# 1AR

#### Reading Curry is black fem-phobic – I’m gonna attach a shit ton of screen-shots and insert sections of curry’s work.

#### He scapegoats Black women as the ones who wanted Black men to be the patriarch – in response to Black hypermasculinity, Curry would blame Black women.

Curry 17 — Tommy J. Curry, Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Southern Illinois University, 2017 (“Conclusion: Not MAN but Not Some Nothing,” *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood*, Published by Temple University Press, ISBN 9781439914878, p. kindle 4854-4996)

Intersectionality and Hegemonic Masculinity

While contemporary intersectionality theorists argue that the theory can and, in fact, does apply to Black males, there has been no critical interrogation of the role dominance theory plays in explaining or defining heterosexual Black male behavior under intersectionality. For example, Frank Rudy Cooper’s “Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy” asserts that the analysis of Black male bipolarity (the oscillation between the Good Black and Bad Black male image) “is an intersectional phenomenon because it is the product of the combination of narratives about [B]lackness in general and narratives about [B]lack masculinity in particular.”36 At the same time, however, he asserts that heterosexual Black men, good and bad, are seduced “into taking pleasure in the present hierarchies”37 Despite their material location, in prison or in the boardroom, “heterosexual [B]lack men are taught to emulate the economically-empowered heterosexual white men who set the norms in this culture.”38 Using Michael Kimmel’s essay “Masculinity as Homophobia,” Cooper interprets Raewyn Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinity to conclude:

The predominant account of normative United States masculinity describes it as fundamentally based on a fear of being associated with denigrated others. To be a full man, one must distinguish oneself from femininity. One accomplishes that by distancing himself from the qualities associated with women and from women themselves. Instead, one treats women as possessions to be displayed as evidence of one’s manhood. Similarly, one must distance oneself from gay men. This is the attempted repudiation of the presence of feminine qualities in men.39

Kimmel cites Connell’s Gender and Power to explain hegemonic masculinity as “the image of masculinity of those men who hold power.” 40 According to Kimmel, “We equate manhood with being strong, successful, capable, reliable, in control.”41 In fact, it is these definitions of manhood that are used to “maintain the power that some men have over other men and that men have over women.” As discussed previously, these notions simply do not apply to racially subordinated males who are targeted by white patriarchy. As decades of data have suggested, Black men and boys simply do not see masculinity either as the ideal for which one should strive or as synonymous with Black manhood.

Cooper argues that heterosexual Black men seek to emulate this normative white masculinity, making them “feel compelled to prove their manhood through acts that distance them from marginalized others.” Perhaps most interesting, he maintains that intersectional disadvantage does not change the impulse of the heterosexual male. Despite their condition or circumstances, “heterosexual [B]lack men will seek to offset their feelings of powerlessness by subordinating others.”42 This explanation highlights the difference between the application of a theory and anthropological assumptions behind a theory. Cooper argues that intersectionality helps us understand the identity-level tensions and conflicts between Black men being designated as good or bad in a white-supremacist society, but behind the analysis of identity is an assumption about the nature of heterosexual Black men. Cooper’s claim does not emerge from any historical or empirical study of heterosexual Black males, but from the familiarity this narrative has among gender theorists—his repetition of the consensus concerning Black males held by his audience. Cooper only cites the anecdotal analysis bell hooks offers of Black males’ political aspirations after emancipation. While hooks admits that newly freed Black men and women were both struggling with the contradictions of gender in which Black women demanded that Black men protect and provide for them, it is only Black men, in their struggle to fulfill this role and be recognized as men, who are deemed patriarchs.43 Like Michele Wallace, hooks is unable to conceptualize (non-feminist-inspired) Black masculinities, especially after racial integration.44 She assumes that the history of Black gender relations can be told as one that conceptualizes Black womanhood as participating in sexism but is much less innocuous in its reproduction of patriarchy than Black males, while the political struggles of Black men are primarily mimetic and motivated by their desire to dominate others. Since hooks provides no citations to substantiate her interpretation of (heterosexual) Black men’s 150-year struggle for freedom in this country, the reader is expected to accept Cooper’s understanding of the Black male personality based solely on the authoritative force of bell hooks’s pronouncement. Regardless of their location, heterosexual Black men, because they are male, are thought always to aspire to the characteristics of white (bourgeois) masculinity. Even in those cases where the Black male is shown to be materially oppressed, Cooper asserts, Black males will subordinate others to compensate for the power they lack.

#### AND He argues that women have privilege in the court system, and they actively use and exploit it in assault cases.

Curry 17 — Tommy J. Curry, Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Southern Illinois University, 2017 (“Introduction: Toward a Genre Study of Black Male Death and Dying,” *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood*, Published by Temple University Press, ISBN 9781439914878, p. kindle 705-823)

Black Male Vulnerability as a Foundation: Evaluating the Political Economy of Black Male Erasures from Theory

Black male vulnerability is the term I use to capture the disadvantages that Black males endure compared with other groups; the erasure of Black males’ actual lived experience from theory; and the violence and death Black males suffer in society. The term is not meant simply to express the material disadvantages Black males face due to incarceration, unemployment, police brutality, homicide, domestic and sexual abuse throughout society, or their victimhood. The term is also meant to express the vulnerable condition—the sheer fungibility—of the Black male as a living terror able to be killed, raped, or dehumanized at any moment, given the disposition of those who encounter him. Black male vulnerability is an attempt to capture the Black male’s perpetual susceptibility to the will of others, how he has no resistance to the imposition of others’ fears and anxieties on him. Despite the contemporary intersectional, feminist, and liberal-progressive framings of gender hierarchies that maintain that Black men have some privilege based on their maleness, Black men and boys lag behind on practically every population indicator, from education and income to health and mortality.

