# 1AC – China

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### 1AC – Footnote

Counter Solvency Advocates –

XI Lashout DA –

[Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Space Commercialization DA –

Klein 19, John J. Understanding space strategy: the art of war in space. Routledge, 2019. (a Senior Fellow and Strategist at Falcon Research, Inc. and Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute) *Elmer*

Innovation DA –

Joshua Hampson 1-25-2017 "The Future of Space Commercialization" <https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf> (Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center) *Elmer*

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan: The Peoples Republic of China ought to prohibit appropriation of space by private entities.

### 1AC – Adv

#### The Advantage is Primacy.

#### The US is in the lead now but China’s set to surpass – space becomes a new frontier for war, influence, and property.

**Kharpal 21** [Arjun Kharpal, 5-29-2021, “China once said it couldn’t put a potato in space. Now it’s eyeing Mars,” CNBC, [https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/30/china-space-goals-ccp-100th-anniversary.html //](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/30/china-space-goals-ccp-100th-anniversary.html%20//) JB]

GUANGZHOU, China — In 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite, which sparked a space race with the U.S. China, however, was nowhere to be seen. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union were battling for superiority in this new domain, Mao Zedong, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party (**CCP**), reportedly **said**: “**China cannot even put a potato in space**.” Fast forward more than six decades and President [**Xi** Jinping](https://www.cnbc.com/xi-jinping/), China’s current leader, **is seen congratulating** [three **astronauts** who were sent](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/17/china-launches-first-astronauts-to-its-self-developed-space-station.html) to the country’s own **space station** earlier this month. Since Mao’s comments, [**China** has **launched satellites**](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/23/beidou-china-completes-rival-to-the-us-owned-gps-system.html), sent humans to space and is **now**[**planning to build a base on Mars**](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/china-plans-to-send-its-first-crewed-mission-to-mars-in-2033.html)**, achievements** and ambitions Beijing has highlighted as the **centennial of the CCP’s founding approaches**. Space is now another **battleground between the U.S. and China** amid a **broader technological rivalry for supremacy**, one that could have **scientific and military implications on Earth**. “President **Xi** Jinping has **declared that China’s ‘Space Dream’ is to overtake all nations and become the leading space power by 2045**,” said Christopher Newman, professor of space law and policy at the U.K.’s Northumbria University. “This all feeds into **China’s ambition to be the world’s single science and technology superpower**.” In March, [China highlighted space as a “frontier technology”](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/05/china-to-focus-on-frontier-tech-from-chips-to-quantum-computing.html) it would focus on and research into the “origin and evolution of the universe.” But there are other implications too. “It is important for China and the US because it can advance **technological development**” in areas such as “**national security** and some **socioeconomic development**,” according to Sa’id Mosteshar, director of the London Institute of Space Policy and Law, and research fellow Christoph Beischl. While experts doubt it could spiral into war in space, **extra-terrestrial activities** can support **military operations on Earth**. Space achievements are also about the optics. Through **space exploration** to the Moon or to Mars, “China and the U.S. display their technological sophistication to the domestic audience and the world, increasing their domestic and **international prestige, domestic legitimacy** and **international influence**,” Mosteshar and Beischl said. China’s space program kicked off in the late 1950s but it was only recently that the world’s second-largest economy was able to tout major successes. In June last year, **China** [completed its own global **satellite** navigation system called **Beidou**](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/23/beidou-china-completes-rival-to-the-us-owned-gps-system.html), a rival to the U.S. government-owned Global Positioning System (GPS). [Experts