## 1AC Glenbrooks R3 vs Iowa City West HM

### Framing

#### The meta-ethic is substantive moral naturalism. Prefer – Bottom of Form

#### [1] Empiricism – naturalism is the only objective way to derive experiences for normative values based on the real world around us.

Papineau 11

[David Papineau, “Naturalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007]

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such **non-naturalist** view of **morality faces** immediate **difficulties**, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If **all physical effects are due to** a limited range of **natural causes**, and **if moral facts lie outside this** range, **then** it follow that **moral facts can never make any difference** to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, **knowledge of the** spatiotemporal **world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs** and cognitive systems. **If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.**

#### Only impacts and values that exist in the physical world are relevant. Williams 44

[Donald Williams, Duke University. “Naturalism and the Nature of Things”. The Philosophical Review, Volume 53, No. 5. September 1944, Duke Press, pp. 417-443. AS.]

Casting up our accounts to this point, we observe that physical realism is in sum a meaningful, consistent, and essentially confirmable hypothesis. We turn accordingly to assess its credibility a posteriori, in relation to the actual evidence, as we should that of a scientific theory or a war communiqué. We can know forthwith that materialism, granted that metaphysics is confirmable at all, is in principle the most thoroughly confirmable of all world hypotheses. It initiates the most conclusive confirmation or disconfirmation. The ideal aim of systematic knowledge is to disclose the fewest primitive elements into which the diversest objects are analyzable, and the fewest primitive facts, singular and general, from which the behavior of things is deducible. Metaphysics is the most 'scientific' of the sciences because it tries the hardest to explain every kind of fact by one simple principle or simple set of principles. It is the most empirical of sciences (as Peirce reminded us) because, by the same token, a metaphysics is relevant to and confirmable by every item of every experience, whereas every other [theories] sciences are concerned with only a few select and abstract aspects of some experiences. Physical [R]ealism is the ideal metaphysics, the veritable paradigm of philosophy, because its category of spatiotemporal pattern best permits analysis of diverse complexity to uniform and ordered simplicities, is most thoroughly numerable, and so most exactly and systematically calculable. Socratic purposes, Platonic ideals, Aristotelian qualities, Plotinian hierarchies-these are surds in comparison with a system de la nature, limned in patterns of action in the ordered dimensions of a spatio-temporal hypersphere.

#### Abstract moral concepts we haven’t experienced are simply combinations of ideas based on the empirical world. **Morris 10**

[William Edward Morris, “David Hume”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/. 2010.] AS

Hume's program for reform in philosophy thus has two related aspects: the elimination of metaphysics and the establishment of an empirical experimental science of human nature. He shifts the focus away from the traditional metaphysical search for “ultimate original principles” in order to concentrate on describing the “original principles” of human nature [are] that we can discover[ed] through experience and observation, and to which we can give coherent cognitive content by tracing the ideas involved to the impressions that gave rise to them. He does so because claims to have found “ultimate principles” are not just false, they are incoherent, because they go beyond anything that can be experienced. This combination of negative and positive aims is a distinguishing feature of Hume's particular brand of empiricism, and the strategy he devised to achieve these aims is revelatory of his philosophical genius. For Hume, all the materials of thinking — perceptions — are derived either from sensation (“outward sentiment”) or from reflection (“inward sentiment”) (EHU, 19). He divides perceptions into two categories, distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. Our “more feeble” perceptions, ideas, are ultimately derived from our livelier impressions (EHU, Section II; T, I.i.1-2). Hume begins both the Treatise and the Enquiry with an account of impressions and ideas because he thinks that all contentful philosophical questions can be asked and answered in those terms. Trying to go beyond perceptions, as metaphysics must, inevitably involves going beyond anything that can have cognitive content. No wonder the “hypotheses” that purport to give us the “ultimate original principles” that constitute traditional metaphysics turn out to be incoherent. Although we permute and combine ideas in the imagination to form complex ideas of things we haven't experienced, Hume is adamant that our creative powers extend no farther than “the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.” Complex ideas are composed of simple ideas, which are fainter copies of the simple impressions from which they are ultimately derived, to which they correspond and exactly resemble. Hume offers this “general proposition” as his “first principle…in the science of human nature” (T, 7). Usually called the “Copy Principle,” Hume's distinctive brand of empiricism is often identified with his commitment to it.

#### [2] All other theories collapse – epistemological guidance is predisposed with a physical cognitive capacity to act which is reliant on the natural world.

Only naturalism is epistemically accessible.

#### Reflective equilibrium provides a method to justify moral principles with a value system based on coherence. Desaulniers 06

[Angela Desaulniers, “Rossian Moral Pluralism: A (Partial) Defense”, Georgia State Department of Philosophy, Masters Thesis, 2006, pp. 3-16.] DDA

In attempting to refute Hooker’s objection that rule-consequentialism is better than Ross-style pluralism (hereafter referred to as simply moral pluralism) Gaut reminds us that what we consider our common sense morality is essentially pluralistic because we appeal to many principles when generally deciding what to do, and, “given the credence our pre-reflective beliefs possess, we would need to be given good reasons for supposing that this pluralism is mere appearance, hiding a deeper, single moral principle.”53 “Having something extra is not always welcome.”54 While Hooker claims that we need to have something extra around to unify the moral principles we have, Gaut captures the spirit of moral pluralism and states that this is exactly what is up for debate between the pluralist and the monist. “If the extra offered is a single moral principle which unifies all other moral principles, then it is a moot point for the consequentialist to claim this as an advantage of his theory, since it is precisely the existence of such a principle that is in dispute between him and the pluralist.”55 While we would all probably agree that it would be good to have something available to bind and justify our moral principles, Gaut goes on to argue that there is no reason to assume, as Hooker and his rule-consequentialists do, that it has to be a moral principle doing the binding and justifying. “The issue is about what is to do this tying together and justifying – whether it is to be done by a moral principle, or by some general rational justification procedure for the principles that the pluralist advances [emphasis Gaut’s].”56 The answer to Gaut’s questions is clearly that the pluralist would agree that there is a rational justification procedure that binds and justifies the moral principles together. There is no first principle from which they all have developed but a procedure on which they can be grounded. The procedure the pluralist uses is reflective equilibrium. “She [the pluralist] takes these moral intuitions and principles we previously endorse[d] (i.e. common sense morality) and attempts to render[s] them consistent with each other; she correct[ing]s for distortions in our moral reasoning that can be traced to unfair deliberative conditions...The reflective equilibrium to which she appeals is not just narrow (adjusting moral principles to moral intuitions), but is wide, appealing to non-evaluative facts...and to evaluations that encompass more than merely moral matters, such as those evaluations displayed in many of our personal relationships...The pluralist’s account of why we possess just these moral principles, then, rests on the initial credence of our pre-reflectively endorsed intuitions and principles, and their increased credence when they are subjected to a greater degree of reflective improvement drawing on a wide variety of resources, both evaluative and non-evaluative.”57

#### Thus, the standard is *Maximizing Pleasure and Minimizing Pain*. Calc indicts don’t link— framework is a general principle to be applied intuitively, not a rigid calculator.