Classrooms are hostile environments for young Black boys.105 They are often thought of as lazy, disruptive, and in need of the most discipline.106 Teachers routinely assert that Black boys are less intelligent than whites and Black girls and treat them less favorably as a result.107 Some scholars have even shown that parents have taken up the view that Black boys are less academically gifted than Black girls. These lower parental expectations for Black boys academically leads to not only less parental involvement in their education but also less reward or encouragement for their academic success.108 The negative experiences Black boys endure from kindergarten through twelfth grade have very real consequences for college and beyond. Since the dawn of the twenty-first century, Black men have received fewer than 40 percent of the associate, professional, and doctoral degrees awarded to Black Americans.109 The consequence of Black males earning fewer bachelor’s and doctoral degrees is reflected in the number of Black male professors at Title IV institutions throughout the country. According to the most recent report by the American Association of University Professors, there are roughly 48,000 Black male and about 70,000 Black female professors at Title IV colleges or universities in the United States.110 Black female professors outnumber Black male professors by a little more than 20,000. In contrast to the history of white Americans in higher education, Black men have always been outnumbered by their female counterparts in college enrollment and degree attainment. As the demographer Anne McDaniel explains, “The historical trend in college completion for [B]lacks is not marked by the reversal of a gender gap that once favored males, as it is for whites, but rather entails a longstanding female advantage.”111

Similarly, the economist Rhonda Sharpe notes, “Since 2000, Black women earned twice as many associate’s, bachelor’s and master’s degrees as [B]lack men and nearly twice as many professional and doctorate degrees.”112 The growth of Black women in the university has allowed them, as a group, to attain tenure-track employment at rates comparable that of their non-Black counterparts over the past two decades,113 while Black males are still trying to gain sustainable access to colleges and universities at the baccalaureate level.114 This historical advantage of Black women in education, first remarked on by W.E.B. DuBois in 1927, brings attention to a stark race-sex inequality disregarded by many, if not most, scholars working on race and gender.115 If this gender gap in education continues, warns Wilma Henry, “by 2097, all of the baccalaureate degrees earned by African Americans will be bestowed on African American women.”116 The smaller number of Black males pursuing college as a first choice drives many into labor-intensive blue-collar occupations. While these jobs will offer some economic independence compared with those years spent in college, Black males in these blue-collar occupations rarely climb the economic ladder into the middle class. This lack of class mobility for Black males carries the risk of poverty and unemployment.

Incarceration has also had a devastating impact on Black males’ lifelong economic prospects. At the end of 2009, an estimated 841,000 Black men and 64,800 Black women were in state or federal prisons and local jails.117 According to the Bureau of Justice report on prisoners, “On December 31, 2014, [B]lack males had higher imprisonment rates than prisoners of other races or Hispanic origin within every age group.”118 The economists Derek Neal and Armin Rick found that “the growth of incarceration rates among [B]lack men in recent decades combined with the sharp drop in [B]lack employment rates during the Great Recession have left most [B]lack men in a position relative to white men that is really no better than the position they occupied only a few years after the Civil Rights Act of 1965.”119 The impact of incarceration is not simply rooted in the removal of these Black males from society. Incarceration also marks Black men for years after they are released, making employment and basic sustenance nearly impossible. Evelyn Patterson and Christopher Wildeman’s recent study “Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course Revisited” found that imprisonment has even more devastating effects on Black males’ economic condition and quality of life than previously thought, since incarceration robs Black males of disproportionately more years that they are capable of working. Patterson and Wildeman conclude, “The total amount of time [B]lack men on average spend marked—not in prison but an ex-prisoner and felon—is far larger (at 11.14 years, corresponding to roughly 27 percent of their working lives). . . . [T]his means that [B]lack men spend on average 31 percent—roughly one-third—of their working lives either locked in a state prison or struggling to overcome the negative outcomes that result from their marked status.”120 As Becky Pettit argues, “High rates of incarceration among [B]lack men—and [B]lack men with low levels of education in particular—have profound implications for accounts of their social standing and that of their children, families, and communities where they live prior to and following incarceration.”121 Incarceration, then, is more than simply an institution; it is a socially invigorated stigma that marks poor, uneducated Black males throughout their lives and is far too often related to their impending deaths. But what if society is so dangerous for Black men and boys that prison, despite its deleterious consequences, is preferable? Evelyn Patterson’s “Incarcerating Death: Mortality in U.S. State Correctional Facilities, 1985–1998,” points out that Black men are actually safer in prison than in American society. She writes, “For [B]lack males at every age, death rates were higher for the population outside of prison compared with their same-race counterparts in prison.”122 What are scholars to make of this paradoxical social reality?

Historically, the prison has been explained as an institution that deprives the criminal of freedom. Incarceration is thereby linked to slavery and America’s history of racism by the extent to which Black men are criminalized and then made into prisoners, but rarely do these analyses explore the sexual aspects of imprisonment. As with our notions of racism, and even American slavery, Black males are imagined only in terms of their confrontation with white male power, never in terms of their vulnerability to rape or sexual violence at the hands of white men and women. Regardless of race, we live in a culture that denies the vulnerability of men to rape generally. Rape, when it does happen to men, is thought to be perpetrated only by other men. Women are never thought of as rapists or as perpetrators of sexual violence. As Lara Stemple, Andrew Flores, and Ilan Meyer explain, “Stereotypes about women, which reflect gender and heterosexist biases, include the notion that women are nurturing, submissive help mates to men. The idea that women can be sexually manipulative, dominant, and even violent runs counter to these stereotypes. Yet studies have documented female perpetrated acts that span a wide spectrum of sexual abuse, which include even severe harms such as nonconsensual oral sex, vaginal and anal penetration with a finger or object, and intercourse.”123 Female perpetration of sexual violence does not occur in a vacuum. Female perpetrators are aware of the innocence attributed to femininity and consequently the protection being female offers them from being seen as perpetrators of sexual violence, especially in cases involving imprisoned Black males.

