [Maastricht University, Law, Faculty Member, chair of Jurisprudence (Legal Theory) at the University of Maastricht (Netherlands)] “Contrary to Duty Obligations: A Study in Legal Ontology” in Bart Verheij, Arno R. Lodder, Ronald P. Loui and Antoinette J. Muntjewerff (eds.), Legal Knowledge and Information Systems. Jurix 2001: The Fourteenth Annual Conference. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2001, pp. 89-102. IB

On the other interpretation, ought-to-be norms prescribe to see to it that the obligatory state of affairs is achieved or maintained, depending on whether the ideal state in question already obtains. Briefly stated. the obligation is to see to it that the obligatory state of affairs obtains. On this interpretation, the ought to be norm is ‘really' an ought-to-do norm in disguise, it is an incomplete ought-to-do norm, because it leaves the actor unspecified. This deficiency can be remedied, however, by saying that the actors are those who are responsible for seeing to it that the obligatory state of affairs is achieved or maintained.

#### Just implies a legal interpretation.

Us Legal, Inc., "Just Law and Legal Definition,", <https://definitions.uslegal.com/j/just/> //Aanya

The literal meaning of the term 'just' is fair, impartial, evenhanded, candid, or reasonable. It can also mean right or fair according to law. The term can be defined in a wider sense to mean ethically, morally and legally correct or right; lawful. Depending upon conformity to or in opposition to law all human actions are either just or unjust. Anything just would be in perfect harmony with the rights of others.

#### Vote Neg—Predictable Limits –

#### a. Clash – changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and use perms – key to engage a prepared adversary and a target of mutual contestation.

#### b. prep – specific topics are key to reasonable expectations for 2Ns. Open subjects create incentives for avoidance and monopolization of moral high ground—that denies a role for the neg and turns accessibility.

#### 2. Fairness – Debate is a game and their interpretation destroys competitive equity and clash – this argument is procedural which means you filter all 1AR answers through the lens of competition – they create a monopolizing strategy that makes discussion one-sided and subverts inclusion of the neg – that destroys procedural dialogue which is the only internal link to good debates.

#### 3. Unlimited topics make assessing the validity of the 1ac’s truth claims impossible AND cause concessionary ground which creates incentives for avoidance.

#### Our method of refinement via contestation challenges hegemonic structures which I/L turns their method. Reading a Topical aff solves—radical obedience of the debate game is auto-deconstructive—debate doesn’t need YOU to show how absurd and excessive it is.

Baudrillard 96 (Jean, Professor of Philosophy of Culture and Media Criticism at the European Graduate School, The Perfect Crime, p. 73-4/shree)

Irony is the only spiritual form in the modern world, which has annihilated all oth­ers. It alone is the guardian of the mystery, but it is no longer ours to exercise. For it is no longer a function of the subject; it is an objective function, that of the arti­ficial, object world which surrounds us, in which the absence and transparency of the subject is reflected. The critical function of the subject has given way to the ironic function of the object. Once they have passed through the medium or through the image, through the spectrum of the sign and the commodity, objects, by their very existence, perform an artificial and ironic function. No longer any need for a critical consciousness to hold up the mirror of its double to the world: our modern world swallowed its double when it lost its shadow, and the irony of that incorporated double shines out at every moment in every fragment of our signs, of our objects, of our models. No longer any need to confront objects with the absurdity of their functions, in a poetic unreality, as the Surrealists did: things move to shed an ironic light on themselves all on their own; they discard their meanings effortlessly. This is all part of their visible, all too visible sequencing, which of itself creates a parody effect. The aura of our world is no longer sacred. We no longer have the sacred hori­zon of appearances, but that of the absolute commodity. Its essence is promotional. At the heart of our universe of signs there is an evil genius of advertising, a trick­ster who has absorbed the drollery of the commodity and its mise en scene. A scriptwriter of genius (capital itself?) has dragged the world into a phantasmagoria of which we are all the fascinated victims. All metaphysics is swept away by this turnabout in which the subject is no longer the master of representation (‘I’ll be your mirror’), but the operator of the objec­tive irony of the world. It is, henceforth, the object which refracts the subject and imposes upon it its presence and its random form, its discontinuity its fragmenta­tion, its stereophony and its artificial instantaneity. It is the power of the object which cuts a swathe through the very artifice we have imposed on it. There is something of revenge in this: the object becomes a strange attractor. Stripped of all illusion by technology, stripped of all connotation of meaning and value, exorbi­tated — i.e. taken out of the orbit of the subject — it is then that it becomes a pure object, superconductive of illusion and non-meaning.

#### They don’t get to weigh the aff – it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### TVA—defend a policy action—no disadvantage to it since state is process not a project as per the affirmative

#### CI—u cant be reaosnably topical and its artibrary

#### No rvi or impact turns-illogical u dont

## 2

### 1NC –OFF

#### The aff’s investment in a Deleuzian molecular “line of flight,” is rooted in the settler-spatial geometry of the line. The history of their politics is complicit with conquest which actualizes settler-colonial violence and turns case.

King 17 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State, PhD in American Studies from the University of Maryland at College Park, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight,” *Critical Ethnic Studies* Volume 3 Number 1, footnote 43 included in curly braces, modified) gz

If Byrd’s refusal is a first- order engagement and argument, then Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s interrogation of the spatial vocabularies of the human and colonialism is a second- order analysis and practice of refusal, one that reroutes us and makes us ask new questions. As Smith has argued in her classic work *Decolonizing Methodologies*, “there is a very specific spatial vocabulary of colonialism which can be assembled around three concepts: (1) the line, (2) the centre, and (3) the outside.”33 The Deleuzian and Guattarian line of flight then also emerges from the colonial spatial imaginings of the colonizer. Within Western ideas and philosophical conceptions of temporality and spatiality, like Deleuze and Guattari’s line, time and space have been categorized and imagined as entities that can be measured. In Smith’s account, “Space came to be seen as consisting of lines which were either parallel or elliptical.”34 Rather than escaping the reterritorializing capture of colonial and state power, Deleuzian and Guattarian “lines of flight” coalesce with the line’s emergence as a way to map “territory, to survey land, to establish boundaries, and mark the limits of colonial power.”35 While not intended to mark boundaries or colonize Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the line of flight, rhizomatic and violent movements to produce a land of Indigenous peoples without ancestors continues rather than ruptures colonial violence.36 As Deleuze and Guattari attempt to move away from an “I” or “a subject,” through the use of nonrepresentational and nomadic “lines of flight,” they successfully resurrect the human through the geo- epistemology of the “line.”

Within humanist cognitive frames, lines emerge in response to chaos. The line, which seeks to separate “order” from “chaos,” falls into formation with what Sylvia Wynter identifies as “the structural oppositions” that order humanist thought.37 Even the “line of flight” establishes a linear/nonlinear structural opposition that demarcates the “order” of the invisible white “self” in opposition to the “chaotic” realm of the dead Indigenous and Black “nonbeing.” The line in all of its Deleuzian and Guattarian “molar, molecular, and nomadic” iterations is a humanist geospatial and epistemic configuration. The molar lines that make smooth space do so through the clearing of Indigenous peoples (clear to smooth) in order to produce a colonial grid of order. Deleuze and Guattari even fret over the potential susceptibility of the molecular (a more supple and ambiguous line not so prone to segmentation and rigidity) and the liberatory line of flight to become susceptible to the pull of the state. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, one can sense the anxiety they have about the molecular and nomadic line of flight.

There is one last problem, the most anguishing one, concerning the dangers specific to each line. There is not much to say about the danger confronting the first [molar line], for the chances are slim that its rigidification will fail. There is not much to say about the ambiguity of the second [molecular line]. But why is the line of flight, even aside from the danger it runs of reverting to one of the other two lines, imbued with such singular despair in spite of its message of joy, as if at the very moment things are coming to a resolution its undertaking were threatened by something reaching down to its core, by a death, a demolition?38

The “something” that is reaching down and can be found in its core are the very traces of the human. Humanist secular thought that emerged from the fifteenth- century conquest and enslavement of Native and Black peoples produced the geometry of the line. The line is a way or an episteme used by the human to distinguish self from the other and produce the very structural oppositions that Sylvia Wynter names as essential to the human and its various genres. Smith’s deconstruction of the geo- epistemologies of “the center, the line,” and the “outside” poses questions and prods Western critical theory in ways that Western theory has yet to do itself, particularly about its subjectless and more specifically nonrepresentational moves.

In addition to Wynter’s structural oppositions, it is also productive to think about how Wynter’s “beyond” has us contend with the underlying epistemes that make the human possible. Zakiyyah Iman Jackson’s engagement with Wynter’s “beyond” also interrogates the call to transcend the human. In a recent GLQ roundtable discussion titled “Queer Inhumanisms,” Jackson asks what it means when Black life is asked to make this transcendent move.39 Finally, I more carefully consider the work of Amber Jamilla Musser, who makes room for Deleuze and Guattari’s influence while being skeptical of and drawing attention to the specific ways that affect, sensation, and other nonrepresentational theories end up hailing and producing subjects even as they try and avoid systems of representation.

