## K

#### Capitalist values have libidinally coded themselves into the human psyche forcing any investment in the world including the plan is prefigured by an “ethics of envy” that leads to inevitable social and physical death.

Wilkinson 5 Will, policy analyst @CATO, “Capitalism and Human Nature”, CATO Policy Report, XXVII(1), January/February, <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/wilkinson-050201.html>)Perhaps the most depressing lesson of evolutionary psychology for politics is found in its account of the deep-seated human capacity for envy and, related, of our difficulty in understanding the idea of gains from trade and increases in productivity—the idea of an ever-expanding "pie" of wealth. There is evidence that greater skill and initiative could lead to higher status and bigger shares of resources for an individual in the EEA. But because of the social nature of hunting and gathering, the fact that food spoiled quickly, and the utter absence of privacy, the benefits of individual success in hunting or foraging could not be easily internalized by the individual, and were expected to be shared. The EEA was for the most part a zero-sum world, where increases in total wealth through invention, investment, and extended economic exchange were totally unknown. More for you was less for me. Therefore, if anyone managed to acquire a great deal more than anyone else, that was pretty good evidence that theirs was a stash of ill-gotten gains, acquired by cheating, stealing, raw force, or, at best, sheer luck. Envy of the disproportionately wealthy may have helped to reinforce generally adaptive norms of sharing and to help those of lower status on the dominance hierarchy guard against further predation by those able to amass power. Our zero-sum mentality makes it hard for us to understand how trade and investment can increase the amount of total wealth. We are thus ill-equipped to easily understand our own economic system. These features of human nature—that we are coalitional, hierarchical, and envious zero-sum thinkers—would seem to make liberal capitalism extremely unlikely. And it is. However, the benefits of a liberal market order can be seen in a few further features of the human mind and social organization in the EEA. Property Rights are Natural The problem of distributing scarce resources can be handled in part by implicitly coercive allocative hierarchies. An alternative solution to the problem of distribution is the recognition and enforcement of property rights. Property rights are prefigured in nature by the way animals mark out territories for their exclusive use in foraging, hunting, and mating. Recognition of such rudimentary claims to control and exclude minimizes costly conflict, which by itself provides a strong evolutionary reason to look for innate tendencies to recognize and respect norms of property. New scientific research provides even stronger evidence for the existence of such property "instincts." For example, recent experimental work by Oliver Goodenough, a legal theorist, and Christine Prehn, a neuroscientist, suggests that the human mind evolved specialized modules for making judgments about moral transgressions, and transgressions against property in particular. Evolutionary psychology can help us to understand that property rights are not created simply by strokes of the legislator's pen. Mutually Beneficial Exchange is Natural Trade and mutually beneficial exchange are human universals, as is the division of labor. In their groundbreaking paper, "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange," Cosmides and Tooby point out that, contrary to widespread belief, hunter-gatherer life is not "a kind of retro-utopia" of "indiscriminate, egalitarian cooperation and sharing." The archeological and ethnographic evidence shows that hunter-gatherers were involved in numerous forms of trade and exchange. Some forms of hunter-gatherer trading can involve quite complex specialization and the interaction of supply and demand. Most impressive, Cosmides and Tooby have shown through a series of experiments that human beings are able easily to solve complex logical puzzles involving reciprocity, the accounting of costs and benefits, and the detection of people who have cheated on agreements. However, we are unable to solve formally identical puzzles that do not deal with questions of social exchange. That, they argue, points to the existence of "functionally specialized, content-dependent cognitive adaptations for social exchange."

#### The affirmative accelerates a global transition of communicative networks towards nodocentric activism, in which necropolitical feedback loops sustain a cruelly optimistic investment in the global ramifications of our decision-making.

Nyong’o 12 (Tavia Nyong’o, Yale University, “Queer Africa and the Fantasy of Virtual Participation”, <https://nyongo.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/40-1-2-wsq.pdf>, 2012) CJun