said](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/22/beidou-china-aims-to-complete-gps-system-that-rivals-us.html) it will **help China’s military systems** stay **online in the event of a conflict**. In December, a Chinese spacecraft returned to Earth [carrying rock samples from the moon](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/17/china-brings-moon-rocks-back-to-earth-in-a-first-for-the-country.html), a first for the country. Last month, [China sent a crewed mission](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/17/china-launches-first-astronauts-to-its-self-developed-space-station.html) to its self-developed space station which is [still being built](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/29/china-launches-key-module-of-space-station-planned-for-2022-.html). It was China’s first time sending humans to space since 2016. Beijing has now turned its sight on Mars. [China hopes to send its first crewed mission to the Red Planet in 2033](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/china-plans-to-send-its-first-crewed-mission-to-mars-in-2033.html) after landing a [spacecraft there in May](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/15/china-completes-historic-mars-spacecraft-landing.html). China has been a lot more aggressive in recent years in **filing for patents** related to space technologies as it **sets up for** some of these **future missions**. Between January 2000 and June 2021, **Chinese entities filed 6,634 patents related to space travel**, including vehicles and equipment, according to data compiled for CNBC by GreyB, a patent research firm. But nearly 90% of those patent requests were submitted in the last five-and-a-half years. Between January 2016 and June 2021, the top three patent requests came from Chinese entities, followed by U.S. planemaker [Boeing](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/BA). It highlights how rapidly **China** is hoping to **develop the technologies** required for more advanced space flights. **Patents are seen as one way to help define** and control standards for next-generation technologies — [a goal for China in many different sectors](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/27/china-standards-2035-explained.html), including telecommunications to **artificial intelligence**. “These patents do not just signify the level of innovation in China related to space, but also a well thought of strategy to protect these innovations to gain economic advantage for its space related tech,” said Vikas Jha, assistant vice president for intellectual property solutions at GreyB. “In the near future, **most** of the **patents** in cosmonautics will be **owned by China** (unless others follow suit), meaning **China** can become a **gatekeeper for the use of space tech for both private players and governments**. This is in line with the **Chinese strategy** of become a superpower not just on Earth, but also in space.” The **U.S. and China are already** battling for **dominance** in areas **from semiconductor development to artificial intelligence**. Space will be another frontier, even as the U.S. is dominating in that area for now. “**The United States** remains **ahead** overall in all areas of space capability, **but China is rapidly closing that lead**,” Scott Pace, director of the Space Policy Institute at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, told CNBC. “The United States has a strong policy for space exploration, a clear direction, and capable allies and partners,” he said. “The challenge for the United States is not so much what China does, but how well and **how quickly the United States implements its own plans**.” But widening **political differences between China and the U.S. can** also **spill** into the space arena. One example is a disagreement last year between the **two nations over** the so-called **Artemis Accords**, an agreement led by NASA that looks to create rules around responsible and fair space exploration. Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, and the U.K all signed up. China didn’t. “The **polarisation of space activity** along geopolitical lines pause **is a key and possibly existential threat to human space activity**,” Northumbria University’s Newman said. “To China and its allies, the Accords represent an attempt to bypass traditional forum for international decision making,” he added. “It is therefore becoming increasingly **difficult to achieve** the kind of unified **agreements** that are necessary in order **to deal with** problems such as **space debris**, space traffic management and the **exploitation of extra-terrestrial resources**.”

