# 1AC Yale R1 vs. Scarsdale JT

## 1ac

### Framework

#### Only constructing ethics from our rational agency can explain the sources of normativity –

#### A] Bindingness – Any obligation must not only tell us what is good, but why we ought to be good or else agents can reject the value of goodness itself. That means ethics must start with what is constitutive of agents since it traces obligations to features that are intrinsic to being an agent – as an agent you must follow certain rules. Only practical agency is constitutive since agents can use rationality to decide against other values but the act of deciding to reject practical agency engages in it.

#### B] Action theory – every moral analysis requires an action to evaluate, but actions are infinitely divisible into smaller meaningless movements. The act of stealing can be reduced to going to a house, entering, grabbing things, and leaving, all of which are distinct actions without moral value. Only the practical decision to steal ties these actions together to give them any moral value.

#### That justifies universalizability.

#### A] The principle of equality is true since anything else assigns moral value to contingent factors like identity and justifies racism, and the principle of non-contradiction is true since 2+2 can’t equal 4 for me and not for you meaning ethical statements true for one must be true for all.

#### B] Ethics must be defined a priori because of the is ought gap – experience only tells us what is since that’s what we perceive, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory. Applying reason to a priori truth results in universal obligations.

#### Coercion isn’t universalizable—willing your own freedom while violating someone else’s is a conceptual contradiction.

Engstrom [Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal\_Legislation\_As\_the\_Form\_of\_Practical\_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 // WWBW]

Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how **a maxim of action that assaults the freedom of others** with a view to furthering one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim **would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom**, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, **where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom** and so also one’s own self-sufficiency.  Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person—every subject capable of practical judgment—to share the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. Since here **all persons are** on the one hand **deeming good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom, while** on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, **also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom. These judgments are inconsistent** insofar as the extension of a person’s outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.

#### This requires a system of property – mere empirical possession is insufficient and contrary to freedom, Hogdson 10:

Louis Philippe Hogdson, 2010, “Kant on Property Rights and the State” <http://www.yorku.ca/lhodgson/kant-on-property-rights-and.pdf> //LHP AV

What does it mean to say that property rights are essential for freedom? For our purposes, the crucial feature of **property is the possibility of rightfully excluding others from the use of a certain object.**8 If I own a certain apple, then that means that you wrong me if you use the apple without my permission, and hence that you can forcibly be prevented from doing so. Importantly, this is the case **regardless of whether I am physically holding the apple or not.**9 The point is worth stressing. **I can exclude you from using an apple simply by holding it. I then exclude you physically**, since we cannot both hold the apple at the same time; **I also exclude you normatively, since using force** to wrestle the apple from me **would violate my right to freedom** (assuming that you have no property right in the apple).10 **Still**, **this** form of exclusion falls short of what is required for genuine property, because it **makes my right** to the apple **entirely derivative from my right to bodily integrity**, and hence leaves me with no complaint if I accidentally drop the apple and you pick it up. **Genuine property rights do not depend on physical possession** in that way: if an apple is genuinely mine and I drop it, then you wrong me if you pick it up and walk away with it; that I was not physically holding the apple at the time is irrelevant.11 **The question we need to ask, then, is why freedom demands that it be possible for me to exclude others from using certain objects even though I am not in physical possession** of them. How can freedom place such demands with respect to objects that are external to me – objects that are neither physically connected to my body, nor essentially connected to me in the way my body is**? Kant’s answer has two parts**. **First**, he tells us that the possibility of **property is the** object of the **postulate of private right**: It is possible for me to have any external object of my choice as mine, that is, **a maxim by which**, if it were to become a law, **an object** of choice **would** in itself (objectively) have to **belong to no one** (res nullius) **is contrary to right**.12 Second, he explains the necessity of this postulate as follows: **an object of my choice is something that I have the physical power to** **use**. **If it were** nevertheless absolutely **not within my rightful power to** make **use** of **it**, that is, if the use of it could not coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law (**would be wrong**), **then freedom would be depriving itself of the use of its choice with regard to an object of choice, by putting usable objects beyond any possibility of being used**; in other words, **it would annihilate them in a practical respect** and make them into a res nullius, even though in the use of things choice was formally consistent with everyone’s outer freedom in accordance with universal laws.13 The problem is that this seems to get things precisely backwards. Kant stresses that external freedom demands that the use of some objects be rightful. That seems obvious enough: **there would be no external freedom to speak of if the external world were entirely off limits**. But that hardly establishes a link between freedom and property in the stronger sense that concerns us here. Kant explains why it is not possible for every object to be off limits to all; the question we need to ask is how it is possible for any object that I am not physically holding to be off limits to others. The difficulty I am pointing to can be brought out by considering an alternative to a system of property: a system of mere empirical possession in which everything in the world can rightfully be used, so long as it is not under someone’s physical control. In this system, the ground on which I stand and the objects I carry around with me are off limits to you, but the rest of the world – including objects I put down or dropped a moment ago – is up for grabs. Such a system does not put ‘usable objects beyond any possibility of being used’ in any straightforward sense. Yet, if Kant believes that freedom demands the possibility