## Definitions:

#### Definition based on on 6 legal documents:

**Law Insider**, https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/private-entities

***Private entities* means**[**individuals**](https://www.lawinsider.com/clause/individuals)**or**[**organizations**](https://www.lawinsider.com/clause/organizations)**other than**[**federal**](https://www.lawinsider.com/clause/federal)**,**[**state**](https://www.lawinsider.com/clause/state)**, or**[**local personnel**](https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/local-personnel)**or**[**agencies**](https://www.lawinsider.com/clause/agencies).

## Links:

#### The aff’s limitation of private entities, anyone outside of the government, to appropriate outer space, while keeping Earth’s is wrong. They differentiate Earth and Space as different structures, when really they are all interconnected assemblages, and need to be understood so. Dema 7

Dema, Leslie. "" Inorganic, Yet Alive": How Can Deleuze and Guattari Deal With the Accusation of Vitalism?." *Rhizomes* 15.1 (2007).

What does it mean to say that assemblages are the basic unit of inorganic life? Just as biologists once spoke of life by appealing to organisms or species, Deleuze and Guattari wish to speak of life by appealing to assemblages. Unfortunately this introduction is too brief a space in which to develop a proper exposition of the rich concept of assemblages. I will offer a taste rather than a fully developed argument because, with all of their enthusiasm for creating concepts and neologisms, Deleuze and Guattari have built their theory of inorganic life and assemblages upon a very complicated system of their own invention. So, for example, the processes and parts that compose assemblages are not 'like' organs. There is no equivalent to a heart that pumps blood or a chloroplast that digests the sun. Instead, an assemblage is animated by coding and decoding, deterritorializations, and lines of flight; it is composed through doubly-articulated connections between various strata; it effectuates an abstract machine; its nonpersonal segments flow from a plane of consistency. There is a rapport between parts, but no organs in the sense of parts subordinated to a whole. Wrought by both actual and virtual dynamics, assembling is about the interruptions and connections of the flows of the mechanosphere. There is no biosphere or noosphere, only the mechanosphere, which is to say, the sphere of inorganic life. [5] Assembling involves no soul, no death, and no reproduction. Assemblages do not produce more of their own kind; they do not belong to a kind; they are not sustained by an essence. Assembled relations are infinitely more productive than conjugal relations. With organic life reproduction arises from a single centre; DNA is passed on through conjugal coupling. But organic reproduction runs into a puzzle when faced with sexual symbiosis; such is the case with the orchid whose sexual organs are not directed to appeal to its own species, but to attract the wasp, without which the orchid cannot reproduce. This forms the wasp-orchid assemblage which operates via inorganic, rather than organic, life. Symbiosis is by no means limited to persistent and highly specialized co-adaptations of two species; other assemblages may involve transgressions between different spheres. For example, with ergonomics we see workers from the anthropomorphic strata involved with physical apparatuses such as chairs and keyboards from the technological strata. Life is diffused through symbiotic relations until it is no longer recognizably linear and strictly organic: it is assembled inorganically. [6] Assembling is so simple. It is the striking up of a rapport: "the assemblage is co-functioning, it is 'sympathy', symbiosis." [6] At least two parts find some basis of attraction, a method of working together, a shared stylistic technique. Assemblages are not alien or unusual structures; they are types of interactive relationships with which we are already very familiar. [7] Among friends, assemblages of sympathy form. Between you and your friend, what is there? Your friend has a certain charm. She captures you with her "vital stammering," and this charm marks a "delicacy of health." [7] Her own contingencies make her all the more alive, and the various subtle ways in which she is out of place turn out to be opportunities for the two of you to meet. But where is your friend's charm? Is it found in her reactions to stories, her slightly awkward gait, her insecurities, her attentiveness to others, or in the pride she feels regarding her own good taste? It is a mistake to think of her charm as a tool of flattery or merely as a thing in her possession. Charm "gives life a non-personal power," it is what facilitates the rapport between the two of you; it is the formation of assemblages that, as Deleuze and Guattari describe, involves an affirmation of chance: Charm is the source of life just as style is the source of writing. Life is not your history— those who have no charm have no life, it is as though they are dead. But the charm is not the person. It is what makes people be grasped as so many combinations and as so many unique chances from which such a combination has been drawn. It is a throw of the dice which necessarily wins, since it affirms chance sufficiently instead of detaching or mutilating chance or reducing it to probabilities. Thus through each fragile combination a power of life is affirmed with a strength, an obstinacy, an unequalled persistence in the being. [8] Many are the ties that bind friends together, but not all successfully assemble. Charm does not make you want to be 'like' your friend. Your friend's charm does not capture you through identification; you do not want to imitate her mannerisms or step into her shoes. [8] Nor should we fall under the false impression that sympathy is limited to human relations. There are certain methods that are generalizable and applicable outside the social sphere. One such method is the logic of becoming. When Deleuze and Guattari speak of A becoming B, its not a matter of A imitating or turning into B. Instead, it is a matter of A becoming B at the very moment that B is itself taking a line of flight and becoming something else. When two elements enter into a sympathetic becoming "it is not that the two are exchanged, for they are not exchanged at all, but the one only becomes the other if the other becomes something yet other, and if the terms disappear." [9] For example, Deleuze offers several memorable examples of sympathetic blocks of becoming in which inorganic life unfolds: As Lewis Carroll says, it is when the smile is without a cat that man can effectively become cat as soon as he smiles ... with Mozart's birds it is the man who becomes a bird, because the bird becomes music. Melville's mariner becomes albatross when the albatross itself becomes extraordinary whiteness, pure vibration of white." [10] Never entirely alive nor entirely dead, we always talk of health, the quality of life. Assemblages do not die; they are most alive when broken down; they live by continually breaking down. [11] Though it is possible that a line of escape might turn into a line of death, the far more common threats are the various kinds of sickness and destruction wreaked by excessive stratification or, alternatively, the lack of connectivity. Health is not a mysterious force; it is a concrete and sympathetic struggling together; "we can only assemble among assemblages." [12] Practical advice on becoming, or proliferating your desiring-machines, is offered by Deleuze and Guattari in the terms of assembling: experiment with deterritorializing this bit; try to capture the substance of expression from that strata; adopt a different speed into your abstract machine. According to Deleuze and Guattari we engage with inorganic life at the level of assemblages, and the art of living is the art of composing assemblages.

