

According to Britannica, Striking is the collective refusal by employees to work under the conditions required by employers. Strikes arise for a number of reasons, though principally in response to economic conditions (defined as an *economic strike* and meant to improve wages and benefits) or labour practices (intended to improve work conditions).

My value criterion is utilitarianism because maximizing the general welfare of the most amount of people is the most important in a society.

Prefer this framework for the following reasons:

1) Preventing suffering comes before all other rights and ethics because we can't have other rights if we are dead or suffering; preventing suffering allows us to take actions like allowing for freedom. This means that our framework comes first.

Phenomenal Introspection holds that pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable biologically. Just as we know that a lemon is yellow from its color, we know that pleasure is valuable because we naturally strive towards it. For instance, if we put our hand on a hot stove, we instinctively draw it away.

Actor Specificity holds that utilitarianism is the only type of framework that governments can use because when making decisions they engage in aggregation to determine whether a specific policy benefits or harms society as a whole. Since most resolutions have state actors, this argument can be strategic.

Lexical Prerequisite says that instinctively, we strive to maximize pleasure. For instance, if I were standing in front of train tracks and an oncoming train approaches, I would instinctively jump out of the way.

Naturalism is an argument that states all ethical principles must be derived from natural properties. Since utilitarianism is inherently a natural framework that focuses on maximizing pleasure, a natural property, it would exclude any other frameworks that stem from non-natural principles.

2. Existential threats outweigh – all life has infinite value and extinction eliminates the possibility for future generations – err negative, because of innate cognitive biases

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance," Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>,

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. **Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world's existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%.** (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse

than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? **Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history.**

The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.⁶⁵ In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. **What makes**

existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would "destroy the future," as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.⁶⁶ **This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value.** In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an

adverse event against the severity of the event. **Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.**⁶⁷ Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.⁶⁸ Therefore, it would be

unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom's argument. **In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations.** For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.⁶⁹ Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.⁷⁰ Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.⁷¹ **However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity.**

Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, **reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations.** In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. **Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks.** 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE

ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY **In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted.** As a result, concerted international cooperation is

required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in **There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in.**

Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest.

Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs.

Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. **Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.**⁷² This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a

mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. **Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect.** In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered \$80, \$78, and \$88, respectively.⁷³ In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. **People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large.**⁷⁴ **Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude.**

A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.⁷⁵

Extinction comes first!

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three

points. **First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue.** Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, **the number of humans in existence in the future, given that we don't go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^{14}** So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it's very good to prevent human extinction. **Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can't magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Next, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries' time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have.** Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I'll give the following simple but illustrative model. **Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it's a good thing to produce new people;** and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I'm supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don't know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let's use our estimate of 2×10^{14} people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be $(.8-.2) \times (2 \times 10^{14}) = 1.2 \times (10^{14})$. Suppose that, **if we** let the human race continue and **did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value.** If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it's a good thing to produce new people. So there's an 80% chance of a loss of $3 \times (10^{10})$ (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is $2.4 \times (10^{10})$. But **there's also a 20% chance of a gain of $2 \times (10^{14})$, the expected value of which is $4 \times (10^{13})$.** That is, **in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one's options open** while one gains new information.

3. Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework: threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, util comes first and my offense outweighs theirs under their own framework.

Same fw, unnecessary

4. Pleasure and Pain

Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for

there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.² The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences

in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?”** This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer:

“Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “**But** what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the

discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the **pleasure is not good for anything further**; it is

simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.³ As Aristotle observes: **“We never ask [a man]**

what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”⁴

Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our

everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

Only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable – all other values can be explained with reference to pleasure.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought

experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of **additional**

intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong **tendency to be well explained as**

things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, **life** and

consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; **activity**, health, and strength **bring about pleasure**; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”²⁴ Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”²⁵ Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”²⁶ What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-

hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?²⁷.

5] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

Counterplan: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike except for police officers.

Police Strikes are used to combat racial progress and attempts to limit police power. Making them legal and easier only make progress much harder.

Andrew Grim 2020 What is the ‘blue flu’ and how has it increased police power?

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/01/what-is-blue-flu-how-has-it-increased-police-power/>

But the result of such protests matter deeply as we consider police reform today. Historically, blue flu strikes have helped expand police power, ultimately limiting the ability of city governments to reform, constrain or conduct oversight over the police. They allow the police to leverage public fear of crime to extract concessions from municipalities. This became clear in Detroit more than 50 years ago. In June 1967, tensions arose between Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanagh and the Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA), which represented the city’s 3,300 patrol officers. The two were at odds primarily over police demands for a pay increase. Cavanagh showed no signs of caving to the DPOA’s demands and had, in fact, proposed to cut the police department’s budget. On June 15, the DPOA escalated the dispute with a walkout: 323 officers called in sick. The number grew over the next several days as the blue flu spread, reaching a height of 800 absences on June 17. In tandem with the walkout, the DPOA launched a fearmongering media campaign to win over the public. They took out ads in local newspapers warning Detroit residents, “How does it feel to be held up? Stick around and find out!” This campaign took place at a time of rising urban crime rates and uprisings, and only a month before the 1967 Detroit riot, making it especially potent. The DPOA understood this climate and used it to its advantage. With locals already afraid of crime and displeased at Cavanagh’s failure to rein it in, they would be more likely to demand the return of the police than to demand retribution against officers for an illegal strike. The DPOA’s strategy paid off. The walkout left Detroit Police Commissioner Ray Girardin feeling “practically helpless.” “I couldn’t force them to work,” he later told The Washington Post. Rather than risk public ire by allowing the blue flu to continue, Cavanagh relented. Ultimately, the DPOA got the raises it sought, making Detroit officers the highest paid in the nation. This was far from the end of the fight between Cavanagh and the DPOA. In the ensuing months and years, they continued to tussle over wages, pensions, the budget, the integration of squad cars and the hiring of black officers. The threat of another blue flu loomed over all these disputes, helping the union to win many of them. And Detroit was not an outlier. Throughout the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s, the blue flu was a ubiquitous and highly effective tactic in Baltimore, Memphis, New Orleans, Chicago, Newark, New York and many other cities. In most cases, as author Kristian Williams writes, “When faced with a walkout or slowdown, the authorities usually decided that the pragmatic need to get the cops back to work trumped the city government’s long term interest in diminishing the rank and file’s power.” But each time a city relented to this pressure, they ceded more