of full-fledged property rights, he must think that a system of empirical possession unjustifiably restricts freedom. How is that the case? **The problem, in a nutshell, is that a system of empirical possession only allows me to pursue projects taking place within the space I occupy at a given moment and involving objects that I can hold for the entire duration of the project**. Any other project – and this means any remotely complex project – will involve objects whose use I cannot rightfully determine through my choices, and for whose use I am therefore inevitably dependent on the choices of others. Put differently, a system of mere empirical possession makes my (eminently restricted) ability to occupy space and to hold objects the measure of my ability to make objects into my means, and thus to set and pursue ends for myself. This unjustifiably restricts my external freedom, because there is no reason why my having only two hands (to name only one obvious physical limitation) should determine what means I can rightfully secure for myself. To illustrate the point, **suppose that I want to build** myself **a house**. Suppose that one of the means **I need** to pursue this project is **a hammer**, and that I happen to find just the hammer I need. The problem that a system of **mere empirical possession** poses is not that it makes the hammer off limits to me, as Kant seems to suggest in the passage I quoted above, but, rather, that it **makes** **my right to stop you from taking the hammer contingent on my ability to hold on to it**. As soon as I put it down for a second, you are perfectly entitled to pick it up and walk away with it. Worse, once you have grabbed the hammer, it is yours in the sense appropriate to the system, and I cannot rightfully take it back so long as you are holding it. The same holds for the land on which I plan to build my house: my right to exclude others from it only extends to the ground on which I am standing at a given time. You are perfectly entitled to move around on the rest of the land I intend to use, regardless of whether I have fenced it off or started building on it. Indeed, if you decide to stand on part of the land that I claim, you make it off limits to me, and thereby make it impossible for me to realize my project without wronging you. **That I would be wronging you is important here: it shows how your interference differs from other unforeseen circumstances** I may face in pursuing my project. An earthquake could destroy most of what I have built, and thereby hamper my pursuit far more than you would by grabbing the hammer. But the earthquake does not raise normative problems for how I may pursue my end. If it destroys my house, then I can just rebuild it; indeed, if I have the means, I am justified in stopping the earthquake from happening altogether. In this way, the earthquake only presents me with an instrumental problem: it requires me to revise my calculations for how I am to achieve my goal. Interference of that kind does not restrict my ability to set and pursue ends; it is simply part of what exercising that ability involves for a finite being. Your interference raises a different problem. As **a rational agent, you are not just some circumstance that I have to work around: your right to freedom means that you can make things off limits** to me simply by holding on to them. If you choose to stand on the ground where I intended to build, you thereby put a stop to my project of building a house there; if you choose to pick up an object I left lying around, you make it impossible for me to use it for my project. **All a system of mere empirical possession allows me to do to avoid such occurrences is to plead with you** not to interfere with my project. In other words, on such a system, it is always partly up to you whether I can rightfully make use of an object that I am not currently holding, or of a piece of land on which I am not currently standing. The only means I can have at my disposal to set and pursue my ends with are objects to which I am physically connected. As I said above, **this** makes my limited ability to hold objects the measure of what means I can have at my disposal, **which arbitrarily restricts my ability to set and pursue ends** for myself.14 Now on Kant’s view, as I said at the outset, such a restriction can be justified, but only if it is required by freedom. In our case, this means that **the restriction imposed by the system of mere empirical possession is acceptable only if my having a full-fledged property right in the hammer** – that is, my being allowed to stop you from using it even when I am not holding it – **would somehow be incompatible with your freedom**. We can easily show that this is not the case. One way to make the point is to stress that **your freedom depends on your ability to set and pursue ends** for yourself, **which does not depend on** your access to **any particular object**; **therefore, I do not restrict your freedom** by making the hammer off limits to you.15 There is also a more direct way to make the point in the present context. One can simply note that, **from the point of view of you**r access to the hammer, **there is no relevant difference between** a system of **full**-fledged **property** rights **and** a system of mere **empirical possession**, since both systems allow me to exclude you entirely from using the hammer. Of course, on the latter system, I can do so only by physically holding on to the hammer for the rest of my life, whereas the former system allows me to set the hammer down while still excluding you. But **from your standpoint the two scenarios amount to the same thing, since what matters is simply that I exclude you** from using the hammer, not how I do it. A full-fledged system of property thus brings about no further restriction on your freedom. **Consequently, any restriction of freedom associated with a system of mere empirical possession cannot be grounded in the need to protect freedom itself and hence must be unjustified on Kant’s view**. Let me close this section by stressing the general character of the conclusion we have reached. We have seen that **freedom requires property**. This is not to say that freedom requires the specific form of private property found in modern capitalist societies. Kant’s argument only requires some system of rights allowing one to exclude others from using a certain object for a certain amount of time, regardless of whether one is holding it or not. That could be achieved by a system under which the means of production are communally owned, so long as it appropriately determines who has the right to use a given object at a given time.16 The considerations presented here thus do not amount to an endorsement of capitalism, or of the sort of absolute private property rights advocated by libertarians.17 They support a broader thesis: that, **if rational agents are to live together without undermining one another’s freedom, then they must have a system that allows them to control certain objects through their choices without having to hold on to them physically**. Nothing more is required for the rest of our argument. objects through their choices without having to hold on to them physically. Nothing more is required for the rest of our argument.

