
## RR

#### Interp: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.

#### Violation: screenshot in the doc – they are missing rounds



#### Standards:

#### 1] Level Playing Field – big schools can go around and scout and collect flows but independents are left in the dark so round reports are key for them to prep- they give you an idea of overall what layers debaters like going for so you can best prepare your strategy when you hit them. Accessibility first and independent voter – it's an impact multiplier.

#### 2] Strategy Education – round reports help novices understand the context in which positions are read by good debaters and help with brainstorming potential 1NCs vs affs – helps compensate for kids who can't afford coaches to prep out affs.

#### 3] Pre-round prep –1ARs gives especially give an idea of what type of debater someone is – they could go for 1AR theory every round– otherwise I enter every round unknowing whereas you have an idea of what you want to go for from the start.

#### Fairness- consittutive of comp activites, args presume

#### Edu- funded ny schools

#### DTD- dta illogical, time skew

#### No RVI’s- illogical, baiting

#### CI- intervention, race to bottom, collapses, yours vs best

# Case

## Framing

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate consequences.

#### 1] Consequences first — anything else is irresponsible and escapes valuable discussions.

**Bracey 06** (Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318)

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### 2] No performative or methodological offense—it’s extra-topical which is a voting issue because it explodes predictable limits, spiking out of neg ground making any discussion qualitatively worse

#### 3] We access their role of the ballot—nuclear war causes massive suffering and disproportionately affects minorities. Proves even if they win their framing nuke war and warming are still a tiebreaker.

#### 4] Don’t let them weigh the sum total of cap —they only get to weigh the unique amount solved by the affirmative. Filter the debate through scope of solvency—there’s no impact to root cause if they don’t solve it.

#### 5] Extinction first --- moral uncertainty.

**Bostrom 12** [(Nick Bostrom, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford) “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy, 2012] TDI

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate. **Our** present **understanding** of axiology **might** well **be confused**. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. **If we are** indeed profoundly **uncertain about our** ultimate aims, **then we should** recognize that there is a great option **value** in preserving — and ideally improving — **our ability to** recognize value and to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that there will be **a future** version **of humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, **we must prevent any existential catastrophe**.

### Framing OV

#### [1] Hegel begs the question of what evil is when it’s legislated upon us - which only the NC can explain since it has a legit theory of interpersonal relations whereas they just develop a theory of history and assert how relations work from that

#### [2] sociality is not a yes no question – we don’t purely define ourselves as what we are not, but a subjective relationship – the worm sees the blood drops as huge in comparison but it is not purely “I am not blood drops or I am small”

#### [3] no warrant for reflection – it’s just an bundle of nerves that still creates a non-objective relationship to the past – we always reinterpret it

#### [4] Willing an end is an exercise in desire – it’s a desire to claim some external end which means only the neg can bridge the motivation gap – they might win their theory of reason is true but not a reason we ought to act on it – that outweighs because moral projects must be practical to be binding

#### Scaling up psychoanalysis fails for both solvency and descriptive power.

Sharpe and Boucher, ‘10

[Matthew (lecturer in philosophy and psychoanalytic studies at Deakin University) and Geoff (senior lecturer in literary and psychoanalytic studies at Deakin University), Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 186]

• So here is the force of the second, methodological component to Žižek’s untenable erasure of the difference between politics and psychoanalysis. By looking at the contemporary world as a contemporary subject–object in need of the theorist’s liberating ‘psychoanalysis’, Žižek is unable to make a series of key sociotheoretical distinctions long recognised in political and socialtheoretical literature on complex societies. • The key one of these, as we saw in ‘Vanishing Mediations’, is the distinction between the lifeworld of subjects (their lived world of meanings wherein a psychoanalytic ideology critique can be highly informative) and the mediasteered subsystems – principally the economywhose workings demand an objectifying socialscientific analysis, not a psychoanalytic account. • The problem Žižek elides, in the words of his own teacher Althusser, is that modern posttraditional societies are a complex totality of ‘relatively autonomous’ instances – in Althusser’s thinking, the economy, the ideological and the political instances. • Then there is the question of which instance or level might be the predominant one in any particular historical regime. One practical consequence of this theoretical observation is that the peoples or potentials that might be either ‘symptomatic’ or particularly vital at one level (say, the ideological level) may be either well integrated or wholly disempowered at the other levels.

#### It’s wrong—they universalize contingent examples

#### Robinson 5

Robinson, Ph.D. Political Theory from the University of Nottingham, 2005 (Andrew, “The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique,” *Theory and Event*, Vol. 8, No. 1)

