
## 1NC Shell:

#### Interpretation—The aff must disclose the advocacy text and the standard text before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation—they didn't



#### The standard is prep and clash- Two internal links-a) Neg prep: The AC framework controls the direction of a round – even if its whole rez, my prep drastically differs based on a util AC, topical K aff, or a burden/tricks aff. 4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn a little about the affirmative and piece together what 1nc positions work best against the affirmative and cut and research their applications to the affirmative. Exacerbated by the fact that philosophy can be dense and hard to fully understand with a few cross ex questions absent any pre-round prep. They also get months to frontline their one aff, while I coming into the round guessing—o/w since their already structurally ahead, b) Aff quality-disclosing the framework text allows preliminary research into the framework preventing frameworks from winning just because they are terribly confusing and not a philosophy that policymakers would actually use-if they affirmatives framework would be crushed with 20 minutes of research then it does not deserve to win. This will answer the 1ar's claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there's still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can't check against the broader literature.

#### Fairness- consittutive of comp activites, args presume

#### Edu- funded ny schools

#### DTD- dta illogical, time skew

#### No RVI’s- illogical, baiting

#### CI- intervention, race to bottom, collapses, yours vs best

#### Theory before the K – A] Prior question. My theory argument calls into question the ability to run the argument in the first place. They can’t say the same even if they criticize theory because theory makes rules of the game not just normative statements about what debaters should say. B] Fair testing. Judge their arguments knowing I wasn’t given a fair shot to answer them. Prefer theory takes out K because they could answer my arguments, but I couldn’t answer theirs. Without testing their args, we don’t know if they’re valid, so you prefer fairness impacts on strength of link. Impact turns any critical education since a marketplace of ideas where we innovate, and test ideas presumes equal access.

#### We are not defending the resolution – we dive into the black hole as well as the 1AC

# Case

#### Zero aff solvency

#### (1) Alliance DA - using debate as a mode of advocacy ensures the failure of their radical project – competition means debaters ally themselves with individuals who vote for them and alienate those who are positioned with the burden of rejoinder and forced to negate – at worst you vote negative on presumption because they don’t use debate as a stepping stone for their advocacy outside the space and don’t have a net benefit to affirming the 1ac

#### (2) Ballot turn – tying ballots to survivability or the aff is violent as it forces the judge to determine whether their method of survival was “good enough” to get the ballot, which causes self hatred given loses

#### 3) they bite back into knowledge production – no way to prove the aff is not antiblack too

#### Moten’s conceptualization of power conflates the state with sovereignty, creating an idea that “power is power”---makes movements like Black Nationalism impossible

Elsby 19 Charlene Elsby 19, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University at Fort Wayne, “Fred Moten, Consent Not To Be A Single Being,” Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy, 7/9/19, https://www.c-scp.org/2019/07/09/fred-moten-consent-not-to-be-a-single-being

If I have one significant criticism about these books, then it is a criticism with the way in which Moten adopts contemporary theories of sovereign power. That is, occasional exceptions notwithstanding, Moten tends to uncritically adopt the Foucault-through-Agamben conception of sovereignty that mystifies social relations, due to its inability to break from the conception of social power inherited from Hobbes and classical liberalism. In Stolen Life, for example, he writes that “[w]hat remains necessary are the ongoing imperatives of exodus from the genocidal construct of human sovereignty that ceaselessly consumes what it is meant to protect.” (SL, 226) Such a claim is a recurrent theme throughout the trilogy. What results is a conflation of the state and nation with sovereignty, which is common for this type of analysis, and this prevents him from being able to conceptualize what a state or nation are beyond being sites of sovereignty–which is tantamount to declaring power is power. This understanding of social power results in a possible lacuna in his interest in furthering the black radical tradition: Black Nationalism was central to the black radicalism of the 1960s/70s and, however we might judge it now, was significant in revealing which radicals were the allies of Black Liberation. When Hal Draper called Black Nationalism, “Jim Crow in reverse,” radicals knew which side of history he stood on, regardless of his Marxism. And what do demands for an “exodus” from sovereignty–which are identical to claims made by Agamben who, as Weheliye has argued, ignored both slavery and settler-colonialism–mean for radical Indigenous struggles that have generally understood national sovereignty as central to their existence? Due to such an understanding of social power, therefore, Moten makes the occasional strange claim, such as when he claims that the “subprime debtor…is also a freedom fighter” (UM, 245), which I am sure would be news for many subprime debtors.

