# 1AC --- Trivial Semiotic Coherence

### 1AC – Footnote

TW – Nongraphic mentions of suicide, depression, and drug use

CSA –

Jaeggi and Robinson – Alienation – Material Cap

Gillespie – Black hyperreality and communication

Lundberg and McGowan – Debate deployment

Moen – Utilitarian philosophy through maintaining sustainable capitalism

Kant – Free market principles

### 1AC – Thesis

#### Debate is structured as a marketplace for information where we fetishize notions of “pedagogy” and is an extension of semiocapitalist logic through immaterial manors. Communication within the university isn’t one that develops subjectivities and psychic identity rather a system geared towards fragmentation and futuristic productivity.

**Berardi 12** [David Hugill and Elise Thorburn, 9-26-2012, "Interview with 'Bifo': Reactivating the Social Body in Insurrectionary Times," Critical Legal Thinking, [https://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/09/26/interview-with-bifo-reactivating-the-social-body-in-insurrectionary-times //](https://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/09/26/interview-with-bifo-reactivating-the-social-body-in-insurrectionary-times%20//) JB]

* TW – mentions of suicide
* Impact turns fiat and notions of “the aff is a good idea”
* Debate bad and communication gets coopted

A: First of all because **students are increasingly learning in** small parcels, **small fragments**, small fractals **of knowledge**, and they are becoming **more** and more **accustomed to think** of their **knowledge not as knowledge but** as **intellectual availability to exploitation**.  In North American forms of education this is already well established, it is nothing new. It is new in much of Europe and it has begun to provoke some reactions. But it is also a **fact of a networked and globalized world**.  What does precariousness mean today? What is the relationship between precariousness and globalization? It means that you can **buy a fragment of labor** in Bangkok, a fragment in Buenos Aires, and **a fragment in Milan** and that these three **fragments become** the **same product from** the point of view of **capital**.  **Knowledge is** headed the **same** way. You no longer need – from the point of view of capital – to know in the **humanistic sense**, the meaning, the finality, the **intimate contradictions of knowledge**, you just need to know how **particular parcels of knowledge** can be made **functional**. There is something new and something old in this. Herbert Marcuse’s (1964) One Dimensional Man already identified this problem of the functionalization of knowledge but in his time it was only a kind of prediction about how capitalism would be transformed. Today, this functional consideration is the dominant form of our **relationship to knowledge**. So, we should question people about **what is happening to our knowledge**. Are we really learning things, knowing things? Or are we simply learning how to **become part of** the **productive machine**? Additionally, I think we need to ask people, especially young people, **about** their **suffering in the relationship with knowledge**, with communication and so on. I think that the problem of psychic suffering is of central importance our time. Problems of depression, panic, massive suicide, are **very real**.  Do you know that suicide has become the main cause of death among people between 18-25 years old? **Suicide is** becoming a **political weapon**. I’m not only thinking of Columbine or of Mohamed Bouazizi, the man who killed himself and started the Tunisian revolution.  Suicide has something to do with knowledge.  When your **knowledge** is becoming **more and more something** that does **not belong to you**, this is a problem of personal identity, of **psychic identity**.

#### The new dawn of capitalism has created an age of constant information and signifiers floating through our phones and computers as media. This creates a dyslexia – reduced attention spans, no time for true human interaction – this leads to information overload, which is too fast for our organic minds to keep up with – that causes depression and drug use. It’s no coincidence that the rise of tech in the 80s was complimented with a drug epidemic. These signifiers come prior to action, thus debate should disrupt semiocapitalism.