#### However, we are rational and impulsive – this nonideal situation requires a state with coercive authority that secures equal outer freedom and property, Koch 92:

\*bracketed for gendered language\* Koch, Andrew M. "Immanuel Kant, The Right of Necessity, and the Liberal Foundation of Social Welfare" Southeastern Political Review, 20: 2 (Fall 1992) 295-314. <https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/koch_andrew_1992_Immanuel_Kant.pdf> //LHP AV DOA: 9/14/21

Immanuel Kant, Ontology, Morality, and the Law The discussion of "necessity" in the writings of Immanuel Kant takes place within a broad context, linking the Kantian epistemology, ontology, and claims regarding civil society. **The ontology of** Immanuel Kant asserts that **the human** being **is both phenomenal**, part of the physical world of experience, **and noumenal**, part of the "realm of the mind." (Kant 1977b, 196-198) **As a part of the physical environment a person is subject to all the laws which govern** the interaction of **objects** in physical space. **However, Kant suggested** the possibility **that the individual, having** the power of transcendental **reason**, has the capacity for thought which is independent of the deterministic features of the phenomenal world. This seemingly abstract philosophic notion is very significant with respect to Kant's claim about the possibility of freedom and morality. If the power of the will operates in a realm outside the determinism of the phenomenal world then the freedom of the will to direct the body's actions may be assumed. If there is an undetermined element in the make-up of the human being, said Kant, the individual "may" be provided with the possibility of autonomous action. Here it should be noted that Kant does not claim he can "prove" the autonomy of the will, only that the possibility for it exists. He does, however, assert emphatically that, "...**the principle of autonomy is the sole principle of morals**." (Kant 1977b, 188) Kant argues that without freedom no moral accountability is possible. If individuals do not choose their actions they cannot be held morally accountable for those actions. **When a person is not free to do otherwise, that person bears no responsibility for the outcome of an act**. So while freedom of the will cannot be proven within the Kantian scheme, it must be assumed if morality is to have any meaning. **For Kant, the interaction of individuals creates problems. If human beings are truly free, the social environment in which they pursue their happiness will generate "antagonisms."** (Kant 1977c, 429) As both reason and impulse, **selfish egoism would reign unchecked should some mechanism to control the impulsive side** of the human character **not be present.** Kant concluded that in society man is in need of a "master." (Kant 1977a, 122**) The aggression and selfishness in human nature can be mitigated if reason is used to keep impulse under control.** (Kant 1977a, 119) **Reason allows for the creation of an external body of rule which can serve to regulate social interaction**. **This regulation of freedom is designed to produce the maximum amount of freedom that can be shared by all**. (Kant 1977a, 121) Kant indicated that he did not believe every problem could be solved by creating laws. **No matter how perfect a system of laws, the perfectibility of the human being is still in doubt.** As Kant stated, "...a complete solution is impossible. One cannot fashion something absolutely straight from wood which is as crooked as that of which man is made." (Kant 1977a, 123) **The best that one can hope for is an approximate** solution. That consists of creating an external body of laws that will regulate the behavior of individuals in their social interactions. Here Kant is making a very specific claim regarding the role of law in civil society. **Freedom of interaction is to be maximized for everyone equally. The role of the law is to deter those who would subvert the attainment of a common level of freedom for all**. The use of force, that is organized and legitimated as the externalization of human reason, **serves a deterrent function in society**. Those that would inhibit the freedom of others would be, according to Kant, deterred by the threat of punishment. **Law, and the collective force that it represents, checks the impulsive and egoistic elements in human nature. Only when the natural antagonisms among people are checked can [hu]mankind reach its fullest potential**. **A functioning set of laws designed to regulate human intercourse is essential to civil society**. The collection of those laws Kant referred to as a "civil constitution." Kant stated that **joining into civil society is the first duty of those who cannot avoid having mutual influence on one another**. (Kant 1977c, 415) **A union of people in a commonwealth involves the externalization of duties into a formal set of standards based on the principle of freedom.** (Kant 1977c, 415) Kant is emphatic with regard to the standard that is to govern the conduct of individuals in civil society. Kant declared that **people should always act to treat others as "ends"** not merely as means**. Thus Kant has linked the idea of personal obligation and morality to the formulation of law in civil society**. In Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals, a section entitled The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Kant explored this further by asserting what he called the "Universal Principle of Justice." Every action is just if its maxim is such that the freedom of the will of each can coexist with the freedom of everyone....(Kant 1965, 35) This statement contains a variety of elements relevant to the notion of freedom in Kant's moral and political philosophy. The primary characteristic of justice is the maintenance of freedom in social intercourse. It is also important to note that Kant makes no reference to the content of interaction or of its goals. **In fact, he specifically states that the content of social interaction is not the specific concern of justice**. "[T]he content of justice does not take into consideration the matter of the content of the will . . . " (Kant 1965, 34) **Only the form of interaction is relevant for Kant. Relations must be such that the participants share a common and equal level of freedom in the conduct of their affairs**. **Rights** and duties within the state ultimately **derive from the principle of freedom**. (Kant 1977c, 415) **The state has the role of both legal adjudicator and coercive apparatus in the maintenance of freedom**. The strategy of civil society is to create an external set of duties, "publiccoercive law," in which every person's rights are secured against interference from any other person in the society. (Kant 1977c, 415) The state, said Kant, "is a union of men under juridical laws." (Kant 1935, 182) **The state, as a collection of laws, is a legitimate instrument of coercion if it uses its power for the maintenance of the maximum level of freedom that all the members of society can share**. (Kant 1965, 36-39) The state's system of justice, positive law, emerges in order to protect each citizen from the natural antagonisms that arise as individuals seek to maximize their happiness in the social environment. (Kant 1977c, 416-417) **The state has both the obligation and the force to compel compliance to** the laws which **protect the freedom** of all.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with a system of equal outer freedom.

#### Prefer –

#### First, transcendental idealism – there’s a distinction between the noumenal world and the phenomenal world – freedom, as noumenal and undetermined by natural laws, is the supreme principle of ethics, Korsgaard 96:

Korsgaard, Christine. “Creating The Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations.” (p. 317-318). July 28, 1996 //Recut LHP AV

Kant's response to this problem is to maintain that the question should not be asked. **To ask how freedom and determinism are related is to inquire** **into** **the** **relation between the** **noumenal and phenomenal worlds**, a relation **about which it is** in principle **impossible to know** anything. But our understanding of what this response amounts to will depend on how we understand the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, and the related distinction between the two standpoints from which Kant says we may view ourselves and our actions. This is a large issue which I cannot treat here in a satisfactory way, I shall simply declare my allegiance. On a familiar but as I think misguided interpretation, the distinction between the two worlds is an ontological one; as if behind the beings of this world were another set of beings, which have an active and controlling relation to the beings of this world, but which are inaccessible to us because of the limits of experience. According to this view, we occupy both worlds, and viewing ourselves from the two standpoints we discover two different sets of laws which describe and explain our conduct in the two different worlds. We act on the moral law in the noumenal world, the law of self-love in the phenomenal world. This view gives rise to familiar paradoxes about how evil actions are even possible, and how we could ever be held responsible for them if they were. On what I take to be the correct interpretation, **the distinction is not between two kinds of beings, but between the beings of this world insofar as they are authentically active and the same beings insofar as we are passively receptive to them**. **The "gap" in our knowledge exists not because of the limits of experience but because of its** **essential nature**: **to experience** something **is** (in part) **to be passively receptive** to it, **and therefore we cannot** have **experience**s of **activity** as such. **As thinkers and choosers we must regard ourselves as active** beings, **even though we cannot experience ourselves as active beings**, **and so we place ourselves among the noumena, necessarily, whenever we think and act.** According to this interpretation **laws of the phenomenal world** are laws that **describe and explain our behavior**. **But the laws of the noumenal world are laws which are addressed to us as active beings**; **their business is not to describe and explain** at all, **but to govern** what we do. **Reason has two employments, theoretical and practical.** We view ourselves as phenomena when we take on the theoretical task of describing and explaining our behavior; we view ourselves as noumena when our practical task is one of deciding what to do. **The two standpoints cannot be mixed because these two enterprises-explanation and decision- are mutually exclusive**. These two ways of understanding the noumenal/phenomenal distinction yield very different interpretations of Kant's strictures against trying to picture the relation between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. On the ontological view, the question how the two worlds are related is one which, frustratingly, cannot be answered. On the active/passive view, it is one which cannot coherently be asked. **There is no question that is answered by my descriptions of how Marilyn's freedom interacts with the causal forces that determine her. For freedom is a concept with a practical employment, used in the choice and justification of action, not in explanation or prediction**; while causality is a concept of theory, used to explain and predict actions but not to justify them. There is no standpoint from which we are doing both of these things at once, and so there is no place from which to ask a question that includes both concepts in its answer. So, if I am myself Marilyn, and I am trying to decide whether to do something selfish, reflections on the disadvantages of my background are irrelevant. **I must act under the idea of freedom, and so I must act on what I regard as reasons.** Being underprivileged may sometimes be a cause of selfish behavior, but it is not a reason that can be offered in support of it by a person engaged in it. So although we do not necessarily say of Marilyn: "**her background gave her** some tough **incentives** to deal with, **but** still **it is up to her whether she treats them as reasons**," that is what she must say to herself. I say that we do not necessarily say this, because, as I am about to argue, whether we say it depends on whether we have decided to enter into reciprocal relations with her and so to hold her responsible. But in that case, it is better regarded as something we say not about but to her.

