# 1AR

## 1

#### Baudrillard is a sexist who advocates for SACRIFICING WOMEN – don’t let them get away with reading repugnant scholarship

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Jean Baudrillard blames the failure of the “revolution” on women and change, women’s change. He sees puritanical “hysterics” everywhere whom he accuses of exaggeration about sexual abuse (1986, p. 42). The radical nostalgia which pervades his postmodern scribbling is for Rousseau’s (1979) Sophie and Lasch’s haven in a heartless world. For Baudrillard, a rapist is a violent fetus who longs for ancient prohibitions not sexual liberation (1986, p. 47). Baudrillard’s pessimism is actually his hope for a defeat of feminist initiated change and a return to man and god in contract, the eternal sacrifice of woman. His ramblings in his cups of cool whisky (1986, p. 7) are given the status of thought. He considers himself outré and daring to criticize feminists but, as anyone who has taken a feminist position knows, misogynous attack is banal and regular. Sorry, Baudrillard: it is outré to support and to be a feminist. But is this in vino veritas, when Baudrillard proposes a Dionysian sacrifice of woman to the image of beauty, purity, eternity? In Amérique, he writes: “One should always bring something to sacrifice in the desert and offer it as a victim. A woman. If something has to disappear there, something equal in beauty to the desert, why not a woman? (1986, p. 66). When queried about this “gratuitously provocative statement” Baudrillard replied, “Sacrificing a woman in the desert is a logical operation because in the desert one loses one’s identity. It’s a sublime act and part of the drama of the desert. Making a woman the object of the sacrifice is perhaps the greatest compliment I could give her” (Moore: 1989, p. 54). A compliment postmodernism will make over and over, like opera.18 Commenting on a sacrificial scene in D.H.Lawrence’s The Woman Who Rode Away, Millett writes: This is a formula for sexual cannibalism: substitute the knife for the penis and penetration, the cave for a womb, and for a bed, a place of execution—and you provide a murder whereby one acquires one’s victim’s power. Lawrence’s demented fantasy has arranged for the male to penetrate the female with the instrument of death so as to steal her mana... The act here at the centre of the Lawrentian sexual religion is coitus as killing, its central vignette a picture of human sacrifice performed upon the woman to the greater glory and potency of the male (1971, p. 292).

#### Reps are a voter – A. inclusivity -Inclusivity is a prereq to engaging in debate because if there is noone to debate we cant debate. B. they make the debate space unsafe and your role as an educator and adjudicator is to make the space safer C. Reject them for normalizing a sexist author.

## 2

#### Non indigenous setcol is violent – this should function as an independent reps K

Brough ’17 Taylor Brough <https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/2017/03/23/open-letter-to-non-black-native-people-in-debate/> (won CEDA in 2016, debated for Vermont)//Elmer

I am here preoccupied with our enunciative capacities in debate—with what I perceive “Native debate,” and specifically non-Black Native debaters, to be doing in service of Settler/Master (mis)recognition, what the consequences of such doing might be, and what it might mean to push against the disciplining force of recognition in debate. The ontological fact of genocide/sovereignty as a dual positioning for Native people, coupled with academia’s push to identify ourselves at the site of (coherent and recognizable) trauma (what Wilderson terms “intra-human conflicts”), has led Native thought in debate, broadly, to do three related things: 1) prioritize the coherent discussion of sovereign loss over one of genocide and its incoherence, 2) articulate ourselves as always in conversation with (read: traumatized by) the Settler, 3) distance ourselves from a Black/Red conversation or from Black/Red theorizing. These three moves are all antiblack in addition to being an insidious manifestation of the genocide that structures half of our (non?)being. Depressingly, if we were to historicize “Native debate,” we would have to begin with a litany of non-Native debaters reading “Give Back the Land,” offering sovereignty as a solution to a tragic history of genocide that relegates Native people to phobic/phillic objects of the past whose futures are in the hands of those Settlers who bravely dare to talk about them. The terrain in which everyone can become Native—or at least become an advocate for Natives—is a cleared landscape produced by genocide but also, significantly, produced by antiblack slavery. This history of non-Native debaters’ representations of sovereignty, land repatriation, and treaty rights as the only solution to genocide also reaches into the present. What is most disturbing to me about this ongoing history is that we have yet to tie virtually any debate round to actual, material land repatriation, sovereign gains, or the upholding of treaty rights. These material gains involve labor from Native people organizing at the grassroots level, not an academic labor from Settlers. Debate arguments do not facilitate sovereign benefits for Native peoples. Further, the struggle for sovereignty itself does not overcome or solve genocide. The removal of the Hunkpapa Lakota Oyate and their relatives at the Oceti Sakowin camp at Standing Rock should be proof enough of this—sovereignty as a politic is often met with, rather than resolving, genocidal violence. Non-Black Native people in debate have performed a similar land-based politic. Native debate has become so associated with words like “land,” “sovereignty,” “space,” “place,” “treaty rights,” and others, that it is almost impossible to theorize Native debate absent sovereignty as a grammar that marks our existence. So both non-Native debaters (who claim to advocate for Native peoples’ sovereignty) and Native debaters (who claim to advocate for something that usually falls into the grammar of sovereignty) are talking in essentially the same register, with incredibly limited slippage towards genocide as a vector of violence. And, for Native people, like non-Natives, debate arguments do not and cannot facilitate the material elements of decolonization that these land-based arguments frequently rely upon. Sovereign gains don’t happen in debate rounds, but for some reason the (mis)recognition of Native enunciation as sovereignty persists, in that the word “land” harkens to Native debate in almost every instance, that almost every debate involving Native people reading perceptibly “Native” arguments includes a discussion of “treaties” or “sovereignty” or “land-based pedagogy” or “spatiality.” What other reason could this be than a structure of desire around recognition from the Settler/Master? If we really follow the history of how “Nativeness” has been misrepresented in debate by Settlers, it becomes clear that much of contemporary Native debate, strangely (or as I argue, not so strangely), mimics these misrepresentations. Of course, debate is an economy of (mis)recognition. That “Native” becomes coextensive with “land” in debate is no accident. It is an enunciation that has been evoked prior to the involvement of any Native debaters or coaches. And it is reiterated by non-Black Native debaters with increasing certainty about the truthiness of Native relationships to the land. Systematically absent from this conversation, of course, is a discussion of genocide. I have gestured above towards the ways that the desire for recognition from the Settler/Master motivates this conceptual move towards the register of sovereignty. As Wilderson writes, “The crowding out, or disavowal, of the genocide modality [by the sovereign modality] allows the Settler/’Savage’ struggle to appear as a conflict rather than as an antagonism. This has therapeutic value for both the ‘Savage’ and the Settler: the mind can grasp the fight, conceptually put it into words. To say, ‘You stole my land and pilfered and appropriated my culture’ and then produce books, articles, and films that travel back and forth along the vectors of those conceptually coherent accusations is less threatening to the integrity of the ego, than to say,- ‘You culled me down from 19 million to 250,000.’”[4] This gesture towards conceptual coherence and therapeutic value is why there is a celebrated and ongoing association between “land” and “Native” in both non-Native argumentation and in arguments made by Native people. It is why we cannot theorize about Native debate absent the contingent register of sovereignty. I am hesitant to claim that sovereignty should be completely abandoned as an analytic for obvious reasons—I think Wilderson also gives credit to indigenous conceptions of sovereignty, what it unseats, and how it operates, while still articulating a critique of sovereignty unrivaled by much of Native studies. I am not interested in suggesting that all Native people ignore our peoples’ land relationships or histories of broken treaties as politic throughout the United States or the world. I agree with Qwo-Li Driskill’s suggestion, alongside similar ones from other Native theorists, that sovereignty must be re-theorized significantly rather than echoing the propertied enterprise that confers legibility to state formations. Regardless of my reluctance to disavow the potential for sovereignty as a politic outside debate rounds, I think it is obvious that sovereignty in its terms in debate—as a recognized and fundamentally “Native” utterance—is genocidal and anti-Black. Broadly, my argument is that genocide is an undertheorized arm of an antagonism that halfway positions Native people, and that the basis of such undertheorization is the desire to be (mis)recognized as nearly-Human by the Settler. This claim invites an investigation of the context of (mis)recognition in debate and what is particular about debate itself with regard to Wilderson’s theory of position.