GETTING ON AND BEYOND

Throughout Sylvia Wynter’s body of work, particularly the portion that Greg Thomas calls the “beyond” work,40 Wynter attends to the epistemic, aesthetic, performative, and moral technologies such as structural oppositions, which are needed in order to write the human as an exclusive mode of being. Sylvia Wynter is concerned with getting rid of the epistemic systems and orders of knowledge (e.g., biological determinism, economic rationalization, performances, and epistemes) that make the very emergence of exclusionary categories like the human possible. Without getting rid of these systems or artifacts, even if the category of the human is eliminated from language, it will be replaced with something else as long as biological determinism, economic rationalization, oppositions, and lines continue to order and govern thought. The problem with the human is its scaffolding, not the category itself. The emergence of the human and specifically the overrepresentation of the human as man depends on the continual reproduction of and sometimes destruction of oppositional frames— in order to replace a structural oppositional with another. Wynter contends that “all founding oppositions . . . express the fact that humans as organized orders not only struggle against the opposing “chaos,” but have need of it as well, not only destroying but also continually creating it.”41 Over the course of Wynter’s work, there is a protracted discussion about the usefulness of the opposition “order/chaos” as a primary ordering force, which has persisted throughout time yet makes adjustments to what it posits as abject difference or the chaotic outside of man at any given moment.

Within the secular human’s mode of man, the ordered self, culture, or “we” needs the chaotic, not- us, or them in the Negro [the Black] and the Indian in order to know itself as culture—*Logos*, *Reason*—and therefore as human. The human as man, in its ordered, rational, gendered, sexed, European, bourgeois form, needs chaos in order to secure a self, even as what is human changes. While the human as man may become elastic and more diverse (as proletariat and woman), it still requires an outside. It still requires chaos, even if those who were previously a part of the realm of chaos enter into the zone of order. It is within this lineated orbit of chaos and order that even nonrepresentational poststructuralist theories retain the trace of the human as a narrow ordering line of the self (even in subjectless guise). The line is but one geo- epistemology of white posthumanist thought. The Deleuzoguattarian “lines of flight,” even as a nomadic line though supposedly not attached to a self or a subject, carry the specter and trace of the human in the ordering and disciplining colonial lines of flight of conquest. As Wynter argues, there are often reversals of the order and hierarchies of structural oppositions; the reversals fail to actually overcome and annihilate the need and desire for structural opposition as an actual order of knowledge.42 While “natural man” may prevail over ecclesiastical, clergical, or theological man, natural or rational man still needs to create himself as the center or norm in relation to those who lack rationality and reason (the Black and Native). Similarly, poststructuralist theory may prevail over structuralist narratives that center the self or the “I”; however, the impulse to kill and create the Indian without ancestors alongside crafting a new self- annihilating posthumanist subject is still part of the order of knowledge of structural opposition. The selfless, subjectless, posthuman still persists as the realm of life because of the annihilation of Indigenous and Black life.

Within critical theories, Black and Native people are rendered structuralist (or modernist and dead) as white self-actualizing subjects disguise themselves as rhizomatic movements that transcend representation and the human. Epistemes such as the line segregate the chaotic realm of death (Black and Native) from the poststructuralist realm of life (white transcendence) through structural opposition marked with blood. The line is a humanist geo-form and geo-episteme, which makes the kinds of segmentation that structural oppositions are based on possible.43 {43. Even if Deleuze and Guattari’s line is molecular and perhaps not segregating, separating, or dividing, it is bringing things together into categories, orders, taxonomies of chaos, and order as it sutures and gathers matter.} Humans must perceive and come to some social or human agreement that lines even exist in the social (cultural) and natural world. Even in Deleuze and Guattari’s ideal scenario in which lines are drawn and (re)drawn again outside the state’s mandates, someone (as a subject) must still render them as an outside to something.

#### Their embrace of identity and bodies permeated by their environment obliterates the static, land-based subjectivities of the indigenous, justifying assimilation into the American whitestream

Grande 2k [Sandy, Associate Professor of Education at UConnecticut, “American Indian geographies of identity and power: At the crossroads of indigena and mestizaje”, Harvard Education Review, Winter 2000, <https://www.academia.edu/2360040/American_Indian_geographies_of_identity_and_power_At_the_crossroads_of_indigena_and_mestizaje>, Pg. 467] KLu

Discussion The forces of identity appropriation, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification pressure American Indian communities to employ essen-tialist tactics and construct relatively fixed notions of identity, and to render the concepts of fluidity and transgression highly problematic. It is evident from the examples above that the notion of fluid boundaries has never worked to the advantage of Indigenous peoples: federal agencies have in-voked the language of fluid or unstable identities as the rationale for disman-tling the structures of tribal life and creating greater dependency on the U.S. government; Whitestream America has seized its message to declare open season on Indians, thereby appropriating Native lands, culture, spiritual practices. history, and literature; and Whitestream academics have now em-ployed the language of postmodern fluidity to unwittingly transmute centu-ries of war between Indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue" (Valle &Torres, 1995, p. 141). Thus, in spite of its aspirations to social justice, the notion of a new cultural democ-racy based on the ideal of mestizaje represents a rather ominous threat to American Indian communities. In addition, the undercurrent of fluidity and sense of displacedness that permeates, if not defines, mestizaje runs contrary to American Indian sensi-bilities of connection to place, land, and the Earth itself. Consider, for exam-ple, the following statement on the nature of critical subjectivity by Peter Mc-Laren: The struggle for critical subjectivity is the struggle to occupy a space of hope — a liminal space, an intimation of the anti-structure, of what lives in the in-between zone of undecidedability — in which one can work toward a praxis of redemp-tion.... A sense of atopy has always been with me, a resplendent placelessness, a feeling of living in germinal formlessness.... I cannot find words to express what this border identity means to me. All I have are what Georgres Bastille (1988) calls mots glissants (slippery words). (1997, pp. 18-14) McLaren speaks passionately and directly about the crisis of modern society and the need for a "praxis of redemption." As he perceives it, the very possi-bility of redemption is situated in our willingness not only to accept but to flourish in the "liminal" spaces, border identities, and postcolonial hybrid-ities that are inherent in postmodern life and subjectivity. In fact, McLaren perceives the fostering of a "resplendent placelessness" itself as the gateway to a more just, democratic society. While American Indian intellectuals also seek to embrace the notion of transcendent subjectivities, they seek a notion of transcendence that remains rooted in historical place and the sacred connection to land. Consider, for example, the following commentary by Deloria (1992) on the centrality of place and land in the construction of American Indian subjectivity: Recognizing the sacredness of lands on which previous generations have lived and died is the foundation of all other sentiment. Instead of denying this di-mension of our emotional lives, we should be setting aside additional places that have transcendent meaning. Sacred sites that higher spiritual powers have chosen for manifestation enable us to focus our concerns on the specific form of our lives.... Sacred places are the foundation of all other beliefs and prac-tices because they represent the presence of the sacred in our lives. They prop-erly inform us that we arc not larger than nature and that we have responsibili-ties to the rest of the natural world that transcend our own personal desires and wishes. This lesson must be learned by each generation. (pp. 278, 281) Gross misunderstanding of this connection between American Indian sub-jectivity and land, and, more importantly, between sovereignty and land has been the source of numerous injustices in Indian country. For instance, I be-lieve there was little understanding on the part of government officials that passage of the Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978) would open a Pandora's box of discord over land, setting up an intractable conflict between property rights and religious freedom. American Indians, on the other hand, viewed the act as a invitation to return to their sacred sites, several of which were on government lands and were being damaged by commercial use. As a result, a flurry of lawsuits alleging mismanagement and destruction of sacred sites was filed by numerous tribes. Similarly, corporations, tourists, and even rock climbers filed suits accusing land managers of unlawfully restricting access CO public places by implementing policies that violate the constitutional separa-tion between church and state. All of this is to point out that the critical pro-ject of mestizaje continues to operate on the same assumption made by the U.S. government in this instance, that in a democratic society, human subjec-tivity — and liberation for that matter — is conceived of as inherently rights-based as opposed to land-based. To be fair, I believe that both American Indian intellectuals and critical theorists share a similar vision — a time, place. and space free of the compul-sions of Whitestream, global capitalism and the racism, sexism, classism, and xenophobia it engenders. But where critical scholars ground their vision in Western conceptions of democracy and justice that presume a "liberated" self. American Indian intellectuals ground their vision in conceptions of sov-ereignty that presume a sacred connection to place and land. Thus, to a large degree, the seemingly liberatory constructs of fluidity, mobility, and trans-gression are perceived not only as the language of critical subjectivity, but also as part of the fundamental lexicon of Western imperialism. Deloria (1999) writes: Although the loss of land must be seen as a political and economic disaster of the first magnitude, the real exile of the tribes occurred with the d6struction of ceremonial life (associated with the loss of land) and the failure or inability of white society to offer a sensible and cohesive alternative to the traditions which Indians remembered. People became disoriented with respect to the world in which they lived. They could not practice their old ways, and the new ways which they were expected to learn were in a constant state of change because they were not a cohesive view of the world but simply adjustments which whites were making to the technology they had invented. (p. 247). In summary, insofar as American Indian identities continue to be defined and shaped in interdependence with place, the transgressive mestizaje func-tions as a potentially homogenizing force that presumes the continued exile of tribal peoples and their enduring absorption into the American "demo-cratic" Whitestream. The notion of mestizaje as absorption is particularly problematic for the Indigenous peoples of Central and South America, where the myth of the mestizaje (belief that the continent's original cultures and inhabitants no longer exist) has been used for centuries to force the in-tegration of Indigenous communities into the national mestizo model (Van Cott, 1994). According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1992), the myth of mestiza-je has provided the ideological pretext for numerous South American gov-ernmental laws and policies expressly designed to strengthen the nation-state through incorporation of all "non-national" (read "Indigenous") ele-ments into the mainstream. Thus, what Valle and Torres (1995) previously describe as "the continent's unfinished business of cultural hybridization" (p. 141), Indigenous peoples view as the continents' long and bloody battle to absorb their existence into the master narrative of the mestizo. While critical scholars do construct a very different kind of democratic solidarity that disrupts the sociopolitical and economic hegemony of the dominant culture around a transformed notion of mestizaje (one committed to the destabilization of the isolationist narratives of nationalism and cul-tural chauvinism), I argue that any liberatory project that does not begin with a clear understanding of the difference of American lndianness will, in the end, work to undermine tribal life. Moreover, there is a potential danger that the ostensibly "new" cultural democracy based upon the radical mes-tizaje will continue to mute tribal differences and erase distinctive Indian identities. Therefore, as the physical and metaphysical borders of the post-modern world become increasingly fluid, the desire of American Indian communities to protect geographic borders and employ "essentialist" tactics also increases. Though such tactics may be viewed by critical scholars as highly problematic, they are viewed by American Indian intellectuals as a last line of defense against the steady erosion of tribal culture, political sover-eignty, Native resources, and Native lands. The tensions described above indicate the dire need for an Indigenous, revolutionary theory that maintains the distinctiveness of American Indians as tribal peoples of sovereign nations (border patrolling) and also encour-ages the building of coalitions and political solidarity (border crossing). In contrast to critical scholars McLaren and Kris Gutierrez (1997), who admon-ish educators to develop a concept of unity and difference as political mobili-zation rather than cultural authenticity, I urge American Indian intellectuals to develop a language that operates at the crossroads of unity and difference and defines this space in terms of political mobilization and cultural authen-ticity, thus expressing both the interdependence and distinctiveness of tribal peoples

