# 1NC

## 1

### FW

#### The meta-ethic is procedural moral realism - substantive realism holds that moral truths exist independently of that in the empirical world. Prefer procedural realism –

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be, this means experience may be generally useful but should not be the basis for ethical action.

#### [3] Induction – it’s logically incoherent because it’s own method presupposes it’s justification which proves predictions fail

#### Practical Reason is that procedure. To ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary. Aggregation is nonsensical since a] it impedes on one persons ends for another and b] assumes everyone values the same thing.

#### Moral law must be universal—our judgements can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me – any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) // [brackets for gendered language]

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that **when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action,** she **[they] supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified**. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). **In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness**. Kant considers what this might be**: it cannot be an object of inclination**, for those have only a conditional worth, "**for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth**" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, **the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity"** or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that **regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action."** By this I understand him to mean that **we must regard ourselves as capable of** conferring **value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good**. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), **we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves**. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize t hem. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. To clarify, consequences don’t link to the framework.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### [1] Kantian theory has the best tools for fighting oppression through combatting ethical egoism and abstraction

Farr 02 [Arnold (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32 // LEX JB]

**One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s** moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the **universal and the concrete is a valid distinction, the unity of the two is required** for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that **I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. **It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence.** What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also**.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. **The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation.** For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. … Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. **First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions.** It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. **To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings.** Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. **The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves.** Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. **What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.**

#### [2] Enterprise – we are composed of different practical identities, but reason unifies them and allows us to shift and act upon different enterprises. Consequentialist frameworks cannot produce unified moral actions.

#### [3] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

### Offense

#### I negate the resolution

#### 1] Libertarianism mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### 2] Property rights in space can be consistent with international law

Simberg 12 [(Rand, MSE in technical management from West Coast University, recognized as an expert in space transportation by the Office of Technology Assessment) “Homesteading the Final Frontier A Practical Proposal for Securing Property Rights in Space,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, April 2012, <https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Rand-Simberg-Homesteading-the-Final-Frontier.pdf>] TDI

But is it true that any recognition of off-planet property claims is de facto a violation of the Outer Space Treaty? Not necessarily. For instance, one could argue that the existence of the Moon Treaty is in and of itself a refutation of the notion that the Outer Space Treaty outlaws private property in space, or else there would be no need for another treaty that essentially explicitly does so. And there is at least one potential loophole that could be exploited by appropriately worded legislation. There are two key assumptions in the legal argument used by opponents of off-planet property claims: 1) that the recognition by a government would only recognize claims by its own citizens; and 2) that it would defend them by force. That need not necessarily be so. Under the treaty, it would in fact be possible for a government, or group of governments, to recognize the property claims of anyone who met specified conditions, regardless of their citizenship or nationality. Such cooperation would obviate the need for physical force to defend claims. The argument that the treaty permits individual property rights was actually made from the very beginning. In 1969, two years after the treaty went into force, the late distinguished space-law professor, Stephen Gorove, noted that under it, “[A]n individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies.”32 This clearly provides support for the concept of individual claims off planet under Article II.

#### 3] Space appropriation and exploration originates from private companies such as Space X and Blue Origin. Preventing such is a restriction on the ability of companies to set and pursue their ends and these companies gain contracts with the government for projects which turns promise breaking offense.

## 2

### OFF

#### Interpretation – Debaters must disclose all constructive positions in cite boxes on the 2021-22 NDCA LD wiki. To clarify, they can’t say check open source, and if cites don’t work, they should type a basic summary of the position.

#### Violation – they don’t have cites

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### 1] Wiki rules and accessibility – inclusion is a voter because you can’t debate if you can’t participate

**Wiki Admin** [Administrator, "NDCA LD 2021-2022," No Publication, [https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/Main //](https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/Main%20//) JB]

When possible, **complete citations** should be **provided**. If citations are **not available, basic information** about the arguments made is still very helpful. For affirmatives, a **summary of** the **plan and advantages** as well as information about **major 2AC add-ons** or responses would be appreciated. For negatives, information about the arguments made in the **1NC** as well as information about the **2NR strategies** that the team has settled upon are ideal.