The link – submitting an NFT is the link but that is not what the aff is – the aff is the opposite of having unintelligible positions because we fight unintelligible things like cryptocurrency which link turns

Semiotics is good – it’s the only way to understand native setterlism because they had the unproductive signifier attached

# 1AC --- Trivial Semiotic Coherence

### 1AC – Notes

### 1AC – Footnote

TW – Nongraphic mentions of suicide, depression, and drug use

CSA –

Jaeggi and Robinson – Alienation – Material Cap

Gillespie – Black hyperreality and communication

Lundberg and McGowan – Debate deployment

Moen – Utilitarian philosophy through maintaining sustainable capitalism

Kant – Free market principles

### 1AC

#### [1] Debate is structured as a marketplace for information where we fetishize notions of “pedagogy” and is an extension of semiocapitalist logic through immaterial manors. Communication within the university isn’t one that develops subjectivities and psychic identity rather a system geared towards fragmentation and futuristic productivity.

**Berardi 12** [David Hugill and Elise Thorburn, 9-26-2012, "Interview with 'Bifo': Reactivating the Social Body in Insurrectionary Times," Critical Legal Thinking, [https://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/09/26/interview-with-bifo-reactivating-the-social-body-in-insurrectionary-times //](https://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/09/26/interview-with-bifo-reactivating-the-social-body-in-insurrectionary-times%20//) JB]

* TW – mentions of suicide
* Impact turns policy advocacy skills
* Debate bad and communication bad

A: First of all because **students are increasingly learning in** small parcels, **small fragments**, small fractals **of knowledge**, and they are becoming **more** and more **accustomed to think** of their **knowledge not as knowledge but** as **intellectual availability to exploitation**.  In North American forms of education this is already well established, it is nothing new. It is new in much of Europe and it has begun to provoke some reactions. But it is also a **fact of a networked and globalized world**.  What does precariousness mean today? What is the relationship between precariousness and globalization? It means that you can **buy a fragment of labor** in Bangkok, a fragment in Buenos Aires, and **a fragment in Milan** and that these three **fragments become** the **same product from** the point of view of **capital**.  **Knowledge is** headed the **same** way. You no longer need – from the point of view of capital – to know in the **humanistic sense**, the meaning, the finality, the **intimate contradictions of knowledge**, you just need to know how **particular parcels of knowledge** can be made **functional**. There is something new and something old in this. Herbert Marcuse’s (1964) One Dimensional Man already identified this problem of the functionalization of knowledge but in his time it was only a kind of prediction about how capitalism would be transformed. Today, this functional consideration is the dominant form of our **relationship to knowledge**. So, we should question people about **what is happening to our knowledge**. Are we really learning things, knowing things? Or are we simply learning how to **become part of** the **productive machine**? Additionally, I think we need to ask people, especially young people, **about** their **suffering in the relationship with knowledge**, with communication and so on. I think that the problem of psychic suffering is of central importance our time. Problems of depression, panic, massive suicide, are **very real**.  Do you know that suicide has become the main cause of death among people between 18-25 years old? **Suicide is** becoming a **political weapon**. I’m not only thinking of Columbine or of Mohamed Bouazizi, the man who killed himself and started the Tunisian revolution.  Suicide has something to do with knowledge.  When your **knowledge** is becoming **more and more something** that does **not belong to you**, this is a problem of personal identity, of **psychic identity**.

