# Princeton R5

## 1

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – anything else moots 7 minutes of the nc and exacerbates the fact that they get infinite pre-round prep since I should be able to compensate by choosing – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

#### They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Most educational since otherwise we wouldn’t use math or logic to approach topics. Scalar methods like comparison increases intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – T/F binary is descriptive and technical.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional. I denied the truth of the resolution by disagreeing with the aff which means I’ve met my burden.

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) statements are more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways o/w on probability b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted c) the aff has to prove an obligation which means lack of that obligation negates.

#### I negate: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### The resolution specifies that the right to strike must be unconditional—this means it cannot be contingent on any authority or have any exceptions.

Magnell 11 [Thomas Magnell, Quals: Philosopher, Department of Philosophy, Drew University, Madison, NJ, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, J Value Inquiry (2011) 45:1–12]//BA PB

Unconditional rights may be either absolutely unconditional or relatively unconditional. An absolutely unconditional right is a right which every right-holder enjoys as something capable of having rights. These are the most fundamental of all rights. As rights which all right-holders have simply as right-holders, they are common to all people, institutions, corporations, societies, and at least some nonhuman animals. They do not need to be acquired. Because they are held unconditionally, they cannot be overruled. For the same reason, they are as minimal as can be. To draw anything more than the most minimal rights from right-holders as such is almost surely a mistake. The flights of fancy of natural rights theorists led Bentham to shout: ‘‘Natural Rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.’’12 Still, notwithstanding Bentham’s finest flourish of phrasing, there may be some, for example, the right of a right-holder not to be subject to a wanton disregard of its interests. This would seem to be a right that at least some animals have as well as people taken individually or in groups. It is not a particularly robust right. An awful lot of harm can be inflicted upon a right-holder without showing a wanton disregard for the right holder’s interests. Even so, as minimal as it is, it is not a right that is always respected, as National Socialists and International Socialists showed in concentration camps and the Gulag. A relatively unconditional right is a right which all right-holders of a certain kind enjoy without qualification. This gives a clear sense to the much abused term ‘‘human rights,’’ though there may be others. In the strictest sense, human rights are relatively unconditional rights. They are rights which human beings have simply as human beings, or perhaps more precisely as persons, if not all human beings are accounted persons, whatever their role or situation within or apart from a society. A better term for them would be ‘‘person rights,’’ but here the common term is unlikely to be allowed to give way. Human rights are not acquired, though if personhood is a characteristic that human beings can come to have and come to lose, human rights may be gained or lost along with it. Some other right-holders may have the same rights unconditionally, but not all. Narrower on the one hand than absolutely unconditional rights, broader on the other than conditional rights, human rights cannot be conferred by declarations or political manifestos on non-human animals or people: not on non-human animals because non-human animals cannot have them, and not on people because people already have them. In the strictest sense, many of the rights that have come to be labeled as human rights in the fairly recent past, such as the supposed rights to a certain level of income or to a certain level of education are not human rights at all, however politically popular it may be to say that they are. If they are rights in any sense, they are civil rights, acquired rights that are conferred by some civil authority. Human rights in the strictest sense have a more philosophical tone. One notable human right is that of entering into obligations, the right, odd as it sounds, to bear duties. Another is the human right to freedom, the relatively unconditional right that people who are capable of acting autonomously have as such beings. We have a right to liberty without the need for the right to be conferred, while other beings, such as non-human animals that may have the broader absolutely unconditional rights, lack this relatively unconditional right. This is why liberty is intimately tied with human dignity, even as it is demonstrably allied with human prosperity. All other rights that have correlative duties are conditional rights, rights of only some right-holders. They are acquired rights. Their acquisition is conditional on meeting certain qualifications. Someone has a right to have a promise kept only if he meets the qualifications of being the promisee. Someone has a right to receive charity only if he meets the qualification of being in need. From this it should be evident that conditional rights may be either conditioned-rights or unconditionedrights. What makes a right conditioned is a condition of the right itself, that of the correlative duty, an imperfect duty, not being conferred on other qualified rightholders. What makes a right conditional is a condition for acquiring the right in the first place.

#### The right to strike is a conditional right, so viewing it as unconditional is impossible. Fiat doesn’t solve because its intrinsic to the nature of the principle and the aff is a binding policy, not just view X as Y.

