# 1NC

## 1

### Framework

#### The meta ethic is practical reason-

#### [1] Ethics must be derived a priori – moral truths exist independently of the empirical world. Prefer –

#### A] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents which makes it action guiding

#### B] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be, this means experience may be generally useful but should not be the basis for ethical action.

#### C] Induction – it’s own method presupposes

#### [2] Practical Reason is that procedure. To ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is escapable and non-actionguiding which is the problem of regress. Aggregation is nonsensical since a] it impedes on one persons ends for another and b] assumes everyone values the same thing.

#### [3] Moral law must be universal—our judgements can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me – any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) // [brackets for gendered language]

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that **when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action,** she **[they] supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified**. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). **In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness**. Kant considers what this might be**: it cannot be an object of inclination**, for those have only a conditional worth, "**for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth**" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, **the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity"** or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that **regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action."** By this I understand him to mean that **we must regard ourselves as capable of** conferring **value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good**. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), **we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves**. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize t hem. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. To clarify, consequences don’t link to the framework.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### [1] Kantian theory has the best tools for fighting oppression through combatting ethical egoism and abstraction

Farr 02 [Arnold (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32 // LEX JB]

**One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s** moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the **universal and the concrete is a valid distinction, the unity of the two is required** for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that **I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. **It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence.** What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also**.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. **The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation.** For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. … Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. **First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions.** It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. **To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings.** Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. **The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves.** Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. **What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.**

#### [2] An understanding of Kantianism is key to understanding the law in the real world because states abide by inviolable side-constraints in their constitutions

Otteson 09 [(James R., professor of philosophy and economics at Yeshiva University) “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism,” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3, Winter, [2009](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9506-9)] TDI Recut Lex VM

