# Tradition – R1

## 1N

### T

#### Interpretation: A just government protects property and is impartial.

#### Madison 1784:

James Madison, [Founding Father] “Four Documents Concerning Confiscation of Property” in the Legislature of Virginia, 3 December 1784, <http://history.furman.edu/benson/hst121/Madison_on_Property_Confiscation.htm> //LHP AV

**Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.** According to this standard of merit, the praise of affording a just security to property, should be sparingly bestowed on a government which, however scrupulously guarding the possessions of individuals, does not protect them in the enjoyment and communication of their opinions, in which they have an equal, and in the estimation of some, a more valuable property. More sparingly should this praise be allowed to a government, where a man’s religious rights are violated by penalties, or fettered by tests, or taxed by a hierarchy. Conscience is the most sacred of all property; other property depending in part on positive law, the exercise of that, being a natural and unalienable right. To guard a man’s house as his castle, to pay public and enforce private debts with the most exact faith, can give no title to invade a man’s conscience which is more sacred than his castle, or to withhold from it that debt of protection, for which the public faith is pledged, by the very nature and original conditions of the social pact. **That is not a just government**, nor is property secure under it, **where the property which a man has** in his personal safety and personal liberty, **is violated by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service of the rest.** A magistrate issuing his warrants to a press gang, would be in his proper functions in Turkey or Indostan, under appellations proverbial of the most compleat despotism.

#### That outweighs –

#### A] it’s a founding father of the US, so if he disagrees with the US being a just government then it outweighs on founders’ intent

#### B] it provides the foundation of government itself – if constitutive burden is to protect property, then that determines justice

#### Violation:

#### The US a] commits eminent domain abuse, which violates property and b] does it against minorities and the poor which is not impartial, Somin 17:

Ilya Somin, [Contributor, The Volokh Conspiracy which is is a blog co-founded in 2002 by law professor Eugene Volokh,[3] covering legal and political issues[4][5][6] from an ideological orientation it describes as "generally libertarian, conservative, centrist, or some mixture of these."], May 26, 2017 at 10:40 a.m. EDT, “The American experience with eminent domain – and its possible lessons for others” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/26/the-american-experience-with-eminent-domain-and-its-possible-lessons-for-others/> //LHP AV

This week, the Volokh Conspiracy hosted a guest-blogging symposium with posts by contributors to my new book Eminent Domain: A Comparative Perspective (co-edited with Iljoong Kim and Hojun Lee). My last post about the book includes links to a free version of the Introduction to the volume, and to posts by other contributors. In addition to co-editing the volume, I also wrote the chapter on eminent domain in the United States. In this post, I summarize key elements of the American experience with condemnation, building on my chapter in the book and my earlier work on the history of takings in the US. **The United States has the reputation of** being a nation with a strong **commitment to property rights** and constitutional limits on government power. In some ways, that reputation is well deserved. **But**, in some other key respects, it **is** **undercut by our painful history of eminent domain abuse.** The Fifth Amendment and nearly all state constitutions mandate that government may only take private property for a “public use.” Almost from the very beginning, there has been conflict between advocates of the “narrow” and “broad” interpretations of this rule. The former allows takings only for publicly owned projects (such as a public road), or private ones that have a legal duty to serve the entire public, such as a public utility. Under the broad view, virtually anything that might benefit the public in some way qualifies as a public use. The narrow view predominated throughout most of the first century or more of American constitutional history. But the broad view eventually triumphed in the mid-twentieth century, culminating in cases like Berman v. Parker (1954). As a result**, state and federal courts upheld large-scale “blight” and “economic development” takings that forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of people, most of them poor, politically weak, or members of racial and ethnic minorities**. Often, these takings also destroyed more economic value than they created**, wiping out homes and small businesses, and destroying neighborhood “social capital.”** **Such abuses persist to the present day**, though on a considerably smaller scale than at the height of “urban renewal” takings in the 1950s and 1960s. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad view in its controversial 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, which ruled that it is permissible to take property from one private owner and give it to another simply because it might lead to greater “economic development” in the area. But Kelo was a close 5-4 decision that turned out to be enormously controversial, generating a massive political backlash. In the aftermath, many states enacted eminent domain reform laws limiting takings, and several state supreme courts ruled that economic development takings violate their state constitutions. Although a win for the broad view, Kelo ended up destroying the seeming consensus behind it. In the wake of Kelo, the narrow view commands greater legitimacy than at any time in decades, and the debate over the proper scope of the eminent domain power continues with no end in sight. In recent years, controversy has erupted over takings for pipelines. An unusual coalition of property rights advocates on the right and environmentalists on the left has won a series of legislative and judicial victories seeking to limit pipeline takings. The alliance recalls the similarly cross-ideological reaction against Kelo, which also brought together some strange bedfellows. The debate over public use is far from the only controversy surrounding eminent domain in the US. **Another longstanding problem is the tendency to undercompensate owners of condemned property.** The Supreme Court has long held that owners must get “fair market value” compensation. **This, unfortunately, fails to account for the “subjective value” that many attach to their land over and above its market value. For example, a person who has lived in the same neighborhood for many years may value the social ties she has formed there; a small business may have a network of clients that would be hard to replicate elsewhere.** Even worse, studies show that owners often don’t even get the fair market value compensation that the law requires. That is particularly likely for owners who are relatively poor and lacking in political clout. Donald Trump’s claim that owners of condemned property stand to make “a fortune” is – to put it mildly – belied by the evidence.

#### Vote neg –

#### 1] Precision –

#### A] stasis point – the topic is the only reasonable focal point for debate – anything else destroys the possibility of debate because we will be two ships passing

#### B] internal link turn – violating semantics justifies the aff talking about whatever with zero neg prep or prediction which is the most unfair and uneducational

#### C] Jurisdiction – you can’t vote for them because the ballot and the tournament invitation say to vote for the better debater in the context of the resolution

#### D] grammar first – all args assume grammatical correctness to evaluate them

#### E] objectivity – only semantics are objective whereas pragmatics are subjective which means intervention

#### 2] Limits – there are almost 200 national governments in the world which is an unmanageable burden, especially for a 3 week camp. Only imposing restrictions via the word just can ensure debates are limited and full of clash

#### 3] TVA – use ideal theory instead and defend whole rez. That’s better – a] promotes in-depth philosophical clash over labor law that’s constittuive to LD b] solves your offense because you can indicate you would solve these problems in an ideal world too – no reason you need the US in particularVoters:

#### Fairness

#### Education

#### DTD

#### No RVI

#### Competing Interps

#### T First

### NC

#### Because ought is defined as moral obligation by Merriam Webster, I value morality.

#### Accordingly, my value criterion is preserving freedom by protecting individual negative rights. To clarify, a positive right is claiming others must provide you with something, while a negative right is claiming others must not take what you have. There are two major reasons to prefer it:

#### 1] Only embracing the negative right can cohere with important conceptions of self-ownership key to morality. This card also explains positive and negative rights. Philosophy Professor Edward Feser Summarizes

Edward Feser [Philosophy professor at Loyola], On Nozick by Eric Mack, 2004, p. 36-7, Volume 8, Issue 4 //Scopa

This brings us to a second feature of Nozick’s conception of rights, namely that they are essentially negative. A right to X just is a right not to be hindered in using something you own, X, as you want to use it. It is not a right to have X if you don’t already own it and no one wants to give or sell it to you. Your right to your TV set is just your right not to have it damaged or taken from you against your will; it is not a right that someone should buy you a TV set. Your right to life is just the right not to be killed; it is not a right that others should provide you with what you need to live. You own your life, so no one has the right to take it from you. But by the same token, others own their lives, bodies, labor, and the things they produce with their labor, and thus no one has a right to take those things from them. In particular, you do not have the right forcibly to take, or have someone else take, other people’s resources simply because you want or need them, even if you need them to live (just as you have no right to take their body parts from them even if you needed those to live). A right to what you need in order to live would be a positive right a right to something that someone else must provide you with, as opposed to a (negative) right that someone merely refrain from doing something to you. So-called rights to welfare, health care, education, and the like would be positive rights. But there simply are and can be no such fundamental positive rights on a libertarian view. For no one has a basic right against other people that they must provide things for him; to assume otherwise is to assume, in effect, that a person at least partially owns other people’s property, including their labor, if I claim a right to education, for example, I am in effect claiming that other people must provide me with an education — it won’t just fall out of the sky, after all — which means I’m claiming a right to a part of their labor, i.e. whatever labor must go into paying the taxes that fund my state-run school. But no one has a right to anyone else’s labor — people own their own labor, and cannot morally be forced to give up some of it for others. If you want voluntarily to help me out in paying my tuition. and sign a contract saying you’ll do so, that’s one thing — in that case, I do have the right to your money, because you’ve agreed to provide it but if you don ‘t agree, I have no such right, and I and the government are stealing from you if we take your money anyway. Now many rights that people claim to have are positive rights of this sort. The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is filled with claims not only to negative rights, but also to many positive rights — rights to education, health care, even “periodic holidays with pay”! But all such claims are bogus, and the alleged “rights” pure fictions conjured out of thin air. For they conflict with the fundamental rights of self-ownership, and make people slaves to the realization of others’ desires and needs. Being essentially negative, a person’s rights function, in Nozick’s terminology, as moral side-constraints on the actions of others (1974, 28-35). Respecting others’ rights, that is, isn’t to be understood merely as one goal among others that we might seek to maximize, leaving open the possibility that violating rights in some circumstances for the sake of achieving some other good is an acceptable trade-off. Rather, one’s rights constitute a set of absolute restrictions within which all other people must behave with respect to him, and override all considerations of utility or welfare. They lay down the ground rules for our behavior towards others — telling us that, in anything we do, there are certain things we must not do. “Side constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means,” Nozick says; “they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent. Individuals are inviolable” (1974, 30-31). Being inviolable, their rights are also inviolable — those rights cannot be overridden for any reason. Nor, given that rights are negative, is there any danger that they might conflict, which would put their inviolability in doubt. If your having a right to X just means that I cannot interfere with your use of X, and my right to Y just means that you cannot interfere with my use of Y, then there is no conflict between our rights: All we’re required to do is to leave each other alone. But if I also claim a positive right to Z, and Z requires the use of X, then our rights inevitably will conflict, for the only way I can get Z is if you give me X. Positive rights will generally, and obviously, lead to such conflicts — surely another reason to be suspicious of them. Negative rights, however, will not. Such rights are perfectly compatible with one another, and thus with the notion that rights are inviolable.