**Berardi 09** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2009. P. 40-42 // LEX JB]

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The acceleration of information exchange has produced and is producing an effect of a pathological type on the individual human mind and even more on the collective mind. Individuals are not in a position to consciously process the immense and always growing mass of information that enters their computers, their cell phones, their television screens, their electronic diaries and their heads. However, it seems indispensable to follow, recognize, evaluate, process all this information if you want to be efficient, competitive, victorious. The practice of multitasking, the opening of a window of hypertextual attention, the passage from one context to another for the complex evaluation of processes, tends to deform the sequential modality of mental processing. According to Christian Marazzi, who has concerned himself in various books with the relations between economics, language and affectivity, the latest generation of economic operators is affected by a real and proper form of dyslexia, incapable of reading a page from the beginning to the end according to sequential procedures, incapable of maintaining concentrated attention on the same object for a long time. And dyslexia spreads to cognitive and social behaviors, leading to rendering the pursuit of linear strategies nearly impossible. Some, like Davenport and Beck , speak of an attention economy. But when a cognitive faculty enters into and becomes part of economic discourse this means that it has become a scarce resource. The necessary time for paying attention to the fluxes of information to which we are exposed and which must be evaluated in order to be able to make decisions is lacking. The consequence is in front of our eyes: political and economic decisions no longer respond to a long term strategic rationality and simply follow immediate interests. On the other hand, we are always less available for giving our attention to others gratuitously. We no longer have the attention time for love, tenderness, nature, pleasure and compassion. Our attention is ever more besieged and therefore we assign it only to our careers, to competition and to economic decisions. And in any case our temporality cannot follow the insane speed of the hypercomplex digital machine. Human beings tend to become the ruthless executors of decisions taken without attention. The universe of transmitters, or cyberspace, now proceeds at a superhuman velocity and becomes untranslatable for the universe of receivers, or cybertime, that cannot go faster than what is allowed by the physical material from which our brain is made, the slowness of our body, the need for caresses and affection. Thus opens a pathological gap and mental illness spreads as testified by the statistics and above all our everyday experience. And just as pathology spreads, so too do drugs. The flourishing industry of psychopharmaceuticals beats records every year, the number of packets of Ritalin, Prozac, Zoloft and other psychotropics sold in the pharmacies continually increases, while dissociation, suffering, desperation, terror, the desire not to exist, to not have to fight continuously, to disappear grows alongside the will to kill and to kill oneself. When, towards the end of the 1970s, an acceleration of the productive and communicative rhythms in occidental metropolitan centers was imposed, a gigantic epidemic of drug addiction made its appearance. The world was leaving its human epoch to enter the era of machinic posthuman acceleration: many sensitive organisms of the human variety began to snort cocaine, a substance that permits the acceleration of the existential rhythm leading to transforming oneself into a machine. Many other sensitive organisms of the human kind injected heroin in their veins, a substance that deactivates the relation with the speed of the surrounding atmosphere. The epidemic of powders during the 1970s and the 1980s produced an existential and cultural devastation with which we still haven’t come to terms with. Then illegal drugs were replaced by those legal substances which the pharmaceutical industry in a white coat made available for its victims and this was the epoch of anti-depressants, of euphorics and of mood regulators. Today psychopathy reveals itself ever more clearly as a social epidemic and, more precisely, a socio-communicational one. If you want to survive you have to be competitive and if you want to be competitive you must be connected, receive and process continuously an immense and growing mass of data. This provokes a constant attentive stress, a reduction of the time available for affectivity. These two tendencies, inseparably linked, provoke an effect of devastation on the individual psyche: depression, panic, anxiety, the sense of solitude and existential misery. But these individual symptoms cannot be indefinitely isolated, as psychopathology has done up until now and as economic power wishes to do.

#### Questions regarding ethics are irrelevant in the world of the infosphere. All information gets coopted by the inescapability of capitalism – it’s search is cruelly optimistic in the infosphere.

Berardi 11 [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism “0. Bifurications.” Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 14-15 // LEX JB]