**Lacanian analysis consists mainly of an exercise in projection**.  As a result, Lacanian "explanations" often look more propagandistic or pedagogical than explanatory.  **A particular case is dealt with only in order to**, and to the extent that it can, **confirm the already-formulated structural theory**.  Judith Butler criticizes Žižek's method on the grounds that 'theory is applied to its examples', as if 'already true, prior to its exemplification'.  'The theory is articulated on its self-sufficiency, and then shifts register only for the pedagogical purpose of illustrating an already accomplished truth'.  It is therefore 'a theoretical fetish that disavows the conditions of its own emergence'[52](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn52).  She alleges that Lacanian psychoanalysis 'becomes a theological project' and also 'a way to avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement' involved in studying specific cases[53](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn53).  Similarly, Dominick LaCapra objects to the idea of constitutive lack because specific 'losses cannot be adequately addressed when they are enveloped in an overly generalised discourse of absence... Conversely, absence at a "foundational" level cannot simply be derived from particular historical losses'[54](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn54).  Attacking 'the long story of conflating absence with loss that becomes constitutive instead of historical'[55](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn55), he accuses several theorists of eliding the difference between absence and loss, with 'confusing and dubious results', including a 'tendency to avoid addressing historical problems, including losses, in sufficiently specific terms', and a tendency to 'enshroud, perhaps even to etherealise, them in a generalised discourse of absence'[56](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn56).  Daniel Bensaïd draws out the political consequences of the projection of absolutes into politics.  'The fetishism of the absolute event involves... a suppression of historical intelligibility, necessary to its depoliticization'.  **The space from which politics is evacuated 'becomes... a suitable place for abstractions, delusions** and hypostases'.  Instead of actual social forces, there are 'shadows and spectres'. The operation of the logic of projection is predictable.  According to Lacanians, there is a basic structure (sometimes called a 'ground' or 'matrix') from which all social phenomena arise, and this structure, which remains unchanged in all eventualities, is the reference-point from which particular cases are viewed.  **The "fit" between theory and evidence is constructed** monologically by the reduction of the latter to the former, or **by selectivity in inclusion and reading of examples**.  At its simplest, the Lacanian myth functions by a short-circuit between a particular instance and statements containing words such as "all", "always", "never", "necessity" and so on.  **A contingent example or a generic reference to "experience" is used, misleadingly, to found a claim with supposed universal validity**.  For instance, Stavrakakis uses the fact that existing belief-systems are based on exclusions as a basis to claim that all belief-systems are necessarily based on exclusions[58](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn58), and claims that particular traumas express an 'ultimate impossibility'[59](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn59).  Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe use the fact that a particular antagonism can disrupt a particular fixed identity to claim that the social as such is penetrated and constituted by antagonism as such[60](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn60).  Phenomena are often analysed as outgrowths of something exterior to the situation in question.  For instance, Žižek's concept of the "social symptom" depends on a reduction of the acts of one particular series of people (the "socially excluded", "fundamentalists", Serbian paramilitaries, etc.) to a psychological function in the psyche of a different group (westerners).  **The "real"** is a supposedly self-identical principle which **is used to reduce any and all qualitative differences between situations** to a relation of formal equivalence.  This shows how mythical characteristics can be projected from the outside, although it also raises different problems: the under-conceptualization of the relationship between individual psyches and collective phenomena in Lacanian theory, and a related tendency for psychological concepts to acquire an ersatz agency similar to that of a Marxian fetish.  "The Real" or "antagonism" occurs in phrases which have it doing or causing something. As Barthes shows, **myth offers the psychological benefits of empiricism without the epistemological costs**.

#### Even if they win superior explanatory power, psychoanalytic imaginings are useless in advancing political change

**Rosen-Carole 10** [Adam, Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Bard College, 2010, “Menu Cards in Time of Famine: On Psychoanalysis and Politics,” Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. LXXIX, No. 1, p. 205-207

On the other hand, though in these ways and many others, psychoanalysis seems to promote the sorts of subjective dispositions and habits requisite for a thriving democracy, and though in a variety of ways psychoanalysis contributes to personal emancipation— say, by releasing individuals from self-defeating, damaging, or petrified forms action and reaction, object attachment, and the like—in light of the very uniqueness of what it has to offer, one cannot but wonder: to what extent, if at all, can the habits and dispositions—broadly, the forms of life—cultivated by psychoanalytic practice survive, let alone flourish, under modern social and political conditions? If the emancipatory inclinations and democratic virtues that psychoanalytic practice promotes are systematically crushed or at least regularly unsupported by the world in which they would be realized, then isn’t psychoanalysis implicitly making promises it cannot redeem? Might not massive social and political transformations be the condition for the efficacious practice of psychoanalysis? And so, under current conditions, can we avoid experiencing the forms of life nascently cultivated by psychoanalytic practice as something of a tease, or even a source of deep frustration? (2) Concerning psychoanalysis as a politically inclined theoretical enterprise, the worry is whether political diagnoses and proposals that proceed on the basis of psychoanalytic insights and forms of attention partake of a fantasy of interpretive efficacy (all the world’s a couch, you might say), wherein our profound alienation from the conditions for robust political agency are registered and repudiated? Consider, for example, Freud and Bullitt’s (1967) assessment of the psychosexual determinants of Woodrow Wilson’s political aspirations and impediments, or Reich’s (1972) suggestion that Marxism should appeal to psychoanalysis in order to illuminate and redress neurotic phenomena that generate disturbances in working capacity, especially as this concerns religion and bourgeois sexual ideology. Also relevant are Freud’s, Žižek’s (1993, 2004), Derrida’s (2002) and others’ insistence that we draw the juridical and political consequences of the hypothesis of an irreducible death drive, as well as Marcuse’s (1970) proposal that we attend to the weakening of Eros and the growth of aggression that results from the coercive enforcement of the reality principle upon the sociopolitically weakened ego, and especially to the channeling of this aggression into hatred of enemies. Reich (1972) and Fromm (1932) suggest that psychoanalysis be employed to explore the motivations to political irrationality, especially that singular irrationality of joining the national-socialist movement, while Irigaray (1985) diagnoses the desire for the Same, the One, the Phallus as a desire for a sociosymbolic order that assures masculine dominance. Žižek (2004) contends that only a psychoanalytic exposition of the disavowed beliefs and suppositions of the United States political elite can get at the fundamental determinants of the Iraq War. Rose (1993) argues that it was the paranoiac paradox of sensing both that there is every reason to be frightened and that everything is under control that allowed Thatcher “to make this paradox the basis of political identity so that subjects could take pleasure in violence as force and legitimacy while always locating ‘real’ violence somewhere else—illegitimate violence and illicitness increasingly made subject to the law” (p. 64). Stavrakakis (1999) advocates that we recognize and traverse the residues of utopian fantasy in our contemporary political imagination.1 Might not the psychoanalytic interpretation of powerful figures (Bush, Bin Laden, or whomever), collective subjects (nations, ethnic groups, and so forth), or urgent “political” situations register an anxiety regarding political impotence or “castration” that is pacified and modified by the fantasmatic frame wherein the psychoanalytically inclined political theorist situates him- or herself as diagnosing or interpretively intervening in the lives of political figures, collective political subjects, or complex political situations with the idealized efficacy of a successful clinical intervention? If so, then the question is: are the contributions of psychoanalytically inclined political theory anything more than tantalizing menu cards for meals it cannot deliver**?** As I said, the worry is twofold. These are two folds of a related problem, which is this: might the very seductiveness of psychoanalytic theory and practice—specifically, the seductiveness of its political promise—register the lasting eclipse of the political and the objectivity of the social, respectively? In other words, might not everything that makes psychoanalytic theory and practice so politically attractive indicate precisely the necessity of wide-ranging social/institutional transformations that far exceed the powers of psychoanalysis? And so, might not the politically salient transformations of subjectivity to which psychoanalysis can contribute overburden subjectivity as the site of political transformation, blinding us to the necessity of largescale institutional reforms? Indeed, might not massive institutional transformations be necessary conditions for the efficacy of psychoanalytic practice, both personally and politically? Further, might not the so-called interventions and proposals of psychoanalytically inclined political theory similarly sidestep the question of the institutional transformations necessary for their realization, and so conspire with our blindness to the enormous institutional impediments to a progressive political future?

