## 1AC Isidore Newman R4 vs Orange County AK

### Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

#### Experiences prove that pain is intrinsically bad – one cannot understand what pain without associating it with objective disvalue.

Mendola 06 [Joseph Mendola, (Joseph Mendola is professor and chair in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. He is the author of Human Thought and of articles on ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind.) "Goodness and Justice: A Consequentialist Moral Theory" Cambridge University Press, 2006, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/goodness-and-justice/AE25780DC33533E8797FB684C5FBD36E, DOA:6-7-2019 // WWBW]

While this view is of course controversial in our historical situation, in which many hold that sensory experience is as of yellow though there is nothing in the world that is so, not even a sense datum, or at the very least that the yellow we experience is a natural property constituted by physical properties like a certain range of surface spectral reflectance, still the view in question is, as I’ve said, one live competitor. Indeed, it is often motivated by arguments that are structurally similar to the open-question argument: You look at a gold bar and have a certain sort of phenomenal experience. But it seems to some that it might well be an open question whether your physical twin in a physically identical environment has the same phenomenal experience, or any at all. He might be a zombie or a qualia invert. And the openness of that question suggests to some that **the physical cannot constitute** your **phenomenal experience.** At least such qualia dualism is relatively concrete and robust. Even though it involves physically unconstituted qualia, it involves nothing that is non-natural in Moore’s sense. It is at least concretely comprehensible. And that gives it a great advantage over alternative forms of normative realism. That is my main point, that this so far familiar qualia dualism unexpectedly but very plausibly implies a form of normative realism. **Painfulness** – or, more accurately, the phenomenal property present in certain sorts of extreme and paradigmatic physical pain – **is** a kind of **disvalue**. That is my new idea.34 The phenomenal difference between those in bliss and those in agony includes a difference in a sort of felt phenomenal value. **The phenomenal difference between pain and pleasure seems** (at least in part and sometimes) **to be that the phenomenal component of the former is nastier, intrinsically worse than that of the second. The red knight was stabbed to death.** Just as no one can adequately describe what it was like to be him without capturing his sensation of his red and flowing blood and hence the property of phenomenal redness, so no one can describe what it was like to be him without capturing the nasty sensations he felt and hence the property of phenomenal nastiness or disvalue. And **no one can understand what his phenomenal state was without knowing that it was intrinsically bad, worse than pleasure. No one, not even a Martian, can give a complete and adequate characterization of the red knight’s murder while ignoring the phenomenal state that was a part of that situation. And no one, not even a Martian, can give a complete and adequate characterization of that phenomenal state without capturing its nastiness, its intrinsic disvalue.** The red knight’s murder possessed what we might call objective intrinsic disvalue. If someone feels bad, then there is something bad, at least in cases of extreme physical pain. My further claim, to which constitutive naturalists dissent, is that this involves unconstituted but natural disvalue. **Like other phenomenal properties, the disvalue present in agony is unconstituted by physical properties, though it is itself concrete and natural. It is just like phenomenal yellow.** The objective but unconstituted phenomenal component of agony involves a correspondingly objective and unconstituted phenomenal property that is usually present in cases of at least extreme physical pain, a painfulness or “unpleasant hedonic tone”, as it was once called.35 And **such objective phenomenal properties are, at least in part, a sort of intrinsic disvalue or badness.** Something analogous is true of certain paradigmatic physical pleasures. They involve objective intrinsic value.

#### Existential risk comes first under any framework

**Ord 20** Toby Ord [Australian philosopher. He founded Giving What We Can, an international society whose members pledge to donate at least 10% of their income to effective charities], “The Precipice” Hachette Books, 2020 // Lex CH

But **an existential catastrophe is not** just **a catastrophe that destroys a particularly large number of lives. It destroys our potential**. My mentor, Derek Parfit, asked us to imagine a devastating nuclear war killing 99 percent of the world’s people.19 **A war that would leave behind a dark age lasting centuries, before the survivors could eventually rebuild civilization to its former heights; humbled, scarred—but undefeated. Now compare this with a war killing a full 100 percent of the world’s people. This second war would be worse, of course, but how much worse? Either war would be the worst catastrophe in history. Either would kill billions.** **The second war would involve tens of millions of additional deaths, and so would be worse for this reason**. But there is another, far more significant difference between the two wars. **Both wars kill billions of humans; but the second war kills humanity**. **Both wars destroy our present; but the second war destroys our future. It is this qualitative difference in what is lost with that last percent that makes existential catastrophes unique, and that makes reducing the risk of existential catastrophe uniquely important. 20 In expectation, almost all humans who will ever live have yet to be born.** Absent catastrophe, **most generations are future generations.** As the writer Jonathan Schell put it: The procession of generations that extends onwards from our present leads far, far beyond the line of our sight, and, compared with these stretches of human time, which exceed the whole history of the earth up to now, our brief civilized moment is almost infinitesimal. Yet we threaten, in the name of our transient aims and fallible convictions, to foreclose it all. **If our species does destroy itself, it will be a death in the cradle—a case of infant mortality**. 21 And because, in expectation, **almost all of humanity’s life lies in the future, almost everything of value lies in the future as well**: almost all the flourishing; almost all the beauty; our greatest achievements; our most just societies; our most profound discoveries. 22 We can continue our progress on prosperity, health, justice, freedom and moral thought. **We can create a world of wellbeing and flourishing that challenges our capacity to imagine. And if we protect that world from catastrophe, it could last millions of centuries**. This is our potential—what we could achieve if we pass the Precipice and **continue striving for a better world**. **It is this view of the future—the immense value of humanity’s potential —that most persuades me to focus my energies on reducing existential risk. When I think of the millions of future generations yet to come, the importance of protecting humanity’s future is clear to me**. **To risk destroying this future**, for the sake of some advantage limited only to the present, **seems** to me profoundly parochial and **dangerously short-sighted**. Such neglect privileges a tiny sliver of our

#### Extinction first – it’s mathematically and ethically correct.

Sánchez ’17 (David; 2/8/17; BA in Public Policy, BA in Economics and Philosophy, expert at the Kenan Institute for Ethics, citing Nick Bostrom, PhD in Philosophy; Duke’s The Chronicle; “Existential risks”; <http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2017/02/existential-risks-questions-and-considerations>; DOA: 4/21/17)

How often do you think about the end of the world? Some people think about it quite a bit. Within Effective Altruism circles, many people share a concern for the future of humanity. Effective Altruists attempt to combine good intentions with science and reasoning to find the best ways to do good, whether for humans or non-human animals. Mitigation of so-called “existential risks” is a **huge priority** for some of their more risk-seeking members. An existential risk, put simply, is some class of possible event that presents a **risk of extinction** to humanity. Nick Bostrom, Oxford philosopher and existential risk extraordinaire, defines it this way: “One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.” Some main classes of existential risk include catastrophic climate change, malicious artificial superintelligence, the emergence of malicious nanotechnology, **nuclear war** and malicious bio-tech, among others. When considering the threats posed by so-called “x-risks,” there are at least three factors to keep in mind. First, bear in mind that if humanity continues for the foreseeable future, then the number of potential people in the future will be **significantly higher** than the number who exist today or have existed in the past. Additionally, the expected disutility of extinction-level events is massive, meaning that **even a small mitigation** of those probabilities results in a **huge positive**. Per one interpretation of the evidence, “even if we use the **most conservative** of these **estimates**… we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of **1016 human lives**. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere **one millionth of one percentage point** is at least a **hundred times the value of a million human lives**.” If this holds even remotely true, then surely we should keep listening. Second, consider that some experts believe the probability of extinction-level events is somewhat high. In a report released by Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, a survey of experts found the likelihood of extinction by the year 2100 to be a whopping **19 percent**. While this number should be taken with a grain of salt, it is unsettling that people in the know are so pessimistic about our odds. Third, bear in mind that there are very, very few people dedicated to mitigating these existential risks. Some limited efforts exist, but they are low-staffed and underfunded. As Nick Bostrom has noted, even “a million dollars could currently make a **vast difference** to the amount of research done on existential risks; the same amount spent on furthering world peace would be like a drop in the ocean.” If you’re looking for a cause with a funding gap, this might be just the ticket. Looking throughout history, we can find **plenty of examples of near-nuclear war**; the Future of Life Institute compiled a nice list of the most notable. What this might show us is that our planet has almost faced near-extinction level events in the past. One reason we are all still here is because people worked to craft systems that would **avoid careless mistakes** or oversights. In other words, we built systems that attempted to mitigate these risks. If these systems had not been in place, and lazy fail-safes failed to prevent disaster, then what would have happened? Perhaps not outright extinction, but disaster indeed. During the Cold War, the notion of “mutually assured destruction” was not some abstract; it was a working possibility, one that humanity had to take seriously. So today, in a world with ever-advancing technology and **geopolitical uncertainty**, we lack a compelling reason not to take these sorts of risks seriously. The need to mitigate existential risk stands or falls with free will—if it does not exist, then there is little or no case to be made. But if it does—even to an extent—then we have every reason to at least listen to the experts. So, perhaps my thesis is that insofar as a person believes humans have free will (i.e. a degree of autonomy over their destinies), he or she likely will have reason to support causes that mitigate the risks imposed by disaster scenarios. This is not meant to take a stand on cause prioritization. It might be more worthwhile still to donate to groups that fight global health problems or empower people economically. However, excluding opportunity cost, donating time or money to mitigating these threats is likely net positive, depending on the efficacy of the organization or project. Given that we have not observed an existential threat play out in the past, we **might be biased** towards believing that one might never emerge. Accordingly, this is an area where rational thinking is absolutely **essential**. In my view, whether or not to support or donate to these causes is an open question. But if the whole of humanity is **at stake**, it is at least a conversation worth having.