#### You should refuse their attempt to intervene upon those movements and instead allow those existing movements to crash the infrastructure of modernity.

King 17 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State, PhD in American Studies from the University of Maryland at College Park, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight,” *Critical Ethnic Studies* Volume 3 Number 1) gz

So what of Black and Native stakes in identity? **If the primary concern for Black and Native studies is to interrogate and then destroy the structures and lineaments that make the human-as-man possible, then Black and Native people do not necessarily seek to inhabit the space of the human or identity as they currently exist**. **For example, if Black Lives Matter** (BLM) **is asking to be absorbed into the category of the human, then BLM’s version of the human** does not yet exist. Further, **if Black lives were to be absorbed into the category of the human, the social order and the scaffolding that upends and holds together the human would collapse**. For example, **if Black Lives Matter** (as a variety of local chapters with their own unique politics) **is actually making an appeal to be included within humanity**—**as an intelligible identity of the living**—**the request is also accompanied by a** demand for the abolition of the police. **In addition to the BLM movement** and its various local chapters, **the Black Youth Project, the Trayvon Martin Organizing Committee, and other voices of Black revolt are emerging from within and outside the movement and are calling for the abolition of the police state**.48 **If the human is to exist in Black form, then the police state must wither away**. Reflecting on the Rodney King case and the initials N.H.I., **Wynter effectively illustrates how the police state has the power to confer the identity of “human” or “no human.”**49 **If the goal of Black activists to abolish the police is achieved, the police state would no longer have the power to decide who was or who was not human**. Further, **if Native people were to be fully incorporated into the category of the human, then the United States would cease to exist**. **The nation-state (United States) that gives the “absolute” human (white “Americans”) excusive claims to the category of the human would have to be demolished**. **When the United States, as the practice of genocide itself, ceases to exist, then Native/Indigenous peoples can exist and identify as human**. **Rather than quibbling about “identity” itself, practices of Native refusal and decolonization and Black “skepticism/pessimism” and abolition argue that the U.S. police state can no longer determine the conditions of possibility for being considered human**. **Critical ethnic studies can continue to look to Black and Native resistance against state-sanctioned killing and genocide as the** praxis and theory that shift the terms of contemporary discussions and contestations over identity.

#### Settler colonialism’s logic of elimination perpetuates antiblack violence and results in endless war.

Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez 13 [Eve, Professor at SUNY, Ruben, Professor at the University of Toronto, “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity”, Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, Volume 29, Number 1, 2013, PDF, pg. 73-75, October 24, 2016] KLu

Settler Colonialism and Curriculum Studies Settler colonialism is the specific formation of colonialism in which the colonizer comes to stay, making himself the sovereign, and the arbiter of citizenship, civility, and knowing. Patrick Wolfe (2006) argues that settler colonialism “destroys to replace,” (p. 338) operating with a logic of elimination. “Whatever settlers may say—and they generally have a lot to say,” Wolfe observes, “the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory” (ibid., parentheses original). The logic of elimination is embedded into every aspect of the settler colonial structures and its disciplines—it is in their DNA, in a manner of speaking. Indeed invasion is a structure, not an event (p. 402). The violence of invasion is not contained to first contact or the unfortunate birthpangs of a new nation, but is reasserted each day of occupation. Thus, when we write about settler colonialism in this article, we are writing about it as both an historical and contemporary matrix of relations and conditions that define life in the settler colonial nation-state, such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Israel, South Africa, Chinese Tibet, and others. In North America, settler colonialism operates through a triad of relationships, between the (white [but not always]) settlers, the Indigenous inhabitants, and chattel slaves who are removed from their homelands to work stolen land. At the crux of these relationships is land, highly valued and disputed. For settlers to live on and profit from land, they must eliminate Indigenous peoples, and extinguish their historical, epistemological, philosophical, moral and political claims to land. Land, in being settled, becomes property. Settlers must also import chattel slaves, who must be kept landless, and who also become property, to be used, abused, and managed. Several belief systems need to be in place to justify the destruction of Indigenous life and the enslavement of life from other lands, in particular the continent of Africa. These belief systems are constituted through “what Michel Foucault identifies as the ‘invention of Man’: that is, by the Renaissance humanists’ epochal redescription of the human outside the terms of the then theocentric, ‘sinful by nature’ conception/‘descriptive statement’ of the human” (Wynter, 2003, p. 263). These include what was termed in the 19th century “manifest destiny”–or the expansion of the settler state as afforded by God; heteropaternalism–the assumption that heteropatriarchal nuclear domestic arrangements are the building block of the state and institutions; and most of all, white supremacy. Settler colonialism requires the construction of non-white peoples as less than or not-quite civilized, an earlier expression of human civilization, and makes whiteness and white subjectivity both superior and normal (Wynter, 2003). In doing so, whiteness and settler status are made invisible, only seen when threatened (see also Tuck & Yang, 2012). Settler colonialism is typified by its practiced epistemological refusal to recognize the latent relations of the settler colonial triad; the covering of its tracks. One of the ways the settlercolonial state manages this covering is through the circulation of its creation story. These stories involve signs-turned mythologies that conceal the teleology of violence and domination that characterize settlement (Donald, 2012a, 2012b). For example, Dwayne Donald examines the centrality of the “Fort on Frontier” as a signifier for the myth of civilization and modernity in the creation story of the Canadian nation-state. The image of the fort works as “a mythic sign that initiates, substantiates and, through its density, hides the teleological story of the development of the nation” (2012a, p. 43): Fort pedagogy works according to an insistence that everyone must be brought inside and become like the insiders, or they will be eliminated. The fort teaches us that outsiders must be either incorporated, or excluded, in order for development to occur in the desired ways. (2012a, p. 44) The fort is not simply about the process of colonization–of the exogenous conquering of land and people, but more importantly, about a process of colonial settlement—of imposing a hegemonic logic from the inside, “premised on the domination of a majority that has become indigenous” (Veracini, 2010, p. 5, emphasis added). As Donald (2012b) explains, “transplanting a four-cornered version of European development into the heart of the wilderness” (p. 95), the fort stands as a signifier “of the process by which wild and underutilized lands were civilized through European exploration, takeover, and settlement” (p. 99). Scholars like John Willinsky (1998) have offered ample evidence of the ways in which schooling has served the purpose of promoting an imperialist view of the world that justifies colonization premised on European epistemological supremacy. While he provides a powerful critique of the colonizing force of the North American curriculum, such analyses stop short of examining how the project of curriculum is implied in the ongoing project of colonial settlement, assuming that settler colonies are a thing of the past. Recognizing that colonization is an ongoing process, there have been many postcolonial conceptualizations of curriculum and curriculum history (e.g. Asher, 2005; Coloma; 2009; McCarthy, 1998). Yet such conceptualizations typically ignore important differences in the various kinds of colonial processes occurring in the contemporary world. Because it is different from other forms of colonialism in ways that matter, settler colonialism requires more than a postcolonial theory of decolonization. Indeed, “decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 7). In this light, the specific contours of settler colonialism in curriculum studies are as yet undertheorized, particularly its continued role in ensuring what we describe later in this article as settler futurity. This essay takes part in this conversation by theorizing what we call the curriculum project of replacement.