#### Independently, calc indicts fail: A] Ethics –they indict everything since they use events to understand how their ethics have worked B] Reciprocity- functionally NIBs that create a 2:1 skew where I have to answer them to access offense while they only have to win one C] Internalism- asking why we value pain and pleasure is nonsensical cuz the answer is intrinsic since we just do, which means we still prefer hedonism despite shortcomings.

#### 3] Consequentialism is true—[A] All actions are forward-looking, so intentions are constituted by foreseen consequences. [B] No act omission distinction---choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act.

#### Prefer—

#### 1] All other frameworks collapse—

**A] Only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable** . Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] TDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that **pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the **pleasure is not good for anything further**; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### That outweighs their justifications on probability—simpler beliefs are more likely to be true and external standards collapse to pleasure and pain.

#### B] Universalizability standards collapse to util. Sayre-Mccord 01 Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, “Mill's "Proof" of the Principle of Utility: A More than Half-Hearted Defense.” UNC/Chapel Hill: Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 18, no. 2; Spring 2001, p. 330-360.

According to the second argument, **the evaluative starting point is** again **each person thinking** "**my own happiness is valuable,**" but this fact about each person is taken as evidence, with respect to each bit of happiness that is valued, that that bit is valuable. **Each person** is seen as **has**ving **reason to think that the happiness** she enjoys **is valuable**, **and** reason **to think of others** -- **given that they are in a parallel situation with respect to the happiness they enjoy** -- that **each person's happiness is** such that there is the **same evidence available to each for the value of the happiness that another person enjoys** as there is for the value of one's own happiness. If happiness is such that every piece of it happiness is desired by someone, then it seems as if, in taking ourselves to have reason to seeing the bit we value as valuable, we are committed to acknowledging the value of all the rest.

#### C] Kantianism justifies a positive duty to promote happiness. Happiness is the objective end of all rational beings; util resolves conflicts between duties. Cummiskey 90

[David Cummiskey (professor of philosophy at Bates College, Ph.D., M.A., University of Michigan; B.A., Washington College). “Kantian Consequentialism.” 1990. http://www.bates.edu/Prebuilt/kantian.pdf]

Now, according to Kant, the formula of the end-in-itself generates both negative and positive duties (GMM, p. 430; MEJ, p. 221; DV, pp. 448-51). In the negative sense we treat persons as ends when we do not interfere with their pursuit of their (legitimate) ends. In the positive sense we treat persons as ends when we endeavor to help them realize their (legitimate) ends. **Kant describes the positive interpretation of the second formulation of the categorical imperative as a duty to make others’ ends my own**. Since, it one wills an end, one wills the necessary means (GMM, p. 417), it follows that the positive interpretation requires that we do those acts which are necessary to further the permissible ends of others. **Since Kant also maintains that “to be happy is** necessarily **the desire of every rational** but finite **being”** (CPR, p. 25; GMM, p. 415), **we have a positive duty to promote** the **happiness** of others. Thus, in addition to any constraints on action which Kant’s principle might generate, it also provides a rationale for a moral goal that we are obligated to pursue (GMM, pp. 398, 423, 430; DV, pp. 384-387). **Since Kant’s principle generates both positive and negative duties, and** since **there are many situations which involve**, at least, **prima facie conflicts** of these duties**, we need a rationale for giving priority to one duty rather than the other**. Of course, according to Kant, there cannot be unresolvable conflicts of duty. The concept of duty involves the objective practical necessity of an action and since two conflicting actions cannot both be necessary, a conflict of duties is conceptually impossible. Kant, however, does not grant that “grounds of obligation” can conflict, even if obligations cannot. He is thus left with the priority problem at this level. **Kant argues that** in cases of conflict “**the stronger ground of obligation prevails**” (MEJ, p. 224). Although such a response is intuitively plausible, **without an account of how one ground** of obligation **can be stronger than another, it does not provide** any **practical guidance**. In addition to the conceptual impossibility of conflicting duties, Kant’s confidence that there are no unresolvable conflicts of duty is rooted in his larger moral and metaphysical system; specifically, his conception of the Kingdom of Ends, his teleology of nature, and his division of reality into sensible and intelligible realms. According to Kant, the ends of fully rational beings will not conflict but will form a harmonious Kingdom of Ends. It is part of the very idea of lawful ends and rational beings that they coexist in a state of harmony, because as fully rational beings they would all will the same thing. Of course, as finite, imperfect, rational beings (beings guided by both reason and natural inclination) we need some guide to the proper ends of rational beings. Kant often maintains that the teleological ends of natural law are our guide in identifying the proper and legitimate ends of a rational being. As imperfectly rational beings, existing in the sensible rather than the intelligible realm, we can act in accordance with the teleological laws of nature to assure that our ends are rational and thus worthy of being realized. As Bruce Aune explains, “If by treating an imperfectly rational being in a certain way, we promote a kingdom of nature, we can infer, by analogy, that we are acting in accordance with the requirements of the pure moral law, which directly applies to an inaccessible domain of purely rational, intelligible beings.” Essentially, Kant argues that a kingdom of nature represents a Kingdom of Ends and natural law represents a universal practical law. Natural law is, according to Kant, our analogue for universal practical law. Most neo-Kantians do not defend these parts of Kant’s theory. If we reject (as I assume we do) the view of nature as a system of teleological laws which prescribes the natural and lawful ends to rational beings, then we must rely on the concept of rational nature as an end-in-itself to determine the shared ends of all rational beings. The telos of rational action must replace the telos of nature. Thus, **to discover which ground of obligation is stronger**, and thereby resolve prima facie conflicts of duty, **we must appeal directly to the objective end of rational action.**

#### Arguments like Korsgaard’s don’t necessitate rational nature as lexically prior to happiness; even if they did, it still devolves to util. Cummiskey 2

[David Cummiskey (professor of philosophy at Bates College, Ph.D., M.A., University of Michigan; B.A., Washington College). “Kantian Consequentialism.” 1990. http://www.bates.edu/Prebuilt/kantian.pdf]

Although I will not argue the point, it would seem that **one can accept Korsgaard’s** basic **interp**retation of **Kant**’s theory of the good **but** still **not endorse the lexical priority thesis**. Korsgaard’s reconstruction of Kant’s argument is a transcendental argument which starts with the internal perspective of a valuing agent. If an agent begins with the assumption that the pursuit of happiness is rational, then the agent must also place a special kind of value on rational nature itself. However, **even if one grants that one must believe that rational nature has value if it is to confer value,** one need not believe that it is lexically more valuable than the value it confers. As the unconditional condition of all value, **one must think of rational nature as having only as much value as it confers.** Indeed, it would seem that rational nature only has value proportional to the value it confers. Despite these questions about the specifics of Kant’s theory of value, I will assume that a Kantian theory of value involves some priority of the unconditionally valuable, rational nature, over the conditionally valuable, happiness. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that **even if one accepts** the thesis **that** the value of **rational nature is lexically prior to the value of happiness, one does not get agent-centered constraints**. As even many neo-Kantians recognize, agent-centered constraints require a nonvalue-based rationale (see Sec. III above). Kant’s normative theory, however, is based on an unconditionally valuable, objective end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then it would seem that promoting the two tiers of value would be the goal of moral action. On the consequentialist interpretation of Kant’s theory of the good, we are obligated to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings (unconditional value) and, in addition, we are obligated to promote the ends or happiness of rational beings (conditional value). It thus seems that, in principle, a Kantian may have to sacrifice some rational beings in order to promote the existence of other rational beings or a Kantian may have to sacrifice the happiness of a few in order to further the happiness of many persons.