## Case

### Transition Wars

#### Transition wars: Even if they win that neolib isn’t good, they won’t win that there’s a viable alternative

**Anderson**, professor of sociology – UCLA, **’84**

(Perry, In the tracks of historical materialism, p. 102-103)

That background also indicates, however, what is essentially missing from his work. How are we to get from where we are today to where he point us to tomorrow? There is no answer to this question in Nove. His halting discussion of “transition” tails away into apprehensive admonitions to moderation to the British Labor Party, and pleas for proper compensation to capitalist owners of major industries, if these are to be nationalized. Nowhere is there any sense of what a titanic political change would have to occur, with what fierceness of social struggle, for the economic model of socialism he advocates ever to materialize. Between the radicalism of the future end-state he envisages, and the conservatism of the present measures he is prepared to countenance, there is an unbridgeable abyss. How could private ownership of the means of production ever be abolished by policies less disrespectful of capital than those of Allende or a Benn, which he reproves? What has disappeared from the pages of The Economics of Feasible Socialism is virtually all attention to the historical dynamics of any serious conflict over the control of the means of production, as the record of the 20th century demonstrates them. If capital could visit such destruction on even so poor and small an outlying province of its empire in Vietnam, to prevent its loss, is it likely that it would suffer its extinction meekly in its own homeland? The lessons of the past sixty-five years or so are in this respect **without ambiguity or exception**, **there is no case**, from **Russia** to **China**, from **Vietnam** to **Cuba**, from **Chile** to **Nicaragua**, where the existence of capitalism has been challenged, and the furies of intervention, blockade and civil strife have not descended in response. Any viable transition to socialism in the West must seek to curtail that pattern: **but to** shrink from or to **ignore it is to depart from the world of the possible altogether**. In the same way, to construct an economic model of socialism in one advanced country is a legitimate exercise: but to extract it from any computable relationship with a surrounding, and necessarily opposing, capitalist environment—as this work does—is to locate it in thin air.

#### Alternatives to growth kill hundreds of millions and cause global conflict—we can’t “*turn off*” the economy.

Barnhizer 6 — David R. Barnhizer, Emeritus Professor at Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 2006 (“Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government,” *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* (18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 595), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty, and strife. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities. n60¶ The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior.

#### Contradictions between the market and environment can be controlled with solutions like a carbon tax—their aff goes too far and alienates the Green movement.

Frederic C. RICH, J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, practiced at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (1981-2014), Vice Chair of the Land Trust Alliance, head of the Environmental Leaders Group in New York State, 16 [*Getting to Green*, 2016, p. 88-91]

Closely allied with the notion that economic growth is the main enemy of a sustainable environment is the conviction that capitalism, so good at producing growth, is a social and economic framework inconsistent with environmental goals. It is tempting but wrong to think of this as a fringe position. This anticapitalist bias arises from a longstanding Green focus on market failure, and has been promoted by some of the most mainstream figures in environmentalism, such as former Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies dean Gus Speth, who—not mincing words or evidencing any concern for conservative sensibilities—asserts, "The planet cannot sustain capitalism as we know it."" The rapturous reception accorded by many Greens to Naomi Klein's 2014 anticapitalist polemic, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate, demonstrates the continuing strength of this bias within the Green movement.

There are few Green books that do not at some point mention Garrett Hardin's 1968 article in Science, "The Tragedy of the Commons."12 This is because most Green engagement with market capitalism starts with the proposition that people acting only as economic animals in their own rational self-interest will be free riders. Free riders take advantage of any opportunity to use (to and past the point of abuse) public or ecological resources (as in the grazing rights on the commons or fish stocks in the ocean). Free riders also impose costs on others or society at large (e.g., through pollution, where the free rider imposes an "externality," or cost, on society that should properly be priced into its own cost of production). This predisposition and ability to abuse public resources and impose externalities in a laissez-faire market system is at the heart of much Green discomfort with leaving everything to the free-market economy.

A similar market failure arises on the value side of the equation: Greens observe that the market prices resources such as timber and minerals, but fails to value "ecological services" (like the role [END PAGE 88] of forests in protecting aquifers or of wetlands in buffering storm surges). These failures are related to the market's difficulty in valuing things that are as intricate as ecological systems, or in accounting for deferred consequences (such as the flood-buffering effects of wetlands over time in the face of sea level rise). As Speth puts it, "The result is that our market economy is operating on wildly wrong market signals, lacks other correcting mechanisms, and is thus out of control environmentally."13 This much is true. The solution, of course, is not to throw out the market system but to correct the market failures by, for example, a carbon tax that shifts the costs of the externality to the producer.

Market failures are not, however, the exclusive cause of the anti-capitalist tendency among Greens. Parts of the Green movement are influenced by a broad leftist distrust of markets and capitalism. This distrust was exacerbated after the debacle of 2008 and the rise among progressives generally of severe doubts about the particular risks attached to unfettered financial markets. These doubts can, I think, be excused, given the damage done in the last decade by irrational excess, both on Wall Street and in corporate America. The distinction between rational self-interest (good) and excessive greed (bad) is also a critical one for some on the right, as illustrated by Russell Kirk's worrying in 1953 that the withering of religion, with its prohibition against avarice, and "the decay of the old aristocratic prejudices against greedy speculation," could lead to "a vast and voracious concentration upon profits."14 This sense that "a vast and voracious concentration upon profits" may not be a good thing is shared both by traditional conservatives and the left.