#### Appropriation is key to meet China’s goals through space resources and tech

Campo 21 [Jose A. Martin del Campo, J.D. Candidate at Texas A&M University School of Law, 3-23-2021, “Finders K Finders Keepers: Who Has Say Over Private Property in Space,” Texas A&M Journal of Property Law, https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1155&context=journal-of-property-law]/Kankee

I. INTRODUCTION On October 4, 1957, the Space Age officially began when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik into orbit, the first successful, human-made satellite.1 A little more than a decade later, on July 20, 1969, American astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin became the first humans to land and step foot on the moon.2 Neil Armstrong marked the completion of John F. Kenney’s national goal of landing an astronaut on the moon when he radioed back to Earth “[t]hat’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.”3 The launch of Sputnik, the moon landing, and other endeavors achieved by the scientific community, kick-started a chain of events leading to the current ambition of exploring outer space and mining resources throughout the solar system. The push for unlocking low-cost space travel and space industrialization by entrepreneurs, like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos, propels the search for extraterrestrial materials such as water and minerals.4 According to NASA, minerals found in the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter contain an estimated value of approximately $100 billion for every person on Earth.5 However, uncertainty lingers because private entities are unsure that they will possess property rights to their payload or the mined celestial body.6 Celestial bodies refer to naturally occurring objects in space. The United States Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (“COMSTAC”), an advisory body to the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) Office of Commercial Space Transportation (“FAA-AST”), has undertaken review regarding the granting of private property licenses.7 COMSTAC expressed a desire to confirm that private entity resource extractions may be owned and utilized as it deems appropriate.8 The current framework of space law is a combination of agreements with the foundation of space law consisting of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”).9 At the time of signing, the Outer Space Treaty hoped to foster cooperative and peaceful exploration of outer space without discrimination of any kind.10 However, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty contains the bane of private property rights in outer space, which forbids the national appropriation of the moon and other celestial bodies.11 While the Outer Space Treaty explicitly mentions the prohibition of public entities claiming celestial bodies, private enterprises risk failing to have their interest in property rights recognized by the global community. Private entities and investors grapple with the issues pertaining to their rights to mine and extract resources from outer space legally. Without further international recognition of their property rights, private entities may shy away from exploring the concept of celestial mining. The issue of not knowing what laws are applicable, or to whom private companies are accountable, impedes the progress private entities make in achieving their goal of harvesting extraterrestrial resources. Private entities fear that the non-appropriation clause of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, the epicenter of the issue, will strip them of the right to transport their mined resources back to Earth. A new legal regime will likely need to be formed that facilitates the continuation of innovation and promotes the exploration of outer space. Whether or not past private and public international doctrines, i.e., the law of the sea, may provide guidance in creating a new doctrine of space law is yet to be determined. The advancement in modern technology, along with the depletion of natural resources, creates a unique opportunity for private entities to resolve this issue through the exploitation of outer space. Space law is once again relevant due to its inadequacies in protecting the property rights of said entities in space. Part II will explore the different treaties and principles that gave rise to space law, and Part III will analyze whether the application of such principles should continue, or if the establishment of a new regime offers a more beneficial long-term solution. Part IV will then explore the structure of a new outer space regime and the enforcement of property rights. II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE LAW

#### It’s exponential – more and more companies will follow

**Jiang Zhao 18** [Shengli Jiang & Yun Zhao (2018) “The Aftermath of the US Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: What’s Left for China?” [https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c3a4/fb6e0f91f4d8a13ddac4b0f949f6c3afa5c0.pdf //](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c3a4/fb6e0f91f4d8a13ddac4b0f949f6c3afa5c0.pdf%20//) JB]

Olinga argued that the legal regime prohibiting the **appropriation** of space resources deprives **private entities** of the guarantee for payback of costs invested in the exploration and utilization of space resources, and **makes them lose** the driving force of further conducting the **exploration** and utilization.81 As a consequence, whole activities of **exploring** and utilizing space resources could **get into** the trouble of **slow development** or even **stagnation**. Therefore, it is strongly argued that **private entities should be granted** the right of **appropriation over space resources**, so that **they may engage in** the **exploration** and utilization of **space resources more positively**, under the attraction of expected profits to be derived from the exploration and utilization.82 It is necessary **to attract private entities** to engage in the exploration and utilization of space resources, so as **to conform** **to** the current trend of the **booming** development of the commercial **space industry**; maximize the **economic value** of space resources; and stimulate the development of space science and technology in return.83 The negative results from the appropriation of space resources will be far beyond the benefits to be brought thereby. That is, the international rule of law, the peace, and security of outer space should take the priority to the interests from the exploration and utilization of space resources.

#### Space becomes a new domain where China establishes primacy and appropriation is their golden ticket

**Jiang Zhao 18** [Shengli Jiang & Yun Zhao (2018) “The Aftermath of the US Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: What’s Left for China?” [https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c3a4/fb6e0f91f4d8a13ddac4b0f949f6c3afa5c0.pdf //](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c3a4/fb6e0f91f4d8a13ddac4b0f949f6c3afa5c0.pdf%20//) JB]