#### [2] The new dawn of capitalism has created an age of constant information and signifiers floating through our phones and computers as media. This creates a dyslexia – reduced attention spans, no time for true human interaction – this leads to information overload, which is too fast for our organic minds to keep up with – that causes depression and drug use. It’s no coincidence that the rise of tech in the 80s was complimented with a drug epidemic. These signifiers come prior to action, thus debate should disrupt semiocapitalism.

**Berardi 09** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2009. P. 40-42 // JB]

* TW – mentions of suicide, not read, but it’s in the card if you chose to read it after the round

The acceleration of information exchange has produced and is producing an effect of a pathological type on the individual human mind and even more on the collective mind. Individuals are not in a position to consciously process the immense and always growing mass of information that enters their computers, their cell phones, their television screens, their electronic diaries and their heads. However, it seems indispensable to follow, recognize, evaluate, process all this information if you want to be efficient, competitive, victorious. The practice of multitasking, the opening of a window of hypertextual attention, the passage from one context to another for the complex evaluation of processes, tends to deform the sequential modality of mental processing. According to Christian Marazzi, who has concerned himself in various books with the relations between economics, language and affectivity, the latest generation of economic operators is affected by a real and proper form of dyslexia, incapable of reading a page from the beginning to the end according to sequential procedures, incapable of maintaining concentrated attention on the same object for a long time. And dyslexia spreads to cognitive and social behaviors, leading to rendering the pursuit of linear strategies nearly impossible. Some, like Davenport and Beck , speak of an attention economy. But when a cognitive faculty enters into and becomes part of economic discourse this means that it has become a scarce resource. The necessary time for paying attention to the fluxes of information to which we are exposed and which must be evaluated in order to be able to make decisions is lacking. The consequence is in front of our eyes: political and economic decisions no longer respond to a long term strategic rationality and simply follow immediate interests. On the other hand, we are always less available for giving our attention to others gratuitously. We no longer have the attention time for love, tenderness, nature, pleasure and compassion. Our attention is ever more besieged and therefore we assign it only to our careers, to competition and to economic decisions. And in any case our temporality cannot follow the insane speed of the hypercomplex digital machine. Human beings tend to become the ruthless executors of decisions taken without attention. The universe of transmitters, or cyberspace, now proceeds at a superhuman velocity and becomes untranslatable for the universe of receivers, or cybertime, that cannot go faster than what is allowed by the physical material from which our brain is made, the slowness of our body, the need for caresses and affection. Thus opens a pathological gap and mental illness spreads as testified by the statistics and above all our everyday experience. And just as pathology spreads, so too do drugs. The flourishing industry of psychopharmaceuticals beats records every year, the number of packets of Ritalin, Prozac, Zoloft and other psychotropics sold in the pharmacies continually increases, while dissociation, suffering, desperation, terror, the desire not to exist, to not have to fight continuously, to disappear grows alongside the will to kill and to kill oneself. When, towards the end of the 1970s, an acceleration of the productive and communicative rhythms in occidental metropolitan centers was imposed, a gigantic epidemic of drug addiction made its appearance. The world was leaving its human epoch to enter the era of machinic posthuman acceleration: many sensitive organisms of the human variety began to snort cocaine, a substance that permits the acceleration of the existential rhythm leading to transforming oneself into a machine. Many other sensitive organisms of the human kind injected heroin in their veins, a substance that deactivates the relation with the speed of the surrounding atmosphere. The epidemic of powders during the 1970s and the 1980s produced an existential and cultural devastation with which we still haven’t come to terms with. Then illegal drugs were replaced by those legal substances which the pharmaceutical industry in a white coat made available for its victims and this was the epoch of anti-depressants, of euphorics and of mood regulators. Today psychopathy reveals itself ever more clearly as a social epidemic and, more precisely, a socio-communicational one. If you want to survive you have to be competitive and if you want to be competitive you must be connected, receive and process continuously an immense and growing mass of data. This provokes a constant attentive stress, a reduction of the time available for affectivity. These two tendencies, inseparably linked, provoke an effect of devastation on the individual psyche: depression, panic, anxiety, the sense of solitude and existential misery. But these individual symptoms cannot be indefinitely isolated, as psychopathology has done up until now and as economic power wishes to do.

#### [3] Questions regarding ethics are irrelevant in the world of the infosphere. All information gets coopted by the inescapability of capitalism – it’s search is cruelly optimistic in the infosphere.

Berardi 11 [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism “0. Bifurications.” Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 14-15 // LEX JB]

Because of this, I believe that it is necessary to identify the new forms of social consciousness beginning from generational belonging. And for this reason I will speak of two decisive successive shifts in a mutation that has led to the draining of humanistic categories and of the perspectives on which modern politics was based. These two passages are constituted in the subsumption of the human mind in formation within two successive technological configurations of the media-sphere. The first is that which I call video-electronic, meaning the technologies of televisual communication. It is a case of the passage that Marshall McLuhan speaks of in his fundamental 1964 study, Understanding Media. McLuhan looks at the transition from the alphabetic sphere to the video-electronic one and concludes that when the simultaneous succeeds the sequential, the capacity of mythological elaboration succeeds that of critical elaboration. The critical faculty presupposes a particular structuring of the message: the sequentiality of writing, the slowness of reading, and the possibility of judging in sequence the truth or falsity of statements. It is in these conditions that the critical discrimination that has characterized the cultural forms of modernity becomes possible. But in the sphere of video-electronic communication, critique becomes progressively substituted by a form of mythological thinking in which the capacity to distinguish between the truth and falsity of statements becomes not only irrelevant but impossible. This passage took place in the techno-sphere and media-sphere of the 1960s and 1970s and the generation that was born at the end of the 1970s began to manifest the first signs of impermeability to the values of politics and critique that had been fundamental for the preceding generations of the twentieth century. The more radical mutation was the diffusion of digital technologies and the formation of the global internet during the 1990s. Here, the functional modality of the human mind changes completely, not only because the conditions of communication become infinitely more complex, saturated and accelerated, but rather because the infantile mind begins to form itself in a media environment completely different from that of modern humanity.