It is difficult to imagine a stronger defense of the “sacred” dignity of individual agency. Kantian individuality is premised on its rational nature and its entailed inherent dignity, and the rest of his moral philosophy arguably is built on this vision.1 Kant relies on a similarly robust conception of individuality in work other than his explicitly moral philosophy. The 1784 essay “An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?’” (Kant 1991), for example, emphasizes in strong terms the threat that paternalism poses to one’s will. Kant argues that “enlightenment” (Aufklärung) involves a transition from moral and intellectual immaturity, wherein one depends on others to make one’s moral and intellectual decisions, to maturity, wherein one makes such decisions for oneself. One cannot effect this transition if one remains under another’s tutelage, and, as a corollary, one compromises another’s enlightenment if one undertakes to make such decisions for the other person—which, as Kant argues, is the case under a paternalistic government. Kant also writes in his 1786 essay “What Is Orientation in Thinking?” that “To think for oneself means to look within oneself (i.e. in one’s own reason) for the supreme touchstone of truth; and the maxim of thinking for oneself at all times is enlightenment” (1991, 249, italics and bold in the original). These passages are consistent with the position he takes in Grounding that a person who depends on others is acting heteronomously, not autonomously, and is to that extent not exercising a free moral will. These passages also help to clarify Kant’s notion of personhood and rational agency by indicating some of their practical implications. For example, on the basis of his argument, one would expect him to argue for setting severe limits on the authority that any group of people, including the state, may exercise over others: because individual freedom is necessary both to achieve enlightenment and to exercise one’s moral agency, Kant should argue that no group may impinge on that freedom without thereby acting immorally. Kant expressly draws this conclusion in his 1793 essay “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice’”: Right is the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonises with the freedom of everyone else (in so far as this is possible within the terms of a general law). And public right is the distinctive quality of the external laws which make this constant harmony possible. Since every restriction of freedom through the arbitrary will of another party is termed coercion, it follows that a civil constitution is a relationship among free men who are subject to coercive laws, while they retain their freedom within the general union with their fellows. (1991, 73, emphasis in original) Kant insists on the protection of a sphere of liberty for each individual to self-legislate under universalizable laws of rationality, consistent with the formulation of the categorical imperative requiring the treatment of others “always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (1981, 36). This formulation of the categorical imperative might even logically entail the position Kant articulates about “right,” “public right,” and “freedom.” Persons do not lose their personhood when they join a civil community, so they cannot rationally endorse a state that will be destructive of that personhood; on the contrary, according to Kant, a person enters civil society rationally willing that the society will protect both his own agency and that of others. Robert B. Pippen rightly says that for Kant “political duties are a subset of moral duties” (1985, 107–42), but the argument here puts it slightly differently: political rights, or “dignities,” derive from moral rights, which for Kant are determined by one’s moral agency. Thus, the only “coercive laws” to which individuals may rationally allow themselves to be subject in civil society are those that require respect for each others’ moral agency (and provide for the punishment of infractions thereof) (see Pippen 1985, 121). When Kant comes to state his own moral justification for the state in the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals, this claim is exactly the one he makes: the state is necessary for securing the conditions of “Right”—in other words, the conditions under which persons can exercise their autonomous agency (see 1991, 132–35). Consistent with this interpretation, Kant elsewhere endorses free trade and open markets on grounds that make his concern for “harmony” in the preceding passage reminiscent of Adam Smithian invisible-hand arguments. In his 1784 essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Kant writes: “Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest” (1991, 41). This statement is similar to Smith’s statement of the invisible-hand argument.2 Kant proceeds to endorse some of the same laissez-faire economic policies that Smith advocated—for example, in his discussion in his 1786 work “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” of the benefits of “mutual exchange” and in his claim that “there can be no wealth-producing activity without freedom” (1991, 230–31, emphasis in original), as well as in his claim in the 1795 Perpetual Peace that “the spirit of commerce” is motivated by people’s “mutual self-interest” and thus “cannot exist side by side with war” (1991, 114, emphasis in original).3 Finally, although Kant argues that we cannot know exactly what direction human progress will take, he believes we can nevertheless be confident that mankind is progressing.4 Thus, in “Universal History” he writes: The highest purpose of nature—i.e. the development of all natural capacities—can be fulfilled for mankind only in society, and nature intends that man should accomplish this, and indeed all his appointed ends, by his own efforts. This purpose can be fulfilled only in a society which has not only the greatest freedom, and therefore a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most precise specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can co-exist with the freedom of others. The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly just civil constitution. (1991, 45–46, emphasis in original) Kant’s argument in this essay runs as follows: human progress is possible, but only in conditions of a civil society whose design allows this progress; because the progress is possible only as individuals become enlightened, and individual enlightenment is in turn possible only when individuals are free from improper coercion and paternalism, human progress is therefore possible only under a state that defends individual freedom. Kant believes that individuals have the best chance to be happy under a limited civil government, and he therefore argues that even such a laudable goal as increasing human happiness is not a justifiable role of the state: “But the whole concept of an external right is derived entirely from the concept of freedom in the mutual external relationships of human beings, and has nothing to do with the end which all men have by nature (i.e. the aim of achieving happiness) or with the recognized means of attaining this end. And thus the latter end must on no account interfere as a determinant with the laws governing external right” (“Theory and Practice,” 1991, 73, emphasis in original). The Kantian state is hence limited on the principled grounds of respecting agency; the fact that this limitation in his view provides the conditions enabling enlightenment, progress, and ultimately happiness is a great but ancillary benefit. Thus, the positions Kant takes on nonpolitical issues would seem to suggest a libertarian political position. And Kant explicitly avows such a state. In “Universal History,” he writes: Furthermore, civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades and industries, and especially to commerce, in the event of which the state’s power in its external relations will also decline. . . . If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check. For this reason, restrictions placed upon personal activities are increasingly relaxed, and general freedom of religion is granted. And thus, although folly and caprice creep in at times, enlightenment gradually arises. (1991, 50–51, emphasis in original) In “Theory and Practice,” Kant writes that “the public welfare which demands first consideration lies precisely in that legal constitution which guarantees everyone his freedom within the law, so that each remains free to seek his happiness in whatever way he thinks best, so long as he does not violate the lawful freedom and rights of his fellow subjects at large” and that “[n]o-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law” (1991, 80, emphasis in original, and 74). In a crucial passage in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the “Universal Principle of Right” is “‘[e]very action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.’” He concludes, “Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (1991, 133, emphasis in original).5 This stipulation becomes for Kant the grounding justification for the existence of a state, its raison d’être, and the reason we leave the state of nature is to secure this sphere of maximum freedom compatible with the same freedom of all others. Because this freedom must be complete, in the sense of being as full as possible given the existence of other persons who demand similar freedom, it entails that the state may—indeed, must—secure this condition of freedom, but undertake to do nothing else because any other state activities would compromise the very autonomy the state seeks to defend. Kant’s position thus outlines and implies a political philosophy that is broadly libertarian; that is, it endorses a state constructed with the sole aim of protecting its citizens against invasions of their liberty. For Kant, individuals create a state to protect their moral agency, and in doing so they consent to coercion only insofar as it is required to prevent themselves or others from impinging on their own or others’ agency. In his argument, individuals cannot rationally consent to a state that instructs them in morals, coerces virtuous behavior, commands them to trade or not, directs their pursuit of happiness, or forcibly requires them to provide for their own or others’ pursuits of happiness. And except in cases of punishment for wrongdoing,6 this severe limitation on the scope of the state’s authority must always be respected: “The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance” (Perpetual Peace, 1991, 125). The implication is that a Kantian state protects against invasions of freedom and does nothing else; in the absence of invasions or threats of invasions, it is inactive.