### Offense

#### My sole contention is that the right to strike violates individual freedoms

#### 1] When you strike you keep your job but refuse to work, arbitrarily limiting the freedom of others who need a job to get one.

#### Gourevitch summarizes in 2016,

Gourevitch, A.. “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (2016): 307 - 323. //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

If **a right to strike** is not a right to quit what is it? It **is the right that workers claim to refuse to perform work they have agreed to do while retaining a right to the job**. Most of what is peculiar, not to mention fraught, about a strike is contained in that latter clause. Yet, surprisingly, few commentators recognize just how central and yet peculiar this claim is (Locke 1984).2 Opponents of the right to strike are sometimes more alive to its distinctive features than defenders. One critic, for instance, makes the distinction between quitting and striking the basis of his entire argument: **the unqualified right to withdraw labour, which is a clear right of free men, does not describe the behaviour of striker**s...**Strikers**...**withdraw from the performance of their jobs, but in the only relevant sense they do not withdraw their labour**. The 2 Don Locke is one of the few to note both how central the claim to ‘keeping the job’ is and how hard it is to ground this claim. “So what is distinctive about **a strike is**....**the refusal to do a particular job, combined with the insistence that the job is none the less still yours.”** Locke 1984, 181. jobs from which they have withdrawn performance belong to them, they maintain. (Shenfield 1986, 10-11) On what possible grounds may workers claim a right to a job they refuse to perform? While many say that every able-bodied person should have a right to work, and they might say that the state therefore has an obligation to provide everyone with a job, **the argument for full employment never amounts to saying that workers have rights to specific jobs from specific private employers.** For instance, in 1945, at the height of the push for federally guaranteed full employment, the Senate committee considering the issue took care to argue that, “**the right to work has occasionally been misinterpreted as a right to specific jobs of some specific type and status.” After labeling this a “misinterpretation,” the committee’s report cited the following words from one of the bill’s leading advocates:** “It is not the aim of the bill to provide specific jobs for specific individuals. **Our economic system of free enterprise must have free opportunities for jobs for all who are able and want to work**. **Our American system owes no [person] ~~man~~ a living, but it does owe every man an opportunity to make a living**.” (Senator Murray, quoted in United States, Wagner, and Radcliffe 1945, 8). These sentences remind us how puzzling, even alarming, the right to ‘specific jobs’ can sound. In fact, **in a liberal society, the whole point is that claims on specific jobs are a relic of feudal thinking.** In status-based societies, specific groups had rights to specific jobs in the name of corporate privilege. Occupations were tied to birth or guild membership, but not available to all equally. **Liberal society, based on freedom of contract, was designed to destroy just that kind of unfair and oppressive status-based hierarchy**. A common argument against striking workers is that they are latter day guilds, protecting their sectional interests by refusing to let anyone else perform ‘their jobs’ (e.g. Hayek 2011, 384-404). As one critic puts it, the strikers’ demand for an inalienable right to, and property in, a particular job cannot be made conformable to the principles of liberty under law for all...the endowment of the employee with some kind of property right in a job, [is a] prime example of this reversion to the governance of status. (Shenfield 1986, 13) If such criticisms fundamentally misunderstand the entirely modern basis for the right to strike, we still need an account of how anyone could claim something like a property right in a job she not only never acquired but that she then refuses to perform.

## Case

### ADV 1

#### On Carpenter:

#### 1] No ev proves teachers are necessary in policy. It’s just about educational outcomes so if we win strikes harm that we turn the advantage.

#### On Boyce:

#### 1] Quality early education is the strongest internal link to education as a whole.

Cooper et al. 12 Donna Cooper (senior fellow with economic policy team @ Center for American Progress) and Adam Hersh (economist @ Center for American Progress) and Ann O’Leary (director of The Children and Families Program @ The Center for the Next Generation and lecturer at UC Berkeley Law), 2012, “The Competition that Really Matters Comparing U.S., Chinese, and Indian Investments in the Next-Generation Workforce,” Center for American Progress, <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED535561.pdf>, SJBE