#### [4] Space creates a new domain for crypto with private investment and innovation. The 1AC is a disruption of a project of conservation – the future is here and it’s ridden with crypto.

Greene 21 Greene, Tristan. Tristan covers human-centric artificial intelligence advances, quantum computing, STEM, Spiderman, physics, and space stuff. As far as I can tell his highest level of education was that he was in the Navy for a while. "What happens to Bitcoin when billionaires build cryptocurrency miners on the Moon?" TNW | Hardfork, 8 June 2021, thenextweb.com/news/bitcoin-billionaires-build-cryptocurrency-miners-on-moon-bitcoin.

Space exploration and exploitation have traditionally been nationalist endeavors. But the rise of the 12-digit billionaire has suddenly made outer space look like open territory. The players Jeff Bezos is stepping down from his position as the CEO of Amazon after 25 years ahead of his imminent launch into space aboard one of his own Blue Origin spaceships. This will be the future of fintech 6 trends that will dominate fintech in 2022 While it’s easy to imagine the long-time leader retiring to live out a childhood fantasy, there’s nothing in Bezos’ history as an incredibly ambitious person and businessman to indicate his he’ll just blast off into the sunset to live a life of quiet leisure. Simply put, Bezos’ interest in the space sector likely won’t end with offering consumer thrill rides. While it’s impossible to know where the soon-to-be-former CEO might take his ambition, it’s likely Amazon and/or Blue Origin is already looking for ways to exploit the space sector for profit. But, obviously, Bezos isn’t the only private citizen with a spaceship company. Elon Musk’s SpaceX has spent the last decade becoming the belle of NASA’s ball and he’s already all-in on the idea of sending humans to Mars. And we can’t forget Richard Branson. He may only be worth a paltry $5 billion (lol), but his Virgin Galactic company’s been banking on making some money in space tourism for a long time. Let’s also not forget that Virgin’s dabbled in everything from railroad technology to record labels. And the list goes on. Anyone with a few billion dollars has business options and opportunities that extend beyond our planet’s surface. Space for profit In the past, we’ve discussed the idea of mining space asteroids for profit. Some experts believe there are unimaginable fortunes floating around in space in the form of resource-rich asteroids. In fact, you can even get a degree in asteroid mining. And even Goldman Sachs has considered getting in on the action. But, at the end of the day, we still have to figure out where these resources are, build machines capable of extracting them, and get them safely to somewhere they can be useful. Right now, there’s not much value in investing in asteroid mining futures because the technology either doesn’t exist or isn’t ready yet. However, there’s more than one kind of mining you can do in space. Enter cryptocurrency and the future Elon Musk recently got involved in a friendly space race, but this time it has nothing to do with competition over rockets or government contracts. He’s racing against BitMEX, a cryptocurrency exchange and derivative platform, to see who can get a cryptocurrency on the Moon first. If you’re curious about how that works, here’s a snippet from BitMEX’s official announcement: BitMEX will mint a one-of-a-kind physical bitcoin, similar to the Casascius coins of 2013, which will be delivered to the Moon by Astrobotic. The coin will hold one bitcoin at an address to be publicly released, underneath a tamper-evident hologram covering. The coin will proudly display the BitMEX name, the mission name, the date it was minted and the bitcoin price at the time of minting. According to BitMEX, this isn’t just a ceremonial or token delivery. The coin itself is a hardware wallet containing an actual Bitcoin, so its value will change with the value of the BTC here on Earth. In other words, BitMEX is sending a literal treasure to the Moon for anyone brave (or rich) enough to retrieve it. Per the company’s blog post: A moon surface background with text superimposed, quote below Credit: BitMEX Come and Get It. When the physical coin lands, it will remain on the Moon until anyone deems it worthy of retrieval. Decades from now, what will it be worth? It’s a great question. Some experts have predicted a single bitcoin will one day be worth $100K, $1M, or even more. But an even better question is this: What’s the end game for cryptocurrency in space? Billionaires want to be trillionaires Back in 1999 Wired ran a feature about the imminent rise of the world’s first trillionaire. At the time, everyone assumed the richest man in the world, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates, would be the first trillionaire by a long shot. Here’s a quote from that article: The value of Bill’s Microsoft stake has grown from $233.9 million at the time of Microsoft’s 1986 IPO to $72.2 billion as of June 15, 1999 (disregarding stock sales). At this rate – 58.2 percent a year – he will become a trillionaire in March 2005, at age 49, and his Microsoft holdings will be valued at $1 quadrillion in March 2020, when he is 64. Of course, we still haven’t seen a trillionaire in modern history. As of the time of this writing, the richest person in the world is France’s Bernard Arnault, whose $193.6 billion empire edges out Jeff Bezos’ $189 billion. At some point, if Bezos wants to pull away with it or Elon Musk wants to close the widening gap between his $151.4 billion and a first place finish, the world’s richest people are going to have to do more than squeeze terrestrial markets for every last drop of profit. That’s why many experts view Elon Musk’s heavy involvement in cryptocurrency as the potential difference maker. On any given day the Tesla, SpaceX, and Neuralink founder’s total worth can skyrocket or plummet by tens of billions of dollars based on how his cryptocurrency holdings are performing. When you consider that market movements can be directly tied to Musk’s social media statements, the power proposition for billionaires holding cryptocurrency is unbridled. Simply put: Elon Musk has more control over the so-called “volatile” world of cryptocurrency than most. Putting a cryptocurrency in space, much like firing a Tesla off into the galaxy, is a PR move meant to generate interest in the burgeoning cryptomarket. But that’s not the only purpose they serve. These acts remind us that people like Musk and Bezos can do anything they want. If they want to put a coin on the Moon, they have the means to do it. And, for example, if Musk or Bezos suddenly wanted to solve the biggest problems with cryptocurrency mining – power consumption, carbon footprint, developing powerful-enough hardware – they’re in a unique position to do so. In space, no one can hear you mine Arguably, one of the biggest things stopping an apex whale like Elon Musk from spending a fair portion of his billions on cryptomining centers is the fact that such an operation would almost certainly draw universal condemnation for its potential effect on the global climate crisis. But the Moon’s atmosphere isn’t necessarily as fragile as the Earth’s. Hypothetically speaking, there’s nothing to stop a billionaire from building a facility on the Moon to mine cryptocurrency. They would, of course, need to be able to build their own batteries, have experience with artificial intelligence and supercomputers, and already have their own satellite network set up in space – all boxes Elon Musk can tick today. And, in the near-future, as we perfect deep space transmission technology, what’s to stop a billionaire from putting a supercomputer on a satellite and sending it somewhere in deep space to mine cryptocurrency 24/7 at near absolute-zero temperatures? All of this is conjecture, but the writing is on the wall. Cryptocurrency enthusiasts fear what the experts are consistently warning: regulation is coming. Eventually, it’s possible cryptocurrency mining could become regulated with harsh policies designed to keep mining operations from further damaging the environment. This could seriously hinder the market. If humanity walks away from terrestrial mining to save the planet, we’ll be leaving unfathomable amounts of money on table. Billionaires don’t become billionaires by doing that. The only logical path forward, barring some unknown new green mining technology, may be moving the cryptocurrency industry to space.

