# 1AC

### Notes

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### Plan

#### Resolved: The government of the Republic of Kazakhstan ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

Legalization, legal strikes

### 1AC – Adv

#### Restrictions on striking cause spontaneous action instead of collective bargaining.

**Rittmann, 7-22** [Mihra Rittmann, leads Human Rights Watch’s work on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 7-22-2021, accessed on 10-31-2021, *Foreign Policy Centre*, "A sustained crackdown on independent worker organising – Kazakhstan, a case study", https://fpc.org.uk/a-sustained-crackdown-on-independent-worker-organising-kazakhstan-a-case-study/) \*brackets in original //D.Ying]

While the right to strike is guaranteed in Kazakhstan’s Constitution and Labour Code, in reality, workers must exhaust cumbersome and lengthy mediation procedures before they can consider declaring a strike, making it difficult, and in some instances, impossible, for workers to hold a legal strike.[21] Furthermore, in 2014, Kazakhstan introduced criminal sanctions for actions provoking workers to continue a strike declared illegal by a court (Criminal Code article 402). In May 2020, Kazakhstan reduced maximum sanctions for the offense from a three-year prison sentence to a fine. For many years, Kazakhstan also imposed a blanket ban on strikes by workers employed in “hazardous production facilities,” which includes the entirety of the oil and gas sector, as well as on “railway transport and civil aviation workers, medical workers, and service providers (including workers in public transport, water supply, electricity, heat, and communications).” Following sustained pressure from the ILO, in May 2020 Kazakhstan’s Labour Code was amended to allow service providers and oil and gas workers to hold strikes, provided they ensure minimum or uninterrupted services.[22] Given the obstacles to staging legal strikes, workers in practice resort to spontaneous, short-term industrial actions, sidestepping burdensome collective bargaining procedures, to make their grievances known. Doing so exposes them to risk of dismissal, as well as possible administrative or criminal prosecution. According to media reports, in February 2021 over a dozen workers were dismissed from an oil company in western Kazakhstan after they participated in a strike demanding higher wages.[23] In April 2021, oil workers who staged a strike in Zhanaozen were informed by their employer that the strike was “illegal” and told they must come back to work.[24]

#### The restrictions deck union power.

**Akhmetzharov and Orazgaliyev, 8-31** (Slyamzhar Akhmetzharov and Serik Orazgaliyev, \*Senior Research fellow of the Social and Political Studies Department at Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, \*\*Assistant Professor at Nazarbayev University's Graduate School of Public Policy, 8-31-2021, accessed on 10-31-2021, Journal of Eurasian Studies, "Labor unions and institutional corruption: The case of Kazakhstan", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/18793665211041198) //D.Ying

The adoption of the new Labour Code (2015) has led to a weakening of the position of labor unions in negotiations with employers in general. In particular, the Labor Code violates employees’ rights for collective bargaining as well as to strike, which are recognized internationally. The right for collective bargaining is complicated by the requirement to go through the mediation processes with the employer. Workers are unable to exercise their right to strike, which is guaranteed by the constitution and international norms unless they go through a mediation process with company management (Labour Code, 2015, chapter 15). Another limitation of the new Labour Code is associated with greater discretion for employers to dismiss workers without a prior warning or reasonable explanation (Labour Code, 2015, article 51–52). Consequently, it leads to fear of losing jobs, in case of non-compliance with the employers’ instructions (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Apart from the Law on labor unions and the Labour Code, the limitations on the activities of labor unions are further promoted by the Criminal Code. The authorities use articles from the Criminal Code to prosecute labor union leaders and activists. In 2014, a new article was introduced to the Criminal Code, which implies the punishment of up to 3 years of imprisonment for “actions provoking continued participation in a strike that has been declared illegal by a court” (Criminal Code, 2014, article 402). Another article from the Criminal Code that has been used against the labor union activists is “inciting social strife” (Criminal Code, 2014, article 174). For instance, a former lawyer at “Karazhambasmunaigas” oil company Natalya Sokolova, who was reportedly helping participants of a massive labor strike in 2011 in Zhanaozen with filling out the complaints, was sentenced to sixth years of imprisonment for inciting social strife. Local human rights activists criticized such application of the law against labor union activists (Tsoy, 2017).

