# 1NC

## 1

### OFF

#### Interpretation: Topical 1AC’s analyze appropriation of space through a lens of tropicality. To clarify, affirmatives must interpret their critical geography and provide an ethical lens to understand the tropical spaces in space.

#### Violation: They don’t forefront a critical geography framing—that reproduces destructive colonial violence against the equatorial margins.

#### Tropicality is a procedural prerequisite to ethical space policy discussion.

Dunnett, 19—Department of Geography, School of Natural and Built Environment, Queen’s University Belfast (Oliver, “Imperialism, Technology and Tropicality in Arthur C. Clarke’s Geopolitics of Outer Space,” Geopolitics, January 31, 2019, dml)

Approaching concepts of outer space, geopolitics and science through Arthur C. Clarke first requires a broader discussion of relevant debates in postcolonial studies, science and technology studies, and historical geography. Synthesising some of these themes, the anthropologist Peter Redfield’s study of the European space programme aimed to ‘recombine elements of imaginative discourse with technical practise, tracing the trajectory of adventure as it leaves the planet, and highlighting the historical geography of power that runs through the Final Frontier’ (Redfield 2002, 792). This empirically rich work provides a sound theoretical basis for exploring the cultural and political roots of spaceflight in the late modern era, while taking seriously imaginative representations of outer space. Existing studies of outer space in this period have mostly examined, by contrast, the social and cultural ‘impacts’ of the better-known American and Soviet/Russian space programmes, in the geopolitical context of the Cold War (Dick and Launius 2007; Parker and Bell 2009). Redfield connects outer space and empire in two ways: Firstly, through analysing the imaginative geographies of exploration, conquest and adventure that have long characterised spaceflight narratives, and second, in examining the colonial status of the European Space Agency launch site in French Guiana in South America, home of the Ariane satellite launcher rocket since 1979. Other researchers have considered rocket sites in colonial locations such as Hammaguir in Algeria, launch site of the French satellite Astérix in 1965, and Woomera in South Australia, where the British Blue Streak rocket was tested in the 1960s (Gorman 2009; Instone 2010). The development of these sites as centres of imperial techno-science notably came at a time when European empires were disintegrating in spaces across the world, and thereby make effective case studies for examining late-modern connections to the empire of outer space.

An integral argument in critical studies of spaceflight is that space exploration represents a modernist dream that acts as a continuation of empire, implicating discourses of technology-as-progress. In this respect, historian Michael Adas has explained how, in the industrial era, science and technology were seen as ‘measures of human worth’, justifying European colonialism while also acting as the means through which imperial power was exercised (Adas 1989, 3). This pattern has been noted in accounts of technological determinism that frequently characterise narratives of space exploration. For example, the American space programme of the 1960s, specifically Project Apollo, is said to have exemplified and helped proliferate ‘technocratic’ modes of governance in the United States, typified by ‘a utopian attitude towards technology’ as a solution to all the world’s problems (Sage 2014, 57). More recently, ‘NewSpace’ magnates such as Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos have enrolled the language of utopian technological futurism to promote ambitious space ventures such as the colonisation of Mars (SpaceX 2018). Such framings have been described as ‘depressingly ubiquitous’ in portrayals of so-called ‘frontier technologies’, adding to debates on the extent to which technology can be seen as culturally and politically produced, rather than naturalised as a harbinger of progress and modernity (Bingham 2005, 202; Jasanoff and Kim 2015). Critics have typically rejected technological determinism as an effective explanation of societal development, drawing on postmodernist accounts that define a role for the social construction of science and technology (Shapin and Schaffer 1985). Indeed, researchers have demonstrated how spaceflight technology did not emerge naturally at any given place or time, with political and cultural factors influencing substantial geographical and historical disparities in its development (Winter 1983). Further studies have effectively outlined how various popular cultures, including science fiction novels, astronomical art and the public spectacle of rocketry, worked as integral parts of the wider discourse of twentieth-century outer space technology (MacDonald 2008; Redfield 2002; Sage 2008).

Adding further nuance to debates on the relationship between technology and culture, Redfield explains how a combination of political, cultural and geophysical factors led to the selection of French Guiana as the home of the European Space Agency’s rocket launch facility in the early 1970s (Redfield 2000). Notwithstanding its history as part of the French imperial sphere of influence, French Guiana’s significance for European spaceflight operations lies with its geographical location near to the equator, and its eastward-facing coastline. This is because, firstly, equatorial sites benefit from the maximum ‘latitudinal boost’ resulting from the centrifugal forces of the earth’s rotation, and, second, the Atlantic Ocean is made available as a vast testing range, where spent rockets can safely crash back down into the open seas. Furthermore, the equatorial region becomes prized in the geography of spaceport site selection because of its alignment with the prime ‘real estate’ of the geosynchronous orbit, located along a band in space 36,000 km above the earth’s equator (Collis 2009). As Clarke illustrated in 1945, satellites placed in this orbit attain specific value as they remain fixed above any given point on the earth’s equatorial belt, and can thereby be used for reliable global communications services (Clarke 1945). This new perspective was officially recognised in the 1976 Bogotá Declaration, which stated that ‘[t] he geostationary orbit is a scarce natural resource’, over which equatorial states should have national sovereignty (Bogotá Declaration 1976). While signed by a consortium of equatorial states, the declaration remains unratified by the United Nations, highlighting the unequal power geometries involved in outer space geopolitics. Such concerns demonstrate how the study of space launch sites, both actual and anticipated, presents opportunities for researchers interested in the intersections between science and technology studies, critical geopolitics and cultural-historical geographies of the tropical region.