#### Blackness is not para-ontological---Moten’s theory can never move beyond fugitivity and relies on a misapplication of Fanon and Heidegger

Marriot 16 David Marriott 16. Professor, UC Santa Cruz. “Cultural Studies in Emerging Knowledge.” Rhizomes 29: 1-5. <http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/pdf/marriott.pdf>.

[4] Crucially, Moten presents his argument not as a 'refusal' of Fanon, but as a 'demand that we read' his texts as if 'for the first time'.[9] This would mean that any reading of Fanon must begin naively (etymologically speaking), without prejudice or prescription: it's a demand that recalls phenomenology's approach to things/sachen (an approach in which reading is both a bracketing and a reduction). This scene is immediately complicated, however, in that naïve reading, which in this hypothesis or story is to begin without judgment, reappears in the prescription that we read naively. Indeed, if naivety is demanded what would it mean to prescribe Fanon's texts as the addressee of that naivety? And if one accepted, with Moten, that such naïve reading constitutes neither a refusal nor judgment of Fanon, and if it were decided that such reading could also be named a refusal of refusal (of Fanon's disavowing claim), then the complication only spreads. That demand for naivety, which describes itself as black optimism, is in turn derived from a certain reading of Heidegger. It is from the latter that Moten rapidly determines what it means to give the 'case' of blackness a hearing, to register the optimism of its outpouring despite the 'horror of its making', or the horror from which it was made.[10] The word 'case' must be understood as both a tribunal and its hearing, but 'case' too in the sense of psychopathology: here Moten does not explain why, nominally speaking, the case of blackness should take the form of a juridical dispute between Fanon and Heidegger, nor why that dispute should be settled by the latter's account of 'representational thinking'.[11] In terms of the law applicable to this case, Fanon's crime, then, would be his failure to think beyond law or pathology, or to imagine a new set of possibilities as defined by Heidegger's ontological naivety—but also that the latter's claim to return representation to its ontological ground (as too in Moten's constant implicit claim to give blackness a hearing) merely means that Fanon's own critique of ontology is inevitably reduced to a litigious politics of representation. [5] We know that the case of blackness (and its juridical rhetoric) includes at least two questions: what is this thing called blackness and how is it to be represented? The junction at which these two questions meet in Peau noire, masques blancs is that of a flaw: this flaw is born very specifically from an experience of ruination 'that interdicts any ontological explanation'.[12] In the colony, the phenomenological form of social power is never immediate, that is to say, a relation of representation, but a confrontation that designifies, and, at the same time, resignifies social relations once they are racially determined, a confrontation in which both being and law acquire new significations born out of disavowal (what Fanon defines as the lactifying desire for substitution or separation of the black from the négre, and of the white from its other) and of amplification (the recoding of the social and symbolic order by racial signifiers of precarity and threat, fear and impoverishment). Saying that there is a question whether blackness is disavowed in Fanon, a disavowal whose meaning is in dispute, **does not**, however, **explain** why Moten continues to use the language of ontology and of law to explain Fanon's writing on blackness as a phenomenology. The etymology of the word 'case' also includes that of **contingency** and of fall (lapsus); that is to say, the meaning of blackness is **not prescribed**, and has no prior signification before it is raced. This contingency or fall (the lapsus or trauma of racialization) denotes not a prescribed imperfection but refers to the time, paradoxically enough, in which the black comes face to face with its own contaminating filiation with the négre, a confrontation that is never simply in the order of an object, but is that of an exposure that is also the work of a certain concealment; it is a moment in which any simple history (of escape or confinement, mimicry or identification) is necessarily the impure avowal of an imaginary longing for a colorless presence, meaning, or proximity. If one accepts, along with Moten, that blackness always escapes its positioning in either law or representation, and if it were to be shown that neither that law (or its history) nor that representation (or its history) can capture 'the case blackness makes for itself in spite of and by way of every interdiction', according to which this case names both a specific pathology and object, then **why** hold onto this juridical rhetoric (with respect to the case) to present that which **apparently** always escapes law and representation?[13] [6] By writing blackness as ceaseless fugitivity, Moten has moved towards a position in which blackness is only black when it exceeds its racist disavowal. Or, the blackness of blackness can only be recognized as black in so far as it escapes the racism of its history: but what allows us to see this escape is not blackness, but its racist disavowal. Or, in order to reconcile blackness with that which blackness supposedly is, Moten has to rely on the narrative of its constraint or pathology, **which he cannot do without**: this pathology enables Moten to avoid the disavowing naiveties of Fanon but only in so far as he too reads naively, or optimistically. A third possibility would make this disavowing claim, that Moten wants to make deliver up its secrets, a sign of how Moten himself disavows how racist disavowal complicates his reading of what he describes as Fanon's phenomenology, in which impurity inevitably generates a pathological meaning. Or again: if Fanon hears what Moten does not hear (in terms of his reading of the case), this is because Moten can only affirm blackness as affirmation, not because it escapes pathology, but because blackness is experienced **only** as the activity of escape, but one which **never escapes the ontology of such production**. It follows that blackness **cannot escape** its own fugitivity; its constitutive moment is traversal (or, what constitutes it is its force of subversion with regard to the pathological classifications of blackness). If Fanon fails 'to investigate more adequately the change from object to thing', one could also suggest this failure fails to address, or **forecloses**, that other scene in Fanon; in short, how the very distinction between **object and thing** refuses to engage with the Fanonian unconscious (in which the object is **neither** simply represented nor simply fugitive to the languages of **law**, **ontology**, or **difference**).[14] The form of this problem seems to be linked to what can appear to be a persistent equivocation in Moten's reading of Fanon between apparently ontological claims and the use of the aesthetic-political to somehow escape ontology. This situation, which would demand new formulations of the relationship between ontology and the aesthetic-political, is perhaps programmed by the logic of a presentation which needs to see a radical break between them, a necessity whose prescription is also thus disavowed. [7]

