

I negate the resolution resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

Because of the word “ought” in the resolution my value is morality.

According to Britannica, Striking is the collective refusal by employees to work under the conditions required by employers. Strikes arise for a number of reasons, though principally in response to economic conditions (defined as an *economic strike* and meant to improve wages and benefits) or labour practices (intended to improve work conditions).

Just government is defined as - acting or being in conformity with what is morally upright or good”

My value criterion is utilitarianism because maximizing the general welfare of the most amount of people is the most important in a society.

Prefer this framework for the following reasons:

1) Preventing suffering comes before all other rights and ethics because we can't have other rights if we are dead or suffering; preventing suffering allows us to take actions like allowing for freedom. This means that our framework comes first.

Phenomenal Introspection holds that pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable biologically. Just as we know that a lemon is yellow from its color, we know that pleasure is valuable because we naturally strive towards it. For instance, if we put our hand on a hot stove, we instinctively draw it away.

Actor Specificity holds that utilitarianism is the only type of framework that governments can use because when making decisions they engage in aggregation to determine whether a specific policy benefits or harms society as a whole. Since most resolutions have state actors, this argument can be strategic.

Lexical Prerequisite says that instinctively, we strive to maximize pleasure. For instance, if I were standing in front of train tracks and an oncoming train approaches, I would instinctively jump out of the way.

Naturalism is an argument that states all ethical principles must be derived from natural properties. Since utilitarianism is inherently a natural framework that focuses on maximizing pleasure, a natural property, it would exclude any other frameworks that stem from non-natural principles.

2. Existential threats outweigh – all life has infinite value and extinction eliminates the possibility for future generations – err negative, because of innate cognitive biases

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance," Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>,

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. **Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world's existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills**

100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? **Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.**⁶⁵ In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. **What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,”** as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.⁶⁶ **This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value.** In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. **Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.**⁶⁷ Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.⁶⁸ Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. **In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations.** For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.⁶⁹ Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.⁷⁰ Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.⁷¹ **However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing.** Indeed, **reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations.** In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. **Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks.**

1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY **In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted.** As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in **There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action.** Consequently, a country which

reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. **Secondly**, as already suggested above, **existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs.** **Thirdly**, many **existential risks**, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, **pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat.** Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. **Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.**⁷² This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. **Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect.** In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered \$80, \$78, and \$88, respectively.⁷³ In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. **People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large.**⁷⁴ **Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude.** A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.⁷⁵

Extinction comes first!

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. **First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue.** Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, **the number of humans in existence in the future, given that we don't go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^{14} .** So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it's very good to prevent human extinction. **Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can't magically bring ourselves**

back into existence at a later date. Next, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally over the next few centuries, **as we have progressed in the past.** So we should expect that **in a few centuries' time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have**

Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I'll give the following simple but illustrative model. **Suppose that we have** 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new

people, and **0.2 certain that it's a good thing to produce new people**; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I'm supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don't know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let's use our estimate of 2×10^{14} people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit

of letting the human race go extinct now would be $(.8 - .2) \times (2 \times 10^{14}) = 1.2 \times (10^{14})$. Suppose that, **if we** let the human race continue and **did research for 300**

years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of

positive or negative **value**. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it's a good thing to produce new people. So there's an 80% chance of a loss of $3 \times (10^{14})$ (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is $2.4 \times (10^{14})$. But

there's also a 20% chance of a gain of $2 \times (10^{14})$, the expected value of which is

$4 \times (10^{13})$. That is, **in expected value terms, the cost of waiting** for a few hundred years **is**

vanishingly small compared with the benefit of **keeping one's options open** while one gains new information.

3. Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework: threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, util comes first and my offense outweighs theirs under their own framework.

Same fw, unnecessary

4. Pleasure and Pain

Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJD1

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about** the way **pleasure** feels **and**

something **undeniably bad about** the way **pain** feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.² The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are

heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?”** This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking **“But** what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion

is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the **pleasure is not good for anything further;** it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.³ As Aristotle observes: **“We never ask** [a man] **what his end is in being pleased, because** we assume that **pleasure is** choice **worthy**

in itself.”⁴ Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both** **places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

Only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable – all other values can be explained with reference to pleasure.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJD1

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of **additional intrinsic values** that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong **tendency to be** well **explained as things that** help **promote pleasure and avert pain.** To go through Frankena’s list, **life** and **consciousness** are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; **activity**, health, and strength **bring about pleasure;** and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some

have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism's: "Hedonists," he writes "do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend."²⁴ Ross writes that "[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors."²⁵ Roger Crisp observes that "those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy."²⁶ What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam's razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further

intrinsic values and disvalues. **It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts.** The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values

does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?²⁷

5] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don't have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

Hospitals Disadvantage

Hospitals were excluded from collective bargaining which meant strikes were relatively low. Nurse strikes cause disruption in hospital preparedness and quality of care. This wrecks pandemic preparedness for the next wave of pandemics which will be even deadlier than COVID which causes Extinction.