#### [1] The right to strike is conditional on the government existing and enforcing it: A] The Sqou proves that without the state, the right doesn’t exist, which means turning the NC non-uniques the aff B] State of nature would just mean people could take the action, not that they have a guaranteed right to do so.

#### [2] The right is conditional on the existence of certain social institutions: IE a workplace and employer to strike against, and a job to stop doing. This doesn’t apply to unconditional rights like freedom or life, since they are intrinsic to human nature not social constructs.

#### [3] Unconditional rights cannot conflict with each other, as otherwise neither would be absolute, but the right to strike conflicts with 1] The right to life of those deprived of stuff like medicine, which is fundamental to every human action.

## 2

#### Ethics must begin a priori and the meta-ethic is bindingness.

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Bindingness – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which is self-justified.

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer –

#### [1] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict. b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events.

#### Negate:

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.

## 3

**Their scholarship is hateful and a reason to lose the round—their author endorsed pedophilia and actively advocated against the age of consent law.**

**Doezema 18 [Marie Doezema (Parisian Journalist). “France, Where Age of Consent Is Up for Debate.” The Atlantic, 10 March 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/frances-existential-crisis-over-sexual-harassment-laws/550700/ //WWDH]**

After May 1968, French intellectuals would challenge the state’s authority to protect minors from sexual abuse. In one prominent example, on January 26, 1977, Le Monde, **a French newspaper, published a petition signed by** the era’s most **prominent intellectuals—including** Jean-Paul **Sartre**, Simone **de Beauvoir**, Gilles **Deleuze**, Roland Barthes, Philippe Sollers, André Glucksmann and Louis Aragon—**in defense of** three men on trial for **engaging in sexual acts with minors**. “French law recognizes in 13- and 14-year-olds a capacity for discernment that it can judge and punish,” the petition stated, “But it rejects such a capacity when the child's emotional and sexual life is concerned.” Furthermore, **the signatories argued, children and adolescents have the right to a sexual life**: “If a 13-year-old girl has the right to take the pill, what is it for?” It’s unclear what impact, if any, the petition had. The defendants were sentenced to five years in prison, but did not serve their full sentences.

**Drop the debater—academic spaces have way too many sympathizers who ignore violence against children, and every act must be challenged in the most unflinching terms because anything else reinforces the epistemic bias in favor of rationalizing disgusting behavior.**

**Grant 18 [Alec Grant (Independent Scholar, retired from the Uiversity of Brighton where he was a Reader in Narrative Mental Health). “Sanitizing Academics and Damaged Lives” Mad In The UK, 12 April 2018. https://www.madintheuk.com/2018/12/sanitizing-academics-and-damaged-lives/ //WWDH]**