#### Reject silence as a political orientation. It can’t enumerate a political paradigm out of modernity’s crimes

McGowan 18 John McGowan 18, John W. and Anna H. Hanes Distinguished Professor @ UNC in English and Comparative Literature, “Moten and Harney, The Undercommons,” McGowan Blog, 6/20/18, https://jzmcgowan.com/2018/06/20/moten-and-harney-the-undercommons/

M&H have any number of things they want to reject/refuse. But the two big ones are politics and individuation. Politics is pernicious precisely because it insists on the formation of subjects, of individuals, who then step forward to ask for recognition, to make claims on the basis of rights, to articulate interests that must be taken into account, and to grab/claim a share of goods. The very act of subject formation, of individuation, sets in motion a credit/debt accounting, a parceling out of responsibility, and of owing that M&H want to get out from under. So they are with the various leftists I have been discussing these past few months in seeing the making of political demands only as a trap that legitimizes the powers and institutions to which the demands are addressed. Moten told us that he rejected everything that Arendt designated as politics. Yet . . . M&H also accept that the current order of things is rotten to the core. Modernity is constituted by anti-blackness, by the exclusion of the black subject even as that black body’s labor is extracted from it. Blacks are “conscripts of modernity”—and it would be a terrible mistake for them to see their goal (political or otherwise) as admission to the condition of the rights-bearing modern subject. “You have denied us a place in modernity even as we are the condition of its emergence and persistence. Don’t delude yourselves that what we want is what you have. We want something utterly different.” What is that utterly different thing? Here is where is gets both inspiring and weird. Moten fully admitted to a romanticism of “black sociality.” There is nothing wrong with us (blacks). We are already doing what we want to do, being who we want to be, in the fullness of black sociality (which also goes by the name of the “undercommons.”) M&H aspire to a fundamental affirmation; black life is not about lack or deprivation; black life, instead, is a rich set of practices and entanglements that were created “in the hold” of modernity, out of a need to live otherwise. The basic message: “We are here. You can’t get rid of us (as much as you might want to). And we won’t be placated by the crumbs you think to push our way. But we have our own world, the one we have created in your despite, and we just want to live in that world, as untroubled by you as possible.” An odd kind of quietism. Just leave us alone. We don’t want to partake of your madness. We ask nothing of you; just stop bothering us. Yet—Moten also said “anti-blackness” is what is going to kill me, just as it killed my father and my grandfather, and it will kill my children. Because whites can’t just leave blacks alone since modernity is dependent on the exploitation of blacks. Moten also said that anti-blackness will kill everyone—even (maybe especially Donald Trump) because modernity is poison. But that description of a murderous modernity makes the affirmation of a quietist sociality harder to stomach. Living in the interstices (Ellison’s invisible man) is a completely understandable strategy. But it is surely a second best. Is there no hope, no politics, that can address modernity’s crimes and mis-steps?

