
## New Affs Bad

#### Interpretation—The aff must disclose the advocacy text and the standard text before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation—they didn't



#### The standard is prep and clash-

#### Two internal links-a) Neg prep: The AC framework controls the direction of a round – even if its whole rez, my prep drastically differs based on a util AC, topical K aff, or a burden/tricks aff. 4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn a little about the affirmative and piece together what 1nc positions work best against the affirmative and cut and research their applications to the affirmative. Exacerbated by the fact that philosophy can be dense and hard to fully understand with a few cross ex questions absent any pre-round prep. They also get months to frontline their one aff, while I coming into the round guessing—o/w since their already structurally ahead, b) Aff quality-disclosing the framework text allows preliminary research into the framework preventing frameworks from winning just because they are terribly confusing and not a philosophy that policymakers would actually use-if they affirmatives framework would be crushed with 20 minutes of research then it does not deserve to win. This will answer the 1ar's claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there's still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can't check against the broader literature.

#### Turns the aff – they say in cx that disclosure helps spread the message of the aff, yet they deny me that

#### No RVI’s or impact turns- illogical, baiting, perf con – if theory is bad and you vote on an impact turn you are voting on theory

#### CI- intervention, race to bottom, collapses, yours vs best

## Frwk

#### The aff should be topical.

#### “Resolved:” refers to a legislative debate.

Louisiana State Legislature 16, “Glossary of Legislative Terms,” http://www.legis.state.la.us/glossary2.htm

Resolution: A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11, 13.1, 6.8, and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Private company is defined as

Chen, 21, Learn about Private Companies, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privatecompany.asp, Investopedia,

A private company is a firm held under private ownership. Private companies may issue stock and have shareholders, but their shares do not trade on public exchanges and are not issued through an [initial public offering](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp) (IPO). As a result, private firms do not need to meet the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) strict filing requirements for [public companies](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/publiccompany.asp). In general, the shares of these businesses are less liquid, and their [valuations](https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/09/how-to-value-shares-in-private-company.asp) are more difficult to determine.

#### Meriam webster defines outer space

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outer%20space>

: space immediately outside the earth's atmosphere broadly : interplanetary or interstellar space

#### [1] Competitive equity—any alternative wrecks it—it’s impossible to negate alternative frameworks with the ground allocated to us by the parameters of the resolution—all 1AR defense to this claim will rely on concessionary ground which isn’t a stable basis for a year of debate.

#### They don’t get to weigh the aff – it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### [2] Switch Side Debate – read your stuff on the neg which non-uniques your offense and is net better since a Kritik on the neg has to be tailored to the aff– otherwise your discussion starts and ends at the 1AC.

#### [3] Refinement – a well-defined resolution is critical to allow the neg to refute the aff in an in-depth fashion. This process of negation produces iterative testing and improvement. Only a resolution with ground on both sides allows for the most clash which controls the internal link to education. Committees outweigh because they discuss the best topic for a stasis point – even if some resolutions are bad it is net better for a group to create a topic rather than an individual.

#### [4] TVA – discuss how private entities in outer space have a negative impact on the disabled body

#### [5] Truth testing—they moot the role of the negative which is to force the aff to defend their core assumptions—allowing affs to reframe the debate around their terms makes engagement impossible—outweighs and turns the aff because clash is the only way to translate anything debate gives us outside of the activity.

#### T isn’t violent – A] I don’t have the power to impose a norm – only to convince you my side is better. T doesn’t ban you from the activity – the whole point is that norms should be contestable – I just say make a better arg next time. B] Exclusion is inevitable – every role of the ballot excludes some arguments and even saying T bad excludes it – that means we should delineate ground along reciprocal lines, not abandon division altogether.

#### Reading T isn’t psychic violence – that was above, but especially if we’re not going for it since reading T can be used to prevent aff shiftiness and make substance a viable option.

