## Frwk

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution.

#### Resolved means a legislative policy

**Words and Phrases 64** Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964. ED

**Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “**to establish by law**”.

#### Outer space means anything above Earth’s Karman line

**Dunnett 21** (Oliver Tristan, lecturer in geography at Queen’s University Belfast). Earth, Cosmos and Culture: Geographies of Outer Space in Britain, 1900–2020 (1st ed.). Routledge. 2021.<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780815356301> EE

In such ways, this book argues that Britain became a home to rich discourses of outer space, both feeding from and contributing to iconic achievements in space exploration, while also embracing the cosmos in imaginative and philosophical ways.2 **INSERT FOOTNOTE 2** 2 **This book primarily uses the term ‘outer space’ to describe the realm beyond the Earth’s atmosphere, conventionally accepted as beginning at the Kármán line of 100km above sea level**. Other terms such as ‘interplanetary space’, ‘interstellar space’, ‘cosmos’, and ‘the heavens’ are used in specific contexts. **END FOOTNOTE 2** Cognisant of this spatial context, a central aim is to demonstrate how contemporary geographical enquiry can provide specific and valuable perspectives from which to understand outer space. This is an argument that was initiated by Denis Cosgrove, and his critique of Alexander von Humboldt’s seminal work Cosmos helped to demonstrate geography’s special relevance to thinking about outer space.3 The key thematic areas which provide the interface for this book’s research, therefore, are the cultural, political and scientific understandings of outer space; the context of the United Kingdom since the start of the last century; and the geographical underpinnings of their relationship.

#### In the context of space, “Appropriation” means to take as property

**Leon 18** (Amanda M., Associate, Caplin & Drysdale, JD UVA Law) "Mining for Meaning: An Examination of the Legality of Property Rights in Space Resources." Virginia Law Review, vol. 104, no. 3, May 2018, p. 497-547. HeinOnline.

**Appropriation**. The term "appropriation" also remains ambiguous. **Webster's defines** the verb "**appropriate**" **as** "**to take to oneself in exclusion of others**; **to** claim or **use as by an exclusive or pre-eminent right**; as, let no man appropriate a common benefit."16 5 Similarly, **Black's** Law Dictionary **describes "appropriate" as an act "[t]o make a thing one's own; to make a thing the subject of property**; to exercise dominion over an object to the extent, and for the purpose, of making it subserve one's own proper use or pleasure."166 Oftentimes, **appropriation refers to the setting aside of government funds, the taking of land for public purposes, or a tort of wrongfully taking another's property as one's own**. The term appropriation is often used not only with respect to real property but also with water. According to U.S. case law, a person completes an appropriation of water by diversion of the water and an application of the water to beneficial use.167 This **common use** of the term "appropriation" with respect to water **illustrates** two key points: (1) **the term applies to natural resources-e.g., water or minerals-not just real property**, **and** (2) **mining space resources and putting them to beneficial use**-e.g., selling or manufacturing the mined resources **could reasonably be interpreted as an "appropriation" of outer space**. While **the ordinary meaning of "appropriation"** reasonably **includes the taking of natural resources as well as land**, whether the drafters and parties to the OST envisioned such a broad meaning of the term remains difficult to determine with any certainty. **The prohibition against appropriation "by any other means" supports such a reading**, though**, by expanding the prohibition to other types not explicitly described**.168

#### Private entity = majority nonstate

**Warners 20** (Bill, JD Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School) "Patents 254 Miles up: Jurisdictional Issues Onboard the International Space Station." UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law, vol. 19, no. 4, 2020, p. 365-380. HeinOnline.

To satisfy these three necessary requirements for a new patent regime, the ISS IGA must add an additional clause ("Clause 7") in Article 21 specifically establishing a patent regime for private nonstate third parties onboard the ISS. First, Clause 7 would define **the term "private entity" as an individual, organization, or business which is primarily privately owned and/or managed by nonstate affiliates**. Specifically defining the term "private entity" prevents confusion as to what entities qualify under the agreement and the difference between "public" and "private."99 This definition would also support the connection of Clause 1 in Article 21 to "Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization." 100 A succinct definition also alleviates international concerns that the changes to the ISS IGA pushes out Partner State influence. 101 Some in the international community may still point out that Clause 7 still pushes towards a trend of outer space privatization. However, this argument fails to consider that private entities in outer space have operated in space almost as comprehensively as national organizations. 102

#### [1] Competitive equity—any alternative wrecks it—it’s impossible to negate alternative frameworks with the ground allocated to us by the parameters of the resolution—all 1AR defense to this claim will rely on concessionary ground which isn’t a stable basis for a year of debate.

