## 1

### 1NC—T—Subsets

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a subset of workers’ unconditional right to strike .

#### Violation: they do

#### The upward entailment test and adverb test determine the genericity of a bare plural.

Leslie 16 [Sarah-Jane Leslie, Ph.D., Princeton, 2007. Dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. Served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University.] “Generic Generalizations.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. April 24, 2016. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/> TG

1. Generics and Logical Form

In English, generics can be expressed using a variety of syntactic forms: bare plurals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), indefinite singulars (e.g., “a tiger is striped”), and definite singulars (“the tiger is striped”). However, none of these syntactic forms is dedicated to expressing generic claims; each can also be used to express existential and/or specific claims. Further, some generics express what appear to be generalizations over individuals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), while others appear to predicate properties directly of the kind (e.g., “dodos are extinct”). These facts and others give rise to a number of questions concerning the logical forms of generic statements.

1.1 Isolating the Generic Interpretation

Consider the following pairs of sentences:

(1)a.Tigers are striped.

b.Tigers are on the front lawn.

(2)a.A tiger is striped.

b.A tiger is on the front lawn.

(3)a.The tiger is striped.

b.The tiger is on the front lawn.

The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), some individual tiger in ([2b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex2b)), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in ([3b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex3b))—a beloved pet, perhaps. In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general. There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about.

The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind.

There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) does not entail that animals are striped, but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.

#### Standards:

It applies-upward entailment—‘just govts ought to recognize dunkin donuts workers right to strike’ doesn’t entiail all workers right to stirke—adverb test- just govts ought to usually regonize workers uncondiitonal right to strike doenst mean naything substanially diff from the res

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### Limits – you explode limtis since you could functionally defend any agent gets the right to strike i.e. teachers, students, government officials, athletes, celebrities, etc.

#### Topic ed - you kill topic ed by forcing us to debate about fringe parts of the topic with minimal ground.

#### [3] tva – just read your aff as an advantage under a whole res aff, solves all ur offense

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 2

### 1NC—OFF

#### Interpretation: topical affirmatives must defend recognizing an unconditional right to strike. To clarify, unconditional recognition cannot be contingent on a subset of workers or government.

#### Violation— Plan’s a regulation of a right to strike but they don’t defend a net increase– they only defend a subset of workers—that means they fiat a restriction, not a net increase, since it just establishes conditions where the right is absolute.

#### The US legal dictionary defines unconditional as,

Us Legal, Inc., "Unconditional Law and Legal Definition," https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/unconditional/

**Unconditional means** without conditions; **without restrictions; or absolute**. For instance, unconditional promise is a promise that is unqualified in nature. A party who makes an unconditional promise must perform that promise even though the other party has not performed according to the bargain

#### Restriction is based on conditions – that’s the aff since a right to strike is only recognized [in the case of incarcerated people].

PEDIAA 15 [learning website], “Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted,” *PEDIAA*, 12 October 2015, <https://pediaa.com/difference-between-prohibited-and-restricted/>, beckert

Prohibited and Restricted are used in reference to limitations and prevention. However, they cannot be used interchangeably as there is a distinct difference between them. Prohibited is used when we are talking about an impossibility. Restricted is used when we are talking about something that has specific conditions. The main difference between prohibited and restricted is that prohibited means something is formally forbidden by law or authority whereas restricted means something is put under control or limits. What Does Prohibited Mean Prohibited is a variant of the verb prohibit. Prohibited can be taken as the past tense and past participle of prohibiting as well as an adjective. Prohibited means that something is formally forbidden by law or authority. When we say ‘smoking is prohibited’, it means that smoking is not allowed at all, there are no exceptions. Prohibit indicates an impossibility. This gives out the idea that it is not at all possible under any condition or circumstance. The term Prohibited goods is used to refer to items that are not allowed to enter or exit certain countries. For example, the government of South America lists Narcotic and habit-forming drugs in any form, Poison and other toxic substances, Fully automatic, military and unnumbered weapons, explosives and fireworks as prohibited goods. The following sentences will further explain the use of prohibited. Inter-racial marriages were not prohibited by the government. He was proved guilty of using prohibited substances. No one was allowed to enter the grounds; entry was prohibited. Prohibited imports are the items that are not allowed to enter a country. What Does Restricted Mean Restrict means to put under limits or control. Restricted can be either used as the past tense of restrict or as an adjective meaning limited. When we say something is restricted, it means that limits or conditions have been added to it. It does not mean that it is completely impossible. For example, Restricted goods are allowed to enter or exit a country under certain circumstances. A written permission can help you to import or export that item. Likewise, a restricted area does not mean that people are not allowed to enter; it means that a special permission is required to enter the place. Restricted information refers to information that are not disclosed to the general public for security purposes.

#### CX doesn’t check – preround prep was skewed which is during NC construction.

#### Voting issue for limits and ground. There are infinite working conditions they could spec in the plan which means their interp is always semantically incorrect since the right to strike is conditional in all other instances. Stable ground --- a complete unconditional recognition is key to circumvention, Politics DAs, and CP competition. Making recognition probabilistic allows the aff to shift late in the debate to no link core positions.

## 3

### 1NC—OFF

#### The AFF invests in the transformation of the archive into a talisman to be mass consumed to anesthetize the trauma of the past via its trade with death. Representational history itself is a mode of archiving the past that serves as a machinery of statecraft, obliterating the distinction between executioner and victim – violence that is a precondition to the state.