**Academics who sympathize with paedophilia constitute its intellectual public relations arm. Their role is to make child-adult sex presentable, more acceptable to the public, fit for polite society, sugar-coated, glossed with a scholarly veneer, sanitized. Snapshots of sanitizing academic activity from the last 40 years show how this seeps into and contaminates public policy, education and practice in insidious ways. This is done via the workings of power, privilege, perverse cronyism, and, as Pilgrim (2018) argues, as a result of widespread moral stupor and denial. It’s astonishing that this happens in the face of the psychological and development features of complex post-trauma which are often a consequence of child sexual abuse. By pathologizing adult survivors, often with the ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’ (BPD) tag, mainstream psychiatric business-as-usual plays out its role in suppressing the truth about the consequences of paedophilia among adult survivors. Pilgrim (2018) reminds us that care and mutuality are core ethical features of all sexual practices. As someone who was for many years associated with cognitive therapy, I’m interested in ‘cognitive, or thought distortions’, which are used by people in rationalising their behaviour in self-serving ways. We know from Pilgrim and many other writers, researchers and practitioners about the rationalisations of perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation. They include: Children are not victims but willing participants; They want it; They enjoy it; It’s about friendship; It’s about love; It helps children develop and mature. According to Pilgrim (2018), the ‘heyday’ period of academic versions of such rationalisations was the 1970s. 1977 was the year of an unsuccessful lobby by French intellectuals to defend intergenerational sex. Included among these were the otherwise well-respected philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Jaques Derrida, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. These figures were at the forefront of the use of academic authority to lobby governments to liberalise and decriminalise adult-child sexual contact. In 1978, Foucault took part in a France-Culture broadcast with two other gay theorists, Hocquengham and Danet, to discuss the legal aspects of sex between adults and children. They wanted a repeal of the law preventing this because they took the view that in a liberal (they really meant libertarian) society, sexual preferences generally should not be the business of the law. Foucault, Hocquengham and Danet made the following assertions: that children can, and have the capacity to, consent to such relations without being coerced into doing so; that abuse and post-abuse trauma isn’t real; that the law is part of an oppressive and repressive heteronormative social control discourse which unfairly targets sexual minorities; that children don’t constitute a vulnerable population; that children can and are capable of making the first move in seducing adults (they introduced here the category of ‘the seducing child’); that the laws against sexual relations between children and adults actually function to protect children from their own desires, making them an oppressed and repressed group; that – in the language of the sociologist Stanley Cohen – international public horror about sexual relations between adults and children is a form of moral panic which feeds into constructing the ‘paedophile’ as a folk devil, in turn provoking public vigilantism; that sex between adults and children is actually a trivial matter when compared with ‘real crimes’ such as the murder of old ladies; that many members of the judiciary and other authority figures and groups don’t actually believe paedophilia to be a crime; and that consent should be a private contractual matter between the adult and the child. Fast forward to 1981. The Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE) has been active for seven years. This was a pro-paedophile activist group, founded in the UK in 1974 and officially disbanded in 1984. The group, an international organisation of people who traded in obscene material, campaigned for the abolition of the age of consent. Dr Brian Taylor, the research director and member of PIE, and sociology lecturer at the University of Sussex produced the controversial book Perspectives on Paedophilia, which had the aim of enlightening social workers and youth workers about the benefits of paedophilia. Taylor, who identified as gay, advocated ‘guilt-free pederasty’ (sexual relations between two males, one of whom is a minor). He argued that people generally are hostile to paedophilia only because they don’t understand it, and If they did wouldn’t be so against it. So it was simply a matter of clearing up prejudice and ignorance.**