Because of this, I believe that it is necessary to identify the new forms of social consciousness beginning from generational belonging. And for this reason I will speak of two decisive successive shifts in a mutation that has led to the draining of humanistic categories and of the perspectives on which modern politics was based. These two passages are constituted in the subsumption of the human mind in formation within two successive technological configurations of the media-sphere. The first is that which I call video-electronic, meaning the technologies of televisual communication. It is a case of the passage that Marshall McLuhan speaks of in his fundamental 1964 study, Understanding Media. McLuhan looks at the transition from the alphabetic sphere to the video-electronic one and concludes that when the simultaneous succeeds the sequential, the capacity of mythological elaboration succeeds that of critical elaboration. The critical faculty presupposes a particular structuring of the message: the sequentiality of writing, the slowness of reading, and the possibility of judging in sequence the truth or falsity of statements. It is in these conditions that the critical discrimination that has characterized the cultural forms of modernity becomes possible. But in the sphere of video-electronic communication, critique becomes progressively substituted by a form of mythological thinking in which the capacity to distinguish between the truth and falsity of statements becomes not only irrelevant but impossible. This passage took place in the techno-sphere and media-sphere of the 1960s and 1970s and the generation that was born at the end of the 1970s began to manifest the first signs of impermeability to the values of politics and critique that had been fundamental for the preceding generations of the twentieth century. The more radical mutation was the diffusion of digital technologies and the formation of the global internet during the 1990s. Here, the functional modality of the human mind changes completely, not only because the conditions of communication become infinitely more complex, saturated and accelerated, but rather because the infantile mind begins to form itself in a media environment completely different from that of modern humanity.

#### The topic’s call for unionization and strikes might have worked a century ago, but post digital infosphere, the affirmative bites into a cycle of production of fragmentation and facing the impossibility of the 1NC’s TVA argument.

**Berardi 11** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism “Chapter 4 Exhastion and Subjectivity.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 107-108 // LEX JB]

The financial cycle is bleeding the social environment dry: sucking energies, resources, and the future. And giving nothing back. Recovery of the financial process of valorization of capital is totally separated from the cycle of material production and social demand. Financial capitalism has obtained autonomy from social life. Let’s consider the political side of the same problem: once upon a time when society was suffering the blows of recession, workers reacted with strikes, struggle and political organization, and forced state intervention in order to increase demand. Industrial growth needed mass consumption and social stability. What is impressive in the ongoing crisis, on the contrary, is the widespread passivity of the workers, their inability to unionize. The political trend in Europe is the meltdown of leftist parties and the labor movement. In the US, Obama is daily attacked by racist and populist mobs, but no progressive social movement is emerging. 1.2 million people have had their mortgages foreclosed upon and lost their houses following the sub-prime swindle, but no organized reaction has surfaced. People suffer and cry alone. In the old time of industrial capitalism, the working class could fight against a target that was precisely identified: the boss, the entrepreneur who was the owner of material things like the factory, and of the product of his laborers. Nowadays the boss has vanished. He is fragmented into billions of financial segments, and disseminated into millions of financial agents scattered all around the world. The workers themselves are part of recombinant financial capital. They are expecting future revenues from their pension fund investments. They own stock options in the enterprise exploiting their labor. They are hooked up, like a fly in a spider web, and if they move, they get strangled, but if they don’t move, the spider will suck their life from them. Society may rot, fall apart, agonize. It is not going to affect the political and economic stability of capitalism. What is called economic recovery is a new round of social devastation. So the recession is over, capitalism is recovering. Nonetheless, unemployment is rising and misery is spreading. This means that financial capitalism is autonomous from society. Capitalism doesn’t need workers: it just needs cellular fractals of labor, underpaid, precarious, de-personalised. Fragments of impersonal nervous energy, recombined by the network. The crisis is going to push forward technological change, and the substitution of human labor with machines. The employment rate is not going to rise in the future, and productivity will increase. A shrinking number of workers will be forced to produce more and more, and to work overtime. The real bubble is the work bubble. We have been working too much; we are still working too much. The human race does not need more goods, it needs a redistribution of existing goods, an intelligent application of technology and a worldwide cut in the lifetime dedicated to labor. Social energies have to be freed from labor dependence, and returned to the field of social affection, education, and therapy. We should take seriously the concept of autonomy. In the present condition autonomy means exodus from the domain of economic law: Out-onomy, abandonment of the field of economic exchange, self-organization of knowledge and of production in a sphere of social life which is no longer dependent on economic culture and expectations – barter, free exchange of time and of competence, food self reliance, occupation of territories in the cities, organization of self-defense.

#### Thus, the vote affirmative to symbolically take the system hostage through it’s own method of exhaustion. It’s a reimagination of the status quo through the lens of a radically passive Wu Wei society. T-Framework is just uniqueness and a move towards passivity – the only way to escape the infosphere which proves contradictions affirm because it confuses productivity in debate.