#### 2] Extinction outweighs—

#### A] Existential risk comes first under any framework.

**Ord 20** Toby Ord [Australian philosopher. He founded Giving What We Can, an international society whose members pledge to donate at least 10% of their income to effective charities], “The Precipice” Hachette Books, 2020 // Lex CH

But **an existential catastrophe is not** just **a catastrophe that destroys a particularly large number of lives. It destroys our potential**. My mentor, Derek Parfit, asked us to imagine a devastating nuclear war killing 99 percent of the world’s people.19 **A war that would leave behind a dark age lasting centuries, before the survivors could eventually rebuild civilization to its former heights; humbled, scarred—but undefeated. Now compare this with a war killing a full 100 percent of the world’s people. This second war would be worse, of course, but how much worse? Either war would be the worst catastrophe in history. Either would kill billions.** **The second war would involve tens of millions of additional deaths, and so would be worse for this reason**. But there is another, far more significant difference between the two wars. **Both wars kill billions of humans; but the second war kills humanity**. **Both wars destroy our present; but the second war destroys our future. It is this qualitative difference in what is lost with that last percent that makes existential catastrophes unique, and that makes reducing the risk of existential catastrophe uniquely important. 20 In expectation, almost all humans who will ever live have yet to be born.** Absent catastrophe, **most generations are future generations.** As the writer Jonathan Schell put it: The procession of generations that extends onwards from our present leads far, far beyond the line of our sight, and, compared with these stretches of human time, which exceed the whole history of the earth up to now, our brief civilized moment is almost infinitesimal. Yet we threaten, in the name of our transient aims and fallible convictions, to foreclose it all. **If our species does destroy itself, it will be a death in the cradle—a case of infant mortality**. 21 And because, in expectation, **almost all of humanity’s life lies in the future, almost everything of value lies in the future as well**: almost all the flourishing; almost all the beauty; our greatest achievements; our most just societies; our most profound discoveries. 22 We can continue our progress on prosperity, health, justice, freedom and moral thought. **We can create a world of wellbeing and flourishing that challenges our capacity to imagine. And if we protect that world from catastrophe, it could last millions of centuries**. This is our potential—what we could achieve if we pass the Precipice and **continue striving for a better world**. **It is this view of the future—the immense value of humanity’s potential —that most persuades me to focus my energies on reducing existential risk. When I think of the millions of future generations yet to come, the importance of protecting humanity’s future is clear to me**. **To risk destroying this future**, for the sake of some advantage limited only to the present, **seems** to me profoundly parochial and **dangerously short-sighted**. Such neglect privileges a tiny sliver of our

#### B] Winning one framework doesn’t discount another and excludes no impacts. That means epistemic modesty: evaluation of arguments is never impervious to mistakes. Christensen and Lackey 13

[David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, “Epistemic Modesty Defended”. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, Oxford University Press. 2013.]

One might, of course, give up entirely on epistemic modesty. But I think that such a radical approach would be misguided. We are fallible thinkers, and **we know** it. We know that it often happens that **we evaluate** the **arguments** and evidence on a certain topic—as **carefully** and conscientiously as we possibly can—**and reach the wrong conclusion**. That is to say, we often make epistemic mistakes. And we know that simply looking over the **arguments** and evidence again, no matter how carefully and **conscientiously**, **cannot** be expected **disclose** our **mistakes[.]** to us.That being so, it seems clear that a person who was interested in having **accurate beliefs**, and, thus, in correcting her epistemic errors, **would not be rational to let** her **confidence in P be unaffected by** **evidence** that **she** **was** especially prone to **making epistemic mistakes about P.** It would be irrational even in instances where the person had in fact managed to avoid epistemic error in her original thinking about P. To give one example: **suppose a doctor**, **after reaching a confident diagnosis** based on a patient’s symptoms and test-results, comes to **realize[s]** that she’s severely sleep-deprived, that she’s under the influence of powerful judgment-distorting drugs, that she’s emotionally involved with the patient in a way likely to warp her judgment, or that many sober clinicians, on the basis of the same symptoms and **tests**, have **reached a contrary diagnosis**. Perhaps she learns all of these things! In such a case, it seems quite clear to me that it would be highly irrational for her to maintain undiminished confidence in her diagnosis. So I don’t think that we may plausibly resolve the tension by denying epistemic modesty entirely.

#### 3] Actor specificity – Governments must aggregate with util because their policies benefit some and harm others so side constraints freeze state action. Comes first – different agents have different ethical standings – takes out calc indicts because it proves the fwrk is empirically used.

#### 4] Brain studies disprove personal identity.

Parfit ’84Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). – GV SK

Some recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View. Human beings have a lower brain and two upper hemispheres, which are connected by a bundle of fibres. In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, surgeons have cut these fibres. The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. The effect, in the words of one surgeon, was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ This effect was revealed by various psychological tests. These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, psychologists can thus present to this person two different written questions in the two halves of [their] visual field, and can receive two different answers written

#### If nothing unifies agency from one second to the next, then only states of consciousness can matter—that’s util.

#### 5] The brain seeks pleasure to initiate action – optogenetics proves.

**Schaffer 17** (MIT technology review, Amanda Schaffer is a freelance journalist who writes about science and medicine for Slate, the New York Times, and other publications. Neuroscientist Kay Tye tackles the physical basis of emotions and behavior. [“How the Brain Seeks Pleasure and Avoids Pain” MIT research lab <https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/06/27/150948/how-the-brain-seeks-pleasure-and-avoids-pain/> 6/27/17] // Mberhe