#### [5] Bitcoin is private

Rule & LeClair 21 [Dylan LeClair And Sam Rule Bitcoin Magazine. "Bitcoin’s Private Property Rights." https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/bitcoins-private-property-rights-2021-09-28]

Bitcoin’s Superior Private Property Rights

For the first time in history, bitcoin offers us a property option that does not rely on a local authority or legal system to enforce or protect it. It’s protected by the natural incentives of those participating in the network.

“Satoshi Nakamoto has created a form of property that can exist without relying on the state, centralized authority, or traditional legal structures.” - Eric D. Chason,"How Bitcoin Functions As Property Law"

It provides us with a store of value and savings technology where no government, central institution or voting bloc can seize, freeze or access it through violence or force when properly secured. Anyone in the world with an internet connection can secure this property without permission, and no other person or institution may take it away or erode its value. Whether it’s real estate, cash, equities, bonds, or gold, no other asset on the market provides this level of assurance and security.

What we know of strong, well-defined property rights is that they are the basis of human cooperation and economic activity. When private property rights flourish, so do the people. When we look at the nations of the world with the lowest ranking of property rights, we also find some of the key regions where bitcoin is making its mark.

#### [6] The 1AC is a collection of data – appropriation is no longer within the physical but has entered the crypto era of art. Their politicizing of geopolitics is outdated, behold the theory of art and ontology of the NFT. Our performance is one of resistance and a reason to vote negative – we’ve submitted the 1AC as an NFT to the judge and we get paid with the ballot.

Aesthetics for Birds, 3-18 [“BEEPLE AND NOTHINGNESS: PHILOSOPHY AND NFTS” <https://aestheticsforbirds.com/2021/03/18/beeple-and-nothingness-philosophy-and-nfts/>, accessed 4-18-21, TAP]

It was the Beeple heard round the world: on Thursday, March 11th, Christie’s sold a collage of digital art images for 69 million dollars. Beeple, real name Mike Winkelmann, is the artist responsible for the work; this makes him the third-highest selling living artist behind Jeff Koons and David Hockney. Prior to the sale, Beeple had made a modest artistic practice out of posting original 3D images online daily. Most of these “everydays” are technically competent but nondescript abstracts—the sort of thing that you might use as a desktop background. Recently they’ve grown more referential, including images of a breastfeeding Donald Trump, Tiger King dethroned, and the coronavirus as a scifi movie monster. How, exactly, did Beeple’s work find itself in the rarefied air of a Christie’s auction, outselling the likes of Lucien Freud and Damien Hirst? The answer, I suspect, has a lot to do with his chosen format for sale: an ‘NFT’, or non-fungible token.

What’s an NFT? As numerous internet explainers will inform you, the abbreviation stands for ‘non-fungible token’. NFTs are crypto tokens, just like Bitcoins and other cryptocurrency: each NFT is a pointer to an address on a publicly verifiable and distributed blockchain. Owning an NFT means that you own the cryptographic key required to demonstrate your ownership; this can be verified by consulting the blockchain, which lists you—or more precisely your digital wallet—as the owner.

Most crypto tokens are fungible; any bitcoin (or fraction thereof) can be exchanged for any other. What differentiates NFTs is that each one is unique. This means that NFTs can be used as identifiers for unique objects. More importantly for our purposes, by attaching an NFT to a particular object—like basketball highlights, digital albums, and yes, even tweets—sellers can use NFTs to transfer ownership of these objects to individual buyers. The person who holds the NFT is the owner. It’s roughly equivalent to possessing a digital deed to the object in question.

NFTs have proven to be especially useful for selling digital art. By linking digital art pieces to specific NFTs, artists have been able to create opportunities for individual ownership and collecting of objects that, to date, have been by their very nature, replicable, shareable, and ownerless. Consider the example of Nyancat, a GIF image-turned-meme dating from 2011 featuring an 8-bit cat with a Pop Tart body: this GIF has been circulating throughout the internet for a decade, featuring most prominently in an insanely catchy YouTube video set to music. The creator of the original GIF, Chris Torres, recently sold an NFT linked to a one-of-a-kind version of Nyancat for roughly $600,000.