**The notion of fluidity is structurally inaccessible to Black folks.**

**Massa 14** Massa, Andre [News Contributor] “Implications of Wildersons Afropessimism” December 2014.

Since the very beginning, Wilderson argues that the United States is an unethical formation because it was founded on the backs of slaves but that the current paradigm of analysis is incapable of making this judgment because it is incapable of understanding the grammar of su"ering that the Black Body speaks. Criticizing those who advocated for coalitional politics and progressivism, Wilderson writes, “Those steadfast in their conviction that there remained a discernable quantum of ethics in the United States writ large were accountable, in their rhetorical machinations, to theparadigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground. Radicals and progressives could deride, reject or chastise armed struggle mercilessly with respect to tactics and the possibility of ‘success’, but they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could not make a convincing case-by way of paradigmatic analyses that the United States was an ethical formation and still hope to maintain credibility as radicals and progressives.” (Wilderson, Red, White and Black, pg. 4). **If the formation of the United States is unethical and if there is truly a grammar of su"ering that still seeks to speak to us, then why are current understanding of morality and epistemology derived from the Enlightenment or even new understandings of identity, meaning and power developed by postmodern philosophers such as Jacques Derida, Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault capable of understanding this**? For Wilderson it has to do with the banishment of the Black Body from the Human fold because their ontological construction is “the very antithesis to the Human subject”. (Wilderson, Red, White and Black, pg. 9). **The reason for the banishment of the Black Body from the paradigm of human subjectivity has to do with the ontological condition that the Middle Passage positioned on the Black Body**. In comparing the Middle Passage with the Jewish Holocaust Wilderson writes, “The gratuitous violence of the Black’s first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, “wiped out metaphysics. Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks. This violence which turns a body into flesh, ripped apart literally and imaginatively, destroys the possibility of ontology because it positions the Black in an infinite and horrifying and open vulnerability, an object made available for any subject.” (Wilderson, Red, White and Black, pg. 38). In understanding Wilderson’s argument, it is important to note the relationship between fungibility and Black subjectivity. Like Patterson, because the Middle Passage had destroyed an sense of kinship and culture Blacks had as Africans, destroying any sense of self-conceptions victims of the Middle Passage had regarding their own ontology. The di"erence that Wilderson highlights between the Holocaust and the Middle Passage is that Jews came out of the Holocaust still retaining their culture and kinship, in e"ect retaining their position as Human subjects a!er the event. Blacks, on the other hand, did not even have the privilege to retain these customs and bonds of kinship. Their status as fungible objects allowed for structures of whiteness to construct Black subjectivity as they saw fit while other groups, such as Jews, Latinos, Native Americans, were still considered Human to retain some independent agency with regards for the construction of their own subjectivity. Because of the violence of the Middle passage and its construction of the Black Body as the ontological Slave, current paradigms of analysis will never be able to account for the Black grammar of su"ering because they are built from the very epistemological foundations that constructed the Black Body as a fungible object in the first place and cannot account for the ontological condition of the Black Body. Going a step further, **Wilderson infers that these paradigms of analysis continue to eradicate Black subjectivity** when he writes, “Whiteness is parasitic because it monumentalizes its subjective capacity, its lush cartography, in direct proportion to the wasteland of Black incapacity. By ‘capacity’ I have meant something more than comprehensive than ‘the event’ and it casual elements and something more indeterminate than ‘agency’. We should think of it as a kind of facility or matrix through which possibility itself can be elaborated. Without the Negro, capacity itself is incoherent.” (Wilderson, Red, White, and Black, pg. 45). This parasitic relationship is the foundation of anti-blackness. Wilderson argues that the paradigms of analysis that constitute both modern and postmodern epistemology necessitate the perpetuation of the ontological construction of the Black Body as the Slave because they are reliant on the incapacity of Black subjectivity to imagine its own possibility so that White capacity can have something to compare itself to maintain its own coherence, to have an example of social death that it can look to in order to assure ontologically that they have the capacity and agency to imagine possibility for itself. **A prime example of parasitic Whiteness can be seen with Gilles Deleuze’s concept of being in a constant state of “becoming”, in which we refuse to be shackled by the static identity that dominant institutions label us with so that we can be in a better position to examine our own desire for repression that institutions seem to take advantage of**. (Conley, Deleuze and Queer Theory, pg. 25-27). **The parasitism that takes place here is that the idea of being in a constant state of “becoming” is inaccessible to the Black Body because it requires some form of independent subjectivity in the first place. In order for one to assure themselves that they are in the state of “always becoming”, that they have the capacity to engage in this process, the incapacity of the Black Body to engage in this form of “becoming” must be maintained so that Whiteness can have that model of incapacity to with which to compare itself to so as to assure itself ontologically that they are in the process of becoming.** Legal reform falls into the same reasoning for Wilderson. He critiques these forms of coalitional politics as “feigning ontological capacity regardless of the fact that Blackness is incapacity in its pure and unadulterated form.”. (Wilderson, Red, White and Black, pg. 38). By incapacity, Wilderson means that the Black Body can never access the benefits o legal reform because they do not have the subjectivity to be able to advocate for their own interests nor will civil society ever recognize the Black Body because the construction of the Black Body as the Slave is necessitated by the parasitic nature of Whiteness so as to maintain an a conception of their capacity to shape their own subjectivity. Thus, in a world where we continue to placate the Black Body with the false hope of legal reform, anti-black violence will always be inevitable in that world because we will never take the necessary steps required to re-examine the epistemology that constructs the Black Body as the Slave in the first place. For Wilderson, the only way we can do that is through complete freedom by imagining the end of the world. Regarding the reconceptualization that is necessary, Wilderson writes, “The Slave needs freedom not from wage relation, nor sexism, homophobia, and patriarchy, nor freedom in in the form of land restoration. The slave needs freedom from the Human race, freedom from the world. The Slave requires gratuitous freedom. Only gratuitous freedom can repair the object status of his or her flesh, which itself is the product of accumulation’s and fungibility’s gratuitous violence. There are no feelings powerful enough to alter to the structural relation between the living and the dead. But one can imagine feelings powerful enough to bring the living to death.”(Wilderson, Red, White and Black, pg. 141-142). Imagining the end of the world is the only way that the Slave can truly become free form the Human race. This is the knowledge production that Wilderson advocates to bring about the “gratuitous freedom” that is needed to reconceptualize Black ontology. However, there are two negative impacts to this form of thinking. The first is that Wilderson’s call to imagine the end of the world is a form of colonialist knowledge production because it universalizes the experiences of the individual black people by forcing them to embrace the negativity surrounding their own ontological position in the world, reducing them to what Spivak calls the subaltern. The second is that Wilderson’s thought production destroys the potential for emancipatory political reform as his negativity creates a form of political apathy in which the Black Body loses all motivation to challenge the laws that perpetuate racism while creating a culture of self-hatred for one’s identity that destroys the possibility of forming coalitions that Bell hooks believes necessary to break down racism.