and more power to police unions, which would turn to the strategy repeatedly to defend officers' interests — **particularly when it came to efforts to address systemic racism in police policies and practices.** In 1970, black residents of Pittsburgh's North Side neighborhood raised an outcry over the "hostile sadistic treatment" they experienced at the hands of white police officers. They lobbied Mayor Peter F. Flaherty to assign more black officers to their neighborhood. The mayor agreed, transferring several white officers out of the North Side and replacing them with black officers. While residents cheered this decision, white officers and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), which represented them, were furious. They slammed the transfer as "discrimination" against whites. About 425 of the Pittsburgh Police Department's 1,600 police officers called out sick in protest. Notably, black police officers broke with their white colleagues and refused to join the walkout. They praised the transfer as a "long overdue action" and viewed the walkout as a betrayal of officers' oath to protect the public. Nonetheless, the tactic paid off. After several days, Flaherty caved to the "open revolt" of white officers, agreeing to halt the transfers and instead submit the dispute to binding arbitration between the city and the police union. Black officers, though, continued to speak out against their union's support of racist practices, and many of them later resigned from the union in protest. Similar scenarios played out in Detroit, Chicago and other cities in the 1960s and '70s, as **white officers continually staged walkouts to preserve the segregated status quo in their departments.** These blue flu **strikes amounted to an authoritarian power grab by police officers bent on avoiding oversight, rejecting reforms and shoring up their own authority.** In the aftermath of the 1967 Detroit walkout, a police commissioner's aide strongly criticized the police union's strong-arm tactics, saying "it smacks of a police state." The clash left one newspaper editor wondering, "Who's the Boss of the Detroit Police?" But in the "law and order" climate of the late 1960s, such criticism did not resonate enough to stir a groundswell of public opinion against the blue flu. And police unions dismissed critics by arguing that officers had "no alternative" but to engage in walkouts to get city officials to make concessions. Crucially, the very effectiveness of the blue flu may be premised on a myth. **While police unions use public fear of crime skyrocketing without police on duty** in many cases, **the absence of police did not lead to a rise in crime.** In New York City in 1971, for example, 20,000 officers called out sick for five days over a pay dispute without any apparent increase in crime. The most striking aspect of the walkout, as one observer noted, "might be just how unimportant it seemed." Today, municipalities are under immense pressure from activists who have taken to the streets to protest the police killings of black men and women. Some have already responded by enacting new policies and cutting police budgets. As it continues, **more blue flus are likely to follow as officers seek to wrest back control of the public debate on policing and reassert their independence.**

Those strikes cement a police culture which leads to endless amounts of racist violence and the bolstering of the prison industrial complex.

Chaney and Ray 13, Cassandra (Has a PhD and is a professor at LSU. Also has a strong focus in the structure of Black families) , and Ray V. Robertson (Also has a PhD and is a criminal justice professor at LSU). "Racism and police brutality in America." *Journal of African American Studies* 17.4 (2013): 480-505. SM//do I really need a card for this

Racism and Discrimination According to Marger (2012), "racism is an ideology, or belief system, designed to justify and rationalize racial and ethnic inequality" (p. 25) and "discrimination, most basically, is behavior aimed at denying members of particular ethnic groups' equal access to societal rewards" (p. 57). Defining both of these concepts from the onset is important for they provide the lens through which our focus on the racist and discriminatory practices of law enforcement can occur. **Since the time that Africans [African Americans] were forcibly brought to America, they have been the victims of racist and discriminatory practices** that have been spurred and/or substantiated by those who create and enforce the law. For example, **The Watts Riots of 1965, the widespread assaults against Blacks in Harlem during the 1920s (King 2011), law enforcement violence against Black women (i.e., Malaika Brooks, Jaisha Akins, Frankie Perkins, Dr. Mae Jemison, Linda Billups, Clementine Applewhite) and other ethnic women of color (Ritchie 2006), the beating of Rodney King, and the deaths of Amadou Diallo in the 1990s and Trayvon Martin more recently are just a few public examples of the historical and contemporaneous ways in which Blacks in America have been assaulted by members of the police system** (King 2011; Loyd 2012; Murch 2012; Rafail et al. 2012). In Punishing Race (2011), law professor Michael Tonry's research findings point to **the fact that Whites tend to excuse police brutality against Blacks because of the racial animus that they hold against Blacks.** Thus, to Whites, **Blacks are viewed as deserving of harsh treatment in the criminal justice system** (Peffley and Hurwitz 2013). At first glance, such an assertion may seem to be unfathomable, but that there is an

extensive body of literature which suggests that **Black males are viewed as the “prototypical criminal,”** and this notion is **buttressed in the media, by the general public, and via disparate sentencing outcomes** (Blair et al. 2004; Eberhardt et al. 2006; Gabiddon 2010; Maddox and Gray 2004; Oliver and Fonash 2002; Staples 2011). For instance, Blair et al. (2004) revealed that Black males with more Afrocentric features (e.g., dark skin, broad noses, full lips) may receive longer sentences than Blacks with less Afrocentric features, i.e., lighter skin and straighter hair (Eberhardt et al. 2006). Shaun Gabiddon in *Criminological Theories on Race and Crime* (2010) discussed the concept of “Negrophobia” which was more extensively examined by Armour (1997). Negrophobia can be surmised as an irrational of Blacks, which includes a fear of being victimized by Black, that can result in Whites shooting or harming an AfricanAmerican based on criminal/racial stereotypes (Armour 1997). **The aforementioned racialized stereotypical assumptions can be deleterious because they can be used by Whites to justify shooting a Black person on the slightest of pretense** (Gabiddon 2010). **Finally, African-American males represent a group that has been much maligned in the larger society (Tonry 2011). Further, as victims of the burgeoning prison industrial complex, mass incarceration, and enduring racism, the barriers to truly independent Black male agency are ubiquitous and firmly entrenched (Alexander 2010; Chaney 2009; Baker 1996; Blackmon 2008; Dottolo and Stewart 2008; Karenga 2010; Martin et al. 2001; Smith and Hattery 2009). Thus, racism and discrimination heightens the psychological distress experienced by Blacks (Robertson 2011; Pieterse et al. 2012), as well as their decreased mortality in the USA (Muennig and Murphy 2011).**

