# Newark R1

## New Affs Bad

#### Interpretation—The aff must disclose the advocacy text and the standard text before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation—they didn't

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### The standard is prep and clash-

#### Two internal links-a) Neg prep: The AC framework controls the direction of a round – even if its whole rez, my prep drastically differs based on a util AC, topical K aff, or a burden/tricks aff. 4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn a little about the affirmative and piece together what 1nc positions work best against the affirmative and cut and research their applications to the affirmative. Exacerbated by the fact that philosophy can be dense and hard to fully understand with a few cross ex questions absent any pre-round prep. They also get months to frontline their one aff, while I coming into the round guessing—o/w since their already structurally ahead, b) Aff quality-disclosing the framework text allows preliminary research into the framework preventing frameworks from winning just because they are terribly confusing and not a philosophy that policymakers would actually use-if they affirmatives framework would be crushed with 20 minutes of research then it does not deserve to win. This will answer the 1ar's claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there's still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can't check against the broader literature.

#### Fairness- consittutive of comp activites, args presume

#### Edu- funded ny schools

#### DTD- dta illogical, time skew

#### No RVI’s- illogical, baiting

#### CI- intervention, race to bottom, collapses, yours vs best

### 1NC—OFF

#### Next off is the NC

#### The meta-ethic is procedural moral realism - substantive realism holds that moral truths exist independently of that in the empirical world. Prefer procedural realism –

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### Our relation to how we establish ethics is lexically prior to consequences – there are intrinsic values that make it such the means can never justify the ends.

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Core consequentialism holds that the permissibility of actions supervenes on (is fully determined by), and is positively sensitive to, the value of their consequences. This does not require valuemaximization; it only requires value promotion, where the relevant value is that of the 14 consequences. I shall argue that core consequentialism, at least in its standard forms, is mistaken. The ends do not always justify the means. If core consequentialism is true, then any action with maximally good consequences (in a given choice situation) is permissible. The main argument in favor of this claim is the following: P1: An action is morally permissible if it is best supported by insistent moral reasons for action. P2: The value of consequences is always an insistent moral reason for action. P3: The value of consequences is the only insistent moral reason for action. C: Thus, an action is morally permissible if it maximizes the value of consequences. This is the same argument given in the previous section for the impermissibility of actions that do not have maximally good consequences, except that (1) the appeal to insistent reasons has been made explicit, (2) the necessary conditions of the original P1 and C have been converted to sufficient conditions, and (3) the qualification in P3 that allowed the possibility of some prior constraints has been dropped. P1 is highly plausible. An action that is best supported by insistent moral reasons is surely permissible. P2 can be challenged, as I did earlier, on the ground that beyond some point the value of consequences ceases to be an insistent moral reason (once consequences are good enough, their value may only be a non-insistent reason). For the present purposes, however, we can grant this claim. The crucial claim is P3. It is implausible, because there are insistent moral reasons other than the value of consequences. There are also deontological insistent reasons, and these, or at least some of these, are lexical prior to the value of consequences. In particular, individuals have certain rights that may not be infringed simply because the consequences are better. Unlike prudential rationality, morality involves many distinct centers of will (choice) or 15 interests, and these cannot simply be lumped together and traded off against each other.16 The basic problem with standard versions of core consequentialism is that they fail to recognize adequately the normative separateness of persons. Psychological autonomous beings (as well, perhaps, as other beings with moral standing) are not merely means for the promotion of value. They must be respected and honored, and this means that at least sometimes certain things may not be done to them, even though this promotes value overall. An innocent person may not be killed against her will, for example, in order to make a million happy people slightly happier. This would be sacrificing her for the benefit of others. The claim here is that there are some constraints on how value may be promoted. The ends do not always justify the means. Moreover, these constraints, as I shall explain below, are grounded in the normative separateness of persons.17 Constraints may be personal or impersonal. An impersonal constraint against killing, for example, prohibits killing, independently of whether this is in the killed person’s interests and independently of whether she has consented to it (i.e., is in conformance with her will). It would rule out, for example, well-informed suicide, voluntary euthanasia, and non-voluntary euthanasia where an incompetent individual is terminally ill and likely to be in great pain for the remainder of her life. Although impersonal constraints do reflect a normative separateness of individuals, they do not do so, I believe, in the relevant manner. They fail to capture the respect due to persons. Persons (beings that are protected by morality for their own sake) have interests and often autonomous wills. Any constraint against treating a person in a specified way that applies even when the holder validly consents to such treatment and such treatment is in the holder’s interest fails to reflect the respect due to that person. Impersonal constraints fail to reflect this respect, and I agree with core consequentialism’s rejection of such constraints. Constraints can, however, be personal. A personal constraint empowers the protected 16 individual, and makes the prohibition conditional on it thwarting her interests or, alternatively, not being in conformance with her will. Personal constraints are waivable rights, and are waived (and hence not violated) when the breach of the constraint is—for interest-protecting rights—in the person’s interests, or——for choice-protecting rights—when the person has given valid (e.g., free and informed) consent.18 Thus, for example, well informed suicide and voluntary euthanasia do not violate the choice-protecting right against being killed, and non-voluntary euthanasia for a person with a life not worth living does not violate her interest-protecting right against being killed. Personal constraints—both choice-protecting and interest-protecting rights—reflect the normative separateness of persons in an appropriate manner. Like impersonal constraints, they require that the holder not be used merely a means for promoting value. Unlike impersonal constraints, by giving a special role to the interests or will of the rights-holder, they further require that the holder be treated with respect.19 There are, of course, many important questions that need to be answered. One concerns the content of the rights. For the present purposes, we don’t need to answer this question. All that matters is that there are some rights. I believe, for example, that one of our core rights is that of bodily security (e.g., against being killed, struck, or restrained). A second issue concerns whether the rights are choice-protecting or interest-protecting. The issue concerns the nature of the requisite respect that rights require. I’m inclined to think that psychologically autonomous agents have (mainly) choice-protecting rights and non-autonomous but sentient beings (such as young children and certain animals) have interest-protecting rights, but we need not resolve this issue here. All we need is the existence of some kind of right. A third issue concerns whether the rights are absolute or conditional in certain ways. Rights with thresholds, for example, have no force when the value that would be foregone is 17 above some threshold (e.g., a right against being killed might not apply where infringement is the only way of avoiding social catastrophe).20 If there are thresholds, then at some point the normative separateness of persons yields to the promotion of value. For the present purposes, we can leave this open. As long as the rights at least sometimes have some force, the normative separateness of persons will be at least partially recognized in a way incompatible with core consequentialism. The objection to core consequentialism is that it does not recognize that the ends do not always justify the means, and more specifically that the normative separateness of persons (as reflected in rights) make it impermissible to treat people in certain ways even if it promotes value.

