
## Theory

#### Interp: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.

#### Violation: screenshot in the doc – they are missing most of their rounds



#### Standards:

#### 1] Level Playing Field – big schools can go around and scout and collect flows but independents are left in the dark so round reports are key for them to prep- they give you an idea of overall what layers debaters like going for so you can best prepare your strategy when you hit them. Accessibility first and independent voter – it's an impact multiplier.

#### 2] Strategy Education – round reports help novices understand the context in which positions are read by good debaters and help with brainstorming potential 1Ars vs NCs – helps compensate for kids who can't afford coaches to prep out negs.

#### 3] Pre-round prep –1ARs gives especially give an idea of what type of debater someone is – they could go for 1AR theory every round– otherwise I enter every round unknowing whereas you have an idea of what you want to go for from the start.

#### DTD- dta illogical, time skew

#### No RVI’s- illogical, baiting

#### CI- intervention, race to bottom, collapses, yours vs best

## Combo Shell

#### Cant say 1AR theory, DTD, CI, no RVI and 1AR theory above neg theory

#### Inf abuse

## CP

#### Counterplan: States ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike except in the instance that strikes directly demand discrimination towards certain groups of individuals

BPSC[Unfair Labor Practices by Union, http://bpscllc.com/unfair-labor-practices-by-unions.html, N.D., Business & People Strategy Consulting Group, California's trusted source for workplace human resources and employment law] [SS]

Causing or Attempting to Cause Discrimination: Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3). The section is violated by agreements or arrangements with employers, other than lawful union-security agreements, that condition employment or job benefits on union membership, on the performance of union membership obligations or on arbitrary grounds. But union action that causes detriment to an individual employee does not violate Section 8(b)(2) if it is consistent with nondiscriminatory provisions of a bargaining contract negotiated for the benefit of the total bargaining unit, or if the action is based on some other legitimate purpose. A union’s conduct, accompanied by statements advising or suggesting that action is expected of an employer, may be enough to find a violation of this section if the union’s action can be shown to be a causal factor in the employer’s discrimination. Contracts or informal arrangements with a union under which an employer gives preferential treatment to union members also violate Section 8(b)(2). However, an employer and a union may agree that the employer will hire new employees exclusively through the union hiring hall if there is no discrimination against nonunion members on the basis of union membership obligations. In setting referral standards, a union may consider legitimate aims such as sharing available work and easing the impact of local unemployment. The union may also charge referral fees if the amount of the fee is reasonably related to the cost of operating the referral service. A union that attempts to force an employer to enter into an illegal union-security agreement, or that enters into and keeps in effect such an agreement, also violates Section 8(b)(2), as does a union that attempts to enforce such an illegal agreement by bringing about an employee’s discharge. Even when a union-security provision of a bargaining contract meets all statutory requirements, a union may not lawfully require the discharge of employees under the provision unless they were informed of the union-security agreement and their specific obligation under it. A union violates Section 8(b)(2) if it tries to use the union-security provisions of a contract to collect payments other than those lawfully required, such as assessments, fines and penalties. Other examples of Section 8(b)(2) violations include: Causing an employer to discharge employees because they circulated a petition urging a change in the union’s method of selecting shop stewards Causing an employer to discharge employees because they made speeches against a contract proposed by the union Making a contract that requires an employer to hire only members of the union or employees “satisfactory” to the union Causing an employer to reduce employees’ seniority because they engaged in anti-union acts Refusing referral or giving preference on the basis of race or union activities when making job referrals to units represented by the union Seeking the discharge of an employee under a union-security agreement for failure to pay a fine levied by the union

#### Racist union strikes have happened before

Allison Keyes, JUNE 30, **2017**, "The East St. Louis Race Riot Left Dozens Dead, Devastating a Community on the Rise," Smithsonian Magazine, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/east-st-louis-race-riot-left-dozens-dead-devastating-community-on-the-rise-180963885/ //SR

Racial tensions began simmering in East St. Louis—a city where thousands of blacks had moved from the South to work in war factories—as early as February 1917. The African-American population was 6,000 in 1910 and nearly double that by 1917. In the spring, the largely white workforce at the Aluminum Ore Company went on strike. Hundreds of blacks were hired. After a City Council meeting on May 28, angry white workers lodged formal complaints against black migrants. When word of an attempted robbery of a white man by an armed black man spread through the city, mobs started beating any African-Americans they found, even pulling individuals off of streetcars and trolleys. The National Guard was called in but dispersed in June.

## Util

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

#### 1] Only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable – all other frameworks collapse.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] TDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that **pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the **pleasure is not good for anything further**; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### 2] Extinction first --- moral uncertainty.

**Bostrom 12** [(Nick Bostrom, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford) “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy, 2012] TDI

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate. **Our** present **understanding** of axiology **might** well **be confused**. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. **If we are** indeed profoundly **uncertain about our** ultimate aims, **then we should** recognize that there is a great option **value** in preserving — and ideally improving — **our ability to** recognize value and to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that there will be **a future** version **of humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, **we must prevent any existential catastrophe**.

#### m3] Actor specificity: A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefit some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. C] Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings.