What explains the simultaneity of these messages on the web platform of a single activist site?^ I don't wish to single out a well-meaning, multi-issue activist organization for undue criticism, simply for failing to keep a webpage updated. The dynamic of the story is undoubtedly complex: the Bahati bill has wound an unpredictable way through Uganda's legislative procedure, periodically appearing to be on the verge of adoption before being semi-permanently "shelved" in May 2011 (although its author vows to reintroduce a new version after elections due in February 2012) ("Uganda's Anti-gay Bill 'Shelved'" 2011). Without unfair criticism, I do want to point out how the Internet is shaping the communicative strategy of humanitarian and human rights activism.\* Technology theorist Jaron Lanier (2010) calls these design "lock-ins," structures that become self-sustaining because of mass adoption and the consequent nigh impossibility of conversion to more optimal systems. Because of one such arbitrary structure of the web, for instance, the call to action and the follow-up reports are on different webpages (in this case not even hyperlinked to each other). The sharing mechanism of web 2.0 sites like Facebook and Twitter further isolate individual pages from the sites they originate from, and add their own independent commenting and archiving that can perpetuate the life of the page even if it is updated or removed on the original server. The rhythmic urgency and delay produced by the series of action alerts and updates on the Avaaz website can thus not exactly be mapped directly onto the chronology of the Bahati bill's progression through Uganda's parliament. Because of the peculiar temporality of alerting an indefinite number of people via the Internet, Avaaz activists deliberately composed their alert to be chronologically ambiguous. Rhetorically, the call combines temporal urgency with no specific time frame.^ A webpage, instantly accessible globally at low cost, is best left ambiguous, all the better to capture the marginal utility of the least committed, least informed browser who can be convinced to click a button and send an email. The homepage ofAvaaz.org at any given point in time is a bewildering array of flash points from that day's or week's media, drawn from all corners of the globe. Encountering it, one is confronted with the prospect of the Sisyphean task of involving oneself comprehensively, and with a peculiar kind of indifference, to all issues equally. But the site appears to work best as a kind of clearinghouse, where issues work more like nodal entry points, with no attempt to discourage involvement with an exhaustive presentation (or integrated analysis) of world crisis. As Ulises Mejia (2010) notes, such "nodocentrism" has performative effects on the activism it ostensibly facilitates, shaping and structuring what can be known and done even as it greatly magnifies and accelerates the means by which such knowledge and action can occur. In converting activism into a kind of informatics—the crucial objective is the count of signatures and the rapidity with which they can be gained and deployed—a specific kind of discourse is mobilized and, with it, another short circuit. This raises questions regarding our easy convictions about the causative role of sheer numbers in swaying decision makers, cast in the role of masters being confronted with a demand to exchange reasons (a role I will return to and query in my conclusion). The deliberate reduction of information in order to ease the threshold of participation can actually have the effect, I argue, of disorienting the subject in the process of mobilizing her or him to action. I mean here to go beyond the quite familiar critique that information on the Internet is unreliable to note how unreliability and affective intensity can enter into a negative feedback loop, such that the less reliable information we can glean, the more we attach ourselves to intensities that seem plausible insofar as they conform to imaginary structures. This is what Zizek calls the decline in symbolic efficiency. Jodi Dean comments on the idea in the following passage: ÍAiek's notion of a decline in symbolic efficiency... highlights our perpetual uncertainty, our sense that we never really know whether what we say registers with the other as what we mean as well as our sense that we are never quite sure what "everybody knows." ... Imaginary identities sustained by the promise and provision of enjoyment replace symbolic identities.... Imaginary identities are incapable of establishing a firm place to stand, a position from which one can make sense of one's world.... The flip side of the multiplicity of imaginary identities, then, is the reduction and congealing of identity into massive sites or strange attractors of affective investment (2009,63-67). The subject of the urgent action alert, we could hypothesize, is increasingly imaginary, rather than symbolic. That is, she or he is mobilized by a presymbolic image of threat or lure, one that proliferates independent of secure symbolically efficient knowledge. Uganda becomes a strange attractor of imaginary identities gathered around a "world outcry," and Ugandan queers are framed within an updated version of what Anne McClintock calls "panoptical time," or "the image of global history consumed—at a glance—in a single spectacle from a point of privileged invisibility"( 1995, 37). In this current case, Ugandan LGBT folk are depicted through the metaphor of the closet, globally and transhistorically construed and, through that metaphor, placed at a prior point in a historical development that the West has already progressed through (see, for example, Gettleman 2010). As McClintock's stresses, this is above all an optical effect that produces a fantasy of the other as somehow occupying a different order of time. Outcry is organized around what might happen or may already be happening in Uganda, that is, around temporal uncertainty, and we are urged to invest affect to the extent that we remain uncertain. How could it possibly hurt, after all, to quickly express our indignation to President Yoweri Museveni for presiding over plans to execute gays? It's less important that we truly understand the situation and believe in the efficacy of this action than it is to believe that someone believes in it. We are thus yoked to our activism through a relation of interpassivity. The decline of symbolic efficiency presents a challenge to more empirical approaches to the study of human rights in Africa. The shock of the "Kill the Gays" bill as a strange attractor of global affect could indeed be parlayed into a more sustained, deeply historical knowledge of the situation in Uganda. Such a sustained ethnographic, historical, and political engagement would place the recent events in the context of prior controversies, going back to the 1990s, over Uganda's ABC (Abstinence, Be Faithful, Condoms) HIV/AIDS education strategy. Uganda's approach was seen as an outlier in the global mainstream, and its efficacy became the subject of sharp ideological dispute as evangelical groups, among others, championed Uganda's "just say no" approach (Hoad 2010). The sexual regulation of the citizenry had thus been established as the basis of a displaced struggle over sovereignty well before the Bahati bill had been introduced and provides the necessary context for understanding how global action against it is perceived in Uganda. Once the bill drew international censure, from the administration of President Barack Obama and other foreign governments and agencies, it was drawn into the complex diplomatic and political calculus of a regime balancing a variety of concerns. The legal and moral proscriptions against homosexuality were hardly primary among those concerns, given that Uganda's penal code—derived from the British colonial era—already punishes homosexuality. Rather than a question of the symbolic order of the law, as most activism assumed it to be, homosexuality became a strange attractor for imaginary identities aggressively competing within the communicative terrain of neoliberalism, such as the evangelical scourge of the gay seducer, and the humanitarian angel swooping in to rescue the endangered and helpless African queer. While such imaginary identities do have real-world effects, their allure often encourages implausible leaps, such as the miscategorization of a human rights violation as an imminent humanitarian catastrophe, which the free-floating circulation of the term "genocide" encouraged. The patient, retrospective, and time-consuming work of piecing together the full picture of a situation is precisely what a politics organized around rapid mobilization militates against, particularly when it is a single issue. Interminable analysis is disparaged in situations where a decision is needed. It is certainly the case that activists must act with less than total information. And furthermore, activism is a performative agency designed to change a situation, not merely to adequately understand it. But this does not answer the question of how the decision actually operates under conditions of declining symbolic efficiency. How do we know, in other words, that the outcry has worked, even if we agree to participate in it? What chain of causation, exactly, links our participation in the plight of queer Africa to the eventual decision (or nondecision) to shelve the Bahati bill? Who is the master to whom we are addressing our demands, and does a figure like Giles Muhame speak his discourse?

#### The impact is the destruction of value to life as pleasure becomes based on a game of envy built with resentment and mimeticism – aff impact calculus assumes value in life is net positive BUT capitalist structures reinterpret any value as inevitable torture.

Morgareidge 1998 Prof of Philosophy at Lewis & Clark College 1998 Clayton Why Capitalism is Evil 08/22 <https://sites.google.com/a/lclark.edu/clayton/commentaries/evil>

To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. Under capitalism, Marx writes, everything in **nature and** everything that **human beings** are and can do **becomes an object: a resource for**, or an obstacle, to the **expansion of production**, the development of technology, the growth of markets, and the circulation of money. For those who manage and live from capital, nothing has value of its own. Mountain streams, clean air, hum**an lives** -- all **mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only if they** can be used to **turn a profit.**[1] If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it **sees** there only eyes through **which** brand names and **advertising can** enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, **if** the **needs are incompatible with** the **growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be** unrepresented or **silenced.** Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. **Capital profits from** the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of **life**. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. **If we care** about life**, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to** want all the things capital does to be governed by that care, to **be directed by the ethical concern for life.** But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. Therefore ethics, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, is left out of deliberations about what the heavyweight institutions of our society are going to do. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable. People no longer say, "You can't stop progress," but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority ("idealists") can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. **Only** when the end of capitalism is on th**e table will ethics have a seat** at the table.