#### Appropriation is realizing the potential of the subject; to appropriate outer space is to create new relations and experiences with matter in outer space. The aff blocks the individual from learning about their interests and creativity by immersing themselves in space, stopping their ability to experiment and draw lines of flight while trying to claim appropriation is bad, when it is necessary. GOODLEY 7

Dan Goodley (2007) Becoming rhizomatic parents: Deleuze, Guattari and disabled babies, Disability & Society, 22:2, 145-160, DOI: [10.1080/09687590601141576](https://doi.org/10.1080/09687590601141576) // LHP HL

## A key problem for Deleuze and Guattari is the segmentation of the subject along binary lines (e.g. disabled/non-disabled, accepting parent/parent in denial), centralized in linear ways by available discourses. The question, therefore, is not which subject to become (Lawlor, 1998) but how to escape the forces of subjectification that block flows of desire and territorialize the subject with rigid segmentarities (Bogard, 1998). Such a task sounds so difficult in a world where parents are subjectified along hard professional lines. Professionals ranged from information worker, to community nurse, to autism specialist. When asked about the ways in which parents made sense of their children and diagnosis, parents were pigeonholed into denial (the most prominent category), acceptance (which seemed to include acceptance of the professional role), professional parent (a problematic subject position where parents build up their knowledge of impairment labels often via the internet drawing upon, in the professionals’ opinions, spurious information). We proposed a final type of parent: the parent who is becoming—someone who follows the philosophy of the present … —who is working with the everyday with his or her child. This parent was not really recognised by professionals and when considered, I think, was cast as simply being a (naively) positive person. (Dan Goodley, research notes from a professional focus group of health and social care professionals, 2005) If we take the position espoused by Deleuze and Guattari that there are no complete concepts (Bearn, 2000, p. 446), then how might we see parents? Perhaps, we need to give up the big Subject and rediscover the forces that generate minor subjects. Once relieved of the burden of the big Subject we can start to make sense (Bogard, 1998, p. 59). Weiss (1999, p. 164), following Rosi Braidotti, suggests that in actuality the Subject is often ‘man-white-western-male-adult-reasonable-heterosexual-living-intowns-speaking a standard language’. It is perhaps understandable why such a subject would be deconstructed! An understanding of parents’ engagement is located in Downloaded by [Texas State University, San Marcos] at 16:24 15 August 2013 Rhizomatic parents 155 Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) notion of ‘becoming’ (which is implicated in the smoothing, BwOs and rhizomatic actions outlined earlier). By this we are not referring to ‘how the human being is constructed’ (Lawlor, 1998), but to how subjects transcend the given (Buchanan, 1997), to become or to engage with places of immanence, to create action and results rather than establish transcendentals, not being, but always becoming as a line of flight. Not occupying a body/organism but becoming a BwO. For many of the parents in this study their reflections have sometimes taken place as if they lacked the conceptual frameworks through which to describe their experiences. I’m not saying I’m embarrassed because I’m not … perhaps its because I’ve not accepted it myself yet, I don’t know, I don’t quite know what it is but … some people aren’t bothered about disability but I am, sometimes. (Rebecca Greenwood). One take on this would be that Rebecca lacks a reflexive vocabulary from which to talk of herself as a subject as a mother. In other cases it could be argued that some parents apparently contentedly reflect on the present, with seemingly scant regard for past and future. This idea of parents’ embracing the philosophy of present and becoming, as a resistant story to the linear narratives of the medical model, has been developed elsewhere (Fisher & Goodley, in press). In short, for Deleuze and Guattari (1987) becoming is not based around relational binaries (becoming a good parent rather than a bad parent) ): I am coping. I do one thing at a time, one day at a time. I do not make huge plans, I don’t expect certain things. If we overcome a hurdle then great but there’ll be something else around the corner (Cheryl Smith, mother of Danny who has been labelled as having autism; see Fisher & Goodley, in press). Uncertainty promotes openness to new ideas and locations. The subject never settles for too long. For Braidotti (1994) this is a crucial impact of becoming: nomadism. This refers to the kind of critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded modes of thought and behaviour. Nomads also find themselves in different locations and lands (see also Bayliss, 2006; Goodley & Roets, forthcoming; Roets, 2006): I have this booklet written by the mother of a special needs child. It’s called Welcome to Holland. She talks about the wonderful dreams we attach to pregnancy, birth and having the child and likens it to going on a journey to Italy. It’s what you’ve always dreamt of, you get on the plane and you’re all excited. And then you get on this plane after a couple of hours later or whatever, you’ve now landed in Holland. And you were expecting this fantastic place, Italy, and you’re just so disappointed. But if you look carefully and don’t let go of Italy you’ll see the beauty that’s in Holland, the beautiful tulips, the canals. It will have certain things Italy may never have. You’ll meet people that you wouldn’t meet if you were going to Italy. And you might not get Italian wine but, hey, they’ve got some really good beer in Holland. (Rebecca Greenwood) But let us not forget, nomads settle occasionally. They have to. Hence, a further aspect of becoming to consider in relation to parents is appropriation. Buchanan Downloaded by [Texas State University, San Marcos] at 16:24 15 August 2013 156 D. Goodley (1997) asked how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given? Don’t we settle sometimes? Can nomads ‘be’ for a short while. This is a key question for Deleuze and Guattari. Only a subject that is given can be shaped by the social, that is, constituted by forces external to itself. But a subject that is completely given and not at least partially transcendent cannot have any effect on the social order … the subject is the product of social mechanisms and … the subject is capable of manipulating those mechanisms. To see how this is possible we have to interrogate the decisive relation between the principles of association and the subject. (Buchanan, 1997, p. 484, emphasis in the original) The process of appropriation enables the nomad to become active, to self-fashion as it were (Buchanan, 1997, p. 487; see also Weiss, 1999). For parents of disabled babies this highlights those times when they use normative and normalizing practices of health care. They transcend them through appropriation. I took Ashley into hospital. She’d been having loads of fits. It was just dreadful. They put her on these drugs which knocked her out. She didn’t open her eyes for three days. They were just saying, ‘right, we’ll administer this drug again’. It stopped her fitting but wiped her out. I eventually snapped at the doctor. We spoke about the dosage. He looked again at the dosage, gave me permission to administer the drugs at home and we spoke about increasing dosage if the number of fits started to creep up. When this doctor was away on holidays I spoke to one of his colleagues who was concerned about me being responsible for the drugs. So I carefully took her through my thinking about increasing half a ml here and there, when needed. She told me off for doing it. For increasing amounts. But when my doctor returned he said I’d done the right thing. (Emma Brown’s story) Appropriation is thus a means of creating pluralism where homogeneity had previously reigned (Buchanan, 1987, p. 491). This is not to say that the parent totally escapes the imprisonment of powerful totalizing discourses of health care, but ‘it becomes possible to say, now, that one is not free in prison, but that one can nevertheless achieve freedom there’ (Buchanan, 1987, p. 489). This links back to the idea of the BwO being created on a stratum—an organism, subject position, way of thinking—in which the parent experiments. Appropriation links to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) advice to engage in a cautious destratifying of the BwO. Not to totally empty the body, to wildly destratify to a point where no one else can connect because the body, subject and enunciation have been abandoned, but to work in slippery ways with other (temporary) beings/organisms on the stratum (Markula, 2006). It is only by asking how parents are being created and how they may well transcend the givens of