Nonetheless, when Greens like Gus Speth take aim at capitalism, hostile conservatives shine a spotlight on the antimarket rhetoric and use it to paint the movement as socialistic. These old fault lines between socialism and capitalism have been revived by the virulent debate around capping carbon emissions, where forces on the right argue that confronting climate change threatens the free-market [END PAGE 89] system as we know it, and certain forces on the left agree, admitting that lowering global carbon emissions to the levels required to stabilize the climate will indeed be achieved "only by radically reordering our economic and political systems in ways antithetical to [the] 'free market' belief system." Canadian journalist and author Naomi Klein argues that this is a good thing, and that "the real solutions to the climate crisis are also our best hope of building a much more enlightened economic system-one that closes deep inequalities, strengthens and transforms the public sphere, generates plentiful, dignified work and radically reins in corporate power.”15 Her new book calls frankly for redistribution of wealth, what she calls “managed de-growth.” She writes that rightist ideologues who argue that action to limit climate change would spell the doom of capitalism actually have a better understanding of what is really required than mainstream environmentalists.

The anticapitalist flavor of "deep ecology" also provides an easy target

**Aff causes transition wars**---

Lee **Harris 3**. Analyst – Hoover Institution. 2003. “The Intellectual Origins of America-Bashing.” Hoover Instituion. Policy Review. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3458371.html.

This is the immiserization thesis of Marx. And it is central to revolutionary Marxism, since if capitalism produces no widespread misery, then it also produces no fatal internal contradiction: If everyone is getting better off through capitalism, who will dream of struggling to overthrow it? Only genuine misery on the part of the workers would be sufficient to overturn the whole apparatus of the capitalist state, simply because, as Marx insisted, **the capitalist class could not be realistically expected to relinquish control of the state apparatus** and, with it, the monopoly of force. In this, Marx was absolutely correct. **No capitalist society has ever willingly liquidated itself,** **and it is utopian to think that any ever will**. Therefore, **in order to achieve the goal of socialism**, **nothing short of a complete revolution would do; and this means**, in point of fact, **a full-fledged civil war** not just within one society, but **across the globe**. **Without this catastrophic upheaval, capitalism would remain completely in control of the social order** and all socialist schemes would be reduced to pipe dreams.

**Transition wars cause extinction**

**Nyquist 5.** J.R. renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, WorldNetDaily contributing editor, “The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash,” February 4, www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html

Should the United States experience a severe economic contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit of the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage the formation of anti-capitalist majorities and a turning away from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America’s strategic position abroad. The withdrawal of the **U**nited **S**tates from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would catastrophically impact an international system that presently allows 6 billion people to live on the earth’s surface in relative peace. Should anti-capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global market and trading system that evolved under American leadership, the planet’s economy would contract and untold millions would die of starvation. Nationalistic totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be waged with mass destruction weapons and the United States would be blamed because it is the center of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti-capitalist party gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive wars, invasions and mass destruction attacks. A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs.

### Cap Good Warming

#### Cap net good for environment – property rights

Veer 12(Pierre-Guy, Independent journalist writing for the Von Mises Institute, 5/2, “Cheer for the Environment, Cheer for Capitalism,” http://www.mises.ca/posts/blog/cheer-for-the-environment-cheer-for-capitalism/)

No Ownership, No Responsibility How can such a negligence have happened? It’s simple: **no one was the legitimate owner of the resources** (water, air, ground). When a property is state-owned – as was the case under communism – **government has generally little incentive to sustainably exploit it**. In communist Europe, governments wanted to industrialize their country in order, they hoped, to catch up with capitalist economies. Objectives were set, and they had to be met no matter what. This included the use of brown coal, high in sulfur and that creates heavy smoke when burned[4], and questionable farming methods, which depleted the soil. This lack of vision can also be seen in the public sector of capitalist countries. In the US, the Department of Defense creates more dangerous waste than the top five chemical product companies put together. In fact, pollution is such that cleanup costs are estimated at $20 billion. The same goes for agriculture, where Washington encourages overfarming or even farming not adapted for the environment it’s in[5]. Capitalism, the Green Solution In order to solve most of the pollution problems, there exists a simple solution: **laissez-faire capitalism, i.e.** **make sure property rights and profitability can be applied**. The latter helped Eastern Europe; when communism fell, capitalism made the countries seek profitable – and not just cheap – ways to produce, which greatly reduced pollution[6]. As for the former, it proved its effectiveness, notably with the Love Canal[7]. Property rights are also thought of in order to protect some resources, be it fish[8] or endangered species[9]. Why such efficiency? Because an owner’s self-interest is directed towards the maximum profitability of his piece of land. By containing pollution – as Hooker Chemicals did with its canal – he keeps away from costly lawsuit for property violation. At the same time, badly managed pollution can diminish the value of the land, and therefore profits. Any entrepreneur with a long-term vision – and whose property is safe from arbitrary government decisions – thinks about all that in order to protect his investment. One isn’t foolish enough to sack one’s property! In conclusion, I have to mention that I agree with environmentalists that it is importance to preserve the environment in order to protect mother nature and humans. However, I strongly disagree with their means, i.e. government intervention. Considering it very seldom has a long-term vision, it is the worst thing that can happen. In fact, one could says that most environmental disasters are, directly or indirectly, caused by the State, mainly by a lack of clear property rights. Were they clearer, they would let each and everyone of us, out of self-interest, protect the environment in a better manner. That way, everyone’s a winner.

**Growth forces structural changes that solve environmental damage**

Faik **Bilgili et al. 16**. \*\*PhD in Economics, The City University of New York and Istanbul University; professor of Economics, Erciyes University, Turkey. \*\* Emrah Kocak, Researcher, Evran University. \*\*Ümit Bulut, PhD in Economics, Gazi University and Professor of Economics, Ahi Evran University. “The dynamic impact of renewable energy consumption on CO2 emissions: A revisited Environmental Kuznets Curve approach.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 54(Feb): 838-9. Emory Libraries.