Indeed, while equatorial sites have their own unique advantages for the space industry, postcolonial scholars have demonstrated how tropical spaces have been assigned particular characteristics, drawing on a wider body of work that has addressed the complicity of western culture in discourses of empire (Pratt 1992; Said 1993). Such characteristics relate to opportunities for adventure, the presence of bountiful natural resources, and the danger and excitement of exotic allure. For Richard Phillips, ‘European empires and European masculinities were imagined in geographies of adventure’ in children’s novels such as Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), famously set on a fictitious tropical island (Phillips 1997). Twentieth century imaginative spaces of adventure have also been interpreted in relation to geographies of empire, whether in relation to historical figures like T E Lawrence, or fictional archetypes such as James Bond or Tintin (Dawson 1994; Dodds 2003; Dunnett 2009). According to Graham Dawson, ‘the modern adventure tale is imbued with the imaginative resonance of colonial power relations underpinned by science and technology’, while at the same time, adventure becomes ‘balanced with anxiety and desire’ in the colonial context (Dawson 1994, 59, 53). The adventure genre and its associated tropes remain closely connected to narratives of space exploration, as seen in examples such as the 1964 feature film Robinson Crusoe on Mars, or Andy Weir’s 2014 novel The Martian and subsequent film release, whose extra-terrestrial spaces are represented through a combination of masculine endeavour and exotic encounter (Crossley 2010).

Beyond generic conceptions of adventure, research in cultural and historical geography has drawn on the concept of ‘tropicality’ as a way of understanding certain representations and experiences of tropical spaces, that also relate to wider cosmographic frameworks (Arnold 2000). As Denis Cosgrove reminds us, ‘the originating tropics [of Cancer and Capricorn] are celestial rather than terrestrial markers within a geocentric cosmos’ (Cosgrove 2005, 199). They comprise two great circles that delineate the equatorial band of the earth where the sun passes through the zenith directly above at least once a year, as defined by the earth’s axial tilt. It is the interplay between this cosmographic definition of the tropics, and ethnographic and biological understandings of the tropics, which has defined notions of tropicality in the western world. Such framings can be traced to medieval notions of an equatorial ‘torrid zone’ as part of a Ptolemaic theory of world climatic regions (Cormack 1994). While being considered a barrier to human (European) civilization, the equatorial zone has also been seen as a realm where ‘the superabundance of nature was believed to overwhelm human endeavour’ (Leys Stepan 2001, 18). Yet as voyages of discovery opened up previously unencountered spaces to European experience and representation, imaginative geographies of the tropics persisted. Some, for example, have associated ‘paradisal geographies’ with ‘New World islands … as the location of peoples as yet unfallen and as sites of natural richness’ (Withers 1999, 84). Others have recognised the ways in which ‘tropicality has frequently served as a foil to temperate nature’, or as a ‘site for European fantasies of self-realisation’ (Driver and Martins 2005, 3, 4). Tropical spaces have also been associated with forms of modernity, whether in relation to early modern voyages of discovery, or in ‘modernist abstraction[s] of nature’ in twentieth century landscape designs (Leys Stepan 2001, 210). This paper adapts cultural and cosmographical readings of tropicality in the context of late-imperial techno-science to consider a concept of ‘cosmological tropicality’, a sense in which tropical spaces are more intimately aligned with the heavenly movements of the cosmos, and therefore could hold the key to the future of space exploration.

Geographers Felix Driver and Luciana Martins have argued that understandings of tropicality have been largely framed through ‘projections’ of imagined geographies, and that researchers should attempt to understand such representations as they have been produced, negotiated or contested (Driver and Martins 2005, 5). Touching on similar themes, Gerry Kearns’ research on the late-nineteenth-century travels of Mary Kingsley and Halford Mackinder in colonial Africa has investigated the ways in which personal encounters and travel experiences helped shape the identities of British imperial subjects, informing their broader geopolitical outlooks (Kearns 1997). As such, while Clarke’s projections of Ceylon/Sri Lanka are inherently representational, they also relate closely to the tangible, experienced geographies of his life in Ceylon/Sri Lanka, and present the unusual perspective of a western individual who lived on this island for most of his adult life. In approaching Clarke by thinking through his experiences as well as the representational texts he produced, it becomes possible to engage ‘socio-technical’ understandings of the nuanced relationships between technology, society, representation, discourse and experience. Here, drawing from Bruno Latour’s conception of technology as a social and material construction, Nick Bingham has called for a renewed understanding of socio-technical assemblages ‘between diverse people, non-humans and places’ (Bingham 2005, 201). As such, this paper attempts to understand the extent to which Clarke’s projections of outer space technology were shaped by negotiation with, and experience of, the specific geographies of twentieth century Ceylon/Sri Lanka.