#### That undermines public trust and creates labor violence.

**Akhmetzharov and Orazgaliyev, 8-31** (Slyamzhar Akhmetzharov and Serik Orazgaliyev, \*Senior Research fellow of the Social and Political Studies Department at Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, \*\*Assistant Professor at Nazarbayev University's Graduate School of Public Policy, 8-31-2021, accessed on 10-31-2021, Journal of Eurasian Studies, "Labor unions and institutional corruption: The case of Kazakhstan", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/18793665211041198) //D.Ying

Problems associated with the functioning of labor unions contribute to a relatively low level of involvement of employees in activities of labor unions. Collectively, only about a third of those surveyed were or had ever been members of a labor union. This is consistent with the official data on labor unions in Kazakhstan; according to the Bureau of National Statistics (2020), the total number of employees in the economy of Kazakhstan during the years 2012–2019 has fluctuated around 8.5 million people. The number of labor union members during the same period has fluctuated around 2.5–3 million people (Bureau of National Statistics, 2020). There is a correlation between the age of respondents and their membership; the older is the age of an individual the higher is the probability that he or she is a member of a labor union. A decorative role of labor unions is confirmed by the survey results (Table 2). About 43% of the respondents pointed toward the absence of any labor union organizations in their workplace. Meanwhile, about 13% of the respondents indicate that labor unions do not impact the working life of employees, while the number is slightly higher (16%) among the members of labor unions. Nevertheless, the indicators of a positive assessment of the influence of labor union organization on working life were higher among those who were members of the labor union—3.5 times higher than the average result for the whole sample of respondents. The survey results demonstrate the low popularity of membership in labor unions as a means to solve labor disputes (Table 3). According to the respondents, the most popular method to protect labor rights and interests was a direct appeal to the management (34.7%). Among other popular methods of protecting labor rights, respondents outlined—legal advice (24.7%) and seeking help from colleagues (16.2%). The remaining methods of promoting rights, including an appeal to the labor union, were less popular among respondents. Such responses indicate that employees are not used to solving labor disputes at the workplace through collaboration with the labor union. In other words, the social perception is that labor unions have a limited role in advocating the rights and interests of workers in front of employers. Every fifth person interviewed pointed to the lack of opportunities to protect their labor rights and interests (19.6%). Inevitably, a weakened role of labor unions in the promotion of the rights of employees resulted in declining trust of people toward this institution. A representative of the FLUK, Gulnara Zhumageldiyeva, indicated in an interview that in the eyes of many Kazakhstani people, labor unions are mostly responsible for the distribution of social benefits such as tours to health resorts and organization of other social events (Bodrova, 2020). The weakening of the role of labor unions, coupled with low public trust in the institution itself has led to a deterioration of labor relations, which has resulted in labor conflicts, strikes, and mass protests often of a violent nature. In many instances, due to the impotence of local labor union organizations, local executive bodies take the role of mediators and representatives of workers’ interests. It has been reported (Yessenova, 2012) that oftentimes, akims (district leaders) of the regions more often than labor inspectors, are personally engaged in the mitigation of labor conflicts. Officially, these functions should be fulfilled by respective labor inspectors, which are the local agencies of the Ministry of Labor responsible for monitoring labor relations.

#### Labor conflict causes state fragility – Kazakhstan’s on the brink now and is still declining BUT relaxing restrictions solves.

**Akhmetzharov and Orazgaliyev, 8-31** (Slyamzhar Akhmetzharov and Serik Orazgaliyev, \*Senior Research fellow of the Social and Political Studies Department at Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, \*\*Assistant Professor at Nazarbayev University's Graduate School of Public Policy, 8-31-2021, accessed on 10-31-2021, Journal of Eurasian Studies, "Labor unions and institutional corruption: The case of Kazakhstan", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/18793665211041198) //D.Ying