It is our hope that squads will **contribute all of the information** that they gather about other teams' arguments. **Hoarding intelligence** to gain a strategic advantage **undermines** the overall **quality of** the **information available** to all squads and is **antithetical** to the spirit of **clash** inherent in contest round debating. **Democratizing** the **process** of intelligence gathering distributes the burden onto a much greater number of people, enabling **students and teachers** to spend more time **generating** and discussing **arguments** and **less time chasing** down **citations**.

#### 2] Wiki also warns you before you disclose which means no reasonability on this shell

A screenshot of a cell phone

Description automatically generated

#### I’ll preempt “wiki doesn’t work” – 1] The interp solves, yes the wiki sometimes doesn’t post wikify versions but you can still post a summary of arguments which is what the wiki asks you to do 2] Asking doesn’t solve because it’s a question of the norm you posit and some people don’t know you 3] Verifiability flows neg – you know they didn’t disclose but you don’t know if they’re lying. Either way, most debaters follow my interp which means risk of offense negates.

#### Wiki rules is a voter – 1] You reap the benefits of it from other disclosure but you think you’re special – links to fairness which is a voter you can’t tell who won if the layer was skewed 2] It’s run by volunteers so you’re just freeriding on a volunteer website that does great things – internal link to being a better person

#### Fairness – a) debate is a game which requires fairness b) it’s jurisdictional of the judge’s role

#### DTD – a) deterrence b) rectify time loss c) it affected the entire round ie. the strat skew is irreversible

#### CI>Reasonability – a) it’s arbitrary so there is no norm set b) collapses because you’re defending your model of debate which is your counterinterp just with no offense c) causes a race to the bottom because everything is seen as reasonable so we don’t find better norms

#### No RVIs on NC theory – a) norming because neg’s will be afraid to read theory against the aff that always has the 2ar for new responses and new implications that means neg never wins b) they have 2 speeches to recontextualize answers that I could never respond to because I don’t have a 3NR which means good affs will always win their norm

## 3

### OFF

#### A: Interpretation – Debaters must only read normatively justified frameworks.

#### B: Violation – You read an impact justified framework; defined as a framework that justifies its conclusion with reasons that thing is bad, rather than starting from a metaphysical truth claim about morality that can justify a comprehensive theory of what is right and wrong: you just say cap bad

#### C: Standards –

#### 1. Strat skew – Reading an impact justified framework destroys my strategy: A) Turn ground – it artificially exclude impacts from a larger framework that would justify your impact being bad which means you can cherry pick any impact that flows one direction. Also, you should reject impact justified frameworks because they fail and derive a moral imperative to act.

#### 2. Phil ed – Impact justified framework destroy phil ed: A) Justification – impact justification destroys the requirement to learn concepts like normativity, metaphysics, meta-ethics, and other types of justifications for frameworks since all you need is reasons why one impact is bad Phil ed controls the internal link to education since it’s the internal link to knowing what counts as good education through philosophical justification.

#### 3. No counterinterp offense – LD is a values debate but policy and PF are places where you don’t have to do it which means it’s a functional TVA

## Case

### UV

1] New 2NR responses because arguments aren’t clear and implicated until the 1AR – either way err on the side of more debating

2]

### FW

#### Reject Consequentialism – [A] consequentialism condemns end states which means all actions are permissible till there consequences are analyzed [B] Each type of pleasure is qualitatively different, so we can’t quantify and compare pleasures which answers calculations. [C] There is no bright line to where consequences end. Ends will always trigger more ends. [D] Inductive reasoning fails since you justify induction based on what happened in the past because you know inductive reasoning worked before so its circular. [E] Infinite consequences of any action, if I drop my pen it could do an infinite amount of things meaning we cant tell an action [F] Intent foresight fails because by the time I perceive all consequences and weigh them to see the most probable one it would be too late to take the action

OFF Reid Brinkley

1] missing internal link as to why debate necessitates policymaking - yes it applies to policy but not LD because it's a values debate

2] k affs are read all the time too

3] even if theyre right they cant solve this - debate will still exist and you still affirm the resolution

framing

kant hijacks - you only know antiblackness bad bc it treats as means to end

kant solves - we resist antiblack structures like farr 02 - if reading black authors is resisting antiblackness then we meet too

the rotj and ballot is to vote fo rbetter debater - treat their framewokr as a standard to preserv competitive equity and semantic outframing

public entity fill in - decks any chance of solvency

no internal link between private entities and then furthering space colonization or exploration - no reason why that furthers racial capital

the aff doesnt solve - you made arguments about how cap is ingrained whcih means even if private appropriation is banned they wont donate