#### Second, ontology – being a human is constituted by rational reflection to answer the normative question – this is abstraction that is consistent with our identity, Shoaibi:

Nader Shoaibi, [Nader Shoaibi is a visiting assistant professor at University of Indianapolis, Department of Philosophy and Religion] “In Defense of Kantian Moral Theory” <http://fresnostate.edu/artshum/philosophy/documents/ShoaibiCUPR.pdf> //LHP AV DOA: 7/20/21

Up to this point, I have characterized a certain reading of the Kantian theory that Williams found objectionable. Further, I have shown what it is about this reading that Williams objects to. In what follows, I will use **Korsgaard’s reading of the Kantian moral theory** to show that a deeper understanding of it **avoids the charge** Williams makes altogether. Before setting out to do that, though, I would like to note that **Korsgaard**, like Williams, justifiably **holds that our projects and commitments**, what she calls our identities, **are at the center of morality**. **Your identity**, she writes, **is “A description under which you value yourself**, a description under which you find your life to be worth living **and your actions to be worth undertaking**” (Korsgaard 1996, 101). As such, **our identities** are things that **oblige us unconditionally** (Korsgaard 1996, 102). Consider the following: **Suppose that I identify myself with being an A**. This means that I take myself to be an instance of A. **As such, I commit myself to doing anything that would constitute** being **an A**. What gives being an A normative authority over me is the fact that I take myself to be an A. Now, **if** for some **reason I fail to comply** with an obligation that being an A requires, **then I would not be an A** (Korsgaard 1996, 102). I would fail myself in my determination to be what I chose to be, an A. And **that is** an **undesirable** thing: After all, **what good is my commitment if I myself don’t find it valuable enough to want to keep it?** Thus, Korsgaard and Williams justifiably agree on this much: **Projects and commitments, or one’s identity in Korsgaard’s language, are the foundational motives for action. If there is anything that has normative force, it must be one’s commitments.** The question to ask, then, is this: How is Korsgaard’s agreement that one’s identity is central to any account of morality consistent with Kantian moral theory, if Williams’ understanding of the Kantian moral theory is correct? In responding to this question, Korsgaard offers an alternative reading of Kantian moral theory. I will attempt in the rest of this paper to explain what this reading is, and how it allows Korsgaard to, on the one hand, be committed to the Kantian moral theory and on the other, consistently hold that one’s commitments are the sort of things that give one reasons to continue living and thus are foundational. Let us ask: **What is it to will something** (Korsgaard 1996, 93)**?** **Kant began** his project in the Groundwork **by examining the authority of our reflective thinking** about the choices we face in our lives. He thought that this authority could be partly explained by imperatives that are aimed at some end. For example, I resolve to drink a glass of water, because I want to satiate my thirst. However, he realized that **those ends themselves need to derive their authority from somewhere**. **Thus**, he **proposed there must be imperatives that derive their authority from themselves.** As such, these fundamental principles cannot be aimed at yet another end themselves. **The categorical imperative is absolute in the sense that it derives its authority from itself** (Kant 1998, 4:414). Kant wrote, “There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law” (Kant 1998, 4:421**) There is nothing in this statement that reveals what the content of the law is**. All that this statement of the categorical imperative says is that the agent has to act according to some law (Korsgaard 1996, 98, 120). **That is, if there is to be any decision, there has to be some reason**. That is explained by the fact that **human beings**, the kind of agents that we are discussing when talking about morality, **are reflective agents** (Korsgaard 1996, 93). If that is true, **we think and wonder about the situations we face, and in order to get ourselves to act we need some kind of principle on which to base our reflections**. In other words, Kant tells us that **the structure of our reflection is such that we need laws to act**. What is more, **these laws cannot gain their authority from outside of the agent** (Korsgaard 1996, 100). Even if **a law** exists **outside** of the agent, it **has no force** on the agent unless the agent has some representation of it in her. That is, **unless the agent** herself **consents** to a law, **the law has no binding effect** on her. Thus, the categorical imperative, if it is to have any force, must be represented in the agent. In other words, **the categorical imperative is the law that the self formulates for itself**. What we have established is that there is a structure to the way we will things. **When we face a decision to will something, we first ask ourselves a normative question. Then, we set out to answer the question according to the kind of laws we have**. Central in this picture is that there is something special about this set of laws. They are strictly personal, or in the Kantian language, autonomous. They are not imposed on the self from the outside, and they are not formed based on the kind of ends that one might have. With this, we have established what these laws might look like. So, the question now is: **What is the content of the categorical imperative? What is there that is wanted categorically?** According to Korsgaard the representation of **the laws that the self requires** in order to make judgments and resolutions **are encapsulated in our practical identities.** “It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that give rise to unconditional obligations” (Korsgaard 1996, 102). As we have seen, for Kant and Korsgaard **our conceptions of our selves and our identities are indeed personal imperatives.** In other words, Korsgaard seems to point to what we were looking for, something that would fit the criteria we have defined above. **First, one’s identity provides the self with norms** and standards **to judge and make decisions**, and thus it satisfies the condition to be an imperative. **Second, one’s identities are the representations that one adopts for their own sak**e and for no greater end. And **third**, **one’s identity is not imposed** upon the self **from the outside1** and thus it satisfies the condition to be personal. Our identities, then, are the will’s way of devising laws to govern itself. Now that we know what Korsgaard’s account of Kantian moral theory is, we can see that it indeed avoids the problem Williams raised. Let us recall that Korsgaard agrees on two issues with Williams. First, she agrees that one’s projects and commitments, one’s conception of one’s self, is what gives one reason to continue living in the first place and thus she agrees that they have a central role in one’s decision-making processes. Second, she agrees with Williams that the Kantian theory involves some level of abstraction. By that, I mean the abstraction involved in stepping back from one’s situation and reflecting on one’s options. Indeed she thinks this **abstraction just is what constitutes a human being: we are “essentially reflective**” (Korsgaard 1996, 92). However, what separates her from Williams is this. She disagrees that this abstraction translates into the problem Williams points to, because she takes **Kant to have positioned one’s identities rightly in the center of morality.** Thus, **although there is abstraction involved in one’s asking oneself the normative question, one still provides the answer to this question by appealing to one’s identity, projects, and commitments**. Thus, **it would be impossible for one to come up**, in his Kantian reflective exercise, **with a decision that is in conflict with one’s projects**. That is because **it is precisely one’s projects that provide the grounds for a response to the normative question**. If this is how we reach our decisions, then how could one, as Williams claimed, abstract from one’s identities and still be able to act at all? In the case of the man who has to make a decision whether to favor his wife, it is clear, that he does not abstract from the person he is, because **if he did abstract from his identity as a human being, then it would have been impossible** for him **to make a decision at all** (Korsgaard 1996, 121**). He would ask the normative question and then, nothing**. He would be ~~paralyzed~~, so to say. He acts because he has some principle in him that tells him to do one thing rather than another. Thus, Korsgaard’s account of Kantian moral theory avoids the problem raised by Williams. What is now in order is a general examination of Korsgaard’s account to make sure that in responding to this charge it has not fallen short of its original aim of being a viable account of morality.