Kazakhstan is seen as fragile and institutionally weak by international human rights organizations, particularly when it comes to protections of workers’ rights (Human Rights Watch, 2020). A trend toward an increase in labor conflict occurrences in Kazakhstan is alarming and points toward unresolved socio-economic issues. Domestic labor unions are often criticized for the lack of independence and weak performance in protecting employee rights (Human Rights Watch, 2020). For instance, the Federation of Labour Unions of Kazakhstan (FLUK) was excluded from the International Confederation of Labor Unions because it is considered to be heavily influenced by the local government (Beissembayev, 2018). A number of labor activists who promoted demands of employees in Kazakhstan were prosecuted under the special article in the criminal code for “inciting social discord.” Due to significant state presence in the economy, the state and institution of business enterprise are closely associated in Kazakhstan. In particular, the majority of companies in the extractive sector are controlled by Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund. The government regularly initiates roadmaps to stimulate employment levels. For instance, in 2020, it implemented infrastructure projects that accounted for about 1 trillion tenge, which created additional 250,000 workplaces (Sevostyanova, 2020). As a result, extensive government intervention in the economy facilitates a close relationship between the state and the institution of business enterprise. Considering the extent of state intervention in the economy, labor conflicts, besides other things, reflect a societal discontent with the government’s social and economic policies. Globally, the rise of neoliberalism since the 1970s has led to a decline in the number of unionized workers globally (McCarthy, 2019). This has led to a weaker protection of employee rights and growing income inequality across countries. In addition, the share of labor in total workforce compensation globally has declined significantly in the past four decades (Giovannoni, 2014). The declining share of unionized workers is also generally associated with falling labor share, which is part of national income allocated to wages. Such a trend has been recorded globally including in high-income countries such as Germany, Japan, and the United States (Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014). In particular, the union coverage rate in the United States, for example, declined from 26.7% to 13.6% between 1973 and 2009 (Hirsch & Macpherson, 2010). The decline of unionization has been associated with the fall in middle-class income in the past five decades, which reportedly enabled Donald Trump to appeal to American voters in the 2016 presidential elections (Fukuyama, 2016b). Francis Fukuyama (2016a) went as far as calling the United States a “failed state” suggesting that as a result of political rot, the country’s collapse could be as big as the one associated with the Soviet Union. Within the context, if a process of overcoming state fragility was identified as “a process for connecting citizens’ voices to government” (Ghani & Lockhart, 2009, p. 21), labor unions serve as an institution for delivering its members’ preferences to the government. To a certain degree, they are also capable of holding the government accountable by means of electoral politics. In that respect, the institution of labor unions is one of the instruments for government to obtain feedback from employees regarding labor policies as well as enterprises’ employment policies. Labor unions are designed to represent views of workers over working conditions, salaries, and other collective interests. If governments weaken the institution of labor unions, they diminish the opportunity of benefiting from this feedback mechanism. A weak role of labor unions in promoting rights and interests of employees damages public trust toward this institution. Paradoxically, a state’s desire to control labor relations through restrictive labor union legislation only makes the situation worse.

#### State fragility causes Russian intervention – no deterrence.

**Stronski, 18** (Paul Stronski, senior fellow in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program, January 2018, accessed on 11-1-2021, American Enterprise Institute, "A Troubling Scenario for Kazakhstan", https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/A-Troubling-Scenario-for-Kazakhstan.pdf) //D.Ying

However, its neighbor to the north will likely pose some of the biggest challenges. The Russian leadership has made clear that the country is a key part of its vision of a “Russian world” and that Kazakhstan is part of Moscow's privileged “sphere of interest,” a place where Russian culture, language, and governance norms should dominate. This runs counter to many of the Kazakh government’s own plans for institutional reform, which envision diverse pools of foreign investors and greater integration with global institutions. Perhaps more important still, Russia sees Kazakhstan as its final bulwark against the instability and Islamist-inspired violence that the Kremlin fears could flow into Russia through Central Asia if Afghanistan is destabilized or if one of Kazakhstan’s weaker neighbors—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—prove incapable of responding to a critical threat. Should something like this occur, the pressure on Kazakhstan to act—or to allow the Kremlin to act on its behalf using Kazakh territory— would likely increase. If Kazakhstan itself becomes threatened or proves unable to respond to extremist threats, it could prompt Russia to intervene in northern Kazakhstan to “defend” ethnic Russians or “secure” nuclear material stored in the region. Additionally, given that Kazakhstan’s borders were drawn arbitrarily in the Soviet era and the region is seeing a rise in nationalism on both sides of the border, Moscow could conceivably try to reignite its failed attempts of the past to stoke separatism in Kazakhstan’s northern regions, particularly if domestic problems at home prompt the Kremlin to act boldly in Eurasia, as it did in 2014. Intervening in Kazakhstan would entail some risks to Russia, but those risks are much lower than a similar intervention in the Baltics—which enjoy NATO Article 5 assurances—or even in Georgia, a country that enjoys robust military assistance from the West. The fact that Central Asia frequently falls off the West’s radar screen may even increase Kazakhstan’s attractiveness as a potential target. It is a worrying prospect.