### TL

1] They can’t solve all of racial cap, no advocacy text except the resolution

If extra T – destroys compettivie equity from predictable stasis point of contestation

#### Racial Capitalism thesis is incorrect – connection between Race and Cap is circumstantial not necessary

Walzer 20 Michael Walzer 7-29-2020 "A Note on Racial Capitalism" <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/a-note-on-racial-capitalism> (a prominent American political theorist and public intellectual. A professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey)//Elmer

I have been puzzled for many months by the appearance of the phrase “racial capitalism” in the left press (see, for example, the article by K. Sabeel Rahman in the Summer 2020 issue of Dissent). What does it mean? Perhaps the adjective “racial” is simply an ordinary qualifying adjective. Racial capitalism is one kind of capitalism, and then there must be other kinds, requiring other adjectives. Here in the United States we have a kind of capitalism where the majority of exploited workers or a majority of the most exploited workers are people of color. The underclass and the reserve army are defined both racially and economically. Of course, no leftist writer would be indifferent to the exploitation of white workers, who might still make up the majority of the American workforce—and who are certainly the majority of exploited workers in Europe. The point of the adjective, then, is simply to focus our attention, for good reasons, on non-white workers. But is the exploitation of these workers a necessary feature of American capitalism? The phrase “racial capitalism” leaves us unclear about whether the hierarchical location of non-white workers is determined by race or by capitalism or by the two somehow working together. To begin to answer that question, we need to look at some examples of non-racial capitalism. The form of capitalism sponsored by the **Chinese communists** is obviously non-racial. Though the exploited workers are, in Western terminology, people of color, Western terminology is out of place here. If the Chinese imported white workers to take on the most menial jobs, that might make Chinese capitalism “racial,” **but no such importations have been reported**. The predatory version of capitalism that prevails in Putin’s Russia is also non-racial. It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia, but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group. But no one is doing that. I have no statistics, but from what I read about China and Russia, I doubt that the rate of exploitation is higher in the United States, in racial capitalism, than it is in those two countries, **where capitalism is non-racial**. **Capitalism “works” with and without a racialized underclass** and reserve army. But is that right? The adjective “racial” sometimes makes a much stronger claim: it isn’t a qualifying but rather a definitional adjective. Capitalism is necessarily, inherently, racist. Forget about China and Russia, which are capitalist latecomers. Western capitalism is the prototypical version, and it has been racist from day one (if we can agree on day one)—always and forever racist. Does this mean that Manchester in 1844, as Engels described it, where all the exploited workers were white, wasn’t capitalist? No, for those workers were producing fabrics from cotton raised and harvested by Black slaves in the American South. That’s true enough, but I am not sure it is sufficient for an argument about necessity. Consider a counterfactual possibility: had no Black slaves been available, the recruitment of Irish workers would have started much earlier than it did. The rise of capitalism would not have been halted had the slave trade never begun. But the Manchester/Southern plantation example suggests what we all now know: capitalism is a global economic system, and it depends on the exploitation of people of color around the world. Here, however, it seems clear that the key **issue is exploitation, not racism**.

Given global demography, the majority of workers in any global economy will be people of color. Even in a democratically or social democratically regulated global system, the majority of workers and the majority of managers—the underclass and the overclass—will be non-white. Indeed, it would be the refusal of any transnational corporation to hire people of color that would rightly be called racist. (In the Pennsylvania town where I grew up, the local steel company did not hire, and therefore did not exploit, Jews or Black people. I suppose that this is also an example of racial capitalism.) All this suggests that capitalism and racism **have to be analyzed separately**. They overlap sometimes, as they do today in the United States. But the overlap is **circumstantial, not necessary**. **The two phenomena are distinct. They don’t rise and fall together. Each one, for different reasons, requires severe criticism and sustained opposition.** Many years ago, socialist writers argued that the triumph of the working class would liberate women, Jews, Black people, and everyone else. Separate political struggles against sexism, anti-Semitism, or racism were unnecessary—indeed they were a distraction from the all-important class war. Today some people on the left seem to believe that the end of racism will bring with it the downfall of capitalism. Both these theories are wrong. Overthrowing racism will still leave us with capitalism; overthrowing capitalism will still leave us with racism. Putting the adjective and noun together gives us a false sense of the **relationship** between the two phenomena. It might make sense, then, to ban the phrase from the pages of left newspapers and magazines. But since I am opposed to bans of that sort, I would only suggest that the phrase should always be queried by the editors. Do the writers who use it have some idea about what it means? Or are they just against racial capitalism, whatever it means?