#### 3] Motivation – only motivating factor

### Offense

#### [1] The process of strike uses patients or beneficiaries of work as a means to an end

**Howard 20** [Danielle Howard,, Mar 2020, "What Should Physicians Consider Prior to Unionizing?," Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association, [https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03 //](https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03%20//) LEX JB]

* Written in the context of doctors, warrant can be used for all jobs

**The** possible **disadvantage to** patients highlights the crux **of** the moral issue of physician **strikes. In** Immanuel **Kant’s** *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, one formulation of **the categorical imperative is to “Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means**.”24 **When patient care is leveraged** by physicians during strikes, **patients serve as a means to the union’s ends**. Unless physicians act to improve *everyone’s*care, union action—if **it jeopardizes** the **care of some hospitalized patients**, for example—cannot be ethical. It is for this reason that, in the case of **physicians looking to form a new union**, the argument can be made that unionization should be used only as a last resort. Physician union **members must be prepared to utilize collective action and accept its risks to patient care, but every effort should be made to avoid actions that risk harm to patients.**

#### [2] Going on strike isn’t universalizable – a) if everyone leaves work then there will be no concept of a job b) everyone means the employer even leaves which is a contradiction in contraception

#### [3] No aff offense – no unique obligation of the state to give ability to strike – if a workplace is coercive you can use legal means or just find another job – promise

#### [4] Neg contention choice – otherwise they can concede all of our work on framework and just read 4 minutes of turns which moots the four minutes of framework debate that the 1NC did giving them a massive advantage. It also kills phil education since it allows them to escape the framework lbl which outweighs since phil ed is unique to LD.

## 2

### OFF

#### Interpretation – the affirmative must specify the metaethic of their ethical theory/framework in the delineated text of the 1AC

#### Violation – they don’t

#### [1] Resolvability – Metaethics is a key question when debating moral obligation – it explores questions that a simple “the standard is” can’t solve for

Sayre-Mccord 12 [Sayre-Mccord, Geoff, 1-23-2007 substantive revision Thu Jan 26, 2012, "Metaethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics //](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics%20//) LEX JB]

**Metaethics** is the attempt to **understand** the **metaphysical**, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, **presuppositions** and commitments **of moral thought**, talk, and practice. As such, **it** **counts within** its domain **a** broad **range of questions** and puzzles, **including: Is morality more a matter of taste than truth? Are moral standards culturally relative? Are there moral facts? If there are moral facts, what is their origin? How is it that they set an appropriate standard for our behavior? How might moral facts be related to other facts (about psychology, happiness, human conventions…)? And how do we learn about the moral facts, if there are any?** These questions lead naturally to puzzles about the meaning of moral claims as well as about moral truth and the justification of our moral commitments. **Metaethics explores** as well the **connection between values, reasons for action, and human motivation, asking how it is that moral standards might provide us with reasons to do or refrain from doing as it demands, and it addresses many of the issues commonly bound up with the nature of freedom and its significance (or not) for moral responsibility**.[[1](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/notes.html" \l "1)] The range of issues, puzzles and **questions** that fall **within metaethics’** purview **are consistently abstract. They** reflect the fact that metaethics **involve**s an attempt to step back from **particular substantive debates within morality to ask about the views, assumptions, and commitments that are shared by those who engage in the debate**. By and large, the **metaethical issues that emerge as a result of this** process of stepping back **can be addressed without taking a** particular **stand** on **substantive moral issues** that started the process. In fact, **metaethics** has seemed to many to **offer a crucial neutral background against** which **competing moral views need to be seen if they are to be assessed properly**. Some metaethicists early in the twentieth century went so far as to hold that their own work made no substantive moral assumptions at all and had no practical implications.[[2](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/notes.html" \l "2)] Whether any view that is recognizably still a view about the nature and status of ethics could manage this is dubious. **But there is no doubt that, whatever metaethics's substantive assumptions and practical implications might be, it involves reflecting on the presuppositions and commitments of those engaging in moral thought, talk, and practice and so abstracting away from particular moral judgments.**