#### Draws in China.

**Žuvela, 2-10** (Daniela Žuvela, undertaking the Master of International Relations and National Security programme at Curtin University, 2-10-2021, accessed on 11-1-2021, Future Directions International, "China-Kazakhstan Relations: Setting a Standard for Central Asian States - Future Directions International", https://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/china-kazakhstan-relations-setting-a-standard-for-central-asian-states/) //D.Ying

Recent security co-operation between China and the Central Asian states, however, as seen in the establishment of a military base in Tajikistan and growing arm sales to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, is evidence of China increasingly asserting itself in Central Asia’s security sphere. That likely causes some concern within Moscow but remains understated, perhaps due to US-Russia tensions that have led Moscow to a tighter embrace of Beijing, albeit without being tied too closely to Beijing’s objectives. Nevertheless, the shift in the balance of dominance along Russians “near abroad” will likely vex the Sino-Russian relationship in the future, raising the question: will Russia move to balance China’s growing regional influence? If so, how will local elites respond? To answer these questions, Kazakhstan’s experience affords insights into the challenges and opportunities that an increasingly influential China offers, which is likely to set the standard for its relationships with other Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has long been recognised as the linchpin in China’s growing ambitions along its western hinterlands (a strategy dubbed “march west”). China’s interests in Kazakhstan essentially converge between perceived security concerns on the one hand and capitalising on economic opportunities on the other. This pertains to cross-border military co-operation to counter the so-called “three evil forces” of religious extremism, ethnic separatism and international terrorism (specifically in Xinjiang); the preservation of political legitimacy within Central Asian states; and the growing importance of Beijing’s energy supply and transport diversification needs. It is therefore no coincidence that China places special emphasis on its bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan. In turn, Kazakhstan has been the recipient of significant Chinese FDI – to the tune of US$27.6 billion ($35.8 billion) in the country’s oil, mining, transportation, and agricultural sectors – signalling increasing bilateral trade and co-operation. As the Kazakh Government seeks to: (1) diversify its economy away from its over dependence on the extractive sector and; (2) to enhance connectedness to international markets as the world’s largest landlocked country, Kazakhstan is well positioned to be among the larger beneficiaries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). That said, China’s growing presence in Kazakhstan is not without issue. As Sebastien Peyrouse puts it, there is a gap across socio-economic divides between perceptions of what China-Kazakh co-operation entails for the country and its people. This is compounded by a lack of transparency in China-Kazakh interactions and Beijing’s ongoing persecution of ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region, including ethnic Kazakhs. In an effort to reconcile the dissonance between co-operation with Beijing that serves elite interests and persistent Sinophobia among its other social strata, Kazakhstan simultaneously restricts Chinese ownership of land, has enacted an anti-Chinese visa regime and, in 2019, leaked information about the arrest of a senior government advisor on charges of spying for China in efforts to push back against Chinese influence. We see similar behaviour with regard to Kazakhstan’s former colonial ruler Russia. Kazakhstan shares a 7,644-kilometre border with Russia, has a large ethnic Russian population and has historically embraced Moscow as its closest ally across all domains. Yet, Kazakhstan continues with its efforts to safeguard its independence from Russian dominance, as evidenced by its position on various issues within the Eurasian Economic Union, the United Nationsand NATO, along with Tokayev’s support for a Latinised alphabet.

#### Goes nuclear.

**Hughes, 6** (Mark W. Hughes, writer for Infoshop, 2-15-2006, accessed on 11-1-2021, Infoshop News, "Is China Preparing for War?", https://web.archive.org/web/20081026071351/http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20060215180623912) //D.Ying