#### AND He Misgenders queer folx

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#### AND Says Black Trans folx are too small of a category to analyze the intersections between transness and violence

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#### And Elitist –

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#### AND Silences Black Women

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#### That’s a reason to DTD: 1.] DTA makes it a no risk option – they can always read the argument and then go for it if a team doesn’t call them out but if they are they kick out of it. Only rejecting them sets a norm of violent authros to read. 2.] Risk of reading this author causes trauma to other debaters in the future is proof of why you should err on the side of dropping the team 3.] Even if they cited a different portion of curry, we shouldn’t let him gain academic hegemony that invisiblizes his violent tendencies.

### NC

#### civic engagement – strikes increase democratic participation which reinvigorates democracy.

McElwee 15 [Sean; Research Associate at Demos; “How Unions Boost Democratic Participation,” The American Prospect; 9/16/15; https://prospect.org/labor/unions-boost-democratic-participation/]

Labor organizer Helen Marot once observed, "The labor unions are group efforts in the direction of democracy." What she meant is that more than simply vehicles for the economic interests of workers (which they certainly are), labor unions also foster civic participation for workers. And nowhere is this clearer than in voter turnout, which has suffered in recent years along with union membership. Indeed, new data from the Census Bureau and a new analysis of American National Election Studies data support the case that unions' declining influence has also deeply harmed democracy.

In 2014, voter turnout was abysmal, even for a midterm. Census data suggest that only 41.9 percent of the citizen population over 18 turned out to vote. However, as I note in my new Demos report Why Voting Matters, there are dispiriting gaps in turnout across class, race, and age. To examine how unions might affect policy, I performed a new analysis of both Census Bureau and American National Election Studies data. The data below, from the 2014 election, show the differences in voter turnout between union and non-union workers (the sample only includes individuals who were employed, and does not include self-employed workers). While only 39 percent of non-union workers voted in 2014, fully 52 percent of union workers did.

As part of ongoing research, James Feigenbaum, an economics PhD candidate at Harvard, ran a regression using American National Election Studies data suggesting that union members are about 4 percentage points more likely to vote and 3 points more likely to register (after controlling for demographic factors) and individuals living in a union household are 2.5 points more likely to vote and register. This is largely in line with the earlier estimates of Richard Freeman.

These numbers may appear modest, but in a close national election they could be enough to change the result.

Other research has found an even stronger turnout effect from unions. Daniel Stegmueller and Michael Becher find that after applying numerous demographic controls, union members are 10 points more likely to vote.

What's particularly important is that unions boost turnout among low- and middle-income individuals. In a 2006 study, political scientists Jan Leighley and Jonathan Nagler found that, "the decline in union membership since 1964 has affected the aggregate turnout of both low and middle-income individuals more than the aggregate turnout of high-income individuals." In 2014, the gap between unions and non-union workers shrunk at the highest rung of the income ladder. There was a 15-point gap among those earning less than $25,000 (40 percent turnout for union workers, and 25 percent turnout for non-union workers). Among those earning more than $100,000, the gap was far smaller (49 percent for non-union workers and 52 percent for union workers).

Individuals living in union households are also more progressive than those in non-union households. I examined 2012 ANES data and find that union households aren't largely different from non-union households on many issues regarding government spending, but they are more likely to have voted for Obama, identify as Democratic, and support a robust role for the government in reducing income inequality. When looking at union members specifically, the gaps become slightly larger.

More upscale union members are far more progressive than their non-union counterparts. Non-union households with an income above $60,000 oppose government intervention to reduce inequality by 11 points, with 32.2 percent in favor and 43.4 percent against. But richer union households support government intervention, with 42.5 percent in favor and 29.9 percent opposed. As Richard B. Freeman has pointed out, "union members are more likely to vote for a Democrat for the House or Presidency than demographically comparable nonunion voters." He similarly finds that "unionism moves members to the left of where they would be given their socioeconomic status," in line with the data I examined from 2012.

A 2013 study by Jasmine Kerrissey and Evan Schofer finds that union members are not only more likely to vote, but also more likely to belong to other associations, and to protest. They also find that these effects are strongest among people with lower levels of education, suggesting that unions may help mobilize the least politically active groups. A recent study of European countries finds union members vote more and identifies those aspects of union membership that contribute to the higher turnout.

The strongest factor is that workers who engage in democratic organizations in the workplace (via collective bargaining) are more likely to engage in democracy more broadly by, for instance, voting.

Other studies support the idea that civic participation creates a feedback loop that leads to higher voting rates. Another factor is that union members make more money, and higher income is correlated with voting behavior. Finally, union members are encouraged by peers and the union to engage in politics, which also contributes to higher levels of turnout.

It's not entirely surprising that politicians who savage unions often share a similar contempt for the right to vote. Democracy in the workplace leads to democracy more broadly throughout society. Workers with more democratic workplaces are more likely to democratically engage in in society. Further, when unions and progressives demonstrate that government can benefit them, Americans are more likely to want to participate in decision-making. For all these reasons, unions play a unique and indispensable role in the progressive project. As Larry Summers, certainly not a leftist, recently argued, "the weakness of unions leaves a broad swath of the middle class largely unrepresented in the political process."