There are interesting—and difficult—philosophical questions to be considered here. I don’t think I’ll be able to answer all of them in this post, but I’ll pose a few of them in order to get the ball rolling on the NFT discussion in the philosophy of art.

NFTs and the Ontology of Art

Start with some problems in the ontology of art: What, exactly, is the ontological status of an NFT in relation to the work linked to it? And how might the issuance of an NFT change or update digital artworks like Nyancat, which are already in existence, and have been widely shared and copied?

Philosophers of art have long marked a difference between singular artworks like paintings and sculptures and those which are multiply instantiable, like novels and photographs. In the latter case, there are many instances of these artworks in circulation, and encountering any of them is enough to offer us full acquaintance with the work. Digital artworks seem to fall into the latter category: there are countless instances of Beeple’s everydays circulating around the internet, and loading any one of them onto your device should be enough for you to encounter the work. A tricky question in the ontology of art has to do with the question of what, precisely, these multiply instantiable artworks are, fundamentally: should we understand them as abstract objects? Types with many individual tokens? Or are they just nothing over and above the set of all of the existing instances? (If you destroy all the existing copies of a novel, does the novel no longer exist?)

When an artist issues an NFT—say, for Nyancat or an ultra-rare Pepe—does this fundamentally change the artwork itself? Consider a parallel case from more traditional art: the limited edition print. When an artist issues a limited run of prints of, say, a photograph, they are indicating that some particular set of instances are licensed or genuine instances of the work. They are authorizing these particular prints as privileged compared to any other existing copies—making them into what David Davies calls “provenential instances” because of their provenance. Karen Gover has argued that the set of such privileged instances, in an important sense, just is the work. What’s important here is the idea that artists commonly use their authority to designate which particular instances of their works are genuine, and that these play a privileged role with respect to both what counts as a genuine encounter with the work and (more strongly) what the work fundamentally is.

This analogy isn’t perfect, for two reasons: First and foremost, with respect to many NFTs there isn’t a physical object like a print associated with the NFT at all. There is simply a set of digital bits that’s identical to any other set of bits that makes up an instance of the work. So, it’s unclear whether artists even can designate some instance of the work as licensed or genuine in any meaningful way. Second, with respect to many NFTs being sold, it’s not clear that digital artists have the relevant authority to determine what is and isn’t an authentic instance. Take Nyancat again: sure, Torres sold an individual version of Nyancat, but it’s not clear that Torres has any authority over Nyancat, the internet meme.

So, ontologically speaking, you don’t seem to be getting a special or privileged instance of the work when you buy what’s associated with an NFT. Nor does it seem that issuing an NFT necessarily changes the nature of the work. All of this raises an important question: What exactly is it that you are getting when you buy an NFT?

Getting the NFT Right(s)

Dig through the Christie’s condition of sale for Beeple’s work and you’ll find the following:

You acknowledge that ownership of an NFT carries no rights, express or implied, other than property rights for the lot (specifically, digital artwork tokenized by the NFT). You understand and accept that NFTs are issued by third parties, and not by Christie’s itself.You acknowledge and represent that there is substantial uncertainty as to the characterization of NFTs and other digital assets under applicable law.

Remember how I initially characterized an NFT: NFTs are simply pointers. They are cryptographic tokens that point to something—be it, a piece of digital art or any other digital collectible. Something that’s currently a profoundly unsettled issue is what, exactly, comes along with said pointer. Usually, in agreeing to purchase an NFT, there is an agreement about what taking possession of that pointer means, and what rights it entitles you to with respect to whatever the pointer points to. So: NFTs are fundamentally tools for transferring rights—specifically property rights—from buyer to seller. But at least as of right now, it’s unclear what exactly such rights would amount to for many of the digital artworks being sold via NFTs.

Think about buying a traditional artwork like a painting: ownership involves the ability to control display and performance of artworks. You get to decide where to hang it, who gets to see it, and so on. (Ownership doesn’t give you full control; artists still maintain copyright and other moral rights.) If the work is greatly in demand, you might loan it out to a museum for safekeeping and public viewing; on the other hand, if you’re the Martin Shkreli type, you might gloat publicly about ownership while never allowing anyone else to see it.

However, in the case of digital art, it’s not clear that sale via NFT actually gives you this sort of control. For example, the images in Beeple’s $69 million collage are all freely available on the artist’s website. These are exactly the same digital files that were sold via the NFT. What’s more, they seem to have exactly the same provenance and official authorization as the images that you own as a result of purchasing the NFT. Owning an NFT associated with a digital artwork doesn’t seem to guarantee any control over reproduction and display online. In short: you may end up getting ownership with none of the benefits.

At the same time, as mentioned above, it’s not clear that artists even have ownership rights to transfer with respect to some digital artworks. While Pepe the Frog’s creator Matt Furie has had some success in legal efforts attempting to stop unauthorized uses of Pepe it’s unclear that Pepe qua meme is his property at all. If you were to buy a licensed image of Pepe from Furie via NFT, what you’d be getting would be ownership of that image. However, owning a one-off Pepe or Nyancat just isn’t the same thing as owning the meme itself—which is, I think, an independent, collective, and participatory artwork that would resist any sort of individual ownership. So, NFTs may not even be capable of giving us any sort of ownership of a great deal of the internet art and ephemera that we care about.

NFTs, Stonks, and Getting Paid

A final concern about NFTs—and a major one—is the eye-popping amount of money involved in their sales. There’s no doubt that the explosion in the NFT market is largely the result of the huge growth in value of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum. The buyer of Beeple’s work was a cryptocurrency whale known pseudonymously as “Metakovan.” In interviews, he has stated that he is purchasing NFTs primarily as investments, and that he has purchased NFT art alongside other NFT collectibles.