In fact, such a fear would be well-founded, and if Ivanov was attempting to send any messages to China, it is doubtful China took him seriously. The one really strong card that Russia has to play is its nuclear arsenal, and that is what China must ultimately come to terms with if they make a move against Siberia. Several reasons China might feel safe from a nuclear confrontation have already been noted above; however, there may be additional factors to consider as well. One way China could almost assure itself that Russia would not launch a nuclear attack is if China is able to launch a 'decapitation strike' against Russia first, destroying the Russian government and most command-and-control over milita ry forces. Once Moscow was destroyed, any Chinese invasion of Siberia would almost surely succeed rather easily. Many analysts suspect that much of Russia's early warning defense system, which alerts them to any missile attacks against their country, is in a state of utter disrepair. It is known that on several occasions, this entire warning system has shut down completely. Taking into account China's proximity to Moscow, the fact that most of Russia's warning systems are built to detect a missile launch by NATO and the U.S., and the fact that once Chinese missiles were detected Russia would have precious little time to launch a retaliatory strike, it is possible that China could successfully strike Moscow without suffering a retaliatory strike. To precipitate this, China would have to schedule a supposed 'missile test' from somewhere as close to their northern border as possible. By the time it became obvious that the missile was intended for Moscow (and China migh t even claim it is a mistake and that the missile has no warhead, to further confuse matters and delay any Russian response), it might be too late for Russia to launch a counter-attack. Or China might simply try to smuggle a nuclear weapon into Moscow and detonate it, an act which could be blamed on "terrorists" even after China invaded (an act which would be obviously opportunistic, but China would no doubt rather be blamed for opportunism than for a nuclear attack). There are no doubt other scenarios that China could employ if they wished to take this course of action. What is important to remember is that such an action would be of great benefit to any planned invasion of Siberia, and so the danger of such an attempted nuclear attack is real even if it is not highly probable. Should China invade without a nuclear first-strike, then Russia would likely not respond with nuclear weapons, at least not initially. However, if nations armed with such weapons go to war, then the potential for a nuclear war always exists. Moreover, once one side sees that it is clearly loosing, and if the stakes are high for each nation, then there is a strong possibility that the losing side will attempt to gain some advantage by utilizing nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Once a war has gone nuclear, escalation is almost inevitable, as the other side retaliates, and the targets of the nuclear exchanges become more significant until a full-scale nuclear war in which populations of the largest cities will likely be targeted and killed. The implications of even a small-scale nuclear exchange (to the extent a nuclear exchange can be small-scale) in Central Eurasia are staggering. The death toll would be in the millions and the region would be poisoned with radiation and fallout. Since China lacks the massive nuclear arsenal of Russia, even a full-scale nuclear exchange would not quite be the global doomsday scenario that would arise from a U.S.-Russian exchange, since the total number of nuclear detonations would be barely more than half of the doomsday scenario and would be restricted to a much more narrow targeting area. But the war would take place in the most populated part of the entire world, Central Eurasia, and where a huge amount of global resources are found. The radiation and fallout would affect other large parts of the world, and the death toll from the initial nuclear detonations combined with those suffering radiation sickness and long-term related illnesses would no doubt be in the hundreds of millions. And of course, the political and economic impacts would be earth-shattering, especially in light of the scenarios leading up to the war and if North Korea were enlisted to attack South Korea at the same time. China would have to be willing to gamble that the war would not turn nuclear, unless they devised a way to take out Moscow without any danger of being detected. Most likely, China will bet on keeping the war conventional and hope that surprise and a quick victory will make the operation a success before events spiral out of control. They might also count on Europe and the U.S. pressuring Russia not to respond with nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the realities of peak oil and the survival of China's current government combine to leave China with little choice but to place their bets and face the risk of the conflict becoming nuclear.

#### Extinction, nuclear winter erases humanity

Starr ’17 (Steven; director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, expert in the environmental consequences of nuclear war; 1/9/17; “Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies”; <https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/>; Federation of American Scientists; accessed 11/24/18; TV)