## Impact

#### The Aff directly opposes the subject’s infinite potential, ending all possibility for understanding. When the subject surrounded by stable structures— structures that oppress and confine an individual to a certain norm— they are only allowed to understand themselves in one way. The AC limits the individual from creating connections with a new world, stealing the possibility of new understanding for the subject, hurting them ontologically.

**DELEUZE and GUITARRI 88**

[Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 1988. Pg 53-55] // LHP HL

Forms relate to codes and processes of coding and decoding in the parastrata; substances, being formed matters, relate to territorialities and movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization on the epis-trata. In truth, the epistrata are just as inseparable from the movements that constitute them as the parastrata are from their processes. Nomadic waves or flows of deterritorialization go from the central layer to the periphery, then from the new center to the new periphery, falling back to the old center and launching forth to the new.16 The organization of **the** **epistrata** **moves** in the direction of **increasing deterritorialization**. Physical particles and chemical substances cross thresholds of deterritorialization on their own stratum and between strata; these thresholds **correspond to** more or less **stable intermediate states**, to more or less transitory valences and existences, to engagements with this or that other body, to densities of proximity, **to** more or less **localizable connections**. Not only are physical particles characterized by speeds of deterritorialization—Joycean tachyons, particles-holes, and quarks recalling the fundamental idea of the "soup"—but a single chemical substance (sulfur or carbon, for example) has a number of more and less deterritorialized states. **The more interior milieus an organism has** **on its own** stratum, **assuring its** **autonomy** and bringing it into a set of aleatory relations with the exterior, **the more deterritorialized it is**. That is why degrees of **development** **must** **be** **understood relatively**, and as a function of differential speeds, relations, and rates. **Deterritorialization** must be thought of as a perfectly positive power that **has degrees and thresholds** (epistrata), is always relative, and has reterritorialization as its flipside or complement. An organism that is deterritorialized in relation to the exterior necessarily reterritorializes on its interior milieus. A given presumed fragment of **embryo is deterritorialized** **when it changes thresholds** or gradients, but is **assigned a new role by** the **new surroundings**. Local movements are alterations. Cellular migration, stretching, invagination, folding are examples of this. **Every voyage is intensive,** and **occurs in relation to thresholds of intensity** between which it evolves or that it crosses. One travels by intensity; displacements and spatial figures depend on intensive thresholds of nomadic deterritorialization (and thus on differential relations) **that simultaneously define complementary**, sedentary reterritorializations. Every stratum operates this way: by grasping in its pincers a maximum number of intensities or intensive particles over which it spreads its forms and substances, constituting determinate gradients and thresholds of resonance (deterritorialization on a stratum always occurs in relation to a complementary reterritorialization).17 As long as preestablished forms were compared to predetermined degrees, all one could do was affirm their irreducibility, and there was no way of judging possible communication between the two factors. But we see now that forms depend on codes in the parastrata and plunge into processes of decoding or drift and that degrees themselves are caught up in movements of intensive territorialization and reterritorialization. There is no simple correspondence between codes and territorialities on the one hand and decodings and deterritorialization on the other: on the contrary, a code may be a deterritorialization and a reterritorialization a decoding. Wide gaps separate code and territoriality. The two factors nevertheless have the same "subject" in a stratum: it is populations that are deterritorialized and reterritorialized, and also coded and decoded. In addition, these factors communicate or interlace in the milieus. On the one hand, modifications of a code have an aleatory cause in the milieu of exteriority, and it is their effects on the interior milieus, their compatibility with them, that decide whether they will be popularized. **Deterritorializations and reterritorializations** do not bring about the modifications; they do, however, strictly **determine their selection**. On the other hand, every modification has an associated milieu that in turn entails a certain deterritorialization in relation to the milieu of exteriority and a certain reterritorialization on intermediate or interior milieus. Perceptions and **actions in a**n associated **milieu**, even those on a molecular level, construct or **produce territorial signs** (indexes). This is especially true of **an animal world**, which is constituted, marked off by **signs** that **divide it into zones** (of shelter, hunting, neutrality, etc.), mobilize special organs, and correspond to fragments of code; this is so even at the margin of decoding inherent in the code. Even the **domain of learning is defined by the code**, or prescribed by it. But indexes or territorial signs are inseparable from a double movement. Since the associated milieu always confronts a milieu of exteriority with which the animal is engaged and in which it takes necessary risks, **a line of flight must be preserved to enable the animal** **to regain its** associated **milieu** **when danger appears** (for example, the bull's line of flight in the arena, which it uses to regain the turf it has chosen).18 A second kind of line of flight arises when the associated milieu is rocked by blows from the exterior, forcing the animal to abandon it and strike up an association with new portions of exteriority, this time leaning on its interior milieus like fragile crutches. When **the seas dried**, the primitive **Fish** **left** **its** associated **milieu** to explore land, **forced to "stand on its own legs,"** now carrying water only on the inside, in the amniotic membranes protecting the embryo. In one way or the other, **the animal is** more **a fleer** than a fighter, but its **flights** **are** also conquests, **creations**. Territorialities, then, are shot through with **lines of flight testifying to the presence** within them of movements **of deterritorialization** and reterritorialization. In a certain sense, they are secondary. They **would be nothing without these movements** that deposit them. In short, the epistrata and parastrata are continually moving, sliding, shifting, and changing on the Ecumenon or unity of composition of a stratum; some are swept away by lines of flight and movements of deterritorialization, others by processes of decoding or drift, but they all communicate at the intersection of the milieus. The strata are continually being shaken by phenomena of cracking and rupture, either at the level of the substrata that furnish the materials (a prebiotic soup, a prechemical soup ...), at the level of the accumulating epistrata, or at the level of the abutting parastrata: everywhere there arise simultaneous accelerations and blockages, comparative speeds, differences in deterritorialization creating relative fields of reterritorialization.

