## NC Lib (2:15)

## Framework:

I Negate the resolution resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### My value is justice because of the word just in the resolution.

#### In setting an end, every agent must recognize freedom as a necessary good, Gewirth 84 bracketed for grammar and gendered language

[Alan Gewirth, () "The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alternative" American Journal Of Jurisprudence: Vol. 29: Iss. 1 Article 5, 1984, https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ajj/vol29/iss1/5/, DOA:9-10-2018 // WWBW Recut LHP AV]

Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, **every agent acts for purposes [t]he[y] regards as good.** Hence, **[t]he[y] must regard as necessary goods the freedom** and well being **that [is]** are the generic features and **necessary conditions of** his **action** and successful action in general. From this, it follows that **every agent logically must hold or accept** that he has **rights to these conditions**. For if he were **to deny** that he has **these rights**, then he **would** have to **admit that it is permissible** for other persons **to remove** from him the very **conditions** of freedom and well-being **that**, as **an agent**, he **must have**. But **it is contradictory** for him **to hold both that [t]he[y] must have these conditions and also that he may not have them.** Hence, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. Moreover, **every agent must further admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other actual or prospective agents have the same general characteristics of agency** on which he must ground his own right-claims. What I am saying, then, is that every agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and must hold that he and all other actual or prospective agents have rights to these necessary goods. Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the following principle: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, freedom, and well-being. I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action.

#### Preserving free choice to decide what is best for oneself is the best way to be ethical, because people have differing opinions of what is ethical. Accordingly, my criterion is preserving freedom.

#### People are not merely pawns of society, but real people with goals, dreams, and interests. It’s simply unethical to use one human against their will for the benefit of others. Nozick 74

Nozick 74, Robert Nozick, [American political philosopher, former professor at Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974.

**Side** **constraints express the inviolability of other persons**. But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? **Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid greater harm: we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some persons diet to improve their health or looks; some save money to support themselves when they are older. In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall good**. Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefits other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? **But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits others. Nothing more**. **What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up.** (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that **his is the only life he has**. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and **no one is entitled to force this upon him--least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance** (as other individuals do not) **and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens.**

#### Individuals have rights, so people must respect your actions and cannot restrict you, meaning the government’s only obligation is to protect rights. Philosophy professor Edward Feser writes:

Feser, Edward, (Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College), IEP, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/nozick/>. [ajv].

The various programs of the modern liberal welfare state are thus immoral, not only because they are inefficient and incompetently administered, but because they make slaves of the citizens of such a state. Indeed, **the only** sort of **state that can be moral**lyjustified **is** what Nozick calls a***minimal*** *state*or "night-watchman" state, a government **which protects individuals**, via police and military forces, from force, fraud, and theft, **and administers courts** of law, but does **nothing else**. In particular, such **a state cannot** regulate what citizens eat, drink, or smoke (since this would **interfere with their right to use their** self-owned **bodies** as they see fit), cannot control what they publish **or** read (since this would interfere with their right to use the **property** they've acquired with their self-owned labor- e.g. printing presses and paper - **as they wish**), cannot administer mandatory social insurance schemes or public education (since this would interfere with citizens' rights to use the fruits of their labor as they desire, in that some citizens might decide that they would rather put their money into private education and private retirement plans), and cannot regulate economic life in general via minimum wage and rent control laws and the like (since such actions are not only economically suspect - tending to produce bad unintended consequences like unemployment and housing shortages - but violate citizens' rights to charge whatever they want to for the use of their own property).

#### Prefer –

#### A] performativity – argumentation requires the assumption that freedom is good – else agents would be unable to make arguments

#### B] prerequisite – condoning any action requires condoning the freedom required to take that action – so my theory’s a prerequisite to theirs and my offense acts as a side-constraint to your framework.

#### C] culpability – absent a conception of free will, people can just claim they were acting of desires they can’t control.