#### They don’t get to weigh the aff – it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### [2] Switch Side Debate – read your stuff on the neg which non-uniques your offense and is net better since a Kritik on the neg has to be tailored to the aff– otherwise your discussion starts and ends at the 1AC.

#### [3] Refinement – a well-defined resolution is critical to allow the neg to refute the aff in an in-depth fashion. This process of negation produces iterative testing and improvement. Only a resolution with ground on both sides allows for the most clash which controls the internal link to education. Committees outweigh because they discuss the best topic for a stasis point – even if some resolutions are bad it is net better for a group to create a topic rather than an individual.

#### [4] TVA – read the aff as an indite on how space and the exploration of it position themselves onto the disabled body

#### [5] Truth testing—they moot the role of the negative which is to force the aff to defend their core assumptions—allowing affs to reframe the debate around their terms makes engagement impossible—outweighs and turns the aff because clash is the only way to translate anything debate gives us outside of the activity.

#### T isn’t violent – A] I don’t have the power to impose a norm – only to convince you my side is better. T doesn’t ban you from the activity – the whole point is that norms should be contestable – I just say make a better arg next time. B] Exclusion is inevitable – every role of the ballot excludes some arguments and even saying T bad excludes it – that means we should delineate ground along reciprocal lines, not abandon division altogether.

#### Reading T isn’t psychic violence – that was above, but especially if we’re not going for it since reading T can be used to prevent aff shiftiness and make substance a viable option.

#### No silencing DA - Theory is just like a disad or critique we’ve said a certain practice the aff took was bad and it would’ve been better had they done it differently not that they are bad debaters – just like the cap k says the aff engaged in some practice that reinforced capitalism and it would’ve been better if they had emphasized Marxism – impositions in some form are inevitable because the negative has the burden of rejoinder and needs link arguments – every disad link says the aff did something wrong and theres an implicit version of the aff that wouldn’t have linked

#### Theory before the K – A] Prior question. My theory argument calls into question the ability to run the argument in the first place. They can’t say the same even if they criticize theory because theory makes rules of the game not just normative statements about what debaters should say. B] Fair testing. Judge their arguments knowing I wasn’t given a fair shot to answer them. Prefer theory takes out K because they could answer my arguments, but I couldn’t answer theirs. Without testing their args, we don’t know if they’re valid, so you prefer fairness impacts on strength of link. Impact turns any critical education since a marketplace of ideas where we innovate, and test ideas presumes equal access.

#### Fairness- consittutive of comp activites, args presume

#### Question of what the ballot can solve for – voting neg can rectify a shift in fairness in the round but voting aff cannot do anything to resolve structural issues of disability

#### Reject aff pre empts – not clearly delineated, impossible to know implications

# Case

### Case Overview

#### Negate on presumption:

#### n(1) No solvency and turn – debate as a communicative act may be violent, but they’re authors don’t differentiate it from the rest of the world it’s just an institution inside the ableist world. They misread their authors the 1AC is a “band-aid” solution their authors don’t treat debate nihilistically in isolation BUT the world and eradicating debate doesn’t change the nature of the drive that recreates violence in different forms – proves it’s not endurance. ALL they actually do is generate cruel optimism since it creates a feel good solution that places disability in a not yet but maybe to come social order where disabled infiltration of tournaments occurs. Their attempt to reform the content of debate through examining the way war goes down in the community is complicit in an ableist world that consumes their project as false energy.

#### (2) Allies da - using debate as a mode of advocacy ensures the failure of their radical project – competition means debaters ally themselves with individuals who vote for them and alienate those who are positioned with the burden of rejoinder and forced to negate – at worst you vote negative on presumption because they don’t use debate as a stepping stone for their advocacy outside the space and don’t have a net benefit to affirming the 1ac.

#### 1] Reform may not be perfect, but they improve the material conditions of disabled life – 1AR spin that ableist violence is evolving is a neg argument since disabled relation to the world has changed. THIS is OFFENSE against the Aff would say no to the ADA which has decreased workplace violence, allowed voting rights and increases employment for disabled folk.

#### 2] The disability drive is NOT logical, think of it’s application in debate if the OVERALL psyche claim was true then how do they get non-disabled ballots.