Competition from rapidly growing countries such as China and India are changing business norms and the links between national economies. We are quite familiar with what economists call “global labor arbitrage,” the substitution of high-wage workers in advanced economy countries with low-wage workers in developing economies. That’s led to a global re-ordering of production, jobs, and growth. More recently, technological advances in telecommunications and transportation, as well as skills development in the developing world, are dragging more U.S. industries—including computer programming, high-tech manufacturing, and service sectors—into international competition. This development is feeding a mounting demand for high-skilled labor around the world. To position the United States for the future, substantial investments are needed in research, infrastructure, and education. The most important of these areas to address is education. Why? Because as this report shows, the overwhelming economic evidence points to education—and human capital investments, generally—as the key drivers of economic competitiveness in the long term. Harvard University economist Gregory Mankiw, for example, has shown that in advanced countries such as the United States, human capital investment had three times the positive effect on economic growth as did physical investment. And educational investment is particularly important in early childhood development and learning, according to growth economists. The return on investment from interventions such as prenatal care and early childhood programs is higher than for virtually any class of financial assets over time, according to Nobel Prize winning economist James Heckman. The academic literature also shows that failing to provide broad opportunities for nurturing, learning, and productive development harms economic growth and national competitiveness. Having established the primacy in human capital investments as the key to U.S. long- term economic competitiveness, it’s important for policymakers and the public to understand how American children are faring today, and where they need to catch up. The state of U.S. children from a global competitiveness perspective It may seem counterintuitive to hold up Chinese and Indian children as a challenge to U.S. competitiveness, as this report does. After all, the United States is the world’s wealthiest nation, one that invests more in education, provides more access to quality health care, and enjoys far less inequality than either of the Asian giants. Indeed, the state of America’s children has improved dramatically in the last century. We have fewer kids living in abject poverty, more children have access to health care, and more are graduating from high school and college. Our national determination to promote the American Dream—a society that promotes equal opportunity and chances for success— has led to unparalleled investment in public health, safety, and educational infrastructure for children. These investments for generations have fueled the engine of U.S. economic growth. But U.S. gains have begun to stagnate in recent years, even before the Great Recession of 2007-2009, and educational attainment and achievement gaps that track income and race groups have become more entrenched— and more worrisome. These gaps do not portend well for future U.S. competitiveness because groups with disproportionately lower education achievement and poorer health—including African Americans and Hispanics—will soon comprise a majority of American children. The family structure that was once the foundation of a child’s education is crumbling, with more children raised in single-family homes. Meanwhile, our workplace policies are ossified and inflexible, making it difficult for modern parents to be with their children when their children need them most. This report describes in detail the progress and lack of progress in U.S. child development across the areas economists and experts believe are the best indicators of human capital development: education, health, family income and childhood poverty, and pro-family workplace policies. Here is a small sampling of the data to underscore the challenge: • Half of U.S. children get no early childhood education, and we have no national strategy to increase enrollment. • More than a quarter of U.S. children have a chronic health condition, such as obesity or asthma, threatening their capacity to learn. • More than 22 percent of U.S. children lived in poverty in 2010, up from about 17 percent in 2007. • More than half of U.S. post-secondary students drop out without receiving a degree. • Only 11 percent of workers have paid family leave, making it increasingly difficult for dual-earner and single-family households to properly care for children. American children coming of age today will work in a global, technologically advanced economy, competing with peers in India, China, and other countries around the world. Their ability to compete for high-skill and high-paid jobs is a direct function of our willingness to adopt policies that will boost child education and health, reduce child poverty, and increase parental support and care for their children. That’s what policymakers in China and India are doing, as this report’s two main case studies show. Both countries are rapidly increasing their share of children enrolled at all levels of the education system—from early learning programs to high schools to universities. These investments have propelled the countries to the top two in the world by number of children educated. The rise of China’s skilled labor force In the late 1970s, leaders of post-Cultural Revolution China made a renewed commitment to education as the core of its economic revitalization strategy. China’s economic boom since 1978 and its increasing human capital investment developed hand-in-hand. Consider: In 1978 China spent less than $2 billion on education, health, and other social investments. By 2006 that number was $117 billion, a 58-fold increase. Today, public commitment to early childhood, educational, and technological development in China is accepted as an integral part of a national economic strategy, unlike in the United States. In 2007 China surpassed the United States in the numbers of college graduates focusing on science, math, engineering, and technology fields. Three years later, it became the world’s largest provider of higher education. By 2030, China will have 200 million college graduates—more than the entire U.S. workforce. Chinese national goals are ambitious and inspiring. By 2020 China plans to: • Enroll 40 million children in preschool, a 50 percent increase from today • Provide 70 percent of children in China with three years of preschool • Graduate 95 percent of Chinese youths through nine years of compulsory education (that’s 165 million students, more than the U.S. labor force) • Ensure that no child drops out of school for financial reasons • More than double enrollment in higher education • Double the share of the working-age population that completes higher education to 195 million workers. To achieve these goals, China is deploying a coordinated set of strategies that directly track the policy levers economists and experts have identified as critical to boosting human capital and economic competitiveness. Specifically: • Families and early childhood education. The 1988 “Act of Protecting Female Staff and Workers” gave women, employed by public enterprises, a minimum of 90 days paid maternity leave, and covered related medical costs, which was increased to 98 days in 2011. The 2010 “National Plan for Medium and Long Term Education Reform and Development” established a target of near universal coverage for one year of kindergarten over the following decade. • Kindergarten-through-12th grade education. Chinese children compete in a global economy. Foreign language classes, often English, are often begun in the third grade and studied through middle school. The government’s goal is for 90 percent of eligible students to be enrolled in high school by 2020, up from 80 percent today. • Higher education. In 2010 China became the world’s largest provider of higher education—and will grant degrees to more than 200 million people over the next two decades. It’s improving its state-run universities accordingly. Today, China ranks sixth in the world among countries with the most universities ranked in the world’s top 500 universities. • Teacher quality. China is improving the quality of its teachers, even as their numbers explode. The number of teachers with bachelor’s degree has increased 66 percent in just eight years, with almost two-thirds of primary school teachers with a higher degree. There are nearly 6 million secondary school teachers in China, up from about 3 million in 1980. And the number of university-level teachers has grown to nearly 1 million from 250,000. To be sure, China faces massive challenges, including rising inequality and inferior educational quality and access to schools in rural and migrant populations. But despite these obstacles, China’s momentum and its education-focused economic strategy will make the country increasingly competitive in sophisticated industries—precisely those where U.S. workers now lead the competition. The rise of India’s skilled labor force In 1947 more than 80 percent of Indians were illiterate. Today, only a quarter are. Poverty in the country plummeted by 30 percent from 1981 to 2005. By 2017 India will graduate 20 million people from high school—or five times as many as in the United States. As in China, this dramatic turnaround has been shaped by a national economic strategy focused on education. India’s public investment in education grew from $11 billion a year in the late 1980s to $44 billion in 2008. And as in China, India’s national policies to increase the skills of its young workforce are reaping dividends. The country is already producing more students with bachelor’s degrees than is the United States. Over the last seven years, India has tripled its output of four-year degrees in engineering, computer science, and information technology. To be sure, life for most children in India remains hard, with the World Bank estimating that 40 percent of Indian families live on $1.25 a day or less. But their lot is improving as India executes its national education strategy, which includes: • Family and early education. India’s Integrated Child Development System is boosting the life chances of India’s 160 million children under six years old. This educational system proposes to boost the number of children who enter school ready to learn from 26 percent to 60 percent by 2018. The pre-school education system, while in need of much more structure and upgrades, reaches an estimated 38 million children under six. By comparison, in the United States publicly supported pre-school education reaches about 3.5 million children ages 3 to 5 years old. • Grades 1 through 5. India’s effort to ensure universal primary school enrollment is the world’s most ambitious elementary school enrollment effort. The federal government has paid for the construction of more than 400,000 elementary school buildings; trained and hired 1.5 million teachers; and in an effort to get children to school, established a school lunch program that can feed over 100 million children a day. As a result seven times more children attend primary school in India than in the United States. • Grades 6 through 12. Only a third of India’s students today enroll in high school, compared with slightly more than 90 percent in the United States. But investments in lower grades are boosting high school attendance. The percent of Indian students finishing high school will rise from 33 percent today to approximately 47 percent by 2017, according to World Bank estimates. • Higher education. The government’s goal of enrolling 40 million Indians in college by 2020 will require spots for 26 million more collegebound students. India already confers more bachelor’s degrees than the United States, and by 2020 will be conferring 8 million a year, compared with around 2 million here. Even if India only applies a modestly more intensive effort to increase educational access, it will produce twice the number of college graduates than the United States is able to produce annually. That’s a trend that will deliver great benefits to this rising economic powerhouse, as its labor force grows by a third over the next two decades (compared with just 1 percent expected growth on the U.S. labor force by 2030). Insights and best practices for the United States So what are U.S. policymakers to do with this information, other than worry? The first step is to identify the ingredients for America’s strategic investment in our next generation workforce, mined with insights from America’s successful middle-class and high-income families. We should also look at the “best practices” of systematic next-generation investments in European countries more similar to ours. Lessons from the U.S. middle class It’s no surprise that U.S. children from highincome and middle-class families are outperforming those from low-income families across a range of outcomes. Socioeconomic class is the best indicator of future success because of the advantages wealthier parents can provide. High-income and middle-class youth graduate from high school and college at higher rates, and are more likely to be gainfully employed at age 25. They have higher earnings on average, and a higher probability of having jobs with employer-sponsored health care benefits. The evidence also points to a series of behaviors and actions taken by parents and youths associated with these successes—actions that are more prevalent as one moves up the income scale. The 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a U.S. government survey of men and women born from 1980 to 1984, can help us understand what “inputs” are associated with successful education and development of these American children, who were ages 12 to 17 when first interviewed: • Early childhood learning and education. Children receiving child care were more likely to graduate from college and obtain better jobs when entering the workforce, the survey showed. Children who attended prekindergarten child care also were more likely to be employed at age 25.

#### On Garcia:

#### 1] Teacher strikes can be disastrous and hurt student growth.

**Norton and Hernandez 18** [Hilary and Tracy. *Hilary Norton is BizFed chair and executive director of FAST (Fixing Angelenos Stuck in Traffic).* *Tracy Hernandez is the founding CEO of the Los Angeles County Business Federation (*[*BizFed*](http://www.bizfedlacounty.org/)*) and president of IMPOWER Inc.*. “Commentary: A teachers strike is bad for our students, families and economy ”. 10-10-2018. No Publication. http://laschoolreport.com/commentary-a-teachers-strike-is-bad-for-our-students-families-and-economy/.] SJ//VM

While a strike looms within our nation’s second-largest school district, the business community of Los Angeles urges the Los Angeles Unified School District and United Teachers Los Angeles to resolve their differences in a way that doesn’t put students at risk. As the organized, grassroots voice of the business community in Greater Los Angeles, BizFed works to support the public institutions that serve our community and the families that work to build our region’s economy. BizFed represents 390,000 businesses that employ nearly 4 million people throughout Los Angeles County. The majority of these employees are working to support their families, many of which include LAUSD students. It is important that the needs of students are placed first in the negotiations. Last week, BizFed wrote a letter to the LAUSD board and the UTLA executive officers urging them to do everything possible to avoid a strike. We received appreciative and positive feedback from LAUSD Board President Mónica García and Superintendent Austin Beutner as well as UTLA President Alex Caputo-Pearl. When schools are closed due to strikes, students miss learning opportunities, parents must take days off from work and our region is disrupted. Beyond hurting families, this strike will hurt our businesses and their ability to sustain and create new jobs. This potential strike by LAUSD teachers will be the first in nearly three decades. The strike in 1989 lasted nine days; the most recent teachers strike in West Virginia lasted seven days. For a family living paycheck to paycheck, over a week of unpaid time off to watch their children should not be the deciding factor between paying the rent and putting food on the table; the entire family’s livelihood is threatened. Imagine a single mom who is a nurse and has no one to watch her children. She must choose between leaving her children at home or missing a shift. That money cannot be paid back. Every day that a student is not in the classroom, they lose learning opportunities. Students fall behind the content standards set by the California State Board of Education, and teachers have to add those lost days into their curriculum. Students lose daily social interactions with their peers, which helps build character and good citizenship. Think of a student who has the dream of being a doctor. They miss school and now are discouraged and lose the aspiration of being a doctor. At-risk youth are the most vulnerable when there are school closures. If parents don’t have the ability to skip work during a teacher strike, can’t afford childcare or don’t have family that can help out, that means students are left unsupervised. Anyone who has children knows that the course of their lives can change in an instant. We must avoid putting our children’s health and safety at risk. In LAUSD, over 84 percent of the students qualify for free or reduced-price meals; the district serves over 700,000 meals each day. For many of these students, this is their only chance to eat a healthy breakfast, lunch and supper after school. A child’s nutrition should not be compromised at the hands of this potential strike. As business leaders, we value the importance of treating teachers fairly while maintaining fiscal solvency. We urge LAUSD and UTLA to find a resolution that accomplishes both. Employers care deeply for the strength and effectiveness of our K-12 educational systems. These students will also become the workforce that will grow our economy into the future. We understand that LAUSD needs more resources and support from the state, but they do not need to exacerbate the problem by cutting off the current stream of per-pupil state funding each day the strike occurs. The business community is ready to stand with its school district and teachers to support our public education system. We implore LAUSD and UTLA to avoid public fights, come to a resolution and work with the larger community to improve our city’s education system for all. Keep our future leaders learning!

#### 2] Strikes hurt working conditions in the long term.

**Lovenheim and Bio 20** Lovenheim, M. F., & Bio, A. W. A. (2020, August 5). *A Bad Bargain*. Education Next. https://www.educationnext.org/bad-bargain-teacher-collective-bargaining-employment-earnings/. SJ//VM

These data enable us to examine the effects of teacher collective-bargaining policies on multiple indicators of students’ labor-market success. Taken as a whole, our results clearly indicate that laws supporting collective bargaining for teachers have adverse long-term consequences for students.