#### The alternative is the “end of the world” – use the war machine to disrupt capitalist values based on investment into the world to create new paradigms of value incoherent to civil societies analysis – a permutation is impossible they’ve picked optimism we endorse pessimism. Alt is condo, not a floating PIC

Culp 3 Andrew Culp (PhD Ohio State, 2013, teaches Media History and Theory in the MA Program in Aesthetics and Politics and the School of Critical Studies at CalArts) “Dark Deleuze”, University of Minnesota Press, 2016 Lex AKF

There are those who have hitherto only enlightened the world in various ways; the point is to darken it. Some speculate that humans first pondered the ways of the world under the brilliant light of the heavens. On that vast celestial stage, the gods played out great dramas of arts and culture. This cosmos also inspired the earliest sciences of mathematics and astronomy, which wove the many constellations into a single tapestry. As the light of the stars became cycles and then detailed calendars, so came the dawn of time. A more modern story begins in 1609, when, upon hearing news of the Dutch invention of the telescope, Galileo created his own. Almost immediately, Galileo was peering into the dark quadrants of the moon and illustrating its angle of illumination. These discoveries would lead him to loudly endorse heliocentrism—replacing God with a new light at the center of the universe. Galileo curiously flaunts the rules of astronomy in his lunar record, as he does not date each ink wash according to its time of observation, nor does he make a photorealistic reproduction of the moon’s landscape (Gingrich and van Helden, “From Occhiale to Printed Page,” 258–62). Centuries of critics have tried to determine the source of Galileo’s inaccuracy. Johannis Hevelii, the father of stenography, wondered if Galileo’s instruments were too crude (Selenographia sive Lunae Descriptio, 205). Others suggest that he may have been too overtaken by the excitement of discovery (Kopal, The Moon, 225). But what if Galileo chose not to view the moon mathematically but philosophically? He was less concerned about its angles of illumination as an astronomical object than about what his telescopic perspicillum revealed about it as a cosmological concept. His styling of the moon reveals a way of seeing far more appropriate to baroque visual argument than to geographic measure. Galileo’s ink washes demonstrate the baroque’s beautiful convergences. Referring “not to an essence but rather to an operative function,” Galileo’s moon unfurls in the collision of multiple points of view as darkness and landscape meet in its leaping shadows (L, 3). More importantly, he marks a transition driven by “the force of divergences, impossibilities, discords, dissonances” (81). In a world no longer illuminated by the light of God, Galileo paints “many possible borders between worlds” in a chromatic scale so as to be irresolvable from the lens of any one camera set to a single angle (81). How, then, does one continue Galileo’s journey to the far side of the moon? By refusing divine harmony and instead conspiring with divergent underground worlds. The most immediate instance of lightness, connectivism, is the realization of the techno-affirmationist dream of complete transparency. The fate of such transparency is depicted in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis. In it, the drive for complete communicability elevates transparency in the false transcendence of a New Tower of Babel. Deep in the shadows of the Lower City labors the working class, enslaved to the machines that automation promised to eliminate. Only in the catacombs does the secret rebellion commence. But instead of ending in Lang’s grand Hegelian mediation, it would be better to listen to the Whore of Babylon in Metropolis, who says, “Let’s watch the world go to hell.” Such an untimely descent into darkness begins with a protest: lightness has far too long been the dominant model of thought. The road there descends from the chapel to the crypt. Crypts are by their very nature places of seclusion. Early Christians facing public persecution fled to the underground catacombs below Rome, where they could worship in secret (“Essay upon Crypts,” 73– 77). Early basilicas contain crypts as a “second church” under their choirs, featuring a vaulted ceiling, many columns, several aisles, and an altar (Lübke, Ecclesiastical Art, 24–25). Some great churches even included a second crypt dedicated to a particular saint (26). At times, when sacred objects are of special interest, crypts of especially renowned saints have inspired mass pilgrimages (Spence-Jones, Early Christianity and Paganism, 269). Deleuze notes that these spaces fold in on themselves, simultaneously expressing the “autonomy of the inside” and the “independence of the façade” as an inside without an outside or an outside without an inside, depending on how you approach it (L, 28). Looking at El Greco’s great baroque mannerist painting The Burial of Count Orgaz, we are given the choice. Above the great horizontal line, a gathering of saints ascends to the height of Jesus, whose own ascension grants the heavens eternal lightness. Below, a communion of cloaked, pale men crowd together to lay the count to rest under a dark background illuminated only by torchlight. The painting reveals the baroque truth of knowledge: “for ages there have been places where what is seen is inside: a cell, a sacristy, a crypt, a church, a theater, a study, or a print room” (L, 27–28). So beyond the association of crypts with rot and death, it is a projection of subterranean architectural power. From the crypt, Dark Deleuze launches a conspiracy. It is fueled by negativity, but not one of antimonies. Following Freud, negation is not a necessary by-product of consciousness. The lesson to be drawn from him is that negation is finding a way to say “no” to those who tell us to take the world as it is. To this end, the path forward is Deleuze’s nondialectical negation, the “contrary,” which operates as the distance between two exclusive paths (LS, 172–80). Klossowski identifies the goal of the conspiracy as breaking the collusion between institutionalized morality, capitalism, and the state (“Circulus Vitiosus”). He then shows how Nietzsche’s laughter can be used as an experimental instrument to dissolve all identities into phantasms. A number of commentators have tried to rehabilitate the conspiracy on the basis of an esoteric/exoteric distinction, whereby exoteric discourses are the mere public face to a deeper paranoia whose desire is concealed in an esoteric code. To the extent that it is true, in his book Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, Klossowski warns that the esoteric tradition must be avoided because it “demystifies only in order to mystify better” (131). The point is not to replace angelic messages with arcane ones. This raises an important question: what is an appropriately cryptic language? Deleuze and Guattari note that “the man of war brings the secret: he thinks, eats, loves, judges, arrives in secret, while the man of the state proceeds publicly” (TP, 543–44). Fortunately, in our conspiratorial world of phantasms, one does not hold a secret but