#### 3] Disability can’t be ontological, and progress is possible

#### A] It’s not static – conceptions of disability aren’t concrete but fluid over time – for example ADHD wasn’t diagnosed as disability until more recent medicine, and there’s no clear brightline or definition of disability.

#### B] Disability not ontological – only reform can resolve societal prejudices against disabled people.

Hudak ’11 (GLENN M., PhD, is a professor at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. “On the Commerce of Disability and the Advocacy of Philosophy for Educators.” PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2011. Robert Kunzman, editor © 2011 Philosophy of Education Society  Urbana, Illinois.)-JJN

In his essay on the equality of difference, Michael Surbaugh asks us to consider what philosophy of education can offer special education, particularly an education revolving around “someone with severe cognitive deficits.” In an effort to accomplish this task and make his discussion more concrete, he constructs a “composite case study:” “Sarah.” Sarah is a “disabled” young female living in a group home. The rub: “Sarah has no voice, even as many social institutions have arisen to protect her rights and confer entitlements on her because of her disability. In the eyes of many, she is taken care of, and that is the end of the issue.” For Surbaugh, this is not the end of the issue. Drawing from John Dewey, Surbaugh claims, “all live creatures share a similar educational ‘task’ and ‘purpose,’ in asserting themselves in the context of their environment, weaving complex relations and richer forms of experience” (original emphasis). From Hannah Arendt he claims that, regardless of one’s abilities or disabilities, all children are “newcomers to the world, with unforeseen possibilities for the relationships they enter into and sustain.” Taken together, he wants us to grasp the “phenomenological” moment: “Sarah is a live creature.” As a live creature, she is endowed with task and purpose in the world; her relationships to the world are open rather than closed and, like a “newborn” — open to new unforeseen possibilities. The foreclosures to possible actions for Sarah, then, are not ontological in nature; rather, they are the result of societal prejudices and misunderstandings that close off Sarah’s possibilities, limiting her potential, curtailing who she is. While Surbaugh rightly advocates for Sarah — advocates that caregivers realize her humanity and respond accordingly — if we are to grasp the societal prejudices that foreclose Sarah’s possible actions then, the educative experience of the caregiver needs to be included and developed. Why? Because if we take the pragmatist perspective that Sarah’s actions and intentions can never be fully understood in isolation — as Sarah is never out of contact with her world, nor out of relation with the caregivers — then, as Surbaugh argues, Sarah’s education “should encourage her commerce with the world that envelops her, developing her understanding of her own causal impact on it and in it.” That is, Sarah’s education requires that she come to some “understanding of her causal impact” on others, and perhaps by extension the role she plays in determining the outcome of the situation at hand. Further, if there is to be an educative experience for Sarah, then, “for Dewey,” as Alison Kadlec points out, “experience is not a matter of knowing, rather it is a matter of doing in which we undergo, endure, and suffer the consequences of our actions.”1 Sarah’s experience is not a private matter; rather it is constituted within her interactions with the world. At minimum, if Sarah’s experiences are to be educative, Sarah will need to work through the consequences of her actions with the hope that through this process she will develop skills and habits to adapt, cope, and thereby restructure her relationship to the caregivers.

#### C] Disability isn’t ontological – social context determines disability discrimination.

Anastasiou and Kauffman ’13 (DIMITRIS - Associate Professor and Program Coordinator, Ph.D., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2004. JAMES M. - Professor Emeritus of education at UVA, Ed.D. in special education from University of Kansas. “The Social Model of Disability: Dichotomy between Impairment and Disability.” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 38: 441–459, 2013. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/James\_Kauffman/publication/249647375\_The\_Social\_Model\_of\_Disability\_Dichotomy\_between\_Impairment\_and\_Disability/links/02e7e521b55fa0504d000000.pdf)-JJN