#### [2] Extinction – the question and discussion of metaethics is key to solve collapse and extinction of the galaxy, discussion is key – we have at best 40 more years and it won’t wait for us to have sloppy phil debates

**Muehlhauser 11** [Muehlhauser, Luke (Executive director at the Singularity Institute). “The Urgent Meta-Ethics of Friendly Artificial Intelligence.” LessWrong. 01 February 2011. http://lesswrong.com/lw/43v/the\_urgent\_metaethics\_of\_friendly\_artificial]

**Barring a major collapse of human civilization (due to nuclear war, asteroid impact, etc.), many experts expect the intelligence explosion Singularity to occur within 50-200 years. That** fact **means** that many **philosophical problems, about which philosophers have argued for millennia, are suddenly very urgent**. Those concerned with **the fate of the galaxy must say to the philosophers: "Too slow! Stop screwing around with transcendental ethics and qualitative epistemologies! Start thinking with the precision of an AI researcher and solve these problems!" If** a near-future **AI will determine the fate of the galaxy, we need to figure out what values we ought to give it. Should it ensure animal welfare? Is growing the human population a good thing? But those are questions of applied ethics. More fundamental are the questions about which normative ethics to give the AI: How would the AI decide if animal welfare or large human populations were good? What rulebook should it use to answer novel moral questions that arise in the future? But even more fundamental are the questions of meta-ethics. What do moral terms mean? Do moral facts exist? What justifies one normative rulebook over the other? The answers to these meta-ethical questions will determine the answers to the questions of normative ethics, which, if we are successful in planning the intelligence explosion, will determine the fate of the galaxy**. Eliezer Yudkowsky has put forward one meta-ethical theory, which informs his plan for Friendly AI: Coherent Extrapolated Volition. But **what if that meta-ethical theory is wrong? The galaxy is at stake**. Princeton **philosopher** Richard **Chappell worries** about how Eliezer's **meta-ethical theory depends on rigid designation**, which in this context may amount to something like a semantic "trick." Previously and independently, an Oxford philosopher expressed the same worry to me in private. Eliezer's theory also employs something like the method of reflective equilibrium, about which there are many grave concerns from Eliezer's fellow naturalists, including Richard Brandt, Richard Hare, Robert Cummins, Stephen Stich, and others. My point is not to beat up on Eliezer's meta-ethical views. I don't even know if they're wrong. Eliezer is wickedly smart. He is highly trained in the skills of overcoming biases and properly proportioning beliefs to the evidence. He thinks with the precision of an AI researcher. In my opinion, that gives him large advantages over most philosophers. **When Eliezer states and defends a particular view, I take that as significant Bayesian evidence for reforming my beliefs**. Rather, my point is that **we need lots of smart people working on these meta-ethical questions. We need to solve these problems, and quickly. The universe will not wait for the pace of traditional philosophy to catch up.**

#### Reject uncarded responses – study of quantum physics requires evidence from smart scholars

#### [3] Phil debate – two internal links – a) frameworks fail to provide an ought statement if they don’t explore the natural state of agents or the actor in the resolution b) I can’t ask questions about it in 1AC CX which kills access to novices trying to learn – outweighs on inclusion

#### [4] Strat skew – two internal links a) absent specification the NC loses access to framework k’s, metaethic debate, metahijacks, hijacks etc. for example, a metaethic can be used to frame out a kritik, but the NC loses access to this and the 1AR can shift into one that’s reactive b) even if I specify my own in the 1NC, I can’t contest yours until the 2NR which means you moot 7 minutes of the 1NC and this cause latebreaking framing debates

#### Fairness – a) it’s constitutive of debate as a competitive game b) all arguments concede the validity of fairness, c)

#### DTD – a) deterrence b) enforcement c) punishment d) dta doesn’t make sense

#### CI>reason – a) reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention b) collapses to CI because you’re defending your model of debate c) causes a race to the bottom because we never reform new norms which has the strongest internal link to norming d) Footnoting DA – even if you think it’s a silly shell, the norm would still be a comparatively better than the squo, that means reasonability is footnoting because we never experience the norming potential of the shell with different brightlines