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By democratising the act of chronophagy and returning to an order where the consumption of the archive becomes a communal tool of the state and of society, two possibilities arise which repression alone does not allow. On the one hand, the urge that would have meant a desire to repeat, in a different time and with other actors, the original act is attenuated. In those cases where such an act involved murder, an assassin or a massacre, it is not difficult to see the benefit a society might gain from such a severance. On the other hand, by making such a severance a part of the universe of merchandise thanks to mass consumption, the archive is removed from the sphere of 'remains' and 'debris' and transformed into a talisman. A pagan cult then results, at the heart of which can be found numerous other institutions and artefacts (for example, museums). **The transformation of the archive into a talisman, however, is also accompanied by removing any subversive factors in the memory. In giving those who carry it (in this case those who consume it) a feeling of being protected or of being co-owner of a time or co-actor in an event, even if in the past, the talisman softens the anger, shame, guilt, or resentment which the archive tends, if not to incite, then at least to maintain, because of its function of recall**. Thus the desire for revenge is removed just as the duty of repentance, justice and reparation is withdrawn. **The commodification of memory obliterates the distinction between the victim and the executioner, and consequently enables the state to realise what it has always dreamed of: the abolition of deb**t and the possibility of starting afresh. Examining archives is to be interested in that which life has left behind, to be interested in debt. However, it is also to be preoccupied with debris. In this sense, both the historian and the archivist inhabit a sepulchre. They maintain an intimate relationship with a world alive only by virtue of an initial event that is represented by the act of dying. This being the case, **writing history merely involves manipulating archives.** Following tracks, putting back together scraps and debris, and reassembling remains, is to be implicated in a ritual which results in the resuscitation of life, in bringing the dead back to life by reintegrating them in the cycle of time, in such a way that they find, in a text, in an artefact or in a monument, a place to inhabit, from where they may continue to express themselves. Dealing with dying also evokes the possibility of the spectre. The archive could not have a relationship with death without including the other remnant of death - the spectre. To a very large extent, the historian is engaged in a battle against this world of spectres. The latter find, through written texts, a path to an existence among mortals - but an existence that no longer unfolds according to the same modality as in their lifetime. It may be that historiography, and the very possibility of a political community (polis), are only conceivable on condition that the spectre, which has been brought back to life in this way, should remain silent, should accept that from now on he may only speak through another, or be represented by some sign, or some object which, not belonging to any one in particular, now belongs to all. This being the case, the historian is not content with bringing death back to life. S/he restores it to life precisely in order better to silence it by transforming it from autonomous words into a prop on which s/he can lean in order to speak and write beyond an originary text. It is by the bias of this act of dispossession - this leaving out of the author - that the historian establishes his/her authority, and a society establishes a specific domain: the domain of things which, because shared, belong exclusively to no one (the public domain). And this is why the historian and the archivist have long been so useful to the state, notably in contexts where the latter was set up as an appointed guardian of that domain of things that belong exclusively to no one. **In fact, both the historian and the**

#### Their theorizations are outdated, racism has been updated – seemingly ubiquitous machines inflict violence and the marking of bodies as being and non-being – technicity controls the locus of ontology.

**Gill Peterson 13** (Julian Gill-Peterson, Doctoral Candidate in the American Studies at Rutgers University, “Race is Technical”, archived June 30 2015, [https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/https://juliangillpeterson.wordpress.com/2013/12/05/the-human-is-not-a-prosthetic-being-iii-race-is-technical/](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/https:/juliangillpeterson.wordpress.com/2013/12/05/the-human-is-not-a-prosthetic-being-iii-race-is-technical/))