## ROB

#### The Role of the Ballot is to interrogate the image of thought, the current figure of thought that manipulates the subject into conforming with societies demand. Vote for the debater which better presents methods to question structures of hierarchy that limit and oppress individuals, it is only from this ROB can we move away from structures such as white supremacy and resist the oppressive mindsets that hold us all captive by dictating thought, DRONSFIELD 12

Dronsfield, Jonathan. "Deleuze and the image of thought." Philosophy Today 56.4 (2012): 404-414. // LHP HL

The image of thought is Deleuze’s characteri- sation of what comes before thinking: that which philosophy implicitly presupposes and explicitly projects, a pre-philosophical and natural and hence dogmatic image of what thinking is. The dogmatic image supposes that what thought wants, wants both materially and wilfully, is the true. Morality leads us to presuppose this. It is pre-supposed in the sense that everybody knows what it means to think, as though it were common sense. We all have this common picture of what it means to think. It’s an image in which subject and object and being and beings are already assigned their proper place and relation one to the other. And so long as philosophy holds to this image it does not matter what it goes on to think conceptu- ally. If the image of thought guides the creation of concepts then those concepts will be part of the same image projected. Moreover, it is the suppo- sition of a natural capacity to think in this way that permits philosophy to claim to begin without suppositions. It is a supposition which is en- dowed with the power to undercut the conditions of the present moment and its attendant perver- sions. It is not a particular image of thought that worries Deleuze; it’s that thought is pre-conceived as an “image in general.” This is philoso- phy’s subjective presupposition and the frame of Deleuze’s critique. “Nous ne parlons pas de telle ou telle image de la pensée,” he says, “variable suivant les philosophies, mais d’une seule Image en général qui constitue le présupposé subjectif de la philosophie dans son ensemble.”5 Part of the image, its stance as it were, is that thought is construed as “naturally upright.” “Up- right” here means proper and good-willed. Thought is upright because it is the possession of the subject. As the unity of the faculties it reduces every other faculty to modes of the subject. Be- cause thinking is subjective in this way the sub- ject’s model of thought is recognition. The fac- ulty of sensibility can grasp only that which can be recognised by all the other faculties in the sub- jective act of recognition. When thinking is modelled on recognition, that which can be recog- nised is a reflection of the subject. The subject for whom recognition is the model of thought is filled with no more than an image of itself. Thought is left with no means of grasping that which cannot be recognised, at least whilst it remains erect and standing. But Deleuze makes clear that it is not a ques- tion of opposing “another image” to the dogmatic image of thought. Even the schizophrenic cannot be imaged, because the schizophrenic becomes a possibility for thought and is “revealed as such” only through the “abolition” of the dogmatic im- age.6 Deleuze is unequivocal then about the ne- cessity of theorising a thinking without image. Deleuze’s thought must be measured by the ex- tent to which it thinks without image. Its new- ness, its “répétition authentique,” will be its thinking without image. Indeed, so rigorous would the denunciation of the image as non-phi- losophy be that it would yield the prize of “the greatest destructions and demoralisations,” so obstinate would a thought without image be that it would have no ally but paradox, having re- nounced both representation and common sense, so original would a thinking purged of the image be that thought could finally begin to think. But thought can only begin, and it is this that would allow it continually to begin again, only when liberated from the image and its postulates.7 If representation for Deleuze is a transcendental il- lusion in which thought is “covered over” [se recouvre] by an image, it implies that in over- coming representation the image must be re- moved t;hought is only “uncovered” once the shroud of the image is taken down.8 The insistence that thought can and should happen “without images” extends even to valo- rising creator-writers, writers who are creators before they are authors, as “blind.” Deleuze’s self-understanding in the form of his “dialogue” with Claire Parnet in 1977, a dialogue which is no way an encounter because in it we recognise a Deleuze pre-given and decided, figures the likes of Nietzsche and Proust not as authors but as cre- ators, creators precisely because they are not au- thors. For as soon as the designation “author” is made, thought is once again determined as an im- age [“qu’on soumet la pensée à une image”], and writing made an activity of life.9 Creation is en- counter, in which the writer encounters himself, and a writing which because it is its own life ne- cessitates that reading be an act of creation. Such encounters are “acts of thought without image,” and at once both blind and blinding [“aussi bien aveugles qu’aveuglants”]10—a thought blind to itself, and one which refuses to form itself as an image which might enable it to be visible. It is the imperceptible, it is that which dwells in the dark- est regions. This is not to argue for a thought no longer subject to recognition and representation, but to a thought no longer determinable as an im- age as such. It is as if an image can only order, or- der correct ideas rooted in goodwill and recogni- tion and governed by an origin of representation and the already decided. And what philosopher would not hope to set up an image of thought that no longer presupposes goodwill and a pre-medi- tated decision? But philosophy is too much on the side of friendship to achieve this.11 In place of the image of thought “rooted” in such postulates Deleuze instates a thinking in which the passional, aimless and horizontal line will be favoured over the natural and upright stance, a thinking always already begun, with its beginning in the repetition of a beginning again. Thinking becomes no longer a natural capacity we all possess but an activity some of us are forced into doing by that which we do not recog- nise but sense; moreover sense in a way which differentiates the faculty of sensibility from all other faculties, indeed brings it into discord with them whilst at the same time confronting them with their own limits.