On the one hand, this is a potential boon to digital artists looking to get paid. NFTs allow for artists to create artificial scarcity, which paves the road to a market for digital art. Of course, this market might not be especially rewarding to all but the most successful artists, and some have already pointed out that between registration and transaction fees, most artists are unlikely to turn a huge profit in NFT sales. But this isn’t too different from the kinds of overhead involved in traditional art sales where galleries standardly take a commission out of the sales of their art.

What’s more significant, though, is the kind of market that is emerging for NFT sales. Insofar as the market is explicitly viewed as an investment platform, market forces will encourage the development of specific kinds of art. A similar phenomenon is already afoot in the world of fine art: Sarah Hegenbart has written about the rise of “zombie formalism”, a trend in the art market for slick, abstract art designed to cater to the needs and desires of ultra-rich investors. Artists such as Lucien Smith and Damien Hirst tend towards creating bland, vaguely interesting works whose primary aim is, in Hegenbart’s words, “generating value out of nothing.”

I think that a great deal of internet art is a kind of folk art—something akin to a massive, collaborative project of generating aesthetic value that reflects some of our strangest and most wonderful predilections. Most of us make and share memes and images because it’s fun, and because we like to be a part of this gigantic collective project of creating and riffing and sharing. I worry that the huge sums of cash (or, well, cryptocurrency) being thrown at NFTs will commercialize and marketize this culture in a way that shifts its content away from the wonderful and weird, and more towards the bland world of Beeple and cryptokitties. It’s also possible that we’ll come to regard digital art as just another investment platform: the next GME, the next Bitcoin, the next stonks. That, I think, would be a major cultural loss.

#### [7] Financial absolutism is framed by accelerationism – appropriation of resources becomes the end goal of desire. Extinction has already happened but the race for space through appropriation allows that semiotic cycle of wealth to survive.

**Berardi 18** [Excerpted from *Breathing: Chaos and Poetry* by Franco “Bifo” Berardi, published by Semiotext(e) © Franco “Bifo” Berardi, 2018. All Rights Reserved, [https://courtauld.ac.uk/research/events-archive/vital-exhaustion/expiration-the-last-breath-franco-bifo-berardi-2018 //](https://courtauld.ac.uk/research/events-archive/vital-exhaustion/expiration-the-last-breath-franco-bifo-berardi-2018%20//) JB]

According to an **Oxfam report** that was made public at the Davos conference in January 2018, in 2016 inequality peaked: **82 percent of** the **wealth** produced that year **was hijacked by** the **1 percent** of the world’s population that already owns two-thirds of the world’s wealth.3 This is **not a joke** or an **exaggeration**: this is a documented **proof of** the demented nature of **financial absolutism**. Like a drain pump, financial capitalism has been sucking life from the organism of human society, at a rate that is accelerating by the second. The question is, why are people doing this? Why is a small fraction of humankind accumulating an unimaginable amount of wealth, while the gross majority of humankind is regressing toward misery? **What motivates this enormous appropriation** of common resources? Indeed, is there a motivation, or does the logic of financial accumulation automatically produce this irrational and immoral effect? Lastly, what is the point of accumulating and hoarding uncountable billions that could never all be exchanged for goods or pleasure in this lifetime? I don’t think that greed sufficiently explains this extreme concentration of wealth in the hands of a precious few. Should we rather explain this irrational inequality in terms of an evolutionary survival instinct? Can I even speak of an evolutionary instinct of humankind, does such a thing exist? Probably not, but I’m trying to find a sort of autopilot in human evolution. The survival instinct is alert today, because we sense (even if we tend to deny the evidence and reject this knowledge in our collective unconscious) **that** civilized **life on planet earth is approaching its end**. Our collective unconscious senses that the **final stampede** is drawing near because of so many unstoppable and irreversible processes: proliferation of **nuclear weapons**, global **warming**, water **scarcity, demographic expansion** and **desertification**, and, last but not least, **mental collapse**, spreading depression and panic. It is totally understandable at this point for **a human to be**, whether consciously or not, **preparing for a flight from planet hell**. And preparing to escape from hell is inconceivably expensive. **The 1 percent** of humankind **is preparing for this flight**, and they need huge amounts of **financial resources** to do so. Dystopian science fiction? Perhaps. Don’t forget, however, that in the last fifty years dystopian **science fiction has** produced the **most accurate roadmaps of our social and political becoming**.

#### [8] Post digital infosphere, the notion of “private entities” appropriating is overdetermined by capitalist desire – the network economy means that privatization is static and collapses to the semiotic economy.

**Berardi 09** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2009. P. 59-60 // JB]

Capital reacted, following the dictates of liberalist ideology, with the **coercive privatization** of the products of collective knowledge and the submission of **experimentation** to **economic competition**. The **privatization** of collective knowledge has **encountered resistance** and opposition everywhere, and cognitive **laborers** have started to **realize** that their **potential is superior to the** power of the **merchant**. Since **intellectual labor is** at the center of the **productive** scene, **the merchant no longer possesses** the juridical or material **instruments to impose** the principle of **private property**. Given that the most precious **goods in** social **production have** an immaterial and **reproducible character**, we have discovered that the **private appropriation of goods makes no sense**, while the reasons sustaining the **privatization of material goods** in industrial society have weakened. In the sphere of **semiotic-capital** and **cognitive labor**, when a product is consumed, **instead of disappearing** it remains available, while **its value increases** the more its use is shared. **This is** how the **network economy** works, and this **contradicts** the very principle of **private property** on which capitalism was founded until now.

#### [9] The impact is the destruction of the subject—info overload impedes memory retention. This produces a depersonalized subject that gets molded by structures of homogeneity and distorts our ability to engage in affective enjoyment – reducing us to cold automatons that react to stimuli with non-reflective action. This is the internal link to panic, chaos, depression, and conflict.