Nurse strikes devastates hospitals

Wright 10 Sarah H. Wright July 2010 "Evidence on the Effects of Nurses' Strikes"

<https://www.nber.org/digest/jul10/evidence-effects-nurses-strikes> (Researcher at National Bureau of Economic Research)

U.S. hospitals were excluded from collective bargaining laws for three decades longer than other sectors because of fears that strikes by nurses might imperil patients' health. Today, while unionization has been declining in general, it is growing rapidly in hospitals, with the number of unionized workers rising from 679,000 in 1990 to nearly one million in 2008. In *Do Strikes Kill? Evidence from New York State* (NBER Working Paper No. 15855), co-authors Jonathan Gruber and Samuel Kleiner carefully examine the effects of nursing strikes on patient care and outcomes. The researchers match data on nurses' strikes in New York State from 1984 to 2004 to data on hospital discharges, including information on treatment intensity, patient mortality, and hospital readmission. They conclude that nurses' strikes were costly to hospital patients: in-hospital mortality increased by 19.4 percent and hospital readmissions increased by 6.5 percent for patients admitted during a strike. Among their sample of 38,228 such patients, an estimated 138 more individuals died than would have without a strike, and 344 more patients were readmitted to the hospital than if there had been no strike. "Hospitals functioning during nurses' strikes do so at a lower quality of patient care," they write. Still, at hospitals experiencing strikes, the measures of treatment intensity -- that is, the length of hospital stay and the number of procedures performed during the patient's stay -- show no significant differences between striking and non-striking periods. Patients appear to receive the same intensity of care during union work stoppages as during normal hospital operations. Thus, the poor outcomes associated with strikes suggest that they might reduce hospital productivity. These poor health outcomes increased for both emergency and non-emergency hospital patients, even as admissions of both groups decreased by about 28 percent at hospitals with strikes. The poor health outcomes were not apparent either before or after the strike in the striking hospitals, suggesting that they are attributable to the strike itself. And, the poor health outcomes do not appear to do be due to different types of patients being admitted during strike periods, because patients admitted during a strike are very similar to those admitted during other periods. Hiring replacement workers apparently does not help: hospitals that hired replacement workers performed no better during strikes than those that did not hire substitute employees. In each case, patients with conditions that required intensive nursing were more likely to fare worse in the presence of nurses' strikes.

Hospitals are the critical internal link for pandemic preparedness.

Al Thobaity 20, Abdullelah, and Farhan Alshammari. "Nurses on the frontline against the COVID-19 pandemic: an Integrative review." *Dubai Medical Journal* 3.3 (2020): 87-92. (Associate Professor of Nursing at Taif University)

The majority of infected or symptomatic people seek medical treatment in medical facilities, particularly hospitals, as a high number of cases, especially those in critical condition, will have

an impact on hospitals [4]. The concept of **hospital resilience** in disaster situations is **defined as the ability to recover from the damage caused by huge disturbances quickly** [2]. The resilience of hospitals to pandemic cases depends on the preparedness of the institutions, and not all hospitals have the same resilience. **A lower resilience will affect the sustainability of the health services.** This also affects healthcare providers such as doctors, nurses, and allied health professionals [5, 6]. **Despite the impact on healthcare providers, excellent management of a pandemic depends on the level of preparedness of healthcare providers, including nurses.** This means that if it was impossible to be ready before a crisis or disaster, responsible people will do all but the impossible to save lives.