In his aforementioned essay on tropicality, Cosgrove warns that, ‘in rehearsing – even with critical intent – the ways in which Europeans so closely and outrageously have bound tropical ethnography into a mutually deterministic embrace with the physical environments of the tropics, we risk perpetuating the silencing of voices speaking from within tropical space’ (Cosgrove 2005, 198). The same could be said of any account that purports to interpret the visions of one Englishman’s fantasy of space exploration in a tropical ‘paradise’. Yet there remains value in ascertaining the ways in which outer space has been connected to earthly imaginative geographies, and how experiences of particular places have informed geopolitical cultures of outer space. While acknowledging the limitations of such an approach, this paper seeks to investigate the extent to which Clarke’s socio-technical constructions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka were formulated with respect to local culture and politics. Tariq Jazeel has, for example, contested the notion of ‘Sri Lankan island-ness’, explaining how the perceived unity of the Sri Lankan state today can be traced to British imperial rule from 1815 to 1948, before which the island had been made up of a number of separate kingdoms since the fifteenth century (Duncan 1990; Jazeel 2009). The replacement of this multi-cultural space with a unitary British imperial island colony was, according to one researcher, reflected in a sense of modernity in the everyday material cultures of local people, while the damaging legacy of the unification can be clearly seen in the destructive civil war that plagued the country from 1983 to 2009 (Wickramasinghe 2009). Such issues are pertinent to understanding the complex interactions that Clarke had with the places and landscapes of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, particularly the understandings of modernity and progress that were central to Clarke’s world-view.

Discourses of space exploration have, in the ways outlined here, been connected to a variety of familiar geographical imaginations concerning empire, adventure and the anticipation of a technologically-driven future. Yet studying Arthur C. Clarke adds the further perspective of experiencing and representing tropical spaces as part of a critical geopolitics of outer space, an exercise that has only received partial critical attention through Redfield’s work on French Guiana. By turning to three phases in Clarke’s life and works we can see how cultures of empire, technological determinism and ‘cosmological tropicality’ are played out in the immediate context of late-twentiethcentury Ceylon/Sri Lanka.

#### That ethical frame outweighs.

Klinger, 19—Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University (Julie Michelle, “Environmental Geopolitics and Outer Space,” Geopolitics, March 20, 2019, dml)

On Earth, the environmental geopolitics of outer space are inseparable from questions of environmental justice. Environmental (in)justice unfolds across multiple scales through concrete processes: localized and stratospheric emissions from space launches (Carlsen, Kenesova, and Batyrbekova 2007; Jones, Bekki, and Pyle 1995), the placement of outer space related infrastructure in national and global peripheries (Gorman 2007; Mitchell 2017; Redfield 2001), and the use of such infrastructure to advance or thwart environmental destruction (Da Costa 2001; Guzmán 2013; Parks 2012).

Human engagement with outer space enlists industrial economies, global networks of infrastructure and expertise, and the generation and control of information. All of these activities take place in specific sites and are subject to ongoing transformations in territorial governance practices. By locating infrastructures that are securitized, dangerous, and environmentally toxic in remote areas, the state or empire accomplishes two things. It consolidates power in far-flung territories while mitigating against liabilities and security threats that might arise from placing launch infrastructures closer to the metropole. In order to reduce environmental impacts, adequate resources, personnel, and expertise need to be assigned to the task of monitoring and mitigating the regional fallout of rocket launches (Hall et al. 2014). This may not be the case if the site in question has been deemed sacrificable by those with territorial control.

Launches and Their Infrastructures

Reaching outer space requires Earthly infrastructure, which means that space launches have concrete footprints that change according to developments in launch technologies. The placement of outer space related infrastructure on Earth is a question of environmental (in)justice. Which sites are chosen, who is expropriated, and which environments are impacted is subject to strategic geopolitical calculations, which, more often than not, employ classical geopolitical reasoning (Hickman and Dolman 2002; Ingold 2006; Meira Filho, Guimarães Fortes, and Barcelos 2014; NDRI 2006). Launch sites are tightly controlled to reduce the risk of interference or failure, therefore situating launch sites in remote areas is often explained in terms of safety and security (Zapata and Murray 2008). No doubt this is important: rockets are composed of many tonnes of material and combustive fuel, so they must be launched in places where damage from routine as well as potentially catastrophic explosions can be contained. For humans to reach “the final frontier,” they must first find a frontier space on Earth that can be made into an empty space in which controlled explosions can be routine.

Frontiers are seldom as empty as those aiming to conquer them would claim. Where they are not populated by people, they are filled with other sorts of meanings and life forms (Klinger 2017; Tsing 2005). Potential launch sites and testing ranges deemed by government authorities to be simultaneously remote, safe, and suitable to contain the risks of rocket launch must first be made empty of people, with prior land use regimes or territorial claims pushed beyond designated buffer zones (Gorman 2007; Mitchell 2017). Hence the placement of space infrastructure follows colonial geographies of extraction, sacrifice, and risk (Mitchell 2017; Redfield 2001). As Gorman (2007) put it: “because of their distance from the metropole, these places lend themselves to hosting prisons, detention camps, military installations, nuclear weapons, and nuclear waste. All of these establishments, including rocket ranges, have inspired reactions of protest.” These so-called ‘peripheral’ spaces are nevertheless central to their inhabitants and their neighbors, who question the logic of extraglobal conquest in the face of unresolved Earthly injustices.