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The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. The global recession started officially in September 2008 and lasted officially until the summer of 2009. Since the summer of 2009 the official truth in the media, in political statements, in economic talk was: recovery. The stock exchange began to rise again and the banks started again paying huge bonuses to their managers and so on. Meanwhile, unemployment was exploding everywhere, salaries were falling, welfare was curtailed, 90 million more are expected to join the army of poverty in the next year. Is this recovery? Our conditional reflex (influenced by the Keynesian knowledge that recovery is the recovery of the “real economy”) answered: no, this is not recovery, capitalism cannot recover only by financial means. But we should reframe our vision. Finance is no longer a mere tool of capitalist growth. The financialization of capitalism has made finance the very ground of accumulation, as Christian Marazzi (2010) has explained in recent works such as The Violence of Financial Capitalism. In the sphere of semiocapitalism, financial signs are not only signifiers pointing to some referents. The distinction between sign and referent is over. The sign is the thing, the product, the process. The “real” economy and financial expectations are no longer distinct spheres. In the past, when riches were created in the sphere of industrial production, when finance was only a tool for the mobilization of capital to invest in the field of material production, recovery could not be limited to the financial sphere. It took also employment and demand. Industrial capitalism could not grow if society did not grow. Nowadays we must accept the idea that financial capitalism can recover and thrive without social recovery. Social life has become residual, redundant, irrelevant.

### 1AC – Cohering Logic

#### [1] Logic structures debate through speech acts and is the basis for agency – one cannot opt out of logic because it requires logic to do so

#### [2] That means rational agents can uniquely use their logic to perform speech acts. They use logic to pursue ends.

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* Rational agents able to have speech acts. They can pursue things and set ends
* Rational agent avoids compromised existence, that means if trivialism is part of their nature, then they preserve it’s trivial value
* That means all desire is to continue as a trivialist

But, in addition, it would seem that **the** very **arguments of Priest and Aristotle** (assuming that they are sound) **provide the trivialist with sufficient reason not to believe each and every proposition. That is to say, both arguments would render the trivialists refusal to believe each and every proposition quite rational. In reply then to the claim that her avoiding belief in all propositions is irrational, she can simply say that she is justified in doing this because if she did not, then it would be impossible for her to behave in a discriminating and purposeful manner**. Destruction of the acting self is hardly rational given many worldviews (there are, of course, exceptions - Hinduism and Buddhism, for example). For such a worldview, **a rational agent avoids anything that would result in her existence being compromised, including believing things that prevent her from existing** (something that would be deeply compromised if an agent were to believe each and every proposition to be true). **The trivialist justifies the limitedness of her beliefs in terms of her desire to continue existing as a rational agent. It** would appear then that not only is **it possible to believe in trivialism but it is a relatively easy belief to take on**. All that one presumably requires is good reason for thinking that it is true. **Once one has found such reason and has taken to believing the sentence ‘everything is true’, one need not make any further revisions to ones belief system**. Everything that one already believes is not only compatible with this sentence but it is entailed by it. **Trivialism then is the least controversial and simplest metaphysical theory ever devised. In a sense, everyone is already a trivialist waiting to happen.** All that is required is a little incentive in the right direction – perhaps in the form of an argument for trivialism (for which there are plenty as I have discussed in chapters 2 and 3).

#### [3] Contradicting statements do not mean that both are wrong. For example, the statements “the next statement is a lie”, and “the previous statement is true” contradict each other, but that does not mean that both are false. This results in Trivialism, a logical theory that all propositions and statements are true. Thus, the standard is consistency with true statements through trivialism. To clarify, consequences don’t link

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* Thesis

**Trivialism is the claim that every proposition is true**. This is such a bizarre view that one wonders why anyone would have taken an interest in it – **let alone think that it is true**. The reason why there is an interest in trivialism is due to the fact that there has been a revival in a view known as **dialetheism - the claim that some contradictions are true. Trivialism is often understood as an extreme form of dialetheism (all, as opposed to some, contradictions are true).** There has been pressure on dialetheists to distinguish their own view from trivialism. There is no doubt that there is a tendency to conflate the two. This dates back to Aristotle’s formulation and defense of the Law of NonContradiction in his Metaphysics Γ. 1 It is clear, given Aristotle’s intended target, that he is often defending the Law of Non-Triviality, i.e. the law that there is at least one proposition that fails to be true. So, these passages are misunderstood if they are interpreted to be an attack on **dialetheism solely and not also trivialism**. But the temptation to conflate the two positions remains today.