New Pandemics are deadlier and faster are coming – COVID is just the beginning

Antonelli 20 Ashley Fuoco Antonelli 5-15-2020 <https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2020/05/15/weekly-line> "Weekly line: Why deadly disease outbreaks could become more common—even after Covid-19" (Associate Editor — American Health Line)

While the new coronavirus pandemic suddenly took the world by storm, the truth is public health **experts** for years **have warned** that **a virus** similar to the new coronavirus **would cause the next pandemic—and they say** **deadly infectious disease outbreaks could become more common**. Infectious disease experts are always on the lookout for the next pandemic, and in a report published two years ago, researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health **predicted that the pathogen most likely to cause the next pandemic would be a virus similar to the common cold**. Specifically, the researchers predicted **that the pathogen at fault for the next pandemic would be: A microbe for which people have not yet developed immunities**, meaning that a large portion of the human population would be susceptible to infection; Contagious during the so-called "incubation period"—the time when people are infected with a pathogen but are not yet showing symptoms of the infection or are showing only mild symptoms; and Resistant to any known prevention or treatment methods. **The researchers also concluded that such a pathogen would have a "low but significant" fatality rate, meaning the pathogen wouldn't kill human hosts fast enough to inhibit its spread. As Amesh Adalja—a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, who led the report—told Live Science's Rachael Rettner at the time, "It just has to make a lot of people sick" to disrupt society.** The researchers said RNA viruses—which include the common cold, influenza, and severe acute respiratory syndrome (or SARS, which is caused by a type of coronavirus)—fit that bill. And even though we had a good bit of experience dealing with common RNA viruses like the flu, Adalja at the time told Rettner that there were "a whole host of viral families that get very little attention when it comes to pandemic preparedness." **Not even two years later, the new coronavirus, which causes Covid-19, emerged and quickly spread throughout the world, reaching pandemic status in just a few months.** To date, officials have reported more than 4.4 million cases of Covid-19 and 302,160 deaths tied to the new coronavirus globally. In the United States, the number of reported Covid-19 cases has reached more than 1.4 million and the number of reported deaths tied to the new coronavirus has risen to nearly 86,000 in just over three months. Although public health experts had warned about the likelihood of a respiratory-borne RNA virus causing the next global pandemic, many say the world was largely unprepared to handle this type of infectious disease outbreak. **And as concerning as that revelation may be on its own, perhaps even more worrisome is that public health experts predict life-threatening infectious disease outbreaks are likely to become more common—meaning we could be susceptible to another pandemic in the future.** Why experts think deadly infectious disease outbreaks could become more common As the Los Angeles Times's Joshua Emerson Smith notes, infectious disease experts for more than ten years now have noted that "[o]utbreaks of dangerous **new diseases** with the potential to become **pandemics have been on the rise—from HIV to swine flu to SARS to Ebola.**" For instance, a report published in Nature in 2008 found that **the number of emerging infectious disease events that occurred in the 1990s was**

more than three times higher than it was in the 1940s. Many experts believe the recent increase in infectious disease outbreaks is tied to human behaviors that disrupt the environment, "such as deforestation and poaching," which have led "to increased contact between highly mobile, urbanized human populations and wild animals," Emerson Smith writes. In the 2008 report, for example, researchers noted that about 60% of 355 emerging infectious disease events that occurred over a 50-year period could be largely linked to wild animals, livestock, and, to a lesser extent, pets. Now, researchers believe the new coronavirus first jumped to humans from animals at a wildlife market in Wuhan, China. Along those same lines, some experts have argued that global climate change has driven an increase in infectious diseases—and could continue to do so. A federally mandated report released by the U.S. Global Change Research Program in 2018 warned that warmer temperatures could expand the geographic range covered by disease-carrying insects and pests, which could result in more Americans being exposed to ticks carrying Lyme disease and mosquitos carrying the dengue, West Nile, and Zika viruses. And experts now say continued warming in global temperatures, deforestation, and other environmentally disruptive behaviors have broadened that risk by bringing more people into contact with disease-carrying animals. Further, experts note that infectious diseases today are able to spread much faster and farther than they could decades ago because of increasing globalization and travel. While some have suggested the Covid-19 pandemic could stifle that trend, others argue globalization is likely to continue—meaning so could infectious diseases' far spread.

Future pandemics will cause extinction – it only takes one ‘super-spreader’ – US prevention is key

Bar-Yam 16 Yaneer Bar-Yam 7-3-2016 “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world” <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition> (Professor and President, New England Complex System Institute; PhD in Physics, MIT)

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the

phase transition to extinction is **its suddenness**. **Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized** by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to **increase**. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don't know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn't take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. **As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase**. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? **Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with** some very highly connected individuals that can be **"superspreaders."** The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like **a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk** if they do happen. **If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.**

ON CASE

India is not a just government

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<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/06/g7-india-narendra-modi-democracy/619144/>

When the G7 group of rich democracies assembles this weekend in southwest England, it will discuss issues including COVID-19, taxes, and climate change. One item overhanging the formal agenda, however, will be the global deterioration of democracy itself, and the nation on which this question may hinge won't be any of the hosts, but a guest invited to this year's confab: **India**. Democracy's fate there may determine its fate throughout the world. At the moment, the **signs aren't looking good**—and that should be a flashing-red warning beacon for the rest of us.