#### Second, corruption reduction – the right to strike fights concentration of power while reducing inequality.

IER 17 [Institute of Employment Rights. The IER exists to inform the debate around trade union rights and labour law by providing information, critical analysis, and policy ideas through our network of academics, researchers and lawyers. “UN Rights Expert: Right to strike is essential to democracy”. 3-10-2017. . https://www.ier.org.uk/news/un-rights-expert-right-strike-essential-democracy/.]

The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, has reminded member states of the International Labour Organization (ILO) – including the UK – that they have a positive obligation to uphold the right to strike. Speaking at an ILO meeting on Monday 06 March 2017 in Geneva, Kiai argued that the right to strike is fundamental to the preservation of democracy. “The concentration of power in one sector – whether in the hands of government or business – inevitably leads to the erosion of democracy, and an increase in inequalities and marginalization with all their attendant consequences. The right to strike is a check on this concentration of power,” he explained. The right to strike has been established in international law as a corollary to the right of freedom of association for decades, and is enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights as Article 11. As a member state of the ILO and of the EU, the UK is legally obliged to uphold the right to strike, although through the Trades Union Act 2016 and the anti-trade union laws that preceded it, the government is making it harder and harder for trade unions to take industrial action. Kiai criticised such actions, saying government’s have a duty not to impede workers’ ability to take industrial action. “I deplore the various attempts made to erode the right to strike at national and multilateral levels,” the expert said, reminding delegates: “Protest action in relation to government social and economic policy, and against negative corporate practices, forms part of the basic civil liberties whose respect is essential for the meaningful exercise of trade union rights. This right enables them to engage with companies and governments on a more equal footing, and Member States have a positive obligation to protect this right, and a negative obligation not to interfere with its exercise.”

# 1AC

### Framework

#### The meta ethic is practical reason-

#### [1] Ethics must be derived a priori – moral truths exist independently of the empirical world. Prefer –

#### A] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents which makes it action guiding

#### B] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be, this means experience may be generally useful but should not be the basis for ethical action.

#### [2] Practical Reason is that procedure. To ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is escapable and non-actionguiding which is the problem of regress. Aggregation is nonsensical since a] it impedes on one persons ends for another and b] assumes everyone values the same thing.

#### [3] Moral law must be universal—our judgements can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me – any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) // LEX JB [brackets for gendered language]

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that **when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, [they] supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified**. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). **In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness**. Kant considers what this might be**: it cannot be an object of inclination**, for those have only a conditional worth, "**for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth**" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, **the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity"** or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that **regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action."** By this I understand him to mean that **we must regard ourselves as capable of** conferring **value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good**. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), **we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves**. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize t hem. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. To clarify, consequences don’t link to the framework.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### [1] Kantian theory has the best tools for fighting oppression through combatting ethical egoism and abstraction

Farr 02 [Arnold (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32 // LEX JB]

**One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s** moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the **universal and the concrete is a valid distinction, the unity of the two is required** for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that **I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. **It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence.** What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also**.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. **The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation.** For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. … Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. **First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions.** It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. **To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings.** Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. **The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves.** Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. **What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.**

#### [2] An understanding of Kantianism is key to understanding the law in the real world because states abide by inviolable side-constraints in their constitutions

#### [3] Analytical philosophy means anyone can generate offense under the framework with analytics without evidence – couple impacts

#### a) Accessibility – util disproportionately favors evidence-based debate which is what big schools with coaching staffs have which kills small school engagement

#### b) Ground – it ensures that there’s always offense on both sides whereas util might skew against an uninherent aff because of what countries do

#### c) Critical thinking – ensures that you engage and contest offense instead of running to cards for argumentation

#### [4] Ideal theory is in no way incompatible with a radical agenda—broad principles can inspire broad sweeping change and allow previously-excluded groups to claim political agency.

**Holmstrom** [Holmstrom, Nancy [Prof. Emeritus @ Rutgers]. "Response to Charles Mills's." Radical Philosophy Review 15.2 (2012): 325-330.] [recut by Lex CH]

We have to speak to people where they are, he says, and that means appealing to core values of liberalism: **individualism, equal rights and moral egalitarianism**. Against what he calls the conventional wisdom among radi- cals, he argues that **there is no inherent incompatibility between these values and a radical agenda**. If these values are suitably interpreted, I think he is absolutely right. Over two hundred years ago, Mary **Wollstonecraft and** Toussaint **Louverture took** the **abstract universalistic principles** of the French Revolution **and extended them to groups they were intended to exclude**. Gradually and incompletely women and blacks and landless men have achieved the democratic rights promised to all (in words) by the anti-feudal revolution. So I agree with Charles that such universalistic principles have great value; **even if usually applied in self-serving ways, they have a deeply radical potential** and it would be foolish of radicals to reject them, any more than we should reject all of the technological developments of the Indus- trial Revolution which also developed with the rise of capitalism. in fact, few American radicals have rejected these aspects of liberalism in their politi- cal practice but have been their strongest champions since the Revolution; socialists of all kinds helped to build the labor and civil rights movements.