China is a “responsible major country” of **space activities**.96 It should thus take corresponding positions in response to the adoption of the Act. With rapid development of space science and technology, **China** will be ready to **engage** in the exploration and **utilization of space resources** in the near future.97 Space resources have high value but limited quantity. As **space science** and technology **for** exploring and **utilizing** those space **resources** may be used for both **civilian** and **military purposes**, it is necessary for China to firmly **refute** the **legality of granting private entities** the right of **appropriation over space resources** for global common interest. In addition, China should **not** follow the **unilateral approach** of appropriating space resources. Instead, it should actively promote the improvement of the existing space legal regime, taking the leading role in establishing an **international mechanism** governing the exploration and **utilization of space resources**. In this process, China should take full account of due interests of the whole international community in the exploration and utilization of space resources, as well as maintain the international rule of law for the peace and security of outer space.98 On the domestic level, meanwhile, China is in the process of drafting its national space law which will provide legal basis for the space industry.99 This law is expected to clarify the legal status of space resources, the attribution of the right of appropriation, the right to use and profits over space resources, and the rules for the exploration and utilization of space resources by both governmental and private entities. On the international law level, China should play a more active role in the international space law-making process regarding space commercialization and privatization.100 In this course, China is willing to **establish** a **global governance** mechanism for space exploration and utilization. This part will focus on an international mechanism for the space mining activities.

#### Scenario 1 is Primacy –

#### Primacy solves arms races, land grabs, rogue states, and great power war.

Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment. Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group, and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades. Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch. Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more permissive conditions have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist organizations, and great-power competition; there are severe challenges in all three Eurasian theaters. “I don’t recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by Russia and China and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “litany of doom.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its military dominance than it has for at least a quarter century.

#### Chinese leadership in technology causes extinction.

Kroenig 18 [Matthew, Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, and Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council, holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin, Nov 2018, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, [https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war](https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/)]

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

#### Reject heg bad arguments – their evidence is epistemologically suspect

Gilsinan 20 [(Kathy, a St. Louis-based contributing writer at The Atlantic. Her book, The Helpers: Profiles From the Front Lines of the Pandemic, comes out in March 2022. She was previously an editor at World Politics Review.) “How China Is Planning to Win Back the World” The Atlantic, 5/28/2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation-propaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/] BC

This was a bizarre salvo in China’s propaganda war with the United States over the coronavirus, and it showcased Beijing’s latest information weaponry. Misleading spin, obfuscation, concealment, and hyperbole have been hallmarks of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda campaign, before and during the coronavirus era. But the pandemic appears to have given rise to more forceful attacks on foreign governments, as well as a new level of flirtation with outright disinformation.

The party has never waged a global struggle quite like this one—and its battle with the U.S. over where the virus came from and whose failures made the pandemic worse have marked a serious deterioration in the two countries’ ties. Just months ago, Trump was praising Xi Jinping for how he handled the outbreak; now Trump is toying with cutting off relations with the Chinese government altogether.

Seven decades ago, Mao Zedong publicly embraced a benevolent view of propaganda, as if he were a latter-day prophet spreading the communist gospel: “We should carry on constant propaganda among the people on the facts of world progress and the bright future ahead so that they will build their confidence in victory,” he mused in 1945. Just a few months ago, Xi Jinping urged state journalists to spread “positive propaganda” for the “correct guidance of public opinion.” Indeed, Beijing’s global propaganda efforts in recent years have been more about promoting China’s virtues than about spreading acrimony and confusion, à la Russian information ops and election meddling. Moscow wants a weakened and divided West, one that leaves Russia free to dominate its self-appointed sphere of influence—but Russia in 2016 was also an economically sluggish, oil-dependent nation with an economy a tenth the size of America’s, and lacked the resources to remake the world in its image.

Beijing has a much bigger prize in mind and a much longer-term plan to get it: The contest isn’t about who gets to run the U.S. It’s about who deserves to run the world. And China, with its economy poised to overtake that of the United States, has already plowed billions into crafting an image as a responsible global leader, and billions more into cultivating global dependence on Chinese investments and Chinese markets.

“While the [Chinese Communist Party] has long sought to be a global influencer, their efforts today are aggressive and sophisticated,” Bill Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, wrote in an email. “In short, they’re looking to reshape the history of coronavirus and protect their reputation at home and around the world.”