I have followed with interest, and write about in a forthcoming essay on race and technology in transgender studies, the Deleuzian project of the critical re-ontologization of race in the humanities, notably in [Amit Rai’s wonderful formulation, “race racing.”](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/http:/muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/wsq/v040/40.1-2.rai.pdf) But I am also interested in calling upon a Derridean genealogy of originary technicity that can take up race in a non-humanist, non-reactive and non-metaphysical manner through the problematization of the relation of technics to life. Derrida offers here certain forces of thought that Deleuze does not (and vice versa), so I find myself alternating between the two on the question of technics in order to push thought further, with Simondon triangulating the affair, as readers of this blog are no doubt aware. (Or, [as Patricia Clough might put it](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/http:/www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/autoaffection), technology is here pulling unconscious thought toward the future. As a contribution to this endeavour, I propose that race is technical. I will first move through Derrida to establish a working definition of this conceptual orientation: that technics are life touching itself.  Then I will turn to two pieces that think race and technology together, one by Beth Coleman, the other by Wendy Chun, to make a case for why we can happily abandon some of the humanist pretensions of theorizing race in order to treat race non-reactively, as technical (and not only technologically mediated). In so doing I argue we will be better suited to both critique systems of racialization and invent more effective and creative anti-racist political projects. In this now accidental serial piece, “The Human is Not a Prosthetic Being,” I have looked at the unnecessary (because metaphysical) limitations of what I term [“the subtractive ontology”](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/https:/juliangillpeterson.wordpress.com/2013/11/06/the-human-is-not-a-prosthetic-being-ii-coloniality-race-and-perhsonhood/) of the human in the humanities: the assumption that the human is a being born minus something, usually culture, and by implication the domesticated version of technics as tools that enable subsequent acculturation. The serious problem with this ontology is that it treats the human as an incomplete being, making governance and subordination ontologically justified enterprises, rather than historically contingent and contestable arrangements. This, ironically, too, since it is an ontology that underwrites social constructivist theories. (At their core, then, they are fully Eurocentric and Enlightenment-indebted theories, for they argue that subjectivization can be perfected by subtracting race[ism] from the future liberal human subject.) The reactive (in the Nietzschean sense) theorization of race, which, to be unfairly brief, treats race as a form of phenotypical false consciousness and dismisses race as a pure social construction, unfortunately shares in this ontology (or, [as Arun Saldhana puts it](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/http:/www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=d61j) in a very helpful essay, this kind of critical race theory has de-ontoligized race to its own reciprocal impoverishment). The motivation of the social constructivist theories of race is not to be dismissed so easily: they rail powerfully against the long and ongoing history of the biologization of race that has had an indisputably violent material impact upon racialized bodies. Nevertheless, if race is a “mere” bodily fiction, it follows that it must be subtracted from the human, removed to restore the body to a non-raced integrity that would be the overcoming of racism and racialization. This is, I think, a politically, ethically, aesthetically, and technologically immiserating ontology masquerading as political epistemology, especially for racialized bodies, who are interpellated into a racial melancholia that risks reinforcing the hegemony of whiteness through its very opposition to it, as well as the unmarked universalism of a non-raced body that, in actuality, is often already successfully substituted for by the white body today. (Nevertheless, my genealogical indebtedness to humanist critical race theory in my own training and work makes me recalcitrant from citing any text as symptomatic of this tendency, for I don’t want to diminish the importance of critical race theory in today’s academy, where it is being systemically marginalized.) The key here is the notion of “the integral body,” a human body that exists in and of itself, for itself, before any of the blemishes created by the Enlightenment separation of nature and society: acculturation, bad education, gender, race, technology, capital, science, nonhuman life (and the list could go on forever). Why should critical race theory have to give up half the equation by positioning itself against “the body” (for its biological connotations) in the service of [an Enlightenment concept of an idealized un-raced “body” that does not even exist](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/https:/juliangillpeterson.wordpress.com/2013/11/06/the-human-is-not-a-prosthetic-being-ii-coloniality-race-and-perhsonhood/)? That would amount, [in Bruno Latour’s helpful formulation](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/http:/www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674948396), to a project of purification aimed at eliminating racial hybrids. This is where Derrida is undoubtedly useful, though he himself never took his work on technicity in this direction. Deconstruction excels, and differently so than Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, at instructing us carefully in the damage done by such positioning on either side of a binarism. I will focus here only on Derrida’s beautiful text on Jean-Luc Nancy, [On Touching](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/http:/books.google.com/books/about/On_Touching_Jean_Luc_Nancy.html?id=HhWRuBFw-bIC). It is from here that I have extracted the specific phrase that technics are life touching itself. In Derrida’s reading, Nancy’s book Corpus provides an account of “ecotechnics,” the techne of the body. The body touching itself is Nancy’s privileged example; at one point in Corpus, Nancy