## Alt

#### The Alternative is to interrogate the stable concept of the subject in favor of alignment with the Body without Organs. The Body without Organs is the exact moments a subject has infinite potential to become anything they may wish, like an egg capable of growing into any kind of species, chicken, dinosaur, or even human being. The Alternative allows the subject to exist in society independent of social constructs such as gender, class, and nationality that have previously composed the stable subject, SMITH 18

[Smith, Daniel. "What is the body without organs? Machine and organism in Deleuze and Guattari." *Continental Philosophy Review* 51.1 (2018): 95-110.] // LHP HL

As scholars have noted, the body without organs (sometimes abbreviated to BwO) is a somewhat confusing term, because it does not describe ‘‘a body deprived of organs,’’ as the term seems to indicate, but rather ‘‘an assemblage of organs freed from the supposedly ‘natural’ or ‘instinctual’ organization that makes it an organism.’’43 As Deleuze and Guattari put it, for the body without organs, the ‘‘enemy’’ is not the organs, but the organism, the particular arrangement and configuration of the organs.44 The body without organs is supposed to designate all of those things that an organic body could do, but that it is prevented from doing because of its homeostatic self-regulation processes. The body without organs is the full set of capacities or potentialities of a body prior to its being given the structure of an organism, which only limits and constrains what it can do: it is ‘‘what remains when you take everything away.’’45 As they ask in A Thousand Plateaus: Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs? Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly?46 The injunction here is to use our bodies and our organs in ways which are not in thrall to the overarching plan of the organism, to put them to work doing things other than those for which they were designed. In short, to treat them as machines capable of producing ‘‘events.’’ The organism, then, can be defined as being a certain way in which the body without organs is ‘‘captured,’’ one which restricts its capacities, and constrains it: ‘‘the BwO howls: ‘They’ve made me an organism! They’ve wrongfully folded me! They’ve stolen my body!’’’47 Of course, ‘‘organisms’’ are not the only way in which the body without organs can be ‘‘captured,’’ and in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari analyse a number of other ‘‘strata’’ which impose their own forms on it and limit its capacities.48 The fact that there are other ‘‘strata’’ helps to explain their otherwise puzzling comment that the body without organs is not an ideal, unattainable point, but something we are attaining all the time.49 One example is the human face, the subject of an entire chapter of A Thousand Plateaus. It is clear that the face is not wholly subordinated to organic functions: we use it to express our emotions, we treat it as an aesthetic object, we use it for communication, and so on. In fact, if one believes the early Levinas, the human face opens us to the very possibility of ethics.50 All of these functions have nothing to do with the head qua organism, and would not have been made possible had the face not first been ‘‘freed’’ from its relation with the organic body and its place within this hierarchy of its system. It is in this sense that the face ‘‘removes the head from the stratum of the organism,’’ and thereby frees it to be used in different ways.51 Thus, rather than following the conservative tendencies of the organism that always pull it back towards the statistically normal, relegating everything that falls beyond this range to the register of the ‘‘pathological,’’ Deleuze and Guattari recommend a kind of experimentation whose ultimate goal is the event, that is, the production of something new. And as we saw in the first section, the production of an event changes even the thing that produced the event in the first place, so that the organic body will not remain the same after it has made itself into a body without organs. We humans are able to carry out this kind of experimentation because, as Canguilhem notes, we are fortunate enough to have a surfeit of organs: ‘‘too many kidneys, too many lungs, too much parathyroid, too much pancreas, even too much brain, if human life were limited to the vegetative life.’’52 Pathological states thus arise not when we use our bodies in ways that make us deviate from the statistical norm, or when we make use of our organs in ways which take them beyond the range of possibilities considered ‘‘normal’’ by the organism, but only when our ‘‘experimentation’’ goes too far, reaching the point where, instead of increasing our capacities, it reduces them, and prevents us from creating something new.53 Now that we have explored Deleuze and Guattari’s modifications to the concepts of ‘‘machine’’ and ‘‘organism,’’ let us briefly summarize our findings. Whereas we usually think that machines are defined by their substance, that is, the way in which they are constructed, the form which they take, Deleuze and Guattari understand them according to what they do. As they write, a machine should be understood ‘‘by function, not by form’’ (recall the example of the knife-rest: understanding it as a machine means understanding what it is used for, not its geometric properties).54 Whereas we usually think that organisms are defined by what they do, that is, by their behaviors, by the kinds of activities they carry out, Deleuze and Guattari instead understand them according to their structure. As we saw in the distinction between ‘‘analogy’’ and ‘‘homology,’’ what makes organisms similar to one another has nothing to do with their function. Rather, comparisons should be based on morphology, that is to say the virtual schema out of which the body emerged. In other words, an organism should be understood by form, not by function (recall the example of the bat wing: understanding it as an organism means understanding the order and connection of it bones, not what it is used for).55 Further, in both cases, there is no substantial link between the form it has and the function it carries out one can no more deduce the function of a bat’s wing from its morphology than one can deduce the function of a knife-rest from its geometrical properties.56 There is something like a priority of creation in Deleuze and Guattari, a preference for the new, which leads them away from what might otherwise appear to be a kind of symmetry between the two concepts (function not form vs. form not function), towards a valorization of the idea of the machine, and a strong criticism of the idea of the organism. This leads, first, to an asymmetry between the scope of the two concepts: whereas their idea of ‘‘machine’’ is supposed to be universal (everything is a machine), their idea of ‘‘organism’’ is restricted to a certain kind of body. But perhaps more importantly, it also leads them to a different understanding of the relation between the two terms, centered on their concept of the ‘‘body without organs.’’ Their non-mechanical mechanism, which is also a vitalism of the inorganic, highlights not the form or structure that bodies actually have, but rather the virtual capacities that bodies have to do something different. A body may be structured like an organism, but, since its organs are all machines, it will always retain the capacity to ‘‘disarticulate,’’ as they put it, to cease to be an organism. The body without organs, then, can be defined as the becoming-machine of the organism; it is what happens when one part of the body enters into combination with some other machine in a way which allows it to escape from the organism’s regularizing, normalizing processes. Seen in this way, the body previously considered an organism is opened up to a whole host of new connections, each of which may lead to the production of an event.