**[1] humans are inherently oriented towards the future, such as through deciding on a career, making plans with friends and caring for their future health. That presupposes that the subject is continuous and exists through time, and that the future self is continuous with your current self. Thus, there is a connection and obligation to your future self which requires static subjecthood.**

**[2] Even though there are different fragment of ourselves that exist and change over time, our ability to isolate past and present instances of that self-necessitate the existence of a static subject**

**[3] Rejection of static truth norms like 2+2=4 is bad, and makes it fail as an ethical theory**

**[4] Under deleuze, my subject is fluid- I am the judge and I am giving myself the ballot now, this round is over**

**[5] War machines fail, they inevitably become the state in which they were trying to break free from, creating an endless cycle of violence**

**[6] Your NC fails, you focusing on one static issue and allowing it to define you transforms you from a nomadic war machine to a staticizing one**

**[7] People are excluded from partaking in assemblages, they become exclusionary and perpetuate the violence that they are created to stop**

**FRAMING ISSUE: Constantly changing desires and actions do not change our ONTOLOGICAL NATURE—there’s no internal link between the flux of desires and the flux of agency**

**1. Turn: If two thoughts belong to the same mind, then there is a train of thought available to that mind in which they could both figure. That presupposes that there's a singular agent that encapsulates different things. The phrase “I think” necessitates unity of self-consciousness, so even if my interactions in the world themselves are not static, the ways in which I process them are.**

**2. Even if there are such things as desires that implicate a shiftiness of the subject, the ability to conceptualize those desires is static. This is the same reason why there is nothing that shifts a racist person from their desires.**

**3. Although some instances desire would alter the subject, this does not affect their AGENCY as a whole. Certain negative or positive experiences contextualize how an agent pursues and formulates their desires.**

**4. Fluidity alone can’t generate static obligations since they’re temporally bound; you need static norms that are always good for a subject’s agency to do so. If you can’t generate an obligation you can’t generate a prescription of what obligation you should take.**

**Death bad under deleuze**

**There is no force more staticizing than death, under deleuzian philosophy stopping death comes first, A) takes away all fluidity, you are dead therefore you inherently cannot make any choices B) takes away your abillity to be affected, you can’t be affected if you are dead C) you cannot form war machines or assemblages if you are dead**

**Perf cons**

1. **You are following static norms by taking a (x) minute speech, under deleuzian phil this is bad**
2. **You obeyed the rules of cx time and prep time, you are reinforcing static norms in the debate space**
3. **You disclosed - You attempting to disclose and set norms for the space is a perf con, you can’t even claim you needed to disclose to have access to the space, you are staticizing the space and making it violent**

# Case

#### Cross apply Kant Off Workers are oppressive to patientshttps://www.cnbc.com/2011/06/06/strike-and-well-change-the-law-uk-warns-unions.html

https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/22/economy/uk-inflation-5-bank-of-england/index.html

#### Interperetation debaters must not read “Fluidity leads to differentiation in ethics as each subject’s ethicality arises from their own affective relations indexed to themselves”

Offense –

1] infinite abuse – under a normsetting model I would lose every round since they would just read this argument and I’d lose since they just have to prove the resolution is true under one subjects index.

2] Accessibility – arg justifies racism like hitlers index being true to prove the res.

Paradigm issues

Dtd – deter future abuse

Competing interps race to top best norms

Cant weigh case

Nc theory first - norming

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)