Earnings. We find strong evidence that teacher collective bargaining has a negative effect on students’ earnings as adults. Attending school in a state with a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling reduces later earnings by $795 dollars per year (see Figure 3). This represents a decline in earnings of 1.9 percent relative to the average. Although the individual effect is modest, it translates into a large overall loss of earnings for the nation as a whole. In particular, our results suggest a total loss of $196 billion per year accruing to those who were educated in the 34 states with duty-to-bargain policies on the books.

Hours worked. Consistent with this reduction in earnings, we also find that exposure to a duty-to-bargain law throughout one’s school years is associated with a decline of 0.49 hours worked per week. This is a 1.4 percent decline relative to the average, and it suggests that a reduction in hours worked is a main driver of the lower earnings.  
Wages. The reduced earnings caused by unionization could also reflect lower wages, and the evidence suggests a negative relationship between collective-bargaining exposure and wages. While this relationship is not statistically significant, it is consistent with our other results and suggests that teacher collective bargaining may also have a modest adverse effect on average wages.

Employment. The fact that teacher collective bargaining reduces working hours suggests that duty-to-bargain laws may also affect employment levels. In fact, when we use the share of individuals who are employed as the outcome variable, we find that duty-to-bargain laws reduce employment. Specifically, exposure to a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling lowers the likelihood that a worker is employed by 0.9 percentage points. Duty-to-bargain laws have no impact on unemployment rates, however, suggesting that they reduce employment by leading some individuals to drop out of the labor force altogether.

Occupational skill level. Finally, we analyze the effects of collective bargaining on the skill level of a student’s selected occupation, as measured by the share of workers in that occupation who have any education beyond a high school diploma. The results suggest yet another negative effect: being exposed to a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling decreases the proportion of such workers in an occupation by almost half of a percentage point (or 0.6 percent relative to the average). This effect is modest in size, but it implies that teacher collective bargaining leads students to work in occupations requiring lower levels of skill.

Educational attainment. The reduced earnings and labor force participation associated with teacher collective bargaining raise the possibility that affected students may have completed less education. Our analysis, however, finds little evidence of bargaining power having a significant effect on how much schooling students completed. This finding is surprising in light of the substantial labor-market effects we document, but it comports with prior research that has found no effect of duty-to-bargain law passage on high-school dropout rates.

Additionally, educational attainment is but one measure of the amount of human capital students accumulate. Even if students do not complete fewer years of education, they may be acquiring fewer skills while they are in school. We believe that our results concerning earnings and employment are driven by other aspects of school quality that are not reflected in educational attainment, and they reinforce the importance of studying labor-market outcomes directly in order to understand how major reforms such as the enactment of teacher collective-bargaining laws affect students’ life outcomes.

#### Extinction from warming requires 12 degrees, far greater than their internal link, and intervening actors will solve before then

Sebastian Farquhar 17, master’s degree in Physics from the University of Oxford, leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

Err against Specktor – it makes a lot of claims without good warranted evidence

### ADV 2

#### Decline of liberal order and emergence of US-Sino power competition is inevitable – it will be peaceful. Preserving it causes populism and war.

Mearsheimer 19, John J. "Bound to fail: The rise and fall of the liberal international order." International Security 43.4 (2019): 7-50. (President and Fellows of Harvard College)//Elmer

SUMMARY The various causal processes described above have all played an important role in subverting the liberal international order. Although each one has a distinct logic, they have often operated synergistically. For example, the negative effects of hyperglobalization on the lower and middle classes have combined with the nationalist resentment over immigration and the sense of lost sovereignty to fuel a strong populist backlash against the principles and practices of the liberal order. Indeed, that anger has often been directed at the liberal elites who have benefited from the order and who vigorously defend it. That resentment, of course, has had significant political consequences. It has caused deep political divisions in the United States and other Western democracies, led to Brexit, helped put Trump in the White House, and fueled support for nationalist leaders around the world. Where Are We Headed? One might acknowledge that the liberal international order is in terminal decline, but argue that it can be replaced with a more pragmatic version, one that avoids the excesses of the post–Cold War order.85 This more modest liberal order would pursue a more nuanced, less aggressive approach to spreading liberal democracy, rein in hyperglobalization, and put some significant limits on the power of international institutions. The new order, according to this perspective, would look something like the Western order during the Cold War, although it would be global and liberal, not bounded and realist. This solution is not feasible, however, because the unipolar moment is over, which means there is no chance of maintaining any kind of liberal international order for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, President Trump has no intention of pursuing a "liberal-lite" world order, and without his support, that option is a nonstarter. But even if Trump were not an obstacle and the international system were to remain unipolar, the United States would fail if it lowered its sights and attempted to construct a less ambitious liberal order. Indeed, it would end up building an agnostic international order instead. It is impossible to build a meaningful liberal global order with modest or more passive policies. The enterprise requires too much social engineering in too many places. If it has any chance of succeeding (I think it has none), the liberal unipole and its allies must relentlessly pursue highly ambitious global policies, which is why the United States and its liberal partners acted the way they did in the wake of the Cold War. That approach, however, is now politically infeasible because of past failures. Consequently, the **liberal democracies have no choice** but to take small steps here and there to remake the world in their own image, while adopting a live and let live approach toward most countries in the world. That humble approach would effectively produce an agnostic order. But that is not going to happen, because the system is multipolar and great power politics are once again at play. Thus, the key question is: What kinds of realist orders will dominate the landscape in the new multipolar world? THE NEW REALIST ORDERS There are likely to be three different realist orders in the foreseeable future: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders—one led by China, the other by the United States. The emerging thin international order will be concerned mainly with overseeing arms control agreements and making the global economy work efficiently. It is also likely to pay more serious attention than in the past to problems relating to climate change. In essence, the institutions that make up the international order will focus on facilitating interstate cooperation. The two bounded orders, in contrast, will be concerned principally with waging security competition against each other, although that will call for promoting cooperation among the members of each order. There will be significant economic and military competition between those two orders that will need to be managed, which is why they will be thick orders. Two key features of the new multipolar world will profoundly shape the emerging orders. First, assuming that China continues its impressive rise, it will be involved in an intense security competition with the United States that will be the central feature of international politics over the course of the twenty-first century. That rivalry will lead to the creation of bounded orders dominated by China and the United States. Military alliances will be core components of those two orders, which are now beginning to form and will resemble the Soviet-led and U.S.-led orders in the Cold War. Beijing and Washington, however, will sometimes have reasons to cooperate on select military issues, an endeavor that will fall within the purview of the international order, as it did during the Cold War. Again, the focus will be principally on arms control agreements and will involve Russia as well as China and the United States. The existing treaties and agreements dealing with proliferation are likely to remain in place, because all three great powers will want to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. But Beijing, Moscow, and Washington will have to negotiate new treaties limiting their arsenals, as the superpowers did during the Cold War.86 Nevertheless, the U.S.-led and Chinese-led bounded orders will be largely responsible for dealing with core security matters.

#### Impact turn – democracy increases war, Baliga 11’

Baliga 11—prof of managerial economics and decision sciences at Kellog School of Business, NU. PhD from Harvard—AND—Tomas Sjöström—chaired prof of economics at Rutgers—AND—David O. Lucca—economist with the Federal Reserve Board (Sandeep, Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?, The Review of Economic Studies, July 2011, 78;3)