Police Brutality Against Black Males According to Walker (2011), police brutality is defined as “the use of excessive physical force or verbal assault and psychological intimidation” (p. 579). Although one recent study suggests that the NYPD has become better behaved due to greater race and gender diversity (Kane and White 2009), **Blacks are more likely to be the victims of police brutality. A growing body of scholarly research related to police brutality has revealed that Blacks are more likely than Whites to make complaints regarding police brutality (Smith and Holmes 2003), to be accosted while operating [driving] a motorized vehicle (“Driving While Black”), and to underreport how often they are stopped due to higher social desirability factors** (TomaskovicDevey et al. 2006). Interestingly, data obtained from the General Social Survey (GSS), a representative sample conducted biennially by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago for the years 1994 through 2004, provide further proof regarding the acceptance of force against Blacks. In particular, the GSS found Whites to be significantly (29.5 %) more accepting of police use of force when a citizen was attempting to escape custody than Blacks when analyzed using the chi-squared statistical test (p The average Southern policeman is a promoted poor White with a legal sanction to use a weapon. His social heritage has taught him to despise the Negroes, and he has had little education which could have changed him....The result is that probably no group of Whites in America have a lower opinion of the Negro people and are more fixed in their views than Southern policeman. (Myrdal 1944, pp. 540–541) Myrdal (1944) was writing on results from a massive study that he undertook in the late 1930s. He was writing at a time that even the most conservative among us would have to admit was not a colorblind society (if one even believes in such things). But current research does corroborate his observations that less educated police officers tend to be the most aggressive and have the most formal complaints filed against them when compared to their more educated counterparts (Hassell and Archbold 2010; Jefferis et al. 2011). Tonry (2011) delineates some interesting findings from the 2001 Race, Crime, and Public Opinion Survey that can be applied to understanding why the larger society tolerates police misconduct when it comes to Black males. The survey, which involved approximately 978 non-Hispanic Whites and 1,010 Blacks, revealed a divergence in attitudes between Blacks and Whites concerning the criminal justice system (Tonry 2011). For instance, 38 % of Whites and 89 % of Blacks viewed the criminal justice system as biased against Blacks (Tonry 2011). Additionally, 8 % of Blacks and 56 % of Whites saw the criminal justice system as treating Blacks fairly (Tonry 2011). Perhaps most revealing when it comes to facilitating an environment ripe for police brutality against Black males, 68 % of Whites and only 18 % of Whites expressed confidence in law enforcement (Tonry 2011). Is a society wherein the dominant group overwhelming approves of police performance willing to do anything substantive to curtail police brutality against Black males? Police brutality is not a new phenomenon. The Department of Justice (DOJ) office of Civil Rights (OCR) has investigated more than a dozen police departments in major cities across the USA on allegations of either racial discrimination or police brutality (Gabbidon and Greene 2013). To make the aforementioned even more clear, according to Gabbidon and Greene (2013), “In 2010, the OCR was investigating 17 police departments across the country and monitoring five settlements regarding four police agencies” (pp. 119–120). Plant and Peruche (2005) provide some useful information into why police officers view Black males as potential perpetrators and could lead to acts of brutality. In their research, the authors suggest that since Black people in general, and Black males in particular, are caricatured as aggressive and criminal, police are more likely to view Black men as a threat which justifies the disproportionate use of deadly force. Therefore, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that police officers’ decisions to act aggressively may, to some extent, be influenced by race (Jefferis et al. 2011). The media’s portrayals of Black men are often less than sanguine. Bryson’s (1998) work in this area provides empirical evidence that the mass media that has been instrumental in portraying Black men as studs, super detectives, or imitation White men and has a general negative effect on how these men are regarded by others. Such characterizations can be so visceral in nature that “prototypes” of criminal suspects are more likely to be African-American (Oliver et al. 2004). Not surprisingly, the more Afrocentric the African-American’s facial features, the more prone he or she is expected to be deviant (Eberhardt et al. 2006). Interestingly, it is probable that less than flattering depictions of Black males on television and in news stories are activating pre-existing stereotypes possessed by Whites as opposed to facilitating their creation. According to Oliver et al. (2004), “it is important to keep in mind that media consumption is an active process, with viewers’ existing attitudes and beliefs playing a larger role in how images are attended to, interpreted, and remembered” (p. 89). Moreover, it is reductionist to presuppose that individual is powerless in constructing a palatable version of reality and is solely under the control of the media and exercises no agency. Lastly, Peffley and Hurwitz (2013) describe what can be perceived as one of the more deleterious results of negative media caricatures of Black males. More specifically, the authors posit that most Whites believe that Blacks are disproportionately inclined to engage in criminal behavior and are the deserving on harsh treatment by the criminal justice system. On the other hand, such an observation is curious because most urban areas are moderate to highly segregated residentially which would preclude the frequent and significant interaction needed to make such scathing indictments (Bonilla-Silva 2009). Consequently, the aforementioned racial animus has the effect of increased White support for capital punishment if questions regarding its legitimacy around if capital punishment is too frequently applied to Blacks (Peffley and Hurwitz 2013; Tonry 2011). Ultimately, erroneous (negative) portrayals of crime and community, community race and class identities, and concerns over neighborhood change all contribute to place-specific framing of “the crime problem.” These frames, in turn, shape both intergroup dynamics and support for criminal justice policy (Leverentz 2012).

Reject 1AR Theory

1. Pre-emptive theory solves, if they also get 1AR theory they have an extra route to the ballot because they can introduce a shell in 2 speeches to my 1.
2. There's no perfect 1NC so 1AR theory means every round will be a theory debate because there's always something to read a shell on. Destroys neg prep and means no substantive debate.
3. Time skew: If they introduce theory in the 1AR then they get 7 minutes total to my 6
4. I have no 3NR but since they read the shell in the 1AR they can make weighing claims in the 2AR that I can't respond to.
5. They can prep bidirectional 1AR shells and heavily frontline them, so I will always be behind on the theory debate.
6. 2AR collapse on 1AR theory is uniquely strong because they can clean up messy theory debates and take advantage of judge psychology skew.