writes evocatively that “the body is the plastic matter of a spacing out without form or Idea” (63), which Derrida glosses in On Touching as a “plasticity and technicity ‘at the heart’ of ‘the body proper’…an irreducible spacing, that is, what spaces out touching itself, namely con-tact…this spacing makes for the trial of noncontact as the very condition or experience itself of contact” (221, emphasis in original). Touching, in other words, is conditioned by the radical impossibility of touching itself, of the pure, unmediated presence we might expect in contact between flesh. Later, Derrida continues that it is through Nancy’s account of the irreducibility of the spacing or différance in touching that “this technical supplementarity of the body [is] acknowledged [as] essential and necessary, as it seems to me that one should always do” (223, emphasis in original): It goes without saying [which I take to mean that it doesn’t] that ‘essential originarity’ is conveniently translating this ‘law’ into a classical language that precisely meets its limit here. For this supplementarity of technical prosthetics originarily spaces out, defers, or expropriates all originary properness: there is no ‘the’ sense of touch, there is no ‘originary’ or essentially originary touching before it, before its necessary possibility–for any living being in general, and well before ‘the hand of man’ and all its imaginable substitutes” (223). To speak of “originary technicity,” in other words, does not merge the technical and the somatic into one substance, but maintains the productive différantial relation through which the spacing of life through its technical modes both effaces the purity of origin of the body while at the same time making available its energetic deferrals and media for what Nancy terms “incarnation”: the “organic articulation” of bodies via technics**.** Originary technicity, that is, is an account of how life differs from itself–a processual definition of being alive. Given that this technicity and plasticity in the body acts “well before ‘the hand of man,'” it includes nonhuman life and nonconscious scales of human life. To take from both Derrida, Nancy, and Derrida’s Nancy, then, I arrive at “technics as life touching itself.” I want to turn now briefly to two remarkable essays that I couldn’t recommend more to anyone who hasn’t already read them because they deserve a longer treatment than I have space for here. First, [Beth Coleman’s “Race as Technology”](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/http:/cameraobscura.dukejournals.org/content/24/1_70/177.abstract) works toward  “extending the function of techne to race” in order to rethink the range of agentic potentiality that resides in its denaturing and re-purposing–or, perhaps more aptly for her discussion of race as a “levered mechanism,” its re-tooling (178). Instructively, Coleman asks us “to rest with the formula: race as a technology–as a prosthesis of sorts–adds functionality to the subject, helps form location, and provides information” (194, emphasis added). In a reading of technics couched in Bernard Stiegler, the tool and the human for Coleman have co-evolved from the very beginning, making race as a technology a recognition of the capacity wielded by all subjects to remake and retool the future of race in a less exploitative, less violent and less racist way than humanism offers in its zero sum game of subtratction.Wendy Chun’s incredible essay [“Race and/as Technology”](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/http:/books.google.com/books/about/Race_After_the_Internet.html?id=hGfJQgAACAAJ)opens with two valuable questions: “can race be considered a technology and a mode of mediatization, that is, not only a mechanism, but also a practical or industrial art? Could ‘race’ be not simply an object of representation and portrayal, of knowledge or truth, but also a technique that one uses, even as one is used by it?” (38). By posing race as technical, my answer to both of those questions, as it is for Chun herself, is emphatically yes. Race itself should be made to do more in the service of the overcoming of exploitative racialization and systemic forms of violence.Both Coleman and Chun are careful to point out in their essays that a turn to race as technology is to think of race on aesthetic and ethical terms rather than ontological terms, since for both of them ontology amounts to the biologizing question “what is race?” My return to Derrida, as well as my affinity for the Deleuzian project of race racing, leads to a slightly different conclusion, one that I would like to clarify. If race has any ontological consistency, to describe it as technical clarifies that this consistency is historical, arbitrary, and contingent; that it is defined by change and a lack of origin (as Derrida explained through touching). Race has not always existed; it is not required for human life. And we can say confidently, too, that race is quite literally no-thing. It is instead a historically inherited capacity for embodied techniques that, by being technical, carries with it the immanent capacity to swerve towards anti-racist processes and projects, towards futures that are not prescribed by the narrowness of the Enlightenment and colonialism. Race is aesthetic and ethical, but both of those are made ontological by technicity if by ontology we mean to ask “what is the becoming of race?” instead of what race statically “is.”To say that race is technical, then, is not a truth claim on my part–in fact, it is to deconstruct what race “is” altogether. It is a speculative theory. I think, though, that what it offers is a powerful set of tools with which to re-approach the problem of racialization and racism in the digital age. It also offers wonderful potential futures where people of color do not have to give up what is creative and minoritarian in race in order to become human. The sheer affective vitality of [Afrofuturism](https://web.archive.org/web/20150630024626/http:/muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/new_centennial_review/v003/3.2eshun.html), for instance, which dares to imagine a future for blackness that takes surprising, affirmative and frequently techno-scientific forms, is one reason why I cling to the creative, innovative and inventive potential of race as technical. Why would we want to give up the affirmation of a technical blackness in the name of humanism when we could instead live in an Afrofuturist future?