#### [2] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be, this means experience may be generally useful but should not be the basis for ethical action.

#### Practical Reason is that procedure. To ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary.

Velleman (David, “Self To Self”, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pg 18-19)

As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source of authority turn out to be escapable because the authority behind them can be questioned. We can ask, “Why should I act on this desire?” or “Why should I obey the U.S. Government?” or even “Why should I obey God?” And as we observed in the **case** of the desire to punch someone in the nose, this question demands a reason for acting. The authority we are questioning would be vindicated, in each case, by the production of a sufficient reason. What this observation suggests is that any purported source of practical authority depends on reasons for obeying it—and hence on the authority of reasons. Suppose, then, that we attempted to question the authority of reasons themselves, as we earlier questioned other authorities. Where we previously asked “Why should I act on my desire?” let us now ask “Why should I act for reasons?” Shouldn’t this question open up a route of escape from all requirements? As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask “Why should I?” is to demand a reason; and so to ask “Why should I act for reasons?” is to demand a reason for acting for reasons. This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to question—namely, the authority of reasons. Why would we demand a reason if we didn’t envision acting for it? If we really didn’t feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldn’t help. So there is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons.

#### Reason’s authority is self-justified. Only self-justification is epistemically sound—otherwise inquiry is infinitely regressive or circular. That means the aff must prove their framework is based in a self-justifying axiom.

#### Aggregation is nonsensical since a] it impedes on one persons ends for another and b] assumes everyone values the same thing.

#### Moral law must be universal—our judgements can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me – any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with liberty. Prefer:

#### 1] The state is obligated to prioritize freedom.

Otteson 09 [(James R., professor of philosophy and economics at Yeshiva University) “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism,” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3, Winter, [2009](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9506-9)] TDI