Climate Strikes are ineffective.

Matsakis 19

Matsakis, Louise (Staff Writer at WIRED) "Thousands of Tech Workers Join Global Climate Change Strike" WIRED, 20 September 2019. <https://www.wired.com/story/tech-workers-global-climate-change-strike/>.

The Amazon group organizing today's walkout, Amazon Employees for Climate Justice, **said** in a statement Thursday **that their employer's new sustainability initiatives** are a "huge win," but **ultimately don't go far enough. Amazon has not dropped its contracts with oil and gas companies for optimizing the discovery and extraction of fossil fuels, and continues to donate to climate-denying politicians and think tanks. Bezos didn't commit to either of his employees' asks**, and said Amazon would continue working with energy companies.

Warming + Democracy Cards

Warming D

Extinction from warming requires 12 degrees, far greater than their internal link, and intervening actors will solve before then

Sebastian **Farquhar 17**, leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

The **most likely** levels of global **warming** are **very unlikely to cause human extinction**.¹⁵ The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that **warming of 11-12°C would render most** of the planet **uninhabitable**,¹⁶ and would completely devastate agriculture.¹⁷ This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.¹⁸ Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.¹⁹ Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that **humanity is able to adapt** enough **to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios**. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.²⁰ If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,²¹ which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.²² The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the **probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%**,²³ and of **10°C is around 3%**.²⁴ **These estimates are of course highly uncertain**. It is **likely** that **the world will take action** against climate change **once it begins to impose large costs** on human society, **long before there is warming of 10°C**. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO₂ emissions and eventual warming,²⁵ and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO₂ will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.²⁶ Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO₂ emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

Ecological tipping points are “scientific garbage” and lack data---effects are slow and localized

Brook et al. 18 — Barry W. Brook, ARC Australian Laureate Professor and Chair of Environmental Sustainability at the University of Tasmania in the Faculty of Science, Engineering & Technology, Erle C. Ellis, Ph.D., Cornell University, 1990 Professor, Geography & Environmental Systems University of Maryland, and Jessie C. Buettel, “What Is the Evidence for Planetary Tipping Points?” In *Effective Conservation Science: Data Not Dogma*, Chapter 8, Oxford University Press (2018). http://ecotope.org/people/ellis/papers/brook_2018.pdf

*The Nine Planetary Boundaries Brook Et Al. Refer Too Are, “Land-Use Change, Rate of Biodiversity Loss, Phosphorus Cycle, Global Freshwater Use, Ocean Acidification, Climate Change, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, Atmospheric Aerosol Loading, Chemical Pollution, Terrestrial Net Primary Production, and Biodiversity Intactness”

As **living standards**, technological capacities, and **human welfare** have continued to improve, **concerns have mounted about possible natural limits to economic** and population **growth**. Climate change, habitat loss, and recent extinctions are examples of impacts on natural systems that have been used as markers of global environmental degradation associated with the expanding influence of humans (Barnosky et al., 2012; McGill et al., 2015). Past civilizations have faced rapid declines and even collapsed in the face of regional environmental degradation, drought, and other environmental challenges (Scheffer, 2016; Butzer and Endfield, 2012). **This begs the question of whether** long-term societal relationships with the planet's ecology may **be approaching a global tipping point** as the human population hurtles toward **ten billion people**. If this is indeed the case, the future of both biodiversity and humanity hangs in the balance. The hypothesis is that without urgent action to prevent reaching a global tipping point, the natural life support systems that sustain humanity may fail abruptly, with drastic consequences.

8.1 Regional tipping points yes— but what about global tipping points? **There is strong evidence for rapid global shifts** in the biosphere in the **distant past**, sometimes **taking the form of mass extinction events**, which have been linked to biophysical tipping points (Hughes et al., 2013). Tipping points occur when components of a system respond gradually to an external forcing to a point at which the response becomes nonlinear and abrupt. This response is often amplified through positive feedback interactions that induce an eventual state (or regime) shift (Lenton, 2013). Tipping points are well documented in studies of local ecosystems, such as lakes, that undergo regime shifts driven by alterations of energy or nutrient flows when thresholds are crossed and hysteresis prevails (Scheffer et al., 2015). Various tipping elements, some definite and others speculative, have also been noted in the Earth's climate system (Lenton et al., 2008). Given this context, it would seem **logical and indeed intuitive to conclude that the Earth system is susceptible and sensitive to planetary regime shifts caused by human alteration** of Earth's ecology. James Lovelock's original Earth-system conception of "Gaia," for instance, focused on interconnections and positive feedbacks between the geosphere and the biosphere, which act to promote stability and resilience (Lovelock and Margulis, 1974). But within this same framework, a temporary global forcing event, invoking disconnections and positive feedbacks, could lead to a rapid transition to an alternative stable state, as has been observed in many local systems (Kefi et al., 2016). This conceptual model invites the question of whether identifiable "boundaries" exist within the interacting components of the Earth system. If they do—and they are transgressed—then the planetary biosphere might be dramatically and permanently altered (Brook et al., 2013).

8.2 Planetary boundaries as a seductive policy framework **The planetary boundaries concept**, coined less than a decade ago (Rockström et al., 2009), **represents the idea that contemporary societies have potentially transgressed the historical "natural" conditions—the "safe operating space"—under which human societies have historically thrived. However, to mark the boundaries of a planetary safe "reference state," defined baselines are required.** One possibility that has been suggested is the climatic conditions that marked the last 10 000 years of our current warm interglacial period, the Holocene, in which agricultural and urban societies first arose, should be used as a safe space (Steffen et al., 2015). Other safe spaces (or conversely boundaries) might be similarly recognized. In total, nine planetary boundaries have been hypothesized in association with Earth-system processes that, if sufficiently distorted, might potentially cause harmful changes in Earth's functioning as a wholistic system (Table 8.1). This perspective has led some to postulate the potential breaching of critical thresholds, pushing the Earth out of the Holocene and consequently inducing a shift in the stability of the system (Barnosky et al., 2012). To quote: "Crossing these boundaries could generate abrupt or irreversible environmental changes." (stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries.html). A hope often expressed is that flagging the crossing of these boundaries as a significant risk will provoke decision makers and the public into taking actions to mitigate harmful global changes (McAlpine et al., 2015). Such a framework, of global tipping points counterbalanced by secure