#### Humanity is the fundamental identity – this grounds a system of equal and outer freedom, Shoaibi:

Nader Shoaibi, [Nader Shoaibi is a visiting assistant professor at University of Indianapolis, Department of Philosophy and Religion] “In Defense of Kantian Moral Theory” <http://fresnostate.edu/artshum/philosophy/documents/ShoaibiCUPR.pdf> //LHP AV DOA: 7/20/21

One worry that could be raised is this. **If it is an agent’s mere endorsement of an identity, whatever it might be, that gives it its authority, then what prevents an agent from justifying obviously impermissible acts by simply endorsing an identity that would accommodate such acts? The answer to this question cannot be simply “nothing**.” Obviously, there must be something wrong with a moral theory that would allow an individual to, say, torture innocent babies on the condition that the individual’s identity is to torture babies. If Korsgaard’s account is to have any force, then, it must have some way of introducing limits on the kind of identities that one is allowed to adopt. **And indeed it does**. Let us see how. We have already seen that a law can have binding force on an agent only if the agent has some representation of the law. That is, a principle that is not endorsed by the agent has no authority over him. For instance, if I do not identify with being a good soldier, then I would feel no categorical urge to wax my shoes every morning. I might do it because I would get into trouble if I didn’t, but that would be only hypothetically imperative for me. **For it to be categorically imperative I would have to identify myself with being a soldier.** **Interestingly this is also true in case of being reflective itself. I am subject to the principles that come with being reflective, only if I identify with being reflective** (Korsgaard 1996, 121). Further, if we assume as Korsgaard does, that being **a human being just is being reflective, then it would only make sense to expect reflectivity of me, if I endorsed being a human.** In other words, **the first statement of the categorical imperative that requires of any rational being to “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which [he] can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law,” has binding force on any being insofar as it identifies itself as a rational being** (Kant 1998, 4:421). To put that in language by now familiar, let us simply say, **since every decision** we make **implies reflective thinking, it also implies that the agent identifies with being a human**. **Humanity**, then, **is a fundamental identity that precedes others** (Korsgaard 1996, 121). **In so far as we value our identities**, if it is true that the most fundamental of our identities is our identity as a human being, **then being a human is one thing we can surely claim to be universally valuable for all human beings. Thus, there is a universal identity that defines fundamental boundaries for the kind of decisions we make, including about the other kinds of identities we adopt. For example, since it would be contra our commitment to humanity to torture little babies, then it would be immoral to torture babies, no matter what.** Since **you** would **have to commit to being a human being before** committing to **any other identity**, you would not just do anything that that identity requires of you, because your identity as a human being, that is, a reflective agent, requires of you to value humanity over all other considerations, and that means refraining from a heinous act like torturing babies. In the last few pages, I have examined an important consequence of the Kantian theory**: Humanity is valuable unconditionally**. Suddenly, it seems like Williams’ charge has regained its force. That is, if morality requires of you to value something outside of yourself unconditionally (like humanity) then isn’t that just to say that there is an impartial view from where morality is determined? Strangely the answer to that question is yes. However, what I have established in this paper is that **humanity’s demands on us are not**, although they certainly can seem to be, **outside of ourselves**. Like all our identities, **humanity engages the will by being first adopted by the agent as a categorical principle.** Thus, it is insofar as I identify with being a human that I am committed to not torturing little babies, for example. As such, it is true: **We are bound, but we are bound as far as we choose to be. It is our humanity that requires us to value humanity, nothing else.**

#### Third, performativity – an intrinsic feature to any action is the acceptance of the goodness of universal freedom, Gewirth 84 bracketed for grammar and gendered language

[Alan Gewirth, () "The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alternative" American Journal Of Jurisprudence: Vol. 29: Iss. 1 Article 5, 1984, https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ajj/vol29/iss1/5/, DOA:9-10-2018 // WWBW Recut LHP AV]

Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, **every agent acts for purposes [t]he[y] regards as good.** Hence, **[t]he[y] must regard as necessary goods the freedom** and well being **that [is]** are the generic features and **necessary conditions of** his **action** and successful action in general. From this, it follows that **every agent logically must hold or accept** that he has **rights to these conditions**. For if he were **to deny** that he has **these rights**, then he **would** have to **admit that it is permissible** for other persons **to remove** from him the very **conditions** of freedom and well-being **that**, as **an agent**, he **must have**. But **it is contradictory** for him **to hold both that [t]he[y] must have these conditions and also that he may not have them.** Hence, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. Moreover, **every agent must further admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other actual or prospective agents have the same general characteristics of agency** on which he must ground his own right-claims. What I am saying, then, is that every agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and must hold that he and all other actual or prospective agents have rights to these necessary goods. Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the following principle: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, freedom, and well-being. I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action.