#### 4] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first.

## 1NC – DA

#### Women are coming back to the workforce – but that hinges on stable school environments

**Dmitrieva and Shah 11/5** [Katia Dmitrieva and Jill R Shah, Jill and Katia are reporters for Bloomberg. 11-5-2021, "U.S. Women Are Coming Back to the Job Market," Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-05/u-s-women-come-back-to-job-market-as-school-year-gets-under-way>] Adam

Women of childbearing age are returning to the U.S. workforce, showing a small improvement in their participation rate after a decline in September.

Participation among prime-age female workers, those 25 to 54 years old, rose slightly last month, Labor Department data released Friday [showed.](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm) It was little changed for men of the same age.

The small increase could be the first sign of a return many economists were predicting would happen in September as children went back to school. Women with children have particularly struggled over the course of the pandemic as school closures and a lack of care have hampered their ability to work.

#### Teacher strikes disproportionately hurt female participation in the workforce

**Jaume and Willén 19** [David Jaume y Alexander Willén, Jaume holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Cornell University, a master’s in economics from Universidad Nacional de La Plata (Argentina), and a BA in Economics from Universidad Nacional de Cuyo (Argentina). He is also a research affiliate at the Center for Distributive, Labor, and Social Studies (CEDLAS). Willén is a Professor of Economics at the Norwegian School of Economics. My main fields of interest are labor economics, public economics, and economics of education. He holds a PhD in Policy Analysis from Cornell University (2018), a MPP in Public Policy from Georgetown University (2013) and a BA from Durham University (2011). March 2019, Centro de Estudios Distributivos, [https://www.cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/wp-content/uploads/doc\_cedlas243.pdf Accessed 11/5/21](https://www.cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/wp-content/uploads/doc_cedlas243.pdf%20Accessed%2011/5/21)] Adam

Temporary school closures are common features of education systems across the globe, and a relatively large literature has investigated how TSCs impact the short- and long-run education and 25 labor market behavior of students. A neglected but equally important question relates to how TSCs affect the labor market behavior of parents. This is the first paper to present a detailed analysis on this topic. First, we provide a framework for thinking about the decision problem faced by parents in the event of a disruption to their children’s school services. Second, we exploit a novel identification strategy coupled with a rich and newly created data set to test the predictions of the model and examine the reduced-form effect of school disruptions on parental labor market decisions. To obtain plausibly exogenous variation in TSCs, we use variation in teacher strikes within and across provinces over time between parents with and without children in primary school. Results indicate that school disruptions negatively affect the labor force participation of mothers. These adverse labor supply effects translate into economically meaningful reductions in earnings and wages: a mother whose child is exposed to ten days of TSCs experiences a decline in earnings equivalent to 2.92% of the mean. Through auxiliary analysis we find that these effects are predominantly driven by low-skilled mothers at the margin of employment, such that TSCs disproportionally hurt an already vulnerable subgroup of mothers. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the average mother would be willing to forego more than 1.6 months of earnings in order to ensure that there are no TSCs while her child is in primary school. While we do not find any effects among fathers in general, fathers who are married to women with higher predicted relative earnings also experience negative labor market effects: A father who earns less than his wife and whose child is exposed to ten days of TSCs suffers a decline in his hourly wage equivalent to 2.09% of the mean. This result suggests that the labor supply response of parents depend, at least in part, on the relative income of each parent. However, this group of households is small, such that women are disproportionally affected by TSCs. These results thus imply that interruptions to core childcare services may exacerbate existing labor market and intra-household gender inequality by disproportionately affecting mothers. Our findings illustrate the importance of providing stable childcare options to mothers in order to maximize their ability to participate in the labor market and to prevent an augmentation of labor market and intra-household gender inequality. While the effect of TSCs on student outcomes can be reduced by offering make-up days at the end of the semester, this type of policy intervention would be unsuccessful in reducing the impact of TSCs on parental labor market behavior. An increased awareness of how TSCs affect parental labor market outcomes is therefore imperative for guiding the development of future childcare policies and establishing policy responses to TSCs.

#### Gender diversity in the workforce is key to innovation

Lorenzo 17 [Rocio, Partner and managing director at The Boston Consulting Group, J.D. University of Passau and University of Santiago de Compostela, “The Mix That Matters: Innovation Through Diversity,” 4/26, <https://www.bcg.com/publications/2017/people-organization-leadership-talent-innovation-through-diversity-mix-that-matters.aspx> Accessed 11/5/21] Adam

When companies undertake efforts to make their management teams more diverse by adding women and people from other countries, industries, and companies, does it pay off? In the critical area of innovation, the answer seems to be yes. A study of 171 German, Swiss, and Austrian companies shows a clear relationship between the diversity of companies’ management teams and the revenues they get from innovative products and services. (See “Study Methodology.”)

The study comes at a time when diversity’s business benefits have become a topic of intense discussion. In the past, the indirect benefits of diversity were sufficient—an expansion of the job candidate pool at all levels, or an increase in social and political status for the company. Direct financial benefits weren’t needed to justify diversity initiatives—no one could even say for sure if such benefits existed. This study shows that they do.