instead becomes a secret. Even if she ends up spilling everything, it turns out to be nothing. Why? The secret first hides within dominant forms to limit exposure, yet what it smuggles inside is not any specific thing that needs to evade discovery. Rather, it is a perception of the secret that spreads under the shroud of secrecy: perception + secret = the secret as secretion. Conspiracies do not remain limited to a few furtive missives; their creeping insinuations are part of a universal project to permeate all of society (TP, 286–89). The best conspiracy is when it has nothing left to hide. There is an affective dimension to our conspiracy. Pessimism becomes a necessity when writing in an era of generalized precarity, extreme class stratification, and summary executions of people of color. The trouble with the metaphysics of difference is that it does not immediately suggest a positive conception of alienation, exploitation, or social death. To the extent that those who affirm difference and its intensifications do make such violence thinkable, it appears as the consequence of deprivation. As a result, they cannot explain the simultaneous connection–separation of a body alienated from their own powers. Such joyousness makes no place for Marx’s theory of exploitation in which one class systematically extracts profit by expanding the capacities of another. The conspiracy offers a way out. On the affective level, it takes the ambivalence of hatred to grasp how one’s own capacities are the yoke of his oppression. On the level of strategy, it takes deep, labyrinthine paths to develop a cryptography. To do so myself, I reenact Winston’s trips to the shallow alcove of his apartment in 1984 to keep our own illicit diary of slogans. This is how I learned to find my own way to say “DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER” and “If there is hope, it lies with the proles” (181). This is because the ultimate task of Dark Deleuze is but a modest one: to keep the dream of revolution alive in counterrevolutionary times. The conspiracy Dark Deleuze is a series of contraries. Contraries are not poles, which are dialectical opposites that ultimately complement each other. To distill a central argument from Deleuze’s magnum opus Difference and Repetition, philosophy has (to its detriment) taken the nature of thinking to be the establishment of equivalence or logical identity between two terms (59). As such, contrasts must avoid relating terms on the basis of “a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition, or a perceived similitude” (138). Deleuze summarizes this argument in an interview: “It was Lévi-Strauss, I think, who showed you had to distinguish the following two propositions: that only similar things can differ [dialectics—presupposing a primordial identity behind differences], and only different things can be similar [contraries—difference primary to identity]” (N 156). There is a second reason for avoiding opposites: opposites imply a “golden mean” whereby the optimal place is found somewhere in between each extreme. Such middling compromise is the greatest tragedy of Deleuze and Guattari’s rhetorical presentation of what appear to be dualisms (smooth/striated, molar/molecular, arborescent/rhizomatic) in A Thousand Plateaus. The unfortunate effect is a legion of noncommittal commentators who preach the moderation of the middle. In response, we must contaminate every last one of those conceptual pairs with a third term that arrives from the outside. Deleuze and Guattari set the example in how they reimagine Dumézil’s tripartite state as two opposing poles besieged by a third term that arrives from the outside. Such a reformulation would more closely follow Deleuze’s atomism of two terms relating through the production of an independent third term. To make the stakes clear: we are told in A Thousand Plateaus that the state is made of two opposing poles, one liberal and one authoritarian, that in fact work in a “complementarity” not dissimilar from the dialectical logic of determinate negation—this is the model of relation that must be avoided at all costs (for more, see the section “Difference: Exclusive Disjunction, Not Inclusive Disjunction”) (Dumézil, Mitra-Varuna). This is why Dark Deleuze contrasts dark to joyous and not dark to light or joyous to sad. Each contrary is a forking path, an alternate route for every instance one is tempted by affirmation. Listed in what follows are the contrasting terms. In the column on the left, I list a series of tasks. Across each column I have placed two contrary approaches, one joyous and one dark. The association each term has to its contrary is purely incidental. Each term’s contrariness is not given, as if one implied the other— I propose dark terms simply on their ability to unexpectedly usurp the operations of their contraries. Contrary approaches should be taken as mutually exclusive, as they are independent processes each meant to fulfill the given task without recourse to the other. What makes them dark is the position of exteriority from which the irregular forces of darkness attack the joy of state thought. The foreignness of relation is why each pair of contrasting terms is notably imbalanced. My ultimate purpose is to convince readers to completely abandon all the joyous paths for their dark alternatives. The best scenario would be that these contraries fade into irrelevance after Dark Deleuze achieves its ostensible goal: the end of this world, the final defeat of the state, and full communism. It is far more likely that various aspects of darkness will be captured along the way. Like any other war machine, a dark term is defeated when it isomorphically takes on relations or forms of its joyous counterpart. So it is worth uttering a cautionary note from A Thousand Plateaus: even when contrary, never believe that darkness will suffice to save us. The conspiracy against this world will be known through its war machines. A war machine is itself “a pure form of exteriority” that “explains nothing,” but there are plenty of stories to tell about them (TP, 354, 427). They are the heroes of A Thousand Plateaus—Kleist’s skull-crushing war machine, the migratory war machine that the Vandals used to sack Rome, the gun that Black Panther George Jackson grabs on the run, and the queer war machine that excretes a thousand tiny sexes. “Each time there is an operation against the state—insubordination, rioting, guerilla warfare, or revolution as an act—it can be said that a war machine has revived” (386). War machines are also the greatest villains of A Thousand Plateaus, making all other dangers “pale by comparison” (231)—there is the constant state appropriation of the war machine that subordinates war to its own aims (418), the folly of the commercial war machine (15), the paranoia of the fascist war machine (not the state army of totalitarianism) (230–31), and, worst of them all, the “worldwide war machine” of capitalism, “whose organization exceeds the State apparatus and passes into energy, military–industrial, and multinational complexes” to wage peace on the whole world (387, 419–21, 467). “Make thought a war machine,” Deleuze and Guattari insist. “Place thought in an immediate relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside” (TP, 376–77). Two important inventions follow: speed and secrecy. These are the affects of the war machine, its weapons of war, which “transpierce the body like arrows” (356, 394). The resulting violence is not so vulgar as to encourage blow-by-blow bloodletting or a once-and-for-all immediate killing but institutes an economy of violence whose hatred is unlimited and therefore durable. The war machine engages in war along two poles: one forms a line of destruction “prolongable to the limits of the universe,” while the other draws a line of flight for the “composition of a smooth space and of the movement of people in that space” (422). Deleuze and Guattari would prefer to promote the connectivist line by saying they “make war only on the condition that they simultaneously create something else” (423). But today, that path leads to collusion with capitalism’s drive toward creative destruction (Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy, 87). This is certainly not lost on those in Silicon Valley who spread the mantra of “disruptive innovation.” We can thus take heed of Deleuze and Guattari’s warning against treating terms as having “an irresistible revolutionary calling” (387). It is time to accept Nietzsche’s invitation to philosophize with a hammer, rendered here in the voice of Krishna: “I am become Time, the destroyer of worlds.” We must find an appetite for destruction that does not betray Deleuze and Guattari’s “abolitionist dream.” This takes the “progressive, anxiety-ridden revelation” that destroying worlds is just another way of “smashing capitalism, of redefining socialism, of constituting a war machine capable of countering the world war machine by other means” (385, 417, 372). Make the whole world stand still. Indeed, it may be the only way to think the present in any significant sense. To be clear: the suspension of the world is not a hunt for its conditions of reproduction or a meditative “rhapsody of sensations” (DR, 56). It is thought that treats the world as if struck by an unspecified disaster, where the best friends you have left are your own ideas. This is not the banal disaster movie, whose ambitions are usually limited to teaching us what are the bare essentials to survive. Writing the disaster is how we break free from the stifling perpetual present, for the present carries with itself a suffocating urgency. The present imposes material limits. To it, the past and the future are the empty form of time, and they must endure the complications of having a body to become part of the present (LS, 146–47, 165). The past and the future exist in their own right only through representation—the former in history as the present memorialization of things passed and the latter in the yet to come as the projection of an image of the present (147). Such re-presentation is why the future appears with the distinct impression that “we have seen it all before” (Flaxman, Fabulation of Philosophy, 392). The productivist sees the event of thought as an eminently practical reorientation toward the present achieved while generating a new image of the future (WP, 58). In contrast, those learning to hate the world must short-circuit the “here and now” to play out the scene differently. While still being in this world, they turn away from it. This is the life of characters so agitated that they force the world to stand still— Dostoyevsky’s Idiot, the head of Kurosawa’s seven samurai (TR, 317–18). Against bleating urgency that “there a fire, there’s fire . . . I’ve got to go,” they insist that everything could burn to the ground but nothing happens, because one must seek out a more urgent problem! There are those who say that we already have one foot in utopia; but would it not be more suitable to say that we have both feet firmly planted in a present slouching toward dystopia? Deleuze and Guattari call on utopia in their search for a new people and a new earth (WP, 99). They look to Samuel Butler, dissecting his Erewhon as a simultaneous “now-here” and “no-where” (100). Yet a closer examination of his novel reveals utopia to be a farce. While not exactly a dystopia, the utopia Erewhon is a comic satire of the British Empire. The narrator is a crass traveler with settler colonial dreams who catalogs the strange ways of Erewhon—in chapters 10 and 11, he outlines how they punish the sick (“convicted of aggravated bronchitis”) and sentence the misfortunate to hard labor (“ill luck of any kind . . . is considered an offense against society”) but nurture financial transgressions with medicine (“taken to a hospital and most carefully tended at the public expense”). Beyond being an object lesson in reading footnotes, Deleuze and Guattari’s reference to Erewhon demands an attention to the exact configuration of conceptual devices (dispositifs) and how power flows through them. Link thought with its epoch, they suggest, begin with a survey to identify whatever forces are already circulating and then work with them —“connecting up with what is real here and now in the struggle against capitalism, relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed” (100). They warn of “proud affirmation” as the guise of restoration that opens the door to transcendence, such as appeals to truth, right, or authority (100). For Butler, Erewhon summons neither a new people nor a new earth but is instead a field guide to negate everything he finds intolerable in his present. Utopia becomes the map to transform the now-here into the no-where. “It should have been an apocalyptic book,” laments Deleuze, disappointed that the “old style” Difference and Repetition did not make apparent a key implication—he killed God, humankind, and even the world (xxi). The Death of God began long before Deleuze, who sees Feuerbach as completing it long before Nietzsche with the proposition that “since man has never been anything but the unfold of man, man must fold and refold God” (F, 130). Nietzsche identifies a different problem: that God was reborn in the form of Man. For Deleuze, it takes Foucault to establish the finitude of humanity—“Man has not always existed, and will not exist forever”—thus sealing its fate (F, 124). But to destroy the world . . . that is the truly heretical proposition. A small group of dissident Deleuze scholars have rallied around the slogan that “there is no ‘ontology of Deleuze’”—Gregory Flaxman, Anne Sauvagnargues, Gregg Lambert, and François Zourabichvili, to name a few (Zourabichvili, A Philosophy of the Event, 36). The statement does not imply that ontology is an illusion, but criticizing those who build a Deleuzian system around a coherent ontology of the world is ill considered, as it fails draw a line to the outside—“to incalculable forces, to chance and improvisation, to the future” (Flaxman, “Politics and Ontology”). Blazing such a path may require “the extinction of the term ‘being’ and therefore of ontology,” or in so many words, a destruction of this world (37). Deleuze and Guattari suggest as much when they propose to “overthrow ontology” (TP, 25). Summed up, this stance names the “joyful pessimist” Deleuze. Too restless to stop there, the Dark Deleuze broadens the coup de force into a fierce pessimism that shatters the cosmos.