As a child, Kay Tye was immersed in a life of science. “I grew up in my mom’s lab,” she says. At the age of five or six, she earned 25 cents a box for “restocking” bulk-ordered pipette tips into boxes for sterilization as her mother, an acclaimed biochemist at Cornell University, probed the genetics of yeast. (Tye’s father is a theoretical physicist known for his work on cosmic inflation and superstring theory.) Today, Tye runs her own neuroscience lab at MIT. Under large black lights reminiscent of a fashion shoot, she and her team at the Picower Institute for Learning and Memory can observe how mice behave when particular brain circuits are turned on or off. Nearby, they can record the mice’s neural activity as the animals move toward a particular stimulus, like sugar water, or away, if they’re crossing a floor that delivers mild electric shocks. Elsewhere, they create brain slices to test in vitro, since these samples retain their physiological activity, even outside the body, for up to eight hours. Tye has been at the forefront of efforts to pinpoint the sources of anxiety and other emotions in the brain by analyzing how groups of neurons work together in circuits to process information. In particular, her work has contributed to a profound shift in researchers’ understanding of the amygdala, a brain area that has been thought of as central to fear responses: she has found that signaling in the amygdala can in fact reduce anxiety as well as increase it. To gain such insights, she has also made crucial advances in a technique, called optogenetics, that allows researchers to activate or suppress particular neural circuits in lab animals using light. Optogenetics was developed by Stanford neuroscientist and psychiatrist Karl ­Deisseroth, and it represented a breakthrough in efforts to determine the role of specific parts of the brain. While Tye was working in his laboratory as a postdoc, she demonstrated, for the first time, that it was possible to pinpoint and control specific groups of neurons that were sending signals to specific target neurons. This fine-grained approach is important because drugs that treat conditions like anxiety currently do not target specific circuits, let alone individual neurons; rather, they operate throughout the brain, which often leads to undesirable side effects. Tye’s research may eventually help open the door to drugs that affect only specific neural circuits, reducing anxiety with fewer side effects. Such work has earned formal accolades, including a Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers from President Obama, a Freedman Prize for neuroscience, and a TR35 award, recognizing outstanding researchers under the age of 35. Tye has also won high praise from others in her field who admire the creative breadth of her ambition. “She’s not afraid to ask the most fundamental questions, the ones most other scientists shy away from,” says Sheena Josselyn of the University of Toronto and the Hospital for Sick Children Research Institute. The questions she takes on involve emotions and phenomena that loom large in human experience, such as reward-seeking, loneliness, and compulsive overeating. Her goal is to understand their neural basis—to bridge the gap between brain, as understood by neuroscientists, and the mind, as conceived more expansively by psychiatrists, psychologists, and other students of human behavior. Would-be novelist Though it might seem as if Tye was born to be a scientist, she says her choice of career was anything but inevitable. In high school, she was ambivalent about science and gravitated instead toward writing; she wrote plays, short stories, and poetry. “In my mind, I was going to be a novelist,” she recalls. Still, while applying to college, she included MIT on her list, partly to humor her parents, Bik-Kwoon Tye and Henry Tye, both of whom had earned PhDs there in 1974. And when she received an acceptance letter, her father found it hard to disguise his feelings as his eyes welled with tears. “I’d never in my life seen my dad cry,” she says. She decided that she ought to give scientific learning a more dedicated try. She also convinced herself (with parental encouragement) that focusing on the natural world would give her more to write about down the road. As a freshman at MIT, Tye joined the lab of Suzanne Corkin, who was working with H.M., one of the most famous patients in the history of neuroscience. H.M., whose name was revealed to be Henry Molaison upon his death in 2008, suffered from profound amnesia after a lobotomy to treat seizures; studying his condition allowed researchers to probe the neural underpinnings of memory. One of Tye’s roles in the group was to make H.M. a peanut butter and jelly sandwich for lunch. He would eat it and then, moments later, with crumbs still on his face, ask, “Did we have lunch yet?” “It made me appreciate that these basic functions, like memory, that are so key to who we are have biological substrates in the brain,” she says. Neuroscience can be intimidating and filled with jargon, she adds. But the experience with H.M., along with an inspiring introductory psychology class taught by Steven Pinker, “made it seem worth it to slog through the all-nighters” to understand the biological mechanisms behind psychological constructs. Still, after graduation, Tye wanted to make sure she was “looking around,” thinking about who she was and who she wanted to be. So she spent a year backpacking in Australia, where she worked on a farm, lived in a yoga ashram, taught yoga, camped out on the beach, and worked on a novel. She found that writing was “hard and lonely.” She enjoyed teaching yoga but didn’t see it as a satisfying career path. “I came out of that year surprisingly ready to go to grad school,” she says. Diving back into the academic world, she initially struggled to find a lab that would accept her and almost dropped out after her first year. But she found a mentor in Patricia Janak, who became her advisor, and earned a PhD in neuroscience at the University of California, San Francisco, in 2008. A surprise in the amygdala In 2009, Tye joined Deisseroth’s lab at Stanford. Deisseroth had already developed optogenetics, which gave researchers a much more precise way to identify the contributions of individual neurons within a circuit. Along with others in the lab, Tye used optogenetics to probe the connection between two parts of the amygdala, an almond-shaped region that is crucial to anxiety and fear. She first identified neurons in one area (known as the basolateral amygdala) that formed connections to neurons in another amygdalar area (known as the central nucleus) by sending out projections of nerve fibers. When she stimulated those basolateral amygdala neurons, she was able to reduce anxiety in mice. That is, she could cause the animals to spend more time in open spaces and less time cowering to the side. This was surprising, because when researchers stimulated the amygdala as a whole, the mice’s behavior grew more anxious. At first, everyone asked, “Are you sure you’re using the tool right? What’s going on?” she recalls. But after meticulous validation, in 2011, Tye and the group published their results in Nature, showing that some circuitry within the amygdala helps to calm animals down. This paper also represented a breakthrough in optogenetic technique. For the first time, researchers were able to zero in on and manipulate a specific part of a brain circuit: particular groups of neurons communicating with known target neurons. The technique, known as optogenetic projection-specific manipulation, is now considered one of the key tools of neuroscience. In 2012, Tye came to MIT as an assistant professor of brain and cognitive sciences at the Picower, continuing her work on anxiety. While setting up her lab, she targeted neurons within the amygdala that seemed to have the opposite effect on mouse anxiety, causing it to increase. These brain cells are also located in the basolateral amygdala, but they send projections to a nearby region known as the ventral hippocampus. When Tye stimulated this circuit using optogenetics, the mice avoided open spaces, apparently suffering from anxiety. (When she inhibited the connections from forming, the animals hung out in the open again, their anxiety seemingly alleviated.) Tye proposed that neighboring neurons in the amygdala can have opposite effects on animals’ behavior, depending on the targets to which they send signals. Threats and rewards At the time, most researchers studying the amygdala still tended to focus mainly on its role in fear. Yet Tye suspected that activity in this part of the brain might encode a stimulus as either rewarding or threatening, good or bad, helping individuals decide how to respond. “There are many stimuli we encounter in our daily lives that are ambiguous,” says Conor ­Liston of the Brain and Mind Research Institute at Weill Cornell. “A social interaction, for example, can be either threatening or rewarding, and we need brain circuits devoted to differentiating which is which.” By looking at the relative strength of the currents passing through two glutamate receptors known to indicate synaptic strength, Tye discovered that different neural connections in mice were reinforced depending on whether a particular stimulus was linked to a reward or a threat. When mice learned to associate a sound with a treat of sugar, she found stronger synaptic input to the neurons in the basolateral amygdala that were sending information to the nucleus accumbens, which is part of the brain’s reward circuitry. On the other hand, when mice learned to associate the sound with mild electric shocks to their feet, input signals grew stronger in circuits leading from the basolateral amygdala to the centromedial amygdala, which is involved in pain and fear. In addition, she demonstrated a trade-off: when one of these circuits grew more active, the other grew less so. In other words, she had found how the brain encodes information that allows mice to differentiate between stimuli that are rewarding and those that are potentially harmful. The results were published in Nature in 2015. In recent work, Tye also probed the circuitry involved in making split-second decisions when both threatening and rewarding cues are present at the same time. She and her team focused this time on connections between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex, an area responsible for higher-order thinking. (Specifically, they examined interactions between the basolateral amygdala and the prelimbic medial prefrontal cortex.) Using optogenetics and other techniques, they showed that this circuitry was active when the animals were simultaneously exposed to a potential sugar treat and a potential electric shock and had to make a decision about how to behave. Her results, which appeared in April in Nature Neuroscience, help illuminate how animals figure out what to do in the face of complex and sometimes contradictory cues.