#### The aff fails---fugitivity is a flawed method of political engagement that makes neoliberal violence inevitable.

Love 15 – Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania [Heather, ““Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary,” differences Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 89-91]

Today, queer studies – prestigious but unevenly institutionalized – still signals absolute refusal or criticality – all anti- and no normativity. In their influential 2004 essay, “The University and the Undercommons” (and in the 2013 book that followed from it), Fred **Moten and** Stefano Harney rely on such an understanding of queer (as well as concepts borrowed from black studies, feminism, ethnic studies, and anticolonial thought). They **call for betrayal, refusal**, theft, **and marronage** as modes of resisting the iron grip of the academy, pointing to an uncharted, underground, and collective space they call the undercommons. “To enter this space,” they write, “is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons” (103). Moten and Harney speculate whether the “thought of the outside” (105) is possible inside the university and suggest that if there is an outside, it is along the margins and at the bottom. **Yet their imagination of that outside is indebted to the inside**, in particular to the conception of deviance produced within sociology. **Their account of the undercommons reads like a rap sheet, a list of the traditional topics of deviance studies: theft, homosexuality, prostitution, incarceration. Moten and Harney do not describe the undercommons, but rather ask their readers to join it**, to participate in active revolt against profes- sional and disciplinary protocols. To o er an objective account of the social position of radical academics would be to further business as usual in the academy; dwelling in the undercommons requires giving up on the usual protocols of description. Moten and Harney argue against the traditional role of the “critical academic” (105), which they see as just another turn of the professional screw, since work that opposes the academy does not challenge its basic structure or everyday operations. They argue that “to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and to be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of the internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions” (105). In contrast to the figure of the critical academic, they forward the image of the “subversive intellectual” who is “in but not of” the academy (101). Without dismissing the galvanizing effect of such a call to the undercommons, **it is important to consider the limits of the refusal of objectification as a strategy**. To be unlocatable, to be nowhere, to be in permanent revolt: Moten and Harney describe the path that queer inquiry laid out for itself. **Objectification** – **recognition, description, critique** – **can be a way to reinforce the status quo, but it is also a way of acknowledging one’s institutional position and the real differences between inside and outside**. Even the most subversive intellectuals in the academy are “on the stroll” in a metaphorical but not a material sense. The fate of those who came “under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love” (101), if they survive, is to become “superordinates” in Becker’s sense. Whose side are we on? Can we hold onto the critical and polemical energy of queer studies as well as its radical experiments in style and thought while acknowledging our implication in systems of power, management, and control? Will a more explicit avowal of disciplinary affiliations and methods snuff out the utopian energies of a field that sees itself as a radical outsider in the university? To date, **both the political and the methodological antinormativity** of queer studies **have made it difficult to address our implication in the violence of knowledge production, pedagogy, and social inequality.** **Such violence is inevitable, and critical histories of the disciplines** – and the production of knowledge about social deviance – **are essential.** **Undertaking such work**, **however**, **will not allow escape into a radically different relation to our objects because we are** (as Moten and Harney also argue) part of that history – we are **its contemporary instantiation**. To imagine a social world in which those relations are transformed – in what Moten and Harney refer to as the “**prophetic organization**” (102) – **may be crucial for** the achievement of **social justice, but to deny our own implication in existing structures is also a form of violence**.

#### Performance fails – it gets coopted by the audience and becomes valueless.

Phelan 03 [Peggy, chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies. 2003. “Unmarked: The Politics of Performance.”]