#### Continual becoming is key to education – static majoritarian perspective in educational spaces destroys innovative thought and supports unethical collectivization of the Other. The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best embraces becoming minoritarian.

Carlin and Wallin 14 [Carlin, Matthew. Wallin, Jason. “Deleuze & Guattari, Politics and Education.” Bloomsbury. 2014. Pg. 119-121] MK

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’ (p. 6). Where education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its modes of production have taken as their teleological goal the production of a ‘majoritarian people’, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where education aspires to invest desire in the production of a ‘majoritarian’ or ‘molar’ public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed, not only through the paucity of enunciatory forms and images available for thinking education in the first place, but further, through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the singular, the ‘majoritarian’ and standardizing impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production the reification of common sense, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’, common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.

#### (1) Ethics preceeds existence - our K of the 1AC’s relationship to ethics HOLDS as prior to AFF advantage ground EVEN if they weigh the case as it’s meta-theory that questions IF we can find good through redemption in the world, where the aff’s futural act already ASSUMES value in that progressive narrative to gain solvency.

#### (2) Reject plan focus -- rejoinder SHOULD NOT be based on the imaginative costs and benefits of the plan BUT proving aff solvency REQUIRES capitalist values is a win condition for negative not individual lines in evidence but premises inherent to solvency on any resolution such as redemption and progress.

#### (A) Repetition compulsion - their relationship to ethics operates on the level of performance – capitalism defines itself on internal simulations of freedom REQUIRED by political scenario analysis --- AN addiction based on the pleasure of investing in the world, feeding the addict more junk – you do MORE the less you try or imagine

**Bluhdorn 07** – (May 2007, Ingolfur, PhD, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology, University of Bath, “Self-description, Self-deception, Simulation: A Systems-theoretical Perspective on Contemporary Discourses of Radical Change,” Social Movement Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1–20, May 2007, google scholar)

Yet the established patterns of self-construction, which thus have to be defended and further developed at any price, have fundamental problems attached to them: ﬁrstly, the attempt to constitute, on the basis of product choices and acts of consumption, a Self and identity that are distinct from and autonomous vis-a`-vis the market is a contradiction in terms. Secondly, late-modern society’s established patterns of consumption are known to be socially exclusive and environmentally destructive. Despite all hopes for ecological modernization and revolutionary improvements in resource efﬁciency (e.g. Weizsa¨cker et al., 1998; Hawkenet al., 1999; Lomborg, 2001), physical environmental limits imply that the lifestyles and established patterns of consumption cherished by advanced modern societies cannot even be extended to all residents of the richest countries, let alone to the populations of the developing world. For the sake of the (re)construction of an ever elusive Self, in their struggle against self-referentiality and in pursuit of the regeneration of difference, late-modern societies are thus locked into the imperative of maintaining and further developing the principle of exclusion (Blu¨hdorn, 2002, 2003). At any price they have to, and indeed do, defend a lifestyle that requires ever increasing social inequality, environmental degradation, predatory resource wars, and the tight policing of potential internal and external enemies.14 For this effort, military and surveillance technology provide ever more sophisticated and efﬁcient means. Nevertheless, the principle of exclusion is ultimately still unsustainable, not only because of spiralling ‘security’ expenses but also because it directly contradicts the modernist notion of the free and autonomous individual that late-modern society desperately aims to sustain. For this reason, late-modern society is confronted with the task of having to sustain both the late-modern principle of exclusion as well as its opposite, i.e. the modernist principle of inclusion. Very importantly, the conﬂict between the principles of exclusion and inclusion is not simply one between different individuals, political actors or sections of society. Instead, it is a politically irresolvable conﬂict that resides right within the late-modern individual, the late-modern economy and late-modern politics. And if, as Touraine notes, late-modern society no longer believes in nor even desires political transcendence, the particular challenge is that the two principles can also no longer be attributed to different dimensions of time, i.e. the former to the present, and the latter to some future society. Instead, late-modern society needs to represent and reproduce itself and its opposite at the same time. If considered within this framework of this analysis, the function of Luhmann’s system of protest communication, or in the terms of this article, the signiﬁcance of late-modern societies’ discourses of radical change becomes immediately evident. At a stage when the possibility and desirability of transcending the principle of exclusion has been pulled into radical doubt but when, at the same time, the principle of inclusion is vitally important, these discourses simulate the validity of the latter as a social ideal. In other words, latemodern society reconciles the tension between the cherished but exclusive status quo – for which there is no alternative – and the non-existent inclusive alternative – on whose existence it depends – by means of simulation. The analysis of Luhmann’s work has demonstrated how the societal self-descriptions produced by the system of protest communication, or late-modern society’s discourses of radical change, fulﬁl this function exactly. They are an indispensable function system not so much because they help to resolve late-modern society’s problems of mal-coordination, but because by performing the possibility of the alternative they help to cope with the fundamental problem of self-referentiality.

#### (B) Educational value – our thesis proves there exists none within capitalist super structures – only supplementing a pessimistic curriculum can teach students a way of life beyond the ethics of envy that pits subjects against each other, this outweighs fairness as it’s scope extends beyond debate and into every day relationships and interactions.

## Resistance DA

#### Low prices independently cause AMR.

Babu and Suma 6 Babu, Varsha, and C. Suma. "Antibiotic pricing: when cheaper may not be better." Clinical infectious diseases 43.8 (2006): 1085-1086. (Government Primary Health Center)//Elmer

To The Editor—Antibiotics in India have always been cheaper in absolute terms thanks to weak patent laws that have been in effect until recently. Because a direct translation of drug prices from US dollars to Indian rupees (INR) would have rendered most new antibiotics inaccessible to the vast majority of Indians, such patent violations were subtly encouraged. Even despite this, we were caught unaware when pharmaceutical representatives approached our primary care center in rural India, claiming that a 5-day course of levofloxacin would henceforth cost the patient ∼INR 20 (<$0.50). Reluctant to accept such a statement at face value, we consulted the CIMS Updated Prescriber's Handbook [1], a popular index of pharmaceutical drugs available in India. Here, we discovered that a 5-day course of oral levofloxacin (500 mg once daily) cost anywhere from INR 19.5 to INR 475 ($0.50–$10.50), with most companies pricing their brand at <$1 for a full course. The same course in the United States would cost >$100. Intrigued, we did some more research and came up with the following results. The cheapest 5-day courses of first-line antibiotics, such as oral amoxicillin (500 mg thrice daily) or oral erythromycin (500 mg 4 times daily), cost INR 45 ($1) and INR 90 ($2), respectively. On the other hand, the cost of a 3-day course of oral azithromycin (500 mg daily) was one-half that of a course of erythromycin. Despite the obvious price advantage to the patients, we find this trend troubling. **Lower prices** often **lead to wider prescription of a given drug**, especially in resource-limited settings. **If** second-line **antibiotics**—such as levofloxacin and azithromycin—**are made available at lower prices** than first-line antibiotics, **there is a high probability of their overuse and subsequent development of resistance**. In the face of **very low costs of medication**, patients are unlikely to complain of escalating medical expenses. The issue assumes more gravity when one considers the fact that levofloxacin is an important second-line drug for the treatment of tuberculosis [2]. Its widespread use in the community **is likely to lead to emergence of resistance** **among** **mycobacteria** **and** delayed diagnosis of **tuberculosis** [3]—an occurrence that India, with its large population of tuberculosis-affected patients, cannot afford. We believe we have encountered a situation where **low prices of antibiotics are likely to cause more harm than good**. In the post World Trade Organization treaty scenario, governments in resource-limited countries should use their privileges of essential drug control to ensure that the costs of first-line antibiotics remain lower than those of second-line drugs. Such a government-instituted ladder in antibiotic pricing is essential to prevent the misuse of antibiotics in the community and to ensure that antibiotic resistance is kept at low levels.