#### Concrete reality structures existence – vague philosophizing does nothing

**Cone 10** Cone, James. [Professor of Systematic Theology, Union Theological Seminary]. A Black Theology of Liberation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010. BE

Participation in divine liberation places the church squarely in the context of the world. It s existence is inseparable from worldly involvement. Black theology cannot say that the “church is the world” or “the world is the church” (as implied in some secular theologies), but it does affirm that the church cannot be the church in isolation from the concrete realities of human suffering. The world is earthly existence, the place where human beings are enslaved. It is where laws are passed against the oppressed, and where the oppressed fight back even though their efforts seem futile. The world is where white and black persons live, encountering each other, the latter striving for a little more room to breathe and the former doing everything possible to destroy black reality.¶ The world is not a metaphysical entity or an ontological problem, as some philosophers and theologians would have us believe it is very concrete. It is punching clocks, taking orders, fighting rats, and being kicked around by police officers. it iswhere the oppressed live. Jews encountered it in concentration camps, Amerindians on reservations, and blacks on slave ships, in cotton fields, and in “dark” ghettos. The world is white persons, the degrading rules they make are for the “underprivileged”, and their guilt dispelling recourse to political and theological slogans about the welfare of society “ as a whole”. In short, the world is where the brutal reality of inhumanity makes its ungodly appearance, turning persons into animals.

#### Prioritize material, observable effects as the basis for ethics – anything else is epistemically inaccessible

Papinau ’07 (David [David Papineau is an academic philosopher. He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London, having previously taught for several years at Cambridge University and been a fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge], “Naturalism”. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/)) 2007)

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If **all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world** (Harman, 1986). At first sight **this** may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it **has** **very awkward epistemological consequences.** For beings like us, **knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then [we can’t] it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.**

#### Pain provides an objective reason for why oppression is bad.

**Gray 09** [Gray, James W. "An Argument for Moral Realism." Ethical Realism. N.p., 07 Oct. 2009. Web. 04 Sept. 2015. <https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2009/10/07/an-argument-for-moral-realism/>. MA in philosophy from San Jose State University (2008)]

**If we have evidence** that **anything** in particular **has intrinsic value**, then we also have evidence that **moral realism is true**. Our experiences of pleasure and pain are probably the most powerful evidence of intrinsic value because such experiences are tied to our belief that they have intrinsic value. My argument that pain has intrinsic disvalue is basically the following: We experience that pain is bad. We experience that pain is important. The disvalue of pain is irreducible. The disvalue of pain is real. If pain is bad in the sense of being important, irreducible, and real, then pain has intrinsic disvalue. Therefore, pain has intrinsic disvalue. I am not certain that the premises are true, but I currently find good reasons for accepting them. Therefore, we have reason for accepting the conclusion. The conclusion could be read saying, “We have reason to believe that pain has intrinsic disvalue.” If we accept that **pain has intrinsic disvalue**, then we will simultaneously accept moral realism.1 In order to examine the plausibility of my argument, I will examine each of the premises: We experience that pain is bad. We know pain is bad **because of our experience** of it. If someone described their pain as extremely wonderful, we would doubt they are feeling pain. Either the person is lying or doesn’t know what the word “pain” means. When a child decides not to touch fire because it causes pain, we understand the justification. **It would be strange to ask** the child, “So what? **What’s wrong with pain**?” We experience that pain is important. If pain is important in the relevant sense, then it can provide us reason to do something without merely helping us fulfill our desires. In other words, we must accept the following: The badness of pain isn’t just an instrumental value. The badness of **pain is a final end**. Pain’s badness isn’t an instrumental value – Pain’s disvalue is not an instrumental disvalue because pain can be quite useful to us. **Pain** can tell us when we are unhealthy or injured. We evolved pain because **i**t’**s** **essential** **to** our **survival**. Pain’s bad for a different kind of reason. Pain’s disvalue is found in our negative experience, and this is why pain is a candidate for having an intrinsic disvalue. Whenever someone claims that something has intrinsic value, we need to make sure that it’s not just good because it’s instrumentally valuable. If it’s merely useful at bringing about something else, then it’s not good in and of itself (as intrinsic values are). Pain is perhaps the perfect example of something that is useful but bad. If usefulness was the only kind of value, then pain would actually be good because it helps us in many ways. Pain’s badness isn’t just our dislike of pain – We dislike **pain** because it **feels bad**.2 If pain didn’t feel bad, then we wouldn’t have such a strong desire to avoid intense pain. Pain means “feels bad” and it **is manifested in various experiences**, such as touching fire. **We have to know the meaning of “bad”** in order to understand pain at all. **We attain an understanding of “bad” just by feeling pain**. If pain was only bad because we dislike it, then we couldn’t say that “pain really matters.” Instead, the badness of pain would just be a matter of taste. However, we don’t just say pain is bad because we dislike it. We also say pain is bad because of how it feels. Avoiding **pain is a final end** – A final end is a goal people recognize as being **worthy of being sought after for its own sake**. Money is not a final end **because** it is only valuable when used to do something else. Pleasure and pain-avoidance are final ends because they are taken t be worthy of being avoided for their own sake. We know that avoiding pain makes sense even when **it doesn’t lead to anything else** of value, so avoiding pain is a final end.3 If I want to take an aspirin, someone could ask, “Why did you do that?” I could answer, “I have a headache.” This should be the end of the story. We understand that avoiding pain makes sense. It would be absurd for someone to continue to question me and say, “What difference does having a headache make? That’s not a good reason to take an aspirin!”4 Both realists and anti-realists can agree that pain is bad, and they can both agree that pain is a final end. Our desire to avoid pain is non-instrumental and such a desire is experienced as justified. (However, the ant-realist might argue that it is only taken to be justified because of human psychology.) If pain is a final end, then we understand (a) that pain is important and (b) it makes sense to say that we ought to avoid pain. **Pain’s disvalue is irreducible**. **If the badness of pain was reducible to nonmoral properties, then we should be able to describe what** “bad” means **through a non-moral description**. **However**, **we** currently **have no** way of understanding pain’s badness as being something else. We can’t describe pain’s badness in non-moral terms. If someone needs to know what ” bad” means, they need to experience something bad. To say that some moral states are irreducible is just like saying that some mental states are irreducible. Pain itself can’t be described through a non-mental description. If we told people the mental states involved with pain, they would still not know what pain is because they need to know what it feels like. Someone could argue that **“bad” means the same thing as** something like **“pain,”** and then we would find out that the badness of pain could be reduced to something else. However, pain and the badness of pain are conceptually separable. For example, I could find out that something else is bad other than pain. They could then reply that “bad” means the same thing as a disjunction of various other bad things, such as “pain or malicious intent.” But people who disagree about what constitutes what is “bad” aren’t just arguing about the meaning of the word “bad.” They are arguing about what has the property “bad.”5 Additionally, the word “bad” would no longer have any importance. If “bad” just means “pain or malicious intent,” then why care about it? Why ought I refrain from causing pain or having a malicious intent? It could be that we can find out that “bad” and “pain” are identical, but then “bad” might not be entirely reducible to “pain” (or a disjunction of bad things). We might still think that there are two legitimate descriptions at work. The “pain” description and the “bad” description. (Some people think water is H2O through an identity relation similar to this.) This sort of irreducible identity relation require us to deny that pain is “important.” (If the identity theory did require us to deny that pain is “important,” then we would have a good reason to reject such an identity theory.) I have given reason to think the word “bad” is irreducible, but I haven’t proven it. If someone could prove that pain isn’t important, and we can reduce pain to something else, then I will be proven wrong. I just don’t see any reason to agree with that position at this time. I discuss the badness of pain as irreducible in more detail in my essays “Objection to Moral Realism Part 1: Is/Ought Gap” and “Objections to Moral Realism Part 3: Argument from Queerness.” The badness of pain is real. **If the badness of pain is real**, **then everyone’s pain is bad**. Pain isn’t bad just for me, but not for you. It states that **we don’t** all merely **share a subjective preference** in avoiding pain,