#### [5] Abstract ideals are inevitable and good.

Shelby 13 [Tommie Shelby, “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills,” *Critical Philosophy of Race*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2013), pp. 145-162] AG

#### On the Rawlsian view, injustices are conceptualized as deviations from the ideal principles of justice, in much the same way that fallacious reasoning is conceived as a deviation from the rules of logical inference. An injustice is a failure on the part of individuals or social arrangements to satisfy what the ideal principles of justice demand. Thus, charges of injustice presuppose ideals of justice, which particular individuals and institutions can and often do depart from. Such deviations can be small or great, minor or serious, and depending on the size and nature of the gap between ideals and practice (and also on whether these deviations are avoidable or blameworthy), different remedies will be required. Nonideal theory specifies and justifies the principles that should guide our responses to such deviations from ideal justice.17 Within nonideal theory (and here I focus on domestic rather than global justice), we should distinguish at least four sets of principles: 1. Principles of reform and revolution: the principles that should guide efforts to bring an unjust institutional arrangement more in line with justice such that the society’s members have a more just (though not necessarily perfectly just) society within which to live. 2. Principles of rectification: the principles that should guide the steps a society takes to remedy or make amends for the injuries and losses the oppressed have suffered as a result of past injustice. 3. Penal principles: the principles that should guide the policies a society relies on when responding to individual noncompliance with what justice requires (e.g., principles for punishment, detention, and deportation). 4. Political ethics: the duties and permissions individuals have under unjust social conditions, that is, the principles that should guide their response to injustice. Rawls’s theory provides some direction for (1) and (4), and some limited guidance for (3). But he provides almost no help with (2). And it is (2)—principles of rectification—that is Mills’s chief concern and the main concern of many black radicals. Most of my work has focused on principles of reform and revolution and political ethics (particularly the political ethics of the oppressed), and on the relationship between the two. Yet I certainly see value in work defending principles of rectification Indeed, we can view the principles of reform and revolution and the principles of rectification as jointly constituting a theory of corrective justice. Principles of type (1) have to do with altering the basic structure of a society so that it better approximates a well-ordered society. Type (2) principles address the need to make amends to those burdened and harmed by unjust basic structures. Type (1) principles are forward looking, oriented toward establishing a just society. Type (2) principles are backward looking, oriented toward settling unpaid moral debts. To see that (1) and (2) are distinct it is enough to observe that one could fully pay reparations to the victims of past racial injustice and yet their society remain unjust, including racially unjust. Rawls is concerned with corrective justice, but he thinks of it as encompassing more than laying down principles for making amends to the victims of past injustice. He conceives of it as also including the philosophical arm of reform or revolutionary efforts to establish a society regulated by a mutual commitment to justice, a well-ordered society. When the principles of justice function as a goal of reform or revolution, what the reformers and revolutionaries are ultimately aiming at is this: a society in which the principles are fully realized in its institutions and citizens support and comply with institutional rules because these are in accord with their shared conception of justice. It is in this way that ideal theory serves as a guide for nonideal theory. Mills might accept this more expansive conception of corrective justice and even concede that Rawls’s ideal theory can aid us in its development. But I suspect he would still have doubts about ideal theory’s helpfulness in developing the rectificatory dimension of nonideal theory. After all, Rawls’s two principles are supposed to provide a basis for citizens to judge the validity of their claims of justice on their social system. One kind of claim citizens may make (on their own behalf or on behalf of others) is that they or others are due reparations for harms they have incurred as a result of serious injustice. Does Rawls provide any guidance for judging the validity of such claims? Mills is skeptical. He asserts, “Surely forty years is long enough—especially in a society to whose creation racism has been central—for there to be a significant body of work by now showing how one derives principles of rectificatory racial justice (a “pressing and urgent matter” [Rawls, Theory, 9] if ever there was one) from the idealtheory principles!” (23, note 6) In reply I would note that serving as a guide for nonideal theory is not the same as serving as a set of axioms from which theorems of rectification can be directly deduced. I doubt that ideal theory could play this latter justificatory role. And it should not surprise us if auxiliary precepts of justice were required for a fully adequate theory of compensatory justice. (The same would presumably be true of penal principles. After all, one cannot strictly derive a principle of proportionality in punishment from the two principles of justice either.)18 What ideal theory can provide, however, are evaluative standards for judging when such rectification is prima facie called for—namely, when culpable violations of the principles of justice have caused serious and identifiable harm. The ideal principles (particularly the equal liberty principle) help to explain what was wrong with, say, Jim Crow and Apartheid and why the damage they did to their victims warrants various corrective measures, perhaps including reparations. The trouble with Mills’s view is that he regards nonideal theory as independent of ideal theory, indeed as an alternative to it. But nonideal theory—the study of the principles that should guide our responses to injustice—cannot succeed without knowing what the standards of justice are (and perhaps also what justifies these standards). It is not clear how we are to develop a philosophically adequate and complete theory of how to respond to social injustice without first knowing what makes a social scheme unjust. When dealing with gross injustices, such as slavery, we may of course be able to judge correctly that a social arrangement is unjust simply by observing it or having it described to us, relying exclusively on our pre-theoretic moral convictions. We don’t need a theory for that. But with less manifest injustices, or when our political values seem to conflict, or when we’re uncertain about what justice requires, or when there is great but honest disagreement about whether a practice is unjust, we won’t know which aspects of a society should be altered in the absence of a more systematic conception of justice. Without a set of principles that enables us to identify the injustice-making features of a social system, we coul

### Advocacy

#### Thus the advocacy – Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

**Findlaw 17** [Created By Findlaw'S, 5-2-2017, "Labor Strike FAQs," Findlaw, <https://www.findlaw.com/employment/wages-and-benefits/labor-strike-faqs.html> // LEX JB]

* Definition of worker and strike, explains process

For **a strike** to occur, a [union or group of workers](https://www.findlaw.com/smallbusiness/employment-law-and-human-resources/unions-basics.html)**begins negotiations with an employer**. A threat of strike action is the main weapon that the workers has—**essentially the workers** will walk off the job if **their** collective demands are not met. For a strike to occur, **union leadership must call for a strike, which can only occur if enough union members have voted for the strike**. Each individual union has rules dictating what percentage of workers must vote for a strike in order for it to occur. Once the workers strike and stop coming to work, the business might shut down and feel financial strain, which **puts pressure on the employer and** gives the workers leverage in the negotiations**.**