#### 2] Only growth can sustain space colonization and solve extinction

Dale Skran 2016 (Executive Vice President of the National Space Society and a member of the Board of Directors of the Alliance for Space Development. “Settling space is the only sustainable reason for humans to be in space,” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2915/1>)

So why then do Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and many others, including organizations like the National Space Society (NSS) and Alliance for Space Development, believe strongly that space settlement is essential to human survival? Although this may seem surprising, the Earth is not a “safe space.” The destiny of virtually all species on Earth is extinction in a relatively short span of geologic time. The Tellers claim that “we live on a planet that is perfect for us.” This statement is both completely true and total nonsense. We fit well on the Earth because we have evolved over millions of years to become creatures that are both adapted to live here and to like living here. It is truer to say that we are perfect for the Earth than the reverse. In fact, the Earth is not such a commodious place. It is subject to periodic calamities of various sorts, ranging from massive asteroid and comet impacts to titanic volcanic eruptions, and from periodic ice ages to disastrous solar flares. In the short run, the Earth seems balmy and comfortable. Viewed from the perspective of deep time, it starts to look more like a death trap, bedeviled by regular mass extinctions. However, things are actually quite a bit worse. Although there are many potentially bad things that might happen to the human race on the Earth from natural sources, there are many more from unnatural sources. We have been dancing with nuclear disaster for a long time. An apocalyptic atomic war is not inevitable, but it is possible. Add to this scenario the genetically engineered killer virus, “gray goo,” a robot revolt, and other horrors as yet undreamt, and the odds against human survival get longer. Hence, the need to abandon the fiction of Earth as our eternal and unchanging perfect home and to appreciate both the need for, and promise of, space settlement. Not so the rich can escape to an Elysium in the sky, or so we can all leave behind a polluted and overheated Earth, but simply so that the human species and human culture has a chance at surviving and flourishing in the long term. The Tellers believe that sustainability on the Earth has no relationship to what we do in space, but the same technologies that enable deep space settlement will have a profound impact on terrestrial sustainability. The Tellers write, “We haven’t even colonized the Sahara desert, the bottom of the oceans… because it makes no economic sense.” This may be true, but it also makes no sense to settle the Sahara desert, the bottom of the oceans, or Antarctica since these locations are on the Earth, and humans living there will not increase the probability of species survival. Near-Earth free space settlements and lunar bases are just stepping stones to ones much further out that are quarantined from Earth by millions of kilometers of vacuum. Once the motivation of species survival is put front and center, it becomes clear that a settlement in low Earth orbit, on the Moon, at L5, or on the Martian surface is not nearly sufficient. What is needed is a large set of thriving communities distributed throughout the solar system, and even ultimately in the Oort Cloud surrounding the solar system proper. This vision is not a small thing. It will be the work of many generations, just as was the settling of the New World or, even earlier in history, the human diaspora out of Africa along the Asian coast to Australia and beyond. The Tellers believe that sustainability on the Earth has no relationship to what we do in space, but the same technologies that enable deep space settlement will have a profound impact on terrestrial sustainability. Space settlements, of necessity, push the limits of food production per square meter and per liter of water. Space settlement agricultural methods can also be applied to growing food in parched California or in vertical farms in crowded urban areas. Space settlements require humans and technology to co-exist in close proximity. This implies an absolute minimization of pollution and sustained recycling of all