### Adv—Growth

#### The advantage is Workforce Retention.

#### A right to strike is crucial to negotiating conditions for workforce retention—but unchecked, companies lash out with dismissals. Bogage 10/17

Jacob Bogage, writes about business and technology for The Washington Post, where he's worked since 2015. He's previously covered the automotive and manufacturing industries and wrote for the Sports section. He has previously reported for the Columbia Missourian, Columbia (Mo.) Daily Tribune, Bethesda Magazine and the Montgomery County Gazette. He is a Maryland native and a graduate of the University of Missouri, 10-17-2021, "Strikes are sweeping the labor market as workers wield new leverage ," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/10/17/strikes-great-resignation/, 10-22-2021//Aanya

Marcial Reyes could have just quit his job. Frustrated with chronic understaffing at the Kaiser Permanente hospital where he works in Southern California, he knows he has options in a region desperate for nurses. Instead, he voted to go on strike. While Americans are leaving their jobs at staggering rates — a record 4.3 million quit in August alone — hundreds of thousands of workers with similar grievances about wages, benefits and quality of life are, like Reyes, choosing to dig in and fight. Last week, 10,000 John Deere workers went on strike, while unions representing 31,000 Kaiser employees authorized walkouts. Some 60,000 Hollywood production workers reached a deal Saturday night, averting a strike hours before a negotiation deadline. All told, there have been strikes against 178 employers this year, according to a tracker by Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which records only large work stoppages, has documented 12 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers so far this year. That’s considerably higher than 2020, when the pandemic took hold, but in line with significant strike activity recorded in 2019 and 2018. The trend, union officials and economists say, is an offshoot of the phenomenon known as the Great Resignation, which has thinned the nation’s labor pool and slowed the economic recovery. Workers are now harder to replace, especially while many companies are scrambling to meet heightened demand for their products and manage hobbled supply chains. That has given unions new leverage, and made striking less risky. In interviews, workers and labor leaders said union members are angry with employers for failing to raise pay to match new profits and are disappointed by the lack of high-quality jobs. They also are frustrated that wage growth is not keeping pace with inflation. Although the average U.S. worker’s hourly pay was up 4 percent in September compared with a year ago, according to the St. Louis Federal Reserve, inflation grew 5.4 percent over the same period. “The strikes are sending a signal, no doubt about it, that employers ignore workers at their peril,” AFL-CIO President Liz Shuler said in an interview with The Washington Post. “I think this wave of strikes is actually going to inspire more workers to stand up and speak out and put that line in the sand and say, ‘We deserve better.’ ” Not all work stoppages have been successful. More than 1,000 Alabama miners have been on strike at Warrior Met Coal since April. That same month, 14 oil workers staged a walkout against United Metro Energy in New York; eight have since been fired, according to the local Teamsters branch. And roughly 1,400 workers at Kellogg Co. cereal factories in four states are entering their third week on the picket line. Still, the labor movement has drawn support from the White House. President Biden made a public statement supporting the Amazon union drive in Alabama — a rare move by a sitting president. And his constant calls to raise the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour have delighted labor leaders. In Fontana, Calif., Reyes is hopeful. As a covid-19 patient who spent a month in the same Kaiser hospital where he works, he has a unique perspective on pandemic-related staffing shortages. “I think I got the best care that I could have gotten at Kaiser,” he said. “Now it’s time to pay back the nurses that took care of me” by striking for additional resources. The strike drives in 2021 run the gamut of American industry: Nurses and health workers in California and Oregon; oil workers in New York; cereal factory workers in Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Tennessee; television and film production crews in Hollywood; and more. The surge in strike activity has yielded mixed results, economists say. Though work stoppages this summer at Nabisco and Frito-Lay helped secure higher raises and new vacation allowances for workers, employers have not made meaningful increases in their workforces or compensation structures. Both sides acknowledge the benefit of retaining workers. Management more often would rather deal with a brief strike than absorb higher costs associated with turnover and training new staff. For the employee, a new job isn’t necessarily a better one. A “There’s a cost to searching and a cost to leaving your current employer,” said William M. Rodgers III, director of the Institute for Economic Equity at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. “And maybe some of the desire to strike is predicated out of a level of loyalty that these people have been with this company for a good duration.” Unions increasingly are seeking changes in the workplace and corporate culture. Some strike drives are pushing for better safeguards against sexual harassment and coronavirus safety protocols, including one at El Milagro, a Chicago-based tortilla manufacturer. Workers at a West Virginia producer of industrial pump parts went on strike Oct. 1 seeking better seniority rights. Some are attempting to claw back perks that vanished years ago during economic downturns. Striking John Deere workers contend that the company’s massive profit during the pandemic — earnings nearly doubled to a record $1.79 billion last quarter — should be reflected in their compensation, particularly retirement benefits. More than 60,000 members of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE), which represents Hollywood production workers, had planned to strike Monday unless they reached a deal with the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers. The two sides arrived at a tentative agreement Saturday night that guarantees workers meal breaks, weekends and breaks between shifts, plus significant raises. “They do have to change the way they do business,” IATSE President Matthew D. Loeb said, “to avoid a strike, to have good morale and to have safe, healthy employees.” A spokesman for the television and film producers alliance did not respond to a request for comment. Labor leaders have defined wage demands as a new frontier for workers’ rights. Unions helped deliver the 40-hour workweek, they note, and the coronavirus crisis has reinforced the need to secure living wages and safer workplaces. “Especially during the pandemic, where people have worked overtime, they’ve sacrificed. They want to be acknowledged and appreciated,” Shuler said. Workers took notice when their companies publicly praised them as heroic and essential in the early days of pandemic, labor leaders and experts say, and it made them angry. Many saw a disconnect between the accolades and the realities of their jobs, and now interpret “essential” more broadly: They’re not only crucial to helping put food on families’ tables or treating patients, they’re essential to very companies they serve — and can inflict pain by shutting down or slowing operations. “A strike is really the last resort. That’s labor’s power, a worker’s power is to withhold their labor,” said Kim Cordova, president of the Colorado branch of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union. “A company can function without a CEO, but they can’t function without the workers to actually go do the work.”

#### High wages are the crucial internal link for continued growth.

Bivens 17 – PhD @ The New School for Social Research (Josh, “Inequality is slowing US economic growth,” *Economic Policy Institute*, <https://www.epi.org/publication/secular-stagnation/)//BB>

This new attention to the crisis of American pay is totally proper. The failure of wages of the vast majority of Americans to benefit from economy-wide growth in productivity (or income generated in an average hour of work) has been the root cause of the stratospheric rise in inequality and the concentration of economic growth at the very top of the income distribution. Had this upward redistribution not happened, incomes for the bottom 90 percent of Americans would be roughly 20 percent higher today.3 In short, the rise in inequality driven by anemic wage growth has imposed an “inequality tax” on American households that has robbed them of a fifth of their potential income. There would be huge benefits to American well-being from blocking or reversing this upward redistribution. This welfare gain stemming from blocking upward redistribution is the primary reason to champion policy measures to boost wage growth and lead to a more equal distribution of income gains. Put simply, a dollar is worth more to a family living paycheck to paycheck than it is to families comfortably in the top 1 percent of the income distribution. Proponents of increases in the minimum wage and other measures to boost American wages have often argued that there are benefits to these policies besides the welfare gains stemming from pure redistribution. These proponents have often argued that boosting wages would even benefit aggregate economic outcomes, like growth in gross domestic product (GDP) or employment. Recent evidence about developments in the American and global economies strongly indicate that these arguments are correct: boosting wages of the bottom 90 percent would not just raise these households’ incomes and welfare (a more-than-sufficient reason to do so), it would also boost overall growth. For the past decade (and maybe even longer), the primary constraint on American economic growth has been too-slow spending by households, businesses, and governments. In economists’ jargon, the constraint has been growth in aggregate demand lagging behind growth in the economy’s productive capacity (including growth of the labor force and the stock of productive capital, such as plants and equipment). Much research indicates that this shortfall of demand could become a chronic problem in the future, constantly pulling down growth unless macroeconomic policy changes dramatically.