V. Disabilities in Social Context Proponents of a social model seem to support the idea that disability is a product of wrong interpretation of impairments (Reindal, 1995) related to disabling social structures. Our question is very simple: Assuming that we have an ideal, perfect, caring society, will disabilities no longer exist? If we followed the arguments of the social model, in an ideal society we would have only impairments but not disabilities! Unfortunately, we do not think that it would be possible to eradicate disabilities by changing only the sociopolitical context. Why? Because the dichotomy between impairment and disability is methodological; it is not ontological. The names we give to physical or mental conditions do not create disabilities or turn disabilities into abilities (Kauffman et al., 2008; Kauffman, 2011). Of course, names have their importance, because they circulate in a social context and turn back on the named people. Also, a much better social context can substantially improve the quality of life of people with disabilities, and this is not a trivial matter. But whatever names we use in our societies, the most profound restrictions related to intrinsic factors will remain for the vast majority of people with disabilities. Nevertheless, the discussion about social context is an important issue. Disabilities should be viewed as embedded in their social context in many different ways. First, a certain disability is conceptualized within a specific social context and characterized by a discrepancy between the individual’s performance and the expectations or demands of the social group to which the person belongs. This brings social values into the appreciation of disabilities. Any conceptualization of disability, whether physical or mental, is inevitably value-laden. Disabilities naturally arouse children’s curiosity, but social perceptions can change. The recognition of disabilities can take different directions according to social values. Zola, an American sociologist, has eloquently described it: “Children spontaneously express an interest in wheelchairs and leg braces, but as they grow older they are taught that . . . it’s not nice to ask [about] such things” (1982, 200). Values and attitudes exert profound influence on the way nondisabled people perceive others with disabilities, as Zola stated: When the “able-bodied” confront the “disabled,” they often think with a shudder, “I’m glad it’s not me” . . . The threat to be dispelled is the inevitability of one’s own failure. The discomfort that many feel in the presence of the aged, the suffering, and the dying is the reality that it could just as well be them. (1982, 202) Second, social decisions about the border between disability and normality are difficult because of the statistical phenomena involved. In many cases, the border is both vague and rather arbitrary (Kauffman and Hallahan, 2005; Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011; Kauffman and Lloyd, 2011 ). Defining the qualitative differences we call disabilities by making binary decisions (yes or no, has or does not have) requires making judgments about people, even though the quantitative data are continuous statistical distributions. The identification of a disability depends on judgment, and judgment means that one arrives at a cutpoint on continuously distributed abilities. Inevitably social values are linked to the judgmental identification of disabilities. However, not making such a judgment precludes the kind of assistance we consider necessary for social justice (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011). Third, although categorizing and labeling have become major issues in disability and special education debates, the debate is often misguided. Kauffman (2002, 2011) and Kauffman et al. (2008) have argued analytically for the inevitability of labeling, given that we really want to offer special services and benefits to specific individuals. We simply cannot offer extra or better services to individuals without speaking about difference or special needs, and this is as true for disabilities as it is for economic assistance or any social program. For this reason, an individual-based perspective is necessary for identifying people with special needs for certain services (Reindal, 1995). Without a definition based on individual criteria of disability, the rights of people with disabilities cannot be fully guaranteed (see Kauffman and Landrum, 2009). Even in Norway, a country with an extended safety net of social welfare services, the identification of benefits to be received is based on judgment of individual need (Reindal, 1995). Antilabelists imagine services without labels. But even in an ideal communitarian society with enough resources, we cannot offer excellent services according to the old socialistic principle “from each according to his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs” without any need identification process. Perhaps the process is more obvious in an antagonistic society with a plurality of interests and unequal distribution of power, status, and wealth. Those who want to avoid all labels commit a great mistake in confusing the relationship between education and social change. Public education, by its nature, is a rather conservative institution that reflects the mainstream values of society and represents an adopted social agenda. It is a trailer and not a leader in political, economic, and social change. Historically great social changes precede important educational changes. Imagining the opposite relationship and neglecting today’s predominant sociopolitical forces is a political fallacy. The danger is that without labels the needs of individuals with disabilities will be ignored (see Kauffman, 2011). Surely labeling is not trivial, because labels are used to describe human beings as well as things. Labels often carry unintended stigma to receivers of services. And in many cases, the experiences of being disabled are socially constructed, mirroring the thoughts, feelings, and values of the social milieu. Indeed, the institutional response to disabilities is difficult. The “dilemma of difference” has been underlined in special education’s literature. If we emphasize existing differences (including disabilities), then we are in danger of unjustified discrimination; if we ignore the existence of disabilities or pretend that they do not exist, then we are in danger of leaving critical humans’ needs untreated (Hallahan and Kauffman, 1994; Kauffman and Badar, forthcoming). Fourth, disabilities are defined in a specific sociopolitical context and a system of social relations. Many dimensions of disabilities are part of the social process by which the social meanings of disability are negotiated (Zola, 1989). Public policy has a great impact on the lives of people with disabilities, and the formulation of disability strategy in education and public arena is of huge importance (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2010, 2011). In summary, disabilities are sealed within their social context. And many concepts about disabilities, whether involving low-incidence disabilities (e.g., severe intellectual disabilities) or high-incidence disabilities (e.g., mild intellectual disabilities, specific learning disability), have socially constructed aspects. It is not accidental that they have been classified and reclassified, defined and redefined according to the status of scientific knowledge and social values (e.g., Bruno Bettelheim’s theory of “refrigerator mothers” as a cause of autism—that autism was caused by cold, distant, and unconsciously rejecting mothers). Using the reasoning of Hacking (1999), we could make a distinction between the idea of autism (and the surrounding conceptual context) as socially constructed and autistic behaviors, which are real. Social construction does not give us insight into the severely restricted communication and social interaction of children with autism. Recognizing the influence of social context does not mean that there are no other viable ideas about disabilities. Social factors such as biomedical technology and special education can interact with biological factors, codetermining the evolution of disabilities as atypical predicaments. Thus, social and individual explanations of disabilities should be seen not as mutually exclusive but as codeterminants of development of people who have disabilities (Williams, 1999).