safe spaces within planetary boundaries, is conceptually elegant and politically seductive. Notably, this implies two possible conditions—a state in which environmental change is without risk, and another in which risk is clear and action necessary. Such a framework is both constraining and liberating, and clearly defines a safe zone in which human societies may go about their activities without risk. As a consequence, if such clear knowledge on the risks of altering global environmental processes existed, a defined set of boundaries could be extremely useful to decision makers. But is there **evidence of global tipping-point** dynamics **with safe space and global risk** clearly **demarcated**? 8.3 **The search for mechanisms and evidence** in support of the **nine planetary boundaries** Since its **original publication**, the planetary boundaries framework, including the **related** concepts of a “**safe operating space**” and **global regime shifts**, have become increasingly prevalent in **scientific** and policy **discussions** concerned with global change (Corlett, 2015). **This work has been heavily cited**, updated, and actively promoted as a policy tool. But there has also been a counter-vailing critique that challenges the universality, utility, and even the underlying validity of the planetary boundaries framework (Brook and Blomqvist, 2016; Lenton and Williams, 2013). The underlying bases for this debate stem from disagreements over technical and scientific issues, including questions of scale, scientific underpinning, deterministic “boundary setting,” and the generality of mechanisms proposed. **Most of the nine processes and systems listed in Table 8.1 lack theoretical mechanisms or evidence for a causal connection from local perturbations to global “boundary crossing”** (Brook et al., 2013). The exceptions are the atmospheric and oceanic systems, which seem to most closely fit the characteristics required for a globally “scaled-up” version of the coupled, non-linear dynamics that have been shown to undergo phase shifts. But for others, like global land use or worldwide biodiversity, it is difficult to conceive how aggregated **local-to-regional measures** are **representative** of a coherent planetary system that is **prone to tipping** (Mace et al., 2014). Moreover, **anthropogenic pressures** vary geographically, **and the system responses to stressors can be highly heterogeneous** (Reyer et al., 2015). While global tipping points have **been hypothesized, their exact “position” has not been determined**. If the boundaries did **exist at a global level**, there is a good chance they could not be known until well after the regime shift or boundary crossing had occurred. **This is because of our lack of our understanding of complex systems and the wild fluctuations in state variables that have occurred** historically and continue to occur, **without any evidence of an irreversible global collapse**. Finally, implementing policies that avoid crossing planetary boundaries is a “global commons” problem, and everything we know from climate action indicates that it is difficult to generate agreements that address such risk when there is uncertainty about thresholds (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012). 8.4 **The problem with going from local process to a global tipping point** For at least six of the nine proposed boundaries, **the operational scales of these “Earth system processes” are local or regional** (Table 8.1), yet the **proposed boundaries represent global aggregations** (the sum of many component sub-systems). **The value assigned to any particular boundary is, in virtually all cases, speculative and represents an arbitrary point** along a continuum of possible values, **as opposed to a phase shift due to global non-linear dynamics**. The most plausible threshold is for ocean acidification, because it is directly related to the calcite and aragonite compensation depth (i.e., something that is inherently quantifiable). The others are purely **supported by a statement to the effect that “this stress or change from the baseline is deemed excessive.” This lack of scientific underpinning for these boundaries raises significant questions on the biological and physical relevance of such thresholds** for the Earth system. What is currently needed are explicit efforts to link long-term monitoring to the choice of these boundary values (Robert et al., 2013). Unquestioning **acceptance of these boundaries** that in turn guide subsequent global assessment (as in Newbold et al., 2016) **will only inhibit our understanding of human impacts**. In addition to masking finer-grained detail, globally averaged or aggregated metrics are also often difficult to link to directed action. For instance, the recent Paris Agreement to limit average global temperature rise to less than 2 °C above

pre-industrial levels was ultimately re-framed as a plethora of national goals or aspirations based on carbon-emissions intensity (Rogelj et al., 2016). This is partly because a “global temperature,” averaged across all the Earth system, is not a real physical phenomenon or quantity observed in any place. As such, it cannot be used to guide or monitor local system states. What can be monitored and altered are the trajectories of the underlying drivers of system changes (e.g., carbon emissions intensity, in the climate case), and these therefore ought to be the domain of targets. Even if one can identify and **measure a global environmental attribute**, it does not automatically follow that it is associated with a **real-world threshold that, when crossed, leads to irreversible change**. Asserting “safe” global limits on indicators like land-use change (the boundary of a maximum of 15% of land given over to cultivation, see Table 8.1) or decline in the **local species abundance** of originally present species (e.g., “10% loss relative to undisturbed habitat” as is the case in Newbold et al., 2016) is totally arbitrary. Such thinking **ignores inherent complexity and promotes a “one size fits all”** mode of thinking for conservation management that elides the very real need for locally appropriate solutions. Trying to avoid crossing a global land-use or biodiversity boundary might also lead to perverse outcomes locally, such as if restoring a “safe level” of biodiversity intactness in the world’s most fertile and productive regions (where most food originates) triggers undesirable trade-offs such as the displacement of farming to marginal regions that require more land, greater inputs, and hardship. In the context of food production, Running (2012) recently argued that at most an additional 10% of harvestable annual net global primary production (NPP) of terrestrial plants could be co-opted for future human use without crossing out of the planetary safe space. The implications of this assertion are draconian. Global NPP has been essentially steady, even with the massive agricultural expansion that has occurred over the last century. Thus, because the allocation of NPP is essentially a zerosum activity, asserting that humans can only get at most an additional 10% of that NPP implies future shortages of food, fiber, fodder, and fuel for people (Erb et al., 2012; Lewis, 2012). Policy based on this boundary would be fraught with human suffering, while the boundary itself has little mechanistic support or clear evidence of existence. In a similar vein, seeking to achieve uniform limits on practices such as nitrogen or phosphorus fertilizer use would inevitably lead to winners and losers at local scales (de Vries et al., 2013), because of differences in soil fertility and the legacies of historical farming practices (Erb et al., 2012; Carpenter and Bennett, 2011). For instance, while nitrogen fertilizer has been over-used in many developed countries, increases are urgently needed in sub-Saharan Africa to close the yield gap (Mueller et al., 2014). Given the consistent need for regionally appropriate limits, what practical use is a globally defined boundary? 8.5 Finding the research questions in an arena that is rife with competing visions of desirable futures