#### A] Authority – The theory is constitutive and impossible to deny – everything collapses

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* Trivialism is the conjunction of every proposition
* You can’t deny a conjunctions with more conjuncts, it just proves validity of conjunction with truth
* Every speech act requires conjuncts, else it’s incoherent
* That means nontrivialism isn’t a coherent speech act. The performance of denial is impossible

There we have it – trivialism is true and it is both possible and reasonable to believe that it is true. I have reached this conclusion in the following way. First, as I argued in chapter 3, the consensus view on trivialism – that trivialism should be denied – is not sustainable in the sense that it is literally impossible. This is for two reasons. **First, trivialism is the conjunction of every proposition. Secondly, it is not possible to express a denial of a conjunction by asserting one or more of its conjuncts. It follows that nontrivialism cannot be performed or expressed – there is no such speech act. As such, the nontrivialist does not exist and there is nothing that one can believe that would enable one to be a nontrivialist**. In the dialectic between the trivialist and the nontrivialist, the trivialist wins by default, as there is no such thing as the nontrivialist. But **even if we assume a different account of denial that enables one to successfully deny trivialism** (one in **which** denial **does not involve asserting something asserted by the trivialist**, as it does not involve asserting anything at all), **it still remains the case that there is nothing that one can assert that results in the performance of the speech act of nontrivialism and so nothing that one can believe that would make one a nontrivialist**. But, as I have pointed out, there are reasons for thinking that such alternative accounts of denial are not entirely satisfactory.

#### B] Inescapability – Non-trivialism is impossible, everyone is a trivialist by default because the statement “everyone is a trivialist” is already true before even getting the chance to deny. Thus, the role of the negative is to lose.

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* Trivialist v nontrivialist in speech debate act
* Debate is a speech act
* Speech acts affirm
* Neg loses

This chapter provides additional reason, to those developed in chapter 2, for committing oneself to trivialism. In this chapter I argue that **the denial of trivialism is impossible** – and so **one cannot avoid committing to it in some sense. In a sense we have no option but to accept trivialism**. After developing an account of what I mean by the denial of some view (a view is denied **by asserting an alternative view), I then show that it is not possible to deny trivialism, as there is no alternative view to trivialism that one can assert. I then spell out two important implications of this conclusion: that the denial of trivialism is at best irrational; that at very worst the trivialist has no opponent who disputes her view, and so in the debate between the trivialist and the nontrivialist, the trivialist wins by default – there is literally no such thing as the nontrivialist**. I then examine a possible response from the nontrivialist. **This response is centered upon an alternative account of denial**. On this account denial cannot be reduced to a form of assertion – it is, rather, a sui generis speech act. It would seem that one could deny trivialism given this account of denial. I respond to this in two ways. **First, I suggest reasons for thinking that this is not a plausible account of denial. Secondly, even if it is a plausible account of denial that enables one to deny trivialism, it still remains the case that there is nothing that one could assert that amounts to the performance of the speech act of nontrivialism, and so nothing one can believe that would qualify one as a nontrivialist.**

#### C] More warrants – Even if you negate, you still affirm

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* Every statement/speech act requires propositional content and illocutionary force to make a statement.
  + Propositional content is the claim of the sentence
  + Illocutionary force means the claim is enforced
* Every statement, like the resolution is true then
* If you affirm x, x is true. If you negate x, you affirm -x which means it’s still true
* That’s because the propositional content is still there