The idea that democracy promotes peace has a long history. Thomas Paine argued that monarchs go to war to enrich themselves, but a more democratic system of government would lead to lasting peace: “What inducement has the farmer, while following the plough, to lay aside his peaceful pursuit, and go to war with the farmer of another country?” (Paine, 1985 p. 169). Immanuel Kant agreed that if “the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business” (Kant, 1795, 1903, p. 122). More recently, the democratic peace hypothesis has influenced the “neoconservative” view of international relations (Kaplan and Kristol, 2003). U.S. policy makers of different political persuasions have invoked it in support of a policy to “seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.”1 But some anecdotal **observations** seem to **support a more “realist”** **viewpoint**. For example, **after the breakup of Yugoslavia, democratic reforms were followed by war, not peace**. **When given a chance** in the legislative elections of 2006, the **Palestinians voted for Hamas, which did not have a** particularly **peaceful platform**. Such anecdotes suggest that **democratization does not always promote peace.** Even fully democratic countries such as the U.S. sometimes turn aggressive: under perceived threats to the homeland, the democratically elected President George W. Bush declared war on Iraq. **We develop a** simple **game-theoretic model of conflict** based on Baliga and Sjöström (2004). **Each leader can behave aggressively or peacefully.** A leader's true propensity to be aggressive, his “type”, is his private information. Since actions are strategic complements, the fear that the other leader might be an aggressive type can trigger aggression, creating a fear spiral we call “Schelling's dilemma” (see Schelling, 1960; Jervis, 1976, Jervis, 1978; Kydd, 1997). Unlike Baliga and Sjöström (2004), we assume a leader may be removed from power. Whether a leader can stay in power depends on the preferences of his citizens, the political system, and the outcome of the interaction between the two countries. **The political system interacts with Schelling's dilemma to create a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace.** Like the leaders, **citizens have different types**. By hypothesis, **the median type prefers to live in peace. This imposes a “dovish bias” on a dyad of two full democracies** (whose leaders can be replaced by their median voters). Thus, a dyadic democratic peace is likely to obtain. **However, when facing a country that is not fully democratic, the median voter may support aggression out of fear and may replace a leader who is not aggressive enough.** (For example, Neville **Chamberlain had to resign after appeasing Hitler**.) This gives rise to a “hawkish bias”. Thus, **in a fully democratic country, a dovish bias is replaced by a hawkish bias when the environment becomes more hostile**. In contrast, a **dictator is not responsive to** the preferences of **his** **citizens**, so there is neither a hawkish nor a dovish bias. Accordingly, a dyad of two dictators is less peaceful than a fully democratic dyad, but **a dictator responds less aggressively than a democratically elected leader to increased threats from abroad.** In the model, **the leader of a limited democracy risks losing power if hawks in his population turn against him.** For instance, **the German leaders during World War I believed signing a peace agreement would lead to their demise** (Asprey, 1991, pp. 486–487, 491). **Conversely, the support of the hawkish minority trumps the opposition of more peaceful citizens**. Thus, **a limited democracy experiences a hawkish bias similar to a full democracy under threat from abroad but never a dovish bias.** **On balance, this makes limited democracies more aggressive than any other regime type** . In a full democracy, if the citizens feel safe, they want a dovish leader, but if they feel threatened, they want a hawkish leader. In dictatorships and limited democracies, the citizens are not powerful enough to overthrow a hawkish leader, but the leader of a limited democracy risks losing power by appearing too dovish. This generates a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace. **Our empirical analysis reassesses the link between democracy and peace using a flexible semiparametric functional form, where fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity across country dyads**. We use Polity IV data to classify regimes as dictatorships, limited democracies or full democracies. Following the literature on the democratic peace hypothesis, we define a conflict as a militarized dispute in the Correlates of War data set. The data, which span over the period 1816–2000, contain many military disputes between limited democracies. In the nineteenth century, Britain had a Parliament, but even after the Great Reform Act of 1832, only about 200,000 people were allowed to vote. Those who owned property in multiple constituencies could vote multiple times.2 Hence, Britain is classified as a limited democracy for 58 years and becomes a full democracy only after 1879. France, Italy, Spain, and Germany are also limited democracies at key points in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These countries, together with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, were involved in many militarized disputes in Europe and throughout the world. For much of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia had many skirmishes and outright wars in the “Great Game” for domination of Central Asia (Hopkirk, 1990). France is also involved in many disputes and is a limited democracy during the Belgian War of Independence and the Franco-Prussian War. Germany is a limited democracy at the start of the First World War. Over the full sample, the data strongly support a dyadic democratic peace hypothesis: dyads consisting of two full democracies are more peaceful than all other pairs of regime types. This is consistent with previous empirical studies (Babst, 1972, Levy, 1988, , maozrussett, Russett and Oneal, 2001). Over the same period, limited democracies were the most aggressive regime type. In particular, **dyads consisting of two limited democracies are more likely to experience militarized disputes than any other dyads, including “mixed” dyads where the two countries have different regime types.** These results are robust to changing the definitions of the three categories (using the Polity scores) and to alternative specifications of our empirical model. **The effects are quantitatively significant**. **Parameter estimates of a linear probability model specification, suggest that the likelihood that a dyad engages in a militarized dispute falls roughly 35% if the dyad changes from a pair of limited democracies to a pair of dictatorships**. We also find that if some country j faces an opponent which changes from a full democracy to another regime type, the estimated equilibrium probability of conflict increases most dramatically when country j is a full democracy. This suggests that as the environment becomes more hostile, democracies respond more aggressively than other regime types, which is also consistent with our theoretical model. A more nuanced picture emerges when we split the data into subsamples. Before World War II, the data strongly suggest that limited democracies were the most conflict prone. It is harder to draw conclusions for the post World War II period, when very few countries are classified as limited democracies, and full democracies have very stable Polity scores. The Cold War was a special period where great power wars became almost unthinkable due to the existence of large nuclear arsenals (Gaddis, 2005). Did the weakening and demise of the Soviet Union bring a return to the pre-1945 patterns? Although the time period is arguably short, in the post-1984 period, it does seem that dyads of limited democracies are again the most prone to conflict. **It is** commonly **argued that a process of democratization**, e.g. **in the Middle East, will lead to peace** (Bush, 2003). **But** both theory and data suggest that the relationship between democracy and peace may be complex and non-monotonic. **Replacing a dictatorship with a limited democracy may actually increase the risk of militarized disputes. Even if a dictatorship is replaced by a full democracy, this may not reduce the risk of militarized disputes if the region is dominated by hostile non-democratic countries**. In the data, **only dyads consisting of two full democracies are peaceful.** **Democratic countries such as Israel and India, with hostile neighbours, do not enjoy a low level of conflict.**

## Didn’t Read

### NC

#### 2] People are not merely pawns of society, but real people with goals, dreams, and interests. It’s simply unethical to use one human against their will for the benefit of others. Nozick, a famous philosopher and former Harvard Professor, writes,

Nozick 74, Robert Nozick, [American political philosopher, former professor at Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974.

**Side** **constraints express the inviolability of other persons**. But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? **Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid greater harm: we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some persons diet to improve their health or looks; some save money to support themselves when they are older. In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall good**. Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefits other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? **But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits others. Nothing more**. **What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up.** (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that **his is the only life he has**. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and **no one is entitled to force this upon him--least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance** (as other individuals do

#### 3] People have varying passions and conceptions of a good life that stems from individuality and freedom. Only by having the state embrace my framework of protecting individual rights can we allow everyone to pursue their passions without arbitrarily valuing certain views. Eric Mack writes:

Eric Mack, June 15, 2018, “Robert Nozick’s Political Philosophy” <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nozick-political/#FraDisPro> //LHP AV

The official purpose of Part III of ASU, “Utopia”, is to show that the minimal state is not merely legitimate and just; it is also inspiring. This purpose is advanced by sketching a framework for utopia that is inspiring and noting that this framework is highly akin to—Nozick actually says “equivalent to” (333)—the minimal state. Yet Nozick also says that the framework might not have any “central authority” (329). Still, the framework is akin to the minimal state because it is an institutional structure that enforces peaceful co-existence among voluntarily formed communities. It protects the independence of such communities and their freedom to recruit members and also protects the liberty of individuals to enter and exit communities as they respectively choose. Although Nozick is not explicit about this, we have to presume that the framework enforces the same norms of personal freedom, property, and contractual compliance that the minimal state enforces except insofar as individuals voluntarily relinquish such rights within the communities they enter. The framework is inspiring because of the way it contributes to persons’ identification of and participation in communities (and other networks of relationships) through which they will find meaning and well-being. It is inspiring to anyone who appreciates how little each of us knows about what sorts of communities best suit human beings in all their depth and diversity and how much the operation of the framework assists individuals in their discovery of and engagement in communities that enhance their respective well-being. Moreover, many persons may value the framework not merely for the way it enhances their own good but, also, for the ways in which it allows them to participate vicariously in others’ achievement of their different modes of flourishing (Lomasky 2002). 5.1 The Framework as Discovery Procedure The framework is—or, more precisely, sustains—a discovery procedure. Under the protective umbrella of the framework, individuals are presented with and can try out diverse communities while communities themselves arise and modify themselves in their competitive search to sustain, improve, or increase their membership. A wide range of communities will continually arise out of and in response to the evolving perceptions that diverse individuals will have about what modes of sociality will best suit them and will best attract welcome partners. Communities will survive and perhaps expand or be imitated insofar as they actually embody modes of relationship that serve well their actual or prospective membership or insofar as they successfully refine their offerings in the market place of communities. The framework also insures that those who are already confident that they know what sort of community is best for them will be free to form those communities by voluntary subscription and, thereby, to manifest their actual value (or disvalue) to themselves and to other seekers of well-being. Part of Nozick’s sub-text here is a message to socialist utopians that nothing in the framework (or the minimal state) precludes their non-coercive pursuit of their ideal communities. How, therefore, can socialists object to the framework (or the minimal state)? This generalizes Nozick’s earlier claims in ASU that that advocates of meaningful work and workers’ control of productive enterprises ought not to be hostile to the minimal state since the minimal state is fully tolerant of non-coercive endeavors to establish such conditions (246–253). In a short essay in Reason magazine published four years after ASU, Nozick asked, “Who Would Choose Socialism?” (Nozick 1978). More precisely, his question was: What percent of the adult population would choose “to participate in socialist interpersonal relations of equality and community” were they in position to choose between “a reasonably attractive socialist option and also a reasonably attractive non-socialist one?” (Nozick 1978: 277). Nozick takes the choice available to Israelis between membership and non-membership in kibbutzim to be a good instance of a choice between such options and notes that around six percent of the adult population of Israel in the 1970s had chosen the socialist option. He speculates that socialists are at least “tempted” to be imperialists precisely because they sense that there will be too few volunteers (Nozick 1978: 279). The discovery procedure that the framework sustains is a version of Millian experiments in living—albeit it is a version that places much more emphasis on the role of a marketplace of communities in providing individuals with experimental options. This discovery procedure (like Millian experiments in living) is, of course, a Hayekian invisible hand process. Given the enormous diversity among individuals, we do not know what one form of community would be best. The idea that there is one best composite answer to all of these questions [about what features utopia has], one best society for everyone to live in, seems to me to be an incredible one. (And the idea that, if there is one, we now know enough to describe it is even more incredible.) (311) Nor do we know what distinct modes of community would be best for distinct types of persons. Thus, we cannot design an inclusive utopia; nor can we design an array of mini-utopia such that some significantly fulfilling community will be available to everyone—or even to most. It is helpful to imagine cavemen sitting together to think up what, for all time, will be the best possible society and then setting out to institute it. Do none of the reasons that make you smile at this apply to us? (313–314) Given our ignorance, the best way to realize utopia—almost certainly many distinct utopia—is through the discovery procedure that the framework sustains. (We should note, however, an implicit, somewhat puzzling, and wholly unnecessary presupposition of Nozick’s discussion, viz, that individuals with utopian aspirations will generally seek out communities that are made up of other individuals like themselves. The suggestion is that chosen communities will be internally homogeneous with heterogeneity existing only across these communities.)