#### Decolonization alone fails, but material action paves the way for a post-colonial future which breaks down the settler-native binary and gives natives autonomy in policy

Bashir and Busbridge, 18. [Bashir Bashir, Ph.D., London School of Economics and a senior lecturer in the department of sociology, political science and communication at the Open University of Israel and a research fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. Rachel Busbridge, Ph.D., and has held research positions at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, La Trobe University and Freie Universitaet Berlin as an Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and has taught sociology and politics at al-Quds University, al-Quds Bard College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of South Australia, Deakin University and Swinburne. 04-09-2018. “The Politics of Decolonisation and Bi-Nationalism in Israel/Palestine” (Political Studies), vol. 67, no. 2, May 2019, pp. 388–405, doi:10.1177/0032321718767029.]//pacc

Theorising Decolonisation For all its attached redemptive prospects and radical possibilities, it is important to emphasise that the meanings of decolonisation as both a concept and political project are not just broad, but also multifaceted and highly contested. What it means to ‘undo’ colonialism is deeply contextual (Jansen and Osterhammel, 2017). While colonialism can be defined broadly as a relationship of domination in which a people or territory is politically and economically subjugated to a foreign power, actual colonial situations vary quite widely from each other, depending on, among others, the particular political systems instituted to maintain control, types of exploitation and expropriation (resources, labour, plantations), relationship between the metropole and colony and patterns of migration they compel (slavery, settlement). Projects of decolonisation accordingly take different forms even if they are united by the common concern of ending or overturning structures of domination instituted by colonialism, which has historically taken place mostly through the withdrawal of colonial powers and achievement of independence for the colonised (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation speaks to the aspiration of self-rule and its concomitant critique of colonialism as the ‘systematic denial of freedom’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 6) and is therefore entangled with a variety of concerns, namely, self-determination, justice, equality, freedom and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. As Todd Shepherd (2006: 3–4) writes, decolonisation is ‘a much wider concept than the mere “winning of Independence” or “transfer of power”… It entails the exploration of dreams, the analysis of struggles, compromises, pledges and achievements, and the rethinking of fundamentals’. Traditional literature on decolonisation approached it in terms of the historical process that began in the immediate aftermath of World War Two in which countries previously under (typically European) foreign rule transitioned to constitutional independence (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation was one of the most significant developments of the twentieth century, radically changing the face of the globe from one in which a small number of empires had dominion over some 80% of the earth’s surface to an international order based on the principle of self-determination and made up of ostensibly independent states (Hopkins, 2008). Scholars in this tradition have done much to illuminate the wide-reaching structural transformations that accompanied decolonisation, including the emergence of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles at the turn of the century, shifts in world economy that made the maintenance of traditional forms of Empire increasingly difficult, the development of a ‘Third World’ political project and the institutionalisation of human and civic rights principles that rendered systems based on ideas of racial and ethnic superiority less viable (Hopkins, 2008: 216). Yet, the focus on transition has been critiqued for its narrowness insofar as it seems to take for granted the meanings of self-determination and temporally restricts decolonisation to the moment of national liberation. Postcolonial scholars, among others, have been at the forefront of this charge, arguing that decolonisation did not produce a postcolonial world per se, but rather one that continues to be shaped in significant ways by the legacies of European colonialism (e.g. Spivak, 1999). As Ella Shohat (1992) has argued, there is no way of turning back from the world colonialism set in play nor did colonial modes of domination end with the formal period of decolonisation. From this broadened perspective, decolonisation is the difficult task of tracing the economic, political, social, cultural, relational and linguistic consequences of colonialism and is therefore also an ongoing imaginative project seeking ‘a new form of consciousness and way of life’ (Pieterse and Parekh, 1995: 3) beyond the coloniality of modern modes of culture, identity and knowledge more generally. While the transitional focus of conventional scholarship is quite illuminating in the contexts of Africa and Asia, for example, it furthermore excludes a great many decolonisation efforts that have taken place and continue to take place in other regions. This includes countries that remained dependent or only achieved semi-independence as dominions, decolonising projects carried out in territories never formally under colonial rule (the Iranian Revolution, for instance) and – as is particularly important to our discussion here – settler colonies that only partially decolonised, whether by way of loosening ties with the Motherland or achieving independence, but which continue to dominate substantial indigenous populations (Hopkins, 2008). There is a significant lacuna in the decolonisation literature when it comes to settler colonialism, which has increasingly been recognised as a distinct form of colonial practice – and one that is particularly resistant to decolonisation (Veracini, 2007). As the transfer of an exogenous population to a territory they intend to claim as their permanent home, settler colonialism establishes quite a different structural relationship to ‘traditional’ forms of colonialism, especially when settler colonial projects succeed in creating a state (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011). Rather than governing native peoples in order to extract resources for economic gain, settler colonisers instead aim to ‘seize their land and push them beyond an ever-expanding frontier of settlement’ (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 2). For Patrick Wolfe (2006), what distinguishes settler colonialism is thus that it is guided by a logic of elimination as opposed to a logic of exploitation, wherein the eradication of indigenous presence is essential to the success of settler colonial projects. The primacy of national liberation in the literature makes it especially difficult to imagine, let alone theorise, decolonisation in many settler colonial contexts. Whereas some settler colonial projects like Algeria and Kenya saw decolonisation by way of a mass settler exodus, paving the way for the establishment of independent states, the more successful ones established permanent settler communities (e.g. Northern Ireland) or their own states (e.g. Australia, Canada, the United States) which preclude a simple transition from foreign rule to sovereign status (Veracini, 2007). This is of course not to say that self-determination of the type aspired to by anti-colonial national movements was an easy or even necessarily achievable task. As Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest, in pursuing the dream of self-rule, anti-colonial thinkers had to reckon with the difficulties of articulating alternative political foundations that would make for a genuinely self-determining polity, an enormous task which **demands decolonising of minds as much institutions and territory** (see Fanon, 2001[1963]). Decolonisation must pursue a convincing ‘break’ between a colonial past and a postcolonial future ‘through decisive action in the present’; it must also ‘seek to reinterpret the past in such a way that it may help in the present and future struggle for self-rule’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 19). While these pursuits are invariably contingent, partial and commonly symbolic, national liberation struggles very often provide the fodder for a reinterpreted past that is robustly positive and the establishment of an independent state serves as that aspired for ‘break’. Settler colonial contexts, especially those where indigenous peoples live as minorities in settler states, make these types of symbolic transitions challenging, as they do the imagining of postcolonial alternatives. If the narrative structure of colonialism is circular (leave, stay, return), making that symbolic break possible, settler colonial narratives are linear insofar as the settler comes to stay and the line continues on unbroken (Veracini, 2007). As Ann Curthoys (1999: 288) writes, **settler colonial spaces are simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising, which makes decolonisation temporally ambivalent at best.** Lorenzo Veracini (2007) suggests that there are only two alternatives to settler evacuation for decolonising settler colonial forms and it is dubious whether one of these counts as decolonisation at all: the decolonisation of relationships through ‘the promotion of various processes of Indigenous reconciliation’ or the maintenance of the status quo ‘with the explicit rejection of the possibility of reforming the settler body politic’. Again, **what the former might mean is often vague, and historically it is the decolonisation of relationships that is hardest to come by considering the psychological consequences of colonialism for coloniser and colonised alike** (Memmi, 1965). Like traditional forms of colonialism, settler colonialism was legitimated by a belief in the colonised’s racial and cultural inferiority. However, the specific settler colonial pursuit of land seizure compels additional stereotypes of native peoples or unique applications of existing colonial ones, wherein their supposed inferiority makes them ill-equipped to develop that land (pre-modern, nomadic, barbaric) or, alternatively, voids any claims to ownership (terra nullius). In other words, settler colonialism is as much premised on the denial of indigenous peoples as a political constituency with rights to land as it is their purported inferiority, which is typically enshrined in their status as second-class citizens with all the economic, cultural and social disadvantage this entails (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011: 3). Given that settler societies are marked by ‘pervasive inequalities, usually codified in law, between native and settler populations’ which preserve political and economic privileges for the latter (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 4), **decolonising relationships demands structural changes that often encounter significant resistance from settler constituencies.** Likewise, it requires a reckoning with historical injustice – specifically violence and conflict at the colonial frontier – that is challenging for settler states and populations because it opens questions of settler identity, privileges, legitimacy and reparations and expressly seeks to scrutinise disavowed and long suppressed histories. Settler colonial decolonisation is thus complicated by a multitude of hurdles, which bring the postcolonial caution of the impossibility of a ‘break’ into stark relief. Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest that **decisive action in the present is essential to decolonisation**, but in settler colonial contexts **this is hindered by power discrepancies between settler and native constituencies, a general lack of settler political will** to enter into difficult processes of historical introspection **as well as the constraining of Indigenous claims within the settler state**. Indeed, even a commitment to a postcolonial polity as expressed through processes of historical reconciliation often encounters strong resistance when it comes to judicial, constitutional or legislative change genuinely decolonised relationships would demand. Nevertheless, even if it remains difficult to comprehensively imagine the decolonisation of ‘settler societies vis-à-vis Indigenous constituencies’ (Veracini, 2007), the central question must be how to construct political foundations which simultaneously acknowledge ‘the practices of racism, violence and subordination’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 18) that preceded them while also **paving the way for a postcolonial future in which natives and settlers are equal parties and share the right to narrate the polity.** Equality, freedom and justice may come from legally enshrining Indigenous rights to self-determination or, alternatively, doing away with the categories of ‘settler’ and ‘native’ altogether (Mamdani, 2001). What shape such efforts are likely to take depends, among others, on the ‘size and tenacity’ of Indigenous populations as well as the power of the settler constituency (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 3, 6). But we would suggest that the measure to which they may be thought of as decolonising rests on the robustness of the relationship they envision and the space they carve for equal membership in and to a postcolonial polity.