Some seminal papers reveal that, **within the process of economic growth, environmental pollution level first scales up and later scales down**. This is **an inverted U-shaped relationship between GDP** per capita **and pollution level** (Grossman and Krueger [3,4], Panayotou [5], Shafik [6], Selden and Song [7]). Since this relationship resembles the relationship between GDP per capita and income inequality produced by Kuznets [8], Panayotou [5] calls it Environmental **Kuznets Curve (EKC)**. According to the EKC hypothesis, **the level of environmental pollution** initially intensifies because of economic growth, later **tampers after GDP per capita reaches a threshold value** (Panayotou [5], Suri and Chapman [9]; Stern [10]). Therefore, this hypothesis implies a dynamic process in which **structural change occurs together with economic growth** (Dinda [2]). Grossman and Krueger [3] first clarify how the EKC arises. They explore that **economic growth affects environmental quality through three channels:** (i) **scale effect,** (ii) **structural effect, and** (iii) **technological effect**. Fig. 1 presents the EKC within the periods of (i), (ii) and (iii). According to the scale effect, given the level of technology, more resources and inputs are employed to produce more commodities at the beginning of economic growth path. Hence, more energy resources and production will induce more waste and pollutant emissions, and the level of environmental quality will get worse (Torras and Boyce [11], Dinda [2], Prieur [12]). **The structural effect states that the economy will have a structural transformation, and economic growth will affect environment positively along with continuation of growth**. In other words, **as national production grows the structure of economy changes**, and **the share of less polluting economic activities increases gradually**. Besides, **an economy experiences a transition from capital-intensive industrial sectors to service sector and reaches technology-intensive knowledge economy** (the final stage of the structural change). Due to the fact **that technology-intensive sectors utilize fewer natural sources, the impact of these sectors on environmental pollution will be less**. The last channel of the growth process is the technological effect channel. **Since a high-income economy can allocate more resources for research and development expenditures, the new technological processes will emerge**. Thus, **the country will replace old and dirty technologies with new and clean technologies, and environmental quality will deepen** (Borghesi [13], Copelan and Taylor [14]). Consequently, **environmental pollution** initially increases and later **decreases as a result of scale, structural and technological effect emerging along with growth**

**We’re past the tipping point – but carbon capture is attainable and solves**

**Mack 19** (Eric Mack, May 28, 2019, “Carbon positive: Turning a planetary pollutant into an asset”, Nesta, https://www.nesta.org.uk/feature/tipping-point/carbon-positive-turning-planetary-pollutant-asset/)

Last year, **the International Panel on Climate Change estimated** in a widely publicised and disturbing report that to avoid catastrophic change **we must not only drastically reduce our carbon dioxide output, but also begin actively pulling about 20 billion metric tons of CO2 out of the atmosphere each year** (IPCC, 2018). A suite of technologies known as “**carbon capture and utilisation” could go a long way** towards addressing the second part of the equation. While the name may sound drab and technical, these innovations could be one of our most powerful levers in addressing climate change. With justifiable scepticism about our collective ability and will to reduce emissions quickly enough, **carbon capture may be needed to stave off runaway climate change.** And even if it isn’t, there’s still a long-term need to get excess CO2 out of the system, a process that could take an extremely long time if left to nature’s depleted capacities. As “carbon wrangler” Julio Friedmann wrote in 2018: “We have a moral responsibility to clean up our mess and restore the world’s atmosphere to how we found it.” The basic concept behind capturing CO2 is to move vast amounts of air through a filter or solution that traps the carbon dioxide molecules. From there, it can be stored, used as-is or converted to a more useful molecule with the help of a little chemistry. Considerable attention has been paid to the idea of **simply burying it underground**: the idea that we can put it to good use has been comparatively neglected. But it is starting to gain traction. A **recent proposal suggests that the world’s air conditioners could also double as carbon capture systems, collecting CO2 and water vapor from the air** (Dittmeyer, R, et.al. 2019). Simple electrolysis can peel H2 off the water and combine it with carbon dioxide to locally produce hydrocarbon fuel using the Fischer-Tropsch process. Laboratory experiments have also used captured CO2, electricity and a little lithium to create carbon nanofibers (Ren, J., et.al. 2015) that **can be used in the manufacture of everything from better batteries and golf clubs to aircraft.** Climeworks is one of a handful of companies that has taken similar technology beyond the lab and is already pulling CO2 directly from the air. The Swiss start-up has set the ambitious goal of removing one per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions by 2025. The company’s small, modular direct air capture system is up and running in Switzerland and other locations in Europe, including a small demonstration unit in Italy that will capture 150 tons of CO2 per year to be converted into natural gas fuel. **Canada’s Carbon Engineering has also been capturing CO2 for several years, converting it into liquid fuels that could be used in today’s cars, trucks and even commercial jets.** CEO Steve Oldham claims the **technology can be “scaled up to capture gigatons of CO2 directly from the atmosphere**… we’re now ready to move into much larger scale.” The company published a breakdown of its technology in a peer-reviewed journal last year (Keith, 2018), and is aiming to scale up enough to pull a gigaton of CO2 from the air per year – more than two per cent of what the world emits in the same time-span.

### General Cap Good

**Global inequality decreasing---cap is key.**

**Tupy 15** (Marian L [a senior policy analyst at the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity]; Stop obsessing about inequality. It's actually decreasing around the world; Jan 8; www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/01/08/stop-obsessing-about-inequality-its-actually-decreasing-around-the-world/)