#### Voting negative is for a hermeneutics of suspicion that refuses the aff’s resuscitation of postmodern thought.

King 17 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State, PhD in American Studies from the University of Maryland at College Park, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight,” *Critical Ethnic Studies* Volume 3 Number 1, footnotes 1 and 7 included in curly braces, modified) gz

More specifically, I have watched graduate students of color experience this kind of stress, anxiety, and unease as they confront the pressure to “take up” more contemporary impulses within Western “critical theory” to move “beyond the human” or toward the posthuman. One task of this article is to attend to the ways that Black and Indigenous academics, as well as Black and Native studies scholars, are expected to perform a commitment to a Deleuzian brand of posthumanist and nonrepresentational theory as proof that they are critical and postmodern scholars and disciplinary formations. Lately, I have heard questions posed to Black and Native scholars and activists who theorize the work of movements like Black Lives Matter, Idle No More, and other work addressing Black and Indigenous death to explain what relationship this (survival- based) work has to “identity,” “the subject,” or “the human.” More specifically, the questions are posed as ones that assume that these movements reify one or all of the above categories. Additionally, the inquiries are accompanied by an expectation that the person(s) and the movements will disavow all claims to identity, subjecthood, and the desire for humanity. What kinds of hostilities, assumptions, and misrecognitions lurk in inquiries such as the following: “Is Black Lives Matter a humanist movement?”2 “Does BLM reify the notion and idea of the human?” “When will Native studies transcend or get beyond the subject or the human?”3 Because emerging scholars in the academy often contend with these hostile inquires in the seminar space, while teaching, at conferences and in other spaces of academe, a change in comportment, tone, affect, and ways of being in the academy also needs to accompany the modes of conceptual and theoretical resistance within Black and Native studies. This article is as interested in the postures, affective states (skepticism), and stubborn practices of insubordination such as refusal that frustrate forward movement and business-as-usual in the academy. Specifically, this article tracks how Native feminist refusal and Black feminist suspicion respond to Deleuzian theory. Native feminist politics of decolonial refusal and Black feminist abolitionist politics of skepticism informed by a misandry and misanthropic distrust of and animus toward the (over)representation of man/men as the human diverge from the polite, communicative acts of the public sphere, much like the politics of the “feminist killjoy.”4 Throughout this article, I deploy the term “feminist” both ambivalently and strategically to mark and distinguish the scholarly tradition created by Black and Native women, queer, trans, and other people marginalized within these respective communities and their anticolonial and abolitionist movements.5 Until a more useful and legible term emerges, I will use “feminist” to mark the practices of refusal and skepticism (misandry/misanthropy) as ones that largely exist outside more masculinist traditions within Indigenous/Native studies and Black studies. “Decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” depart from the kinds of masculinist anticolonial traditions that attempt to reason Native/ Black man to White Man within humanist logic in at least two significant ways. First, neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 Specifically, the Native and Black “feminist” politics discussed throughout launch a critique of both the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. In fact, practices of refusal and skepticism interrupt and flout codes of civil and collegial discursive protocol to focus on and illumine the violence that structures the posthumanist discourse. Attending to the comportment, tone, and intensity of an engagement is just as important as focusing on its content. The particular manner in which Black and Native feminists push back against violence is important. The force, break with decorum, and style in which Black and Native feminists confront discursive violence can change the nature of future encounters. Given that Black women who confront the logics of “nonrepresentational theory” are really confronting genocide and the white, whimsical disavowal of Black and Native negation on the way to subjectlessness, it is understandable that there is an equally discordant response. Refusal and skepticism are modes of engagement that are uncooperative and force an impasse in a discursive exchange. This article tracks how traditions of “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory. Further, this article asks whether Western forms of nonrepresentational (subjectless and nonidentitarian) theory can truly transcend the human through self-critique, self-abnegation, and masochism alone. External pressure, specifically the kind of pressure that “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” as forms of resistance that enact outright rejection of or view “posthumanist” attempts with a “hermeneutics of suspicion,”7 is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory. {7. See the work of Black feminists such as Susana M. Morris, author of *Close Kin and Distant Relatives: The Paradox of Respectability in Black Women’s Literature* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014), as well as womanist theologians who appropriate the phrase “hermeneutics of suspicion” as coined by Paul Ricoeur to describe the reading and interpretive practices of Black woman who are distrustful of traditional tropes about heteronormativity or conventional ways of thinking about what is natural and normal. Further, in Morris’s case, as well as within the tradition of Black women of faith and theologians, canonical and biblical texts are interpreted through a lens that acknowledges white supremacy and misogyny, and critically challenges racism and sexism (or kyriarchy in Morris’s case). Within Black feminist and womanist traditions, it is a position that can recognize the limitations of text and that refuses to accept the doctrine, theories, or message of an ideology wholesale.} While this article does not directly stake a claim in embracing or rejecting identity per se, it does take up the category of the human. Because the category of the human is modified by identity in ways that position certain people (white, male, able- bodied) within greater or lesser proximity to humanness, identity is already taken up in this discussion. Conversations about the human are very much tethered to conversations about identity. In the final section, the article will explore how Black and Native/Indigenous absorption into the category of the human would disfigure the category of the human beyond recognition. Further, I discuss “decolonial refusal” in relation to how Black scholars like Sylvia Wynter, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, and Amber Jamilla Musser work within a Black feminist tradition animated by a kind of skepticism or suspicion capable of ferreting out the trace of the white liberal human within (self- )professed subjectless, futureless, and nonrepresentational white theoretical traditions. In other words, in the work of Sylvia Wynter, one senses a general suspicion and deep distrust of the ability of Western theory— specifically its attempt at self-critique and self-correction in the name of justice for humanity— to revise its cognitive orders to work itself out of its current “closed system,” which reproduces exclusion and structural oppositions based on the negation of the other.9 Wynter’s study of decolonial theory and its elaboration of autopoiesis informs her understanding of how the human and its overrepresentation as man emerges. Recognizing that humans (of various genres) write themselves through a “self-perpetuating and self-referencing closed belief system” that often prevents them from seeing or noticing “the process of recursion,” Wynter works to expose these ~~blind spots~~ [shortcomings].10 Wynter understands that one of the limitations of Western liberal thought is that it cannot see itself in the process of writing itself. I observe a similar kind of cynicism about the way the academic left invokes “post humanism” in the work of Jackson and Musser. Musser in particular questions the capacity of queer theories to turn to sensations like masochism within the field of affect studies to overcome the subject. Further, Jackson’s and Musser’s work is skeptical that white transcendence can happen on its own terms or rely solely on its own processes of self-critique and self-correction. I read Jackson’s and Musser’s work as distrustful of the ability for “posthumanism” to be accountable to Black and Indigenous peoples or for affect theory on its own to not replicate and reinforce the subjugation of the other as it moves toward self-annihilation. Both the human and the post human are causes for suspicion within Black studies.

## 3

### 1NC—OFF

#### Their scholarship is hateful and a reason to lose the round—their author endorsed pedophilia and actively advocated against the age of consent law.

Doezema 18 [Marie Doezema (Parisian Journalist). “France, Where Age of Consent Is Up for Debate.” The Atlantic, 10 March 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/frances-existential-crisis-over-sexual-harassment-laws/550700/ //WWDH]

After May 1968, French intellectuals would challenge the state’s authority to protect minors from sexual abuse. In one prominent example, on January 26, 1977, Le Monde, a French newspaper, published a petition signed by the era’s most prominent intellectuals—including Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Gilles Deleuze, Roland Barthes, Philippe Sollers, André Glucksmann and Louis Aragon—in defense of three men on trial for engaging in sexual acts with minors. “French law recognizes in 13- and 14-year-olds a capacity for discernment that it can judge and punish,” the petition stated, “But it rejects such a capacity when the child's emotional and sexual life is concerned.” Furthermore, the signatories argued, children and adolescents have the right to a sexual life: “If a 13-year-old girl has the right to take the pill, what is it for?” It’s unclear what impact, if any, the petition had. The defendants were sentenced to five years in prison, but did not serve their full sentences.

#### Drop the debater—academic spaces have way too many sympathizers who ignore violence against children, and every act must be challenged in the most unflinching terms because anything else reinforces the epistemic bias in favor of rationalizing disgusting behavior.

Grant 18 [Alec Grant (Independent Scholar, retired from the University of Brighton where he was a Reader in Narrative Mental Health). “Sanitizing Academics and Damaged Lives” Mad In The UK, 12 April 2018. https://www.madintheuk.com/2018/12/sanitizing-academics-and-damaged-lives/ //WWDH]// Recut by Lex AKo

Academics who sympathize with paedophilia constitute its intellectual public relations arm. Their role is to make child-adult sex presentable, more acceptable to the public, fit for polite society, sugar-coated, glossed with a scholarly veneer, sanitized. Snapshots of sanitizing academic activity from the last 40 years show how this seeps into and contaminates public policy, education and practice in insidious ways. This is done via the workings of power, privilege, perverse cronyism, and, as Pilgrim (2018) argues, as a result of widespread moral stupor and denial. It’s astonishing that this happens in the face of the psychological and development features of complex post-trauma which are often a consequence of child sexual abuse. By pathologizing adult survivors, often with the ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’ (BPD) tag, mainstream psychiatric business-as-usual plays out its role in suppressing the truth about the consequences of paedophilia among adult survivors. Pilgrim (2018) reminds us that care and mutuality are core ethical features of all sexual practices. As someone who was for many years associated with cognitive therapy, I’m interested in ‘cognitive, or thought distortions’, which are used by people in rationalising their behaviour in self-serving ways. We know from Pilgrim and many other writers, researchers and practitioners about the rationalisations of perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation. They include: Children are not victims but willing participants; They want it; They enjoy it; It’s about friendship; It’s about love; It helps children develop and mature. According to Pilgrim (2018), the ‘heyday’ period of academic versions of such rationalisations was the 1970s. 1977 was the year of an unsuccessful lobby by French intellectuals to defend intergenerational sex. Included among these were the otherwise well-respected philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Jaques Derrida, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. These figures were at the forefront of the use of academic authority to lobby governments to liberalise and decriminalise adult-child sexual contact.