waste. Such technologies seem highly applicable to sustainability on Earth as well. We will need to provide the best possible medical care for remote space settlements, which will be far from hospitals on Earth. The technologies that make such medicine effective—“tricorders”, telemedicine, and so on—can also bring medical care to underdeveloped and underserved areas of the Earth. The Tellers raise the specter of “winter-over syndrome” in the Antarctic, writing that “living on Mars would be way, way more miserable than living in Antarctica,” and concluding, “Nobody wants to live there.” Although it is clear that the Tellers will not be going, the large numbers who signed up for Mars One’s sketchy settlement plans suggest that a lot of people do want to live on Mars. There are real challenges to constructing space settlements, but current Antarctic bases are not true settlements. Nobody lives there with their families, with the exception of the coastal Esperanza Base, where about ten families routinely winter over. No real effort is made to create any kind of human environment that is comfortable over a long period of time. Conditions in Antarctica might be better compared to living in a campground than a self-sustaining settlement. Additionally, the current Antarctic Treaty essentially prevents any extraction or use of the natural resources found there, thus making economically independent settlements infeasible. The Tellers think that, from an economic perspective, “Mars has nothing to offer in return.” Here, at least in the short run, they have a point. Let us not shy from the truth. Conditions in the early settlements in the New World were difficult at best, and the casualty rate was high. We should expect the same to hold true for early space settlements. However, Jamestown and Plymouth gave rise to vast cities and a tamed landscape on a scale of hundreds of years. We now bring to the table technological means that would seem magical to the Jamestown settlers. Even as difficult an environment as the Moon can be developed and settled using technology that either exists currently or is an engineering project, as one book suggests. The Tellers think that, from an economic perspective, “Mars has nothing to offer in return.” Here, at least in the short run, they have a point. Although Mars may have more of the natural resources a settlement will need than, say, the Moon, it is at the bottom of a fairly steep gravity well and, for the time being, it is not likely that there will be many Mars-to-Earth exports. However, this is like looking at the resources of the New World via a keyhole, seeing a swamp, and reporting back that there is no point in going there. It is worth keeping in mind the example of “Seward’s Folly.” The purchase of Alaska from Russia was mocked as “Seward’s icebox” and a “polar bear garden.” At the time, the oil and mineral riches of Alaska were undiscovered and undreamt of. Space itself teems with valuable resources, including continuous and abundant solar energy and mineral wealth on a scale beyond imagination just in the near Earth asteroids. Just as the Tellers were dismissing space resources as irrelevant, the US Congress was laying the legal groundwork for asteroid and lunar mining with the passage of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, signed by President Obama on November 23, 2015. The Tellers also seem unaware that their leadership at Google, Larry Page and Eric Schmidt, are investors in the asteroid mining firm Planetary Resources. The Tellers say that “we won’t survive [on Earth] unless we learn to live in a resource neutral way.” This statement assumes that that Earth is a closed system, which it is not. The Earth is flooded daily with vast amounts of solar energy that, if exploited, could power just about any civilization we wish to maintain. There is no technical limitation to providing continuous, carbon-free power from space solar power satellites beaming power back to the surface of the Earth anywhere it might be needed. The main opposition to this idea derives from an unwillingness to consider centralized power systems on ideological grounds, combined with the unexpected reality of very cheap natural gas today. Even the most conservative consideration of near-Earth asteroid resources suggests that there is no reason to view the Earth as a closed system to which nothing can be added.