#### Ground – Both debaters have ground to engage under util – Aff gets plans, while Neg gets DAs and counterplans. AND anything can function under util if it has an external benefit. Other fwrks deny 1 side engagement on link and impact level.  Hyper-specific theories mean people have little prep on the issue.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that produces the best material consequences based on the fiated implications of the plan –

#### [1] No performative or methodological offense – It’s extra-T which is a voter for limits, spiking out of neg ground making any discussion worse.

#### [2] Strat Skew – the resolution is the only stasis point and adding other factors to the round decks predictable limits which guts pre round prep.

#### [3] Inclusion – Novices and Lay debaters all use the material consequences in the plan – proven by every lay tournament outside the circuit – by increasing the burden to your model you exclude them from the space.

### Adv—Growth

#### The advantage is Workforce Retention.

#### A right to strike is crucial to negotiating conditions for workforce retention—but unchecked, companies lash out with dismissals. Bogage 10/17

Jacob Bogage, writes about business and technology for The Washington Post, where he's worked since 2015. He's previously covered the automotive and manufacturing industries and wrote for the Sports section. He has previously reported for the Columbia Missourian, Columbia (Mo.) Daily Tribune, Bethesda Magazine and the Montgomery County Gazette. He is a Maryland native and a graduate of the University of Missouri, 10-17-2021, "Strikes are sweeping the labor market as workers wield new leverage ," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/10/17/strikes-great-resignation/, 10-22-2021//Aanya

Marcial Reyes could have just quit his job. Frustrated with chronic understaffing at the Kaiser Permanente hospital where he works in Southern California, he knows he has options in a region desperate for nurses. Instead, he voted to go on strike. While Americans are leaving their jobs at staggering rates — a record 4.3 million quit in August alone — hundreds of thousands of workers with similar grievances about wages, benefits and quality of life are, like Reyes, choosing to dig in and fight. Last week, 10,000 John Deere workers went on strike, while unions representing 31,000 Kaiser employees authorized walkouts. Some 60,000 Hollywood production workers reached a deal Saturday night, averting a strike hours before a negotiation deadline. All told, there have been strikes against 178 employers this year, according to a tracker by Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which records only large work stoppages, has documented 12 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers so far this year. That’s considerably higher than 2020, when the pandemic took hold, but in line with significant strike activity recorded in 2019 and 2018. The trend, union officials and economists say, is an offshoot of the phenomenon known as the Great Resignation, which has thinned the nation’s labor pool and slowed the economic recovery. Workers are now harder to replace, especially while many companies are scrambling to meet heightened demand for their products and manage hobbled supply chains. That has given unions new leverage, and made striking less risky. In interviews, workers and labor leaders said union members are angry with employers for failing to raise pay to match new profits and are disappointed by the lack of high-quality jobs. They also are frustrated that wage growth is not keeping pace with inflation. Although the average U.S. worker’s hourly pay was up 4 percent in September compared with a year ago, according to the St. Louis Federal Reserve, inflation grew 5.4 percent over the same period. “The strikes are sending a signal, no doubt about it, that employers ignore workers at their peril,” AFL-CIO President Liz Shuler said in an interview with The Washington Post. “I think this wave of strikes is actually going to inspire more workers to stand up and speak out and put that line in the sand and say, ‘We deserve better.’ ” Not all work stoppages have been successful. More than 1,000 Alabama miners have been on strike at Warrior Met Coal since April. That same month, 14 oil workers staged a walkout against United Metro Energy in New York; eight have since been fired, according to the local Teamsters branch. And roughly 1,400 workers at Kellogg Co. cereal factories in four states are entering their third week on the picket line. Still, the labor movement has drawn support from the White House. President Biden made a public statement supporting the Amazon union drive in Alabama — a rare move by a sitting president. And his constant calls to raise the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour have delighted labor leaders. In Fontana, Calif., Reyes is hopeful. As a covid-19 patient who spent a month in the same Kaiser hospital where he works, he has a unique perspective on pandemic-related staffing shortages. “I think I got the best care that I could have gotten at Kaiser,” he said. “Now it’s time to pay back the nurses that took care of me” by striking for additional resources. The strike drives in 2021 run the gamut of American industry: Nurses and health workers in California and Oregon; oil workers in New York; cereal factory workers in Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Tennessee; television and film production crews in Hollywood; and more. The surge in strike activity has yielded mixed results, economists say. Though work stoppages this summer at Nabisco and Frito-Lay helped secure higher raises and new vacation allowances for workers, employers have not made meaningful increases in their workforces or compensation structures. Both sides acknowledge the benefit of retaining workers. Management more often would rather deal with a brief strike than absorb higher costs associated with turnover and training new staff. For the employee, a new job isn’t necessarily a better one. A “There’s a cost to searching and a cost to leaving your current employer,” said William M. Rodgers III, director of the Institute for Economic Equity at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. “And maybe some of the desire to strike is predicated out of a level of loyalty that these people have been with this company for a good duration.” Unions increasingly are seeking changes in the workplace and corporate culture. Some strike drives are pushing for better safeguards against sexual harassment and coronavirus safety protocols, including one at El Milagro, a Chicago-based tortilla manufacturer. Workers at a West Virginia producer of industrial pump parts went on strike Oct. 1 seeking better seniority rights. Some are attempting to claw back perks that vanished years ago during economic downturns. Striking John Deere workers contend that the company’s massive profit during the pandemic — earnings nearly doubled to a record $1.79 billion last quarter — should be reflected in their compensation, particularly retirement benefits. More than 60,000 members of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE), which represents Hollywood production workers, had planned to strike Monday unless they reached a deal with the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers. The two sides arrived at a tentative agreement Saturday night that guarantees workers meal breaks, weekends and breaks between shifts, plus significant raises. “They do have to change the way they do business,” IATSE President Matthew D. Loeb said, “to avoid a strike, to have good morale and to have safe, healthy employees.” A spokesman for the television and film producers alliance did not respond to a request for comment. Labor leaders have defined wage demands as a new frontier for workers’ rights. Unions helped deliver the 40-hour workweek, they note, and the coronavirus crisis has reinforced the need to secure living wages and safer workplaces. “Especially during the pandemic, where people have worked overtime, they’ve sacrificed. They want to be acknowledged and appreciated,” Shuler said. Workers took notice when their companies publicly praised them as heroic and essential in the early days of pandemic, labor leaders and experts say, and it made them angry. Many saw a disconnect between the accolades and the realities of their jobs, and now interpret “essential” more broadly: They’re not only crucial to helping put food on families’ tables or treating patients, they’re essential to very companies they serve — and can inflict pain by shutting down or slowing operations. “A strike is really the last resort. That’s labor’s power, a worker’s power is to withhold their labor,” said Kim Cordova, president of the Colorado branch of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union. “A company can function without a CEO, but they can’t function without the workers to actually go do the work.”