The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area of three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the blast, fire, and radiation from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. However, the long-term environmental effects of the war could significantly disrupt the global weather for at least a decade, which would likely result in a vast global famine. The scientists predicted that nuclear firestorms in the burning cities would cause at least five million tons of black carbon smoke to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would remain for more than a decade. The smoke would absorb warming sunlight, which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing ozone losses of 20 to 50 percent over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals. As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface, it would produce the coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that global food production would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a five-year period following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to two billion people to perish from famine. The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to 80 times more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT. Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square miles. A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot and smoke, which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to 20 years, and it would block as much as 70 percent of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight. Under such conditions, it would only require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. Growing seasons would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would be too cold and dark to grow food crops, which would doom the majority of the human population. NUCLEAR WINTER IN BRIEF The profound cold and darkness following nuclear war became known as nuclear winter and was first predicted in 1983 by a group of NASA scientists led by Carl Sagan. During the mid-1980s, a large body of research was done by such groups as the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), the World Meteorological Organization, and the U.S. National Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; their work essentially supported the initial findings of the 1983 studies. The idea of nuclear winter, published and supported by prominent scientists, generated extensive public alarm and put political pressure on the United States and Soviet Union to reverse a runaway nuclear arms race, which, by 1986, had created a global nuclear arsenal of more than 65,000 nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this created a backlash among many powerful military and industrial interests, who undertook an extensive media campaign to brand nuclear winter as “bad science” and the scientists who discovered it as “irresponsible.” Critics used various uncertainties in the studies and the first climate models (which are primitive by today’s standards) as a basis to criticize and reject the concept of nuclear winter. In 1986, the Council on Foreign Relations published an article by scientists from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, who predicted drops in global cooling about half as large as those first predicted by the 1983 studies and described this as a “nuclear autumn.” The nuclear autumn studies were later shown to be deeply flawed, but the proof came too late to stop a massive smear campaign that effectively discredited the initial studies. Nuclear winter was subject to criticism and damning articles in the Wall Street Journal and Time magazine. In 1987, the National Review called nuclear winter a “fraud.” In 2000, Discover Magazine published an article that described nuclear winter as one of “The Twenty Greatest Scientific Blunders in History.” The endless smear campaign was successful; the general public, and even most anti-nuclear activists, were left with the idea that nuclear winter had been scientifically disproved. REJECTION BY LEADERS Yet the scientists did not give up. In 2006, they returned to their labs to perform the research I have previously described. Their new research not only upheld the previous findings but also found that the earlier studies actually underestimated the environmental effects of nuclear war. Dr. Robock of Rutgers and Dr. Toon of the University of Colorado have spent years attempting to bring official attention to their work and get follow-up research studies done by appropriate agencies in the federal government. In a recent (2016) interview, Dr. Toon stated: The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, which should be investigating this problem, have done absolutely nothing. They have not published a single paper, in the open literature, analyzing this problem … We have made a list of where we think the important issues are, and we have gone to every [federal] agency we can think of with these lists, and said “Don’t you think someone should study this?” Basically, everyone we have tried so far has said, “Well that’s not my job.” In the same interview, Dr. Robock also noted: The Department of Homeland Security really should fund this. They will fund you to study one terrorist bomb in New York City. When you explain to them that a war between India and Pakistan is a much greater threat to the U.S. homeland than one terrorist bomb, as horrible as that is, they respond with “Oh, well that’s not my job, go talk to some other program manager” — who, of course, doesn’t exist. After the more recent series of studies were published in 2007 and 2008, Drs. Robock and Toon also made a number of requests to meet with members of the Obama administration. The scientists offered to brief Cabinet members and the White House staff about their findings, which they assumed would have a great impact upon nuclear weapons policy. Their offers were met with indifference. Finally, after several years of trying, Drs. Robock and Toon were allowed an audience with John Holdren, Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama on Science and Technology. Dr. Robock also eventually met with Rose Gottemoeller, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Dr. Robock has written to me that, after these meetings, he and Dr. Toon were left with the impression that neither Holdren nor Gottemoeller think the nuclear winter research “is correct.” But it is not only Holdren and Gottemoeller who reject the nuclear winter research. Greg Mello, of the Los Alamos Study Group, cites a source who confirms that the group that determines the “full range of activities related to the development, production, maintenance (upkeep) and elimination (retirement, disassembly and disposal) of