It is difficult to imagine a stronger defense of the “sacred” dignity of individual agency. Kantian individuality is premised on its rational nature and its entailed inherent dignity, and the rest of his moral philosophy arguably is built on this vision.1 Kant relies on a similarly robust conception of individuality in work other than his explicitly moral philosophy. The 1784 essay “An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?’” (Kant 1991), for example, emphasizes in strong terms the threat that paternalism poses to one’s will. Kant argues that “enlightenment” (Aufklärung) involves a transition from moral and intellectual immaturity, wherein one depends on others to make one’s moral and intellectual decisions, to maturity, wherein one makes such decisions for oneself. One cannot effect this transition if one remains under another’s tutelage, and, as a corollary, one compromises another’s enlightenment if one undertakes to make such decisions for the other person—which, as Kant argues, is the case under a paternalistic government. Kant also writes in his 1786 essay “What Is Orientation in Thinking?” that “To think for oneself means to look within oneself (i.e. in one’s own reason) for the supreme touchstone of truth; and the maxim of thinking for oneself at all times is enlightenment” (1991, 249, italics and bold in the original). These passages are consistent with the position he takes in Grounding that a person who depends on others is acting heteronomously, not autonomously, and is to that extent not exercising a free moral will. These passages also help to clarify Kant’s notion of personhood and rational agency by indicating some of their practical implications. For example, on the basis of his argument, one would expect him to argue for setting severe limits on the authority that any group of people, including the state, may exercise over others: because individual freedom is necessary both to achieve enlightenment and to exercise one’s moral agency, Kant should argue that no group may impinge on that freedom without thereby acting immorally. Kant expressly draws this conclusion in his 1793 essay “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice’”: Right is the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonises with the freedom of everyone else (in so far as this is possible within the terms of a general law). And public right is the distinctive quality of the external laws which make this constant harmony possible. Since every restriction of freedom through the arbitrary will of another party is termed coercion, it follows that a civil constitution is a relationship among free men who are subject to coercive laws, while they retain their freedom within the general union with their fellows. (1991, 73, emphasis in original) Kant insists on the protection of a sphere of liberty for each individual to self-legislate under universalizable laws of rationality, consistent with the formulation of the categorical imperative requiring the treatment of others “always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (1981, 36). This formulation of the categorical imperative might even logically entail the position Kant articulates about “right,” “public right,” and “freedom.” Persons do not lose their personhood when they join a civil community, so they cannot rationally endorse a state that will be destructive of that personhood; on the contrary, according to Kant, a person enters civil society rationally willing that the society will protect both his own agency and that of others. Robert B. Pippen rightly says that for Kant “political duties are a subset of moral duties” (1985, 107–42), but the argument here puts it slightly differently: political rights, or “dignities,” derive from moral rights, which for Kant are determined by one’s moral agency. Thus, the only “coercive laws” to which individuals may rationally allow themselves to be subject in civil society are those that require respect for each others’ moral agency (and provide for the punishment of infractions thereof) (see Pippen 1985, 121). When Kant comes to state his own moral justification for the state in the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals, this claim is exactly the one he makes: the state is necessary for securing the conditions of “Right”—in other words, the conditions under which persons can exercise their autonomous agency (see 1991, 132–35). Consistent with this interpretation, Kant elsewhere endorses free trade and open markets on grounds that make his concern for “harmony” in the preceding passage reminiscent of Adam Smithian invisible-hand arguments. In his 1784 essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Kant writes: “Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest” (1991, 41). This statement is similar to Smith’s statement of the invisible-hand argument.2 Kant proceeds to endorse some of the same laissez-faire economic policies that Smith advocated—for example, in his discussion in his 1786 work “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” of the benefits of “mutual exchange” and in his claim that “there can be no wealth-producing activity without freedom” (1991, 230–31, emphasis in original), as well as in his claim in the 1795 Perpetual Peace that “the spirit of commerce” is motivated by people’s “mutual self-interest” and thus “cannot exist side by side with war” (1991, 114, emphasis in original).3 Finally, although Kant argues that we cannot know exactly what direction human progress will take, he believes we can nevertheless be confident that mankind is progressing.4 Thus, in “Universal History” he writes: The highest purpose of nature—i.e. the development of all natural capacities—can be fulfilled for mankind only in society, and nature intends that man should accomplish this, and indeed all his appointed ends, by his own efforts. This purpose can be fulfilled only in a society which has not only the greatest freedom, and therefore a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most precise specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can co-exist with the freedom of others. The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly just civil constitution. (1991, 45–46, emphasis in original) Kant’s argument in this essay runs as follows: human progress is possible, but only in conditions of a civil society whose design allows this progress; because the progress is possible only as individuals become enlightened, and individual enlightenment is in turn possible only when individuals are free from improper coercion and paternalism, human progress is therefore possible only under a state that defends individual freedom. Kant believes that individuals have the best chance to be happy under a limited civil government, and he therefore argues that even such a laudable goal as increasing human happiness is not a justifiable role of the state: “But the whole concept of an external right is derived entirely from the concept of freedom in the mutual external relationships of human beings, and has nothing to do with the end which all men have by nature (i.e. the aim of achieving happiness) or with the recognized means of attaining this end. And thus the latter end must on no account interfere as a determinant with the laws governing external right” (“Theory and Practice,” 1991, 73, emphasis in original). The Kantian state is hence limited on the principled grounds of respecting agency; the fact that this limitation in his view provides the conditions enabling enlightenment, progress, and ultimately happiness is a great but ancillary benefit. Thus, the positions Kant takes on nonpolitical issues would seem to suggest a libertarian political position. And Kant explicitly avows such a state. In “Universal History,” he writes: Furthermore, civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades and industries, and especially to commerce, in the event of which the state’s power in its external relations will also decline. . . . If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check. For this reason, restrictions placed upon personal activities are increasingly relaxed, and general freedom of religion is granted. And thus, although folly and caprice creep in at times, enlightenment gradually arises. (1991, 50–51, emphasis in original) In “Theory and Practice,” Kant writes that “the public welfare which demands first consideration lies precisely in that legal constitution which guarantees everyone his freedom within the law, so that each remains free to seek his happiness in whatever way he thinks best, so long as he does not violate the lawful freedom and rights of his fellow subjects at large” and that “[n]o-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law” (1991, 80, emphasis in original, and 74). In a crucial passage in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the “Universal Principle of Right” is “‘[e]very action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.’” He concludes, “Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (1991, 133, emphasis in original).5 This stipulation becomes for Kant the grounding justification for the existence of a state, its raison d’être, and the reason we leave the state of nature is to secure this sphere of maximum freedom compatible with the same freedom of all others. Because this freedom must be complete, in the sense of being as full as possible given the existence of other persons who demand similar freedom, it entails that the state may—indeed, must—secure this condition of freedom, but undertake to do nothing else because any other state activities would compromise the very autonomy the state seeks to defend. Kant’s position thus outlines and implies a political philosophy that is broadly libertarian; that is, it endorses a state constructed with the sole aim of protecting its citizens against invasions of their liberty. For Kant, individuals create a state to protect their moral agency, and in doing so they consent to coercion only insofar as it is required to prevent themselves or others from impinging on their own or others’ agency. In his argument, individuals cannot rationally consent to a state that instructs them in morals, coerces virtuous behavior, commands them to trade or not, directs their pursuit of happiness, or forcibly requires them to provide for their own or others’ pursuits of happiness. And except in cases of punishment for wrongdoing,6 this severe limitation on the scope of the state’s authority must always be respected: “The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance” (Perpetual Peace, 1991, 125). The implication is that a Kantian state protects against invasions of freedom and does nothing else; in the absence of invasions or threats of invasions, it is inactive.