#### Aggressive patenting key to preventing generics.

**Gupta et al., 10** **(Himanshu Gupta, Suresh Kumar, Saroj Kumar Roy, and R.S. Gaud, \*Faculty of Pharmacy at Jamia Hamdard, \*\*Faculty of Pharmacy at Jamia Hamdard , \*\*\*School of Pharmacy and Technology Management at SVKM's NMIMS University, \*\*\*\*School of Pharmacy and Technology Management at SVKM's NMIMS University, 2010, accessed on 9-4-2021, *Journal of Pharmacy & BioAllied Sciences*, "Patent protection strategies", https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3146086/) \*brackets in original //D.Ying**

A patent is a legal device that grants an inventor market exclusivity over a new invention or medication. Market exclusivity can mean tremendous economic rewards for the patent holder because it provides the inventor with a monopoly over the invention for the 20-year patent term. Obtaining a patent and retaining market exclusivity can be a treacherous process, especially in the arena of pharmaceutical patents. Pharmaceutical companies today are facing increased costs for drug discovery and development and aggressive competition from generic drug companies [Table 1]. As research costs skyrocket, generic drug companies sit poised and are ready to compete as soon as a patent expires [Table 2]. Maximizing patent term for successful products is an effective strategy for fending off generic competition and extending product lifecycle. Patents grant the creators of new inventions exclusive control and possession over these inventions. This allows the inventor to prevent others from commercially using ideas or inventions without the creator's permission during the life of the patent.[1] Scientific, legal, and practical considerations must be carefully weighed to best protect an inventor's rights. Creating and protecting or attacking pharmaceutical patents requires close interaction between pharmaceutical scientists and lawyers. It also requires a good understanding of key concepts of each other's discipline. Therefore, there should be collaboration between scientists and attorneys.[2,3]

#### Generic antibiotics don't treat infections and create superbugs.

**Eban, 19** **(Katherine Eban, investigative journalist, 5-17-2019, accessed on 9-4-2021, *Time*, "How Some Generic Drugs Could Do More Harm Than Good", https://time.com/5590602/generic-drugs-quality-risk/) //D.Ying**