#### The aff fiats recognition which is

<https://www.ldoceonline.com/Government-topic/recognition> // LEX JB

* Dictionary in the context of governments

the [act](https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/act) of[**realizing**](https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/realize)**and**[accepting](https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/accept) that something is [true](https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/true)**or important**

#### Enforcement through legalization

### Offense

#### **[1] The formula of autonomy demands a workers’ right to strike. The NC’s universalizability objections WILL miss the boat – it’s a question of how workers exercise their agency and autonomy which outweighs**

**Chima 13** [Chima, S. C. (2013). Global medicine: Is it ethical or morally justifiable for doctors and other healthcare workers to go on strike? BMC Medical Ethics, 14(Suppl 1), S5. doi:10.1186/1472-6939-14-s1-s5 // LEX JB]

Some philosophers have described moral obligations or duties, which ought to guide ethical behavior, such as the duty of fidelity or the obligation to keep promises, and beneficence - the obligation to do ‘good’ [10]. However, it has been suggested that some other equally compelling moral duties or ethical obligations may conflict with the above duties, such as the right to justice. Justice is the right to fair treatment in light of what is owed a person [63]. For example, it may be argued that everybody is equally entitled to a just wage for just work. The philosopher Immanuel Kant based his moral theory on a categorical imperative which encourages moral agents to act, based on a principle, which they would deem to become a universal law [64]. One can argue that the decision by any HCW to go on strike may not be universalisable. However, looking at this decision from the principle of respect for autonomy, or freedom of choice, one can conclude that individual autonomy is a sentiment which is desirable for all human beings. Accordingly, every worker should be free to choose whether to work or not, based on a whether any specific set of conditions of their own choosing have been met. Kant argues further that moral agents or individuals should be treated, “whether in your own person or in that of any other, never solely as a means, but always as an end” [64]. This idea that individuals should be treated as ends in themselves has influenced political philosophy for centuries, and stresses the libertarian ideology that people should not have their individual freedoms curtailed either for others or for the good of society in general [10,64]. From this axiomatic considerations, one can conclude that it would be unethical for people to be used as slaves or be forced to work for inadequate wages or under slave-like conditions [4,10,12,51]. The issue of HCW strikes can also be analyzed from utilitarian principles as formulated by one of its major disciples JS Mills as follows [65]: The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that Chima BMC Medical Ethics 2013, 14(Suppl 1):S5 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/14/S1/S5 Page 6 of 10 actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.

#### [2] Recognizing ability to strike is a unique obligation of the institution – anything else allows coercive workplaces and treating workers as a means to an end

**Howard 20** [Danielle Howard,, Mar 2020, "What Should Physicians Consider Prior to Unionizing?," Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association, [https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03 //](https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03%20//) LEX JB]

* Written in the context of doctors, warrant can be used for all jobs

When discussing ethics, practicalities, and outcomes of physician unions, the focus is almost always entirely on physicians. Yet to place the weight of responsibility for patient care entirely on unionized clinicians is unjust, as Kant’s reasoning applies to the employing organization as well (hereafter referred to as “the health system”). The health system benefits from physicians providing patient care; if it then creates working conditions that its employed clinicians do not find sustainable, it violates the categorical imperative by using clinicians as a means to its end. The same can be said of patients, who are used as means to an end if the health system places restrictions on patient care for financial gain. When evaluating the ethics of physician unionization, it is important to realize that the health system has its own corporate social responsibility to both patients and physicians that is independent of physicians’ commitment to patient care.26 Physicians are expected to consider the effects that their unionization will have on the patient population because they have a responsibility to patient care. The health system shares equally in this responsibility.

#### [3] Strikes are just an extension of the right to self defense and a core part of human value

Waas 12 [Professor Dr. Bernd Waas, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany [https://islssl.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Strike-Waas.pdf September 2012](https://islssl.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Strike-Waas.pdf%20September%202012)]

Second, entirely different attitudes exist towards strikes. In some countries, strikes are considered “a right to self-defence” which is not necessarily directed at the employer; in other countries, the area of admissible industrial action may be necessarily congruent with the relationship between employers and employees. In yet other countries, strikes are seen as acts of “self-empowerment” which have very little to do with a legal order granting certain powers or rights. Finally, in some countries, the right to strike is viewed as being firmly rooted in human dignity, granted to each individual worker and not waivable by him or her, and in others, the perspective may be more “technical” with a considerable power to dispose of the right to strike.

#### [4] The offense can’t be turned – strikes are an omission of action

**Benjamin 78** [Walter Benjamin, On Violence, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings [Walter Bendix Schönflies Benjamin was a German Jewish philosopher, cultural critic and essayist]

This is above all the case in the class struggle, in the form of the workers' guaranteed right to strike. **Organized labor is, apart from the state, probably today the only legal subject en­titled to exercise violence. Against this view there is certainly the objection that an omission of actions, a nonaction, which a strike really is, cannot be described as violence**. Such a consideration doubtless made it easier for a state power to conceive the right to strike, once this was no longer avoidable. But its truth is not unconditional, and therefore not unrestricted. It is true that the omission of an action, or service, where it amounts simply to a "severing of relations," can be an entirely nonviolent, pure means. **And as in the view of the state, or the law, the right to strike conceded to labor is certainly not a right to exercise violence but, rather, to escape from a violence indirectly exercised by the employer**, **strikes conforming to this may undoubtedly occur from time to time and involve only a "withdrawal" or "estrangement" from the employer.** The mo­ment of violence, however, is necessarily introduced, in the form of extortion, into such an omission, if it takes place in the context of a conscious readiness to resume the suspended action under certain circumstances that either have nothing whatever to do with this action or only superficially modify it. Understood in this way, the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor, which is opposed to that of the state, the right to use force in attaining certain ends. The antithesis between the two conceptions emerges in all its bitterness in face of a revolu­tionary general strike. In this, labor will always appeal to its right to strike, and the state will call this appeal an abuse, since the right to strike was not "so intended," and take emer­gency measures.