Consider, for example, the case of the launch site in Alcântara, Brazil, which has been well documented by Araújo and Filho (2006) and Mitchell (2017). Through a close examination of local, national, and international politics, these authors document how the government’s racialized approach to the subsistence communities displaced by space infrastructure deepened structural inequalities. Grassroots opposition to the launch site grew not out of an a priori ideological opposition of poor people to national progress in outer space, as some officials alleged, but rather resulted from the failure to account for the food insecurity generated by state resettlement projects. The resettlement schemes were themselves misinformed by impoverished notions of local livelihoods. Local claims against the deprivations caused by statesponsored space practices have deepened schisms between the military and civilian space programs at the federal government level.

Through the lens of classical geopolitics, these structural inequalities scarcely register, with the result that the ‘crawling’ progress of Brazil’s space program is pathologized as poor management practices symptomatic of an inadequately implemented national development vision (Amaral 2010). Critical geopolitics helps deconstruct the nationalist performativity of such endeavors by considering the political and economic value placed on the spectacle of spaceflight (Boczkowska 2017; Macdonald 2008, 2010; Sage 2016). Feminist geopolitics draws our attention to the racialized and gendered dispossession advanced by the state, through the construction of space infrastructure and exercised through access to land. The fact that environmental and public health impacts were only considered by the authorities after years of mobilization by Black social movements, religious communities, and scholars highlights the ways in which inattention to the local in the pursuit of space power perpetuates environmental injustice, which in turn interrupts national plans for space progress.

Rocket launches affect local and global environments through the construction of infrastructure, the exposure of local environments to toxic residues, and the dispersal of pollutants in land, air, and sea. Rockets are the only source of direct anthropogenic emissions sources in the stratosphere. Ozone-depleting substances (ODS) such as nitrous oxide, hydrogen chlorine, and aluminum oxide are emitted by rockets, and can destroy 105 ozone molecules before degrading (Voigt et al. 2013). The ozone layer prevents cancer and cataract-causing ultraviolet-b waves from reaching the Earth. As of 2013, rocket launches accounted for less than 1% of ODS emissions. As other ODS are phased out under the Montreal Protocol and the frequency of lower cost space launches increases, the proportion and quantity is likely to increase (Durrieu and Nelson 2013; Ross et al. 2009).

Although affluent economies in the northern hemisphere are responsible for most ODS emissions (Polvani 2011; Rousseaux et al. 1999), the geography of exposure disproportionately affects an overall higher population in remote regions and in the southern hemisphere (Norval et al. 2011; Robinson and Erickson 2015; Thompson et al. 2011) because ozone depletion is most serious in regions where high altitude stratospheric clouds are most likely to form: above the polar regions and major mountain ranges (Carslaw et al. 1998; Perlwitz et al. 2008). This is an example of environmental injustice on a global scale, where the global south bears the environmental burden of actions predominately taken in the global north, rocket launches included. In the process, global power relations are reinscribed through the uneven distribution of harm to peripheral and southern bodies, mediated in this case through the redistribution of gases in the stratosphere that increase exposure to solar radiation.

Coming closer to Earth, environmental geopolitics of outer space are manifest in the dispersal of particulate matter into ecosystems surrounding active launch sites. This is more than a strictly local environmental concern, because which spaces are subject to the hazards of launch sites involves careful calculations weighing financial cost, state power, and multifarious territorial interests. With each launch, surrounding areas are showered with toxins, heavy metals, and acids over a distance that varies widely with wind, weather, and precipitation patterns at the moment of lift-off.3 The most researched of these pollutants are hydrogen chloride, aluminum oxide, and various aerosolized heavy metals. Release of these pollutants from rocket launches results in localized regional acid rain (Madsen 1981), plant death, fish kills, and failed seed germination of native plants in launch sites (Marion, Black, and Zedler 1989; Schmalzer et al. 1992).

These effects, and research on them, are mostly concentrated within one kilometer of the launch site. But they have been recorded several kilometers away under certain weather conditions (Schmalzer et al. 1998). Recent studies on the concentration of trace elements in wildlife in areas near NASA launch activities in Florida, USA, found that more than half of the adults and juvenile alligators had “greater than toxic levels” of trace elements in their liver (Horai et al. 2014). Both the subject, and the vague statement of findings, highlights the lack of research into the impacts on downstream human and non-human communities. In contrast to the precautions taken to protect workers in buildings adjacent to facilities where these technologies are developed (Bolch et al. 1990; Chrostowski, Gan, and Campbell 2010), much less consideration is given to communities within the dynamic pollutant shadow of rocket launches.