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes itself through disappearance. The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to the laws of the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressedby the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occursover a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, butthis repetition itself marks it as “different.” The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present. The other arts, especially painting and photography, are drawnincreasingly toward performance. The French-born artist Sophie Calle,for example, has photographed the galleries of the Isabella StewartGardner Museum in Boston. Several valuable paintings were stolen fromthe museum in 1990. Calle interviewed various visitors and membersof the muse um staff, asking them to describe the stolen paintings. She then transcribed these texts and placed them next to the photographs of the galleries. Her work suggests that the descriptions and memories of the paintings constitute their continuing “presence,” despite the absence of the paintings themselves. Calle gestures toward a notion of the interactive exchange between the art object and the viewer. While such exchanges are often recorded as the stated goals of museums and galleries, the institutional effect of the gallery often seems to put the masterpiece under house arrest, controlling all conflicting and unprofessional commentary about it. The speech act of memory and description (Austin’s constative utterance) becomes a performative expression when Calle places these commentaries within the 147 representation of the museum. The descriptions fill in, and thus supplement (add to, defer, and displace) the stolen paintings. The fact that these descriptions vary considerably—even at times wildly—only lends credence to the fact that the interaction between the art object and the spectator is, essentially, performative—and therefore resistant to the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. While the art historian of painting must ask if there production is accurate and clear, Calle asks where seeing and memory forget the object itself and enter the subject’s own set of personal meanings and associations. Further her work suggests that the forgetting (or stealing) of the object is a fundamental energy of its descriptive recovering. The description itself does not reproduce the object, it rather helps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost. The descriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and generates recovery—not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers. The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; it rehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs alwaysto be remembered. For her contribution to the Dislocations show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1991, Calle used the same idea but this time she asked curators, guards, and restorers to describe paintings that were on loan from the permanent collection. She also asked them to draw small pictures of their memories of the paintings. She then arranged the texts and pictures according to the exact dimensions of the circulating paintings and placed them on the wall where the actual paintings usually hang. Calle calls her piece Ghosts, and as the visitor discovers Calle’s work spread throughout the museum, it is as if Calle’s own eye is following and tracking the viewer as she makes her way through the museum.1 Moreover, Calle’s work seems to disappear because it is dispersed throughout the “permanent collection”—a collection which circulates despite its “permanence.” Calle’s artistic contribution is a kind of self-concealment in which she offers the words of others about other works of art under her own artistic signature. By making visible her attempt to offer what she does not have, what cannot be seen, Calle subverts the goal of museum display. She exposes what the museum does not have and cannot offer and uses that absence to generate her own work. By placing memories in the place of paintings, Calle asks that the ghosts of memory be seen as equivalent to “the permanent collection” of “great works.” One senses that if she asked the same people over and over about the same paintings, each time they would describe a slightly different painting. In this sense, Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing. 148 I Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive. It is this quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital. Perhaps nowhere was the affinity between the ideology of capitalism and art made more manifest than in the debates about the funding policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).2 Targeting both photography and performance art, conservative politicians sought to prevent endorsing the “real” bodies implicated and made visible by these art forms. Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present—and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only spends. While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.3 To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter the event itself. Just as quantum physics discovered that macro-instruments cannot measure microscopic particles without transforming those particles, so too must performance critics realize that the labor to write about performance (and thus to “preserve” it) is also a labor that fundamentally alters the event. It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing toward disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself. This is the project of Roland Barthes in both Camera Lucida and Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. It is also his project in Empire of Signs, but in this book he takes the memory of a city in which he no longer is, a city from which he disappears, as the motivation for the search for a disappearing performative writing. The trace left by that script is the meeting-point of a mutual disappearance; shared subjectivity is possible for Barthes because two people can recognize the same Impossible. To live for a love whose goal is to share the Impossible is both a humbling project and an exceedingly ambitious one, for it seeks to find connection only in that which is no longer there. Memory. Sight. Love. It must involve a full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence. In the field of linguistics, the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated. “Being an individual and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. Each reproduction is a new act performed by someone who is qualified. Otherwise, the reproduction of the performative utterance by someone else necessarily transforms it into a constative utterance.”4 149 Writing, an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same (the three letters cat will repeatedly signify the four-legged furry animal with whiskers) for the production of meaning, can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive. The mimicry of speech and writing, the strange process by which we put words in each other’s mouths and others’ words in our own, relies on a substitutional economy in which equivalencies are assumed and re-established. Performance refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy fundamental to it. Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward. Writing about it necessarily cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this performative promise. Performance’s independence from mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength. But buffeted by the encroaching ideologies of capitaland reproduction, it frequently devalues this strength. Writing about performance often, unwittingly, encourages this weakness and falls in behind the drive of the document/ary. Performance’s challenge to writingis to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than, as Benveniste warned, constative utterances.