Before the coronavirus hit, the party was becoming bolder in its propaganda efforts overseas as China grew richer and more powerful, trying to promote around the world the orthodoxy it enforced at home, about the beneficence and goodness of the CCP. This involved publicizing Chinese investments in the developing world, arm-twisting diplomats to toe a pro-China line, ruthlessly trying to stifle even other countries’ freedom to dissent—to the point of sanctioning Norway in 2010 when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded its peace prize to the imprisoned democracy activist Liu Xiaobo, who died in 2017. Xi has elevated the role of propaganda even further as he has vowed to build China’s power and prosperity, declaring, “The superiority of our system will be fully demonstrated through a brighter future.”

The coronavirus outbreak and the global outcry against China’s failures of transparency and containment were not part of the plan. They sparked an international backlash that, by Beijing’s reported reckoning, was worse than anything it had faced since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. So Beijing leaped to seize, or at least confuse, the global story of the virus and its cast of heroes and villains.

This has involved unleashing techniques Russia perfected during the U.S. presidential election in 2016. “We’ve seen China adopt Russian-style social media manipulation tactics like using bots and trolls to amplify disinformation on COVID-19,” Lea Gabrielle, the special envoy and coordinator for the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, wrote to me in an email. “Both countries repress information within their countries while taking advantage of the open and free information environments in democracies to push conspiracy theories that seek to undermine those environments.”

As the world realized the virus was spreading out of control, Chinese diplomats, official media, and Twitter influencers launched an aggressive frenzy of defense, scrambling to preserve the Chinese Communist Party’s cratering reputation at home and overseas. And then they went on offense, with an assist from perhaps thousands of fake or hacked Twitter accounts, according to the investigative site ProPublica. The result was a coordinated campaign of attacks on the United States, and the spread of disinformation and confusion about where the virus really came from and whose screwup it was, really, that led to so much death.

Other countries’ faltering responses to the virus have only bolstered this narrative, and the CCP has gleefully trumpeted America’s failures in particular. “Loose political system in the US allows more than 4000 people to die of pandemic every day,” Hu Xijin, the editor in chief of the Global Times newspaper, tweeted in April. “Americans are so good tempered.” Beyond the immediate crisis, this kind of narrative also serves the longer-term goal. In the words of Matt Schrader, a former China analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund: “Ultimately it’s about the [Chinese Communist Party] being the most powerful political entity on the planet.”

The CCP has evolved in its themes and tactics over the course of the coronavirus information war so far, as it battles to bolster its own reputation and degrade that of the United States. The campaign has been widespread and highly focused at the same time. And the party has grown even more emboldened in the belief that it’s too big to fail, and that the reeling world may condemn it but still depends on it.

#### Scenario 2 is Space War –

#### Sino-Russian space alliance undermines existing treaties and greenlights space militarization

Bowman and Thompson 3/31 [(Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) (Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.) “Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space” Foreign Policy 3/31/2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/] BC

Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have sprinted to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons.

To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring.

The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and Moscow have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty.

On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space?

The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, said in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.”

Beijing already has an operational ground-based anti-satellite missile capability. People’s Liberation Army units are training with the missiles, and the U.S. Defense Department believes Beijing “probably intends to pursue additional [anti-satellite] weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.” That is where America’s most sensitive nuclear communication and missile defense satellites orbit and keep watch.

Similarly, Moscow tested a ground-based anti-satellite weapon in December that could destroy U.S. or allied satellites in orbit. That attack capability augments a ground-based laser weapon that Russian President Vladimir Putin heralded in 2018. In a moment of candor, Russia’s defense ministry admitted the system was designed to “fight satellites.”

To make matters worse, both countries are also working to deploy space-based—or so-called “on-orbit”—capabilities to attack satellites.

Meanwhile, at the United Nations and other international forums, China and Russia are pushing the PPWT and advocating for a “no first placement” resolution—saying all governments should commit not to be the first to put weapons in space.

Yet more than two years ago, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency noted that both China and Russia were already putting in space capabilities that could be used as weapons. The PPWT would thus protect their weapons while tying Washington’s hands.