In Kazakhstan, Russia, and China, researchers have begun examining the effects of the highly toxic liquid propellant, unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), which has been in use since the dawn of the space age. It has noted carcinogenic, mutagenic, convulsant, teratogenic, and embryotoxic effects (Carlsen, Kenesova, and Batyrbekova 2007), and it has been found to cause DNA damage and chromosomal aberrations in rodents living near the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan (Kolumbayeva et al. 2014). Despite these known hazards, methods to detect UDMH at the trace concentrations at which toxic effects begin to manifest in humans do not yet exist (Kenessov, Bakaikina, and Ormanbekovna 2015), meaning that there is no knowledge of how this circulates in the environment, bioaccumulates up the food chain, or could potentially be sequestered through soil or plant filtration. The lack of technology or methodology to adequately track the dispersal of hazardous pollutants that have been used for decades in the surrounding environment illustrates another aspect of environmental injustice: the preference on the part of political and economic elites to create spaces of waste rather than allocate adequate resources to maintain safe and non-toxic environments.4

## 2

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#### Debate is structured as a marketplace for information where we fetishize notions of “pedagogy” and is an extension of semiocapitalist logic through immaterial manors. Communication within the university isn’t one that develops subjectivities and psychic identity rather a system geared towards fragmentation and futuristic productivity.

**Berardi 12** [David Hugill and Elise Thorburn, 9-26-2012, "Interview with 'Bifo': Reactivating the Social Body in Insurrectionary Times," Critical Legal Thinking, [https://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/09/26/interview-with-bifo-reactivating-the-social-body-in-insurrectionary-times //](https://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/09/26/interview-with-bifo-reactivating-the-social-body-in-insurrectionary-times%20//) JB]

* TW – mentions of suicide
* Impact turns fiat and notions of “the aff is a good idea”
* Debate bad and communication gets coopted

A: First of all because **students are increasingly learning in** small parcels, **small fragments**, small fractals **of knowledge**, and they are becoming **more** and more **accustomed to think** of their **knowledge not as knowledge but** as **intellectual availability to exploitation**.  In North American forms of education this is already well established, it is nothing new. It is new in much of Europe and it has begun to provoke some reactions. But it is also a **fact of a networked and globalized world**.  What does precariousness mean today? What is the relationship between precariousness and globalization? It means that you can **buy a fragment of labor** in Bangkok, a fragment in Buenos Aires, and **a fragment in Milan** and that these three **fragments become** the **same product from** the point of view of **capital**.  **Knowledge is** headed the **same** way. You no longer need – from the point of view of capital – to know in the **humanistic sense**, the meaning, the finality, the **intimate contradictions of knowledge**, you just need to know how **particular parcels of knowledge** can be made **functional**. There is something new and something old in this. Herbert Marcuse’s (1964) One Dimensional Man already identified this problem of the functionalization of knowledge but in his time it was only a kind of prediction about how capitalism would be transformed. Today, this functional consideration is the dominant form of our **relationship to knowledge**. So, we should question people about **what is happening to our knowledge**. Are we really learning things, knowing things? Or are we simply learning how to **become part of** the **productive machine**? Additionally, I think we need to ask people, especially young people, **about** their **suffering in the relationship with knowledge**, with communication and so on. I think that the problem of psychic suffering is of central importance our time. Problems of depression, panic, massive suicide, are **very real**.  Do you know that suicide has become the main cause of death among people between 18-25 years old? **Suicide is** becoming a **political weapon**. I’m not only thinking of Columbine or of Mohamed Bouazizi, the man who killed himself and started the Tunisian revolution.  Suicide has something to do with knowledge.  When your **knowledge** is becoming **more and more something** that does **not belong to you**, this is a problem of personal identity, of **psychic identity**.

#### Technology has created an age of constant information and signifiers floating through our phones and computers as media. This creates a dyslexia – reduced attention spans, no time for true human interaction – this leads to information overload, which is too fast for our organic minds to keep up with – that causes depression and drug use. It’s no coincidence that the rise of tech in the 80s was complimented with a drug epidemic. These signifiers come prior to action, thus the role of the ballot is to disrupt semiocapitalism.

**Berardi 09** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2009. P. 40-42 // LEX JB]

* TW – mentions of suicide, not read, but it’s in the card if you chose to read it after the round