**Denial is a speech act along with, but not limited to, other speech acts (or illocutionary acts) such as assertion, commanding, questioning, and accusing.**124 Like all speech acts, **denial necessarily has two components – without both of these being present, there cannot be a speech act. First, it has a propositional content. Secondly, it has an illocutionary force with which the proposition is uttered.** Searle refers in this regard to an ‘illocutionary force operator’ and a ‘propositional operator’: … we can distinguish between two (not necessarily separate) elements in the syntactical structure of the sentence, which we might call the propositional operator and the illocutionary force indicator. **The illocutionary force** indicator **shows** how **the proposition is to be taken**, or to put it another way what illocutionary force the utterance is to have; that is, what illocutionary act the speaker is performing in the utterance of the sentence.125 A proposition on its own without illocutionary force plays no role in speech – it does nothing, so to speak. An illocutionary force without a proposition associated with it has no content and so says nothing. There is therefore no speech act without both of these components being present. Also of relevance for the purposes of this chapter is the fact that one and the same proposition can be uttered with a different force to give rise to different speech acts. **Take, for example, the proposition ‘the cat sat on the mat’. This can be uttered with the illocutionary force of an assertion to give rise to the speech act, “the cat is sitting on the mat.” Alternatively it can be uttered with the force of a question, giving rise to the speech act, “is the cat sitting on the mat?” Or the proposition could be uttered with the force of a command: “sit the cat on the mat!” It should also be noted that one can perform a speech act without actually uttering anything i.e. without actually using language. A command can be issued with the click of the fingers or a denial by stomping off in rage or tearing a piece of paper in half. Alternatively one can make an inquiry with the raising of the eyebrows. But even if one does not actually utter anything, it is still the case that such a speech act has the same dual nature of a proposition and an illocutionary force. It is just that sometimes, however, the propositional content is not actually spoken.** **Denial**, along with other speech acts, **has the dual nature of propositional content and illocutionary force**. To provide a sneak preview of what is to come: I will show that the **denial of trivialism is impossible because** necessarily **one cannot meet the requirement of propositional content**. Having said that, there are at least two accounts of denial on offer and they differ in how they characterize the illocutionary force of the speech act, one of which I will examine in this section and the other I will examine in section 5. The first of these, which is associated with the tradition of Frege and Geach, characterizes denial as the assertion of the negation of some proposition.126 Quine is certainly one of the champions of this position: **To deny a statement is to affirm another statement**, known as the negation or the contradictory of the first.127 **If I deny that the cat sat on the mat, I am asserting that it is not the case that the cat sat on the mat. That the denial of p is equivalent to the assertion of ¬p is really the orthodox view and, as can be seen from the names that have advocated it, has considerable authority behind it.**

#### Prefer additionally

#### [1] Math – trivialism is the only logical theory that is consistent with math, which is the one universal truth – 2 warrants. That outweighs insofar as wherever we go, there is a concept of trivialism which proves it’s universal validity.

Rayo 09 [Agustin Rayo, MIT, March 12, 2009, “Towards a Trivialist Account of Mathematics”, [http://web.mit.edu/arayo/www/km.pdf //](http://web.mit.edu/arayo/www/km.pdf%20//) LEX JB]

* Ontology
* Logic and math are the same because math requires logic and to reason about anything requires things like 1+1=2
* Things like 2+2=4 have trivial truth
* 1. Math allows us to articulate things aren’t in language
* 2. Math means we can see intelligible from unintelligible because we can see truth