### UV

**Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all broken constructive positions with underlining and highlighting on open source on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki and under their own name for every round they’ve debated this season 30 minutes after they debated.**

#### Violation – they don’t disclose every doc – impossible to know which are broken and aren’t

Graphical user interface, application, table

Description automatically generated

Table

Description automatically generated

#### A. Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—only way to level the playing field for students like novices in under-privileged programs – key to inclusion and its an independent voter and outweighs because you can’t debate if you aren’t included

#### B. Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t mis cut – otherwise you could have highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s an independent voter – maintaining ethical evidence practices is key to being good academics and to verify you didn’t cheat

#### C. Depth of clash – open source allows debaters to come up with more nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round faster since it’s easier to read through the doc and see what parts of the evidence are actually highlighted. Leads to highest quality evidence comparison – outweighs – thinking on your feet is non-unique but the best quality responses will come from full access to a case. Independently, they didn’t disclose round reports for these rounds either which preround prep is impossible because I don’t know what you’re going for this tournament.

#### [1] DTD on 1ac theory and disclosure – a) disclosure cannot be drop the argument because it would just drop you because you’re the norm b) deterrence

#### [2] No RVI on ac theory – otherwise the neg would dump for 7 mins on a shell and moot the possibility of a 1ar out – any reason why they get an rvi is nonunique because you would have to respond to 6 minutes of the 1AC regardless of if its theory or a contention

#### [3] CI – 1] reasonability is arbitrary – impossible to know what is reasonable until you establish a brightline 2] bites judge intervention cuz they have to gut check what they think is good 3] reasonability collapses cuz u use offense defense to evaluate offense under the BL 4] norms – you can sidestep norms by selectively choosing a different brightline you meet every round.

#### [4] Disclosure outweighs – it’s key to assessing the honesty of the form of your argumentation and how you presented arguments which means it precludes 1nc claims.

#### [5] Fairness is a voter because debate is a game governed by rules and you can’t tell who actually won if the layer was skewed.

#### [6] Asking doesn’t solve – novices need to be able to get the docs full access who don’t have connections

### UV

#### Reject monocausal analyses.

David Martin Jones 15, Visiting Professor in the Department of War Studies, King's College London and Associate Professor, School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Queensland; and M.L.R. Smith, Professor of Strategic Theory in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, September 2015, “Return to reason: reviving political realism in western foreign policy,” International Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 933-952

The dissolution of any prospect for enduring stability, whether in the Middle East, Africa or central and east Asia, exhibits a condition of great complexity. What does this complexity disclose about how European states and the United States might respond? First, it should be recognized that the search for a single root-cause that identifies a singular answer is futile and counter-productive. Monolithic solutions present themselves in a variety of forms, ranging from pacifist utopianism through cosmopolitan transformational idealism to cynical conservative pessimism. Yet even a superficial examination of international problems negates such one-dimensional explanations. For example, the intense sectarian and tribal divisions and rivalries affecting very different societies in the Middle East or across the wider and more diffuse ‘Muslim world’ exposes the practical limitations of any all-encompassing rationalist or normative solution.28 Indeed, the diversity of Islam both in its heartlands and across its diaspora illustrates the difficulty of trying to establish an abstract monocausal explanation that magically reveals a hidden interconnection between very different issues and conflicts.

#### Ideal theory is a pre-requisite to non-ideal theory and is not incompatible with radical agenda

**Laurence 14** (Ben Laurence, "The Priority of Ideal Theory, 2014, "University of Chicago, <https://www.academia.edu/30652065/The_Priority_of_Ideal_Theory?auto=download)//Lex> AKu