Planetary boundaries are typically based on biogeochemical and ecological principles. Their frame is simple: **if we pass threshold “X,” then the following ecological degradation or regime shift will occur**. What this framing neglects is that there are inevitable trade-offs between human development goals and environmental protection/risk. Policy based on any assumed boundary will substantially impact development options. For the most part, truly natural areas are not the main “life support systems” for humanity; instead, people rely on those ecosystems that have been modified or engineered (Ellis et al., 2013). If it comes **down to a choice between improved human development and the potential risk of transgressing an uncertain (and data poor) planetary boundary**, it may be that **society is willing to accept that risk**. Science has a vital role in guiding environmental management. Ultimately, however, science must intersect with human decisions: physical laws are not negotiable, but our response to them is (Larsen et al., 2015). Global change is not a societal construct, so we must avoid the temptation to couch scientific models as policy directives. Value judgements do (and must) play a key role in determining how people respond to global environmental challenges and the possibility of inflexible planetary boundaries. What has become starkly apparent from the debate on planetary tipping points and possible global regime changes is the need for a concerted research agenda aimed at the potential links between biophysical and social systems to determine possible boundary “positions.”

This research could come in the form of: (1) empirical examinations of regime shifts (or not) under gradual degradation; (2) models that explicitly link ecosystem changes and hypothesized boundaries to specific upheavals; and (3) explorations of how the framing of a boundary influences decision makers. For instance, our approach to Earth-system simulations is sophisticated for climatic components but lacks the resolution and mechanisms needed to test ideas on the planetary interconnectedness of nutrient and energy flows, or feedbacks across global biomes (Harfoot et al., 2014).

The Madingley model of ecosystem dynamics (<https://madingley.github.io/about>) offers one promising example of an innovative attempt in this direction, because its design goals are to explicitly capture the scaling of processes that affect biodiversity from local to global scales (Purves et al., 2013). We can also seek a better understanding of the mechanistic underpinnings of the drivers of changes in global systems, such as land-use change and agricultural intensification. This could generate empirically based “bottomup” forecasts of trajectories, which, when linked to multi-ecosystem models, should improve our forecasts of the risks of planetary state shifts (Brook and Blomqvist, 2016). One of the appeals of planetary boundaries is the hypothesis that it resonates as a narrative for environmental action. The question is: how do decision-makers respond to these boundary arguments? Some research suggests that thresholds inhibit collective actions against tragedies of the commons (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012). This is a field ripe for theoretical and empirical study. We also need to ask the hard questions about whether conceptual models like planetary boundaries the most effective strategy and engagement tool for conservation and mitigation are. The difficulty in getting international agreement on climate targets (e.g., the 2 °C “guardrail”) is an obvious case in point (Symons and Karlsson, 2015). Perhaps focusing on planetary opportunities: leverage points for guiding global change in better directions (e.g., carbon-neutral energy systems) is potentially a more effective focus of scientific attention (DeFries et al., 2012). By focusing on something to be averted as opposed to an outcome to be achieved, we risk breeding complacency on one side of a boundary, and hopelessness on the other. To summarize the above: the biosphere, and much of the geosphere, responds to external pressures in many and varied ways. The global human enterprise is driving large-scale changes in most components of the Earth system, but in a haphazard fashion, with responses often being weakly connected or transmitted slowly at a cross-continental scale. What we observe, for the global processes compiled in Table 8.1, is largely just the sum of all those changes. Acknowledging this reality should not be taken as diminishing the seriousness of these impacts or denying that major changes are occurring to the biosphere, atmosphere, and hydrosphere due to human activity. But it does make it implausible that the planet, or indeed most of its component systems, are primed to tip irreversibly to a radically different state that is inhospitable. Although the goal of sustainable stewardship of our planet is a laudable and an achievable one, the mechanisms and opportunities to conserve biodiversity and ecosystems lie mostly in targeted, localized actions (Jonas et al., 2014).

Democracy -- Climate

Democracy will catastrophically delay action on climate change--

Mann & Wainwright '18 (Geoff, teaches political economy and economic geography at Simon Fraser University, where he directs the Centre for Global Political Economy, Joel *Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future*, pp. 38-40, ME)

Relative to the institutional means currently available to capitalist liberal democracy and its sorry attempts at “consensus,” this trajectory has some distinct advantages with respect to atmospheric carbon concentration, notably in terms of the capacity to coordinate massive political-economic reconfiguration quickly and comprehensively. In light of our earlier question—how can we possibly realize the necessary emissions reductions?—it is this feature of Climate Mao that most recommends it. As the climate justice movement struggles to be heard, most campaigns in the global North are

premised on an unspoken faith in a lop-sided, elite-biased, **liberal proceduralism doomed to failure given the scale and scope of the changes required**. If climate science is even half-right in its forecasts, the **liberal** model of **democracy is at best too slow, at worst a devastating** distraction. Climate Mao reflects the demand for rapid, revolutionary, state-led transformation today. Indeed, calls for variations on just such a regime abound on the Left. Mike Davis and Giovanni Arrighi have more or less sided with **Climate Mao**, sketching it as **an alternative to capitalist Climate Leviathan**.³⁵ We might even interpret the renewal of enthusiasm for Maoist theory (including Alain Badiou's version) as part of the prevailing crisis of ecological-political imagination.³⁶ Minqi Li's is arguably the best developed of this line of thought, and like Arrighi he locates the fulcrum of global climate history in China, arguing that **Climate Mao offers the only way forward**: [U]nless China takes serious and meaningful actions to fulfill its obligation of emissions reduction, there is little hope that global climate stabilization can be achieved. However, it is very unlikely that the [present] Chinese government will voluntarily take the necessary actions to reduce emissions. The sharp fall of economic growth that would be required is something that the Chinese government will not accept and cannot afford politically. Does this mean that humanity is doomed? That depends on the political struggle within China and in the world as a whole.³⁷ **Taking inspiration from Mao**, Li says a new revolution in the Chinese revolution—a re-energization of the Maoist political tradition—**could transform China and save humanity from doom**. He does not claim this is likely; one need only consider China's massive highway expansions, accelerated automobile consumption, and subsidized urban sprawl.³⁸ But he is right that if an anticapitalist, planetary sovereign is to emerge that could change the world's climate trajectory, it is most likely to emerge in China.