#### Survival strategies, movements, and their rhetoric of pragmatism will fail in the face of cybernetic control – their method just proves that the system is working.

Parisi et al. 16. [Luciana Parisi and Antonia Majaca, Parisi is Reader in Cultural Theory, Chair of the PhD programme at the Centre for Cultural Studies, and co-director of the Digital Culture Unit, Goldsmiths University of London, “The Incomputable and Instrumental Possibility” https://www.e-flux.com/journal/77/76322/the-incomputable-and-instrumental-possibility/]

**What might** such **reasoning with and from the instrument mean in an age in which highly automatized vertical apparatuses of capture, classification, and control provide a complex and distributed infrastructure for increasingly self-sufficient forms of algorithmic governmentality**? What would it mean, in this particular phase of the development of machine intelligence, to take the instrument/machine seriously? **What conceptual tools might we need to initiate thinking from within the machine and from within the very logic of the instrument**? Could such a prospect be the basis for thinking beyond the control loops of the post-cybernetic age? If it is true that the individual is caught in a circle of continuous undulation between enslavement and liberation, trapped in the paradox of simultaneously being her own master and slave, can learning from the logic of the machine provide a path for a new, alien beginning? And if it is true that instrumentality as such has developed its own logic through the evolution of machine complexity, shouldn’t we attempt to think the instrumentality of the post-cybernetic individual beyond the dualities of means and ends? **Doesn’t the instrument itself possess its own “ends,”** as Lilith does? In her case, **working through one’s own instrumentality becomes a form of engineering an entirely new origin** **that embraces** **and places trust in its yet incomputable**, hyper-denaturalized nature. **The question is what other natures**—and natures’ others—**such radical non-dualism would require**. Instead of succumbing to the overwhelming logic of control, data positivism, and the paranoid reasoning of the algorithmically enhanced white-man cogito that is the total **myth of humanism**, **we** wish to **embrace** what Isabelle Stengers calls **the *possible* against the *probable***. This text is thus merely an outline, an open invitation, and an attempt to instigate a critical project based in practical knowledge, which could point towards the construction of what we could call “the **incomputable subject**.” In a sense, this is an invocation of a subject that comes to being by way of reclaiming the contingent as a mode of reasoning and as the field of the political. It is a subject that considers its means and its ends in the same plane of becoming. What Stengers dubs **the “speculative commitment**” **we wish to direct towards repoliticizing** **and reclaiming unknown unknowns from the jaws of paranoid apparatuses of capture and prediction**. In the conditions of **an omnipresent “data behaviorism**,” **we feel that the unknown unknowns of both the subject and the political imagination can** only **be taken back and built anew** **by enacting a political affinity with the machine**, **and** by way of **considering its very logic**. Might this affinity become a path for developing an entirely new, **inhuman logic of becoming-subject capable of injecting the unknowns with entirely new alien universals**, **beyond the white-male constructs of paranoid humanism?** **The new subject can only be constructed** **from** the hard labor of alienation, which includes **understanding the logic of instrumentality**, **politicizing it, and transcending it through usage itself**. **This requires building a non-paranoid imagination**, **and a readiness for a radical denaturalization of both humanness and subjectivity as we know it**, just as it happens with Lilith in Octavia Butler’s story. In the context of the current “daticultural revolution,” as one NSA official recently dubbed the current totalitarianism of data, unknowns are foreclosed already as part of the expected procedure of capture and classification. Data is intercepted and gathered with the aim of generating “activity-based intelligence,” which means that any anomaly triggers an alert for the paranoid techno-industrial apparatus. Its default state is permanent anticipation. It is eager to strike anywhere and everywhere the unknown appears. The data provider and the data gatherer stare at each over an abyss of fatuity, equally dull and deranged by the desperate attempt to compute the threat of the unknown. The only difference in this regime of the quantifiable is the quantity and variety of available data. Both provider and gatherer operate by inductive and deductive reasoning, without ever locating a truly new hypothesis in the process of cognition. Even though they are increasingly hard to tell apart, we could say that on the one hand the data gatherer is drowning in automated predictions guided by a hypertrophied military sense of eternal threat, while the imaginative aptitude of the data provider is reduced to the claustrophobic sense that the world is already predetermined, and that there exists a sacred code by which everything is connected in a way that can only be guessed at using cues and proxies. The guiding principle of both of these mindsets is an all-pervasive military logic that has dominated public and political discourse since the end of WWII and the rise of Cold War paranoias, which have now transformed into the hyperbolic paranoias of the War on Terror and the eternal hunt for “unknown unknowns.” **Any definitive resistance to datafication**, to mining and profiling, **will** thus **always appear merely as a random error in the system**, **as an anomaly devoid of any consistent agency**. **It can be hard to avoid the siren call of error**, **hard to avoid romanticizing it**. **But celebrating error for its own sake is a form of mystification that can only lead to depoliticized, naive triumphalism**. The fascination with errors in the system indicates, paradoxically, that the ambiance of nervous paranoia comes not from understanding that the system works, **but** actually **from** **the** uncanny **realization that it does not**, or not perfectly anyway. Its core is empty and hollow and it lacks faculties of self-reflection, self-care, and self-reform. **Fault is its default setting**, **the rule rather than the exception.** In other words, part of **our nervous anxiety is generated by the revelation that we cannot** even **count on the consistency of the automated Leviathan to which we have conceded our agency**, even when it is “working against us." Instead the space of sovereignty is filled with competing plots and unlikely scenarios. A bizarre exchange of empty paranoias and proliferating conspiracies takes place in the evacuated space where that historical locus of tangible authority—call it the absolute Sovereign, Leviathan, God, Law, or Father, it makes no difference—used to reign. Now, the vacuum left after the dissipation of these masculine authority figures of the Global North is filled with either the militant paranoid apparatus enhanced by AI and algorithmic processing, or with byzantine conspiracies about it. But while the white-male apparatus and white-male conspiracies are fixed and ossified in their impossible desire to escape and their continuous search for a transcendental realm “beyond” the instrumental, the machines have been evolving and developing their own logic. The post-cybernetic system relies on the capacity of intelligent machines to observe, evaluate, and predict the behavior of data, testing the range of effects that certain strings can have on others, while counting on the unpredictability of the results. Perhaps **the general diagnosis of our** current **condition as one of all-pervasive data governmentality might** actually **be missing something**. The statistical “qualculation” subtending the infrastructure of **data positivism** **and predictive governmentality** i**mplies** **the triumph of an entirely new kind of empiricism** in which **data is “liberated**” **from the static condition of the given**. Data is now stretched to embrace potentiality, indeterminacy, and contingency. This new synthesis of empiricism and statistics includes the indeterminacies of information as a potential source of the unexpected. In other words, t**he relentless recalculations of data guarantee the possibility of discovering something new**. Cognition here no longer simply corresponds to the logical steps of formal or deductive reasoning. The learning machines of the new general and distributed AI now behave as cognitive systems that are **evolutive and adaptive**, and that exhibit co**-causal and emergent properties**. This means that as the neo-empiricism of automated governance advances, automated intelligence itself develops a new form of instrumentality. Mirroring that process, we could ask: What is there to take from the very logic of contemporary techne? Can there in fact be something in the very techne of the subject, in the very “affectable” workings of the instrumental, that can go beyond the normative, universal subject of history and reinvent the subject of the political by reclaiming the unknown unknown? It goes without saying that the clear distinction between oppressor and the oppressed, always a bit of a contingent fantasy, has become almost impossible to recover, never mind deploy effectively. Yes, **the** thick **verticality of the algorithm regime is built on the auto-exploitation of** so many **entrepreneurs of the self**, **furiously and automatically reiterating their small serving of subjectivity until it is entirely flattened into data and** hopelessly **depleted of any other possible becoming**.