It is common ground between Rawls and his critics that nonideal theory concerns the pressing and urgent matters that confront us in our ordinary political life in an unjust society. Nonideal theory, on any conception, involves the identification of injustice, and the proposal of effective, politically possible, and morally permissible remedies to these injustices. It is also common ground that nonideal theory is an indispensible component of the theory of justice, raising its own distinct theoretical questions not addressed by ideal theory. Finally, Rawls agrees that nonideal theory must draw on empirical research to diagnose the underlying political pathologies that confront us and propose effective remedies. However, Rawls appears to differ in holding that we can only achieve a systematic and deep understanding of the relevant issues of nonideal theory by relating them to ideal theory. We are now ready to consider this argument in detail. For this purpose, I will focus on five aspects of the dependence of nonideal theory on ideal theory: identification, explanation, comparison, practical reasoning, and moral permissibility. As we have seen, Rawls agrees with his critics that it is possible to identify injustice without worked out views about justice. However, to identify injustice in a systematic fashion, we need to go beyond our piecemeal judgments about injustice, and group different classes of injustices together by relating them to the general normative requirements that they violate. Such systematic classification of injustice thus depends on the principles of justice developed in ideal theory. The principles bring further system to our judgments insofar as they allow us to extend our judgments into ignored or uncertain areas where we are conflicted and unsure in our judgments. Since our considered judgments of injustice usually come with some awareness of the grounds on which we make the judgment, Rawls agrees that we can often explain the injustice of various phenomena without recourse to ideal theory. However, ideal theory functions to deepen and systematize these explanations by deriving the relevant judgments along with the supporting reasons from principles of justice. The arguments supporting the relevant principle connect them to the more general judgments about the relations between citizens. This serves to deepen our explanations of injustice by showing how the injustice is incompatible with the relation of free equals underlying the principle. These arguments bring to light the common ground underlying the judgments of injustice of a variety of kinds, unifying and connecting the explanation for various lower-level judgments about injustice. The third dimension of justificatory dependence concerns the function of nonideal theory to make comparative judgments concerning the grievousness of different injustices. Although Rawls can agree that such comparison can sometimes be made on the basis of our untutored judgments, a systematic approach to comparative judgments must draw on ideal theory. By providing principles of justice, ideal theory specifies numerous dimensions along which failure can occur. If we wish to be systematic in our comparisons, awareness of the relevant dimensions is important. Furthermore, the principles of justice adjudicate the reasonable claims citizens have on one another in situations where different values stand on each side of a claim. In a just society, these claims are ordered and handled in some way that the principles of justice make clear. Such evaluations, giving precedence to some claims over others, can guide us when making comparative judgments about the grievousness of situations where the choice is between two different injustices. For example, if a just society would not diminish rights of democratic participation to improve economic opportunity, then this indicates to us that lacking the right to vote is more unjust than having a lower rate of opportunity for upward economic mobility. Of course, this weighting might hold only for a range of cases. But even this is interesting and relevant information necessary for a systematic approach to such comparisons. Of course, since they are practical judgments, the whole purpose of the identification, explanation, and comparison of injustice is political action overcoming these practical evils. No doubt, we can reason in a piecemeal and ad hoc fashion about what responses are called for by various injustices, sometimes successfully. However, by specifying the long-range goal of our political hope and action, ideal theory orients such practical reasoning, and allows it achieve a systematic and ambitious character. It reminds us that there is a range of injustices, many inter-related, all of which must ultimately be addressed. It also equips us to make sophisticated practical judgments of a long-range character. For example, it allows us to reason about how we must transform political conditions before various more ambitious reforms become possible. It also allows us to situate our comparative judgments of injustice in their context, by recognizing that short- term gains to justice are not always worth long-term costs. This is the fourth dimension of the dependence of nonideal on ideal theory. The fifth dimension of the dependence of nonideal on ideal theory involves the moral permissibility of responses to injustice. Since nonideal theory looks for politically feasible and morally permissible changes to institutional structures that move us towards a just society, nonideal theory must have something to say about what institutional changes are morally permissible. Nonideal theory also includes the account of different means by which citizens can attempt to introduce institutional change in their society, ranging from ordinary participatory politics, to boycotts and orderly protests, through civil disobedience, and all the way up to militant resistance and revolution. We can see the relevance of ideal theory to a systematic approach to these tasks in several ways. Rawls’ discussion of civil disobedience provides a nice example. To provide a theory of the conditions under which civil disobedience is morally permissible, we must understand the status of the rule of law in a democratic society, and the reasons for obedience to even unjust laws when produced through a genuinely democratic process. Furthermore, we must grasp an idea of democracy deeper than, say, voting in periodic elections, in order to see how civil disobedience could be a profoundly democratic act even while it contravenes democratic legislation. We see here the need to relate the idea of modes of resistance to a conception of the democratic relation of citizens that ideal theory provides. It seems clear as well that systematic views about what institutional policies are morally permissible responses to injustice will depend partially on claims about the nature and aims of a just society. This has to do with the idea of moral costs, and follows from the previously specified dimensions. For example, suppose an effective way of responding to an injustice involves introducing an institutional arrangement that would otherwise violate a principle of justice. This is a moral cost, and it is certainly relevant to judge the moral permissibility of the policy proposal. If an equally effective way of addressing the problem exists that does not introduce the relevant injustice, the policy may be impermissible. But the systematic specification of moral costs will depend on the identification, explanation, and comparison of various injustices, as well as the general point about practical reasoning, which all depend on ideal theory for their systematic character. In sum, the basic Rawlsian argument for the priority claim is that only ideal theory is capable of relating our particular judgments about injustice to their grounds in our general considered judgments and the principles they support. In doing so, it ultimately orients our thinking about injustice in the here and now to a conception of the relation of free and equal citizens. By taking this conception to its limits and specifying its feasible institutional realization, ideal theory orients our practical reason to the end of a just society as the object of our political hope and action. This work of sharpening and deepening our practical intelligence by taking reflection on justice to its limit is arguably indispensible for a systematic and deep approach to the pressing and urgent matters with which nonideal theory contends.

### UV

#### [1] 1ar theory since the neg can do infinite bad things and I can’t check. It’s drop the debater since the 1ar is too short to win both layers. No RVI since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes. CI since reasonability is arbitrary and bites intervention.

#### [2] Permissibility and presumption substantively affirm: a) Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me b) Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason. c) If anything is permissible, then definitionally so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it

#### [3] No neg fiat a) The resolution is a question of ought-reading a more desirable advocacy doesn’t prove that the negative is a good idea d) Aff has to indict the squo, but they don’t defend that, nullifying any possible reason to do the aff – that’s half my speech time and all my offense

#### [4] Negative may not read more than 1 off case position as the affirmative can only read 1 position, K2 reciprocity

#### [5] RVI on NC theory – you can read arguments such as T that are exclusively neg so I need them to compensate

#### [6] Reject Determinism – a) proves that we should never do anything because there’s no purpose to attempts which justifies never solving violence b) it affirms because the aff can be uninherent which means it was already determined c) all the arguments are just reasons why you can’t do the aff which triggers presumption.