Why is India the hinge point? The most obvious answer is the optics: When propagandists in Beijing describe democracy as a Western ideal unsuited to non-Western peoples, having a standard-bearer from the formerly colonized rather than the former colonizers is vital. But India's importance goes far beyond narrative.

But **India's democracy has seen worrisome erosion**. On **The Economist's** list, the country has slid from No. 35 in 2006 to No. 53 today. And the **ways** in which democracy is being undermined there provide a wake-up call to those watching from afar—including in the United States.

At the root of the backsliding, in India as elsewhere, is **a rejection of the core democratic principle that all citizens are equal**. India's governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) champions **Hindutva**, an ideology that **privileges the Hindu majority over religious minorities**. First articulated a century ago, **Hindutva** has grown from a fringe movement into the focus of national politics. Its immediate target has been the country's Muslims, who represent 14 percent of the population. **If India transforms itself from a secular democracy (as is mandated by its constitution) into an avowedly Hindu nation, 276 million non-Hindus will become second-class citizens.**

India's judicial system has bent to the wishes of politicians since 2014. In the early years of Modi's premiership, Uttar Pradesh, India's biggest state, whose population is larger than all but four of the world's nations, saw dozens of murderous attacks on Muslims by Hindu mobs, who accused their victims (in almost all cases falsely) of cow slaughter. The BJP sided with the killers: When the party won state elections in 2017, it appointed as chief minister a firebrand Hindu cleric who had promoted this vigilante action. Since then, the **state's judicial system has declined to punish most**

of the offenders—and the nation's Supreme Court has contented itself with issuing only tsk-tsks.

Weakening these civil-society foundations enabled the next stage of Modi's program: the use of democracy's mechanisms to undermine democracy's core.

Protests in Kashmir were met with a months-long clampdown. Modi followed up with actions that officially and unofficially advantaged Hindus over Muslims nationwide. Demonstrations against these moves peaked in December 2019, and were extinguished only by a COVID-19 lockdown three months later.

Opponent doesn't justify it's a just gov or say what a just gov is — we must follow my definition and my claims

Tyagi 20

<https://theconversation.com/why-modis-india-has-become-a-dangerous-place-for-muslims-132591>

Last week, India's capital, New Delhi, experienced its worst communal violence targeting a religious minority in more than 30 years. The death toll currently stands at 43 and parts of northeast Delhi remain under lock-down.

But under Modi, India's ethos is Hindu, and peace and brotherhood requires religious minorities to know their place. It is this sort of Hindu nationalism that led to the attacks on Muslims, their homes, schools and their places of worship.

Extinction is the worst impact under Util.

Counterplan: Everyone should have the unconditional right to strike, except for healthcare workers

Nurses and doctors leaving would cause sick patients

David 13

Without nurses/doctors to care for them, sick patients may languish in their pain and their suffering. Injured persons may face worsening conditions, or find their injuries becoming irreversible or vastly more complicated.

Only when the benefit of the patient is the ultimate goal, and only after all other avenues of negotiation have been exhausted, can health-care providers ethically leave their patients' bedsides to go on strike. If we as a society allow those who care for our sick to abandon their oaths and their duties any more readily than this, then we too have abandoned our sick.

Reject 1AR Theory

1. Pre-emptive theory solves, if they also get 1AR theory they have an extra route to the ballot because they can introduce a shell in 2 speeches to my 1.
2. There's no perfect 1NC so 1AR theory means every round will be a theory debate because there's always something to read a shell on. Destroys neg prep and means no substantive debate.
3. Time skew: If they introduce theory in the 1AR then they get 7 minutes total to my 6
4. I have no 3NR but since they read the shell in the 1AR they can make weighing claims in the 2AR that I can't respond to.
5. They can prep bidirectional 1AR shells and heavily frontline them, so I will always be behind on the theory debate.

6. 2AR collapse on 1AR theory is uniquely strong because they can clean up messy theory debates and take advantage of judge psychology skew.

1NC theory is fair because we both get 2 speeches on it, whereas 1AR theory gives the aff a 2 to 1 advantage.

The aff didn't give an underview about reading theory, so any theory read would be abusive.