#### Representations come before the effects of th eaff—separating discursive and non-discursive practices is impossible. The representations used are vital to testing the truth claims of the affirmative.

Crawford 2 [Neta, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at Boston University, “Argument and Change in World Politics”, p. 19-21]

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand (the proper frame or representation) must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger Karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively represent situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibilities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representationhow frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

## Case

#### Interpretations of Deleuze as a dialectic causes the failure of world-creation – only a political vision that tries to negotiate a reasonable middle ground of the two can avoid slipping into liberal humanism.

David R. Cole and Mehri Mirzaei Rafe (2017): Conceptual ecologies for educational research through Deleuze, Guattari and Whitehead, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, DOI: 10.1080/09518398.2017.1336805

How do conceptual ecologies work? One of the basic problems for the mapping of conceptual ecologies for educational research is to think outside and beyond ‘the human’. If thought is restricted by and to ‘the human’, ecologies are potentially obscured, non-human diversity and multiplicity are homogenised. Such a philosophical and research-based concern is resolved in part through the introduction of the non-representative vegetal thought of the rhizome in: A Thousand Plateaus, wherein ‘concept creation’ is mentioned in terms of a list of specific concepts, through and by which Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate a dizzying ability to create new concepts. The concepts of A Thousand Plateaus are immediately qualified as a series of numbers and lines (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 22), therefore taking away the direct connection to the humanistic element in their design, or to the agency in their production and use. The rhizomatic concept creation of A Thousand Plateaus is an experimental, immanent, theoretical and interconnected process that creates plateaus at certain points in history, and could be aligned with the notion of creating conceptual, multi-dimensional maps around educational research projects, which this article alludes to. In contrast, the Western notion of concept creation of What is Philosophy? remains a distinctly philosophical, human affair, and leaves little room for the non-human, ecological outside to emerge through thought. However, this paper does not position, What is Philosophy? and A Thousand Plateaus as working against each other, but confirms the different intents of Deleuze and Guattari’s writing, one to understand how Western philosophy works, the other to build immanent plateaus in history that explain the non-linear connections between capitalism and schizophrenia (which here underpin cartographic maps of educational research). The departure from chaos happens in What is Philosophy? because the conception of nature from within the spectrum of Western concept creation can take on the aspect of a romantic other, or of an augmented and synthesised (natural) world view, which has little to do with the real, factual, messy, ecological world of nature. Conceptual ecologies for educational research therefore require an analysis of the world views and perspectives that make up (and destroy) concept creation in order to enable a closer understanding of how conceptual ecologies may emerge due to thought from the outside of anthropomorphism. E.g. Thacker (2011) distinguishes between the ‘world-for-us’ (the human-centric view of the world) and the ‘world-in-itself’ (the world as it exists in essence), from what he calls the ‘world-without-us’: ‘the world-without-us lies somewhere in between, in a nebulous zone that is at once impersonal and horrific’ (p. 6). The thinking necessary to enunciate conceptual ecologies for educational research needs to engage with the ‘world-without-us’, as Thacker (2011) describes it, in order not to reconstruct nature as an imperfect human project, or to remain sheltered within the safe confines of previous (non-ecological) human thought patterns. Of course, thinking the ‘world-without-us’ is not an easy task. One could argue that even the vegetal ‘rhizome’ of A Thousand Plateaus, in which, ‘[a]ny point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other;’ and through which, ‘[a] rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 7), is designed (and operated) by humans. Therefore, from this perspective, the non-human ecological outside of the rhizome is questionable, if not potentially treacherous and scary to fully attain. In a parallel sense, Bennett’s (2004) ‘thing-power’ treads a similar, vitalist line to the rhizome, in that the path to this outside of human thought is a going back and forth between objects, understanding what attracts us to them and finding out how we may become attuned to their presence. Furthermore, a foundational aspect of the rhizome and how it works is exactly this criss-crossing perspective and ontology that it affords, and that is a powerful aspect of its potential and creative promise. On one side of this vegetal perspective, that produces the maps of practice through the act of research, one could broadly place Spinozian affect, and the joyous passions, i.e. what makes a difference in terms of becoming more recognisable ethical in the current situation, on the other, are the darker, more Nietzschean spaces to inhabit through vegetal connections, where invisible force diagrams pre-programme one to take action (however, Nietzsche talks positively about the joyous passions). Nature does not take sides between the joyous and the dark as such, and that is one of the points of working towards a conceptual ecology, wherein the division between the joyous and dark perspectives for vegetal inquiry helps us towards understanding what the journey to conceptual ecologies might look like (beyond direct human experience), and to enable purposeful, non-oscillating cartographic knowledge about practice. A useful resource in this regard is the recent book on Dark Deleuze by Andrew Culp (2016): Whilst this division above between the joyous and dark Deleuze should not reinstate a dualistic approach to using Deleuze, it does chart a course for understanding the mapping of the conceptual ecologies for educational research of this article, i.e. in-between the two poles of appropriation of Deleuze as delineated above, and this figure shows why the division is useful in terms of the type of concepts that may be enacted on either side. Even though Culp (2016) places the rhizome in the lefthand column, under the joyous polarity of appropriating Deleuze, in this article, I have positioned the non-human outside of human thought as treading the more difficult ‘in-between’ path. The right-hand pole or dark Deleuze section (Figure 1) can lead to the all too human perspectives of pessimism, nihilism and a realm of negative thought that can produce self-pitying/self-glorifying/wholly human romanticisms, a type of ‘occultism of the dark’. On the other side of the equation is the joyous uptake of Deleuze (Figure 1), which can potentially lead to an uncritical mode of ‘happy clappy’ thought, which is perhaps even less satisfying than wallowing in the romanticism of blackness, and can be easily appropriated by even the most banal forms of capitalism, as a mode of increased thought production (i.e. uncritically producing more thought): note, this is not how the mapping of conceptual ecologies through rhizomes is being characterised in this paper. To understand how to chart the course down the middle of the two poles as delineated above, and towards conceptual ecologies for educational research (thus avoiding the ‘all too human’ consequences of inquiry, i.e. the oscillation between the dark and the joyous), one must address two basic factors in the appropriation and use of Deleuze and Guattari, and that apply to understanding how rhizomes work as a mode of non-representational, non-human thought in the current situation: (1) the politics involved with the appropriation, which includes an analysis of value, 6 D. R. COLE AND M. MIRZAEI RAFE and (2) an understanding of extinction, or the annihilation of value as a consequence of functioning under the current human-made situation of the Anthropocene (Crutzen, 2002).

#### The aff fails---deriding all attempts at action as “freezing becoming” no way to deal with difficult political choices---we also control terminal uniqueness because they can’t convince others to abandon liberal subjectivity

Joseph Schwartz 8, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, The Future of Democratic Equality, 56-62