#### No silencing DA - T is just like a disad or critique we’ve said a certain practice the aff took was bad and it would’ve been better had they done it differently not that they are bad debaters – just like the cap k says the aff engaged in some practice that reinforced capitalism and it would’ve been better if they had emphasized Marxism – impositions in some form are inevitable because the negative has the burden of rejoinder and needs link arguments – every disad link says the aff did something wrong and theres an implicit version of the aff that wouldn’t have linked

#### Theory before the K – A] Prior question. My theory argument calls into question the ability to run the argument in the first place. They can’t say the same even if they criticize theory because theory makes rules of the game not just normative statements about what debaters should say. B] Fair testing. Judge their arguments knowing I wasn’t given a fair shot to answer them. Prefer theory takes out K because they could answer my arguments, but I couldn’t answer theirs. Without testing their args, we don’t know if they’re valid, so you prefer fairness impacts on strength of link. Impact turns any critical education since a marketplace of ideas where we innovate, and test ideas presumes equal access.

#### Q of what the ballot can solve for – even if ableism is the highest impact- a ballot only signsals an impact on fairness

# Case

### Case Overview

#### Negate on presumption:

#### (1) No solvency and turn – debate as a communicative act may be violent, but they’re authors don’t differentiate it from the rest of the world it’s just an institution inside the ableist world. They misread their authors the 1AC is a “band-aid” solution their authors don’t treat debate nihilistically in isolation BUT the world and eradicating debate doesn’t change the nature of the drive that recreates violence in different forms – proves it’s not endurance. ALL they actually do is generate cruel optimism since it creates a feel good solution that places disability in a not yet but maybe to come social order where disabled infiltration of tournaments occurs. Their attempt to reform the content of debate through examining the way war goes down in the community is complicit in an ableist world that consumes their project as false energy.

#### (2) Allies da - using debate as a mode of advocacy ensures the failure of their radical project – competition means debaters ally themselves with individuals who vote for them and alienate those who are positioned with the burden of rejoinder and forced to negate – at worst you vote negative on presumption because they don’t use debate as a stepping stone for their advocacy outside the space and don’t have a net benefit to affirming the 1ac.

#### 1] Reform may not be perfect, but they improve the material conditions of disabled life – 1AR spin that ableist violence is evolving is a neg argument since disabled relation to the world has changed. THIS is OFFENSE against the Aff would say no to the ADA which has decreased workplace violence, allowed voting rights and increases employment for disabled folk.

#### 2] The disability drive is NOT logical, think of it’s application in debate if the OVERALL psyche claim was true then how do they get non-disabled ballots.

#### 3] Disability can’t be ontological, and progress is possible

#### A] It’s not static – conceptions of disability aren’t concrete but fluid over time – for example ADHD wasn’t diagnosed as disability until more recent medicine, and there’s no clear brightline or definition of disability.

#### B] Disability not ontological – only reform can resolve societal prejudices against disabled people.

Hudak ’11 (GLENN M., PhD, is a professor at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. “On the Commerce of Disability and the Advocacy of Philosophy for Educators.” PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2011. Robert Kunzman, editor © 2011 Philosophy of Education Society  Urbana, Illinois.)-JJN

In his essay on the equality of difference, Michael Surbaugh asks us to consider what philosophy of education can offer special education, particularly an education revolving around “someone with severe cognitive deficits.” In an effort to accomplish this task and make his discussion more concrete, he constructs a “composite case study:” “Sarah.” Sarah is a “disabled” young female living in a group home. The rub: “Sarah has no voice, even as many social institutions have arisen to protect her rights and confer entitlements on her because of her disability. In the eyes of many, she is taken care of, and that is the end of the issue.” For Surbaugh, this is not the end of the issue. Drawing from John Dewey, Surbaugh claims, “all live creatures share a similar educational ‘task’ and ‘purpose,’ in asserting themselves in the context of their environment, weaving complex relations and richer forms of experience” (original emphasis). From Hannah Arendt he claims that, regardless of one’s abilities or disabilities, all children are “newcomers to the world, with unforeseen possibilities for the relationships they enter into and sustain.” Taken together, he wants us to grasp the “phenomenological” moment: “Sarah is a live creature.” As a live creature, she is endowed with task and purpose in the world; her relationships to the world are open rather than closed and, like a “newborn” — open to new unforeseen possibilities. The foreclosures to possible actions for Sarah, then, are not ontological in nature; rather, they are the result of societal prejudices and misunderstandings that close off Sarah’s possibilities, limiting her potential, curtailing who she is. While Surbaugh rightly advocates for Sarah — advocates that caregivers realize her humanity and respond accordingly — if we are to grasp the societal prejudices that foreclose Sarah’s possible actions then, the educative experience of the caregiver needs to be included and developed. Why? Because if we take the pragmatist perspective that Sarah’s actions and intentions can never be fully understood in isolation — as Sarah is never out of contact with her world, nor out of relation with the caregivers — then, as Surbaugh argues, Sarah’s education “should encourage her commerce with the world that envelops her, developing her understanding of her own causal impact on it and in it.” That is, Sarah’s education requires that she come to some “understanding of her causal impact” on others, and perhaps by extension the role she plays in determining the outcome of the situation at hand. Further, if there is to be an educative experience for Sarah, then, “for Dewey,” as Alison Kadlec points out, “experience is not a matter of knowing, rather it is a matter of doing in which we undergo, endure, and suffer the consequences of our actions.”1 Sarah’s experience is not a private matter; rather it is constituted within her interactions with the world. At minimum, if Sarah’s experiences are to be educative, Sarah will need to work through the consequences of her actions with the hope that through this process she will develop skills and habits to adapt, cope, and thereby restructure her relationship to the caregivers.