#### D] probability – it’s logically contradictory to deny my framework because that would use freedom to do so. Therefore, it’s impossible for my framework to be false

## Contention 1: Rights

#### Appropriation is establishing property rights in something formerly un‐owned

**Dominiak 17**

Łukasz Dominiak (Associate Professor at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Poland; he holds a PhD and habilitation in political philosophy and is a Fellow of the Mises Institute). “Libertarianism and Original Appropriation.” Historia i Polityka, 29/2017: 22. Pp. 43‐56. JDN. https://apcz.umk.pl/HiP/article/view/HiP.2017.026/13714

Ownership1 , or property, on the other hand is a normative concept. To own a thing is to have a right to possess it, i.e. to be in such a juridical position that one’s claim to deal with the thing at will is a justified claim whereas claims of other persons are unjustified or less justified than the owner’s. As Barnett puts it, “rights are those claims a person has to legal enforcement that are justified, on balance, by the full constellation of relevant reasons, whether or not they are actually recognized and enforced by a legal system” (2004). To recognise someone’s ownership is therefore to assert that his possession of a thing is just, rightful, lawful, licit or reasonable etc., is to conclude that he ought to possess the thing if such is his will, even if he actually does not possess it. As Kinsella writes, “ownership is the right to control, use, or possess, while possession is actual control” (2009). Thus, ownership is a threefold normative or juridical relation between the owner, the thing owned and the rest of mankind such as the owner may control the thing to the exclusion of others because he has the best title to do it. Hence, the distinction between possession and ownership is a distinction between factual and normative relation. Having drawn the above distinction between possession and ownership, we are ready to define original appropriation. Thus, original appropriation is acquiring ownership of unowned things. To originally appropriate is to establish property rights, i.e. justified claims to physical things that at the moment of acquisition are unowned. What is important to underline again, is that original appropriation is not about taking factual possession of things that are unpossessed or unowned – this process is called occupation and can be conceived as one of the possible investitive facts that can result in original appropriation but should not be confounded with the latter. Neither is it about acquiring ownership of things already owned. It is about instituting new property rights to unowned things. As Nozick puts it, the topic of “original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld things includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be held” (2014), i.e. come to be owned. Hence, original appropriation is about creating normative relations between persons and things.

#### Injustice requires someone wronged, but initial acquisition doesn’t violate any entity’s rights– therefore, private appropriation of outer space cannot be unjust, Feser 05:

Edward Feser, [Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College] “THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION,” 2005 //LHP AV

The reason **there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition** of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of **justice**, that is to say, simply **does not apply** to initial acquisition. **It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place**. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned**. Consider the following example. **Suppose** **an individual** **A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R**. **For it to be** the case that A commits an **injustice** in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that **there is some individual** **B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice**. **But for B to have been wronged** by A’s acquisi- tion of R, **B would have to have had a rightful claim over R,** **a right to R**. By hypothesis, **however**, **B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all**. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, **the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R**. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. **The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer**. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices

#### The question of whether it is just or not to appropriate outer space relies on property rights. Because people have a right to own themselves/property, it CANT be unjust to appropriate outer space.

**Walker-Werth**, Thomas. “Elon Musk Is Right: Governments Shouldn't Control Land on Other Planets: Thomas Walker-Werth.” *FEE Freeman Article*, Foundation for Economic Education, 26 Jan. 20**22**, https://fee.org/articles/elon-musk-is-right-governments-shouldn-t-control-land-on-other-planets/.

Furthermore, the idea that a treaty can apply to all of outer space is ridiculous. If people invented a craft that could fly beyond the reach of any government, how can they possibly be subject to its rules? Space is gigantic, and the fact governments think they can pass laws that apply from here to Andromeda speaks to the boundless self-righteousness and hubris of governments. This invites an important question. If the governments of Earth shouldn’t have jurisdiction in space, how should people decide who can do what on new worlds like Mars? Does anyone have the right to own them? This may seem like a legal question, but fundamentally it’s a moral one—a question of property rights. For that we can turn to the father of liberty and the philosophic originator of the principles behind the American founding: [John Locke](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/). In his [Second Treatise on Government](https://wwnorton.com/college/history/archive/resources/documents/ch04_03.htm#:~:text=Though%20the%20earth%20and%20all,any%20right%20to%20but%20himself.&text=It%20being%20by%20him%20removed,common%20right%20of%20other%20men.), Locke discusse[s] the nature of property rights: "Though the earth. . . be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men." What Locke was saying is that a person has a right to own those things that they create with their effort, and the unowned natural resources around us belong to those who take them out of a state of nature and turn them into something productive. As philosopher [Ayn Rand demonstrated](http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/property_rights.html), this right to property is essential for human beings to be able to use their minds and live fully

#### This proves that unowned natural resources, like outer space, must be governed through property rights, and private entities ought to have those rights.