A politics of radical democratic pluralism cannot be securely grounded by a whole-hearted epistemological critique of “enlightenment rationality.” For implicit to any radical democratic project is a belief in the equal moral worth of persons; to embrace such a position renders one at least a “critical defender” of enlightenment values of equality and justice, even if one rejects “enlightenment metaphysics” and believes that such values are often embraced by non-Western cultures. Of course, democratic norms are developed by political practice and 60 struggle rather than by abstract philosophical argument. But this is a sociological and historical reality rather than a trumping philosophical proof. Liberal democratic publics rarely ground their politics in coherent ontologies and epistemologies; and even among trained philosophers there is no necessary connection between one’s metaphysics and one’s politics. There have, are, and will be Kantian conservatives (Nozick), liberals (Rawls), and radicals (Joshua Cohen; Susan Okin); teleologists, left, center, and right (Michael Sandel, Alasdair McIntyre, or Leo Strauss); anti-universalist feminists (Judith Butler, Wendy Brown) and quasi-universalist, Habermasian feminists (Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser). Post-structuralists try to read off from an epistemology or ontology a politics; such attempts simply replace enlightenment meta-narratives with postmodern (allegedly anti) meta-narratives. Such efforts represent an idealist version of the materialist effort—which post-structuralists explicitly condemn—to read social consciousness off of the structural position of “the agent.” A democratic political theory must offer both a theory of social structure and of the social agents capable of building such a society. In exchanging the gods of Weber and Marx for Nietzsche and Heidegger (or their epigones Foucault and Derrida), poststructuralist theory has abandoned the institutional analysis of social theory for the idealism of abstract philosophy. Connolly, Brown, and Butler reject explicit moral deliberation as a bad faith Nietzschean attempt at “ressentiment.” Instead, they celebrate the amoral, yet ethical strivings of a Machiavellian or Gramscian realist “war of position.”44 Sheldon Wolin, however, has written convincingly of how Machiavelli can be read as an ethical realist, a theorist of moral utilitarianism.45 Even a Machiavellian or Gramscian political “realist” must depend upon moral argument to justify the social utility of hard political choices. That is, if one reads both as ethical utilitarians who believe that, at times, one must “dirty” one’s hands in order to act ethically in politics, then they embrace a utilitarian, “just war” theory of ethical choice. According to this consequentialist moral logic, “bad means” are only justifiable if they are the only, unavoidable way to achieve a greater ethical good—and if the use of such “bad means” are absolutely minimized. Such “hard” political choices yield social policies and political outcomes that fix identities as well as transform them. Not only in regard to epistemological questions has post-structuralist theory created a new political “metaphysics” which misconstrues the nature of democratic political practice; the post-structuralist analysis of “the death of man” and “the death of the subject” also radically preclude meaningful political agency. As with Michel Foucault, Butler conceives of “subjects” as “produced” by powerknowledge discourses. In Butler’s view, the modernist concept of an autonomous subject is a “fictive construct”; and the very act of adhering to a belief in autonomous human choice is to engage in “exclusion and differentiations, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy.”46 That is, the power of discourse, of language and the unconscious, “produces subjects.” If those “subjects” conceive of themselves as having the capacity for conscious choice, they are guilty of “repressing” the manner in which their own “subjectivity” is itself produced by discursive 61 exclusion: “if we agree that politics and a power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction.”47 Susan Bickford pithily summarizes the post-structuralist rejection of the modernist subject: “power is not wielded by autonomous subjects; rather through power, subjectivity is crafted.”48 Bickford grants that post-structuralism provides some insight into how group and individual identity is “culturally constructed.” But Bickford goes on to contend that after post-structuralism exposes the “lie of the natural” (that there are no natural human identities), “socially constructed” modern individuals still wish to act in consort with others and to use human communication to influence others: “people generally understand themselves as culturally constituted and capable of agency.”49 For if there is no “doer behind the deed,” but only “performative” acts that constitute the subject, how can the theorist (or activist) assign agency or moral responsibility to actors who are “constituted by discursive practices.” (“Discursive practices” engaged in by whom, the observer may ask?) Butler insists that not only is the subject “socially constituted” by power/knowledge discourses, but so too is the “ontologically reflexive self” of the enlightenment. Now if this claim is simply that all social critics are socially-situated, then this view of agency is no more radical a claim than that made by Michael Walzer in his conception of the social critic (or agent). Walzer argues that even the most radical dissident must rely upon the critical resources embedded within his own culture (often in the almost-hidden interstices of that culture). Effective critical agency cannot depend on some abstract universal, external logic.50 Asserting that critical capacities are themselves socially constructed provides the reader with no means by which to judge whether forms of “resistance” are democratic and which are not. That is, no matter how hard one tries to substitute an aesthetic, “ironic,” “amoral ethical sensibility” for morality, the social critic and political activist cannot escape engaging in moral argument and justification with fellow citizens. Butler astutely notes that “resistance” often mirrors the very powerknowledge discourses it rejects—resisting hegemonic norms without offering alternative conceptions of a common political life. But Butler seems to affirm the possibility (by whom?) of effective rejection of such “norming” by “performative resignification.” But the “resignification” of “performative” discursive constructions provides no criteria by which to judge whether a given “resignification” is emancipatory or repressive.51 And just who (if not a relatively coherent, choosing human subject) is “performing” the resignification. Furthermore, if all forms of identity and social meaning are predicated upon “exclusion,” then the democratic theorist needs to distinguish among those identities which “exclude” in a democratic way and those which exclude in an anti-humanist, racist, and sexist manner. Some social “identities” are democratic and pluralist, such as those created by voluntary affiliations. But other “identities,” such as structural, involuntary class differences and racial and sexual hierarchies, must be transformed, even eliminated, if democracy is to be furthered. And how we behave—or “perform”—can subvert (or reinforce) such undemocratic social structures. But if these social structures are immutably inscribed by62 “performative practices,” then there can be no democratic resistance. In her call for an ironic politics of “performative resistance,” Butler seems to imply that human beings have the capacity to choose which “performative practices” to engage in—and from which to abstain. If this is the case, then a modernist conception of agency and moral responsibility has covertly snuck its way back into Butler’s political strategy.52

#### Deleuze’s control society thesis is completely wrong – the role of institutions is growing, not shrinking, which means their analysis fails to understand contemporary political situations and produces incoherent resistance

Kelly 15.Mark G.E. Kelly, senior lecturer and ARC Future Fellow in the School of Humanities and Communication Arts at Western Sydney University, “Discipline is Control: Foucault contra Deleuze,” *new formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics*, Volume 84-85, 2015