all United States nuclear weapons — the members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council — have stated that “the predictions of nuclear winter were disproved years ago.” The members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council include: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Commander of the United States Strategic Command It is important to understand that some members of this group — especially the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) — also develop the policies that guide the use of nuclear weapons. Perhaps General John Hyten, Head of USSTRATCOM, who is in charge of the U.S. nuclear triad, and General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the second highest ranking officer in the United States, have never seen or heard of the 21st century nuclear winter studies. Perhaps when they hear a question about “nuclear winter,” they only remember the smear campaigns done against the early studies. Or, maybe, they just choose not to accept the new scientific research on nuclear winter, despite the fact that it has withstood the criticism of the global scientific community. Regardless, the rejection of nuclear winter research by the top leaders of the United States raises some profoundly important questions: Do U.S. military and political leaders fully understand the consequences of nuclear war? Do they realize that even a “successful” nuclear first-strike against Russia could cause most Americans to die from nuclear famine? In 2010, Drs. Toon and Robock wrote in Physics Today: We estimate that the direct effects of using the 2012 arsenals would lead to hundreds of millions of fatalities. The indirect effects would likely eliminate the majority of the human population. In 2013, Drs. Toon and Robock wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that: A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in Self-Assured Destruction. RENEWED COLD WAR Although president-elect Trump appears to favor a return to the policy of détente with Russia, many if not most U.S. political leaders appear to support the Obama administration’s policies of direct confrontation with Putin’s Russia. Mainstream corporate media, including the editorial boards of The New York Times and The Washington Post, routinely engage in anti-Russian and anti-Putin rhetoric that surpasses the hate speech of the McCarthy era. Under President Obama, the United States has renewed the Cold War with Russia, with little or no debate or protest, and has subsequently engaged in proxy wars with Russia in Ukraine and Syria, as well as threatening military action against China in the South China Sea. In response to what NATO leaders describe as Russia’s “dangerous and aggressive actions,” NATO has built up a “rapid-response force” of 40,000 troops on the Russian border in the Baltic States and Poland. This force includes hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery. NATO troops stationed in Estonia are within artillery range of St. Petersburg, the second largest city of Russia. The United States has deployed its Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Romania and is constructing another such BMD system in Poland. The Mark 41 launch system used in the Aegis Ashore systems can be used to launch a variety of missiles, including long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles. In other words, the United States has built and is building launch sites for nuclear missiles on the Russian border. This fact has been widely reported on Russian TV and has infuriated the Russian public. In June, Russian President Putin specifically warned that Russia would be forced to retaliate against this threat. While Russian officials maintain that its actions are normal and routine, Russia now appears to be preparing for war. On October 5, 2016, Russia conducted a nation-wide civil defense drill that included 40 million of its people being directed to fallout shelters. Reuters reported two days later that Russia had moved its Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad, which borders Poland. While the United States ignores the danger of nuclear war, Russian scholar Stephen Cohen reports that the danger of war with the United States is the leading news story in Russia. Cohen states: Just as there is no discussion of the most existential question of our time, in the American political class — the possibility of war with Russia — it is the only thing being discussed in the Russian political class . . . These are two different political universes. In Russia, all the discussion in the newspapers, and there is plenty of free discussion on talk show TV, which echoes what the Kremlin is thinking, online, in the elite newspapers, and in the popular broadcasts, the number 1, 2, 3, and 4 topics of the day are the possibility of war with the United States. Cohen goes on to say: I conclude from this that the leadership of Russia actually believes now, in reaction to what the United States and NATO have said and done over the last two years, and particularly in reaction to the breakdown of the proposed cooperation in Syria, and the rhetoric coming out of Washington, that war is a real possibility. I can’t remember when, since the Cuban Missile Crisis, that the Moscow leadership came to this conclusion in its collective head. Perhaps this narrative will change under president-elect Trump. However, he is inheriting a situation fraught with danger, which retains the possibility of direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine and Syria, as well as increasingly militarized confrontation with China in the South China Sea. My own personal assessment of the state of the nuclear danger today is that it is profound. The United States is sleepwalking towards nuclear war. Our leaders have turned a blind eye to the scientifically predicted consequences of nuclear war, and our military appears to be intent on making “Russia back down.” This is a recipe for unlimited human disaster. It is still not too late to seek dialogue, diplomacy, and détente with Russia and China, and to create a global dialogue about the existential dangers of nuclear war. We must return to the understanding that nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. This can be achieved if our political and military leaders listen to the warnings from the scientific community about the long-term global environmental consequences of nuclear war. President-elect Trump and President Putin must publically acknowledge and discuss the peer-reviewed studies that predict a U.S.-Russian nuclear war will likely wipe out most of the human race. All nations and peoples have a vested interest in eliminating the nuclear arsenals that continue to threaten their existence.