have argued that the growing economic inequality is also economically unsustainable.

#### The right to strike is crucial to stop decline of labor unions, the vital internal link to economic inequality

Pope et al. 17

(James Gray Pope Professor of Law and Sidney Reitman Scholar at Rutgers University.Ed Bruno is the former director of the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, Peter Kellman is past president of the Southern Maine Labor Council and is currently working with the Movement Building/Education Committee of the Maine AFL-CIO https://bostonreview.net/forum/james-gray-pope-ed-bruno-peter-kellman-right-strike , 5-22)

In December 2005 more than 30,000 New York City transit workers walked out over economic issues despite the state of New York’s Taylor Law, which prohibits all public sector strikes. Not only did the workers face the loss of two days’ pay for each day on strike, but a court ordered that the union be fined $1 million per day. Union president Roger Toussaint held firm, likening the strikers to Rosa Parks. “There is a higher calling than the law,” he declared. “That is justice and equality.” The transit strike exemplified labor civil disobedience at its most effective. The workers were not staging a symbolic event; they brought the city’s transit system to a halt. They claimed their fundamental right to collective action despite a statute that outlawed it. For a precious moment, public attention was riveted on the drama of workers defying a draconian strike ban. How did national labor leaders react? AFL-CIO president John Sweeney issued a routine statement of support, while most others did nothing at all. To anybody watching the drama unfold, the message was clear: there is no right to strike, even in the House of Labor. About a decade earlier in 1996, Stephen Lerner, fresh from a successful campaign to organize Los Angeles janitors, had warned in Boston Review that private sector unions faced an existential crisis: density could soon drop from 10.3 percent to 5 percent if unions did not expand their activity beyond the limits imposed by American law. He called for unions to develop broad organizing strategies—industry-wide and regional—and to engage in civil disobedience. Few embraced these radical strategies. Today private sector union density is about 6.5 percent, not quite as low as Lerner predicted, but down from a high of over 30 percent in the mid-1950s. Union decline matters. For half a century, it has moved in lock step with the increase in income inequality. According to an International Monetary Fund study of twenty advanced economies, . In the heyday of American unionism, CEOs made about 25 times the annual compensation of the average worker; today, the multiple is more than 350. Meanwhile, as Thomas Edsell and others have warned for decades, the decline of unions has deprived the Democratic Party of its strongest link to white workers. The overwhelming majority of unions continue to endorse Democratic candidates (including Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election), but with ever-diminishing effect. Until two decades ago it was possible to blame union decline on backward labor leaders, such as George Meany, who were so steeped in business unionism that they could not see the need to organize broadly, much less to ally with other social movements across lines of race, gender, and immigration status. Since then, however, we have seen continued shrinkage under leaders who are, for the most part, well intentioned and savvy. The problem is structural. National union officials are not well positioned to lead a challenge to corporate power. Institutions with big treasuries and tit-for-tat relations with establishment politicians cannot be expected to undertake risky and polarizing actions. Although leaders might see the need to build working-class power, the immediate incentives all point toward the narrow needs of their particular union’s members. This constraint is rooted in the American system of exclusive representation, which divides workers into thousands of bargaining unit boxes, gives unions property interests in particular boxes, and penalizes unions for doing anything other than defending existing boxes and acquiring new ones. The prospects for union revival may seem bleaker than ever during the Trump administration, even as the triumph of right-wing populism makes more urgent what was already apparent: the need to build a labor movement that can fight for the interests of the working class in the face of corporate power. But prospects are not as grim as they appear. Over the past decade, there has been an undeniable shift toward class politics, most visibly evidenced by Occupy Wall Street, the Bernie Sanders campaign, the Fight for Fifteen, and the rise of a Black Lives Matter movement that supports economic justice demands, including the right to organize. Building the labor movement in this period of danger and opportunity will require not only heeding Lerner’s call for a strategic shift and extralegal action; labor must also reclaim the right to strike and confront the deep structural disabilities that impede unions from challenging corporate power.

#### Striketobershows strikes are possible and thump any disad link, but this burst will not last into any long-term change – the question of solvency is sustainability

Greenhouse 10-23-21

(Steven, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/oct/23/striketober-unions-strikes-workers-lasting-change)