#### 4] Reject psychoanalysis –

#### Psychoanalysis is infinitely regressive, not falsifiable, and too abstract.

Gordon 1---Paul Gordon, accomplished psychotherapist, “Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat,” RACE & CLASS v. 42 n. 4, 2001, pp. 17-34.

But in the thirty years since Kovel wrote, that attempt to relate mind and society has been fractured by the advent of postmodernism, with its subsumption of the material/historical, of notions of cause and effect, to what is transitory, contingent, free-¯oating, evanescent. Psychoanalysis, by stepping into the vacuum left by the abandonment of all metanarrative, has tended to put mind over society. This is particularly noticeable in the work of the Centre for New Ethnicities Research at the University of East London, which purports to straddle the worlds of the academy and action by developing projects for the local community and within education generally.28 But, in marrying psychoanalysis and postmodernism, on the basis of claiming to be both scholarly and action oriented, it degrades scholarship and undermines action, and ends in discourse analysis **a language** in which metaphor passes for reality. Cohen's work unavoidably raises the question of the status of psycho- analysis as a social or political theory, as distinct from a clinical one. Can psychoanalysis, in other words, apply to the social world of groups, institutions, nations, states and cultures in the way that it does, or at least may do, to individuals? Certainly there is now a considerable body of literature and a plethora of academic courses, and so on, claim- ing that psychoanalysis is a social theory. And, of course, in popular discourse, it is now a commonplace to hear of nations and societies spoken of in personalised ways. Thus `truth commissions' and the like, which have become so common in the past decade in countries which have undergone turbulent change, are seen as forms of national therapy or catharsis, even if this is far from being their purpose. Nevertheless, the question remains: does it make sense, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, to speak of nations having psyches the way that individuals do? `Can a nation's past make people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? . . . Can we speak of nations ``working through'' a civil war or an atrocity as we speak of individuals working through a traumatic memory or event?' 47 The problem with the application of psychoanalysis to social institutions is that there can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? The pioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, all derived their ideas in the context of their work with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient. Outside of the consulting room, there can be no **such** verification process, and the further one moves from the individual **patient**, the less purchase psychoanalytic ideas can have. Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. But if everything is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true. An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some re¯ections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis. In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular ®lm Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.

#### YES YOUR PYSCHO – saying you integrate other theories doesn’t change that the underlying ‘science’ of pyscho is fake

### AT: Debate Bad

#### 1] Trying to eliminate debate produces cruel optimism and repetition compulsion because they target discriminatory acts produced by the structure of [neoliberalism] i.e debate, instead of the structure of neoliberalism itself. Turns the case – causes endless repetitious targeting of smaller structures never destroying the structure itself and ensuring the failure of the 1ac’s project.

#### 2] 20 years of empirics through debate bad kritiks flow negative.

#### 3] Debate can be used tactically to disabled students and students in general how to survive in the world. All skills don’t have to invest in the world but can be used to endure given the existence OF that world.

#### 4] Unfairness does not give you uniqueness – fairness is key to having discussions about the affs methodology and iterative which you ROTB concedes the validity of. Being unfair will just cause people to prep you out in future rounds which proves you do not do anything.