### Contention

#### Plan: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to eliminate patent protections for life-saving medicines. Rizvi 20:

Husna Rizvi, “WHAT IF…DRUG PATENTS WERE SCRAPPED?” 24 June 2020, <https://newint.org/features/2020/06/11/what-if-drug-patents-were-scrapped> //LHP AV DOA: 9/17/21

In 1955, virologist Jonas Salk was asked about the intellectual property rights of his polio vaccine. To which he responded: ‘**There is no patent**. Could you patent the sun?’ Salk’s choice to make the vaccine patent free ultimately beat back the US polio epidemic by 1962. The pharmaceuticals industry has ballooned in size since then, reaching an estimated value of $1.2 trillion in 2018, made possible by a patents system that grants firms at least 20 years’ exclusive rights to manufacture, sell and market new drugs. Although an estimated two-thirds of global research and development is paid out of the public purse, manufacturers can charge governments eyewatering sums for drugs. According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), it costs just $0.25 to $0.50 to make the daily dose of the tuberculosis drug bedaquiline. But manufacturer Johnson & Johnson charges over eight times that cost in developing countries. Patients require up to 14,600 pills over two years, pricing thousands out of treatment. The tension between public health and private profit has never been more visible, especially as the world searches for a vaccine against coronavirus. Advert Newint - ES FAM Sept 21 Some experts point to existing provisions to compel industry to release vital drugs during times of crisis. **World Trade Organization rules specify that governments can override patents** to allow other manufacturers **to produce generic versions of life-saving medicines** – **this is called compulsory licensing. But Big Pharma fights back with lawsuits.** Corporate Europe Observatory predicts a wave of ‘pandemic legal disputes’ if governments try using this provision to combat coronavirus. As during the AIDS crisis, when 39 transnational pharmaceutical companies sued Nelson Mandela for defying HIV drug licences, companies are unlikely to want to make an exception for Covid-19. **The pharmaceutical patents system is based on the belief that without patents, medical innovation will cease**. **But researchers have shown how firms stifle innovation, engaging in ‘killer acquisitions’ to buy up smaller innovative companies, solely to stop their drug development projects and remove future competition**. **It’s a broken system, not delivering the drugs** we need at prices we need. At the time of writing, the world death toll from Covid-19 is 350,000. Economist Joseph Stiglitz asks: what if a global network of laboratories, without Intellectual Property (IP) lawyers breathing down their necks, ‘monitored for emerging strains of a contagious virus, periodically updated an established formula for vaccinating against it, and then made that information available to companies and countries around the world?’ It’s not pie in the sky. **It’s how flu vaccine research already operates**. **The World Health Organization (WHO) convenes world experts twice a year to add emerging flu strains in order to update flu vaccines. Researchers from across 110 countries, funded largely by governments, are committed to this open-source science**. The infrastructure to gather, interpret and distribute actionable knowledge for the development of vaccines already exists. This system could be funded through prizes, Stiglitz suggests, rewarding companies that invent necessary new medicines. **Companies would need to agree to make products patent-free, be transparent over pricing and costs and share clinical trial data so that other countries can develop the same capacity**. Researchers at Global Justice Now also propose modelling democratically owned start-up firms with workers, clinicians and patients on their boards and on the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP), a UN body set up to increase access to drugs in the Global South. Governments would retain a controlling interest in these bodies. **Abolishing the IP burden would incentivize knowledge-sharing across borders, with open-source data that any WHO member could access.** With increasing vulnerability to pandemics what is needed is an ambitious strategy to compel industry to manufacture the drugs we need at scale. Transitional steps, proposed by Washington University professors Michele Boldrin and David Levine, include shortening patent terms to slowly but surely ‘decrease the strength of intellectual property interventions’. They hasten to add: ‘**the final goal cannot be anything short of abolition**.’

#### Vote aff –

#### 1] IP rights violate an individual’s actual right to property and the grounds on which they are justified,

Cernea and Uszkai 12 Cernea, Mihail-Valentin, and Radu Uszkai. *The Clash between Global Justice and Pharmaceutical Patents: A Critical Analysis*. 2012, the-clash-between-global-justice-and-drug-patents-a-critical-analysis.pdf. SJEP

To make this point clearer, we regard property as an ethical institution which emerged in the context of reiterated conflict between agents for tangible goods. A useful analogy would be, for example, the particular way in which David Hume discusses the emergence of justice in the context of scarcity in which agents pursue their own interests4 . As a result, the purpose of property rights would be that of avoiding or minimizing the possibility of conflict and that of increasing the costs of free-riding or trespassing. Let’s take the following example which will illustrate better our point. Assume that X is a philosophy student and has a copy of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Y is a college of him but he does not have the book. They both have to write an essay on Kant’s categorical imperative. Because Y does not have the book, let’s assume that he decides, whether by the use of coercion or fraud to take his book. As a result, the theft leaves X without his property because tangible goods are rivalrous in consumption. Both student can’t, at the same time but in a different place read about Kant’s categorical imperative from the same copy. Now a different example: suppose X invents a new way of harvesting corn and Y harvests his corn accordingly. This situation is quite different in comparison to the case we presented earlier, because Y does not leaves X without either his new harvesting mechanisms which he created but neither without the idea behind the mechanism. It would be hard to say that Y stole something from X because the consumption of intangible goods such as ideas does not have the same rivalrous property as a copy of a book written by Kant. Actually, the existence of the patent system fosters the scarcity of ideas. In this context patents represent unjustified state-granted monopolies. Moreover, intellectual property rights have another profound immoral consequence: it limits the use of tangible objects which we acquired fully in line with market rules.

#### 2] Right of necessity – nations can legitimately break patents in order to produce life-saving medicines, Bierson 21:

Marshall Bierson, [Marshall is currently completing his PhD in Philosophy at Florida State University. His primarily studies the intersection of ethics and the nature of persons. Outside of Academia, Marshall also directs curricular design for high school debate camps with the Victory Briefs Institute.] “Intellectual Property and the Right of Necessity” August 18, 2021, <https://www.prindlepost.org/2021/08/intellectual-property-and-the-right-of-necessity/> //LHP AV DOA:9/14/21