US labor unions have been on the defensive for decades but this October there has been a surprising burst of worker militancy and strikes as workers have gone on the offensive to demand more. Experts are predicting more actions to come but whether “Striketober” can lead to permanent change remains an open question. The scale of industrial action is truly remarkable. Ten thousand John Deere workers have gone on strike, 1,400 Kellogg workers have walked out, as well as a walkout threatened by more than 30,000 Kaiser Permanente workers, all inflamed by a profound disconnect between labor and management. Many frontline workers – after working so hard and risking their lives during the pandemic – say they deserve substantial raises along with lots of gratitude. With this in mind and with myriad employers complaining of a labor shortage, many workers believe it’s an opportune time to demand more and go on strike. It doesn’t hurt that there’s a strongly pro-union president in the White House and there’s more public support for unions than in decades. But some corporations are acting as if nothing has changed and they can continue corporate America’s decades-long practice of squeezing workers and demanding concessions, even after corporate profits have soared. This attitude doesn’t sit well with Chris Laursen, who earns $20.82 an hour after 19 years at Deere’s farm equipment factory in Ottumwa, Iowa. Laursen is upset that Deere is offering just a one-dollar-an-hour raise and wants to eliminate pensions for future hires even when Deere anticipates a record $5.7bn in profits this year, more than double last year’s earnings. “We were deemed essential workers right out of the gate,” Laursen said, noting that many workers racked up lots of overtime during the pandemic. “But then they came with an offer that was appallingly low. It was a slap in the face of the workers who created all the wealth for them.” Many Deere workers complain that the company offered only a 12% raise over six years, which they say won’t keep pace with inflation, even as the CEO’s pay rose 160% last year to $16m and dividends were raised 17%. Deere’s workers voted down the company’s offer by 90% before they went on strike at 14 factories on 14 October, their first walkout in 35 years. “We really showed up during the pandemic and kept building equipment for them,” Laursen said. “Now we want something back. The stars are finally lined up for us, and we had to bring the fight.” Thomas Kochan, an MIT professor of industrial relations, agreed that it was a favorable time for workers – many corporations have substantially increased pay in response to the labor shortage. “It’s clear that workers are much more empowered,” he said. “They’re empowered because of the labor shortage.” Kochan added: “These strikes could easily trigger more strike activity if several are successful or perceived to be successful.” Robert Bruno, a labor relations professor at the University of Illinois, said workers have built up a lot of grievances and anger during the pandemic, after years of seeing scant improvement in pay and benefits. Bruno pointed to a big reason for the growing worker frustration: “You can definitely see that American capitalism has reigned supreme over workers, and as a result, the incentive for companies is to continue to do what’s been working for them. It’s likely that an arrogance sets in where companies think that’s going to last for ever, and maybe they don’t read the times properly.” Kevin Bradshaw, a striker at Kellogg’s factory in Memphis, said the cereal maker was being arrogant and unappreciative. During the pandemic, he said, Kellogg employees often worked 30 days in a row, often in 12-hour or 16-hour shifts. In light of this hard work, he derided Kellogg’s contract offer, which calls for a far lower scale for new hires. “Kellogg is offering a $13 cut in top pay for new workers,” Bradshaw said. “They want a permanent two-tier. New employees will no longer receive the same amount of money and benefits we do.” That, he said, is bad for the next generation of workers. Bradshaw, vice-president of the Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers union local, noted that it made painful concessions to Kellogg in 2015. “We gave so many concessions, and now they’re saying they need more,” he said. “This is a real smack in the face during the pandemic. Everyone knows that they’re greedy and not needy.” Kellogg said its compensation is among the industry’s best and its offer will help the company meet competitive challenges. Deere said it was determined to reach an agreement and continue to make its workers “the highest paid employees in the agriculture industry”. There are many strikes beyond Deere and Kellogg. More than 400 workers at the Heaven Hill bourbon distillery in Kentucky have been on strike for six weeks, while roughly 1,000 Warrior Met coalminers in Alabama have been on strike since April. Hundreds of nurses at Mercy hospital in Buffalo went on strike on 1 October, and 450 steelworkers at Special Metals in Huntington, West Virginia, also walked out that day. More than 30,000 nurses and other healthcare professionals at Kaiser Permanente on the west coast have voted to authorize a strike. Sixty thousand Hollywood production employees threatened to go on strike last Monday, unhappy that film and TV companies were not taking their concerns about overwork and exhaustion seriously. But seeing that the union was serious about staging its first-ever strike, Hollywood producers flinched, agreed to compromises, and the two sides reached a settlement. Noting that Kaiser Permanente, a non-profit, had amassed $45bn in reserves, Belinda Redding, a Kaiser nurse in Woodland Hills, California, said, “We’ve been going all out during the pandemic. We’ve been working extra shifts. Our lives have been turned upside down. The signs were up all over saying, ‘Heroes Work Here’. And the pandemic isn’t even over for us, and then for them to offer us a 1% raise, it’s almost a slap in the face.” Redding is also fuming that management has proposed hiring new nurses at 26% less pay than current ones earn – which she said would ensure a shortage of nurses. “It’s hard to imagine a nurse giving her all when she’s paid far less than other nurses,” Redding said. Kaiser said that its employees earn 26% more than average market wages and that its services would become unaffordable unless it restrains labor costs. On a smaller scale but in an industry in increasing demand, striking workers at one of the world’s largest bourbon producers were scheduled to vote on a new contract on Saturday, a day after announcing a tentative agreement with Heaven Hill, the producer of Evan Williams bourbon. About 420 members of United Food and Commercial Workers Local 23D went on strike about six weeks ago, forming picket lines at the company’s operations in Bardstown, Kentucky, with the dispute revolving around healthcare and scheduling. Meanwhile, many non-union workers – frequently dismayed with low pay, volatile schedules and poor treatment – have quit their jobs or refused to return to their old ones after being laid off during the pandemic. In August, 4.2 million workers quit their jobs, part of what has been called the Great Resignation. Some economists have suggested this is a quiet general strike with workers demanding better pay and conditions. “People are using exit from their jobs as a source of power,” Kochan said. As for unionized workers, some labor experts see parallels between today’s burst of strikes and the much larger wave of strikes after the first and second world wars. As with the pandemic, those catastrophic wars caused many Americans to reassess their lives and jobs and ask: after what we’ve been through, don’t we deserve better pay and conditions? Professor Bruno said that in light of today’s increased worker militancy, unionized employers would have to rethink their approach to bargaining “and take the rank and file pretty seriously”. They can no longer expect workers to roll over or to strong-arm them into swallowing concessions, often by threatening to move operations overseas. Bruno questioned whether the surge in strikes will be long-lasting. He predicts that the improvements in pay and job quality will be long-lasting, adding that that was more likely than unions substantially increasing their membership. He said that if workers see others winning better wages and conditions through strikes, that will raise unions’ visibility and lead to more workers voting to join unions. Despite the recent turbulence, Ruth Milkman, a sociologist of labor at City University of New York, foresees a return to the status quo. “I think things will go back to where they were once things settle down,” she said. “The labor shortage is not necessarily going to last.” She sees the number of strikes declining once the labor shortage ends. In her view, union membership isn’t likely to increase markedly because “they’re not doing that much organizing. “There’s a little” – like the unionization efforts at Starbucks in Buffalo and at Amazon – “but it’s not as if there’s some big push.” A big question, Milkman said, was how can today’s labor momentum be sustained? She said it would help if Congress passed the Protecting the Right to Organize Act, which would make it easier to unionize workers. That law would spur unions to do more organizing and increase their chances of winning union drives. “That would be a real shot in the arm,” Milkman said.

#### High wages are the crucial internal link for continued growth.

Bivens 17 – PhD @ The New School for Social Research (Josh, “Inequality is slowing US economic growth,” *Economic Policy Institute*, <https://www.epi.org/publication/secular-stagnation/)//BB>

This new attention to the crisis of American pay is totally proper. The failure of wages of the vast majority of Americans to benefit from economy-wide growth in productivity (or income generated in an average hour of work) has been the root cause of the stratospheric rise in inequality and the concentration of economic growth at the very top of the income distribution. Had this upward redistribution not happened, incomes for the bottom 90 percent of Americans would be roughly 20 percent higher today.3 In short, the rise in inequality driven by anemic wage growth has imposed an “inequality tax” on American households that has robbed them of a fifth of their potential income. There would be huge benefits to American well-being from blocking or reversing this upward redistribution. This welfare gain stemming from blocking upward redistribution is the primary reason to champion policy measures to boost wage growth and lead to a more equal distribution of income gains. Put simply, a dollar is worth more to a family living paycheck to paycheck than it is to families comfortably in the top 1 percent of the income distribution. Proponents of increases in the minimum wage and other measures to boost American wages have often argued that there are benefits to these policies besides the welfare gains stemming from pure redistribution. These proponents have often argued that boosting wages would even benefit aggregate economic outcomes, like growth in gross domestic product (GDP) or employment. Recent evidence about developments in the American and global economies strongly indicate that these arguments are correct: boosting wages of the bottom 90 percent would not just raise these households’ incomes and welfare (a more-than-sufficient reason to do so), it would also boost overall growth. For the past decade (and maybe even longer), the primary constraint on American economic growth has been too-slow spending by households, businesses, and governments. In economists’ jargon, the constraint has been growth in aggregate demand lagging behind growth in the economy’s productive capacity (including growth of the labor force and the stock of productive capital, such as plants and equipment). Much research indicates that this shortfall of demand could become a chronic problem in the future, constantly pulling down growth unless macroeconomic policy changes dramatically.