In The Birth of Biopolitics, a rare foray by Foucault into contemporary history, he does argue that our most recent governmentality, neoliberalism, feeds into the formulation of a ‘less . . . disciplinary’ form of economic policy.23 Less disciplinary it may be, but this does not make it non- or anti- or post-disciplinary. Contemporary public policy does not bypass discipline, but utilises it in different ways: in neoliberalism we are disciplined not so much through the direct intervention of the state, but the provision of incentives to drive human behaviour characteristic of neoliberal governmentality nevertheless requires disciplining at the level of enterprises, and is indeed in itself disciplinary. Still, since Foucault does identify historic shifts in the operation of power it does not necessarily contradict him to posit a change that occurred after his death. Such historical ruptures are the stuff of history for him. He is, however, circumspect about identifying one’s own time period as a privileged moment. Moreover, Deleuze’s suggestion that Foucault would prognosticate about the determinate ways in which the future would be different to the present is contrary to Foucault’s essentially critical ethos. Of course, Deleuze is right that things have changed in recent decades. It is in the nature of things always to change. The question is to what extent they are changing, whether the changes are breaks in some respect, and if so how. I will maintain that recent changes identified by Deleuze have been of intensity and not of type, at least in relation to the technologies of power as outlined by Foucault. Foucault for his part does not define discipline succinctly, but he consistently characterises it differently to Deleuze. He understands it, as distinct from the older sovereign power that operated by damaging bodies, as shaping and cultivating bodies. For this reason, he uses the phrase ‘anatomo-politics’ (that is, ‘body politics’) as a synonym for discipline.24 It does not stop at the body, however: rather, he argues in Discipline and Punish that disciplinary power produces a ‘soul’ on the basis of the body.25 This means that there can be ‘consensual disciplines’, in which those disciplined identify with and accept their disciplining.26 He also argues that ‘at the heart of all disciplinary mechanisms functions a small penal mechanism’,27 which is to say that punishment (which may or may not take the form of confinement) is always involved in them, and that disciplines are ‘essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical’ (p222), even though they may be consensual. Any suggestion then that there is a new form of power abroad because today we are in the grip of a soft rather than a hard power that works by subtly influencing our behaviour rather than gruffly mandating it misses the point that such a transition is already at the heart of what Foucault calls ‘discipline’ from its inception centuries ago. Not only does Deleuze define discipline narrowly and inaccurately, his claims for the decline of discipline even on his definition are overblown. Deleuze declares that ‘we’re in the midst of a general breakdown of all sites of confinement – prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, the family’ (‘Postscript’, p178). Not only was this not true in 1990, it is still not true today. Imprisonment in particular has increased to previously unseen levels since Deleuze wrote these words, particularly in the United States, which now incarcerates its populace at a rate unprecedented in human history. Prison itself has not changed, at least not in any relevant way: prisons still brutalise inmates, make them work for profit of others. There are calls for reform, but Foucault showed that these have always been a constitutive element of the carceral system. Far from the decline of disciplinary punishment in favour of new forms of punishment, we have seen earlier forms of discipline reappear, such as the chain gang and execution in the United States during the 1990s. Though these have since largely disappeared again, both are still advocated and practised to an extent that they once were not. Whichever direction this takes going forward, however, it does not pose a threat to the validity of Foucault’s historical analysis, since he does not propound a unidirectional, progressive view of history. Discipline has always been incomplete and has wavered historically.28 Deleuze claims that the traditional confining prison is being replaced through the use of electronic tagging (p182). Thus far, however, the adoption of tagging has coincided with a general increase rather than a decrease in confinement. Even were it to displace the prison, moreover, it is not at all [End Page 155] clear that this constitutes a decline of discipline, or even of confinement. Deleuze mentions (his major collaborator) Félix Guattari’s vision of a card-access city, as an example of ‘a control mechanism that can fix the position of any element at any moment’ (‘Postscript’, pp181-2). This does seem like a possible development: with contemporary GPS we can be tracked and fixed to a minute level. But this seems simply to extend the panoptic imperative behind the prison, creating an infinite management of bodies, completing rather than superseding disciplinary power. We are certainly today under much more surveillance than previously, with CCTV, the monitoring of internet content and of mobile phone calls. We are all now in the position of the prisoners in Bentham’s panopticon, having to presume we are being monitored all the time. Deleuze does not mention any of these connections, however: the Panopticon, arguably the key figure of Foucault’s account of discipline, is missing from the ‘Postscript’, as are even very general themes, like the surveillance or punishment of Discipline and Punish’s original French title, Surveiller et punir. To date, in any case, discipline remains based in the same old cast of institutions - the prison, the hospital, the school - to a large extent. Discipline can indeed never be dead as long as the prison exists in something like its classic form: all discipline has long been underwritten by imprisonment, wielded as the ultimate threat to ensure obedience. But just as prisons are growing, so too are several other disciplinary institutions. Educational institutions continue to expand, and continue to be disciplinary. More and more people study to higher and higher levels. Schools threaten to expand to take in more of the students’ day as the proportion of the population corralled in workplaces until five o’clock or later increases. Deleuze invokes continuous assessment as evidence of the crucial change in schools. This is indeed, as he thinks, the same kind of effect as tagging of prisoners; which is to say, not the decline, but intensification of disciplinary control. He is clearly right to see universities as becoming businesses (‘Postscript, p182), but this is simply neoliberalism, a shift in the boundary between public and private sectors, which is not a shift in the boundary of discipline, since it always straddled both. Regarding factories, disciplinary workplaces have in recent decades massively expanded their intake. In the First World, this expansion has occurred primarily through the bringing of women en masse from the home into the formal workforce (from the discipline of the family to the discipline of the workplace). Offices have displaced factories as the preeminent form of disciplinary workplace, and discipline here might be described as looser than that that prevailed in the factory, but it is less than clear whether it really is looser, since the office involves new forms of surveillance, particularly in the open-plan design that has become predominant in recent years. White collar workers’ hours have tended to increase significantly in recent years, with work blurring via communications devices into formerly private time, [End Page 156] representing an expansion rather than contraction of workplace discipline. In the Third World, moreover – and hence on a global average basis – factories now employ a greater mass of humanity than perhaps ever before, with new industrialisations of formerly agrarian populaces (Deleuze indeed notes this offshoring tendency in the ‘Postscript’) (p181). The family itself does show some signs of decline or fragmentation, partly under the weight of the pressures of new patterns of work, but thirty years on from the ‘Postscript’ remains entrenched, albeit via changes, such as the widespread legal and social approval in the West of families centred on same-sex couples or lone adults. This indeed may be said however to have extended the nuclear family model into areas which were once outside it. The only institution dealt with by Foucault that had unambiguously declined by Deleuze’s time is one Deleuze does not mention it in the ‘Postscript’, the mental asylum. But this institution declined already during the period Foucault was writing, and didn’t lead Foucault to revise his thesis about discipline. This, I would suggest, is because its replacement, known in Britain as ‘care in the community’, is also disciplinary, since it tracks monitors and modifies behaviour, albeit with less confinement. Deleuze claims that, in the midst of their individual decline, the divisions between institutions are breaking down, that schools and factories are blending into one another. Certainly one can note increasing attempts at vocationalisation, and new corporate mantras of lifelong learning. But neither thing is particularly novel, and certainly the distinction has not been abolished: schools are still easily distinguishable from non-educational workplaces. On-the-job education is more rhetoric than reality, moreover: the casualisation of employment means a real decline in pedagogy in the workplace. In any case, the idea of a hybridisation between disciplinary institutions does not threaten disciplinary power as such, only particular, contingent institutional forms of it. Much of the ‘Postscript’ consists of a dense catalogue of phenomena which Deleuze presents as indicative of the new control society. It, at certain points, reads like a newspaper op-ed piece, complaining about modern life without coherence or concern for factual accuracy. He complains that art has been marketised. It’s true that the art market blew up in the 1980s, but wasn’t this just a new tulip mania, the kind of sudden commodification that always accompanied capitalism, as an effect of a surfeit of investment capital? He complains that rate fixing has replaced cost cutting, as if capitalism had not previously exhibited tendencies towards monopolisation or cartels. He complains that ‘we are taught that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world.’ This is supposed to indicate the depth of our corruption in the new age. It’s is a great line, but who is really saying this? Corporations in the US have long (since 1886) been considered to be legal persons, but it seems this led precisely to accusations that they were soulless persons, and then in short order to corporations attempting to cast themselves as having souls by the 1920s.29 He claims debt has replaced confinement. The two are hardly mutually exclusive, however, as debtors’ prisons once attested, and these indeed seem poised to make a comeback with changes to bankruptcy law. And haven’t people always been controlled by debt? David Graeber has recently argued prominently that we have, and it’s no new argument - Marcel Mauss said something similar the best part of a century earlier: both argue that accruing debts is fundamental to exchange and hence both to the economy and society itself. Deleuze suggests that the ‘new forces’ of control assembled gradually, beginning before World War II, but ‘accelerating’ after it. He thus sees Franz Kafka’s The Trial as standing, in the early twentieth century, already at the junction of discipline and control, seeing at once the old system, supposedly one of decisive judgment, with a new ‘endless postponement’. Thus, although the eponymous trial threatens to drag on indefinitely, it in fact ends decisively in execution; presumably were the novel written now, by Deleuze’s lights it would be entirely without conclusion, a juridical Waiting for Godot. From the point of view of the early twenty-first century, The Trial however seems perhaps more prescient than ever, with secret charges and secret courts, and guilt presumed, leading to sentences passed. But of course, such forms are not entirely new, but rather always haunted the judicial system: the system has long been a nightmare to navigate, baffling, arbitrary and unfair. I would suggest that really this novel deals with the Foucauldian theme of the replacement of older forms of law with the rule of the norm, by which everyone is endlessly investigable and always guilty of some abnormality, an effect associated with the broad form of biopower going back to the end of the eighteenth century. However, it does seem Deleuze is right that things are postponed more than they used to be: criminal trials are longer (though rarely endless), penal sentences are longer (and increasingly endless); we spend longer in education, wait longer to marry, to have children, wait forever more than we used to, wait longer to establish ourselves in our careers, and in all these areas people increasingly postpone things indefinitely. Once again, however, this seems simply to extend, not fundamentally alter, disciplinary power: the phenomenon of postponement is surely a hallmark of discipline, which introduced prison sentences as an alternative to summary corporal justice, and education to mediate between infancy and adulthood. Deleuze alleges that we have moved from analogue to digital institutions (analogique-numérique in French, though translators of the ‘Postscript’ get this wrong: the earlier is slavishly literal, giving us ‘analogical’-‘numerical’; the more recent translation renders numérique as ‘digital’, but oddly counterposes it to ‘analogical’).30 While clearly several technologies have made this shift, I don’t understand what this could refer to in terms of power, and am reminded of Sokal and Bricmont’s assessment of Deleuze’s use of technical vocabulary.31 If anything, the opposite is true according to comments he then makes about the modulation of control: it is actually discipline in his schema that is digital [End Page 158] and control that is analogue, since it is the former that involves discrete units, whereas the latter is continuous and without boundaries. This distinction would then tend again to correspond to the distinction that Foucault located much earlier in history from inflexible law to the ambiguous norm. Deleuze also casts the move from the gold standard to fiat currency as significant, though the substance of this claim, that the gold standard is numerical whereas fiat currency is a floating code, seems to me not to make sense, inasmuch as the value of gold also floats. In a risible crescendo to his litany of complaint, Deleuze inveighs that ‘surfing has taken over from all the old sports’ (‘Postscript’, p180). The opposite is true, however: surfing has been codified into a sport, just as other countercultural activities, such as skateboarding, or graffiti, or punk rock, have been professionalised and disciplinarised. Deleuze’s most serious claims concern the way work has been reorganised (p179). There has been a tendential shift away from an older pattern wherein workers at the same level in the same workplace were paid the same rate, to individualised contract negotiations. However, individualisation is the very stuff of discipline. The individual himself is precisely an artefact of discipline on Foucault’s account. Now, Deleuze wants to argue that control has gone further than discipline in this regard, producing not individuals but dividuals. This concept, coined by Deleuze in this text, has been taken up widely since. However, it lacks any clear determination -unsurprisingly given the brevity of the ‘Postscript’. Deleuze does correlate ‘dividuality’ to the various other aspects of control society that he enumerates, but then these are themselves confused. The clearest indication he gives in the ‘Postscript’ of the way in which he believes individuality is heading, though he does not explicitly link this to the concept of the dividual, is to say that today individuals are ‘divided each within himself ’(‘Postscript’, pp179-80). However, this seems to me to describe an effect that is not of a recent date at all, and indeed rather a generic truth of human existence: individuals have never been solid kernels, but rather individuality is a constitutive fiction masking considerable internal dehiscence. Discipline establishes this fiction of individuality in a particularly monolithic way. By setting up individuality as absolute, it creates a particularly fragile subject, beset on all sides by disintegration, hence leads us to feel peculiarly fragmented today when confronted with the fact of our inherent divisions. One might argue in a quasi-Marxist way that discipline thus undermines itself, causing its own workers to disintegrate at the level of their subjectivity, but if this is so it is a side-effect. We see little decline in any case in the insistence on the individual and his truth and self presence in contemporary culture. The rampant individualism of social networks is a case in point. While new media clearly open up radical possibilities, they are still prevalently used by people to cultivate their individual identity, indeed to new heights. The ‘selfie’ may be held up as the clearest example of this in contemporary culture. What is odd about Deleuze’s complaint about what we might call our ‘dividualisation’ is that he was even more critical of individuality than Foucault: as Foucault describes the Deleuzian position in his preface to Anti-Oedipus, ‘The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to “de-individualize” by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations.’32 The difference between this ‘de-individualisation’ and ‘dividualisation’ is clear already in this quotation, however: Deleuze proposes to break the individual through establishing linkages with others that transcend individuality, while dividuals are not more linked to other people, but rather simply more divided. He thus seems to think of dividualisation as hyper-individualisation: he claims that a hallmark of discipline is the absence of a contradiction between individual and mass, thus implying that only in the era of control did individualism cease to be at odds with group solidarity (‘Postscript’, pp179-80). However, it is surely not empirically the case that no one protested in the name of the individual against massification during the disciplinary period - quite the opposite. Rather, I would argue that dividualisation is inseparable from individualisation: the more our fictitious individuality is insisted upon, the more its fragility asserts itself, but that this has continuously occurred throughout the process of disciplinary individualisation. Deleuze, in true Marxist fashion, sees resistance as emerging out of the tendencies of contemporary capitalism. Specifically, he sees an avenue for resistance in the fact that today young people boast of being motivated, throwing themselves willingly into unpaid internships (p182). I would suggest that this is a mark of the success of discipline itself that people do willingly what they previously had to be cajoled into: it is a case of consensual discipline. Today’s individual has an increased level of autonomy relative to her forebears, in the name of efficiency: she supplies answers to the questions she is given, without having to be told. This was always the aim of disciplinary power, completely explicit in every disciplinary institution, even if success in this has varied. This is not to say that there is no resistance from such subjects, but there is no particular reason to expect more resistance than from any others. Deleuze argues that the loss of solidarity individuals experience in recent times involves a replacement of ‘watchwords’, shared maxims, with individual ‘passwords’. From our contemporary perspective, with its profusion of passwords, this seems plausible, but is again an intensification of individualising tendencies inherent in discipline. One may refer here to the changes that Foucault identified already within the constitution of discipline in the nineteenth century. He tells us how in those earlier days of disciplinary technology, all kinds of ‘utopias’ were experimented with. He gives the example of the ‘prison factory’, in which vast numbers of workers lived and slept shackles to their work stations.33 These, however, ‘were found not to be viable or manageable by capitalism. The economic cost of these institutions immediately proved too heavy, and the rigid structure of these prison factories soon caused many of them to collapse’ (p76). The refinements we have been seeing of late are to the factories of a century ago as those factories themselves were to earlier prison factories: they are refinements of discipline. The factory is the particular institution that concerns Deleuze the most – and this is indicative of his residual Marxism. Deleuze maintains a Marxist privileging of production, saying of control that ‘This technological development is more deeply rooted in a mutation of capitalism’ (‘Postscript’, p180). The factory is unique among the plethora of examples that Deleuze provides in that it is widely argued today in relation to it that there has been a recent major shift. I believe Deleuze’s ‘Postscript’ is both primarily animated by and has been most influential through its interaction with claims about the changed character of labour. Deleuze’s position in the ‘Postscript’ represents a cross-fertilisation of his thought with Antonio Negri’s Marxism in particular - it is worth noting the extent to which the interview from the same year, 1990, with Negri that precedes it in Deleuze’s Negotiations shares the Postscript’s perspective. Negri, an Italian philosopher living in exile in Paris since 1983, had become a collaborator of Deleuze’s. Negri’s perspective was representative of a broader tendency in Italian Marxism sometimes called ‘Autonomism’, amongst other appellations. Of central importance to Negri’s thought and that of associated Italian Marxists is a particular elaboration of the notion of ‘post-Fordism’. Deleuze does not mention ‘post-Fordism’ by name in the ‘Postscript’, but it corresponds closely to his notion of ‘control’. Theories of post-Fordism start from the premise that the paradigm of early twentieth century working practices were those typified by Henry Ford’s car plant in Detroit: the production line, with tasks split up into minute repetitive motions (involving Taylorist time-and-motion management), producing homogenous products. ‘Post-Fordism’ by contrast refers to a shift in working conditions in recent decades, from such old style factory production to a new kind of work, more flexible, creative, ‘affective’ and ephemeral. Theorists of post-Fordism emphasise recent trends towards flexitime, working from home, open-plan offices, hot-desking and so on. It cannot be within this remit of this essay properly to consider the post-Fordist paradigm, but I will make a number of points in relation to Deleuze’s contention that it portends a shift at the level of social power itself as such. It is undeniable that, as Deleuze notes, the average working practice in the First World has shifted from factory to office, and from inflexible to flexible. Does this entail a shift at the level of technologies of power itself? Some aspects of post-Fordism are not genuinely novel, so much as a return to pre-Fordism. Recent growth in ‘precarity’ is an example of this, constituting a return to earlier conditions of employment, a loss of security won by workers in twentieth century political and labour struggles. Other aspects of post-Fordism are at a level that is specifically about what may be called the relationship of subjectivity to production, rather than concerning power and control as such, such as increasingly immaterial and affective labour practices. What seems most genuinely novel in post-Fordism, and most political to boot, is the individualisation of employment contracts pointed to by Deleuze. This is a break with any earlier industrial system, since earlier systems always tended to treat ordinary workers as a mass rather than in a highly individualised way. The question is what the implication of this difference is. I believe this difference can be characterised as a coincidence of post-Fordism with contemporary neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism is a different kind of thing to post-Fordism: the latter is a form of working conditions, the former characterised by Foucault precisely as a ‘governmentality’, a logic of government. Neo-liberal governmentality specifically involves the state orienting itself primarily to fostering markets. Neo-liberalism has seen governments aggressively breaking up worker solidarities that are judged to interfere with the operation of market mechanisms, as well as rampant (but paradoxically state-sponsored) privatisation. It is thus (one thing) responsible for the increasing individualisation and marketisation noted by Deleuze in his ‘Postscript’. Such interventions threaten to recreate pre-twentieth century labour conditions in the West by breaking up the very solidarities that produced security for workers in the twentieth century, because this security is seen as a distortion of ideal market conditions. Neo-liberalism is thus a combination of new and old, as its name suggests, resurrecting classical conditions in a novel situation. It does not imply, however, a new technology of power - rather, it implies a new relation of the state to the economy within disciplinary, biopolitical capitalism. Thus, we can say that, to the extent post-Fordism exists, whatever political and economic implications it has (and it may have many), it must take its place alongside the analysis of forms of power, including both technologies of power and governmentalities. By contrast it seems to me that theorists of post-Fordism, and Deleuze in any case, seem to think it possible to in effect deduce effects at the level of power from changes in working conditions. Fordism and post-Fordism are both, from the point of view of power, as opposed to from the point of view of economics, examples of disciplinary power. Deleuze implicitly conflates Foucault’s discipline with Fordist production, whereas these are distinct kinds of things - a technology of power versus a mode of production - with different chronologies, to produce a thesis precisely about a social essence. My point then is not to argue here that our society remains essentially the same as it was in the nineteenth century, that there are no major differences, only that the array of technologies of power remain the same - and the Foucauldian point that we should not reduce society to these, any more than we should reduce it to a system of production, of either things or of desire.