The Right of Necessity and Intellectual Property **If there is a right of necessity, what implication would that have for i**ntellectual **p**roperty rights **over life-saving medication?** **Life-saving medication**, almost by definition, **is often necessary for survival**. Thus, if **the right to necessity justifies** stealing bread from those who have extra, so too it would seem to justify **stealing a vial of unaffordable medication**. Similarly, if I can steal an unaffordable vial of life-saving medication to save a life, **then it would be strange to think I cannot violate an international patent to create that life-saving vial**. It seems, then, that if we accept the old doctrine that there exists a right of necessity, it **would have profound implications for the justice of intellectual property law. Nations, according to such reasoning, possess a natural right to break patents if it is necessary to produce life-saving medication for those who could otherwise not afford them**. (The affordability qualification is an important one. Just as it would be theft for me, who can afford to buy food, to steal a loaf of bread. So too it would be unjust to violate international patents for patients who can otherwise afford to buy the medication.) But even with the affordability qualification in place, **there is currently a huge problem of access to life-saving medications by the global poor. As such, the right of necessity suggests a standing right to break many international medical patents.**

#### The right of necessity is a logical constraint on the coercive powers of the state – even if not ethical, reducing IP for life saving medicines is not in the jurisdiction of legal punishment – that would undermine the very foundation of the omnilateral will, Koch 92:

Koch, Andrew M. "Immanuel Kant, The Right of Necessity, and the Liberal Foundation of Social Welfare" Southeastern Political Review, 20: 2 (Fall 1992) 295-314. <https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/koch_andrew_1992_Immanuel_Kant.pdf> //LHP AV DOA: 9/14/21

**Kant** did not leave the discussion on the functions of law here. In the appendix to Metaphysical Elements of Justice he **suggested two caveats to the ability of the state to compel human action**. There are two areas of human interaction where justice, as the state's use of legitimate coercive force, does not serve its intended purpose. In these two areas **the coercive power of the state cannot, logically, be effective in regulating human behavior** or protecting human freedom. The first of these exceptions to the role played by the law in regulating human interaction is what Kant called the "right of equity." The second he called the "right of necessity." In discussing the right of equity, Kant asserted that the law is not applicable to issues involving the subjective moral conscience of a person. For example, in establishing a private contract between two individuals all the possible contingencies may not be foreseen. In such a case one of the contracting partners may have to appeal to the fairness or sense of "equity" in the other. Kant defined this appeal to personal conscience as "right without coercion." (Kant 1965, 39) The judicial system cannot oversee all the possible facets of interaction, therefore appeals to "fairness" will be part of the interaction of individuals. As part of the general discussion of morality, Kant believed that a general "moral sentiment" can be engendered in individuals through education and moral training. The process of moral training will serve to regulate what is "fair," even when the law cannot be directly engaged. Kant's second caveat to his theory of justice, however, is far more important for the consideration of the state's responsibilities with regard to its citizenry. **Kant defined the right of necessity as essentially "coercion without right."** (Kant 1965, 39) Stated directly**, "necessity" is the right to take any action necessary in order to preserve one's own life.** By "necessity" Kant meant considerably more than a notion of self defense. The right of self defense implies a right to preserve one's life if that life is threatened by another. **The right of necessity, on the other hand, is the right to take action that causes harm or death to another, even to a person who is not a direct threat to one's own life and safety.** This imagined right is supposed to give me permission to take the life of another person when my own life is in danger, even if he has done me no harm. (Kant 1965, 41) **Necessity involves the interaction of two or more people. According to Kant's discussion of civil society, the law is essential for the regulation of that interaction**. Kant asserted, however, that **when necessity is the issue, the law is ineffective as a restraint on human behavior.** It is quite obvious that **this** conception implies a self-contradiction within jurisprudence,...[and] ... **belongs only to ethics**. (Kant 1965, 41) The right of necessity is an issue that can only be addressed in an ethical context. But **Kant did not suggest that acts done out of necessity are ethical or enjoy insulation from moral condemnation**. The contrary is actually the case. **An action done out of necessity may be immoral and still not be appropriately subject to punitive legal action.** This is the case because **law cannot logically deter actions that are generated out of fear for one's survival.** **Necessity is invoked in a context in which the deterrent function of the law is ineffective**. Kant suggested that **when faced with the imminent threat of losing one's life there is nothing that the coercive apparatus of the state can do to compel a particular type of behavior.** **The law, and the force of punishment, can have no effect on an individual's behavior where necessity is at issue. The law cannot serve as a check on moral or social injustices**. The threat of punishment has no meaning if there is no penalty which can be worse than certain death. **The pursuit of selfpreservation**, while it may violate the legal statutes of written law, **cannot logically be punished**. Kant was very clear on this issue. A penal law applying to such a situation could never have the effect intended, for the threat of an evil that is still uncertain cannot outweigh the fear of an evil that is certain. **Hence, we must judge that, although an act of self-presentation through violence is not inculpable, it still is unpunishable**...(Kant 1965, 41) The law cannot apply to an action done out of necessity because it contains no effective threat of coercion behind it. Necessity is described as an important exception to the role positive law plays in maintaining and protecting a common quantity of freedom within the state and society. **The state and its laws are designed to protect the freedom of each of society's members. The state cannot function effectively in circumstances where the adherence to its laws cannot be guaranteed through the use of sanctions**. **"Necessity" is, logically, a constraint on the effectiveness of the law**. In raising the issue of the conditions required for the "effective" law, Kant has provided a context for questioning the state's responsibilities on issues of social policy. What conditions must be present in order for the law to function effectively? Under what conditions can the law fulfill its purpose of protecting the freedom of the citizenry? Kant realized that not all individuals can be expected to be "good." Kant asserted, however, that through a system of laws individuals can be compelled to respect the rights of others. But the conditions for that compliance must first exist. The legal system's intended purpose of protecting the freedom of the citizens cannot be fulfilled under conditions in which necessity is legitimately involved**. The state cannot fulfill its function of compelling individuals to respect the freedom of others unless the state's system of laws are sufficient to deter individual egoism at the expense of other's freedom**. Laws have no power to compel when "necessity" is at issue. **The problem necessity generates for the functioning of the law raises questions about the role of the state in a very broad social context**. If necessity inhibits the effective performance of the law, and effective laws are necessary in order to protect the citizens, then the function of the state must go beyond acting simply as the repository for collective force. The state must act to create the conditions in which the citizens are secure from violence. In order to do this the state must assure that it has created the conditions in which the law is an effective mechanism for deterring violence. **The state must seek to minimize necessity as a motivation for behavior because action generated out of necessity takes place outside of the arena in which the law is effective.** Social welfare is the state's mechanism for removing economic necessity as a motivation for action. Welfare assists in creating the conditions in which the "rule of law" is meaningful and effective. Therefore, the state's legal and coercive functions are inseparable from its welfare functions.