### 1AC – Framing

#### Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**, I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value**. Although **pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### Extinction outweighs

#### A) Reversibility – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible which proves moral uncertainty

#### B) Prerequisite – you can’t do the aff if you’re dead, threats to bodily security preclude action

#### C) Resolvability – body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical anything else means judge intervention

#### D) Reciprocity – you can weigh your impacts under different frameworks, I should be able to as well

#### E) Phil education – MacAskill 14

[William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### Thus, the standard is act hedonistic util – I value morality and the metaethic is consequentialism

#### Prefer additionally –

#### [1] Actor Spec – Util is the best in the context of governments which is the actor in the resolution

#### A) Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B) No act-omission distinction governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is an implicit authorization of action

#### C) No intent foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### D) Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action

### 1AC – UV

**Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all broken constructive positions with underlining and highlighting on open source on the 2020-2021 NDCA LD wiki and under their own name for every round they’ve debated this season 30 minutes after they debated.**

#### Violation – they don’t disclose all and haven’t disclosed every round, yale, apple valley

Heres a link proving they debated all 6 rounds at yale <https://www.tabroom.com/index/tourn/postings/entry_record.mhtml?tourn_id=20393&entry_id=3619170>

Heres a link proving they debated all 6 rounds at apple valley

https://www.tabroom.com/index/tourn/postings/entry\_record.mhtml?tourn\_id=20874&entry\_id=3629936

Graphical user interface, table

Description automatically generated

Even I fyou disclose later you still didn’t disclose 30 minutes after the round u debated which violates text – it also means I didn’t have access to preround prep which still violates

#### A. Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—only way to level the playing field for students like novices in under-privileged programs – key to inclusion and its an independent voter and outweighs because you can’t debate if you aren’t included

#### B. Depth of clash – open source allows debaters to come up with more nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round faster since it’s easier to read through the doc and see what parts of the evidence are actually highlighted. Leads to highest quality evidence comparison – outweighs – thinking on your feet is non-unique but the best quality responses will come from full access to a case. Independently, they didn’t disclose round reports for these rounds either which preround prep is impossible because I don’t know what you’re going for this tournament.

#### [1] DTD on 1ac theory and disclosure – a) disclosure cannot be drop the argument because it would just drop you because you’re the norm b) deterrence

#### [2] Reject all responses to disclosure – they selectively comply with our norm because they disclose some docs that meet our criteria which proves we can’t verify what norms they actually agree with.

#### [3] No RVI on ac theory – otherwise the neg would dump for 7 mins on a shell and moot the possibility of a 1ar out – any reason why they get an rvi is nonunique because you would have to respond to 6 minutes of the 1AC regardless of if its theory or a contention

#### [4] CI – 1] reasonability is arbitrary – impossible to know what is reasonable until you establish a brightline 2] bites judge intervention cuz they have to gut check what they think is good 3] reasonability collapses cuz u use offense defense to evaluate offense under the BL 4] norms – you can sidestep norms by selectively choosing a different brightline you meet every round.

#### [5] Disclosure outweighs – it’s key to assessing the honesty of the form of your argumentation and how you presented arguments which means it precludes 1nc claims.

#### [6] Fairness is a voter because debate is a game governed by rules and you can’t tell who actually won if the layer was skewed.

### 1AC – UV 2

#### [1] 1ar theory since the neg can do infinite bad things and I can’t check. It’s drop the debater since the 1ar is too short to win both layers. No RVI since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes. CI since reasonability is arbitrary and bites intervention.

#### [2] Permissibility and presumption substantively affirm: a) Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me b) Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason. c) If anything is permissible, then definitionally so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it

#### [3] Negative may not read more than 1 off case position as the affirmative can only read 1 position, K2 reciprocity

#### [4] RVI on NC theory – you can read arguments such as T that are exclusively neg so I need them to compensate

### 1AC – UV 3

#### Biological death is the worst evil

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Reject monocausal analyses.

David Martin Jones 15, Visiting Professor in the Department of War Studies, King's College London and Associate Professor, School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Queensland; and M.L.R. Smith, Professor of Strategic Theory in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, September 2015, “Return to reason: reviving political realism in western foreign policy,” International Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 933-952

The dissolution of any prospect for enduring stability, whether in the Middle East, Africa or central and east Asia, exhibits a condition of great complexity. What does this complexity disclose about how European states and the United States might respond? First, it should be recognized that the search for a single root-cause that identifies a singular answer is futile and counter-productive. Monolithic solutions present themselves in a variety of forms, ranging from pacifist utopianism through cosmopolitan transformational idealism to cynical conservative pessimism. Yet even a superficial examination of international problems negates such one-dimensional explanations. For example, the intense sectarian and tribal divisions and rivalries affecting very different societies in the Middle East or across the wider and more diffuse ‘Muslim world’ exposes the practical limitations of any all-encompassing rationalist or normative solution.28 Indeed, the diversity of Islam both in its heartlands and across its diaspora illustrates the difficulty of trying to establish an abstract monocausal explanation that magically reveals a hidden interconnection between very different issues and conflicts.