#### 2] Enterprise – we are composed of different practical identities, but reason unifies them and allows us to shift and act upon different enterprises. Consequentialist frameworks cannot produce unified moral actions.

#### 3] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### Contention –

#### 1] Libertarianism mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates.

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### 2] Property rights in space can be consistent with international law

Simberg 12 [(Rand, MSE in technical management from West Coast University, recognized as an expert in space transportation by the Office of Technology Assessment) “Homesteading the Final Frontier A Practical Proposal for Securing Property Rights in Space,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, April 2012, <https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Rand-Simberg-Homesteading-the-Final-Frontier.pdf>] TDI

But is it true that any recognition of off-planet property claims is de facto a violation of the Outer Space Treaty? Not necessarily. For instance, one could argue that the existence of the Moon Treaty is in and of itself a refutation of the notion that the Outer Space Treaty outlaws private property in space, or else there would be no need for another treaty that essentially explicitly does so. And there is at least one potential loophole that could be exploited by appropriately worded legislation. There are two key assumptions in the legal argument used by opponents of off-planet property claims: 1) that the recognition by a government would only recognize claims by its own citizens; and 2) that it would defend them by force. That need not necessarily be so. Under the treaty, it would in fact be possible for a government, or group of governments, to recognize the property claims of anyone who met specified conditions, regardless of their citizenship or nationality. Such cooperation would obviate the need for physical force to defend claims. The argument that the treaty permits individual property rights was actually made from the very beginning. In 1969, two years after the treaty went into force, the late distinguished space-law professor, Stephen Gorove, noted that under it, “[A]n individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies.”32 This clearly provides support for the concept of individual claims off planet under Article II.

#### 3] Space appropriation and exploration originates from private companies such as Space X and Blue Origin. Preventing such is a restriction on the ability of companies to set and pursue their ends and these companies gain contracts with the government for projects which turns promise breaking offense.

### 1NC – REM PIC

#### CP Text: States, except the United States, should ban the appropriation of outer space for asteroid mining by private entities. The United States should fund the appropriation of outer space for the mining of rare earth metals from asteroids by private entities.

#### The PIC is key to beat China and protect against Chinese REM gatekeeping

Stavridis 21 [(James, retired US Navy admiral, chief international diplomacy and national security analyst for NBC News, senior fellow at JHU Applied Physics Library, PhD in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts) “U.S. Needs a Strong Defense Against China’s Rare-Earth Weapon,” Bloomberg Opinion, March 4, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-04/u-s-needs-a-strong-defense-against-china-s-rare-earth-weapon>] TDI

You could be forgiven if you are confused about what’s going on with rare-earth elements. On the one hand, news reports indicate that China may increase production quotas of the minerals this quarter as a [goodwill gesture](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3122501/china-raises-rare-earth-quotas-goodwill-trade-signal-us) to the Joe Biden administration. But other sources say that China may ultimately ban the export of the rare earths altogether on “[security concerns](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-19/china-may-ban-rare-earth-technology-exports-on-security-concerns?sref=QYxyklwO).” What’s really going on here?