Let us finally turn to the case of mathematics. If you are a **non-trivialist**, you **think there is a** world of **difference between logic and mathematics. Where**as the **truths of pure logic have trivial truth-conditions (and its falsities have trivial-falsity conditions), there are intelligible scenarios that fail to satisfy the truth-conditions of some mathematical truth (or the falsity conditions of some mathematical falsehood).** Accordingly, one needs some sort of entitlement to the view that the **rogue scenarios fail to obtain** before one can claim to know that **the relevant mathematical truth**s are true (or that the relevant mathematical falsehoods are false). **For the trivialist**, on the other hand, **there is no deep difference between logic and mathematics. As in the case of logic, mathematical truths have trivial truth-conditions (and mathematical falsities have trivial falsity-conditions). The difference is simply that the language of mathematics enjoys expressive resources that the language of logic lacks. These enhanced expressive resources are important in two ways. First, they allow us to articulate requirements on the world that cannot be articulated in the language of pure logic, or that can only be articulated with significant awkwardness.** By using the sentence ‘#xApple(x) = #xPear(x)’, for example, one can express the thought that there be just as many apples than pears—something that cannot be done within the language of first order logic in any straightforward sense. (Can **the trivialist generalize this point, and give a recipe that specifies ontologically innocent truth-conditions for arbitrary mathematical sentences**? This is not as easy as one might think, but see my OSTC.) **Second, the enhanced expressive resources of mathematics improve our ability to sort out the intelligible from the unintelligible. Consider the rather unlovely logical truth that I mentioned a few paragraphs back: ∃17!x(Apple(x)) ∧ ∃29!x(Pear(x)) ∧ ¬∃x(Apple(x) ∧ Pear(x)) → ∃46!x(Apple(x) ∨ Pear(x))** By accepting this sentence one acquires the ability to rule out as unintelligible a scenario in which there are seventeen apples, twenty-nine pears and anything other than forty-six apple-or-pears. **But in accepting the (far simpler) mathematical sentence ‘17 + 29 = 46’, one acquires a more general ability—the ability to rule out as unintelligible a scenario in which there are seventeen Fs, twenty-nine Gs and anything other than forty-six F-or-Gs (provided no Fs are Gs).** And, of course, an improved ability to sort out the intelligible from the unintelligible is important because it gives us an improved ability to transfer insights from one context to another. To pick a simple example, **knowledge of the basic facts of multiplication puts you in a position to use the insight gained from counting the rows and the insight gained from counting the columns for the purposes of answering questions of the form ‘How many tiles?’. And, of course, this is only the beginning. Moral: even if the trivialist believes that the truths of pure mathematics have trivial truth conditions, she is able to explain why mathematical knowledge is worthwhile.**

#### [2] Quantum Physics – proves contradictions which justifies the 1AC

MIT ’19 (Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page; Covers latest ideas from blog post about arXiv; 03/12/2019; “Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page”; <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/>; *MIT Technology Review*; accessed: 11/19/2020; MohulA)

Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities. Since then, physicists have used the “Wigner’s Friend” thought experiment to explore the nature of measurement and to argue over whether objective facts can exist. That’s important because scientists carry out experiments to establish objective facts. But if they experience different realities, the argument goes, how can they agree on what these facts might be? That’s provided some entertaining fodder for after-dinner conversation, but Wigner’s thought experiment has never been more than that—just a thought experiment. Last year, however, physicists noticed that recent advances in quantum technologies have made it possible to reproduce the Wigner’s Friend test in a real experiment. In other words, it ought to be possible to create different realities and compare them in the lab to find out whether they can be reconciled. And today, Massimiliano Proietti at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and a few colleagues say they have performed this experiment for the first time: they have created different realities and compared them. Their conclusion is that Wigner was correct—these realities can be made irreconcilable so that it is impossible to agree on objective facts about an experiment. Wigner’s original thought experiment is straightforward in principle. It begins with a single polarized photon that, when measured, can have either a horizontal polarization or a vertical polarization. But before the measurement, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, the photon exists in both polarization states at the same time—a so-called superposition. Wigner imagined a friend in a different lab measuring the state of this photon and storing the result, while Wigner observed from afar. Wigner has no information about his friend’s measurement and so is forced to assume that the photon and the measurement of it are in a superposition of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Wigner can even perform an experiment to determine whether this superposition exists or not. This is a kind of interference experiment showing that the photon and the measurement are indeed in a superposition. From Wigner’s point of view, this is a “fact”—the superposition exists. And this fact suggests that a measurement cannot have taken place. But this is in stark contrast to the point of view of the friend, who has indeed measured the photon’s polarization and recorded it. The friend can even call Wigner and say the measurement has been done (provided the outcome is not revealed). So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co. That’s the theory, but last year Caslav Brukner, at the University of Vienna in Austria, came up with a way to re-create the Wigner’s Friend experiment in the lab by means of techniques involving the entanglement of many particles at the same time. The breakthrough that Proietti and co have made is to carry this out. “In a state-of-the-art 6-photon experiment, we realize this extended Wigner’s friend scenario,” they say. They use these six entangled photons to create two alternate realities—one representing Wigner and one representing Wigner’s friend. Wigner’s friend measures the polarization of a photon and stores the result. Wigner then performs an interference measurement to determine if the measurement and the photon are in a superposition. The experiment produces an unambiguous result. It turns out that both realities can coexist even though they produce irreconcilable outcomes, just as Wigner predicted. That raises some fascinating questions that are forcing physicists to reconsider the nature of reality. The idea that observers can ultimately reconcile their measurements of some kind of fundamental reality is based on several assumptions. The first is that universal facts actually exist and that observers can agree on them. But there are other assumptions too. One is that observers have the freedom to make whatever observations they want. And another is that the choices one observer makes do not influence the choices other observers make—an assumption that physicists call locality. If there is an objective reality that everyone can agree on, then these assumptions all hold. But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong. Of course, there is another way out for those hanging on to the conventional view of reality. This is that there is some other loophole that the experimenters have overlooked. Indeed, physicists have tried to close loopholes in similar experiments for years, although they concede that it may never be possible to close them all. Nevertheless, the work has important implications for the work of scientists. “The scientific method relies on facts, established through repeated measurements and agreed upon universally, independently of who observed them,” say Proietti and co. And yet in the same paper, they undermine this idea, perhaps fatally. The next step is to go further: to construct experiments creating increasingly bizarre alternate realities that cannot be reconciled. Where this will take us is anybody’s guess. But Wigner, and his friend, would surely not be surprised.