### AT: Debate Bad

#### 1] No solvency and turn – debate as a communicative act may be violent, but they’re authors don’t differentiate it from the rest of the world it’s just an institution inside the anti-black world. They misread their authors the 1AC is a “band-aid” solution their authors don’t treat debate nihilistically in isolation BUT the world and eradicating debate doesn’t change the master-slave dialectic that recreates violence in different forms – proves it’s not endurance. ALL they actually do is generate cruel optimism that links to 1AC Gillespie since it creates a feel good solution that places blackness in a not yet but maybe to come social order where black infiltration of tournaments occurs.

#### 2] Even if debate is bad it can tactically be used to teach Black people their correct positioning in the world so they can approach the world without investing hope in it – the alternative is Black people not learning this position and investing hope in everything which recreates cruel optimism and turns the case.

#### 3] Debate is good, double bind either the AC performance is strong enough to destroy debate which should have been done x bids ago or the Ac’s performance doesn’t have anything to prove which means the squo is quite strong and that causes presumption.

#### 4] Every single ballot, speech time you follow, speaker award you receive with this aff just feeds into the structure of debate, you are empowering debate by continuously paying to go to tournaments and reading this aff, which proves that an affirmative ballot cannot be the way to resolve debate being bad.

## Framing

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate consequences.

#### 1] Consequences first — anything else is irresponsible and escapes valuable discussions.

**Bracey 06** (Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318)

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### 2] No performative or methodological offense—it’s extra-topical which is a voting issue because it explodes predictable limits, spiking out of neg ground making any discussion qualitatively worse

#### 3] Util good – Existential threats outweigh.

**GPP 17** (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater**. ...** The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in.Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided.The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks.Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. **74** Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large.Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude.A wide range of other cognitive biases

#### 4] We access their role of the ballot—nuclear war and warming causes massive suffering and disproportionately affects minorities. Proves even if they win their framing nuke war and warming are still a tiebreaker.

#### 5] Don’t let them weigh the sum total of violence —they only get to weigh the unique amount solved by the affirmative. Filter the debate through scope of solvency—there’s no impact to root cause if they don’t solve it.

## Cap Good

**Global inequality decreasing---cap is key.**

**Tupy 15** (Marian L [a senior policy analyst at the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity]; Stop obsessing about inequality. It's actually decreasing around the world; Jan 8; www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/01/08/stop-obsessing-about-inequality-its-actually-decreasing-around-the-world/)