There are 17 elements considered [rare earths](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/why-rare-earths-are-achilles-heal-for-europe-u-s-quicktake) — lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium — and while many aren’t actually rare in terms of global deposits, extracting them is difficult and expensive. They are used across high-tech manufacturing, including smartphones, fighter aircraft and components in virtually all advanced electronics. Of particular note, they are essential to many of the clean-energy technologies expected to come online in this decade.

I began to focus on rare-earth elements when I commanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence in Afghanistan, known as the International Security Assistance Force. While Afghans live in an extremely poor country, [studies](https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/afghanistans-mineral-resources-are-a-lost-opportunity-and-a-threat/) have assessed that they sit atop $1 trillion to $3 trillion in a wide variety of minerals, including rare earths. Some [estimates](https://www.fraserinstitute.org/article/afghanistans-rare-earth-element-bonanza) put the rare-earth levels alone at 1.4 million metric tons.

But every time I tried to visit a mining facility, the answer I got from my security team was, “It’s too dangerous right now, admiral.” Unfortunately, despite a great deal of effort by the U.S. and NATO, those security challenges remain, deterring the large foreign-capital investments necessary to harvest the lodes. Which brings us back to Beijing.

China controls roughly 80% of the rare-earths market, between what it mines itself and processes in raw material from elsewhere. If it decided to wield the weapon of restricting the supply — something it has repeatedly [threatened](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-trade-fight-raises-specter-of-rare-earth-shortage-11559304000) to do — it would create a significant challenge for manufacturers and a geopolitical predicament for the industrialized world.

It could happen. In 2010, Beijing threatened to cut off exports to Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Two years ago, Beijing was reportedly considering restrictions on exports to the U.S. generally, as well as against specific companies (such as defense giant Lockheed Martin Corp.) that it deemed in violation of its policies against selling advanced weapons to Taiwan.

President Donald Trump’s administration issued an executive order to spur the production of rare earths domestically, and created an [Energy Resource Governance Initiative](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Energy-Resource-Governance-Initiative-ERGI-Fact-Sheet.pdf) to promote international mining. The European Union and Japan, among others, are also aggressively seeking newer sources of rare earths.

Given this tension, it was superficially surprising that China announced it would boost its mining quotas in the first quarter of 2021 by nearly 30%, reflecting a continuation in strong (and rising) demand. But the increase occurs under a shadow of uncertainty, as the Chinese Communist Party is undertaking a “review” of its policies concerning future sales of rare earths. In all probability, the tactics of the increase are temporary, and fit within a larger strategy.

China will go to great lengths to maintain overall control of the global rare-earths supply. This fits neatly within the geo-economic approach of the [One Belt, One Road](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-30/china-is-determined-to-reshape-the-globe) initiative, which seeks to use a variety of carrots and sticks — economic, trade, diplomatic and security — to create zones of influence globally. In terms of rare earths, the strategy seems to be allowing carefully calibrated access to the elements at a level that makes it economically less attractive for competitors to undertake costly exploration and mining operations. This is similar to the oil-market strategy used by Russia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries for decades.

Some free-market advocates believe that China will not take aggressive action choking off supply because that could [precipitate retaliation](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-22/china-weaponizing-rare-earths-technology-will-probably-backfire) or accelerate the search for alternate sources in global markets. What seems more likely is a series of targeted shutdowns directed against specific entities such as U.S. defense companies, Japanese consumer electronics makers, or European industrial concerns that have offended Beijing.

The path to rare-earth independence for the U.S. must include: Ensuring supply chains of rare earths necessary for national security; promoting the exploitation of the elements domestically (and removing barriers to responsibly doing so); mandating that defense contractors and other critical-infrastructure entities wean themselves off Chinese rare earths; sponsoring research and development to find alternative materials, especially for clean energy technology; and creating a substantial stockpile of the elements in case of a Chinese boycott.

This is a bipartisan agenda. The Trump administration’s [strategic assessment](https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/06/department-commerce-releases-report-critical-minerals) of what needs to be done (which goes beyond just 17 rare earths to include a total of 35 critical minerals) is thoughtful, and should serve as a basis for the Biden administration and Congress.