**Slower growth wrecks US leadership.**

Richard Haass 17, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan “A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order” published January 10, 2017

A large portion of the burden of creating and maintaining order at the regional or global level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable for several reasons, only one of which is that the United States is and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come. The corollary to this point is that no other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order. Nor can order ever be expected to emerge automatically; there is no invisible hand in the geopolitical marketplace. Again, a large part of the burden (or, more positively, opportunity) falls on the principal power of the day. There is more than a little self-interest at stake. The United States cannot remain aloof, much less unaffected by a world in disarray. Globalization is more reality than choice. At the regional level, the United States actually faces the opposite problem, namely, that certain actors do have the mind-set and means to shape an order. The problem is that their views of order are in part or in whole incompatible with U.S. interests. Examples would include Iran and ISIS in the Middle East, China in Asia, and Russia in Europe. It will not be an easy time for the United States. The sheer number and range of challenges is daunting. There are a large number of actors and forces to contend with. Alliances, normally created in opposition to some country or countries, may not be as useful a vehicle in a world in which not all foes are always foes and not all friends are always friendly. Diplomacy will count for a great deal; there will be a premium on dexterity. Consultations that aim to affect the actions of other governments and their leaders are likely to matter more than negotiations that aim to solve problems. Another reality is that the United States for all its power cannot impose order. Partially this reflects what might be called structural realities, namely, that no country can contend with global challenges on its own given the very nature of these challenges. The United States could reduce its carbon footprint dramatically, but the effect on global climate would be modest if India and China failed to follow suit. Similarly, on its own the United States cannot maintain a world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease. Adding to these realities are resource limits. The United States cannot provide all the troops or dollars to maintain order in the Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia. There is simply too much capability in too many hands. Unilateralism is rarely a serious foreign policy option. Partners are essential. That is one of the reasons why sovereign obligation is a desirable compass for U.S. foreign policy. Earlier I made the case that it represents realism for an era of globalization. It also is a natural successor to containment, the doctrine that guided the United States for the four decades of the Cold War. There are basic differences, however. Containment was about holding back more than bringing in and was designed for an era when rivals were almost always adversaries and in which the challenges were mostly related to classical geopolitical competition.1 Sovereign obligation, by contrast, is designed for a world in which sometime rivals are sometime partners and in which collective efforts are required to meet common challenges. Up to this point, we have focused on what the United States needs to do in the world to promote order. That is what one would expect from a book about international relations and American foreign policy. But a focus on foreign policy is not enough. National security is a coin with two sides, and what the United States does at home, what is normally thought of as belonging to the domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy. It is best to understand the issue as guns and butter rather than guns versus butter. When it comes to the domestic side, the argument is straightforward. In order to lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order. I have written on what this entails in a book titled Foreign Policy Begins at Home.2 This was sometimes interpreted as suggesting a turn away from foreign policy. It was nothing of the sort. Foreign policy begins at home, but it ends there only at the country’s peril.3 Earlier I mentioned that the United States has few unilateral options, that there are few if any things it can do better alone than with others. The counterpart to this claim is that the world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States. The United States is not sufficient, but it is necessary. It is also true that the United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities. An additional benefit is that respect for the United States and for the American political, social, and economic model (along with a desire to emulate it) will increase only if it is seen as successful. The most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth. U.S. growth levels may appear all right when compared with what a good many other countries are experiencing, but they are below what is needed and fall short of what is possible. There is no reason why the United States is not growing in the range of 3 percent or even higher other than what it is doing and, more important, not doing.4



#### Default to status quo hegemony – it’s sustainable and creates a structural disincentive for great power war and escalation—collapse causes cascading prolif and extinction

Brands 15 ( Hal Brands is on the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University The Elliott School of International Affairs The Washington Quarterly Summer 2015 38:2 pp. 7–28)

The fundamental reason is that both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies’ policies.43 During the Cold War and after, for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies’ pursuit of nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements, and even to affect the composition of allied nations’ governments.44 More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is not something that has occurred naturally. It has occurred because the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited arms races and security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-build their militaries. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which powerful countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving and fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United States “effectively acts as a night watchman,” lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would happen if Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence and global stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively be surrendering the most powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned. As offshore balancers have argued, it may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that removing the American pacifier would liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled. Long-dormant security competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously; historical antagonisms between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the reassurance it provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise existing regional orders in their favor—think Russia in Europe, or China in Asia—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they might just as plausibly feel empowered to more assertively press their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble.”46 Scanning the global horizon today, one can easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, the threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race, even as that region also contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of the Islamic State. In East Asia, a rising China is challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways, sounding alarms among its neighbors—many of whom also have historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, removing the American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased conflict and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S. interests even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that increased instability and acrimony would produce the robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the economic consequences. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress toward global prosperity and integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold War) has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of offshore balancing would run, of course, is that a key region might not be able to maintain its own balance following U.S. retrenchment. That prospect might have seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the rise and growing assertiveness of China has highlighted the medium- to long-term danger that a hostile power could in fact gain regional primacy. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly, and if Beijing continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave challenges in containing Chinese power even if they join forces in that endeavor. This possibility, ironically, is one to which leading advocates of retrenchment have been attuned. “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China,” Mearshimer writes, “because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing becomes a dangerous and potentially self-defeating strategy. As mentioned above, it could lead countries like Japan and South Korea to seek nuclear weapons, thereby stoking arms races and elevating regional tensions. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that offshore balancers seek to avoid, by easing China’s ascent to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, “Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals.”49 In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance relationships, basing agreements, and other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first place—and that would allow the United States to surge additional forces into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will be unable to counter China themselves, then reducing U.S. influence and leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and destabilizing than its proponents acknowledge.

#### Extinction.

Starr 15 [(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015] DD

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs.

Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.]

The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere.

Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.]

Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years?

The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death.

Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet.  Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

### Advocacy

#### Plan Text: Resolved: The United States Federal Government ought to recognize an unconditional right to strike. I’ll defend all workers and types of strikes and enforcement through Congress.

#### Unconditional Right to Strike is defined by NLRA:

[National Labor Relations Board](https://www.nlrb.gov/), [The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is comprised of a team of professionals who work to assure fair labor practices and workplace democracy nationwide. Since its creation by Congress in 1935, this small, highly respected, independent Federal agency has had daily impact on the way America's companies, industries and unions conduct business. Agency staff members investigate and remedy unfair labor practices by unions and employers.],"NLRA and the Right to Strike," NLRA https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/your-rights/nlra-and-the-right-to-strike

NLRA and the Right to Strike The Right to Strike. Section 7 of the Act states in part, “Employees shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for employees by this section. Section 13 also concerns the right to strike. It reads as follows: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. It is clear from a reading of these two **provisions** that: the law not only guarantees the right of employees to strike, but also **places limitations** and qualifications **on** the exercise of **that right**. **Lawful** and unlawful strikes. The lawfulness of a **strike** may **depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing, or on the conduct of the strikers.** The object, or objects, of a strike and whether the objects are lawful are matters that are not always easy to determine. Such issues often have to be decided by the National Labor Relations Board. The consequences can be severe to striking employees and struck employers, involving as they do questions of reinstatement and backpay. Strikes for a lawful object. Employees who strike for a lawful object fall into two classes: economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers. Both classes continue as employees, but unfair labor practice strikers have greater rights of reinstatement to their jobs. Economic strikers defined. If the object of a strike is to obtain from the employer some economic concession such as higher wages, shorter hours, or better working conditions, the striking employees are called economic strikers. They retain their status as employees and cannot be discharged, but they can be replaced by their employer. If the employer has hired bona fide permanent replacements who are filling the jobs of the economic strikers when the strikers apply unconditionally to go back to work, the strikers are not entitled to reinstatement at that time. However, if the strikers do not obtain regular and substantially equivalent employment, they are entitled to be recalled to jobs for which they are qualified when openings in such jobs occur if they, or their bargaining representative, have made an unconditional request for their reinstatement. Unfair labor practice strikers defined. Employees who strike to protest an unfair labor practice committed by their employer are called unfair labor practice strikers. Such strikers can be neither discharged nor permanently replaced. When the strike ends, unfair labor practice strikers, absent serious misconduct on their part, are entitled to have their jobs back even if employees hired to do their work have to be discharged. If the Board finds that economic strikers or unfair labor practice strikers who have made an unconditional request for reinstatement have been unlawfully denied reinstatement by their employer, the Board may award such strikers backpay starting at the time they should have been reinstated. **Strikes unlawful because of purpose**. A strike may be unlawful because an object, or purpose, of the strike is unlawful. **A strike in support of** a union **unfair labor practice**, or one that would cause an employer to commit an unfair labor practice, may be a strike for an unlawful object. For example, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge an employee for failure to make certain lawful payments to the union when there is no union security agreement in effect (Section 8(a)(3)). A strike to compel an employer to do this would be a strike for an unlawful object and, therefore, an unlawful strike. Furthermore, Section 8(b)(4) of the Act prohibits strikes for certain objects even though the objects are not necessarily unlawful if achieved by other means. An example of this would be a strike to compel Employer A to cease doing business with Employer B. It is not unlawful for Employer A voluntarily to stop doing business with Employer B, nor is it unlawful for a union merely to request that it do so. It is, however, unlawful for the union to strike with an object of forcing the employer to do so. In any event, employees who participate in an unlawful strike may be discharged and are not entitled to reinstatement. Strikes unlawful because of timing—Effect of no-strike contract. A strike that violates a no-strike provision of a contract is not protected by the Act, and the striking employees can be discharged or otherwise disciplined, unless the strike is called to protest certain kinds of unfair labor practices committed by the employer. It should be noted that not all refusals to work are considered strikes and thus violations of no-strike provisions. A walkout because of conditions abnormally dangerous to health, such as a defective ventilation system in a spray-painting shop, has been held not to violate a no-strike provision. Same—Strikes at end of contract period. Section 8(d) provides that when either party desires to terminate or change an existing contract, it must comply with certain conditions. If these requirements are not met, a strike to terminate or change a contract is unlawful and participating strikers lose their status as employees of the employer engaged in the labor dispute. If the strike was caused by the unfair labor practice of the employer, however, the strikers are classified as unfair labor practice strikers and their status is not affected by failure to follow the required procedure. Strikes unlawful because of misconduct of strikers. Strikers who engage in serious misconduct in the course of a strike may be refused reinstatement to their former jobs. This applies to both economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers. Serious misconduct has been held to include, among other things, violence and threats of violence. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a “sitdown” strike, when employees simply stay in the plant and refuse to work, thus depriving the owner of property, is not protected by the law. Examples of serious misconduct that could cause the employees involved to lose their right to reinstatement are: • Strikers physically blocking persons from entering or leaving a struck plant. • Strikers threatening violence against nonstriking employees. • Strikers attacking management representatives.