**Slower growth wrecks US leadership.**

Richard Haass 17, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan “A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order” published January 10, 2017

A large portion of the burden of creating and maintaining order at the regional or global level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable for several reasons, only one of which is that the United States is and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come. The corollary to this point is that no other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order. Nor can order ever be expected to emerge automatically; there is no invisible hand in the geopolitical marketplace. Again, a large part of the burden (or, more positively, opportunity) falls on the principal power of the day. There is more than a little self-interest at stake. The United States cannot remain aloof, much less unaffected by a world in disarray. Globalization is more reality than choice. At the regional level, the United States actually faces the opposite problem, namely, that certain actors do have the mind-set and means to shape an order. The problem is that their views of order are in part or in whole incompatible with U.S. interests. Examples would include Iran and ISIS in the Middle East, China in Asia, and Russia in Europe. It will not be an easy time for the United States. The sheer number and range of challenges is daunting. There are a large number of actors and forces to contend with. Alliances, normally created in opposition to some country or countries, may not be as useful a vehicle in a world in which not all foes are always foes and not all friends are always friendly. Diplomacy will count for a great deal; there will be a premium on dexterity. Consultations that aim to affect the actions of other governments and their leaders are likely to matter more than negotiations that aim to solve problems. Another reality is that the United States for all its power cannot impose order. Partially this reflects what might be called structural realities, namely, that no country can contend with global challenges on its own given the very nature of these challenges. The United States could reduce its carbon footprint dramatically, but the effect on global climate would be modest if India and China failed to follow suit. Similarly, on its own the United States cannot maintain a world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease. Adding to these realities are resource limits. The United States cannot provide all the troops or dollars to maintain order in the Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia. There is simply too much capability in too many hands. Unilateralism is rarely a serious foreign policy option. Partners are essential. That is one of the reasons why sovereign obligation is a desirable compass for U.S. foreign policy. Earlier I made the case that it represents realism for an era of globalization. It also is a natural successor to containment, the doctrine that guided the United States for the four decades of the Cold War. There are basic differences, however. Containment was about holding back more than bringing in and was designed for an era when rivals were almost always adversaries and in which the challenges were mostly related to classical geopolitical competition.1 Sovereign obligation, by contrast, is designed for a world in which sometime rivals are sometime partners and in which collective efforts are required to meet common challenges. Up to this point, we have focused on what the United States needs to do in the world to promote order. That is what one would expect from a book about international relations and American foreign policy. But a focus on foreign policy is not enough. National security is a coin with two sides, and what the United States does at home, what is normally thought of as belonging to the domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy. It is best to understand the issue as guns and butter rather than guns versus butter. When it comes to the domestic side, the argument is straightforward. In order to lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order. I have written on what this entails in a book titled Foreign Policy Begins at Home.2 This was sometimes interpreted as suggesting a turn away from foreign policy. It was nothing of the sort. Foreign policy begins at home, but it ends there only at the country’s peril.3 Earlier I mentioned that the United States has few unilateral options, that there are few if any things it can do better alone than with others. The counterpart to this claim is that the world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States. The United States is not sufficient, but it is necessary. It is also true that the United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities. An additional benefit is that respect for the United States and for the American political, social, and economic model (along with a desire to emulate it) will increase only if it is seen as successful. The most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth. U.S. growth levels may appear all right when compared with what a good many other countries are experiencing, but they are below what is needed and fall short of what is possible. There is no reason why the United States is not growing in the range of 3 percent or even higher other than what it is doing and, more important, not doing.4



#### Default to status quo hegemony – it’s sustainable and creates a structural disincentive for great power war and escalation—collapse causes cascading prolif and extinction

Brands 15 ( Hal Brands is on the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University The Elliott School of International Affairs The Washington Quarterly Summer 2015 38:2 pp. 7–28)

The fundamental reason is that both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies’ policies.43 During the Cold War and after, for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies’ pursuit of nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements, and even to affect the composition of allied nations’ governments.44 More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is not something that has occurred naturally. It has occurred because the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited arms races and security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-build their militaries. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which powerful countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving and fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United States “effectively acts as a night watchman,” lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would happen if Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence and global stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively be surrendering the most powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned. As offshore balancers have argued, it may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that removing the American pacifier would liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled. Long-dormant security competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously; historical antagonisms between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the reassurance it provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise existing regional orders in their favor—think Russia in Europe, or China in Asia—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they might just as plausibly feel empowered to more assertively press their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble.”46 Scanning the global horizon today, one can easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, the threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race, even as that region also contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of the Islamic State. In East Asia, a rising China is challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways, sounding alarms among its neighbors—many of whom also have historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, removing the American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased conflict and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S. interests even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that increased instability and acrimony would produce the robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the economic consequences. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress toward global prosperity and integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold War) has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of offshore balancing would run, of course, is that a key region might not be able to maintain its own balance following U.S. retrenchment. That prospect might have seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the rise and growing assertiveness of China has highlighted the medium- to long-term danger that a hostile power could in fact gain regional primacy. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly, and if Beijing continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave challenges in containing Chinese power even if they join forces in that endeavor. This possibility, ironically, is one to which leading advocates of retrenchment have been attuned. “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China,” Mearshimer writes, “because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing becomes a dangerous and potentially self-defeating strategy. As mentioned above, it could lead countries like Japan and South Korea to seek nuclear weapons, thereby stoking arms races and elevating regional tensions. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that offshore balancers seek to avoid, by easing China’s ascent to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, “Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals.”49 In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance relationships, basing agreements, and other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first place—and that would allow the United States to surge additional forces into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will be unable to counter China themselves, then reducing U.S. influence and leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and destabilizing than its proponents acknowledge.

#### Extinction.

Starr 15 [(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015] DD

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs.

Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.]

The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere.

Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.]

Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years?

The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death.

Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet.  Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

### Advocacy

#### Plan Text: Resolved: The United States Federal Government ought to recognize an unconditional right to strike. I’ll defend all workers and types of strikes and enforcement through Congress.