The acceleration of information exchange has produced and is producing an effect of a pathological type on the individual human mind and even more on the collective mind. Individuals are not in a position to consciously process the immense and always growing mass of information that enters their computers, their cell phones, their television screens, their electronic diaries and their heads. However, it seems indispensable to follow, recognize, evaluate, process all this information if you want to be efficient, competitive, victorious. The practice of multitasking, the opening of a window of hypertextual attention, the passage from one context to another for the complex evaluation of processes, tends to deform the sequential modality of mental processing. According to Christian Marazzi, who has concerned himself in various books with the relations between economics, language and affectivity, the latest generation of economic operators is affected by a real and proper form of dyslexia, incapable of reading a page from the beginning to the end according to sequential procedures, incapable of maintaining concentrated attention on the same object for a long time. And dyslexia spreads to cognitive and social behaviors, leading to rendering the pursuit of linear strategies nearly impossible. Some, like Davenport and Beck , speak of an attention economy. But when a cognitive faculty enters into and becomes part of economic discourse this means that it has become a scarce resource. The necessary time for paying attention to the fluxes of information to which we are exposed and which must be evaluated in order to be able to make decisions is lacking. The consequence is in front of our eyes: political and economic decisions no longer respond to a long term strategic rationality and simply follow immediate interests. On the other hand, we are always less available for giving our attention to others gratuitously. We no longer have the attention time for love, tenderness, nature, pleasure and compassion. Our attention is ever more besieged and therefore we assign it only to our careers, to competition and to economic decisions. And in any case our temporality cannot follow the insane speed of the hypercomplex digital machine. Human beings tend to become the ruthless executors of decisions taken without attention. The universe of transmitters, or cyberspace, now proceeds at a superhuman velocity and becomes untranslatable for the universe of receivers, or cybertime, that cannot go faster than what is allowed by the physical material from which our brain is made, the slowness of our body, the need for caresses and affection. Thus opens a pathological gap and mental illness spreads as testified by the statistics and above all our everyday experience. And just as pathology spreads, so too do drugs. The flourishing industry of psychopharmaceuticals beats records every year, the number of packets of Ritalin, Prozac, Zoloft and other psychotropics sold in the pharmacies continually increases, while dissociation, suffering, desperation, terror, the desire not to exist, to not have to fight continuously, to disappear grows alongside the will to kill and to kill oneself. When, towards the end of the 1970s, an acceleration of the productive and communicative rhythms in occidental metropolitan centers was imposed, a gigantic epidemic of drug addiction made its appearance. The world was leaving its human epoch to enter the era of machinic posthuman acceleration: many sensitive organisms of the human variety began to snort cocaine, a substance that permits the acceleration of the existential rhythm leading to transforming oneself into a machine. Many other sensitive organisms of the human kind injected heroin in their veins, a substance that deactivates the relation with the speed of the surrounding atmosphere. The epidemic of powders during the 1970s and the 1980s produced an existential and cultural devastation with which we still haven’t come to terms with. Then illegal drugs were replaced by those legal substances which the pharmaceutical industry in a white coat made available for its victims and this was the epoch of anti-depressants, of euphorics and of mood regulators. Today psychopathy reveals itself ever more clearly as a social epidemic and, more precisely, a socio-communicational one. If you want to survive you have to be competitive and if you want to be competitive you must be connected, receive and process continuously an immense and growing mass of data. This provokes a constant attentive stress, a reduction of the time available for affectivity. These two tendencies, inseparably linked, provoke an effect of devastation on the individual psyche: depression, panic, anxiety, the sense of solitude and existential misery. But these individual symptoms cannot be indefinitely isolated, as psychopathology has done up until now and as economic power wishes to do.

#### Financial absolutism is framed by accelerationism – appropriation of resources becomes the end goal of desire. Extinction has already happened but the race for space through appropriation allows that semiotic cycle of wealth to survive – we’re a better starting point

**Berardi 18** [Excerpted from *Breathing: Chaos and Poetry* by Franco “Bifo” Berardi, published by Semiotext(e) © Franco “Bifo” Berardi, 2018. All Rights Reserved, [https://courtauld.ac.uk/research/events-archive/vital-exhaustion/expiration-the-last-breath-franco-bifo-berardi-2018 //](https://courtauld.ac.uk/research/events-archive/vital-exhaustion/expiration-the-last-breath-franco-bifo-berardi-2018%20//) JB]

According to an **Oxfam report** that was made public at the Davos conference in January 2018, in 2016 inequality peaked: **82 percent of** the **wealth** produced that year **was hijacked by** the **1 percent** of the world’s population that already owns two-thirds of the world’s wealth.3 This is **not a joke** or an **exaggeration**: this is a documented **proof of** the demented nature of **financial absolutism**. Like a drain pump, financial capitalism has been sucking life from the organism of human society, at a rate that is accelerating by the second. The question is, why are people doing this? Why is a small fraction of humankind accumulating an unimaginable amount of wealth, while the gross majority of humankind is regressing toward misery? **What motivates this enormous appropriation** of common resources? Indeed, is there a motivation, or does the logic of financial accumulation automatically produce this irrational and immoral effect? Lastly, what is the point of accumulating and hoarding uncountable billions that could never all be exchanged for goods or pleasure in this lifetime? I don’t think that greed sufficiently explains this extreme concentration of wealth in the hands of a precious few. Should we rather explain this irrational inequality in terms of an evolutionary survival instinct? Can I even speak of an evolutionary instinct of humankind, does such a thing exist? Probably not, but I’m trying to find a sort of autopilot in human evolution. The survival instinct is alert today, because we sense (even if we tend to deny the evidence and reject this knowledge in our collective unconscious) **that** civilized **life on planet earth is approaching its end**. Our collective unconscious senses that the **final stampede** is drawing near because of so many unstoppable and irreversible processes: proliferation of **nuclear weapons**, global **warming**, water **scarcity, demographic expansion** and **desertification**, and, last but not least, **mental collapse**, spreading depression and panic. It is totally understandable at this point for **a human to be**, whether consciously or not, **preparing for a flight from planet hell**. And preparing to escape from hell is inconceivably expensive. **The 1 percent** of humankind **is preparing for this flight**, and they need huge amounts of **financial resources** to do so. Dystopian science fiction? Perhaps. Don’t forget, however, that in the last fifty years dystopian **science fiction has** produced the **most accurate roadmaps of our social and political becoming**.

#### Questions regarding ethics are irrelevant in the world of the infosphere. All information gets coopted by the inescapability of capitalism – it’s search is cruelly optimistic in a world of semiocapitalism because of how information interacts with us.