#### C] Disability isn’t ontological – social context determines disability discrimination.

Anastasiou and Kauffman ’13 (DIMITRIS - Associate Professor and Program Coordinator, Ph.D., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2004. JAMES M. - Professor Emeritus of education at UVA, Ed.D. in special education from University of Kansas. “The Social Model of Disability: Dichotomy between Impairment and Disability.” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 38: 441–459, 2013. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/James\_Kauffman/publication/249647375\_The\_Social\_Model\_of\_Disability\_Dichotomy\_between\_Impairment\_and\_Disability/links/02e7e521b55fa0504d000000.pdf)-JJN

V. Disabilities in Social Context Proponents of a social model seem to support the idea that disability is a product of wrong interpretation of impairments (Reindal, 1995) related to disabling social structures. Our question is very simple: Assuming that we have an ideal, perfect, caring society, will disabilities no longer exist? If we followed the arguments of the social model, in an ideal society we would have only impairments but not disabilities! Unfortunately, we do not think that it would be possible to eradicate disabilities by changing only the sociopolitical context. Why? Because the dichotomy between impairment and disability is methodological; it is not ontological. The names we give to physical or mental conditions do not create disabilities or turn disabilities into abilities (Kauffman et al., 2008; Kauffman, 2011). Of course, names have their importance, because they circulate in a social context and turn back on the named people. Also, a much better social context can substantially improve the quality of life of people with disabilities, and this is not a trivial matter. But whatever names we use in our societies, the most profound restrictions related to intrinsic factors will remain for the vast majority of people with disabilities. Nevertheless, the discussion about social context is an important issue. Disabilities should be viewed as embedded in their social context in many different ways. First, a certain disability is conceptualized within a specific social context and characterized by a discrepancy between the individual’s performance and the expectations or demands of the social group to which the person belongs. This brings social values into the appreciation of disabilities. Any conceptualization of disability, whether physical or mental, is inevitably value-laden. Disabilities naturally arouse children’s curiosity, but social perceptions can change. The recognition of disabilities can take different directions according to social values. Zola, an American sociologist, has eloquently described it: “Children spontaneously express an interest in wheelchairs and leg braces, but as they grow older they are taught that . . . it’s not nice to ask [about] such things” (1982, 200). Values and attitudes exert profound influence on the way nondisabled people perceive others with disabilities, as Zola stated: When the “able-bodied” confront the “disabled,” they often think with a shudder, “I’m glad it’s not me” . . . The threat to be dispelled is the inevitability of one’s own failure. The discomfort that many feel in the presence of the aged, the suffering, and the dying is the reality that it could just as well be them. (1982, 202) Second, social decisions about the border between disability and normality are difficult because of the statistical phenomena involved. In many cases, the border is both vague and rather arbitrary (Kauffman and Hallahan, 2005; Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011; Kauffman and Lloyd, 2011 ). Defining the qualitative differences we call disabilities by making binary decisions (yes or no, has or does not have) requires making judgments about people, even though the quantitative data are continuous statistical distributions. The identification of a disability depends on judgment, and judgment means that one arrives at a cutpoint on continuously distributed abilities. Inevitably social values are linked to the judgmental identification of disabilities. However, not making such a judgment precludes the kind of assistance we consider necessary for social justice (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011). Third, although categorizing and labeling have become major issues in disability and special education debates, the debate is often misguided. Kauffman (2002, 2011) and Kauffman et al. (2008) have argued analytically for the inevitability of labeling, given that we really want to offer special services and benefits to specific individuals. We simply cannot offer extra or better services to individuals without speaking about