Is **inequality** increasing or decreasing? The answer **depends on our point of reference.** In America, the income gap between the top 1 percent and the rest has grown. But **if we look** not **at** America, but **the world, inequality is shrinking. We are witnessing**, in the words of the World Bank’s Branko Milanovic, **“the first decline in global inequality between world citizens since the Industrial Revolution**.” For most of human history, incomes were more equal, but terribly low. Two thousand years ago, GDP per person in the most advanced parts of the world hovered around $3.50 per day. That was the global average 1,800 years later. But by the early 19th century, a pronounced income gap emerged between the West and the rest. Take the United States. In 1820, the U.S. was 1.9 times richer than the global average. The income gap grew to 4.1 in 1960 and reached its maximum level of 4.8 in 1999. By 2010, it had shrunk by 19 percent to 3.9. **That narrowing is not a function of declining Western incomes**. During the Great Recession, for example, U.S. GDP per capita decreased by 4.8 percent between 2007 and 2009**. It rebounded by 5.7 percent over the next 4 years and stands at an all-time high today**. Rather, the narrowing of the income gap is a result of growing incomes in the rest of the world. Consider the spectacular rise of Asia. In 1960, the U.S. was 11 times richer than Asia. Today, America is only 4.8 times richer than Asia. To understand why, let’s look at China. Between 1958 and 1961, Mao Zedong attempted to transform China’s largely agricultural economy into an industrial one through the “Great Leap Forward.” His stated goal was to overtake UK’s industrial production in 15 years. Industrialization, which included building of factories at home as well as large-scale purchases of machinery abroad, was to be paid for by food produced on collective farms. But the collectivization of agriculture resulted in famine that killed between 18 and 45 million people. Industrial initiatives, such as Mao’s attempt to massively increase production of steel, were equally disastrous. People burned their houses to stoke the fires of the steel mills and melted cooking wares to fulfil the steel production quotas. The result was destruction, rather than creation of wealth. Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor, partially privatized the farmland and allowed farmers to sell their produce. Trade liberalization ensured that Chinese industrial output would no longer be dictated by production quotas, but by the demands of the international economy. But **Following liberalization in 1978, China’s GDP per capita has increased 12.5 fold,** rising from $545 in 1980 to $6,807 in 2013. Over the same time period, the Chinese poverty rate fell from 84 percent to 10 percent. **What is true of China is also true in much of the developing world. As** Laurence Chandy and Geoffrey Gertz of the Brookings Institution wrote in 2011, “**poverty reduction of this magnitude is unparalleled in history: never before have so many people been lifted out of poverty over such a brief period of time.” Developing countries have made strides in other areas too**. Take life expectancy. Between 1960 and 2010, global life expectancy increased from 53 years to 70. In the U.S. over the same period it rose from 70 to 78**. Similar stories can be told about child and maternal mortality, treatment of communicable diseases, and the spread of technology. Many** Americans **point to globalization as a bogeyman,** robbing our country of good jobs and resources. But really, **the phenomenon has ushered a period of unprecedented prosperity in many poor countries**. Even as we struggle with economic problems at home let us remember the global – and largely positive – perspective on the state of the world.

**Cap solves climate change and alternatives only accelerate it**

---dismantling systems isn’t easy takes time, means warming accelerates in the interim

---causes wars because it forces political upheaval and people will fight to keep capitalism which is both offense and means alt fails

---US has decreased emissions now, sustainable energy like wind, solar, and hydro solve, our ev cites a report that looked at over 7000 cases says sustainable is competitive and will be adopted universally in 10 years

---during transition in order to beat the system, the movement would have to massively ramp up emissions to build weapons which locks in warming

**Smith 19** [Noah Smith Noah Smith is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He was an assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University, and he blogs at Noahpinion, “Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet”, April 5, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism, DOA: 8/20/19] Ian M

public-private cooperation will do more to limit climate change than eco-socialism. It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines. The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major political upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare. Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards have improved substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher). **Doubting the Carbon-Capitalism Equation** In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power. The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free cement production and so on. The best [climate](https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/15/how-to-decarbonize-america-and-the-world/) policy [plans](https://www.dataforprogress.org/green-new-deal) all involve technological improvement as a key feature. Recent developments show that the technology-centered approach can work. A recent report by Bloomberg New Energy Finance analyzed about 7000 projects in 46 countries, and found that large drops in the cost of solar power from photovoltaic systems, wind power and lithium-ion batteries have made utility-scale renewable electricity competitive with fossil fuels. A 76 percent decline in the cost of energy for short-term battery storage since 2012 is especially important. In a blog post, futurist and energy writer Ramez Naam underscores the significance of these developments. Naam notes the important difference between renewables being cheap enough to outprice new fossil-fuel plants, and being inexpensive enough to undercut existing plants. The former is already the case across much of the world, which is among the reasons for an 84 percent decrease in the number of new coal-fired plants worldwide since 2015. But when it becomes cheaper to scrap existing fossil-fuel plants and build renewables in their place, it will allow renewables to start replacing coal and gas much more quickly. Naam cites examples from Florida and Indiana where this is already being done. He cites industry predictions that replacing existing fossil-fuel plants with renewables will be economically efficient almost everywhere at some point in the next decade. Electricity is far from the only source of carbon emissions — there’s also transportation, manufacturing (especially of steel and cement), home and office heating, and agriculture to worry about. But the rapid advance of solar technology is a huge victory in the struggle against climate change, because it will allow people all over the world to have electricity without cooking the planet. And how was this victory achieved? A combination of smart government policy and private industry. Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers Goksin Kavlak, James McNerney and Jessika Trancik in a recent paper evaluated the factors behind the solar-price decline from 1980 to 2012. They concluded that from 1980 to 2001, government-funded research and development was the main factor in bringing down costs, but from 2001 to 2012, the biggest factor was economies of scale. These economies of scale were driven by private industry increasing output, but with government subsidies helping to increase the incentive to ramp up production. It’s apparent, therefore, that both government and profit-seeking enterprises have their roles to play. Government funds the development of early-stage technology and then helps push the private sector toward adopting those technologies, while private companies compete to find ever-cheaper methods of implementation. Instead of eco-socialism, it’s eco-industrialism. If there’s any system that can beat climate change, this looks like it.

