## 1

#### We must treat humanity as an end in itself – it is the only unconditional good because it confers goodness onto other ends – labeling another end as good requires acknowledging humanity as unconditionally good

Korsgaard 86: Christine M. Korsgaard, American philosopher and Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity,” Kant-Studien 77 (1-4):183-202, 1986, 10.1515/kant.1986.77.1-4.183, accessed 8-23-2020.

In fact, the argument that reveals the unconditional value of humanity also teaches us how to apply the Formula of Humanity. In order to know what is meant by treating humanity as an end", we need only consider this argument, and see how humanity got to be an end in itself. What was in question was the source of the goodness of an end— the goodness, say, of some ordinary object of inclination. This source was traced to the power of rationally choosing ends, exercised in this case on this end. So when Kant says rational nature or humanity is an end in itself, it is the power of rational choice that he is referring to, and in particular, the power to set an end (to make something an end by conferring the status of goodness on it) and pursue it by rational means. The question is then: what is involved in treating your own and every other human being's capacity for the rational choice of ends that is to say, for conferring value —as an end in itself? There are several things that are important to keep in mind. First, Kant thinks that this end functions in our deliberations negatively as something that is not to be acted against. The capacity for rational choice is not a purpose that we can realize or something for us to bring into existence. Second, it is an unconditional end, and that has two important implications. The first is that as an unconditional end it must never be acted against. It is not one end among others, to be weighed along with the rest. The second implication in a sense gives the reason for the first; as an unconditional end it is the condition of the goodness of all our other ends. If humanity is not regarded and treated as unconditionally good then nothing else can be objectively good. As Kant puts it in the Foundations: "the subject of a possible will which is absolutely good cannot be made secondary to any other object without contradiction" (437/56). No relative end can be pursued as if it were better or more important than humanity itself without a kind of contradiction.

#### This obligation to treat humanity as an end means there is a non aggression principle – individuals are not justified in committing acts of aggression against each other, even through government

Nozick 74: Nozick, Robert. American philosopher who held the Joseph Pellegrino University Professorship at Harvard University, and was president of the American Philosophical Association (you know, him). “Anarchy, State, and Utopia.” New York: Basic Books, 1974. Print. accessed 8-22-2020.

The moral side constraints upon what we may do, I claim, reflect the fact of our separate existences. They reflect the fact that no moral balancing act can take place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall social good. There is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others. This root idea, namely, that there are different individuals with separate lives and so no one may be sacrificed for others, underlies the existence of moral side constraints, but it also, I believe, leads to a libertarian side constraint that prohibits aggression against another. The stronger the force of an end-state maximizing view, the more powerful must be the root idea capable of resisting it that underlies the existence of moral side constraints. Hence the more seriously must be taken the existence of distinct individuals who are not resources for others. An underlying notion sufficiently powerful to support moral side constraints against the powerful intuitive force of the end-state maximizing view will suffice to derive a libertarian constraint on aggression against another. Anyone who rejects that particular side constraint has three alternatives: (I) he must reject all side constraints; (2) he must produce a different explanation of why there are moral side constraints rather than simply a goal-directed maximizing structure, an explanation that doesn't itself entail the libertarian side constraint; or (3) he must accept the strongly put root idea about the separateness of individuals and yet claim that initiating aggression against another is compatible with this root idea. Thus we have a promising sketch of an argument from moral form to moral content: the form of morality includes F (moral side constraints); the best explanation 6 of morality's being F is p (a strong statement of the distinctness of individuals); and from p follows a particular moral content, namely, the libertarian constraint. The particular moral content gotten by this argument, which focuses upon the fact that there are distinct individuals each with his own life to lead, will not be the full libertarian constraint. It will prohibit sacrificing one person to benefit another. Further steps would be needed to reach a prohibition on paternalistic aggression: using or threatening force for the benefit of the person against whom it is wielded. For this, one must focus the fact that there are distinct individuals, each with his [their] own life to lead. A nonaggression principle is often held to be an appropriate principle to govern relations among nations. What difference is there supposed to be between sovereign individuals and sovereign nations that makes aggression permissible among individuals? [But] Why may individuals jointly, through their government, do to someone what no nation may do to another? If anything, there is a stronger case for nonaggression among individuals; unlike nations, they do not contain as parts individuals that others legitimately might intervene to protect or defend.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with the non aggression principle. This means the state must be a minimal one in order to be morally justified

Wendt 16: Wendt, Fabian. political philosopher at Chapman University. Political Authority and the Minimal State. Social Theory and Practice, vol. 42, no. 1, 2016, pp. 97-122., www.jstor.org/stable/24575777. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.

A just state, from Nozick's and Mack's perspective, is a state that protects people's moral rights and does nothing else. Because people's relevant moral rights are, in the end, property rights, a just state is a state whose function is merely to protect people against force, theft, and fraud, to enforce contracts "and so on."11 In other words, it is a minimal state. A just minimal state (1) enacts laws that transform people's moral (property) rights into more precise legal rights and enforces these rights, and (2) maintains a monopoly on the use of force. Like many others, Mack and Nozick follow Max Weber in regarding having (and claiming) a monopoly on the use of force as a defining characteristic of states.12 What is less clear, and disputed among advocates of a minimal state, is whether a just minimal state also (3) taxes people to provide for rights protection. Some defend a minimal state that is financed voluntarily, without taxation, and protects only the rights of those who pay.13 Nozick calls such a state an ultraminimal s täte.14 Nozick defends a state that protects every one on its territory, but still without taxation.15 Instead, it raises the costs for people who already pay voluntarily for receiving the state's protection services (more in section 2).16 This kind of state can be called a Nozickian minimal state. Others, including Mack, defend a state that does use taxation to protect everyone's rights on its territory. Following Mack, one can call such a state a minimal taxing state1 The notion of a minimal state, as I use it, encompasses all three types of minimal states.

#### Now negate –

#### A minimal state would not interfere to forbid private entities from acquiring property, as there would be no moral rights being violated, so it would fall outside of their domain.

#### Space is libertarian. The appropriation of space by private entities allows us to wean ourselves off of the need for government altogether

Broker 20: Tyler Broker, author at Above the Law, “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, January 14, 2020, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>, accessed 1-13-22.

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being.

## 2

#### Counterplan: The US, China, and Russia should implement “keep-out zones” around their high-altitude satellites.

#### Solves miscalc – that’s their own evidence

Acton and McDonald 21. James M. Acton is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program and holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Thomas D. MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program. 12/10/21. [Defense One, “Nuclear Command-and-Control Satellites Should Be Off Limits,” [https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/ 12/nuclear-command-and-control-satellites-should-be-limits/187472/](https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/%2012/nuclear-command-and-control-satellites-should-be-limits/187472/)]

“Keep-out zones” around high-altitude satellites would be a straightforward way to mitigate these risks. Specifically, the United States, China, and Russia should agree not to maneuver their spacecraft within a certain distance—we propose 430 miles—of one another’s high-altitude satellites. (Exceptions could be made to accommodate occasional repositioning under tightly controlled conditions. Most importantly, the state conducting the maneuver should warn the others at least 24 hours in advance.) In a conflict, if the belligerents had no intention of attacking each other’s high-altitude satellites, they would have strong reasons of self-interest to respect keep-out zones. If a state did seek to launch such attacks, keep-out zones couldn’t stop it from doing so—but they would buy time that the targeted state could use to try to evade the attack. Negotiating keep-out zones during a conflict, when they would be most useful, would be next-to impossible. So, Washington, Beijing, and Moscow shouldn’t wait—they should start negotiating right away.