#### Unconditional Right to Strike is defined by NLRA:

[National Labor Relations Board](https://www.nlrb.gov/), [The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is comprised of a team of professionals who work to assure fair labor practices and workplace democracy nationwide. Since its creation by Congress in 1935, this small, highly respected, independent Federal agency has had daily impact on the way America's companies, industries and unions conduct business. Agency staff members investigate and remedy unfair labor practices by unions and employers.],"NLRA and the Right to Strike," NLRA https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/your-rights/nlra-and-the-right-to-strike

NLRA and the Right to Strike The Right to Strike. Section 7 of the Act states in part, “Employees shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for employees by this section. Section 13 also concerns the right to strike. It reads as follows: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. It is clear from a reading of these two **provisions** that: the law not only guarantees the right of employees to strike, but also **places limitations** and qualifications **on** the exercise of **that right**. **Lawful** and unlawful strikes. The lawfulness of a **strike** may **depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing, or on the conduct of the strikers.** The object, or objects, of a strike and whether the objects are lawful are matters that are not always easy to determine. Such issues often have to be decided by the National Labor Relations Board. The consequences can be severe to striking employees and struck employers, involving as they do questions of reinstatement and backpay. Strikes for a lawful object. Employees who strike for a lawful object fall into two classes: economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers. Both classes continue as employees, but unfair labor practice strikers have greater rights of reinstatement to their jobs. Economic strikers defined. If the object of a strike is to obtain from the employer some economic concession such as higher wages, shorter hours, or better working conditions, the striking employees are called economic strikers. They retain their status as employees and cannot be discharged, but they can be replaced by their employer. If the employer has hired bona fide permanent replacements who are filling the jobs of the economic strikers when the strikers apply unconditionally to go back to work, the strikers are not entitled to reinstatement at that time. However, if the strikers do not obtain regular and substantially equivalent employment, they are entitled to be recalled to jobs for which they are qualified when openings in such jobs occur if they, or their bargaining representative, have made an unconditional request for their reinstatement. Unfair labor practice strikers defined. Employees who strike to protest an unfair labor practice committed by their employer are called unfair labor practice strikers. Such strikers can be neither discharged nor permanently replaced. When the strike ends, unfair labor practice strikers, absent serious misconduct on their part, are entitled to have their jobs back even if employees hired to do their work have to be discharged. If the Board finds that economic strikers or unfair labor practice strikers who have made an unconditional request for reinstatement have been unlawfully denied reinstatement by their employer, the Board may award such strikers backpay starting at the time they should have been reinstated. **Strikes unlawful because of purpose**. A strike may be unlawful because an object, or purpose, of the strike is unlawful. **A strike in support of** a union **unfair labor practice**, or one that would cause an employer to commit an unfair labor practice, may be a strike for an unlawful object. For example, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge an employee for failure to make certain lawful payments to the union when there is no union security agreement in effect (Section 8(a)(3)). A strike to compel an employer to do this would be a strike for an unlawful object and, therefore, an unlawful strike. Furthermore, Section 8(b)(4) of the Act prohibits strikes for certain objects even though the objects are not necessarily unlawful if achieved by other means. An example of this would be a strike to compel Employer A to cease doing business with Employer B. It is not unlawful for Employer A voluntarily to stop doing business with Employer B, nor is it unlawful for a union merely to request that it do so. It is, however, unlawful for the union to strike with an object of forcing the employer to do so. In any event, employees who participate in an unlawful strike may be discharged and are not entitled to reinstatement. Strikes unlawful because of timing—Effect of no-strike contract. A strike that violates a no-strike provision of a contract is not protected by the Act, and the striking employees can be discharged or otherwise disciplined, unless the strike is called to protest certain kinds of unfair labor practices committed by the employer. It should be noted that not all refusals to work are considered strikes and thus violations of no-strike provisions. A walkout because of conditions abnormally dangerous to health, such as a defective ventilation system in a spray-painting shop, has been held not to violate a no-strike provision. Same—Strikes at end of contract period. Section 8(d) provides that when either party desires to terminate or change an existing contract, it must comply with certain conditions. If these requirements are not met, a strike to terminate or change a contract is unlawful and participating strikers lose their status as employees of the employer engaged in the labor dispute. If the strike was caused by the unfair labor practice of the employer, however, the strikers are classified as unfair labor practice strikers and their status is not affected by failure to follow the required procedure. Strikes unlawful because of misconduct of strikers. Strikers who engage in serious misconduct in the course of a strike may be refused reinstatement to their former jobs. This applies to both economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers. Serious misconduct has been held to include, among other things, violence and threats of violence. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a “sitdown” strike, when employees simply stay in the plant and refuse to work, thus depriving the owner of property, is not protected by the law. Examples of serious misconduct that could cause the employees involved to lose their right to reinstatement are: • Strikers physically blocking persons from entering or leaving a struck plant. • Strikers threatening violence against nonstriking employees. • Strikers attacking management representatives.

#### A right to strike is the foundational aspect of collective workforce power and unionized negotiation. Myall 19

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The right to strike would enable fairer negotiations between public workers and the government. All of us have reason to support that outcome. Research shows that union negotiations set the bar for working conditions with other employers. And as the largest employer in Maine, the state’s treatment of its workers has a big impact on working conditions in the private sector. Unions support a fairer economy. Periods of high union membership are associated with lower levels of income inequality, both nationally and in Maine. Strong unions, including public-sector unions, have a critical role to play in rebuilding a strong middle class. Source: MECEP analysis of U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Survey data (spending by state of residence, 1991-2014). Adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index, and for population using the U.S. Census Bureau’s population estimates. 2018 spending estimate from Maine Health Data Organization. Unions help combat inequities within work places. Women and people of color in unions face less wage discrimination than those in nonunion workplaces. On average, wages for nonunionized white women in Maine are 18 percent less than of those of white men. Among unionized workers, that inequality shrinks to just 9 percent. Similarly, women of color earn 26 percent less than men in nonunionized jobs; for unionized women of color, the wage gap shrinks to 17 percent.[i] All of us have a stake in the success of collective bargaining. But a union without the right to strike loses much of its negotiating power. The right to withdraw your labor is the foundation of collective worker action. When state employees or teachers are sitting across the negotiating table from their employers, how much leverage do they really have when they can be made to work without a contract? It’s like negotiating the price of a car when the salesman knows you’re going to have to buy it — whatever the final price is. Research confirms that public-sector unions are less effective without the right to strike. Public employees with a right to strike earn between 2 percent and 5 percent more than those without it.[ii] While that’s a meaningful increase for those workers, it also should assuage any fears that a right to strike would lead to excessive pay increases or employees abusing their new right. LD 900, “An Act to Expand the Rights of Public Employees Under the Maine Labor Laws,” ensures that Maine’s public-sector workers will have the same collective bargaining rights as other employees in Maine. The bill would strengthen the ability of Maine’s public-sector workers to negotiate, resulting in higher wagers, a more level playing field, and a fairer economy for all of us.

### Underview

#### 1] 1AR Theory Paradigm—7-6-4-3 time skew means it checks NC infinite abuse—we cant preempt every possible norm in the 1AC and it’s structurally irreciprocal since they have unconditional routes to the ballot so 1AR theory compensates.

**2] Reject permissibility and presumption – it’s an abhorrent view of the world that makes the debate space horrible which ow on accessibility – making args in favor of an alternate ethic solves. Presumption’s a race to the bottom that forsakes qualitative substantive clash for spamming blippy preclusive arguments.**

#### 3] Nothing in the aff triggers either, but permissibility and presumption affirm.

**A] Freeze- otherwise we would not be able to justify morally neutral actions since there isn’t a prohibition and we would have to prove an obligation.**

**B] Trivialism- statements are true until proven false, if I told you my name you’d believe me.**

#### C] Negation Theory- Negating requires a complete absence of an existing obligation

Negate: to deny the existence of

That’s Dictionary.com- “Negate” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/negate.