#### REM access key to military primacy and tech advancement – alternatives fail

Trigaux 12 (David, University Honors Program University of South Florida St. Petersburg) “The US, China and Rare Earth Metals: The Future Of Green Technology, Military Tech, and a Potential Achilles‟ Heel to American Hegemony,” USF St. Petersberg, May 2, 2012, <https://digital.stpetersburg.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=honorstheses>] TDI

The implications of a rare earth shortage aren’t strictly related to the environment, and energy dependence, but have distinct military implications as well that could threaten the position of the United States world’s strongest military. The United States place in the world was assured by powerful and decisive deployments in World War One and World War Two. Our military expansion was built upon a large, powerful industrial base that created more, better weapons of war for our soldiers. During the World Wars, a well-organized draft that sent millions of men into battle in a short amount of time proved decisive, but as the war ended, and soldiers drafted into service returned to civilian life, the U.S. technological superiority over its opponents provided it with sustained dominance over its enemies, even as the numerical size of the army declined. New technologies, such as the use of the airplane in combat, rocket launched missiles, radar systems, and later, GPS, precision guided missiles, missile defense systems, high tech tanks, lasers, and other technologies now make the difference between victory and defeat.

The United States military now serves many important functions, deterring threats across the world. The United States projects its power internationally, through a network of bases and allied nations. Thus, the United States is a powerful player in all regions of the world, and often serves as a buffer against conflict in these regions. US military presence serves as a buffer against Chinese military modernization in Eastern Asia, against an increasingly nationalist Russia in Europe, and smaller regional actors, such as Venezuela in South America and Iran in the Middle East. The U.S. Navy is deployed all over the world, as the guarantor of international maritime trade routes. The US Navy leads action against challenges to its maritime sovereignty on the other side of the globe, such as current action against Somali piracy. Presence in regions across the world prevents escalation of potential crisis. These could result in either a larger power fighting a smaller nation or nations (Russia and Georgia, Taiwan and China), religious opponents (Israel and Iran), or traditional foes (Ethiopia and Eretria, Venezuela and Colombia, India and Pakistan). US projection is also key deterring emerging threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. While not direct challenges to US primacy, both terrorism and nuclear proliferation can kill thousands.

The US Air Force has a commanding lead over the rest of the world, in terms of both numbers and capabilities. American ground forces have few peers, and are unmatched in their ability to deploy to anywhere in the world at an equally unmatched pace.

The only perceived challenge to the United States militarily comes from the People’s Republic of China.76 While the United States outspends all other nations in the world put together in terms of military spending, China follows as a close second, and has begun an extensive modernization program to boot.77 The Chinese military however, is several decades behind the United States in air power and nuclear capabilities.78 To compensate, China has begun the construction of access-denial technology, preventing the US from exercising its dominance in China’s sphere of influence.79 Chinese modernization efforts have a serious long-term advantage over the United States; access to rare earth metals, and a large concentration of rare earth chemists doing research.80 This advantage, coupled with the U.S. losing access to rare earth metals, will even the odds much quicker than policymakers had previously anticipated. 81

The largest example is US airpower. With every successive generation of military aircraft, the U.S. Air Force becomes more and more dependent on Rare Earth Metals.82 As planes get faster and faster, they have to get lighter and lighter, while adding weight from extra computers and other features on board.83 To lighten the weight of the plane, scandium is used to produce lightweight aluminum alloys for the body of the plane. Rare Earth metals are also useful in fighter jet engines, and fuel cells.84 For example, rare earths are required to producing miniaturized fins, and samarium is required to build the motors for the F-35 fighter jet.85 F-35 jets are the next generation fighter jet that works together to form the dual plane combination that cements U.S. dominance in air power over the Russian PAK FA.86

Rare earth shortages don’t just affect air power, also compromising the navigation system of Abrams Tanks, which need samarium cobalt magnets. The Abrams Tank is the primary offensive mechanized vehicle in the U.S. arsenal. The Aegis Spy 1 Radar also uses samarium.87 Many naval ships require neodymium. Hell Fire missiles, satellites, night vision goggles, avionics, and precision guided munitions all require rare earth metals. 88

American military superiority is based on technological advancement that outstrips the rest of the world. Command and control technology allows the U.S. to fight multiple wars at once and maintain readiness for other issues, as well as have overwhelming force against rising challengers. This technology helps the U.S. know who, where, and what is going to attack them, and respond effectively, regardless of the source of the threat.

Rare Earth Elements make this technological superiority possible.

To make matters worse, the defense industrial base is often a single market industry, dependent on government contracts for its business. If China tightens the export quotas further, major US defense contractors will be in trouble.89 Every sector of the defense industrial base is dependent on rare earth metals. Without rare earths, these contractors can’t build anything, which collapses the industry.90

Rare Earth shortages are actually already affecting our military, with shortages of lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium happening in the status quo. This prevents us not only from building the next generation of high tech weaponry, but also from constructing more of the weapons and munitions that are needed in the status quo. As current weapon systems age and they can’t be replaced, the US primacy will be undermined. Of special concern is that U.S. domestic mining doesn’t produce “heavy” rare earth metals that are needed for many advanced components of military technologies. Given the nature of many military applications, substitutions aren’t possible. 91

#### Primacy and allied commitments solve arms races and great power war – unipolarity is sustainable, and prevents power vacuums and global escalation

Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep.