#### 2] The right to strike necessarily involves violating the right to property and contract – it threatens others’ freedoms, Gourevitch summarizes:

Gourevitch, A.. “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (2016): 307 - 323. //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

A second problem follows on the first. **If workers have rights to the jobs they are striking then they must have some powers to enforce those rights**. **Such powers might include** mass picketing, secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes, **coercion and intimidation of replacement workers, even destruction or immobilization of property** – the familiar panoply of strike actions. While workers have sometimes defended such actions without using the specifically juridical language of ‘rights,’ in many cases they have used that kind of appeal.3 Even when they have not employed rights-discourse, they have invoked some related notion of demanding fair terms to their job (Frow, Frow and Katanka 1971). Each and any of the above listed activities of a strike – pickets, boycotts, sympathy actions – are part of the way workers not only press their demands but claim their right to 3 See James Gray Pope’s (1997) remarkable reconstruction of the way, in the 1920s, rights-discourse helped organize and sustain a ‘constitutional strike’ against attempts to curtail and outlaw the strike. the job. Strikers regularly implore other workers not to cross picket lines and take struck jobs. **These are more than speech-acts. At the outer edges, they amount to intimidation and coercion**. Or at least, workers claim the right to intimidate and coerce if the state will not itself enforce this aspect of their right to strike. Liberal societies rarely permit a group of individuals powers that come close and even cross over into rights of private coercion. It is no surprise that regulation and repression of these strike-related activities have been the source of some of the most serious episodes of strike-related violence in US and European history (Brecher 2014; Lambert 2005; Forbath 1991; Adamic 1971; Taft and Ross 1969; Liebknecht 1917). So, alongside the unclear basis for the strikers’ rights to their jobs, the problem for a liberal society is that this right seems to include private rights of coercion or at least troubling forms of social pressure. Yet there is more. **The standard strike potentially threatens the fundamental freedoms of three specific groups**. • Freedom of contract **It conflicts with the freedom of contract of those replacement workers who would be willing to take the job** on terms that strikers will not. Note, this is not a possible conflict but a necessary one. **Strikers claim the job is theirs, which means replacements have no right** to it. But replacements claim everyone should have the equal freedom to contract with an employer for a job. • Property rights **A strike seriously interferes with the employer’s property rights**. **The point of a strike is to stop production**. **But the point of a property right is that, at least in the owner’s core area of activity, nobody else has the right to interfere with his use of that property**. **The** **strikers**, by claiming the employer has no right to hire replacements and thus no way of employing his property profitably, **effectively render the employer unfree to use his property as he sees fit**. To be clear, strikers claim the right not just to block replacement workers, but to prevent the employer from putting his property to work without their permission. For instance, New Deal ‘sit-down’ strikes made it impossible to operate factories, which was one reason why the courts claimed it violated employer property rights (Atleson 1983, 46-48). Similarly, during the Seattle general strike in 1919, the General Strike Committee forced owners to ask permission to engage in certain productive activities – permission it often denied (Brecher 2014, 106-111). • Freedom of association Though the conceptual issues here are complicated, a strike can seriously constrain a worker’s freedom of association. It does so most seriously when the strike is a group right, in which only authorized representatives of the union may call a strike. In this case, the right to strike is not the individual’s right in the same way that, say, the freedom to join a church or volunteer organization is. Moreover, the strike can be coercively imposed even on dissenting members, especially when the dissenters work in closed or union shops. That is because refusal to follow the strike leads to dismissal from the union, which would mean loss of the job in union or closed shops. The threat of losing a job is usually considered a coercive threat. So not only might workers be forced to join unions – depending on the law – but also they might be forced to go along with one of the union’s riskiest collective actions. **Note that each one of these concerns follows directly from the nature of the right to strike itself**. **Interference with freedom of contract, property rights**, and the freedom of association **are all part and parcel of defending the right** that striking workers claim to the ‘their’ jobs. These are difficult forms of coercive interference to justify on their own terms and **they appear to rest on a claim without foundation**. Just what right do workers have to jobs that they refuse to perform?

### Generic

#### Strikes harm marginalized students in the process of learning from home.

**Curtiss 14** [David. “My special needs students needed their teachers in the classroom — not on the picket line”. 01-29-2019. USA TODAY. https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2019/01/29/los-angeles-teachers-strike-disabled-special-needs-students-column/2699621002/.] SJ//VM

I sighed with relief last week when the Los Angeles Unified School District negotiated a successful end to the teachers' strike that lasted six school days. The spotlight largely focused on the key players of our school system: teachers, the district, students, parents and higher-level staff. But as a special education assistant for an LAUSD elementary school in South L.A., I work with a segment of our public schools that doesn't get the attention or support it deserves — especially during a strike. My job is to help students with disabilities, even in highly under-resourced schools, reach their full potential. As [teachers in Denver and Oakland](https://www.npr.org/2019/01/26/688847473/as-la-teachers-reach-a-deal-denver-authorizes-a-strike-and-oakland-schedules-a-v) prepare to stand on the picket line, they should consider the experiences of their special needs students during this time of upheaval. **Read more commentary:** [As US teachers ramp up pressure, face reality: L.A. strike was about control, not students](chrome-extension://oknpjjbmpnndlpmnhmekjpocelpnlfdi/story/opinion/2019/01/28/teachers-strike-charter-schools-union-power-not-students-column/2694201002/) [My daughter's teacher is on strike. As a mom, I stand on the picket line with her.](chrome-extension://oknpjjbmpnndlpmnhmekjpocelpnlfdi/story/opinion/voices/2019/01/15/los-angeles-school-district-teachers-strike-parent-column/2579471002/) [School discipline is racist enough for black students like me. Arming teachers will make it worse.](chrome-extension://oknpjjbmpnndlpmnhmekjpocelpnlfdi/story/opinion/voices/2018/09/07/gun-violence-printers-blueprints-betsy-devos-column/1203644002/) In the L.A. district, 30,000 teachers went on strike and the number of absences at LAUSD schools skyrocketed. Just [a third of the district's 600,000 students](https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2019/01/21/lausd-teachers-strike-second-week-negotiations-continue/) showed up to school on the strike's first day. Many students and families were forced to find all sorts of creative ways to facilitate learning, such as taking [advantage of free entry](https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/national-international/Zoo-Museum-Free-Admission-if-Teachers-Strike-504240921.html) to museums and zoos, teaching classes at home, or [rallying with teachers](chrome-extension://oknpjjbmpnndlpmnhmekjpocelpnlfdi/story/opinion/voices/2019/01/15/los-angeles-school-district-teachers-strike-parent-column/2579471002/). However, for low-income students and students with disabilities at high-need schools, many of those options were not feasible. This means that noncredentialed school staff such as myself — along with sanitation workers, office personnel, and yard and recreational support — worked tirelessly to keep schools running for students in attendance. Although many are now celebrating the historic win for teachers, the strike did not come without drawbacks for high-need students whose day-to-day experiences became complicated, and for many, dire. Whereas many LAUSD schools’ primary concerns during the strike focused on boring movie days or [limited access](https://www.dailynews.com/2019/01/18/lausds-student-decathletes-wait-and-worry-while-teachers-strike-chips-away-at-their-chance-to-compete/?fbclid=IwAR2GZJj_PlQJVBdiCQNXh-ERewjM8lW0sdRpYkbcCmFCE9I57BBYn_etY4c) to clubs and activities, schools with fewer resources in higher-need areas, such as the one I work in, reflected an ugly, age-old truth of how our educational system defaults to treating students of color, particularly black boys, with disabilities. **Special ed students need support, not discipline** On the first day of the strike, Jan. 14, droves of fourth-, fifth- and sixth-graders noisily filled our school’s auditorium for programming. This was [standard protocol](https://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-edu-lausd-teachers-strike-20190114-story.html) at many schools, but it was nearly impossible for our administrato to redirect the children's attention to schoolwork amidst the mass confusion that both students and staff were experiencing. One student I work with closely, a boisterous and excitable 11-year-old black boy whose attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, known as ADHD, often has him in the wrong places at the worst of times, paced up and down the auditorium floor. He was greeting friends and dancing in the middle to pass time waiting to be assigned work. It was not long until a school administrator snapped at him with such ferocity that it drew attention. She told him he can no longer be in the auditorium. Stunned, the student (along with some nervous staff like myself) waited for clarification. Where would he go? All classrooms serving this age group at our school remained locked during the strike. The school administrator stated that he could keep himself occupied by walking around the school. It was clear to me that the administrator, overwhelmed and with little support, made an exceptionally bad call. It was [raining outside](https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2019/01/14/first-day-strike-austin-beutner-exclusive/). The student’s entire grade level was inside the auditorium with the only available credentialed staff. But what some might excuse as a temporary lapse in judgment was unfortunately all too [common during the strike](chrome-extension://oknpjjbmpnndlpmnhmekjpocelpnlfdi/story/news/2019/01/15/los-angeles-teachers-strike-autism-special-needs/2566954002/) for students like him. Students of color, particularly boys in special ed, were poorly treated. I saw children sent home for arbitrary and vague reasons. They were assigned mandatory escorts to the bathroom and class. At one point, policemen were called in to deal with a classroom infraction for a kindergarten student that left a young black boy screaming and crying in our school halls. **Black boys and girls already face bias in school** During the strike, the resources to deal with high-need students were more scarce than usual, and many students were left in the hands of schools that unconsciously pathologize disability and nonwhiteness because they do not understand it. Unfortunately, many of the students' key advocates, including their teachers who know them and are more skilled in supporting them and meeting their needs, were on the picket lines. It is no secret that children of color have a starkly different experience than their white counterparts in school, especially [when it comes to discipline](https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/4/5/17199810/school-discipline-race-racism-gao). Black boys, who are three times more likely to be suspended than white boys, face the highest rates of school discipline compared to other groups. Black girls are six times more likely to be suspended as white girls. And black students with disabilities are almost [three times more likely](https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/4/5/17199810/school-discipline-race-racism-gao) to experience out-of-school suspension or expulsion than white students with disabilities, regardless of age. The [school-to-prison pipeline](https://www.vox.com/2015/2/24/8101289/school-discipline-race) starts right here in these kinds of environments when it seems as if no one is paying attention. Although most administrators are well-meaning, a general lack of understanding about the biased ways schools see children of color and students with disabilities created a hostile space for children who are already routinely disciplined. I noticed that students in our school who were already labeled as “defiant” or “bad” were now being chastised for simply showing up during the strike, or appearing to cause trouble. I am proud to have witnessed a landmark moment in L.A. public education. I am even prouder that it was the work of teachers that made it happen. However, what I cannot be proud of is the way many of our schools, the institutions we have fought so bravely to reform, resort to punishing and policing our students, particularly disabled children of color, rather than protecting them. Teachers, the next time you must take to the picket lines — however necessary it might be — remember the most vulnerable children you are leaving behind in schools that are unprepared to support them. We must resolve that no matter the set of circumstances or difficulties our schools face during tumultuous times, we can do better than this. Just like our teachers, our students — all of them — deserve better.