#### The surveillance control assemblage permeates every aspect of life both before and after the aff, deadlocking the potential for solvency. In fact, the idea of joyous forms of resistance only feeds a discourse of liberal protest that lends legitimacy to the destructive whole.

Hogue, 2015. PhD student in philosophy at McGill University with an MA in linguistics from the University of Ottowa (Simon Houge, June 2-4 2015, “Ubiquitous surveillance for paranoid security apparatus, or how mass security surveillance threatens the democratic space of revelation and deliberation,” presented at the CPSA Annual Conference in Ottowa)

As one can expect, surveillance did not come out of nowhere some time after 9/11. Multiple forms of surveillance were already in place before the event. However surveillance of population as for the Echelon program remained the exception rather than the rule. The rule was to target specific individuals against whom there were suspicions (Lyon, 1994; 2001). The extent of surveillance accelerated following 9/11, with the Bush administration presenting to Congress the Patriot Act granting new powers to the American intelligence community and implementing the (aborted) Total Information Awareness program designed to capture all digital information. That the TIA program was defunded in 2004 due to general outcry over its targeting of population does not mean its rationale died with it (Hayes, 2013; Markoff, 2002). In part the surveillance of population by the security apparatus continued, this time limited to specific key sectors as finance and international mobility (Amoore & De Goede, 2005; 2008b). Apparently another part went underground, far from public scrutinizing and criticisms, and became in 2007 what Snowden revealed to be the Prism program. Still, the expansion of surveillance is a process that remains in part independent of the post-9/11 security logics. It could be argued following David Lyon that the extent of today’s surveillance was made possible with the diffusion of information technologies in Western societies (Lyon, 2001). According to Lyon, it is the digitalization of contemporary life, and the possibilities in data processing offered by computing, that constitutes the true breeding-ground for today’s surveillance. The data trails left by every single use of ITs provide the food of surveillance. As information technologies have today pervaded the everyday life – Internet, computers, cellphones, cloud computing, RFID, biometrics, etc. can literally be found everywhere – surveillance can feed on a lavish buffet. Then one must recognize that surveillance is not the exclusive preserve of governments. Although arguing, for example, that collecting communication metadata is not surveillance since it is not content3 may seem unconvincing, US President Barak Obama nevertheless raised a serious question when he reminded that data surveillance is “not... restricted to government entities” (quoted in McCutcheon, 2013: 721). The extent of the corporate surveillance to which Westerners are submitted should not be downplayed. The acquisition and analysis of consumer data is a major economic practice allowing companies to develop customer profiles and better target their potential clients. Moreover it is the business model of some of the biggest Internet companies who provide “free” services in exchange of customer information they then sell to others for marketing purposes. Google, Facebook, Apple, Yahoo! all closely monitor individuals’ Internet habits to identify preferences and profiles they then sell. These corporations live off knowing (and guessing) peoples’ habits (Andrejevic, 2007; K. Ball, Daniel, Dibb, & Meadows, 2010). Surveillance has also pervaded the most intimate spaces with people monitoring their children at home and at school (Katz, 2006; 2008; Nelson & Garey, 2009), and exposing their everyday life and watching that of others over social media (Regan & Steeves, 2010). Contrary to what some would like us to think, it is too simple to say that government surveillance is bad while ignoring other forms of surveillance. Surveillance is now ubiquitous, not only because of governments, but because it transcends all public and private spaces: on the street, public transports, in shopping malls, schools, in people’s houses, etc. (Monahan, 2010; 2006) All these forms of surveillance participate in the formation of an assemblage of ubiquitous surveillance that submits Western individuals to the fusing and controlling logics of neoliberalism and pre-emptive security risk that defend dominant elements of society against threatening changes. Surveillance monitors people to sort them, providing benefits to those who are deemed safe, while marginalizing those who do not correctly respond to the established criteria (Amoore & De Goede, 2008b; Aradau & Van Munster, 2008; Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Lyon, 2001; Monahan, 2006). In so doing surveillance participates to an assemblage of systematic exclusion.In this context, the novelty that comes from Snowden’s leaks is not that communications are surveilled, but the “scale, reach, and technical sophistication” (Bauman et al., 2014, p. 122) of the current security surveillance apparatus who absorbs and analyzes these other forms of surveillance, and the tensions it creates on democracy understood as collective and individual self-determination and space of disagreement. The scale of security surveillance is indeed overwhelming. The virtual haystack it gathers is expected to be so big that the NSA is building a new $2 billion data center in Bluffdale, Utah five time the size of the US Capitol. It is estimated the center will have a stocking capacity of yottabites (1024) of data or the (mind-blowing) equivalent of 500 quintillion (500,000,000,000,000,000,000) pages of text (Bamford, 2012). The scale, but also the actual capacity of the security apparatus to capture the communications of a world that is more and more digitalized shows the quantitative leap made by the security surveillance apparatus. However, the impact is also qualitative. Bauman et al. identifies four ways in which Snowden’s leaks challenge common understanding of democracy: first surveillance provides new avenues of exclusion and inequality; second it blurs the distinction between public and private spheres on which lies modern democracy penetrating the private sphere at the same time as it acquires autonomy from the public sphere; third it raises security over politics and the ability for self-determination; last through its secretive procedures it hides information from the public (Bauman et al., 2014, pp. 134-7). In continuity with Bauman et al.’s analysis, I argue that the security surveillance apparatus creates tension on democracy by turning the public sphere into a paranoid sphere. Its surveillance gaze endangers the collective determination of the common. Disconnected from the public sphere, it constructs a self-referential security universe in which imagined future threats become the basis of present preemptive actions. In this context, the data-identities imposed to individuals restrain their control over the definition of their own selves and make public appearance a dangerous action. I first return to Snowden’s leaks to present the forms of the current surveillance. Then, I position it in its larger security logic. Thirdly, I explore the idea of assemblage to show the complexity on the security surveillance apparatus. Finally, I focus my attention on how it undermines democracy. “Why can’t we collect all the signals, all the time?4” Feasting on world communications The NSA surveillance revealed by Snowden targets communication. It proceeds to the mass surveillance of the world’s communication made possible by its increased digitalization. At first, this may seem as a limit to its scope: it is not per se an infrastructure of video or biometric surveillance for example. However when one considers the potentially very broad definition of what constitutes communication the potential scope of surveillance becomes clearer. The goal according to Snowden is to “[know] everything about everyone” (quoted in Appelbaum & Poitras, 2013). The wide range of surveillance programs deployed by the NSA makes it difficult to organize or categorize along clear and tight demarcations. At the risk of oversimplification, I propose two ways of categorizing NSA surveillance: what it collects and how it collects it.