Most people assume that a drug is a drug — that Lipitor, for example, or a generic version, is the same anywhere in the world, so long as it’s made by a reputable drug company that has been inspected and approved by regulators. That, at least, is the logic that has driven the global generic-drug revolution: that drug companies in countries like India and China can make low-cost, high-quality drugs for markets around the world. These companies have been hailed as public-health heroes and global equalizers, by making the same cures available to the wealthy and impoverished. But many of the generic drug companies that Americans and Africans alike depend on, which I spent a decade investigating, hold a dark secret: they routinely adjust their manufacturing standards depending on the country buying their drugs, a practice that could endanger not just those who take the lower-quality medicine but the population at large. These companies send their highest-quality drugs to markets with the most vigilant regulators, such as the U.S. and the European Union. They send their worst drugs — made with lower-quality ingredients and less scrupulous testing — to countries with the weakest review. The U.S. drug supply is not immune to quality crises — over the last ten months, dozens of versions of the generic blood pressure drugs valsartan, losartan and irbesartan have been subject to sweeping recalls. The active ingredients in some, manufactured in China, contained a probable carcinogen once used in the production of liquid rocket fuel. But the patients who suffer most are those in so-called “R.O.W. markets” — the generic-drug industry’s shorthand for “Rest of World.” In swaths of Africa, Southeast Asia and other areas with developing markets, some generic drug companies have made a cold calculation: they can sell their cheapest drugs where they will be least likely to get caught. In Africa, for instance, pharmaceuticals used to come from more developed countries, through donations and small purchases. So when Indian drug reps offering cheap generics started arriving, the initial feeling was positive. But Africa soon became an avenue “to send anything at all,” said Kwabena Ofori-Kwakye, associate professor in the pharmaceutics department at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana. The poor quality has affected every type of medication, and the adverse impact on health has been “astronomical,” he told me. Multiple doctors I spoke to throughout the continent said they have adjusted their medical treatment in response, sometimes tripling recommended doses to produce a therapeutic effect. Dr. Gordon Donnir, former head of the psychiatry department at the Komfo Anokye teaching hospital in Kumasi, treats middle-class Ghanaians in his private practice and says that almost all the drugs his patients take are substandard, leading him to increase his patients’ doses significantly. While his European colleagues typically prescribe 2.5 milligrams of haloperidol (a generic form of Haldol) several times a day to treat psychosis, he’ll prescribe 10 milligrams, also several times a day, because he knows the 2.5 milligrams “won’t do anything.” Donnir once gave ten times the typical dose of generic Diazepam, an anti-anxiety drug, to a 15-year-old boy, an amount that should have knocked him out. The patient was “still smiling,” Donnir said. Many hospitals also keep a stash of what they call “fancy” drugs — either brand-name drugs or higher-quality generics — to treat patients who should have recovered after a round of treatment but didn’t. Confronted with the ailing boy at the Mulago hospital, Westerberg’s colleagues swapped in the more expensive version of ceftriaxone and added more drugs to the treatment plan. But it was too late. In the second week of his treatment, the boy was declared brain dead. Westerberg’s Ugandan colleagues were not surprised. Their patients frequently died when treated with drugs that should have saved them. And there were not enough “fancy” drugs to go around, making every day an exercise in pharmaceutical triage. It was also hard to keep track of which generics were safe and which were not to be trusted, said one doctor in Western Uganda: “It’s anesthesia today, ceftriaxone tomorrow, amoxicillin the next day.” Westerberg, shaken by his newfound knowledge, flew back to Canada and teamed up with a Canadian respiratory therapist, Jason Nickerson, who’d had similar experiences with bad medicine in Ghana. They decided to test the chemical properties of the generic ceftriaxone that had been implicated in the Ugandan boy’s death. Another of Westerberg’s colleagues brought him a vial from the Mulago hospital pharmacy. The drug had been made by a manufacturer in northern China, which also exported to the U.S. and other developed markets. But when they tested the ceftriaxone at Nickerson’s lab, it contained less than half the active drug ingredient stated on the label. At such low concentration, the drug was basically useless, Nickerson said. He and Westerberg published a case report in the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Although they couldn’t say with certainty that the boy had died due to substandard ceftriaxone, their report offered compelling evidence that he had. Some companies claim that, while their drugs are all high-quality, there may be some variance in how they are produced because regulations differ from market to market. But Patrick H. Lukulay, former vice president of global health impact programs for USP (formerly U.S. Pharmacopeia), one of the world’s top pharmaceutical standard-setting organizations, calls that argument “totally garbage.” For any given drug, he says, “There’s only one standard, and that standard was set by the originator,” meaning the brand-name company that developed the product. It’s not just those in developing markets who should be alarmed. Often, substandard drugs do not contain enough active ingredient to effectively cure sick patients. But they do contain enough to kill off the weakest microbes while leaving the strongest intact. These surviving microbes go on to reproduce, creating a new generation of pathogens capable of resisting even fully potent, properly made medicine. In 2011, during an outbreak of drug-resistant malaria on the Thailand-Cambodia border, USP’s chief of party in Indonesia Christopher Raymond strongly suspected substandard drugs as a culprit. Treating patients with drugs that contain a little bit of active ingredient, as he put it, is like “putting out fire with gasoline.” USP is so concerned about this issue that in 2017 it launched a center called the Quality Institute, which funds research into the link between drug quality and resistance. In late 2018, Boston University biomedical engineering professor Muhammad Zaman studied a commonly used antibiotic called rifampicin that, if not manufactured properly, yields a chemical substance called rifampicin quinone when it degrades. When Zaman subjected bacteria to this substance, it developed mutations that helped it resist rifampicin and other similar drugs. Zaman concluded from his work that substandard drugs are an “independent pillar” in the global menace of drug resistance. The low cost of generic drugs makes them essential to global public health. But if those bargain drugs are of low quality, they do more harm than good. For years, politicians, regulators and aid workers have focused on ensuring access to these drugs. Going forward, they must place equal value on quality, through an exacting program of unannounced inspections, routine testing of drugs already on the market and strict legal enforcement against companies manufacturing subpar medicine. One model is the airline industry, which through international laws and treaties, has established clear global standards for aviation safety. Without something similar for safe and effective drugs, the twin forces of subpar medicine and growing drug resistance will be so destructive that developed countries won’t be able to ignore them. As Elizabeth Pisani, an epidemiologist who has studied drug quality in Indonesia, put it, “The fact is, pathogens know no borders.”

# Case

### AT: Extinction ow

#### [1] If I am winning framework within the round, that means that we are morally certain within the debate round about which theory should be used. That is a prefiat impact and the implication is that moral uncertainty doesn’t exist, so we don’t look to Bostrom

#### [2] They conflate postfiat and prefiat. They have justifications for why extinction might happen, but within the context of the debate round. They have 0 effect in solving extinction which means that they dont solve moral uncertainty in the prefiat world.

#### [3] They commit the Fallacy of Origin. Just because extinction precludes moral theorizing, doesn’t meant that extinction is necessarily a good or a bad thing. We could be alive and theorize that life is a bad thing.

## Case

#### donations solve—pharma companies donate a lot of drugs every year to fight NTDs

USAID (<https://www.neglecteddiseases.gov/about/drug-donation-partnerships/>) Ngong

The vast reach of USAID’s NTD Program and the NTD treatments delivered have been made possible due to generous commitments from the pharmaceutical sector. Six of the drugs needed to eliminate and control NTDs are donated by the pharmaceutical companies Eisai, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck & Co., Merck KGaA, Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer. The USAID NTD Program works with countries to forecast and efficiently distribute these donated drugs to target audiences. Since USAID’s NTD Program began distributing donated drugs in 2007, the drug donation programs have expanded significantly. The NTD drugs donated to the USAID-supported countries have been valued at over $27.6 billion, representing the largest public-private partnership in the Agency, with a leverage of $26 in donated drugs for every tax dollar spent by USAID.

#### COVID accelerated biopharma R&D

Neil Lesser and Sonal Shah 20, Shah is senior manager with the Deloitte Center for Health Solutions within Deloitte Services LP and leads the center’s life sciences research, “Seeds of change,” https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/life-sciences-and-health-care/articles/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-innovation.html

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant disruptive effect on clinical trial operations, with biopharma companies, clinical research organizations (CROs), and other research organizations being forced to shut down trials, suspend enrollment, or delay planned study startups or completions (an estimated 1,210 trials have been negatively affected across the industry). However, the pandemic has also accelerated the adoption of new approaches to R&D with the development of a number of novel COVID-19 vaccines and therapies in record time through extraordinary collaboration and partnerships, as well as a wider use of transformative approaches such as master protocols and adaptive trial design and the use of real-world data (RWD). The positive learnings arising from the COVID-19 pandemic have sown the seeds of change for a more productive future for biopharma R&D. Moreover, the accelerated development of COVID-19 therapies and vaccines is expected to have a positive impact on the internal rate of return (IRR) over the coming years.