Is **inequality** increasing or decreasing? The answer **depends on our point of reference.** In America, the income gap between the top 1 percent and the rest has grown. But **if we look** not **at** America, but **the world, inequality is shrinking. We are witnessing**, in the words of the World Bank’s Branko Milanovic, **“the first decline in global inequality between world citizens since the Industrial Revolution**.” For most of human history, incomes were more equal, but terribly low. Two thousand years ago, GDP per person in the most advanced parts of the world hovered around $3.50 per day. That was the global average 1,800 years later. But by the early 19th century, a pronounced income gap emerged between the West and the rest. Take the United States. In 1820, the U.S. was 1.9 times richer than the global average. The income gap grew to 4.1 in 1960 and reached its maximum level of 4.8 in 1999. By 2010, it had shrunk by 19 percent to 3.9. **That narrowing is not a function of declining Western incomes**. During the Great Recession, for example, U.S. GDP per capita decreased by 4.8 percent between 2007 and 2009**. It rebounded by 5.7 percent over the next 4 years and stands at an all-time high today**. Rather, the narrowing of the income gap is a result of growing incomes in the rest of the world. Consider the spectacular rise of Asia. In 1960, the U.S. was 11 times richer than Asia. Today, America is only 4.8 times richer than Asia. To understand why, let’s look at China. Between 1958 and 1961, Mao Zedong attempted to transform China’s largely agricultural economy into an industrial one through the “Great Leap Forward.” His stated goal was to overtake UK’s industrial production in 15 years. Industrialization, which included building of factories at home as well as large-scale purchases of machinery abroad, was to be paid for by food produced on collective farms. But the collectivization of agriculture resulted in famine that killed between 18 and 45 million people. Industrial initiatives, such as Mao’s attempt to massively increase production of steel, were equally disastrous. People burned their houses to stoke the fires of the steel mills and melted cooking wares to fulfil the steel production quotas. The result was destruction, rather than creation of wealth. Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor, partially privatized the farmland and allowed farmers to sell their produce. Trade liberalization ensured that Chinese industrial output would no longer be dictated by production quotas, but by the demands of the international economy. But **Following liberalization in 1978, China’s GDP per capita has increased 12.5 fold,** rising from $545 in 1980 to $6,807 in 2013. Over the same time period, the Chinese poverty rate fell from 84 percent to 10 percent. **What is true of China is also true in much of the developing world. As** Laurence Chandy and Geoffrey Gertz of the Brookings Institution wrote in 2011, “**poverty reduction of this magnitude is unparalleled in history: never before have so many people been lifted out of poverty over such a brief period of time.” Developing countries have made strides in other areas too**. Take life expectancy. Between 1960 and 2010, global life expectancy increased from 53 years to 70. In the U.S. over the same period it rose from 70 to 78**. Similar stories can be told about child and maternal mortality, treatment of communicable diseases, and the spread of technology. Many** Americans **point to globalization as a bogeyman,** robbing our country of good jobs and resources. But really, **the phenomenon has ushered a period of unprecedented prosperity in many poor countries**. Even as we struggle with economic problems at home let us remember the global – and largely positive – perspective on the state of the world.

**Structural impacts – it’s a filter for reductions in poverty, disease, and war.**

**Radelet ’16** (Steven; February 2016; Ph.D. and M.P.P. from Harvard University, B.A. from Central Michigan University, Distinguished Professor of the Practice of Development, and is Director of the Global Human Development Program at Georgetown University, former Professor of Government and Economics at Harvard University, former economic advisor to President Sirleaf of Liberia; Foreign Affairs, “Prosperity Rising,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-14/prosperity-rising; RP)