difference or special needs, and this is as true for disabilities as it is for economic assistance or any social program. For this reason, an individual-based perspective is necessary for identifying people with special needs for certain services (Reindal, 1995). Without a definition based on individual criteria of disability, the rights of people with disabilities cannot be fully guaranteed (see Kauffman and Landrum, 2009). Even in Norway, a country with an extended safety net of social welfare services, the identification of benefits to be received is based on judgment of individual need (Reindal, 1995). Antilabelists imagine services without labels. But even in an ideal communitarian society with enough resources, we cannot offer excellent services according to the old socialistic principle “from each according to his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs” without any need identification process. Perhaps the process is more obvious in an antagonistic society with a plurality of interests and unequal distribution of power, status, and wealth. Those who want to avoid all labels commit a great mistake in confusing the relationship between education and social change. Public education, by its nature, is a rather conservative institution that reflects the mainstream values of society and represents an adopted social agenda. It is a trailer and not a leader in political, economic, and social change. Historically great social changes precede important educational changes. Imagining the opposite relationship and neglecting today’s predominant sociopolitical forces is a political fallacy. The danger is that without labels the needs of individuals with disabilities will be ignored (see Kauffman, 2011). Surely labeling is not trivial, because labels are used to describe human beings as well as things. Labels often carry unintended stigma to receivers of services. And in many cases, the experiences of being disabled are socially constructed, mirroring the thoughts, feelings, and values of the social milieu. Indeed, the institutional response to disabilities is difficult. The “dilemma of difference” has been underlined in special education’s literature. If we emphasize existing differences (including disabilities), then we are in danger of unjustified discrimination; if we ignore the existence of disabilities or pretend that they do not exist, then we are in danger of leaving critical humans’ needs untreated (Hallahan and Kauffman, 1994; Kauffman and Badar, forthcoming). Fourth, disabilities are defined in a specific sociopolitical context and a system of social relations. Many dimensions of disabilities are part of the social process by which the social meanings of disability are negotiated (Zola, 1989). Public policy has a great impact on the lives of people with disabilities, and the formulation of disability strategy in education and public arena is of huge importance (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2010, 2011). In summary, disabilities are sealed within their social context. And many concepts about disabilities, whether involving low-incidence disabilities (e.g., severe intellectual disabilities) or high-incidence disabilities (e.g., mild intellectual disabilities, specific learning disability), have socially constructed aspects. It is not accidental that they have been classified and reclassified, defined and redefined according to the status of scientific knowledge and social values (e.g., Bruno Bettelheim’s theory of “refrigerator mothers” as a cause of autism—that autism was caused by cold, distant, and unconsciously rejecting mothers). Using the reasoning of Hacking (1999), we could make a distinction between the idea of autism (and the surrounding conceptual context) as socially constructed and autistic behaviors, which are real. Social construction does not give us insight into the severely restricted communication and social interaction of children with autism. Recognizing the influence of social context does not mean that there are no other viable ideas about disabilities. Social factors such as biomedical technology and special education can interact with biological factors, codetermining the evolution of disabilities as atypical predicaments. Thus, social and individual explanations of disabilities should be seen not as mutually exclusive but as codeterminants of development of people who have disabilities (Williams, 1999).

#### Reject psychoanalysis –

#### A] Psychoanalysis is not empirical and has no explanatory power --- prefer social science because it can explain events based on causal relationships

Slava Sadovnikov 7, York University, "Escape from Reason: Labels as Arguments and Theories", Dialogue XLVI (2007), 781-796, philpapers.org/archive/SADEFR.pdf