Democracy -- Pandemics

Autocracies solve emerging pandemics – studies prove democratic failure

Kavanagh & Singh 20 – (Matthew M. Kavanagh, assistant professor of global health and visiting professor of law at Georgetown University, where he directs the Global Health Policy & Politics Initiative at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Renu Singh, fellow at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center, "Democracy, Capacity, and Coercion in Pandemic Response—COVID 19 in Comparative Political Perspective," 5-28-2020, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Duke University Press, <https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhpl/article/doi/10.1215/03616878-8641530/165294/Democracy-Capacity-and-Coercion-in-Pandemic>)

Is Democracy Good or Bad for Health in a Pandemic? In general, social scientists have tended to agree, albeit with caveats, that democracy is beneficial for public health. COVID-19 is raising important questions about this contention as high-profile cases show **authoritarian countries winning praise for their response while leading democracies have struggled to respond**. This complicates, perhaps in helpful ways, the exploration of health and of democracy. A wide literature has long debated the value of democracy for health. Electoral pressures and political freedoms of democratic regimes, it is argued, contribute to improved health and longer lives (Ruger 2005; Sen 1999). These claims have empirical support in political science (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; McGuire 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2017), economics (Kudamatsu 2012), and public health (Bollyky et al. 2019)—though not without challenge, as some have shown weak or no connection (Ross 2006). A range of mechanisms have been proposed and tested for how democracy improves health including incentives—median voters desire redistribution, and a norm of equality increases support for accessible health services; information—open media and opposition ensure that information both flows to the public about health and from the public to government about how to calibrate policy; accountability—enabling voters can punish leaders who fail; and association—enabling knowledge networks and interest groups to drive good policy. The narrative of Chinese success and U.S. failure has led to concern

that COVID-19 represents bad news about the value, and future, of democratic governance (Diamond 2020). Initial studies have already been conducted showing a correlation between democracy and worse outbreaks as well as less effective policy responses (Cepaluni, Dorsch, and Branyiczki 2020). Pandemic response is different from much of population health—with effective responses requiring the ability to act quickly, implement effectively, and gain public compliance. With the exception of HIV (e.g., Lieberman 2009), disease outbreaks and political institutions have been under-studied in comparative politics—with much of the literature focused on infant mortality or life expectancy, long-running trends that have far different mechanisms from a pandemic. Here, the accountability mechanisms that help democracies perform better may not be as beneficial. Political leaders with short time horizons may have relatively weak incentives to invest in pandemic preparedness and response (Dionne 2010; Healy and Malhotra 2009). And some of the benefits of associational networks and civil society can be shut down in the face of an emergency—facing, for example, stay-at-home orders. Democracies also have the added challenge of managing competing political factions and institutions, some of whom may have political incentives to undermine response. Once the outbreak broke into the public and Beijing was moved to act, China was able to quickly shut down the Wuhan market, shut down the movement of tens of millions of people, screen and isolate the sick, and even build two hospitals in a matter of days. Singapore is another autocracy that has gained praise for its quick response. The U.S., on the other hand, has struggled to respond. The Trump administration focused on travel bans to keep the “foreign” virus out rather than on mobilizing public health capacities to detect and respond—a message that aligns with the Trump administration’s election-year antiimmigrant and anti-China political frame. The President’s incentive structure has been clear, as his administration has tried to label COVID-19 the “Wuhan Virus,” continuing a trade war with China, the largest producer of medical goods needed by the U.S. Perhaps these incentives were clearest in early March when Trump resisted allowing a cruise ship with COVID-19 cases to dock because “I don’t need to have the numbers double because of one ship” (The White House 2020).

Pandemics risk extinction

Yaneer Bar-Yam 16, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI (July 3, 2016), <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition>

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red—strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the

airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn't take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be **unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases**, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. **As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase**. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be "superspreaders." The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. **If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable**

Democracy -- Drones

Democracy causes drone warfare.

Kaag, PhD, et. al, 14 - John Kaag, Ph.D. Chair of Philosophy, Professor @ Umass **Scott Pratt, Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, Professor of Philosophy @ U of Oregon ***Sujata K. Bhatia, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Globalization; "Democracy and the Necessity of Drones," Belfer Center for Science and International

Affairs, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/democracy-and-necessity-drones-0>

But a worry lingers in the back of our minds: perhaps, far from causing a disconnect, instead **there might be a necessary connection between modern democracies and drone warfare**. Most Americans hold that modern liberal democracies are worth defending. They are worth defending because these democracies, more than any other form of government, provide space for their individual citizens to pursue their own interests. Every citizen has the right to his or her own property, own form of worship, and own freedom of speech. And we recognize the intrinsic value of every individual in our democratic community. Such is the perk of being an American citizen—liberty and justice for all, each in our own particular way. In this ideal democracy, the interests of the individual are continuous with the interests of the nation as a whole. Every citizen also has the right to vote for leaders who are elected to protect the liberal democratic institutions that Americans, for good reason, hold so dear. And protection is, unfortunately, often required. There are, after all, countries and nonstate actors who have little respect for the joys of Western liberalism and who aim to undermine it at every turn. Protecting democracy has always been a tricky proposition. Leaders such as President Obama find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they must take defensive measures to guard the nation and its citizens' rights and interests from external threats. But on the other hand, **leaders must develop and then adopt defensive military strategies that minimize, hopefully even eliminate, the costs that their citizens must face; it is impermissible to send [people] men and women off to die in wars that could be won without these citizens' direct and dangerous involvement**. Every citizen, even soldiers, has intrinsic value. And so **Obama and his predecessors ushered in the era drone warfare and a slew of other automated technologies that would both protect citizens and shield citizen-soldiers. Drone warfare—and its collateral damage—is a necessary consequent of a certain type of modern liberal democracy**. If we are good liberal democrats, the development of drone warfare should neither surprise nor disturb us. **Drones are democratic weapons. There are no other options**. But drones do disturb us. The gruesome scenes of drone strikes—at funerals and birthdays and reunions half a world away—disturb us. When we have the rare misfortune of seeing these scenes, they keep us up at night. So why? Our intuition about the shortcomings and moral failings of drone strikes is not just a discomfort with robot warfare or carnage, but ought to be a sign that we are uncomfortable with a particular form of liberal **democracy that necessitates drone warfare**.