Since the early 1990s, daily life in poor countries has been changing profoundly for the better: **one billion people** have escaped extreme poverty, average **incomes have doubled**, infant death **rates have plummeted**, millions more girls have enrolled in school, **chronic hunger** has been cut almost in half, deaths from malaria and other diseases have declined dramatically, **democracy has spread** far and wide, and the incidence of war—even with Syria and other conflicts—has fallen by half. This unprecedented progress goes way beyond China and India and has touched hundreds of millions of people in dozens of developing countries across the globe, from Mongolia to Mozambique, Bangladesh to Brazil. Yet few people are aware of these achievements, even though, in aggregate, they rank among the **most important in human history**. In 2013, the Swedish survey organization Novus Group International asked Americans how they thought the share of the world’s population living in extreme poverty had changed over the last two decades. Sixty-six percent of respondents said that they thought it had doubled, and another 29 percent said that it hadn’t changed. Only five percent knew (or guessed) the truth: that the share of people living in extreme **poverty had fallen by half**. Perhaps that ignorance explains why Washington has done so little to take advantage of these promising trends, giving only tepid support to nascent democracies, making limited investments in economic development and in new health and agricultural technologies, and failing to take the lead in building more **effective international institutions**. Whatever the reason, many developing countries are now responding to what they perceive as the United States’ indifference by looking elsewhere—especially toward China—for deeper engagement and advice on how to keep growing. At the same time, climate change, the slowdown in global growth, and rising tensions in the Middle East and beyond have begun to **threaten further progress**. As a result, the United States now risks missing out on a **historic chance** to strengthen its global leadership and help create a safer, more prosperous, and more democratic world—just at the moment when it could help the most. ONE GIANT LEAP Global poverty is falling faster today than at any time in human history. In 1993, about two billion people were trapped in extreme poverty (defined by the World Bank as living on less than $1.90 per day); by 2012, that number had dropped to less than one billion. The industrialization of China is a big part of the story, of course, but even excluding that country, the number of extreme poor has fallen by more than 400 million. Since the 1980s, **more than 60 countries** have reduced the number of their citizens who are impoverished, even as their overall populations have grown. This decline in poverty has gone hand in hand with much **faster economic growth**. Between 1977 and 1994, the growth in per capita GDP across the developing countries averaged zero; since 1995, that figure has shot up to three percent. Again, the change is widespread: between 1977 and 1994, only 21 developing countries (out of 109 with populations greater than one million) exceeded two percent annual per capita growth, but between 1995 and 2013, 71 such countries did so. And going backward has become much less common: in the earlier period, more than 50 developing countries recorded negative growth, but in the later one, just ten did. The **improvements in health** have been even bigger. In 1960, 22 percent of children in developing countries died before their fifth birthday, but by 2013, only five percent did. Diarrhea killed five million children a year in 1990 but claimed fewer than one million in 2014. **Half as many people** now **die** from malaria as did in 2000, and deaths from tuberculosis and AIDS have both dropped by a third. The share of people living with chronic hunger has fallen by almost half since the mid-1990s. **Life expectancy** at birth in developing countries has **lengthened by** nearly **one-third**, from 50 years in 1960 to 65 years today. These improvements in health have left no country untouched, even the worst-governed ones. Consider this: the rate of child death has declined in every single country (at least those where data are available) since 1980. Meanwhile, far more children are enrolling in and completing school. In the late 1980s, only 72 percent of all primary-school-age children attended school; now, the figure exceeds 87 percent. Girls in developing countries have enjoyed the biggest gains. In 1980, only half of them finished primary school, whereas four out of five do so today. These leaps in education are beginning to translate into better-skilled workers. Then there is the shift to democracy. Prior to the 1980s, most developing countries were run by left- or right-wing dictators. Coups and countercoups, violence and assassinations, human rights abuses—all formed part of regular political life. But starting in the 1980s, dictators began to fall, a process that accelerated after the Cold War. In 1983, only 17 of 109 developing countries qualified as democracies, based on data from Freedom House and the Center for Systemic Peace; by 2013, the number had **more than tripled**, to 56 (and that’s not counting the many more developing countries with populations of less than one million). As those numbers suggest, power today is far more likely to be transferred through the ballot box than through violence, and elections in most countries have become fairer and more transparent. Twenty years ago, few Indonesians could have imagined that a furniture maker from central Java would beat one of Suharto’s relatives in a free and fair election, as Joko Widodo did in 2014. Nor would many have predicted that Nigeria, then still under military rule, would in 2015 mark its first peaceful transfer of power between parties, or that Myanmar (also called Burma) would hold its most successful democratic election the same year. Across the developing world, individual freedoms and rights are honored to a much greater degree, human rights **abuses are rarer**, and legislative bodies have more power. Yes, many of these new democracies have problems. And yes, the march toward democracy has slowed since 2005—and even reversed in some countries, such as Thailand and Venezuela. But in many more—from Brazil to Mongolia to Senegal—democracy has deepened. Never before in history have so many **developing countries been so democratic**. As states have become wealthier and more democratic, **conflict and violence** within them have declined. Those who think otherwise should remember that as recently as the 1980s and early 1990s, much of the world was aflame, from Central America to Southeast Asia to West Africa. There were half as many civil wars in the last decade as there were in the 1980s, and the number of people killed in armed conflicts has **fallen by three-quarters**. Three major forces sparked this great surge in development progress. First, the end of the Cold War brought an end to the superpowers’ support for some of the world’s nastiest dictators and reduced the frequency of conflict. As ideas about economic and political governance began to change, developing countries introduced more market-based economic systems and more democracy. Second, globalization created vast new opportunities for economic growth. Increased flows of trade, investment, information, and technology created more jobs and improved living standards. Third, new and more effective leaders—in politics, business, religion, and civil society—began to forge deep change. Where courageous figures, such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, stepped forward, countries progressed; where old-style dictators, such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, remained in power, countries languished. This **incredibly wide-ranging progress** should not obscure the considerable work that remains: progress has not reached everyone, everywhere. One billion people still live in extreme poverty, six million children die every year from preventable diseases, too few girls get the education they deserve, and too many people suffer under dictatorships. Countries such as Haiti, North Korea, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe lag far behind. But the fact remains that an **enormous transformation** is under way—one that has already substantially improved the lives of hundreds of millions of people. WIN-WIN The United States should welcome and encourage this progress. For starters, broad-based development **enhances global security**. It is not true that poverty necessarily breeds terrorism, as some argue—after all, most poor people are not terrorists, and many terrorists are not poor. But it is true that poor states tend to be weak states unable to prevent **terrorist and criminal networks** from operating on their soil. Sustained development strengthens government institutions and reduces the need for outside intervention. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, “Development is a lot cheaper than sending soldiers.” Development also builds states’ capacities to fight pandemic disease. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were overwhelmed by Ebola in 2014 largely because they all had weak health systems. The same was true in many of the countries hit hardest by the HIV/AIDS epidemic decades ago. As poor countries grow wealthier, however, they become better equipped to **fight diseases** that can spread quickly beyond their borders. A more prosperous developing world also benefits the U.S. economy. The spread of economic growth creates **new markets** for American businesses not just in China but also in Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and beyond. Developing countries are buying more and more aircraft, automobiles, semiconductors, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, consultancy services, and entertainment. Although the growth in trade with developing countries has slowed during the last year, their economies will no doubt remain major market opportunities for U.S. companies. In 1990, such states accounted for one-third of the global economy; today, their share is half, and they purchase more than half of U.S. exports. In 2011, Walmart spent $2.4 billion to acquire a controlling share of a holding company that operates more than 350 retail stores in South Africa and 11 other African countries, signaling a level of interest in African consumers that would have been unimaginable two decades ago. To be sure, emerging markets also create competition for U.S. businesses and hardship for American workers who lose their jobs as a result. But they also create many new jobs, as American firms expand abroad and as companies in the developing world send more capital to the West. Moreover, developing countries are increasingly coming up with their own **innovations** and **technologies**, in medicine, agriculture, energy, and more. The United States should respond to this growing competition not with protectionism but by strengthening its own capacities: rebuilding its **infrastructure, improving** its **educational** system, and investing in new technologies. Finally, development helps spread and deepen the values that Americans hold dear: openness, economic opportunity, democracy, and freedom. These values tend to go hand in hand with growing prosperity: as incomes rise, citizens demand greater freedoms. History suggests that even governments that do not welcome these ideas eventually embrace them or are replaced by those that do. And as more developing countries achieve progress under market-based economic systems and democracy, other countries seek to **emulate the model**. The United States and Europe have a strong self-interest in encouraging this process, since it will enhance global stability and add to the number of like-minded partners that can help address future challenges. SUSTAINING THE SURGE What makes all this progress especially impressive is that it has continued despite a number of major shocks that in an earlier age could well have stopped it: the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1980s, the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, the 9/11 attacks, the global food crisis of 2007–8, and the global financial crisis of 2008. In each case, pundits predicted that the disaster of the day would set back progress. Yet in each case, the gains continued. There are good reasons to believe they can continue well into the future. The forces that sparked these **changes were fundamental**, not transitory. Governments have learned from their mistakes and gotten much better at managing inevitable downturns. Global integration has made critical technologies available to more and more people. **State institutions** have become more effective, with improved (if imperfect) legal systems, clearer property rights, and greater respect for individual liberties. Democratic rules and norms governing the transfer of political power, free speech, and accountability have become more deeply entrenched. Civil society groups are more active. These deep-seated changes have put enormous additional gains well within reach. If **economic growth proceeds** along the lines of most projections over the next two decades, some 700 million more people will escape extreme poverty. Per capita incomes in poor countries will double again, **millions of** childhood **deaths** will be avoided, **tens of millions** of children will get the education they deserve, hunger will decline, and basic rights and freedoms will spread further. At least, that’s what should happen—but none of these future gains is guaranteed. Growth has slowed markedly since 2008 in emerging economies such as Brazil and China and throughout the developing world. Russia, Thailand, and Venezuela have turned less democratic, and South Africa and Turkey seem to be headed in that direction as well. The Middle East has seen the return of conflict and **authoritarian rule**. China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea could **spark a major conflict** that could kill tens of thousands of people and devastate the region’s economies. Outbreaks of SARS and the H1N1 and Ebola viruses underscore humanity’s vulnerability to disease, and many doctors worry that growing resistance to antibiotics could reverse some of the hard-fought gains in health. Meanwhile, global population is on track to exceed nine billion by 2050, and the combination of more people, higher incomes, and warmer climates will place enormous strains on the world’s supplies of fresh water, food, and energy. Although there are ample grounds for pessimism, the doomsayers continue to **underestimate humanity’s growing ability** to cooperate in the face of new challenges. In the eighteenth century, when Thomas Malthus looked at population growth and foresaw catastrophic famine, he failed to appreciate the advances in agriculture, health, and governance that human ingenuity could create. The same was true for those that predicted a population disaster in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the problems facing developing countries are plain to see, while the new ideas and innovations that will overcome them are harder to picture. Continued progress isn’t automatic or guaranteed. But with smart choices, it is within reach. LEADING BY EXAMPLE Most of the key choices will be made in developing countries themselves. Sustaining progress will require leaders there to reduce their countries’ dependence on natural resources, make their economies more inclusive, invest more in health and education, expand opportunities for women, and strengthen democracy and the rule of law. Yet the future of development will also **depend on the** actions of the **world’s leading countries**, since poorer countries can prosper only in a strong global system. The United States must do its part by regaining its economic leadership through major investments in infrastructure, education, and technological advances in health, agriculture, and alternative fuels. It must act to fix its long-term budget problems by improving the solvency of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid and strengthen the financial system through better regulation. The country must also do a much better job of leading by **example on democracy**. Deep political polarization, the lack of substantive debate, the unwillingness to compromise, misguided foreign policy adventurism, and the Great Recession have made liberal democracy look unattractive and ineffective. That malaise matters, because many developing countries are now engaged in a battle of ideas over which economic and political model they should follow. On the one side stands the model that has prevailed in the West since World War II: market capitalism coupled with **liberal democracy**. On the other is the model practiced by China, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and, increasingly, Russia, among others: state capitalism coupled with authoritarian rule. And there’s yet one more option, with a smaller but more dangerous following: religious fundamentalism, as promulgated by Iran and Saudi Arabia and groups such as the Islamic State (or ISIS) and Boko Haram in Nigeria. As the Western countries struggle and China continues to rise, authoritarian capitalism is becoming more appealing. Consider Beijing’s ties to Africa. China purchased $26 billion in imports from the continent in 2013; the United States purchased $9 billion. Chinese investment in Africa has been growing by 50 percent per year since 2000, whereas U.S. investment is growing by 14 percent per year. Make no mistake: many Africans still prefer to follow the American model and view China with suspicion. But those attitudes are beginning to shift, and Beijing’s apparent ability to get things done will only enhance China’s appeal, especially if Washington seems to talk big but deliver little. THE NEXT SURGE FORWARD Aside from the broader task of getting their own houses in order, the United States and other Western powers should also assert leadership in several specific areas to **keep the progress going**. The first is climate change, which presents one of the greatest threats to poverty reduction. Most of the world’s poor countries had little to do with creating the problem, yet they will bear the brunt of the damage. Rising sea levels, changing rainfall patterns, higher temperatures, and dwindling water supplies will derail progress, will undermine global food production, and could engender major conflict. Developing countries have an important role to play in curbing emissions, but they will not switch to low-carbon fuels and other clean technologies if their developed-world counterparts do not. Washington has taken important first steps to reduce power-plant emissions and raise automotive fuel-efficiency standards, but there is a very long way to go. Second, leading countries—especially the United States—should invest more in **technological innovation**. Much of the credit for recent improvements in living standards goes to vaccines, medicines, high-yielding seed varieties, cell phones, and the Internet. These new technologies (alongside old ones such as electricity and paved roads) have not yet reached everywhere, so simply making them more widely available would do wonders. But **sustaining progress** for the next several decades will also require **significant investments** in new vaccines, more powerful drugs, drought- and heat-resistant seeds, desalination techniques, and clean energy.