#### Strikes hurt potential for scholarships – that leaves poor students with no help.

**Fordham 19** [Evie Fordham. . “Chicago teachers strike may be hurting students' bottom line”. 10-30-2019. Fox Business. https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/students-lost-school-days-chicago-teacher-strike.] SJ//VM

The [Chicago Teachers Union](https://www.foxbusiness.com/category/unions) strike is now posing a more personal threat to the students as they miss the 10th day of school. Students may now face make-up days because legally the schools must have a 180-day minimum calendar. Even with 188 days already built into 2019-2020 academic schedule, Chicago schools have now dropped below the legal requirement, [The Chicago Sun-Times](https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/10/29/20937745/cps-strike-makeup-days-school-ctu-union-state-instruction) reported. This comes as the strike dealt a personal blow to college hopefuls in the Windy City with administrators announcing today's P/SAT test will not happen as planned. It's also impacting the students' bottom line as lucrative college athletic [scholarships](https://www.foxbusiness.com/money) may now be off the table. According to the [Chicago Sun-Times](https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/10/29/20938589/cps-strike-football-ihsa-state-playoffs-chicago-teachers-union), local bylaws require high school football teams to hold a minimum number of practices to play in state playoff games this Saturday. Unless the teams practice Wednesday, they will reportedly have to forfeit. As for missed classroom time, the district could shorten its winter break or add on days at the end of the year. The latter option could allow teachers to recoup some pay lost because of the strike. "The district is in the process of gathering a full understanding of potential outcomes and next steps regarding whether or not the district will make up school days missed beyond eight," district spokeswoman Emily Bolton told The Sun-Times. "The Board would have to vote to add on any additional student attendance days and the district hopes to have additional information and a decision prior to the November Board meeting." [**EXPERTS TO CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION: CHANGING UP PENSIONS COULD FEEL LIKE A RAISE**](https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/chicago-teachers-strike-pension-raise-union) The strike started roughly two weeks ago and has turned into a battle of the wills between union leaders and the city's Democratic Mayor Lori Lightfoot who has previously said the schools will not make up lost days, [The Sun-Times](https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/10/3/20897902/cps-teachers-strike-lightfoot-lori-chicago-public-ctu) reported. **Mayor Lori Lightfoot, joined by CPS CEO Janice Jackson, makes a statement about the Chicago Teachers Union strike on Tuesday, Oct. 29, 2019, at City Hall. (Brian Cassella/Chicago Tribune/Tribune News Service via Getty Images)** The mayor reportedly met with teachers union reps for nearly four hours Tuesday but walked away with no deal. "Are we really keeping our kids out of class unless I agree to support the CTU's full political agenda wholesale?" Lightfoot said at a news conference. "If the CTU wants a deal, there's a deal to be had right now on the table."

#### Strikes hurt students – studies prove.

**Smith and Sharr 19** Smith, M., Shaar, N., & Divounguy, O. (2019, October 2). *Teacher strikes hurt student outcomes and may worsen income inequality*. Illinois Policy. https://www.illinoispolicy.org/press-releases/teacher-strikes-hurt-student-outcomes-and-may-worsen-income-inequality/

As the Chicago Teachers Union plans to announce this afternoon whether it will walk out on more than 360,000 students, [studies show](https://illinoispolicy.us1.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7fe208d3c85ffa1d03aeaade4&id=5ecc6a508a&e=0b391c8e91) strikes negatively affect student academic outcomes.

Research published in the National Bureau of Economic Research indicates strikes can temper growth in elementary student test scores by 2.2%. Given 90% of Chicago Public School students in 2018 were minority and 83% were classified as low-income, this means a strike will disproportionately harm those most in need and leave them to endure the long term negative consequences.

Experts from the nonpartisan Illinois Policy Institute are available to comment on how a strike would hurt minority and low-income students, potentially worsening income inequality.

How strikes harm student populations:

Test score decline: Expert consensus finds strikes have long-term negative effects on students. One study published by the NBER discovered that long strikes of 10 or more days have a significant negative effect on math test scores. Another published by Columbia University economists found extended disruptions, such as a strike, have negative effects on math and English achievement.

Less instruction: Unless the educational time lost during a strike is made up – such as by extending the school year – students lose the corresponding time in the classroom. In addition, students may require extensive review of material to get back up to speed.

Underperforming state averages: CPS already underperforms state academic achievement benchmarks. Its average SAT scores are 56 points lower than the state average, its four-year graduation rates are 11 percentage points lower and the percentage of CPS teachers rated proficient or excellent is 11 percentage points lower. A strike could exacerbate this.

Quote from Orphe Divounguy, chief economist for the nonpartisan Illinois Policy Institute:

“In the case of a teachers’ strike in Chicago, it is students who will ultimately be left behind. Lost classroom time worsens academic achievement and harms poor and disadvantaged students the most.

“With growing concerns about income inequality, the best way to ensure low-income students succeed is for CTU to accept Mayor Lightfoot’s generous offer and keep students in the classroom.”

#### Even if they win strikes are good, Wildcats better for movement building – that turns the aff – Barrington 21:

Barrington, A. (2021). *From the Ashes of the Old: A Critical Analysis of American Labor, Social Movements, and Cooptation* (Doctoral dissertation). (123-126)

The aftermath of the *Janus v. AFSCME* case has been, to the chagrin of institutional antiunion forces and elites, a renewed enthusiasm for industrial union tactics, worker militancy, and coordinated disruption. **Workers have taken the task of confronting capital upon themselves, collectively rejecting the restrictions placed upon them by bosses, the state, and business-unionism.** **This was clearly the case** in **the** 2018-19 **wave of** teacher **strikes**. Notably, **many of the** strikes took the form of a wildcat strike, a tactic most commonly associated with syndicalist and industrial unions defined by workers striking without the approval of employers, the state, or union bosses. The wildcat strike is likely named after the black cat symbol of the Industrial Workers of the World, the ‘sabocat’ (‘sabo’ being short for ‘sabotage,’ another form of militant worker action), depicted fiercely with arched back, fangs bared – an omen of bad luck for the bosses of the world. The power **of the wildcat** is **in its** radicalism, militancy, and refusal **of compromise.** The noticeable resurgence of militant worker tactics arguably began “with a dramatic wildcat strike in West Virginia in February 2018,” which was followed by “a wave of teacher strikes that swept the nation, moving from red states like Arizona and Oklahoma to blue California and Colorado” (French 2019:1). The wave of strikes “centered antiracist class-struggle demands that unite teachers and school communities,” contrasting them with the American teacher strikes of the 1970s which had the unfortunate consequence of exacerbating “tensions between the mostly white teachers and the communities of color they served” (p. 1). The striking teachers in the wildcat wave “also made clear that public education must be funded by reappropriating the wealth of corporations and the ultrarich, not by higher taxes or benefit cuts to working people” (p. 1). The teacher strikes, therefore, had an undeniable aura of class-based worker militancy unseen in the institutionalized American labor movement for decades. The demands made by the striking teachers are significant, as their orientation is openly class-based: “smaller class sizes, more support staff for students, and ends to school closures and charter school expansion” (p. 1). The demands **listed here are not simply teacher-centered (higher pay, etc.) – they are** founded in the concept ofcommunity, shared experiences, and common strength and vulnerability**. Because of this,** teachers “won widespread public support for their cause**” as they** presented “demands on behalf of the entire working class**,” and established “**solidarity against a common enemy**: the billionaires hoarding obscene wealth and trying to destroy public education” (p. 1).** The community- and class-based disposition of the teacher strikes “united parents and students” with the striking teachers, thus making the strikes more than just a battle between the teachers and their employers (p. 5). The teachers in West Virginia “demanded that public education be funded by reversing corporate tax cuts and raising taxes on the state’s highly profitable natural gas industry” while teachers in Arizona “beat back a budget proposal that would have taken additional education funding from Medicaid and other social programs, instead putting forward a ballot initiative to fund schools by taxing the rich” (p. 5). In Los Angeles, “teachers were clear that their fight is a fight for students and the community against privatizing billionaires” (p. 5). The striking teachers in Oakland were able to achieve “historic gains” by framing their strike as an “antiracist class struggle” uniting “parents, students, and other community members against billionaire privatizers, their front groups, and a bought-off school board” (p. 6). By conducting themselves as a militant, unified front within the frame of the greater struggle between classes, Oakland teachers were able to achieve “class-size reductions; reduced caseloads for counselors, nurses, and other support staff; and significant pay raises for teachers” (p. 6). Perhaps most significantly, however, “they won a promise from the Board of Education president to introduce a resolution calling for a five-month pause on school closures and a promise from the Board of Ed to vote on a resolution calling for an end to charter school growth in the Oakland Unified School District” (p. 6). The strike that ignited the brushfire of militant worker activism, the West Virginia wildcat, deserves considerable attention, especially from social movement activists hoping to understand the dynamic between the power structure and movements seeking to challenge it. **The teachers initially conducted a “walkout over rising health insurance costs and stagnant pay**” in February 2018, and by mid-February a settlement seemed to have been reached “with promises from Gov. Jim Justice of a 5 percent pay raise for teachers” (Richman 2018:2). **While union leadership “initially accepted the deal in good faith,” the “rank-and-file teachers refused to end the walkout”** (p. 2). Every public school in West Virginia “remained closed for nine days due to the strike, until the West Virginia legislature voted to approve a 5 percent pay increase for *all* state workers as well as a formal labor-management committee to deal with the healthcare problem” (p. 2). **The action taken by the rank-and-file West Virginia teachers starkly resembled militant worker activity prior to the National Labor Relations Act.**