Berardi 11 [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism “0. Bifurications.” Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 14-15 // LEX JB]

Because of this, I believe that it is necessary to identify the new forms of social consciousness beginning from generational belonging. And for this reason I will speak of two decisive successive shifts in a mutation that has led to the draining of humanistic categories and of the perspectives on which modern politics was based. These two passages are constituted in the subsumption of the human mind in formation within two successive technological configurations of the media-sphere. The first is that which I call video-electronic, meaning the technologies of televisual communication. It is a case of the passage that Marshall McLuhan speaks of in his fundamental 1964 study, Understanding Media. McLuhan looks at the transition from the alphabetic sphere to the video-electronic one and concludes that when the simultaneous succeeds the sequential, the capacity of mythological elaboration succeeds that of critical elaboration. The critical faculty presupposes a particular structuring of the message: the sequentiality of writing, the slowness of reading, and the possibility of judging in sequence the truth or falsity of statements. It is in these conditions that the critical discrimination that has characterized the cultural forms of modernity becomes possible. But in the sphere of video-electronic communication, critique becomes progressively substituted by a form of mythological thinking in which the capacity to distinguish between the truth and falsity of statements becomes not only irrelevant but impossible. This passage took place in the techno-sphere and media-sphere of the 1960s and 1970s and the generation that was born at the end of the 1970s began to manifest the first signs of impermeability to the values of politics and critique that had been fundamental for the preceding generations of the twentieth century. The more radical mutation was the diffusion of digital technologies and the formation of the global internet during the 1990s. Here, the functional modality of the human mind changes completely, not only because the conditions of communication become infinitely more complex, saturated and accelerated, but rather because the infantile mind begins to form itself in a media environment completely different from that of modern humanity.

#### Thus, the alternative is to symbolically take the system hostage through it’s own method of exhaustion. We do this through radical passivity and a method of the Wu Wei – only radical passivity can escape the infosphere

**Berardi 11** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism “Chapter 4 Exhastion and Subjectivity.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 107-108 // LEX JB]

* TW – mentions of suicide, not read, but it’s in the card if you chose to read it after the round

The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. The global recession started officially in September 2008 and lasted officially until the summer of 2009. Since the summer of 2009 the official truth in the media, in political statements, in economic talk was: recovery. The stock exchange began to rise again and the banks started again paying huge bonuses to their managers and so on. Meanwhile, unemployment was exploding everywhere, salaries were falling, welfare was curtailed, 90 million more are expected to join the army of poverty in the next year. Is this recovery? Our conditional reflex (influenced by the Keynesian knowledge that recovery is the recovery of the “real economy”) answered: no, this is not recovery, capitalism cannot recover only by financial means. But we should reframe our vision. Finance is no longer a mere tool of capitalist growth. The financialization of capitalism has made finance the very ground of accumulation, as Christian Marazzi (2010) has explained in recent works such as The Violence of Financial Capitalism. In the sphere of semiocapitalism, financial signs are not only signifiers pointing to some referents. The distinction between sign and referent is over. The sign is the thing, the product, the process. The “real” economy and financial expectations are no longer distinct spheres. In the past, when riches were created in the sphere of industrial production, when finance was only a tool for the mobilization of capital to invest in the field of material production, recovery could not be limited to the financial sphere. It took also employment and demand. Industrial capitalism could not grow if society did not grow. Nowadays we must accept the idea that financial capitalism can recover and thrive without social recovery. Social life has become residual, redundant, irrelevant.

## Case

### FW

#### The K OW and turns the aff –

#### (1) Form v Content – the K indicts the rhetoric or the pedagogical way that the aff is exported to fit in the debate space and is also the best model for clash because you clash with our theory of power instead of plan focus which we’ve indicted. It’s not unfair to expect you to defend your epistemological consequences anything else is academically irresponsible.

#### (2) Epistemology – neoliberalism imposes that our knowledge is formed through an endless cycle of production which means the 1AC “skills” are irrelevant and the exportation of their pedagogy is flawed

#### (3) Neoliberalism controls the value to life through affectivity which presupposes aggregation and traditional consequentialist impact calc.

#### (4) It’s illogical – form over content because it doesn’t matter how right you are if you used violent discourse to get there – just like how “all lives matter” semantically means all lives matter but we know it’s racist because of it’s representations – logic outweighs because it’s a litmus test to determining what is an argument. No amount of fairness can make an argument logical

#### (5) Fiat is illusory none of their policymaking offense is solved but our representations can be rectified with a rejection which outweighs on ballot proximity

#### (6) No permutations a) it’s footnoting DA because we never experience the radicalness of the alt if we keep combining methods that decks solvency b) links are disads and prove competition c) it’s a methods debate and combining the two is a double turn because it’s capitalist logic to combine completely incompatible methods to be more productive

OFF Reid Brinkley

1] missing internal link as to why debate necessitates policymaking – you read this aff which proves it’s not

2] kritikal pedagogy is still available to learn outside which supports black scholarship

3] even if theyre right they cant solve this - debate will still exist and you still affirm the resolution

4] Semiocap is a better explanation for why debate is bad – fiat links to our offense but trying to weaponize debate as a mode of advocacy is something that only gets coopted by the university