**Berardi 09** [Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of the post-alpha generation” by Franco Berardi 2009 // LHPDD // JB]

“The modalities of **memorization depend on** the mind’s **capacity to store information** that has left a **deep impression**, was active over a long period of time or in repetitive fashion. **Memorization** modifies the conscious organism and **shapes** its **identity**, given that identity **can be defined** as a **dynamic** **accumulation of** the memory of places and **relations** forming the **continuity of an experience**. But what happens to memory **when** the **flow of information explodes**, expands enormously, besieges perception, occupies the whole of available mental time, accelerates and reduces the mind’s time of exposure to the single informational impression? What happens here is that the memory of the past thins out and the mass of present information tends to occupy the whole space of attention. The greater the **density of the info-sphere**, the **scarcer** is the **time** available **for memorization**. The **briefer** the **mind’s lapse of exposure to a single piece of information**, the more tenuous will be the trace left by this information. In this way, mental activity tends to be compressed into the present, the **depth of memory is reduced** and thus the **perception of** the **historical** **past** and even of existential diachrony **tends to disappear. And if it’s true that identity is in large part connected to what has** dynamically settled in **personal memory** (places, faces, expectations, illusions), it is possible to hypothesize that we are moving towards **a progressive disidentification**, where **organisms** are increasingly recording a flow that unfolds in the present and **leaves no deep imprint** because of the rapidity **with** which it appears to the eye and settles in **memory**. The thickening of the **info-spheric crust** and the **increase in quantity** and intensity of the incoming **informational material** thus produces the effect of a reduction of the sphere of singular memory. The **things** that **an individual remembers** (images, etc.) work towards the construction of an impersonal memory, **homogenized**, uniformly assimilated and thinly elaborated **because** the **time of exposure** is so fast it **doesn’t allow for a deep personalization**. Cybertime, eroticism, desensitization It seems to me that the fundamental question of the current mutation – the mutation that flows through individual organisms, populations and the entire planet – can be found at the intersection of electronic and organic cyberspace. Young people are naturally the most exposed to the effects of this mutation, because the invasive power of cyberspace has impacted on them to the full, and as a consequence their potential to adapt cybertemporally (that is the potential of their cognitive, psychic and psycho-physical apparatus) is subject to an extreme solicitation. The essential problem is that the rhythms of the **technological** mutation **are** a lot **faster than** those of the **mental** mutation. Hence the expansion of cyberspace is incommensurably **faster than** the **human brain’s capacity to expand and adapt (cybertime**). We can increase the length of time an organism is exposed to information, but experience can’t be intensified beyond a certain limit. Acceleration provokes an impoverishment of experience, given that we are exposed to a growing **mass of stimuli** that we can’t digest in the intensive **modes of enjoyment and knowledge**. Spheres of relationality and behavior that require an extended period of attention such as those of affectivity, eroticism and deep comprehension, are disturbed, subject to a contraction. In these conditions of acceleration and **information overload, automatism** tends to become the prevalent form of reaction to stimuli, in the sense that automatic reactions are those that don’t demand reflection or a conscious and emotional reaction. They are standard reactions, implicit in the preformatted chain of actions and **reactions of the homogenized info-sphere**. The digitalization of the communicative environment and even of the perceptive environment without a doubt acts on the sensibility of human organisms. But how do we address this problematic? What instruments of analysis, what criteria of evaluation allow us to speak of sensibility, of taste, of enjoyment and suffering, eroticism and sensuality? We have no other instrument but ourselves, our antennae, our bodies, our psychic and erotic reactivity. Moreover, the filter of the observer can have a distorting effect. And yet the feeling of rarefaction of contact, coldness and contraction are at the core of our contemporary pathologies, particularly evident in the younger generation. The sphere of eroticism is particularly prone to them.” (88-90)

#### Thus, appropriation of space by private entities is unjust.

#### [10] The standard is to symbolically take the system hostage through it’s own method of exhaustion. It’s a reimagination of the status quo through the lens of a radically passive Wu Wei society. T-Framework is just uniqueness and a move towards passivity – the only way to escape the infosphere which proves contradictions affirm because it confuses productivity in debate.

**Berardi 11** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism “Chapter 4 Exhastion and Subjectivity.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 107-108 // LEX JB]

* TW – mentions of suicide, not read, but it’s in the card if you chose to read it after the round

The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. The global recession started officially in September 2008 and lasted officially until the summer of 2009. Since the summer of 2009 the official truth in the media, in political statements, in economic talk was: recovery. The stock exchange began to rise again and the banks started again paying huge bonuses to their managers and so on. Meanwhile, unemployment was exploding everywhere, salaries were falling, welfare was curtailed, 90 million more are expected to join the army of poverty in the next year. Is this recovery? Our conditional reflex (influenced by the Keynesian knowledge that recovery is the recovery of the “real economy”) answered: no, this is not recovery, capitalism cannot recover only by financial means. But we should reframe our vision. Finance is no longer a mere tool of capitalist growth. The financialization of capitalism has made finance the very ground of accumulation, as Christian Marazzi (2010) has explained in recent works such as The Violence of Financial Capitalism. In the sphere of semiocapitalism, financial signs are not only signifiers pointing to some referents. The distinction between sign and referent is over. The sign is the thing, the product, the process. The “real” economy and financial expectations are no longer distinct spheres. In the past, when riches were created in the sphere of industrial production, when finance was only a tool for the mobilization of capital to invest in the field of material production, recovery could not be limited to the financial sphere. It took also employment and demand. Industrial capitalism could not grow if society did not grow. Nowadays we must accept the idea that financial capitalism can recover and thrive without social recovery. Social life has become residual, redundant, irrelevant.