This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance.

Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors.

First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

**Space dominance solves nuclear war. Hegemony de-escalates all conflict scenarios.**

**Yoo 18** [(Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at AEI since 2003. He served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of the Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice from 2001 to 2003, where he worked on constitutional and national security matters, as General Counsel of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary from 1995-96, and as a law clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court (John, Winning the Space Race, October 15th, <http://www.aei.org/publication/winning-the-space-race/>)] \*edited for offensive language

President Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy set a new course by focusing on rebuilding the domestic economy as central to national security and aiming at “rival powers, Russia and China, that seek to challenge American influence, values, and wealth.” Critics observed that the White House seemed to reverse past presidents’ emphasis on advancing democracy and liberal values and elevating American sovereignty over international cooperation.1

Less noticed but perhaps equally revisionist, the Trump administration reversed its predecessor’s course on outer space. Even as American military and civilian networks increased their dependence on satellites, the Obama White House had deferred to European efforts to develop a space “Code of Conduct.” The Trump administration instead relies on unilateralism: “any harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital US interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.” On June 18, 2018, President Trump announced a new branch of the military: the United States Space Force.

Control of space already underlies the United States’ predominance in nuclear and conventional warfare. Intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the heart of the US nuclear deterrent, pass through space to reach their targets. Reconnaissance satellites monitor rival nations for missile launches, strategic deployments, and major troop movements. Communications satellites provide the high-speed data transfer that stitches the US Armed Forces together, from generals issuing commands to pilots controlling drones. With economic rivals such as China and India, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea developing space programs that pursue similar missions, the importance of space technology to US interests and international peace will only increase.

Space not only enhances military operations, but also exposes new vulnerabilities. Anti-satellite missiles can make an opponent’s space-based communication networks easier to disable than purely ground-based systems. Losing reconnaissance satellites could blind gut the US’s strategic monitoring and disabling the GPS system would degrade its operational and tactical abilities. Space invites asymmetric warfare because anti-satellite attacks could even the technological odds against western powers that have become dependent on information-enhanced operations. As the nation most dependent on space-based networks, **the United States may have the most to lose.**

Strategists divide competition in this emerging arena into four categories. First is space support, which refers to the launching and management of satellites in orbit. The second is force enhancement, which seeks to improve the effectiveness of terrestrial military operations. The importance of these basic missions is well-established. Indeed, the very first satellites performed a critical surveillance role in the strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Spy satellites replaced dangerous aerial reconnaissance flights in providing intelligence on rival nuclear missile arsenals. Later space-based systems provided the superpowers with early warnings of ballistic missile launches. These programs bolstered stability and aided progress in nuclear arms reduction talks. Satellites created “national technical means” of verification: the capability to detect compliance with arms control treaties without the need to intrude on territorial sovereignty. They reduced the chances of human miscalculation by increasing the information available to decision makers about the intentions of other nations.

The US has made the most progress in the second mission, force enhancement, by using space to boost conventional military abilities. GPS enables the exact deployment of units, the synchronization of combat maneuvers, clearer identification of friend and foe, and precision targeting. In its recent wars, the US has used satellite information to find the enemy, even to the level of individual leaders, deploy on-station air or ground forces, and fire precision-guided munitions to destroy targets with decreased risk of collateral damage. American military leaders have argued that continued integration of space and conventional strike capabilities will allow the US to handle the twenty-first century threats—**terrorism, rogue nations, asymmetric warfare, and regional challengers**—more effectively with less resources.

The third and fourth space missions focus on space itself. Space control involves freely using space to one’s benefit while denying access to opponents. Conceptually akin to air superiority, space control begins with defense: hardening command, control, communications and reconnaissance facilities to prevent enemy interference. It includes shielding satellite components, giving them the ability to avoid collisions, disguising their location, and arming satellites to destroy attackers.2

Such forms of active defense can blend into the fourth mission: space force. Space force envisions weapons systems based in orbit that can strike targets on the ground, in the air, or in space. In an important respect, **space control and force application demand a greater exercise of power than air or naval superiority**. While air and naval superiority can be achieved through rapid deployment of assets for the duration of a conflict, dominance in space requires a broader geographic scope and longer-term duration—a constellation of space weapons would circle the globe for years.3It is in this realm that new weapons technologies are emerging, prompting questions of whether space-faring nations like the United States should treat space as another area for great power competition. “The reality of confrontation in space politics pervades the reality of the ideal of true cooperation and political unity in space, which has never been genuine, and in the near term seems unlikely,” argues Everett Dolman.4 The US certainly has taken such concerns to heart. In the decade ending in 2008, for example, the US increased its space budget from $33.7 billion to $43 billion in constant dollars. The entirety of this spending increase went to the Defense Department.