The way McLaughlin shows the rosy prospects of psychoanalytical social theory boils down to this: there are people who labour at it. He reports on Neil Smelser’s lifelong elaborations of psychoanalytical sociology, which prescribed the use of Freudian theories. Then he presents a “powerful” psychoanalytical theory of creativity of Michael Farrell, commenting on how the theorist “usefully utilizes psychoanalytic insights,” though McLaughlin does not specify them. He correctly expects that I might not view his examples as scientiﬁc. Their problems begin well before that. First, due to their informative emptiness, or tautological character, all they amount to is rewordings of everyday assumptions. Second, due to their vagueness these accounts are compatible with any outcomes; in other words, they lack explanatory and predictive power. The proposed ideas are too inarticulate to subject to intersubjective criticism, and to call them empirical or scientiﬁc theories would be, no matter how comforting, a gross misuse of words.¶On the constructive side, a psychoanalytic theorist may be challenged to unambiguously formulate her suppositions and specify conditions of their disproof, to leave out what we already well know and smooth out internal inconsistencies, and revise the theories in view of easily available counter-examples and competing accounts. Only after having done this can one present candidate theories to public criticism and thus make them part of science, and fruitfully discuss their further reﬁnements. Another suggestion is not to label them “powerful theories,” “classics,” or anything else before their real scrutiny begins. ¶That criticism and disagreement are indispensable for science is not a “Popperian orthodoxy,” although Popper does champion this idea; it is the pivot of the tradition (which we owe to the Greeks) which identiﬁes rationalism with criticism. 4 McLaughlin ostensibly bows to the critical tradition but does not put it to use. Instead of critical evaluation of the theories in question he writes of “compelling case,” “powerful analytic model,” and “useful conceptual tool.” ¶On the methodological side of the issue, we should inquire into the mode of thinking common to Fromm and all adherents of conﬁrmation-ism. The trick consists in mere replacement of familiar words with new, more peculiar ones; customary expressions are substituted by “instrumental intimacy,” “collaborative circles,” and “idealization of a self-object.” Since the new, funnier, and pseudo-theoretical tag does the job of naming just as well, it “shows how” things work. The new labels in the cases criticized here do not add anything to our knowledge; nor do they explain. We have seen Fromm routinely abuse this technique. The vacuity of Fromm’s explanations by character type was the central point in my analysis of Escape , yet McLaughlin conveniently ignores it and, like Fromm, uses the method of labelling as somehow supporting his cause. ¶The widely popular practice of mistaking new labels for explanations has been exposed by many methodologists in the history of philosophy, but probably the most famous example of such critique comes from Molière. In the now often-quoted passage, his character delivers a vacuous explanation of opium’s property to induce sleep by renaming the property with an offhand Latinism, “virtus dormitiva.” The satire acutely points not only at the impostor doctor’s hiding his lack of knowledge behind foreign words, but also at the emptiness of his alleged explanation. (Pseudo-theoretical literature is boring precisely because of its “dormitive virtue,” its shufﬂing of labels without rewarding inquiring minds.) ¶Let me review notable criticisms of this approach in the twentieth century by Hempel, Homans, and Weber leaving aside their forerunners. This problem was discussed in the famous debate between William Dray and Carl Hempel. Dray argues, contra the nomological account of explanation, that historians and social scientists often try to answer the question, “What is this phenomenon?” by giving an “explanation-by-concept” (Dray 1959, p. 403). A series of events may be better understood if we call it “a social revolution”; or the appropriate tag may be found in the expressions “reform,” “collaboration,” “class struggle,” “progress,” etc.; or, to take Fromm’s suggestions, we may call familiar motives and actions “sadomasochistic,” and any political choice save the Marxist “escape from freedom.”¶ Hempel agrees with Dray that such concepts may be explanatory, but they are so only if the chosen labels or classiﬁcatory tags refer to some uniformities, or are based on nomic analogies. In other words, our new label has explanatory force if it states or implies some established regularity

### AT: Debate Bad

#### 1] Trying to eliminate debate produces cruel optimism and repetition compulsion because they target discriminatory acts produced by the structure of [neoliberalism] i.e debate, instead of the structure of neoliberalism itself. Turns the case – causes endless repetitious targeting of smaller structures never destroying the structure itself and ensuring the failure of the 1ac’s project.

#### 2] 20 years of empirics through debate bad kritiks flow negative.

#### 3] Debate can be used tactically to disabled students and students in general how to survive in the world. All skills don’t have to invest in the world but can be used to endure given the existence OF that world.

#### 4] Unfairness does not give you uniqueness – fairness is key to having discussions about the affs methodology and iterative which you ROTB concedes the validity of. Being unfair will just cause people to prep you out in future rounds which proves you do not do anything.

#### 5] Perfcon – you are within this debate space using communicative technologies and spreading at 300+ WPM which means you bite into the form of communication that you critique