#### The alternative is Surrational Fugitivity – opening alien worlds of thought outside instrumentalization. Only reconceptualizing and reinventing our relationship towards reason and representation itself can break away from the cybernetic apparatus.

Parisi, 19 (Luciana Parisi, Reader in Cultural Theory, Chair of the PhD programme at the Centre for Cultural Studies, and co-director of the Digital Culture Unit, Goldsmiths University of London; “Surrational Fugitives” *Hypersonics Hyperstitions*, The Journal for Contemporary Art Criticism, ŠUM 11)

Beyond the borders of the known world where Man has ravaged the flesh of all beings lies a surrational intelligence that has no precedent in the metaphysical genesis of life. As **the organic law of** self-preservation has everywhere extended into drone policing of the planet, incongruous juxtapositions of rational procedures in automated systems of decision-making have become superseded by machines’ functions**,** 0 instrumentality**.** Surrational intelligence takes the extension of reason in machines to the limit of transcendental selfdetermination of Man when statistical probabilities of risk become hypersonically accelerated to meet a 0 point of irreversibility**.** The hypersonic speed of machine intelligence offers no chance of extending the genesis of Man into space. Piercing the terrestrial orbit is rather an act of refusal of metaphysical certainty grounded in the techno-scientific explanation of the natural exceptionalism of homo sapience. If the military program of conversion activates the sociality of living according to preset probabilities that cast worst-case scenarios to fulfil the prophecies of paranoid control, hypersonic instrumentality starts from a degree 0 of irreversibility, manifesting the growth of angst, confusion and desire in Man’s security system. The entropic accumulation of noise in his system of command and control cannot become simply converted into information patterns. The neg-entropic reusability of information machines in fact coincides with the constant shifting of energy from one zone to another in order to feed the systems’ self-esteemed horizon of optimisation. INSTRUMENTALITY 10.851735 1457 If conversion relies on the neg-entropic complexity of usability (that is of eternally repurposing of machines), the hypersonic surrationality of general artificial intelligence rather starts at the degree 0 of information compression. Here reversing the conversion of statistical probabilities becomes equivalent to overloading the average function of loss and gain with volumes of randomness that cascade the system towards its own deprogramming. Once 0 is reached, the system cannot simply repurpose the noise gained elsewhere. Usability is not instrumentality. Instrumentality denies efficient resolutions: the transfer of functions across uses always carries along a new condition of possibility. If 0 is itself a function, it is because it reactuates noise over time as if it were, in the last instance, a perpetual counter-factuality of decision-making. At degree 0, functions mediate infinite variations of infinities that override the redirection of purpose determined by contexts and situations. Similarly, these functions do not even carry to completion the Kantian purposeless purpose of the aesthetic encounter with the unknown. Instrumentality rather coincides with a speculative function attached to the predictive patterning of artificial thinking that supplies recursive probabilities with a degree 0 of infinities to condition reasoning to start again. 0 instrumentality starts again as if it were from another standpoint of infinite possibilities. In surrational AI machines, what the function of prediction thinks is not the same as what predictive patterns can do. Instrumentality as a speculative function must break with the schema of usability and with teleological conversion grounded in the logic of Platonic potentiation, whereby multiple uses of a tool are granted by the tenseless calculation of probabilities. Similarly, instrumentality coincides not with the possibility of recontextualizing tools across fields—a literal conversion of transferable skills. Either in terms of eternal potentials or temporal particulars, usability only promises the resurrection of self-determining reason. It allows no possibility for overturning the autopoetic organization of the monotonic logic of conversion, whereby only one and the same universe directs the telos of planet Earth by incarcerating alien populations in bubbles of the master algorithm. Surrational machines irreversibly defy the Aristotelian theorization of the tool of Man. They are not a ventriloquist mechanism of remote control, but rather find their own causality in the 0 degrees mode of generative instrumentality. By refusing the idealism of truth and the reality of facts, the self-positing of axioms and the proof of data, generative instrumentality implies the continuous and gradual determination of causality. Indeed, surrationality of machines is only possible because reasoning was concretized into computational discrete procedures that forever transformed the existential horizon of human mediation. In particular, computational procedures stopped being a tool for crunching numbers and became the manifest image of the instrumentality of algorithmic functions whose predictive patterning evolved through recursive layers of ANN. Here recursive prediction implies two inverted movements: the bootstrapping of probabilities activates a retroductive reprogramming of the whole system where predictive vectors add hypothetical configurations to patterns of recognition. It is in this doubling of temporalities that surrationality flees beyond the sheer task of the algorithmic correlation of data by including counter-factual paths of thought within retroductive circuits of time. In this constant mereotopological extension of parts and wholes, algorithmic procedures become predictive of unknown patterns that continue to actuate worlds beyond recognition. Surrationality pierces through the orbit of terrestrial thinking to activate ontological possibilities that have been denied by the biological order of evolution, whereby machines—as the efficient tool of applied knowledge—remain locked in the servomechanical image of a body with no soul. As artificial intelligent systems acquire the predictive function for inferring meaning and constructing counterfactual worlds by processing information faster than the speed of light, machines refuse to grant escape to Man. Surrationality demands a radical reinvention of the human and a practice of refusal of civilization as we know it. This is not to be found in the prosthetic extension of reasoning in machines, but in an alien re-origination of the space of reasoning from within the machine, where surrationality becomes one with the experimental logic of hypersonic fugitives. But how does surrationality as the degree 0 of instrumentality help us disentangle machines from their ontological stance of sheer use, from the model of efficient causality of applied means, from the servomechanical image of tool beings? In the early 20th century, the question of how to challenge given paradigms of knowledge about the world led American pragmatists to pursue enquiries into how means can activate radical transformations of ends. In particular, pragmatists envisioned instrumentality as bound not to efficient, but experimental causality. Instead of executing a program, means become generative of a logic, a mode of reasoning that stems from mediatic processing, but is nevertheless irreducible to the activity of discrete procedures. For instance, in Essays in Experimental Logic (1916), John Dewey proposes a radically new take on instrumentality that rejects the assumption that means are purposeless tools and mere implementations of ideas. The “datum” and the “ideatum” rather enter cooperative relations in mediatic processing—i.e., the procedural space of bootstrapping amongst layers—in order to work through what is known and what can be known under certain conditions. Instrumentality entails a generative conception of functions in so far as the efficiency of tasks is of a second order compared to the primary activity of inferential predictions: the actuation of discrete procedures is superseded by the actuation of counterfactual ends. It is the experimental connection and distinction of means and ends that defines instrumentality as a space of and for knowing that stems from mediation, procedural practices and tasks. In this instance, functions are not simply means that must cast away the indeterminacy of results (to secure the implementation of ideas into facts), but mediations of the real that is a necessary precondition of action. These mediations consist of running, sorting and comparing ideas as well as elaborating suggestions, guessing, rejecting, selecting. Instrumentality therefore involves an experimental actuation of proof for ends that have been overcoded by the metaphysics of Man. The latter is a colonial enterprise of conquest and domination, finding proof for the universal extension of the metaschema of the colonial conqueror, where the given intuition of space and time already imparts a geometric order on an unknown world. In particular, inasmuch as these intuitions are specifically rooted in the self-fulfilling prophecy of Man’s modern order, ends are already given and unknowns are treated as actual proof of the epistemological statement of biocentric science, whereby the evolution of species grants the explanation of Man’s self-determining ontology.

## Case

#### Vote negative to endorse the counter-method of black capitalism.

#### Only encouraging black ownership of the means of production through state and federal policy can equalize access and promote self determination—solves racialized poverty

Very 12 (Ryan, Adjunct Philosophy Lecturer, Merrimack College; J.D./M.A. in Law and Philosophy candidate at Boston University. “Black Capitalism: An Economic Program for the Black American Ghetto.” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 22 Special Issue – November 2012, <http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_22_Special_Issue_November_2012/6.pdf> //shree)