These weapons systems take several forms. Already operational, the US national missile defense system relies upon satellites to track ballistic missile launches and help guide ground-launched kill vehicles. Space-based lasers, like those in development by the US today, remain the only viable method to destroy ballistic missiles in their initial boost phase, when they are easiest to destroy.

American reliance on space-based intelligence and communication for its startling conventional military advantages has made its satellites a **target of potential rivals**. In 2007, for example, China tested a ground-launched missile to destroy a weather satellite in low earth orbit—the same region inhabited by commercial satellites. “For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the methods of tanks and planes, attacking an American space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice,” Chinese analyst Wang Hucheng has written, in a much-noticed comment.5

Though the 2007 ASAT (Anti-satellite weapon) test sparked international controversy, China had only followed the footsteps of the superpowers. The United States had carried out a primitive anti-satellite weapon test as early as 1959. During the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, the US continued to test anti-ballistic missile systems in an anti-satellite role. The Soviet Union followed suit. The superpowers temporarily dropped these programs with the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, only to restart them in the 1990s. As rivals and rogue nations begin to mimic American development of force enhancement and space control abilities, the US will naturally develop anti-satellite weapons to restore its advantage and deter attacks. Such anti-satellite weapons may become even more common due to the vulnerability of satellites and the spread of ballistic missile technology.

Critics question whether the benefits of space weapons are worth the possibility of strategic instability. They argue that only arms control agreements and international institutions can head off a disastrous military race in space. But space will become an arena for pre-emptive deterrence. Every environment—land, air, water, and now space—has become an arena for combat. The US could deter destabilizing space threats from rivals by advancing its defensive capabilities. Some realist strategists argue not just in favor of protecting US space assets, but seeking US space supremacy. Because great power competition has already spread to space, the United States should capitalize on its early lead to control the ultimate high ground, that of outer space.

Criticisms of space weapons overlook the place of force in international politics. Advances in space technology can have greater humanitarian outcomes that outweigh concerns with space weapons themselves. Rather than increase the likelihood of war, space-based systems reduce the probability of destructive conflicts and limit both combatant and civilian casualties. Reconnaissance satellites reduce the chances that war will break out due to misunderstanding of a rival’s deployments or misperception of another nation’s intentions. Space-based communications support the location of targets for smart weapons on the battlefield, which lower harm to combatants and civilians. Space-based weapons may bring unparalleled speed and precision to the strategic use of force that could reduce the need for more harmful, less discriminate conventional weapons that spread greater destruction across a broader area. New weapons might bring war to a timely conclusion or even help nations **avoid armed conflict in the first place**. We do not argue that one nation’s overwhelming superiority in arms will prevent war from breaking out, though deterrence can have this effect. At the very least, space weapons, like other advanced military technologies, could help nations settle their disputes without resort to wider armed conflict, and hence bolster, rather than undermine, international security.

#### Counterplan solves scenario 1 – climate solutions rely on REMs

Arrobas et al 17 [(Daniele La Porta Arrobas is a senior mining specialist with the World Bank based in Washington DC and has degrees in Geoscience and Environmental Management, Kirsten Hund is a senior mining specialist with the Energy and Extractives Global Practice of the World Bank and holds a Master’s in IR from the University of Groningen in the Netherlands, Michael Stephen McCormick, Jagabanta Ningthoujam has an MA in international economics and international development from JHU and a BS in MechE from Natl University of Singapore, John Drexhage also works at the Intl Institute for Sustainable Development) “The Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a Low Carbon Future,” World Bank, June 30, 2017, <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/207371500386458722/the-growing-role-of-minerals-and-metals-for-a-low-carbon-future>] TDI

* Full report - https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/207371500386458722/pdf/117581-WP-P159838-PUBLIC-ClimateSmartMiningJuly.pdf

Climate and greenhouse gas (GHG) scenarios have typically paid scant attention to the metal implications necessary to realize a low/zero carbon future. The 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change indicates a global resolve to embark on development patterns that would significantly be less GHG intensive. One might assume that nonrenewable resource development and use will also need to decline in a carbon-constrained future. This report tests that assumption, identifies those commodities implicated in such a scenario and explores ramifications for relevant resource-rich developing countries. Using wind, solar, and energy storage batteries as proxies, the study examines which metals will likely rise in demand to be able to deliver on a carbon-constrained future. Metals which could see a growing market include aluminum (including its key constituent, bauxite), cobalt, copper, iron ore, lead, lithium, nickel, manganese, the platinum group of metals, rare earth metals including cadmium, molybdenum, neodymium, and indium—silver, steel, titanium and zinc. The report then maps production and reserve levels of relevant metals globally, focusing on implications for resource-rich developing countries. It concludes by identifying critical research gaps and suggestions for future work.