Drolif means every hotspot goes nuclear.

Zenko and Kreps, PhDs, 14

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The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.²⁰ Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, **misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes** with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, **which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement**. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide **greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders**, **armed drones will have destabilizing consequences**. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).²¹ Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.²² Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre- and post-armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the **threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced**. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.²³ President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”²⁴ Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.²⁵ If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, **drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary**—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.²⁶ Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting

include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan within its borders, and China on its western periphery. In 2013, a Chinese counternarcotics official revealed that his bureau had considered attempting to kill a drug kingpin named Naw Kham, who was hiding in a remote region in northeastern Myanmar, by using a drone carrying twenty kilograms of dynamite. “The plan was rejected, because the order was to catch him alive,” the official recalled.²⁷ With armed drones, China might make the same calculation that the United States has made—that killing is more straightforward than capturing—in choosing to target ostensibly high-threat individuals with drone strikes. China’s demonstrated willingness to employ armed drones against terrorists or criminals outside its borders could directly threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly if the criterion China uses to define a terrorist does not align with that of the United States or its allies. Domestically, governments may use armed drones to target their perceived internal enemies. Most emerging drone powers have experienced recent domestic unrest. Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and China all have separatist or significant opposition movements (e.g., Kurds, Chechens, the Taliban, Tibetans, and Uighurs) that presented political and military challenges to their rule in recent history. These states already designate individuals from these groups as “terrorists,” and reserve the right to use force against them. States possessing the lower risk—compared with other weapons platforms—capability of armed drones could use them more frequently in the service of domestic pacification, especially against time-sensitive targets that reside in mountainous, jungle, or other inhospitable terrain. Compared with typical methods used by military and police forces to counter insurgencies, criminals, or terrorists—such as ground troops and manned aircraft—unmanned drones provide significantly greater real-time intelligence through their persistent loiter time and responsiveness to striking an identified target. Increased Risk of Misperception and Escalation Pushing limits in already unstable regions is complicated by questions raised regarding rules of engagement: how would states respond to an armed drone in what they contend is their sovereign airspace, and how would opposing sides respond to counter-drone tactics? Japanese defense officials claim that shooting down Chinese drones in what Japan contends is its airspace is more likely to occur than downing manned aircraft because drones are not as responsive to radio or pilot warnings, thereby raising the possibility of an escalatory response.²⁸ Alternatively, Japan might misidentify a Chinese manned fighter as an advanced drone and fire on it, especially if the aircraft’s radar signature is not sufficiently distinctive or if combat drones routinely fly over the disputed area. Thus, the additional risks associated with drone strikes, combined with the lack of clarity on how two countries would react to an attempted downing of a drone, create the potential for miscalculation and subsequent escalation. As U.S. Air Force commanders in South Korea noted, a North Korean drone equipped with chemical agents would not have to kill many or even any people on the peninsula to terrorize the population and escalate tensions.²⁹ This scenario points to the spiralizing escalatory dynamic that could be repeated—likely intensified in the context of armed drones—in other tension-prone areas, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Central and East Africa, where the mix of low-risk and ambiguous rules of engagement is a recipe for escalation. Not all of these contingencies directly affect U.S. interests, but they would affect treaty allies whose security the United States has an interest in maintaining. Compared with other weapons platforms, current practice repeatedly demonstrates that drones make militarized disputes more likely due to a decreased threshold for the use of force and an increased risk of miscalculation. Increased Risk of Lethality The proliferation of armed drones will increase the likelihood of destabilizing or devastating one-off, high-consequence attacks. In March 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) observed of drones: “In some respects it’s a perfect assassination weapon. . . . Now we have a problem. There are all these nations that want to buy these armed drones. I’m strongly opposed to that.”³⁰ The worst-case contingency for the use of armed drones, albeit an unlikely circumstance, would be to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Drones are, in many ways, the perfect vehicle for delivering biological and chemical agents.³¹ A WMD attack, or even the assassination of a political leader, another troubling though unlikely circumstance, would

have **tremendous consequences** for regional and **international stability**. Deterring such drone-based attacks will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments to accurately detect and attribute them. Technical experts and intelligence analysts disagree about the extent to which this will be possible, but the difficulties lie in the challenges of detecting drones (they emit small radar, thermal, and electron signatures, and can fly low), determining who controlled it (they can be programmed to fly to a preset GPS coordinate), or assigning ownership to a downed system (they can be composed of commercial, off-the-shelf components).³² It is equally noteworthy that civilian officials or military commanders have almost always used armed drones in ways beyond their initially intended applications. Drones do not simply fulfill existing mission requirements; they create new and unforeseen ones, and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, U.S. officials would be misguided to view future uses of armed drones solely through the prism of how the United States has used them—for discrete military operations in relatively benign air-defense environments. The potential for misperception is compounded by the fact that few governments seeking or acquiring armed drones have **publicly articulated** any strategy for how they will likely use them. Conversely, the uncertainty about how other countries will use drones provides the United States with an opportunity to **shape drone doctrines**, especially for U.S. allies interested in procuring drones from U.S. manufacturers.

Democracy – War

Democratization is even more dangerous than authoritarian backsliding – robust statistical evidence proves it causes war.

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Is it a good idea to democratize a country in order to give peace more of a change? **No, probably not.** It is not only a bad idea because of the three caveats as described above, but also because the democratizing itself could be a very dangerous process during which conflicts are more likely. Countries that are in the process of making a transition to democracy are likely to be involved in wars between countries. As Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995a, b, 2002a, b, 2005) convincingly argued, countries become more aggressive and war-prone in the transitional phase of democratization. Such countries are likely to fight wars with not just dictatorships but also democracies. Democratizing countries are most likely to be involved in an interstate war, even more compared to political systems which are in transition towards dictatorship. The distinction between democratic and democratizing political systems is crucial. Systems can be considered to be democratizing if they change from a less democratic type of system