## On case

#### OVERVIEW:

#### [1] They can’t cross-apply why agency is important to take out the K; I also have an understanding an agency, but the K critiques how we build agency –not as a static being, but a becoming process that is not complete, always changing.

#### [2] Saying the standard allows for different empirical differences among subjects – the claim that we are purely rational but deviate from it in the material world – doesn’t delink the K my arg is that the logic of establishing a base criteria for a subject creates a desire from lack and leads to individual oppression.

#### [3] Their framework grounds agency in a static conception of reason and a definite view of the subject. This is incoherent:

#### Underpinning any rational thought is an irrational desire that makes the subject inherently unstable. SMITH ‘88:

[Smith, Daniel W. Jun, Nathan. “Deleuze and Ethics. Pg. 137. University of Edinburgh. 1988. LHP MK]

3. Third, **the difference between interest and desire** could be said to **parallel[s] the difference between the rational and the irrational. “Once interests have been defined within the confines of a society, the rational is the way in which people pursue those interests and attempt to realize them”** (Deleuze 2004: 262–3) – the interest for a job, or cavity-free teeth. “But **underneath that**,” Deleuze insists, “**you find desires, investments of desire that are not to be confused with investments of interest**, and **on which interests depend for their determination and very distribution: an enormous flow, all kinds of libidinal-unconscious flows that constitute the delirium of this society**” (Deleuze 2004: 263). As Deleuze will say: **Reason is always a region carved out of the irrational** – it is **not sheltered from the irrational at all, but traversed by it and only defined by a particular kind of relationship among irrational factors. Underneath all reason lies delirium and drift.** Everything about capitalism is rational, except capital . . . A stock market is a perfectly rational mechanism, you can understand it, learn how it works; capitalists know how to use it; and yet what a delirium, it’s mad . . . It’s just **like theology: everything about it is quite rational – if you accept sin, the immaculate conception, and the incarnation, which are themselves irrational elements**. (Deleuze 2004: 262)

#### Impacts:

#### [A] New link to the K – proves your conception of an agent is one that restricts the free-flowing bounds of subjectivity and recognition of difference.

#### [B] There is no conceptual structure of an agent. The link from the structure of an agent to its motivation in people is not accounted for in practical reason. The only way we can motivate individuals is to follow through with their unfolding affects and desires so the K is a prior question.

#### [C] Takes out reason - it is always changing – just like our desires. It is not ground in the agent because that assumes the agent has one universal will, but that view is incoherent.