The rotj stuff

OFF Bledsoe & Wright

1] your method is self defeating – capitalism profits off of pain narratives like antiblack suffering – their deployment in debate is fuel to the fire

2] evidence doesn’t say anything about racial capital – just says racism exists but doesn’t tell us how to change those structures

3] Semiotic economy is a better understanding – explains why black people could be targeted more – they have signifiers attached to them

### Solvency

public entity fill in - decks any chance of solvency

no internal link between private entities and then furthering space colonization or exploration - no reason why that furthers racial capital

the aff doesnt solve donations - you made arguments about how cap is ingrained in companies, you can fiat the resolution but you can’t fiat that big companies will donate their money whcih means even if private appropriation is banned they wont donate

no implementation – no solvency

### TL

1] They can’t solve all of racial cap, no advocacy text except the resolution

If extra T – destroys compettivie equity from predictable stasis point of contestation

#### Racial Capitalism thesis is incorrect – connection between Race and Cap is circumstantial not necessary

Walzer 20 Michael Walzer 7-29-2020 "A Note on Racial Capitalism" <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/a-note-on-racial-capitalism> (a prominent American political theorist and public intellectual. A professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey)//Elmer

I have been puzzled for many months by the appearance of the phrase “racial capitalism” in the left press (see, for example, the article by K. Sabeel Rahman in the Summer 2020 issue of Dissent). What does it mean? Perhaps the adjective “racial” is simply an ordinary qualifying adjective. Racial capitalism is one kind of capitalism, and then there must be other kinds, requiring other adjectives. Here in the United States we have a kind of capitalism where the majority of exploited workers or a majority of the most exploited workers are people of color. The underclass and the reserve army are defined both racially and economically. Of course, no leftist writer would be indifferent to the exploitation of white workers, who might still make up the majority of the American workforce—and who are certainly the majority of exploited workers in Europe. The point of the adjective, then, is simply to focus our attention, for good reasons, on non-white workers. But is the exploitation of these workers a necessary feature of American capitalism? The phrase “racial capitalism” leaves us unclear about whether the hierarchical location of non-white workers is determined by race or by capitalism or by the two somehow working together. To begin to answer that question, we need to look at some examples of non-racial capitalism. The form of capitalism sponsored by the **Chinese communists** is obviously non-racial. Though the exploited workers are, in Western terminology, people of color, Western terminology is out of place here. If the Chinese imported white workers to take on the most menial jobs, that might make Chinese capitalism “racial,” **but no such importations have been reported**. The predatory version of capitalism that prevails in Putin’s Russia is also non-racial. It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia, but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group. But no one is doing that. I have no statistics, but from what I read about China and Russia, I doubt that the rate of exploitation is higher in the United States, in racial capitalism, than it is in those two countries, **where capitalism is non-racial**. **Capitalism “works” with and without a racialized underclass** and reserve army. But is that right? The adjective “racial” sometimes makes a much stronger claim: it isn’t a qualifying but rather a definitional adjective. Capitalism is necessarily, inherently, racist. Forget about China and Russia, which are capitalist latecomers. Western capitalism is the prototypical version, and it has been racist from day one (if we can agree on day one)—always and forever racist. Does this mean that Manchester in 1844, as Engels described it, where all the exploited workers were white, wasn’t capitalist? No, for those workers were producing fabrics from cotton raised and harvested by Black slaves in the American South. That’s true enough, but I am not sure it is sufficient for an argument about necessity. Consider a counterfactual possibility: had no Black slaves been available, the recruitment of Irish workers would have started much earlier than it did. The rise of capitalism would not have been halted had the slave trade never begun. But the Manchester/Southern plantation example suggests what we all now know: capitalism is a global economic system, and it depends on the exploitation of people of color around the world. Here, however, it seems clear that the key **issue is exploitation, not racism**.

Given global demography, the majority of workers in any global economy will be people of color. Even in a democratically or social democratically regulated global system, the majority of workers and the majority of managers—the underclass and the overclass—will be non-white. Indeed, it would be the refusal of any transnational corporation to hire people of color that would rightly be called racist. (In the Pennsylvania town where I grew up, the local steel company did not hire, and therefore did not exploit, Jews or Black people. I suppose that this is also an example of racial capitalism.) All this suggests that capitalism and racism **have to be analyzed separately**. They overlap sometimes, as they do today in the United States. But the overlap is **circumstantial, not necessary**. **The two phenomena are distinct. They don’t rise and fall together. Each one, for different reasons, requires severe criticism and sustained opposition.** Many years ago, socialist writers argued that the triumph of the working class would liberate women, Jews, Black people, and everyone else. Separate political struggles against sexism, anti-Semitism, or racism were unnecessary—indeed they were a distraction from the all-important class war. Today some people on the left seem to believe that the end of racism will bring with it the downfall of capitalism. Both these theories are wrong. Overthrowing racism will still leave us with capitalism; overthrowing capitalism will still leave us with racism. Putting the adjective and noun together gives us a false sense of the **relationship** between the two phenomena. It might make sense, then, to ban the phrase from the pages of left newspapers and magazines. But since I am opposed to bans of that sort, I would only suggest that the phrase should always be queried by the editors. Do the writers who use it have some idea about what it means? Or are they just against racial capitalism, whatever it means?