#### No AFF RVIs – a) they have the 2ar to collapse with new weighing so good affs always win b) they have 2 speeches to respond while I have 1 to extend meaning they have 2 speeches to create new implications for arguments and all I can do is sit and flow c) any reason why a 2NR collapse is hard to respond to is taken out by better time allocation, and if you can’t do that, you shouldn’t win the debate anywaysss

## Case

### UV

#### 1NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea since the shell was read earlier.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew – ows on quantifiability

### Framework

pp negate –

1] more often false than true

Don’t vote on it – abhornet

Lbl

OFF blum

1] Evolution is a terrible starting point for philosophy – if we evolved to like pain then the framework would flip proving it’s arbitrary

2] Hijacks – you need to be a reasoner first before distinguishing pain and pleasure

3] It’s a voting issue for safety because biology on ethics justifies excluding those evolved to be different like disabled kids – you can’t debate if you can’t participate

OFF Pummer

1] Presumes consequentialism – they don’t get to weigh extinction under our framework bc we don’t evaluate them

2] Freedom violations outweigh on magnitude – its infinitely bad under my framework but extinction is 7 billion

3] No epistemic modesty – evaluate the framework debate contextually else it allows them to shift frameworks

4] It’s a voting issue for phil education bc it means we never go indepth lbl and discuss ethics you just run to a 1% of extinction outweighs

OFF Asepc

1] 1NC otteson 09 hijacks

2] is ought fallacy j bc they do

3] constitutional side constraints

4] it doesn’t come first – eval contextually to other framework debate

OFF Nixon

1] we meet – its also policy

2] No reason why policy necessitates consequences

3] kant hijacks – its better policy if we win fw

### Solvency

#### Top level – you should reject democracy based impacts – amount of democracy in a state is unquantifiable, fluctuates everyday, and is not causal with peace. It’s arbitrary to rank democracies in a list and apply characteristics to EVERY COUNTRY while we all know geopolitical climate always fluctuates

#### they have ONE card for solvency – im bout to dump on that card

#### I’ll answer their education internal here. It directly answers and the don’t have solvency

**Ordway 19** [Denise-Marie Ordway, 2-12-2019, "How teachers unions affect school district spending, student achievement," Journalist's Resource, [https://journalistsresource.org/economics/teachers-unions-salaries-students-research //](https://journalistsresource.org/economics/teachers-unions-salaries-students-research%20//) JB]

In this study, [Joshua Cowen](https://education.msu.edu/search/FormView.aspx?email=jcowen%40msu.edu) and [Katharine O. Strunk](https://education.msu.edu/search/Formview.aspx?email=kstrunk%40msu.edu) of Michigan State University examine 30 years of research to understand how teacher unions impact district spending, teacher pay and student achievement. They find that school districts with teacher unions spend more money and they spend it on different things. “The majority of studies find that unionized districts have higher spending and specifically higher spending on teachers’ salaries, and especially salaries for veteran teachers,” the authors write.

However, unions do not appear to help — and might actually hinder — student test scores and graduation rates. Early research suggests that students in unionized districts earn slightly higher achievement scores. But according to the authors, the most rigorous studies, which were conducted in more recent years, indicate that students in unionized districts have slightly higher dropout rates and slightly lower rates of math and reading proficiency. “It is as yet unclear the impacts of stronger unions on achievement,” they write.

#### I’ll answer the voting internal here – yes they do turn up but they got it backwards – overrepresentation of certain groups, toying with election dates to maximize chances of winning, muting those who don’t vote prove that it looks more like authoritarianism – they CANNOT make those not voting vote which is key to their solvency.

**Advocacy Labs 21** [AdvocacyLab, 3-18-2021, "Teacher Unions and the Influence of Special Interests in Local Elections," FutureEd, [https://www.future-ed.org/teacher-unions-and-the-outsized-influence-of-special-interests-in-local-elections //](https://www.future-ed.org/teacher-unions-and-the-outsized-influence-of-special-interests-in-local-elections%20//) JB]Top of Form

When elections are held in off years or on unusual days, the people who do show up are the ones who really care about the outcomes, and usually this means that well-organized groups are overrepresented. Oftentimes, in local government, it means that government employees and their unions have outsized influence. It makes sense that they would be really politically engaged, because what these local governments do affects their jobs very directly.