**Cap is good, solves a litany of impacts**

**Kelly, Cambridge engineering professor, 2013**

(Michael, “Why a collapse of global civilization will be avoided: a comment on Ehrlich & Ehrlich”, July, <http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/280/1767/20131193.short#corresp-1>, ldg)

**The population explosion (and its Malthusian societal disruptions) that Ehrlich FRS predicted for the 1990s has not come about [5,6], and the concerns in this present Ehrlich paper are not tempered by the mounting evidence of the demographic transition that occurs when the majority of people live in cities and have access to education**. In Japan, Europe and North America the population, excluding immigration, is in decline. **Some studies indicate that a peak of 9 billion people in 2050 will be followed by a decline to a population of approximately 6 billion in 2100**—less than that in 2000 [7] and bringing new problems of unwanted infrastructure assets! The UN is revising its future population estimates downward **[8]. If we look at the waste in the contemporary food chain,** at the point of growth, in transit to the market and into the homes of consumers, and compound that loss by the amount of food thrown out rather than consumed, **we generate the quantity of food to feed the 9 billion today with the systems in place if we were less wasteful** and could distribute it [9]. **Animal protein is now being generated in the laboratory and not on the farm** [10]. Where is the discussion of the impact of mega-cities being self-sufficient in animal protein from factories within their city boundaries 40 years from now? **This is the time scale on which synthetic fibre comprehensively displaced wool from most of its markets**. Indeed, rather than speak of peak oil, we can speak of peak farmland—we will need smaller areas in future to feed the world, and we will oversee the managed return of excess land to the wild [11]. The starkest example in the consideration of material overconsumption is **the smart phone** [12]. This was developed within the paradigm of business as usual to improve the way in which we communicate. Two points are relevant. **First, the small piece of metal, plastic and semiconductor that fits in the palm of a hand contains the functions of a camera, radio, telephone, answering machine, photo album, dictaphone, music centre, satellite navigation system, video camera and player, compass, stop-watch, Filofax, diary and more, which were all separate and bulky items only 20 years ago**. **This represents the great dematerialization of modern civilization, well ahead of any imminent collapse of natural resources**. The shape of high streets and retail centres are changing to reflect this evolution. Indeed, **the recycling of electronic systems will enhance further this capability of doing more with less material, and the market for extended time between recharging**