#### Complete rejections of hierarchy are structurally incoherent – they overgeneralize and rely on the same principles they seek to eliminate

O’Neil 12. Seamus, associate professor of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy at The Memorial University of Newfoundland, “In Defense of Hierarchy: A Response to Levi Bryant’s ‘A Logic of Multiplicities: Deleuze, Immanence, and Onticology’”, Analecta Hermeneutica, Volume 4 (2012) ISSN 1918-7351 //saenl

Bryant starts with what he does not want: hierarchy. His scorched-earth approach towards hierarchy is destructive and chaotic to the point of destroying even the objects to which he wants to return. Within his description of his position, Bryant does not treat the objects that he wants to recover, which might have lead to a positive standpoint which could say something definitive about objects; rather, the reader is left with a Deleuze-inspired mishmash of self-differentiating relations. It is not clear why one should care about bits of assemblages differentiating themselves from one another, as opposed to the children, dogs, sunsets, and trees that Bryant inadvertently denies. Also, Bryant does not explain where assemblages begin or end and takes for granted the objects they comprise. Even the vague way in which he describes an ‘assemblage’ relies on the concepts he rejects: unity, essences, and natures, that is, the integral concepts of philosophical hierarchies. Bryant does away with essences, natures, forms, god, etc., the very things that vertical ontologies proposed in order to account for the relative logical stability of concepts and relative ontological stability of things, without understanding what they were doing in the first place. All the while, however, he continues to talk about individual things and even universals such as human, animal, and DNA as if there are no consequences to his abatement. He does not like the possibility that the hierarchy within depends upon the hierarchy without—the latter explains the former. It is true that in every pursuit, certain things must be taken for granted: the chemist in a lab takes it on faith that his vision corresponds to the way things are in a way that a phenomenologist never would, just as the phenomenologist takes it on faith, without ever ‘experiencing’ the blockage in his heart, that his cardiologist knows something about his condition. But Bryant’s paper is not just starting from a different place from those of philosophers who were and are concerned about how the things that Bryant takes for granted exist; rather, Bryant’s description of his approach progresses by continual glancing attacks on, and brief dismissals of vertical ontology and hierarchy. Bryant’s arguments are all aimed at straw-man versions of hierarchy that no one believes in and that exist nowhere outside of Bryant’s characterization. Bryant’s conclusion is in fact the starting point from which the Ancients begin philosophical enquiry. Yes, things both affect things and are affected by things—this everyone knows. This observation is the basis from which the philosopher asks the real questions: how is change possible? What maintains the identity of a thing throughout its change? What maintains a thing’s unity in its difference? Not only does Bryant not explore why ‘the transcendent’ was invoked to respond to these questions in the first place, but further, Bryant often assumes and takes for granted precisely what he denies whenever his own position hits upon the truth. This leads to two kinds of claims: 1) unsupported claims which are incoherent because the position throws out all of the concepts that make things and claims coherent, and 2) true claims which are only clear because Bryant sometimes relies upon the concepts like essences and natures despite his explicit denial of them. Throughout the paper 3 Bryant plays a kind of shell game with natures, wherein he explicitly hides them away only to implicitly rely on them when they are needed.3 Finally, a conflict emerges between Bryant’s admirable desire to get back to objects and away from the narcissism that takes the human to be the centre of the universe, and his lamentable political, anti human, Deleuze-inspired approach that is in fact opposed to the very things he claims to want to explain. He simply flattens out what actually needs to be expanded. In his attempt to correct one false view that any human individual is the absolutely autonomous apex of the cosmos, Bryant proposes a second, and perhaps worse, false view which flattens the entire hierarchy and equates humans with worms. The application of Bryant’s ‘onticology’ either avoids anthropocentrism to the point of being timidly trite, or it leads to the anthropomorphism of objects to the point of being patently false.