So especially when elections are off-cycle, firefighters have disproportionate influence in the elections of fire protection districts and cities, and teachers unions have disproportionate influence in school board elections. And that perhaps would surprise most people. If I were to say, “The Chambers of Commerce, the realtors and the developers are really active in local politics.” You might say, “That's obvious.” But people might not realize that firefighters are some of the most active groups in local politics, in many states.

The result is that a relatively small number of people have outsized influence on, for example, how well local government employees are compensated—and that compensation makes up a large share of local government budgets. But, of course, everyone ends up paying as taxpayers whether they knew about the election or not.

Have organized groups always played around with the timing of local elections to maximize their influence?

Toying with the timing of elections goes back to the 1840s, so this is a very old phenomenon. In big cities, it was political parties that were the driving force behind the timing of elections. They figured out whether they would do better in an election in even-numbered or odd-numbered years and would then change the election calendar to boost their chances of winning. And you can track how the election dates were moved back and forth depending on who was in power.

### Inherency

#### Workers don’t care about legality – strikes are on the rise absent the aff.

Notes 19 [Labor Notes; Media and organizing project that has been the voice of union activists who want to put the movement back in the labor movement since 1979; “Why Strikes Matter,” LN; 10/17/19; <https://labornotes.org/2019/10/why-strikes-matter>]//SJWen

“Why do you rob banks?” a reporter once asked Willie Sutton. “Because that’s where the money is,” the infamous thief replied. Why go on strike? Because that’s where our power is. Teachers in West Virginia showed it in 2018 when they walked out, in a strike that bubbled up from below, surprising even their statewide union leaders. No one seemed concerned that public sector strikes were unlawful in West Virginia. “What are they going to do, fire us all?” said Jay O’Neal, treasurer for the Kanawha County local. “Who would they get to replace us?” Already the state had 700 teaching vacancies, thanks to the rock-bottom pay the strikers were protesting. After 13 days out, the teachers declared victory and returned to their classrooms with a 5 percent raise. They had also backed off corporate education “reformers” on a host of other issues. The biggest lesson: “Our labor is ours first,” West Virginia teacher Nicole McCormick told the crowd at the Labor Notes Conference that spring. “It is up to us to give our labor, or to withhold it.” That’s the fundamental truth on which the labor movement was built. Strikes by unorganized workers led to the founding of unions. Strikes won the first union contracts. Strikes over the years won bigger paychecks, vacations, seniority rights, and the right to tell the foreman “that’s not my job.” Without strikes we would have no labor movement, no unions, no contracts, and a far worse working and living situation. In short, strikes are the strongest tool in workers’ toolbox—our power not just to ask, but to force our employers to concede something. DISCOVER YOUR POWER The key word is “force.” A strike is not just a symbolic protest. It works because we withhold something that the employer needs—its production, its good public image, its profits, and above all its control over us. As one union slogan has it, “this university works because we do”—or this company, or this city. A strike reveals something that employers would prefer we not notice: they need us. Workplaces are typically run as dictatorships. The discovery that your boss does not have absolute power over you—and that in fact, you and your co-workers can exert power over him—is a revelation. There’s no feeling like it. Going on strike changes you, personally and as a union. “Walking into work the first day back chanting ‘one day longer, one day stronger’ was the best morning I’ve ever had at Verizon,” said Pam Galpern, a field tech and mobilizer with Communication Workers Local 1101, after workers beat the corporate giant in a 45-day strike in 2016. “There was such a tremendous feeling of accomplishment. People were smiling and happy. It was like a complete 180-degree difference from before the strike,” when supervisors had been micromanaging and writing workers up for the smallest infractions. In a good strike, everyone has a meaningful role. Strikers develop new skills and a deeper sense that they own and run their union. New leaders emerge from the ranks and go on to become stewards. New friendships are formed; workers who didn’t know or trust one another before forge bonds of solidarity. A few stubborn co-workers finally see why the union matters and sign on as members. Allies from faith groups, neighborhood groups, or other unions adopt your cause. You and your co-workers lose some fear of the boss—and the boss gains some fear of you. In all these ways and more—not to mention the contract gains you may win—a strike can be a tremendous union-building activity.