#### Their long term data over-relies on the cold war and no longer applies, Jenke and Gelpi 16’

Jenke and Gelpi 16 Elizabeth Jenke (Duke) and Christopher Gelpi (Duke). “Theme and Variations: Historical Contingencies in the Causal Model of Inter‐State Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2016. JDN. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/gelpi.10/JenkeGelpiCOWForecast.pdf

**Perhaps most importantly, our results show that the impact of joint democracy seems to vary substantially across historical eras.** Bennett and Stam have an unusual and complex specification of the impact of democracy on conflict that involves multiple interaction terms. But two coefficients appear to be most appropriate for evaluating their claim that joint democracy has a strong impact on conflict. First, they include a regime similarity measure that calculates the absolute value of the difference between the polity regime scores for the two states in the dyad. This variable simultaneously tests (and conflates) arguments both about the democratic peace and the so-called “dictatorial peace” (Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez- Terry 2002). Second, Bennett and Stam include the polity scores of the initiator and target states along with their interaction and the square of their interaction. The core proposition of the democratic peace is that increases in democracy within the potential initiator will reduce the probability that the state will initiate a dispute when the polity score of the potential target state is high (Rousseau et. al. 1996). So we also examine the robustness of the democratic peace by estimating the coefficient for the initiator’s polity regime score when the target state’s polity score is at its maximum. This effect is the central prediction from the democratic peace literature (Maoz and Russett 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Rousseau et. al. 1996; Ray 1998). Figure 6 displays the estimated coefficients for these two measures of the impact of joint democracy. **The regime similarity measure is negative and statistically significant in the post-WWII era. However, the coefficient is positive and does not approach statistical significance in the inter-war and pre-WWI eras. Consequently, both of these coefficients fall outside the 95% confidence interval for the post-WWII era. This result is consistent with those who have argued that the democratic peace phenomenon is limited to the Cold War era** (Farber and Gowa 1995). Our analysis of the impact of the initiator’s democracy level also reveals inconsistent effects, although its pattern is somewhat different. In this case, **we find that democracy has essentially no effect on conflict in the post-WWII and pre-WWI eras but has a negative and statistically significant impact on conflict during the inter-war period.** This latter coefficient is outside the 95% confidence interval for the Cold War era.

#### They don’t assume weak democracies

Baliga 11—prof of managerial economics and decision sciences at Kellog School of Business, NU. PhD from Harvard—AND—Tomas Sjöström—chaired prof of economics at Rutgers—AND—David O. Lucca—economist with the Federal Reserve Board (Sandeep, Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?, The Review of Economic Studies, July 2011, 78;3)

Theoretical and empirical work in economics and political science has investigated the relationship between political systems and war. Jackson and Morelli (2007) formalize the idea that leaders start wars when their preferences are sufficiently biased away from their citizens' preferences. Levy and Razin (2004) provide a theory of the democratic peace based on incomplete information. They assume the representative citizen is less well informed about the benefit of concessions than the leader and show that democratically elected leaders are more likely to reveal information truthfully. In Bueno De Mesquita et al. (1999), political leaders must bribe key supporters to stay in power when foreign policy fails. A dictator has to bribe fewer supporters and is therefore more likely to go to war than a democratically elected leader. On the other hand, in order to avoid being replaced, a leader may “gamble for resurrection” with an aggressive foreign policy (Downs and Rocke, 1994, Bueno De Mesquita and Silverson, 1995, Hess and Orphanides, 1995). **Fearon** (1994) **assumes leaders suffer “audience costs” if they back down during a war of attrition. If audience costs are higher in democracies, then democracies are more committed to a conflict and may be more reluctant to enter into one**. Tangeras (2008) assumes that leaders have private information about the probability of winning a war. Democratically elected leaders are more reluctant to start a war because they will lose power if the war ends badly. According to Leeds (1999), democratic leaders are more able to commit to honouring agreements and thus more able to cooperate. **These theories provide underpinnings for** the **democratic peace** hypothesis, **but it is not obvious how they can be extended to explain the non-monotonicity we find in the data**. For example, a natural extension of Fearon (1994) model would be to assume the audience costs of limited democracies lie between those of dictatorships and full democracies, but this would not produce non-monotonicity. Similarly, if the leader of a limited democracy has less biased preferences than a dictator, then the Jackson and Morelli (2007) model would predict that limited democracies go to war less often than dictatorships. Our theory incorporates an important feature of Bueno De Mesquita et al. (1999): the support for the leader's action is derived from heterogeneous preferences among the citizens. In our model, leaders of full and limited democracies suffer audience costs (as in Fearon, 1994) if they are dovish when the opposing leader is hawkish; in addition, a leader of a full democracy faces audience costs (from the median voter) if he is hawkish against a dovish opponent; a dictator faces no audience costs at all. The result is a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) argue that increased nationalism can cause conflict during a period of transition when a regime is being democratized. However, in our baseline empirical model, dyads of limited democracies are the most conflict ridden even when controlling for regime transitions (using Mansfield and Snyder's, 2005, transitional dummies). This suggests that limited democracies are not only prone to conflict during periods of transition. Several articles have investigated the hypothesis that dyads consisting of countries with similar regime types, and thus perhaps “shared values” are relatively peaceful. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2004) classify autocratic regimes as personalist, military and single-party dictatorships and find evidence that dyads consisting of two autocracies of the same type are relatively peaceful. Bennett (2006) analyses plots of conflict probabilities for dyads with different Polity scores. He finds that the hypothesized relationship between similarity and peace holds for dyads with either very high or very low Polity scores, but not in the intermediate range. This is consistent with our finding that dyads of two limited democracies (which have intermediate Polity scores by definition) are relatively conflict prone. However, it is challenging within Bennett's pooled logit specification to formally test for non-monotonicity and to assess robustness within higher-order parametric specifications because the functional form is bidimensional and marginal effects are non-linear functions of explanatory variables. In addition, his specification cannot include dyadic fixed effects. Our dummy variable non-parametric approach has dyad-specific fixed effects, and non-monotonicity can be assessed through simple tests on coefficients. Unlike Bennett's continuous specification, we define limited democracies by cut-off Polity scores, but we verify the robustness of our results by varying the cut-off points. Other authors have analysed limited democracies along other dimensions and found reasons for why such regimes might experience conflicts. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that **limited democracies are more prone to civil wars, as insurgencies are more likely to succeed in weaker political regimes.** Epstein et al. (2006) find that political transitions from limited democracies to other political regimes are harder to explain than political transitions of autocracies and full democracies. Determining the underlying motives behind conflicts, based on a subjective reading of history, will always leave scope for disagreement. **Our theoretical model,** building on Baliga and Sjöström (2004), **assumes that conflicts can be sparked by fear** (“Schelling's dilemma”). **Historians have uncovered** many examples of such “**fear spirals**”.3 For example, Thucydides (1.23, p. 49 1972) argued that **the Peloponnesian War was caused by “the growth of** **Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”** **The period that preceded World War I was characterized by mutual distrust and fear** (Sontag, 1933, Tuchman, 1962, Wainstein, 1971). A spiral of **fear was evident during the Cold War arms race** (Leffler, 1992). **The India–Pakistan arms race is a current example of escalation fuelled by mutual distrust**, and Bobbitt (p. 10 2008) suggests a similar logic will continue to operate in the wars of the twenty-first century: “We think terrorists will attack; so they think we think the terrorists will attack; so they think we shall intervene; so they will attack; so we must.” Nevertheless, there is disagreement about the number of large-scale wars that can be said to have been triggered by fear (see Van Evera, 1999, Reiter, 2000). Reiter (1995) argues that leaders who understand the spiraling logic can prevent conflict by communicating. Baliga and Sjöström (2004) verify that, in theory at least, cheap talk can sometimes prevent a conflict, but it cannot always do so. Our current model assumes that leaders are partly motivated by domestic political concerns and may behave hawkishly in order to maintain political support. Thus, fear is not the only reason for starting a war, and the argument by Reiter (1995) that World War I was not a pure fear spiral is consistent with our model: Domestic politics in a number of nations set the stage for war, though some …have gone further to argue that Germany sought war … to shore up the threatened domestic political order at home (Reiter, 1995, p. 22).