#### A right to strike is the foundational aspect of collective workforce power and unionized negotiation. Myall 19

James Myall, MECEP’s lead on the inclusive economy, including research on labor issues, gender and racial equity, and health care policy. James conducts research and impact analyses, writes educational materials, and collaborates with partners. He is skilled in data collection, research, and statistical and policy analysis. He studied public policy and management at the University of Southern Maine and holds a master’s degree in ancient history and archaeology from the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. 4-17-2019, "Right to strike would level the playing field for public workers, with benefits for all of us," MECEP, https://www.mecep.org/blog/right-to-strike-would-level-the-playing-field-for-public-workers-with-benefits-for-all-of-us/, 10-26-2021//Aanya

The right to strike would enable fairer negotiations between public workers and the government. All of us have reason to support that outcome. Research shows that union negotiations set the bar for working conditions with other employers. And as the largest employer in Maine, the state’s treatment of its workers has a big impact on working conditions in the private sector. Unions support a fairer economy. Periods of high union membership are associated with lower levels of income inequality, both nationally and in Maine. Strong unions, including public-sector unions, have a critical role to play in rebuilding a strong middle class. Source: MECEP analysis of U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Survey data (spending by state of residence, 1991-2014). Adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index, and for population using the U.S. Census Bureau’s population estimates. 2018 spending estimate from Maine Health Data Organization. Unions help combat inequities within work places. Women and people of color in unions face less wage discrimination than those in nonunion workplaces. On average, wages for nonunionized white women in Maine are 18 percent less than of those of white men. Among unionized workers, that inequality shrinks to just 9 percent. Similarly, women of color earn 26 percent less than men in nonunionized jobs; for unionized women of color, the wage gap shrinks to 17 percent.[i] All of us have a stake in the success of collective bargaining. But a union without the right to strike loses much of its negotiating power. The right to withdraw your labor is the foundation of collective worker action. When state employees or teachers are sitting across the negotiating table from their employers, how much leverage do they really have when they can be made to work without a contract? It’s like negotiating the price of a car when the salesman knows you’re going to have to buy it — whatever the final price is. Research confirms that public-sector unions are less effective without the right to strike. Public employees with a right to strike earn between 2 percent and 5 percent more than those without it.[ii] While that’s a meaningful increase for those workers, it also should assuage any fears that a right to strike would lead to excessive pay increases or employees abusing their new right. LD 900, “An Act to Expand the Rights of Public Employees Under the Maine Labor Laws,” ensures that Maine’s public-sector workers will have the same collective bargaining rights as other employees in Maine. The bill would strengthen the ability of Maine’s public-sector workers to negotiate, resulting in higher wagers, a more level playing field, and a fairer economy for all of us.

#### Strikes cultivate a moral economy that transforms political climates in other areas of political life

Reddy 21 [Diana S. Reddy, Doctoral Fellow at the Law, Economics, and Politics Center at UC Berkeley Law, and a PhD candidate in UCB's Jurisprudence and Social Policy. "“There Is No Such Thing as an Illegal Strike”: Reconceptualizing the Strike in Law and Political Economy." https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy]

For those who believe that a stronger labor movement is needed to counterbalance the concentrations of economic and political power in this new Gilded Age, the question is not just whether the law is bad (it is), but whether strikes can be effective nonetheless. If labor activists are correct that there is “no such thing” as an illegal strike, just an unsuccessful strike, the question follows: what makes a strike successful enough, under current conditions, to transcend legal constraints?154 To some extent this is an empirical question, and one on which there are many opportunities for generative research. Beginning with the theoretical, however, I suggest that the success of strikes must be measured in more than economic wins in the private sphere. Like their Progressive Era progenitors, their success must be in raising political consciousness in the public sphere—in making the stakes of the twenty-first century labor question apparent.155

As noted above, under current labor law, strikes are conceptualized as “economic weapons,” as hard bargaining.156 And while legal terminology is distinct from on-the-ground understandings, unions have often emphasized the economic nature of the strike as well. Strikes are “[t]he power to stop production, distribution and exchange, whether of goods or services.”157 A strike works because “we withhold something that the employer needs.”158 At the same time, there has been a corresponding tendency to dismiss the more symbolic aspects of the strike. To quote White again, “while publicity and morale are not irrelevant, in the end, they are not effective weapons in their own right.”159

These arguments are important. A strike is not simply protest; it is direct action, material pressure. But with union density lower than ever, ongoing automation of work tasks that renders employees increasingly replaceable, and decades of neoliberal cultural tropes celebrating capital as the driver of all economic growth and innovation, it is a mistake to think of publicity and morale as nice-to-haves, rather than necessities. Instead, striking must be part of building what sociologists have described as the “moral economy,” cultural beliefs about fair distribution untethered to technocratic arguments about what is most efficient.160 And in that way, striking is and must be understood as political.

The term political, of course, has many meanings—engendered by law, culture, and the relationship between the two. Building on the work of other scholars, I have argued that neo-Lochnerian readings of the First Amendment which have categorized labor protest as solely economic, and therefore apolitical, are one mechanism by which unions have lost legitimacy (and legal protection) as a social movement.161 Under current law, what precisely constitutes the political is less than clear, though. In distinguishing “political” speech from other kinds of speech for the purpose of First Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has at times equated the political with: electioneering;162 speech directed to or about the government;163 or most broadly, “speech and debate on public policy issues.”164 Within labor parlance, by contrast, the term “political strike” is specifically used to refer to strikes that are “designed to win a specific political outcome, such as the passage of legislation or a change inregulation.”165 Consistent with the NLRA’s construction of unions as economic entities, strikes which are solely “political” and without sufficient nexus to the employment relationship, are deemed unlawful secondary boycotts.166

But my argument here for reconceptualizing the strike as political is not about more “political strikes,” or about electoral politics, or even necessarily about state action. Based on a vision of the “political” as normative engagement directed towards collective decision-making—it is about destabilizing jurisprudential line drawing between the economic and the political in the first place.167 It is recognizing that all strikes are political or have the potential to be—in that all strikes are protest meant to transform collective conditions, not merely bargaining towards immediate, transactional ends. To use political science terminology, strikes are contentious politics: “[E]pisodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects.”168 They are a way through which workers engage in claims-making when business and politics as usual have proven nonresponsive.169 They do not only address the employer; they engage the polity.

### Underview

#### 1] 1AR Theory Paradigm—7-6-4-3 time skew means it checks NC infinite abuse—we cant preempt every possible norm in the 1AC and it’s structurally irreciprocal since they have unconditional routes to the ballot like T so 1AR theory compensates.