BCG and the Technical University of Munich conducted an empirical analysis to understand the relationship between diversity in management (defined as all levels of management, not just executive management) and innovation. (See “How Diversity and Innovation Are Defined in This Report.”) Although the research is concentrated in a particular geographic region, we believe that its insights apply globally. The following are the major findings:

•The positive relationship between management diversity and innovation is statistically significant, meaning that companies with higher levels of diversity get more revenue from new products and services.

•The innovation boost isn’t limited to a single type of diversity. The presence of managers who are female or from other countries, industries, or companies can cause an increase in innovation.

•Management diversity seems to have a particularly positive effect on innovation at complex companies—those that have multiple product lines or that operate in multiple industry segments. Diversity’s impact also increases with company size.

•To reach its potential, gender diversity needs to go beyond tokenism. In our study, innovation performance only increased significantly when the workforce included a nontrivial percentage of women (more than 20%) in management positions. Having a high percentage of female employees doesn’t do anything for innovation, the study shows, if only a small number of women are managers

•At companies with diverse management teams, openness to contributions from lower-level workers and an environment in which employees feel free to speak their minds are crucial in fostering innovation

DIVERSITY’S POSITIVE LINK TO INNOVATION

That management diversity might be linked to innovation isn’t a new concept. It’s rooted in the assumption that diversity leads to different perspectives and novel solutions. This is, however, a difficult thing to prove. Unlike other innovation catalysts— R&D spending, for instance, or a specific strategy emphasizing innovation—diversity has an indirect connection to innovation. Until now, most of the research about it has been more qualitative than quantitative.

The BCG-Technical University of Munich study used statistical methods—correlations and regression analyses—not only to show that a relationship exists between diversity and innovation but also to identify the types of companies that get the biggest innovation boost from diversity, the steps that companies can take to increase diversity’s power, and the types of diversity that matter the most. This last area of inquiry is particularly important because many companies’ diversity strategies are no longer focused solely on traditional forms of diversity, such as gender and nationality. Instead, they have expanded, under the catchphrase “2D diversity,” to incorporate so-called acquired diversity, which includes people with cross-industry expertise and nonlinear career paths.

The companies were first analyzed using the Blau index to aggregate their levels of diversity in six areas. (See the Appendix for an explanation of the statistical analysis and terms used in this report.) The resulting diversity score was plotted against each company’s innovation level. We found that innovation revenue—which we define as the share of revenues from new products and services in the most recent three-year period —rises with diversity. (See Exhibit 1.)

Diversity and innovation don’t affect each other directly, the way sales of umbrellas by a street vendor rise on a rainy day; the relationship is more complex. Moreover, there are quite a few factors beyond diversity that can affect a company’s ability to innovate— such as the creativity of its R&D department, the executive team’s attitude toward taking risks, and shareholders’ support of new ventures. Still, management diversity influences innovation on its own. Diversity and innovation move together, and the relationship is statistically significant—meaning that there is a high probability of its repeating in any large population of companies

An initial sense of diversity’s impact on innovation can be derived by comparing companies that are more diverse with those that are less diverse. In our study, companies with Blau index scores above 0.59 (above the median) have generated 38% more of their revenues, on average, from innovative products and services in the most recent three-year period than did companies below the median.

The study’s numbers become even more instructive when they are broken down along other dimensions. This more nuanced analysis yields insights about how to get the most out of diversity and which types of diversity offer the biggest advantage.

Of the six types of diversity analyzed in the study, four positively correlate with innovation: industry background, country of origin, career path, and gender. Age diversity (the extent to which managers are evenly distributed across age groups) is actually associated with less innovation. A sixth type of diversity, academic background, appears to have no impact at all on innovation, either positive or negative. (See Exhibit 2.)

#### Strong Innovation solves Extinction.

Matthews 18 Dylan Matthews 10-26-2018 “How to help people millions of years from now” <https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good> (Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University)//Re-cut by Elmer

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the **odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs** we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

# Case

## Frwk

#### [1] Grievability is impact justified – there is no normative reason why not grieving is bad you just say its independently bad. Reject frameworks that are impact justified a) irresolvable since the fwk provides no way to weigh between different things that are bad b) disincentivizes ethical responsibility because they don’t provide guides to action just say things are bad c) Creates a race to the margins where people find uncontestable statements like “racism is bad” and avoid normative justifications by weighing their impact – The big picture is that we are not contesting that their harms are bad but without a normative moral justification it’s impossible to evaluate them or justify stopping them.

#### [2] People can live outside of relations proves that we do not depend on another for agency and can legislate our own actions.

#### [3] No bright line for how much Grievability is enough – proves its unverifiable at which point the fwk solves immorality. Triggers permissibility.

#### [4] Culpability – internal fluidity is bad because people can change their identity and opt out of action they have willed in the past.

#### [5] There is no distinction between agents – proves we do not know who we are giving the action to insofar as any living thing can feel affect. Triggers permissibility because we do not know who takes the action.

#### [6] Not Normative – Butler does not tell us what actions are good or bad just that we should mourn proves it doesn’t tell us how to act which triggers permissibility.