In a thinly veiled attempt to mask their intentions, the two countries claim that their on-orbit capabilities are simply for peaceful purposes—for assessing the condition of broken satellites and conducting repairs as needed. This “dual-use” disguise permits Beijing and Moscow to put into orbit ostensibly peaceful or commercial capabilities that those countries can actually use to disable or destroy U.S. military and intelligence satellites.

China, for example, has tested several so-called scavenger satellites, which use grappling arms to capture other satellites. China has also demonstrated the capability to maneuver a satellite around the geosynchronous belt, allowing its satellites to sidle up to other satellites in space.

Not to be outdone, Russia deployed a pair of “nesting doll” satellites that shadowed a U.S. satellite in space. One Russian satellite birthed another, with Russia’s defense ministry claiming its purpose was to assess the “technical condition of domestic satellites.”

But later, the second satellite conducted a weapons test, firing what appeared to be a space torpedo. The Kremlin never explained how a fast-moving one-time projectile provided superior inspection benefits compared with the other Russian satellite flying persistently nearby.

Instead of falling prey to China and Russia’s treaty trap, Washington must urgently work with allies to improve spaced-based military and intelligence capabilities.

A well-crafted treaty that clearly defines acceptable and unacceptable actions in space and includes tough and realistic inspection and verification mechanisms could promote security and stability. But the PPWT is decidedly not that kind of treaty.

For starters, the proposed treaty does not explicitly prohibit the ground-based anti-satellite weapons that China and Russia have already fielded. Nor does the proposed treaty prevent the deployment of space-based weapons under the cloak of civilian or commercial capabilities. The PPWT also does not prohibit the development, testing, or stockpiling of weapons on Earth that could be quickly put into orbit.

Even if these deficiencies were addressed, the PPWT lacks any verification plan to ensure compliance. Instead, the treaty calls for “transparency and confidence-building measures” implemented on a “voluntary basis.” In other words, Beijing and Moscow want the United States to trust but never verify.

But then again, Americans should not be surprised by the PPWT. Moscow habitually seeks to use international arms control treaties to constrain the United States while viewing treaty strictures as optional when they become inconvenient or when the Kremlin sees an opportunity to seize a military advantage.

For more than a decade before its demise in 2019, Moscow used the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to constrain the United States while the Kremlin produced, flight-tested, and fielded a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile in direct contravention of the treaty. Beijing, for its part, often exhibits an allergy to serious international arms control treaties. The willingness of the Chinese Communist Party to support the PPWT is, therefore, cause for some additional reflection in Washington.

So instead of falling prey to China and Russia’s PPWT trap, the United States must urgently work with allies to improve the resilience and redundancy of spaced-based military and intelligence capabilities.

Washington should also advance nascent efforts to establish rules of the road in space. “There are really no norms of behavior in space,” Gen. John Raymond, the chief of space operations at U.S. Space Force, said this month. “It’s the wild, wild West.”

In a notable and positive step, the U.N. General Assembly passed a British-introduced resolution in December that seeks to establish “norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” in space, which could reduce the chances for dangerous miscalculation.

The vote was 164 in favor, including the United States—and a mere 12 opposed.

Any guesses regarding who voted no? You guessed it: China and Russia. They were joined by their friends Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba.

So much for a Chinese and Russian desire to pursue constructive and peaceful policies in space. Their duplicity continues.

#### Extinction – destruction of satellites, diminished future use of near space, and terrestrial war

Gilliard 19 [(Alexandra, a Senior Editor and interviewer of international relations experts for the International Affairs Forum. She holds an M.S. in Global Studies and International Relations from Northeastern University, and a B.A. in International Relations from Boston University, with expertise in conflict resolution, arms control, human rights issues, and the MENA region.) “What Are The Consequences Of Militarizing Outer Space?” Global Security Review, 6/10/2019. https://globalsecurityreview.com/consequences-militarization-space/] BC

Consequences of Armament and Aggression in Space

The consequences of weapons testing and aggression in space could span generations, and current technological advances only increase the urgency for policymakers to pursue a limitations treaty. As it stands, there are three major ramifications of a potential arms race in space:

The destruction of satellites

As both financial and technological barriers to the space services industry have decreased, the number of governmental and private investors with assets in space has inevitably increased. There is now an abundance of satellites in space owned by multiple states and corporations. These satellites are used to not only coordinate military actions, but to perform more mundane tasks, like obtaining weather reports, or managing on-ground communications, and navigation.