#### 3] Capitalism solves inequality, boosts living standards, and is economically sustainable

Bourne 15—Head of Public Policy at the Institute of Economic Affairs (Ryan, 1-15-2015, “In defence of rampant consumerism”) LADI

Some worry about the effect of growth and consumption on the environment, or on economic inequality. For others, it’s the sheer vulgarity of desire for stuff which perturbs – as evidenced by the backlash against the supposedly barbarous hordes fighting over flat-screen TVs on the shopping day ‘Black Friday’. But in the public discourse, these views always come together in a predictable narrative: ever-rising demand for material things, and political obsession with GDP, have caused us to lose sight of what matters – community, family, and the duties we have to each other. In particular, the replacement over the past three decades of what Dr Sentamu calls the "solidaristic" state with one which leaves more room for markets is blamed for eroding those values and dehumanising the poor. Wouldn’t it be better for all of us if we placed less emphasis on growth, and instead re-shaped an activist state to target other concerns? No. Every single one of these claims and hopes are mistaken. Material advances are crucial to our well-being. Just three centuries ago, average labourers earned just £2 a day in today’s money. Life was tough. Life expectancy at birth was 36. Most of the world was equivalent to the poorest parts of Bangladesh today. At that time it might have been considered materialistic to desire things that we now take for granted, such as central heating, decent sanitation and cheap clothes and food. Even in 1973, 2 million people in the UK lived without either an indoor toilet, a bath or hot running water. It is therefore impossible to draw a line across 2015 and suggest that our material goals are satisfied and further consumption frivolous. Even Keynes recognised the folly of those who claim in each generation that we’ve reached the limits of progress and should simply be content with our lot. Is it ‘consumerist’ to desire the washing machine, the refrigerator, and the computer, which have all, in so many ways, enriched our lives? Few would wish to reverse these innovations, and the idea that their development – or desire for them – created an individualistic, materialistic culture which eroded social solidarity is difficult to imagine. Far from being frivolous, we can see with hindsight that they contributed to smashing the poverty and poor hygiene which had hitherto characterised all human history. In fact, consumerism in itself is a crucial driver of the innovations that have improved the well-being of the poor. Their refusal to be satisfied with their lot created the conditions for labour-saving devices to take off, first here, and now elsewhere. As the economies of developing countries such as India and China have moved closer to the ‘market’ societies criticised by the clerisy, what Marx described as the “absolute desire for enrichment” has reduced poverty to a greater degree than any other economic system known to humankind. In two decades since 1990 the global rate of absolute poverty has halved. You’d be hard-pushed to think these results were somehow immoral. But clergy in rich countries only see what they want to see. While denouncing the desire for expensive gadgets, they ignore how wealth is used for philanthropic and charitable causes – and all the future good that could come from consumer products, from “stuff”. We can imagine a world where new gadgets allow old people who are ill to stay with their families, monitored by devices rather than confined in hospital, or one where even the poorest can access the expertise of the world’s best teachers. If the clerisy’s agenda was just an articulated distaste for the desire for possessions, it would be one thing. But their generalised denunciations of consumerism and growth in themselves are increasingly becoming a demand for new government action. In particular, many now suggest we should give up on ‘going for growth’ altogether, and instead embrace so-called "solidaristic" aims, such as reducing inequality. These are more commonly understood as "socialistic". This view is dangerous, and based on a falsehood. No government ever has had the aim of maximising GDP above all. Were they doing so, we would have much smaller government, huge tax cuts, no planning system, no carbon-reduction targets, legalised drugs, no immigration controls whatsoever and extremely limited regulation. Suggesting growth at all costs has been the mantra of recent governments is to erect a giant straw ~~man~~ [person]. Every government recognises values beyond the market. Yet it is precisely when governments pursue other aims that their actions detriment the poor whom the clerisy purport to represent. Planning restrictions have raised house prices. Green taxes have raised energy bills. Childcare regulations have made it much more expensive. Sin taxes have been jacked up. All of these regressive measures hit the poor hardest. In any case, inequality is not a useful measure of anything. You can have more equality by having fewer rich people, but doing so does nothing to help reduce poverty - in fact, it worsens it. Living standards are what matters, and all the evidence shows they are far higher in free enterprise economies than in highly socialistic ones. Over time, their growth is faster, and their labour markets perform better. Compare unemployment rates here or in the US to Greece or Spain. Compare our growth in the last two decades to that of Chile to Venezuela. Compare China now to China two decades ago. Nor does a socialistic state guarantee social harmony; think of Britain in the 1970s, or Venezuela today. Ironically for the clerisy, if anything is to blame for individualism and a dehumanisation of the poor, then it is the rise of the welfare state which they now want to strengthen. Whereas civil society institutions like friendly societies, trade unions and charitable organisations flourished prior to 1945, embedded in communities, the centralised bureaucratic welfare state has now usurped them. This state provides essential services irrespective of contribution and without reciprocity; it tells those in need to take a cheque and get on with it. This, too, drives consumerism: state provision of health, education and pensions means less need to save and more money spent in consumption of life’s luxuries. Money may not be everything. Relationships, our conduct toward our fellow beings, and all the non-market actions we take to assist our friends and families are crucial to our well-being. But the desire for enrichment is a natural human ambition, and the best way to achieve it in future is to embrace precisely the values and economic liberty which enable robust economic growth - and which the anti-consumerist, anti-growth brigade lament. Conversely, a bigger state, and a turn away from growth, risks hurting the people the clerisy claim to support. It is very rarely those at the bottom of the pile who moan about an abundance of stuff.