#### D] The Law of Excluded Middles- if something is not false, it must be true, which means that if something is not prohibited, it must be obligatory, and permissibility is the same as obligatory.

#### 4] Use comparative worlds – A] topic ed – forces the neg to research the topic instead of low quality rez flaw args – the only benefit to debate is making us better arguers not perfect logicians, B] reciprocity – truth-testing allows the neg to disprove any part of the aff, but the aff has to defend every part, which gives the neg too much ground, C] inclusion – truth testing says rez is only thing that’s relevant which excludes ks – either only the rez matters so we can’t punish slurs, or people should get dropped for making debate unsafe which proves other things matter

## 1AR

#### Gauthier is indefensibly ableist and their philosophy concludes the same.

**Pfeiffer 01** [David Pfeiffer, 1-11-2001, "'Disabled Lives' commentary," No Publication, [http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/0901/0901pfeiffer.htm //](http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/0901/0901pfeiffer.htm%20//) JB]

Yet many **non-disabled people** would **describe me as** severely **disabled** and dependent, solely **because I use a wheelchair**. That is what ethicist Martha Nussbaum seems to be doing in her ["Disabled Lives: Who Cares?"](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/13956) in the January 11, 2001, issue of The New York Review of Books, which Cal Montgomery dissected so powerfully in her ["Critic of the Dawn"](http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/0501/0501cov.htm) piece (Ragged Edge, May). Nussbaum's discussion of people she calls "severely disabled" reinforces the widespread belief that all people with disabilities are very dependent upon non-disabled people. Some of us are, it's true; but **non-disabled persons are dependent on others as well. Nondisabled people receive "care," too** -- sometimes quite a lot of it. If you doubt that, just consider the level of services -- "care" -- which professional athletes receive. If the reader does not know that professional athletes receive services paid for by **tax dollars**, please take a look at the football and baseball fields and basketball courts built with tax money on which high school and college athletes prepare to become professionals. Pay attention to the amount of tax forgiveness municipalities give professional athletic teams for locating there. The state of Hawaii gives the National Football League two million dollars a year to stage the Pro Bowl here. Perhaps from ignorance, Nussbaum perpetuates a number of common misunderstandings about people with disabilities. While she notes that many elderly persons do not receive care which "shows respect for their dignity," she fails to note that many persons with disabilities do not receive services which show them respect, either. Nussbaum's discussion of "the burdens on people who provide care for dependents" reinforces the idea that people with disabilities are burdens, with little understanding that the "burden" is caused by the inequality of services, not by the person who's disabled. **This same prejudiced attitude is the basis for philosopher David Gauthier's assertion** (noted by Nussbaum) that **people who have "unusual" needs -- as they define unusual" -- cannot be a party to any moral relationship and thus cannot be equal to others**. It also underlies philosopher John Rawls' statement (also noted by Nussbaum) that society is only for people who can act to one another's mutual advantage. **Both Gauthier's and Rawls' reasoning leads one to conclude is that persons with disabilities cannot be free, equal, and independent.** **Although one can observe** that people with **disabilities are neither free, equal, nor allowed to be independent, there is a clear difference between observing our situation and justifying our segregation and forced dependency. None** of the three **ever note this distinction**; they seem not to question the rightness of the status-quo. **Gauthier**, Rawls and Nussbaum are all **making moral judgments about people with disabilities: we have no place in society so we should not exist.** Nussbaum makes an extraordinary statement: "We learn to ignore the fact that disease, old age, and accident impede the moral and rational functions, just as they impede mobility and dexterity." What? Because I had polio 58 years ago when I was nine years old and have used crutches, a cane, and now a wheelchair, "disease" and "age" "impede my moral and rational functions?" Holding a Ph.D. in political science (focusing on public choice), entering my 40th year as a university professor, having over 190 publications to my credit, being a policy analyst specializing in disability issues in the Center on Disability Studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, being a past president of the Society for Disability Studies, and now the editor of Disability Studies Quarterly, I would suggest that neither my moral nor my rational functions have been "impeded." I would argue that they have been heightened. It seems Nussbaum thinks people with disabilities are basically -- fundamentally -- different from people without disabilities. "We forget that the usual human life cycle brings with it periods of extreme dependency, in which our functioning is similar to that of the mentally or physically handicapped throughout their lives," she writes. To Nussbaum, it seems, there are independent people and there are dependent people -- with all people with disabilities being the dependent ones. Yet many non- disabled people I know are quite dependent, in ways many people with disabilities I know never are. At one point Nussbaum seems to be speaking directly to me: "Take two people, one in a wheelchair and one not. If they are to have a similar level of mobility, a lot more will have to be spent on helping the person in the wheelchair." Hah! I challenge Nussbaum to a five-mile race on the nearest track. Unless she is a marathoner, I shall finish the five miles well ahead of her. Her statement is pure ableism: she assumes that the status-quo lack of access is "natural" and "right." The present lack of access in our buildings is due to nothing more than policy choices, enacted in today's building codes. If access requirements had originally been included in the building codes, nothing would need to be spent to correct the prejudicial aspects of those buildings which were built to code and made inaccessible in the process. At one time slavery was "natural" and "right." Later segregation was considered "right." At one time the wife was considered the husband's chattel, his possession. Having made some (but not much) progress in overcoming those prejudicial attitudes today, we are left with Nussbaum's ableism -- that the status-quo of lack of access is "natural" and "right." Elderly persons should receive care because of their earlier periods of productivity, writes Nussbaum, **citing Gauthier; people with disabilities have not had earlier years of productivity to justify services, she and Gauthier both say**. Both simply accept as a given that people with disabilities are not economically productive. Yet **this is not true. We are not simply consumers; we are also producers**. I know many people with disabilities who work hard, earn good salaries, who contribute to the economy and to society. I know just as many people without disabilities who do not work hard, barely earn any income, and make questionable contributions to the economy and to society. And there are many people without disabilities who are quite rich and make no contribution to either the economy or to society -- people who are themselves economic and social liabilities. None of this has anything to do with being a person with or without a disability. It has to do with bigotry.

#### This is a reason to drop them – it kills accessibility to disabled people. Their author was also ableist which means they can’t cross apply the theory to defend itself because it’s whats indicted. Reps first – and comes before theory—

Fairness and education are NUQ, but our impacts are structural—ow on ballot proximity—u cant rectify all unfairness and lack of edu in one round but u can re

#### 1] controls the form of argumentation – every arg you make is skewed because you justified them with flawed rhetoric

#### 2] prevents debaters from engaging in your arguments – if you’re arguments justify these things, they may be sensitive to debaters who identify with those groups and prevent them from effectively engaging.

#### 3] reps shape reality because we only understand arguments through how they’re conveyed, just like you won’t vote on an argument you don’t understand.

#### The representations used are vital to testing the truth claims of the negative.

Crawford 2 [Neta, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at Boston University, “Argument and Change in World Politics”, p. 19-21]

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand (the proper frame or representation) must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger Karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively represent situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibilities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representationhow frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.