#### Every empiric flows neg.

Greenhouse 18 [Steven; Editor at NYT, author of a book about history of labor unions; "Making Teachers’ Strikes Illegal Won’t Stop Them,” The New York Times; 5/9/18; <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/opinion/teacher-strikes-illegal-arizona-carolina.html>]//SJWen

In the five states where teachers have gone on strike this year, teachers complain about many of the same things: low salaries, an education funding squeeze and teacher shortages. They have something else in common. In four of the five — Arizona, Kentucky, Oklahoma and West Virginia — these strikes are illegal under state law. (Colorado, the fifth state where teachers walked out, allows them.)

While private-sector workers generally have a right to strike under federal law, state law governs whether teachers and other state and local government workers can strike. Three dozen states have laws prohibiting teachers from striking. Clearly, making teacher strikes illegal will not necessarily prevent them.

In the states where teachers walked out, many teachers felt they had to beg their state legislatures to approve raises and the funding to pay for them. But their pleas were largely ignored. Joseph McCartin, a labor historian at Georgetown University, says that when workers feel they are at a dead end in negotiating raises, militant outbursts — such as illegal walkouts — are inevitable. “When collective bargaining isn’t allowed or doesn’t work, that doesn’t mean collective action isn’t possible,” he said.

Labor’s most potent weapon is the strike, even when it’s illegal. Workers will often risk engaging in an illegal strike, even though it could mean getting fined, fired and conceivably jailed. In a legal strike, workers typically lose just a few days’ or weeks’ pay.

Explosions of worker militancy have been a recurring pattern throughout American history. West Virginia teachers, for example, said their walkout was inspired by their state’s coal miners, who were part of a historic miners’ strike during World War II.

Ten days after Pearl Harbor was attacked in 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt summoned labor and business leaders to a conference where unions pledged not to strike during the war. The National War Labor Board, which included labor representatives, dictated a nationwide formula that capped how large a raise unions could obtain in bargaining. But the raises often failed to keep up with inflation, angering millions of workers.

As a result, there were dozens of short wildcat strikes — strikes without union authorization — in defiance of Roosevelt and union leaders. The biggest confrontation came in 1943, when the United Mine Workers’ brilliant but bullheaded president, John L. Lewis, gave 500,000 coal miners a wink and a nod, tacit approval for a walkout.

Roosevelt implored the miners to return to work. “Every idle miner directly and individually is obstructing the war effort,” he said in a fireside chat. He had the federal government seize the mines and ordered miners back to work, but eager to restore labor peace, he figured out a way to meet most of their pay demands.

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued an executive order giving most federal employees the right to bargain collectively over some working conditions, but not wages, and he barred them from striking. For years, postal workers seethed about low pay, and their frustration boiled over after members of Congress received a 41 percent raise in 1969.

On March 18, 1970, letter carriers walked out in New York City, and within days, more than 150,000 of the nation’s 600,000 postal workers had joined the illegal strike. One letter carrier boasted that the strikers were “standing 10 feet tall, instead of groveling in the dust.”

During the 1970 postal workers’ strike, military personnel sorted mail at New York City’s main post office.

President Richard M. Nixon denounced the strike, but he didn’t seek to fire or jail the strikers. He mobilized 24,000 military personnel to deliver the mail — not very successfully — and reached a deal that ended the strike after eight days. The postal workers won an initial 6 percent raise, and when Nixon signed the Postal Reorganization Act that summer, they received an additional 8 percent.

H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff, acknowledged a big obstacle to punishing these unlawful strikers. “The mailman is a family friend, so you can’t hurt him,” Haldeman said.

State officials unhappy about the recent strikes have realized the same thing: They can’t really punish or replace the teachers. They’re too popular, there are too many to replace, and if state officials try to jail a few ringleaders, that might spur new strikes.

Not every illegal walkout ends well for workers. When air traffic controllers went on strike in 1981, President Ronald Reagan fired 11,345 controllers and rallied the public against their union, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, emphasizing that every controller had taken a no-strike pledge upon being hired. Reagan also lambasted the union for rejecting the 11 percent raise his administration was offering, about twice what other federal employees had received at the time.

With the end of the Arizona teachers’ walkout last Thursday, there are rumblings about which state might be next. In North Carolina, educators are angry that teacher salaries and per-pupil spending have not kept up with inflation. Even though teacher strikes are illegal in North Carolina, teachers there say they will walk out next Wednesday, the day that the state legislature opens. Lawmakers should take them seriously. Teachers have so far managed to win gains and skirt the law without any penalty because public opinion — and a lot of history — seems to be on their side.