#### Second, time – the ‘I think’ is not the ‘I am’. The ‘I think’ does not determine the subject – it is merely its capacity. Thinking only affects a subject as a being in time and so is not a transcendent feature. Transcendent subject hood fails because of differentiation through time causes instability. DELEUZE:

[Deleuze, Gilles. “Difference and Repitition.” Translated by Paul Patton. Columbia Press. 1994. LHP AA]

Temporally speaking - in other words, from the point of view of the theory of time - nothing is more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito. It is as though **Descartes's Cogito** **operated** **with** two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. **The** **determination (I think) implies an undetermined** **existence** (**I am,** because 'in order to think one must exist') - **and** **determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject**: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks. **The** entire **Kantian** **critique [is]** amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. **The determination ('I think')** obviously **implies** something undetermined **('I am'), but** **nothing so far tells us how it is that** **this undetermined is determinable** **by the 'I think'**: 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.'8 **Kant** therefore **adds** a third logical value: **the determinable**, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the deter­ mination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but **in the form of a transcendental** **Difference** between the Determination as such and what it determines; **no[t] longer in the form of an external difference which separates**, **but in the form of an** **internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation** between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time ...9 The consequences of this are extreme: **my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a** **phenomenon**, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time. As a result, **the spontaneity of which I am** **conscious in the 'I think' cannot** **be understood as the** **attribute of a substantial** and spontaneous **being**, **but only as the affection** **of a passive self** **which experiences its own thought** - its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. **The activity of thought applies** to a receptive being, **to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it**, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself. **To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the** **self** - **that is, the passive position** (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, **namely** **time**. Nor is 'add' entirely the right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the **I were fractured** from one end to the other: fractured **by** the pure and empty form of **time**. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. **Time signifies a** fault or a **fracture in the I and a passivity in the self**, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution. **Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant** and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God. More generally, the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself. For this reason, the substitution of the point of view of the 'I' for the point of view of 'God' = than is commonly supposed, so long as the former retains an identity that it owes precisely tt. If the greatest tmttattve of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity - namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis. On the contrary, we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for experiencing affections, was only a consequence, and that the passive self was more profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive (contemplation ontraction). · The possibility of receiving sensations or impressions follows from this. It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation: here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis. The Kantian initiative can be taken up, and the form of time can support both the death of God and the fractured I, but in the course of a quite different understanding of the passive self. In this sense, it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel is the descendant of Kant - rather, it is Holderlin, who discovers the emptiness of pure time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the constitutive passion of the self.10 Holderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of tragedy and the adventure of Oedipus, as though these were complementary figures of the same death instinct. **Is it possible that Kantian philosophy should thus be the heir of Oedipus?**

#### Takes out their framework – it assumes a consistent model of the subject throughout time which ignores how time influences the subject.

#### Independent Voter on framework:

#### Racism isn’t surprising or anomalous—the ideals of white supremacy are part of the abstract and ideal moral theory that rejects as ideology any concept of specific idea.

**Mills**, Charles. *The Racial Contract*

The discussion at the beginning should have made clear why I think this answer misses the point. **Insofar as the moral theory and political philosophy of present-day contractarianism are trying to prescribe ideals for a just society, which are presumably intended to help transform our present *non*ideal society, it is obviously important to get clear what the facts are.** Moral and political prescription will depend in part on empirical claims and theoretical generalizations, accounts of what happened in the past and what is happening now, as well as more abstract views about how society and the state work and where political power is located. If the facts are radically different from those that are conventionally represented, the prescriptions are also likely to be radically different. Now as I pointed out at the start, and indeed throughout, **the absence from most white moral/political philosophy of discussions of race and white supremacy would lead one to think that race and racism have been marginal to the history of the West. And this belief is reinforced by the mainstream conceptualizations of the polity themselves, which portray it as essentially raceless, whether in the dominant view of an individualist liberal democracy or in the minority radical Marxist view of a class society. So it is not that mainstream contractarians have *no* picture.** (Indeed it is impossible to theorize without *some* picture.) **Rather, they have an *actual* (tacit) picture, which, in its exclusion or marginalization of race and its typically sanitized, whitewashed, and amnesiac account of European imperialism and settlement, is deeply flawed and misleading. So the powerful image of the idealized contract, in the absence of an explicit *counter*image, continues to shape our descriptive as well as normative theorizations. By providing *no* history, contemporary contractarianism encourages its audience to fill in a *mystified* history, which turns out to look oddly like the (ostensibly) repudiated history in the original contract itself!** No one actually believes nowadays, of course, that people formally came out of the wilderness and signed a contract. **But there *is* the impression that the modern European nation-states were not centrally affected by their imperial history and that societies such as the United States were founded on noble moral principles meant to include everyone, but unfortunately, there were some deviations.**[73](file:///Volumes/GoogleDrive/Shared%20drives/21-22%20LD%20Debate/SO21%20-%20Medicine%20IP%20Protections/Work%20Folders/Coaches/Becca/part0007_split_000.html#Ch3-73) ***The “Racial Contract” explodes this picture as mythical, identifying it as itself an artifact of the Racial Contract in the second, de facto phase of white supremacy*.** Thus—in the standard array of metaphors of perceptual/conceptual revolution—it effects a gestalt shift, reversing figure and ground, switching paradigms, inverting “norm” and “deviation,” to emphasize that *nonwhite racial exclusion from personhood was the actual norm***. Racism, racial self-identification, and race thinking are then not in the least “surprising,” “anomalous,” “puzzling,” incongruent with Enlightenment European humanism, but *required* by the Racial Contract as part of the terms for the European appropriation of the world. So in a sense standard contractarian discussions are fundamentally misleading, because they have things backward to begin with: what has usually been taken (when it has been noticed at all) as the racist “exception” has really been the *rule*; what has been taken as the “rule,” the ideal norm, has really been the *exception*. The second**, related **reason that the “Racial Contract” should be part of the necessary foundation for contemporary political theory is that our theorizing** and moralizing ***about* the sociopolitical facts are affected in characteristic ways by social structure.** There is a reflexiveness to political theory, in which it theorizes about itself and later theorists critique the blindnesses of earlier ones. The classic texts of the central thinkers of the Western political tradition—for example, Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Marx—typically provide not merely normative judgments but mappings of social ontologies and political epistemologies which explain why the normative judgments of others have gone astray**. These theorists recognized that to bring about the *ideal* polity, one needs to understand how the structure and workings of the *actual* polity may interfere with our perception of the social truth. Our characteristic patterns of understanding and misunderstanding of the world are themselves influenced by the way the world is and by the way we ourselves are, whether naturally or as shaped and molded by that world**. So one needs criteria for political knowing, whether through penetrating the illusory appearances of this empirical world (Plato), through learning to discern natural law (Hobbes, Locke), through rejecting abstraction for the accumulated wisdom of “prejudice” (Burke), or through demystifying oneself of bourgeois and patriarchal ideology (Marxism, feminism). Particularly for alternative, oppositional theory (as with the last two**), the claim will be that an oppressive polity characterized by group domination distorts our cognizing in ways that themselves need to be theorized about.** We are blinded to realities that we should see, taking for granted as natural what are in fact human-created structures. So we need to see differently, ridding ourselves of class and gender bias, coming to recognize as political what we had previously thought of as apolitical or personal, doing conceptual innovation, reconceiving the familiar, looking with new eyes at the old world around us. Now if the “Racial Contract” is right, existing conceptions of the polity are foundationally deficient. **There is obviously all the difference in the world between saying the system is basically sound despite some unfortunate racist deviations, and saying that the polity is racially structured, the state white-supremacist, and races themselves significant existents that an adequate political ontology needs to accommodate. So the dispute would be not merely about the facts but about *why* these facts have gone so long unapprehended and untheorized in white moral/political theory.** Could it be that membership in the *Herrenvolk*, the race privileged by this political system, tends to prevent recognition of it *as* a political system? Indeed, it could. So not only would meeting this political challenge imply a radically different “metanarrative**” of the history that has brought us to this point, but it would also require, as I have sketched, a rethinking and reconceptualization of the existing conventional moral/political apparatus and a self-consciously reflexive epistemic examination of how this deficient apparatus has affected the moral psychology of whites and directed their attention away from certain realities. By its crucial silence on race and the corresponding opacities of its conventional conceptual array, the raceless social contract and the raceless world of contemporary moral and political theory render mysterious the actual political issues and concerns that have historically preoccupied a large section of the world’s population**. Think of the rich colorful tapestry over the last two centuries of abolitionism, racial vindicationism, aboriginal land claims, antiimperial and anticolonial movements, antiapartheid struggle, searches to reclaim racial and cultural heritages, and ask yourself what thread of it ever appears within the bleached weave of the standard First World political philosophy text. It is undeniable (one would think) that these struggles are political, but dominant categories obscure our understanding of them. They seem to be taking place in a different conceptual space from the one inhabited by mainstream political theory. One will search in vain for them in most standard histories and contemporary surveys of Western political thought. The recent advent of discussions of “multiculturalism” is welcome, but what needs to be appreciated is that these are issues of political *power*, not just mutual misconceptions resulting from the clash of cultures.