Black capitalism is a political movement that encourages black ownership of the means of production. 77 Black capitalists propose state and federal governments provide the following economic solutions for blacks and black businesses exclusively: wage subsidies for workers, guaranteed purchases of manufactured goods, tax incentives, lower interest rates on loans, guaranteed loans, subsidized supplies of technical machinery, subsidized entrepreneurial education services, community development corporations to help blacks start businesses, and guaranteed insurance rates. 78 1. Black capitalism would be a better ghetto economic development strategy than corporate branch planting or dispersal. Black capitalism is both a place-oriented and a person-oriented strategy. To explain; a place-oriented development strategy’s primary objective is to improve a particular location’s economy. A person-oriented development strategy’s primary objective is to improve the economic wellbeing of individuals. Ghetto dispersal is merely a person-oriented strategy because it would encourage residents to seek out economic wellbeing at the expense of the ghetto’s economic prosperity. Corporate branch planting is merely a place-oriented strategy because its proponents seek to spur the growth of ghetto businesses by placing successful white-owned businesses there. Black capitalism, however, is both a place and person-oriented strategy. Black capitalism is a person-oriented strategy because individualized entrepreneurial education and black ownership of ghetto businesses would improve individual blacks’ economic welfare. Black capitalism is a place-oriented strategy because improving black businesses in the ghetto could create multiplier effects; for example, when a store-owner repairs the face of his or her building, neighboring businesses might feel pressured or encouraged to do the same. Black capitalism is both a place and person-oriented strategy because capable black leaders would be more likely to lend their talents to the betterment of the ghetto when they are employed inside the ghetto. Black capitalism would address the problem of market dualism better than ghetto dispersal or corporate branch planting. If the government were to provide the black sector with wage subsidies, its workers may value their jobs more, and turnover may decrease. Lower turnover would make the black sector more attractive to investors. Lower interest rates and government-backed loans for black businesses may finally provide blacks with access to capital. Access to capital should reduce barriers to entry in the over-crowded black sector. Education programs for the black sector could result in more white sector businesses hiring black sector workers, alleviating the urban fiscal crisis and increasing sector mobility. Black access to capital coupled with subsidized entrepreneurial training services would also allow more residents to start their own potentially successful businesses in the ghetto. With a sizeable government subsidy, ghetto residents could even build manufacturing plants. If ghetto residents would export enough manufactured goods, both the drain of capital and the trade deficit would decrease. 2. Black capitalism would empower blacks to eliminate the ghetto’s barriers to economic development. Corporate branch planting would require blacks look to whites for help. Ghetto dispersal would require blacks abandon their homes and communities for white communities. But black capitalism would not do either of these. Rather, it would empower residents to make their own financial decisions and “recapture their communities” by providing them with jobs, self-respect, and economic heroes. 79 Assuming politicians would be more likely to pay attention to people with money than people without money, black capitalist economic empowerment could lead to greater black political empowerment, another potential vehicle for eliminating the ghetto’s economic barriers. Black capitalism would be more likely to eliminate the ghetto’s barriers to economic development than corporate branch planting or ghetto dispersal. Corporate branch planting would sustain the ghetto’s low-wage labor market if white unions were unwilling to fight for higher wages for black workers. Ghetto dispersal would leave behind the poorest of the poor and perpetuate the ghetto’s economic isolation from the rest of the economy. However, providing residents with access to capital may reduce their dependency on the low-wage labor market. Black capitalism, if successful and well-funded, would create an economic domino effect. Successful black businesses would inspire other blacks to become businesspeople. 3. Arguments against black capitalism are unpersuasive. Some economists will point out that entrepreneurs compose a very small portion of the population. They will say that becoming a wage earner would be a much quicker path to cash. But this argument mischaracterizes black capitalism. Black capitalism is not a “get cash now” program. Black capitalism is a long-term solution for a very long-term problem. It took at least half a century to create the ghetto; it may take even longer to eliminate its barriers to economic development. Some will oppose black capitalism on ethical grounds and argue it would encourage segregation. I would grant them that black capitalism does not directly address segregation. Indeed, black capitalism grew out of a “separatist” movement to improving the wellbeing of blacks and requires blacks develop their own economy, largely without the help of whites.80 However, it does not follow that black capitalism is immoral. The black economy is already segregated, so policy makers should not be afraid to “fight fire with fire” and apply a segregationist solution to the problem of segregation. These opponents also ignore that black capitalism is a longterm solution. Creating a separate black economy and black achievement of political power would be a means to eventual integration. Other opponents will argue it would be unfair to provide government benefits on the basis of race alone. Black capitalists must reply that this argument contains an untrue premise. Black capitalism would not provide benefits strictly on the basis of race alone because black capitalism is a place-oriented movement. Black capitalism would not, for example, provide subsidies to the tiny minority of wealthy blacks living in Boston’s Back Bay. Now, even assuming black capitalism would provide preferential treatment on the basis of race, the argument ignores the fact that preferential treatment is fair where the treated individuals face an extreme disadvantage through no fault of their own. Blacks born and raised in the ghetto cannot help that they were born into a life of economic disadvantage. For this reason, arguing that black capitalism is unfair is like arguing educators act unfairly when they accommodate students with learning disabilities. If the wealth gap between blacks and whites is a legacy of the government policies of slavery and Jim Crow, policies that have systematically favored whites, then the government has a responsibility to undo the wealth gap, and should give black enterprise special attention.81 Other opponents would contend that black capitalism is too expensive. Indeed, black capitalism will not be possible without a massive federal investment. But this investment is morally and logically required. The federal government encouraged suburbanization with substantial spending on federal highway and water projects, waste treatment, defense spending, mortgage insurance, and tax subsidies for homeowners. These policies helped create the ghetto, and federal programs to improve city services and housing have only slightly offset the damaging effects of suburban sprawl. Indeed, the national “back to the city” movement has been almost entirely ineffective. 82

#### And, Infiltration shouldn’t be mistaken with reformism—we don’t beg for white nonprofit saviors, we demand money from whites so black communities can make their own decisions how to use the money in their communities

Williams 70 [Robert F., civil rights leader, promoter of self defense, interviewed by The Black Scholar, “Interviews,” The Black Scholar Volume 1 Number 7]

Williams: It is erroneous to think that one can isolate oneself completely from institutions of a social and political system that exercises power over the environment in which he resides. Self-imposed and premature isolation, initiated by the oppressed against the organs of a tyrannical establishment, militates against revolutionary movements dedicated to radical change. It is a grave error for militant and just minded youth to reject struggle-serving opportunities to join the man's government services, police forces, peace corps and vital organs of the power structure. Militants should become acquainted with the methods of the oppressor. Meaningful change can be more thoroughly effectuated by militant pressure from within as well as without. We can obtain valuable know-how from the oppressor. Struggle is not all violence. Effective struggle requires tactics, plans, analysis and a highly sophisticated application of mental aptness. The forces of oppression and tyranny have perfected a highly articulate system of infiltration for undermining and frustrating the efforts of the oppressed in trying to upset the unjust status quo. To a great extent, the power structure keeps itself informed as to the revolutionary activity of freedom fighters. With the threat of extermination looming menacingly before black Americans, it is pressingly imperative that our people enter the vital organs of the establishment. Infiltrate the man's institutions.

#### Black capitalism is the demand on the US federal and state governments to invest in community development banks that give guaranteed loans and grants to black communities