Should states begin weapons testing in space, debris could cloud the orbit and make positioning new satellites impossible, disrupting our current way of life. More pressing, however, is that if a country’s satellites are successfully destroyed by an enemy state, military capabilities can be severely hindered or destroyed, leaving the country vulnerable to attack and unable to coordinate its military forces on the ground.

Diminished future use of near space

Whether caused by weapons testing or actual aggression, the subsequent proliferation of debris around the planet would damage our future ability to access space. Not only would debris act as shrapnel to preexisting assets in space, but it would also become much more difficult to launch satellites or rockets, hindering scientific research, space exploration, and commercial operations.

From the past fifty-odd years of activity in space alone, the debris left behind in Earth’s orbital field has already become hazardous to spacecraft — a main reason why the U.S. and the Soviet Union did not continue with ASAT testing during the Cold War. If greater pollution were to occur, space itself could be become unusable, resulting in the collapse of the global economic system, air travel, and various communications.

Power imbalances and proliferation on the ground

Only so many states currently have access to space—which means any militarization be by the few, while other states would be left to fend for themselves. This would establish a clear power imbalance that could breed distrust among nations, resulting in a more insecure world and a veritable power keg primed for war. Additionally, deterrence measures taken by states with access to space would escalate, attempting to build up weapons caches not dissimilar to the nuclear weapons stockpiling activities of the Cold War.

In any arms race, it is inevitable that more advanced weaponry is created. Yet, this does not only pose a risk to assets in space. Should a terrestrial war break out, this weaponry may eventually be deployed on the ground, and space-faring states would be able to capitalize on the power imbalance by using these new developments against states that have not yet broken into the space industry or developed equally-advanced weaponry.

### **1AC – Framing [Policy]**

#### I value morality.

#### The metaethic is naturalism.

#### The standard is act hedonistic util.

#### [1] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**, I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value**. Although **pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### [2] Extinction is bad and outweighs

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### Prefer –

#### [1] Actor Specificity – Util is the best in the context of governments which is the actor in the resolution

#### A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] No intent-foresight distinction – the actions we take are inevitably informed by predictions from certain mental states, meaning consequences are a collective part of the will.

#### C] No act-omission distinction governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is an implicit authorization of action

#### D] Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action

### 1AC – UV

#### [1] 1ar theory since the neg can do infinite bad things and I can’t check. It’s drop the debater since the 1ar is too short to win both layers. No RVI since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes. CI since reasonability is arbitrary and bites intervention.

#### [2] Biological death is the worst evil

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### [3] Reject monocausal analyses.

David Martin Jones 15, Visiting Professor in the Department of War Studies, King's College London and Associate Professor, School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Queensland; and M.L.R. Smith, Professor of Strategic Theory in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, September 2015, “Return to reason: reviving political realism in western foreign policy,” International Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 933-952

The dissolution of any prospect for enduring stability, whether in the Middle East, Africa or central and east Asia, exhibits a condition of great complexity. What does this complexity disclose about how European states and the United States might respond? First, it should be recognized that the search for a single root-cause that identifies a singular answer is futile and counter-productive. Monolithic solutions present themselves in a variety of forms, ranging from pacifist utopianism through cosmopolitan transformational idealism to cynical conservative pessimism. Yet even a superficial examination of international problems negates such one-dimensional explanations. For example, the intense sectarian and tribal divisions and rivalries affecting very different societies in the Middle East or across the wider and more diffuse ‘Muslim world’ exposes the practical limitations of any all-encompassing rationalist or normative solution.28 Indeed, the diversity of Islam both in its heartlands and across its diaspora illustrates the difficulty of trying to establish an abstract monocausal explanation that magically reveals a hidden interconnection between very different issues and conflicts.

#### 