### LBL – St. Pierre 13

#### 1] This card does not exist online.

#### 2] This is a DA to your performance because it indicates that by becoming a public act of expression, the 1AC forces you to tie your success to your identity—we argue through that you should be free of that.

#### 3] St. Pierre is very deleuzian. Affective labor means that disability is fluid and contingent—if your actions and existence in the space are shaped by your labor and relations with others there is always the possibility for change – takes out all of their ontology claims.

#### 4] Perfcon – you are within this debate space using communicative technologies and spreading at 300+ WPM which means you bite into the form of communication that you critique – outweighs – A) It’s premeditated murder which is a link turn and a reason to drop you B) Resolvability: you’ve made contradictory claims so we don’t know how to resolve them which outweighs since it takes it out of the debaters’ hands.

### AT Mollow 15

#### 1] Even if it’s a good model the judge shouldn’t endorse it, results in guilt politics where the judge does nothing but believes they participate, this leads to broader exported violence in everyday life. Paints suffering as vote for us to remedy, assuages the judge of guilt bc of indivual actions when they have in fact done nothing

#### 2] Any arg that defines what indivuals can read or how they engage based on identity is causes authenticiy testing. Begs the question of who is disabled enough and people pretending to be disabled, this causes physic violenc and turns their violence posited in the 1AC

#### 3] Paternalism DA- they deny the possibillity for a legit victory- voting aff doesn’t remedy strucutral harms, you recreate the logic of paternalism where people feel they are helping disabled debaters and reproduces stereotypes that disabled debaters can only win on identity based arguments

#### 4] Args in round cant remedy structural fairness, only procedural fairnes, a ballot for me can signal my inabillity to debate in this round but doesn’t solve ablesit violence.

### LBL – Primary and Secondary Pity

#### 1] They have NOT warranted the disability drive – Mollow says the disability drive structures pity because it involves a drive towards disability, pity is the impact of that not the other way around proven by the idea that “one cannot bear not to look at disability” – if they have no justified the drive then they do not get access to ontology.

#### 2] There’s no reason this drive structures an ontological condition for the disabled body—the fact that we react in a certain way does not mean we have complete control over the disabled body.

## UV

### Conquergood

#### 1] Relies on them winning that frwk is a form of western knowledge – I don’t indite your specific aff or your reading it or the knowledge I just say not in this space right now

#### 2] Frwk is not me imposing a norm on you rather it is an agreed upon rule within the community I say you should follow, anayone can read frwk on anyone

#### 3] This card is about undocumented immigrants being exported because they lack passports, it is not the same thing.

### Delgado

#### 1] Not specific to the debate space

#### 2] Even if you prove unfairness is inev – we should strive to be as fair as possible better to have 80/20 than 100% unfair but 50/50 is best

#### 3] Presumes that my claims to fairness allow me to oppress and impose my will onto the debate space in some way which they haven’t proven

#### 4] C/A debate good stuff from above – if debate is good then fairness is too

### Antonio

#### 1] C/a Alliances DA from above

#### 2] Not spec to debate

#### 3] This card as highlighted says nothing, it just says people over invest into positions which equally applies to the aff as to the neg

#### 4] considering consequences of actions is good – it allows to not take actions with horrific consequences

## Theory Inco

### OV

#### If theory is incoherent vote neg on face – you don’t care about fairness why should we

#### Perm do the aff- you see how this gets ridiculous

#### 1NC paradigm issues answers these all

### LBL

#### 1] A) this doesn’t make any sense – this just flows neg, if its determined off abuse vote neg because you were abusive b) evaluate the round through a CI model on the T shell c) you can evaluate rounds even with theory???

#### 2] a) evalling off the flow rather than the theory is true for every form of debate – no one wants to read deleuze articles to decide a phil debate b) norms are true as proven in debate – if I win it then it’s a better norm

#### 3] a) If the rule is that much worse you should be able to win it b) this is just a reason for you to be better at theory or at best a reasonability claim not a reason to get rid of it all together

#### 4] A) empirically denied – debates have happened with it B) its obviously not a binding rule like ev ethics rather just what we think would be better C) games such as horse or games like monopoly with house rules disprove

#### 5] a) if its marginally better than nothing then you have created a better norm b) your burden to prove there is a best version of the interp C) this is true for everything – If you don’t have the best K but a good one you would still win

#### 6] a) this doesn’t understand theory – we limit some arguments, no one wants to get rid of all arguments. B) you limit some arguments but use arguments too

# RFD