#### [3] Innovation – anything else means that we don’t further logic and philosophy

Parsons 90 [Terence Parsons, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sep., 1990, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 335- 353 Published by: Cambridge University Press, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231701 //](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231701%20//) LEX JB]

* Denying truth means you never find anything

In Contradiction,1 Graham Priest shows, as clearly as anything like this can be shown, **that it is coherent to maintain that some sentences can be both true and false at the same time. As a consequence, some contradictions are true, and an appreciation of this possibility advances our understanding of the nature of logic and language**. Priest also argues that this view, which he calls **'dialetheism/ is** superior to **popular solutions to paradoxes in logic and language based on the idea that some sentences lack truth-value altogether. This claim of superiority is a priori suspicious, since there is a body of technical literature showing various kinds of isomorphisms between truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts - between sentences lacking truth-values ('gaps') and sentences being both-true-and-false ('gluts').** I will claim that Priest's arguments against the truth-value gap approach fail, and I will go on to explain why I think Priest's account which employs true contradictions is not better than an analysis of paradoxes using truth-value gaps. But it is not worse, either, and that is perhaps a radical conclusion, and a major advance in our understanding of the issues.

### 1AC – Offense

#### I affirm – A just government ought to recognize a worker’s unconditional right to strike – the resolution is true

* Walkout strikes, but will change within reason
* Legalization – more spec in cx

**Presumption and permissibility affirm –**

**A] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me.**

**B] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.**

**C] Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong.**

**D] Presuming obligations is logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation.**

**E] Presuming statements false is impossible since we can’t operate in a world where we don’t trust anything.**

**F] To negate means to deny the truth of, which means if there isn’t offense to deny the truth of you should affirm.**

**G] Otherwise we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water.**

**H] If anything is permissible, then definitionally so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it**

### 1AC – UV

#### [1] 1ar theory since the neg can do infinite bad things and I can’t check. It’s drop the debater since the 1ar is too short to win both layers. No RVI since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes. CI since reasonability is arbitrary and bites intervention.

#### [2] Permissibility and presumption substantively affirm: a) Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me b) Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason. c) If anything is permissible, then definitionally so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it

#### [3] No neg fiat a) The resolution is a question of ought-reading a more desirable advocacy doesn’t prove that the negative is a good idea d) Aff has to indict the squo, but they don’t defend that, nullifying any possible reason to do the aff – that’s half my speech time and all my offense

#### [4] Negative may not read more than 1 off case position as the affirmative can only read 1 position, K2 reciprocity

#### [5] RVI on NC theory – you can read arguments such as T that are exclusively neg so I need them to compensate