**Growth forces structural changes that solve environmental damage**

Faik **Bilgili et al. 16**. \*\*PhD in Economics, The City University of New York and Istanbul University; professor of Economics, Erciyes University, Turkey. \*\* Emrah Kocak, Researcher, Evran University. \*\*Ümit Bulut, PhD in Economics, Gazi University and Professor of Economics, Ahi Evran University. “The dynamic impact of renewable energy consumption on CO2 emissions: A revisited Environmental Kuznets Curve approach.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 54(Feb): 838-9. Emory Libraries.

Some seminal papers reveal that, **within the process of economic growth, environmental pollution level first scales up and later scales down**. This is **an inverted U-shaped relationship between GDP** per capita **and pollution level** (Grossman and Krueger [3,4], Panayotou [5], Shafik [6], Selden and Song [7]). Since this relationship resembles the relationship between GDP per capita and income inequality produced by Kuznets [8], Panayotou [5] calls it Environmental **Kuznets Curve (EKC)**. According to the EKC hypothesis, **the level of environmental pollution** initially intensifies because of economic growth, later **tampers after GDP per capita reaches a threshold value** (Panayotou [5], Suri and Chapman [9]; Stern [10]). Therefore, this hypothesis implies a dynamic process in which **structural change occurs together with economic growth** (Dinda [2]). Grossman and Krueger [3] first clarify how the EKC arises. They explore that **economic growth affects environmental quality through three channels:** (i) **scale effect,** (ii) **structural effect, and** (iii) **technological effect**. Fig. 1 presents the EKC within the periods of (i), (ii) and (iii). According to the scale effect, given the level of technology, more resources and inputs are employed to produce more commodities at the beginning of economic growth path. Hence, more energy resources and production will induce more waste and pollutant emissions, and the level of environmental quality will get worse (Torras and Boyce [11], Dinda [2], Prieur [12]). **The structural effect states that the economy will have a structural transformation, and economic growth will affect environment positively along with continuation of growth**. In other words, **as national production grows the structure of economy changes**, and **the share of less polluting economic activities increases gradually**. Besides, **an economy experiences a transition from capital-intensive industrial sectors to service sector and reaches technology-intensive knowledge economy** (the final stage of the structural change). Due to the fact **that technology-intensive sectors utilize fewer natural sources, the impact of these sectors on environmental pollution will be less**. The last channel of the growth process is the technological effect channel. **Since a high-income economy can allocate more resources for research and development expenditures, the new technological processes will emerge**. Thus, **the country will replace old and dirty technologies with new and clean technologies, and environmental quality will deepen** (Borghesi [13], Copelan and Taylor [14]). Consequently, **environmental pollution** initially increases and later **decreases as a result of scale, structural and technological effect emerging along with growth path**. Some studies of EKC hypothesis consider income elasticity of clean environment demand (Beckerman [15], Selden and Song [16], McConnel [17], Panayotou [18], Carson et al. [19], Brock and Taylor [20]). Accordingly, the share of low-income people’s expenditures for food and basic necessities is higher than that of high-income societies’ expenditures for the same type of commodities (Engel’s Law). **As income level and life standards rise in conjunction with economic growth, the societies’ demand for clean environment advances**. Besides, **societies make often pressure on policy makers to protect the environment through new regulations**. One might argue that, because of these reasons, clean environment is a luxury commodity and the **demand elasticity of clean environment is higher than unity** (Dinda [2]).