Fw lbl

#### Link Turns under Kant:

#### 1] Submitting to international limits on power is a contradiction in will – it weakens the republic and has no binding force.

Waltz ’62 (Waltz, Kenneth N. "Kant, Liberalism, and War." The American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 (1962): 331-40. doi:10.2307/1952369.)

So long at least as the state "runs a danger of being suddenly swallowed up by other States," it must be powerful externally as well as internally. In international relations the difficulties multiply. The republican form is preferable, partly because republics are more peacefully inclined; but despotisms are stronger-and no one would expect or wish to bring the state into jeopardy by decreasing its strength.15 Standing armies are dangerous, arms races themselves being a cause of war, but in the absence of an outside agency affording protection, each state must look to the effectiveness of its army.'6 A freely flowing commerce is a means of promoting peace, but a state must control imports, in the interests of its subjects "and not for the advantage of strangers and the encouragement of the industry of others, because the State without the prosperity of the people would not possess sufficient power to resist external enemies or to maintain itself as a common- wealth."'7 Not only standing armies but also, indeed more so, the disparity of economic capacities may represent danger, occasion fear, and give rise to war. Kant's concern with the strength and thus the safety of the state is part of his perception of the necessities of power politics. Among states in the world, as among individuals in the state of nature, there is constantly either violence or the threat of violence. States, like "lawless savages," are with each other "naturally in a nonjuridical condition.'8 There is no law above them; there is no judge among them; there is no legal process by which states can pursue their rights. They can do so only by war, and, as Kant points out, neither war nor the treaty of peace following it, can settle the question of right. A treaty of peace can end only a particular war; a pretext for new hostilities can always be found. "Nor can such a pretext under these circumstances be regarded as un- just; for in this state of society every nation is the judge of its own cause."'19 More surely than those who extract and emphasize merely Kant's republican aspirations and peaceful hopes, Khrushchev speaks as though he had read Kant correctly. "War," in Khrushchev's peculiar yet apt phrase, "is not fatalistically inevitable." Kant does set forth the "shoulds" and "oughts" of state behavior.2' He does not expect them to be followed in a state of nature, for, as he says, "philosophically or diplomatically composed codes have not, nor could have, the slightest legal force, since the States as such stand under no common legal constraint.... 22 His intention clearly is that the "oughts" be taken as the basis for the juridical order that must one day be established among states, just as the rights of the individual, though not viable in a state of nature, provided the basis for the civil state.

#### 2] The aff violates the rights of private entities under kant– a] no one owns space and can exclude them on legitimate grounds, and they want to go to space so stopping them is a contradiction in will b] private entities expend and have expended resources to claim things in space like making rockets or rocket fuel, preventing that is a violation of property rights since you are not allowing them to use what they own as they want

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