### Underview

#### 1] 1ar theory –

#### A] the aff gets it – otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible

#### B] drop the debater because the 1ar is too short to win theory and substance

#### C] no RVIs – the 2nr has enough time and the 2ar needs strategic flexibility

#### D] Fairness is a voter – debate’s a game that requires objective evaluation – judges have obligations to vote for the better debater which fairness controls. It also controls truth value – absent fairness, args were not subject to contestation, so they only won their arg because they were unfair.

#### 2] 1ar theory first –

#### A] Strat skew – short 2AR means I need to collapse to one layer to counter the long 2N collapse

#### B] Epistemic Indict – if the 1N was abusive then my ability to respond was skewed so you can’t truly evaluate the 1nc

#### C] Investment – it’s a much larger strategic loss because 1min is ¼ of the 1AR vs 1/7 of the 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time

#### 3] Presumption and permissibility affirm –

#### A] we presume statements true – if I said my name was Arjun, you would believe me absent evidence to the contrary

#### B] affirming is harder – the 1ar has to answer 7 minutes of offense and hedge against a 6 minute 2nr collapse and empirics – presumption is this card’s only implication, Shah 2-13:

Sachin Shah, [LHP Debater, Attended TOC 2018 and TOC 2019, Broke at TOC 2019, 5 on AP Stats, Computer Science Major, Experience with side bias stats] February 13, 2020, “A Statistical Analysis of Side-Bias on the 2020 January-February Lincoln Douglas Debate Topic by Sachin Shah” <http://nsdupdate.com/2020/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2020-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic-by-sachin-shah/?fbclid=IwAR2P0AZqQtSiwMZlCpia-Fy1zFOdHn6JrGtcYgGulqeimd-V0a1xbaIMYYs> //LHP AV

It is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds **from** 142 TOC bid-distributing tournaments (September 20**17** – 20**20** YTD), **the neg**ative **won 52.75%** of ballots (p-value < 0.0001, 95% confidence interval [52.3%, 53.2%]). This suggests **the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans nine different topics** [3]. Given a structural advantage for the negative, **the aff**irmative **may be justified** in being granted **a substantive advantage** **to compensate** for the structural skew. This could take various forms **such** **as** granting the affirmative **presumption** ground, tiny **plans**, **or** **framework choice**. Whatever form chosen should be tested to ensure the skew is not unintentionally reversed. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2020 January-February topic. So, once again, don’t lose the flip!

### ROB

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate the truth or falsity of the resolution through a normatively justified framework via fair, safe, and educational arguments. No skep, no tricks, yes phil and yes theory. Prefer it –

#### 1] Reciprocity – normative frameworks provide a reciprocal burden of justifying an obligation with the ability to turn them – other frameworks are arbitrarily impact exclusive and don’t articulate a 1-1 burden

#### 2] Philosophy – only our role of the ballot incentivizes nuanced discussions over the interactions of different ethical theories. That comes first –

#### A] constitutivism – LD debate is a values debate which means the intrinsic purpose of the activity is philosophical discussion

#### B] hijacks any voter – the question of why those are good relies on philosophical justification, ie constitutivism or something.

#### 3] Collapses – A] any framing presupposes a motivation to vote one way or another which means all framings concede the validity of normativity B] Ethics comes prior to logical truth, Peirce 02:

CS Peirce, “CP 2.198” 1902, <https://colorysemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf> //LHP AV

Peirce: CP 2.198 Cross-Ref:†† 198. **Ethics** †3: is another subject which for many years seemed to me to be completely foreign to logic. Indeed I doubted very much whether it was anything more than a practical science, or Art; although I had always been interested in ethical systems. About twenty years ago, I began to be impressed with the importance of the theory; but it has only been within five or six years that all the **intimacy of its relation to logic has been revealed to me**. It may very easily happen that the over-development of a man's moral conception should interfere with his progress in philosophy. The protoplasm of philosophy has to be in a liquid state in order that the operations of metabolism may go on. Now morality is a hardening agent. It is astonishing how many abominable scoundrels there are among sincerely moral people. The difficulty is that morality chokes its own stream. Like any other field, more than any other, it needs improvement, advance. Moral ideas must be a rising tide, or with the ebb foulness will be cast up. But morality, doctrinaire conservatist that it is, destroys its own vitality by resisting change, and positively insisting, This is eternally right: That is eternally wrong. The tendency of philosophers has always been to make their assertions too absolute. Nothing stands more in the way of a comprehension of the universe and of the mind. But in morals this tendency acquires triple strength. The practical side of ethics is its most obviously important side; and in practical matters, the first maxim is that everything may be exaggerated. That is the substance of Aristotle's Ethics. The moral spirit may very easily be carried to excess: all the more so, that the essence of that spirit is to insist upon its own absolute autocracy. All that is one side of the shield; but the other side is quite equally important. We are too apt to define ethics to ourselves as the science of right and wrong. That cannot be correct, for the reason that right and wrong are ethical conceptions which it is the business of that science to develope and to justify. A science cannot have for its fundamental problem to distribute objects among categories of its own creation; for underlying that problem must be the task of establishing those categories. **The fundamental problem of ethics is** not, therefore, What is right, but, **What am I prepared deliberately to accept as the statement of what I want to do, what am I to aim at, what am I after? To what is the force of my will to be directed**? **Now logic is a study of the means of attaining the end of thought**. **It cannot solve that problem until it clearly knows what that end is**. **Life can have but one end. It is Ethics which defines that end. It is, therefore, impossible to be thoroughly and rationally logical except upon an ethical basis**. Had I fully comprehended this great principle early in life, I should undoubtedly have been over-influenced by the moral spirit, and my present understanding of logic which, although it is far in advance of anybody else's, is, as compared with what it ought to be, as the scrawl on an infant's slate to a cartoon of Raphael, would have been even narrower and poorer than it now is--probably almost worthless. Before my logic was brought under the guidance of ethics, it was already a window through which much important truth could be seen, but dim with dust, distorting details by striæ. Under the guidance of ethics I took it and melted it down, reduced it to a fluid condition. I filtered it till it was clear. I cast it in the true mould; and when it had become solid, I spared no elbow-grease in polishing it. It is now a comparatively brilliant lens, showing much that was not discernible before. I believe that it will only remain to those who come after me to perfect the processes. I am as confident as I am of death that Logic will hereafter be infinitely superior to what it is as I leave it; but my labors will have done good work toward its improvement.