# Glenbrooks R5 1N v Lexington AG

## 1N

### T

#### Interpretation: A just government protects property and is impartial.

#### Madison 1784:

James Madison, [Founding Father] “Four Documents Concerning Confiscation of Property” in the Legislature of Virginia, 3 December 1784, <http://history.furman.edu/benson/hst121/Madison_on_Property_Confiscation.htm> //LHP AV

**Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.** According to this standard of merit, the praise of affording a just security to property, should be sparingly bestowed on a government which, however scrupulously guarding the possessions of individuals, does not protect them in the enjoyment and communication of their opinions, in which they have an equal, and in the estimation of some, a more valuable property. More sparingly should this praise be allowed to a government, where a man’s religious rights are violated by penalties, or fettered by tests, or taxed by a hierarchy. Conscience is the most sacred of all property; other property depending in part on positive law, the exercise of that, being a natural and unalienable right. To guard a man’s house as his castle, to pay public and enforce private debts with the most exact faith, can give no title to invade a man’s conscience which is more sacred than his castle, or to withhold from it that debt of protection, for which the public faith is pledged, by the very nature and original conditions of the social pact. **That is not a just government**, nor is property secure under it, **where the property which a man has** in his personal safety and personal liberty, **is violated by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service of the rest.** A magistrate issuing his warrants to a press gang, would be in his proper functions in Turkey or Indostan, under appellations proverbial of the most compleat despotism.

#### That outweighs –

#### A] it’s a founding father of the US, so if he disagrees with the US being a just government then it outweighs on founders’ intent

#### B] it provides the foundation of government itself – if constitutive burden is to protect property, then that determines justice

#### Violation:

#### The US a] commits eminent domain abuse, which violates property and b] does it against minorities and the poor which is not impartial, Somin 17:

Ilya Somin, [Contributor, The Volokh Conspiracy which is is a blog co-founded in 2002 by law professor Eugene Volokh,[3] covering legal and political issues[4][5][6] from an ideological orientation it describes as "generally libertarian, conservative, centrist, or some mixture of these."], May 26, 2017 at 10:40 a.m. EDT, “The American experience with eminent domain – and its possible lessons for others” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/26/the-american-experience-with-eminent-domain-and-its-possible-lessons-for-others/> //LHP AV

This week, the Volokh Conspiracy hosted a guest-blogging symposium with posts by contributors to my new book Eminent Domain: A Comparative Perspective (co-edited with Iljoong Kim and Hojun Lee). My last post about the book includes links to a free version of the Introduction to the volume, and to posts by other contributors. In addition to co-editing the volume, I also wrote the chapter on eminent domain in the United States. In this post, I summarize key elements of the American experience with condemnation, building on my chapter in the book and my earlier work on the history of takings in the US. **The United States has the reputation of** being a nation with a strong **commitment to property rights** and constitutional limits on government power. In some ways, that reputation is well deserved. **But**, in some other key respects, it **is** **undercut by our painful history of eminent domain abuse.** The Fifth Amendment and nearly all state constitutions mandate that government may only take private property for a “public use.” Almost from the very beginning, there has been conflict between advocates of the “narrow” and “broad” interpretations of this rule. The former allows takings only for publicly owned projects (such as a public road), or private ones that have a legal duty to serve the entire public, such as a public utility. Under the broad view, virtually anything that might benefit the public in some way qualifies as a public use. The narrow view predominated throughout most of the first century or more of American constitutional history. But the broad view eventually triumphed in the mid-twentieth century, culminating in cases like Berman v. Parker (1954). As a result**, state and federal courts upheld large-scale “blight” and “economic development” takings that forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of people, most of them poor, politically weak, or members of racial and ethnic minorities**. Often, these takings also destroyed more economic value than they created**, wiping out homes and small businesses, and destroying neighborhood “social capital.”** **Such abuses persist to the present day**, though on a considerably smaller scale than at the height of “urban renewal” takings in the 1950s and 1960s. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad view in its controversial 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, which ruled that it is permissible to take property from one private owner and give it to another simply because it might lead to greater “economic development” in the area. But Kelo was a close 5-4 decision that turned out to be enormously controversial, generating a massive political backlash. In the aftermath, many states enacted eminent domain reform laws limiting takings, and several state supreme courts ruled that economic development takings violate their state constitutions. Although a win for the broad view, Kelo ended up destroying the seeming consensus behind it. In the wake of Kelo, the narrow view commands greater legitimacy than at any time in decades, and the debate over the proper scope of the eminent domain power continues with no end in sight. In recent years, controversy has erupted over takings for pipelines. An unusual coalition of property rights advocates on the right and environmentalists on the left has won a series of legislative and judicial victories seeking to limit pipeline takings. The alliance recalls the similarly cross-ideological reaction against Kelo, which also brought together some strange bedfellows. The debate over public use is far from the only controversy surrounding eminent domain in the US. **Another longstanding problem is the tendency to undercompensate owners of condemned property.** The Supreme Court has long held that owners must get “fair market value” compensation. **This, unfortunately, fails to account for the “subjective value” that many attach to their land over and above its market value. For example, a person who has lived in the same neighborhood for many years may value the social ties she has formed there; a small business may have a network of clients that would be hard to replicate elsewhere.** Even worse, studies show that owners often don’t even get the fair market value compensation that the law requires. That is particularly likely for owners who are relatively poor and lacking in political clout. Donald Trump’s claim that owners of condemned property stand to make “a fortune” is – to put it mildly – belied by the evidence.

#### Vote neg –

#### 1] Precision –

#### A] stasis point – the topic is the only reasonable focal point for debate – anything else destroys the possibility of debate because we will be two ships passing

#### B] internal link turn – violating semantics justifies the aff talking about whatever with zero neg prep or prediction which is the most unfair and uneducational

#### C] Jurisdiction – you can’t vote for them because the ballot and the tournament invitation say to vote for the better debater in the context of the resolution

#### D] objectivity – only semantics are objective whereas pragmatics are subjective which means intervention

#### 2] Limits – there are almost 200 national governments in the world which is an unmanageable burden. Only imposing restrictions via the word just can ensure debates are limited and full of clash. Supercharged by the fact they can spec a non topical government.

#### 3] TVA – use ideal theory instead. That’s better – a] promotes in-depth philosophical clash over labor law that’s constittuive to LD b] solves your offense because you can indicate you would solve these problems in an ideal world too – no reason you need the US in particular

#### Fairness is a voter – a] debate is a game that requires objective evaluation, without it wouldn’t exist b] procedural constraint – if I had 10 seconds to respond to the aff I would loose, that proves it’s a constraint on debating itself

#### Competing interps – a] you can’t be reasonably topical its binary b] requires judge intervention of whats the most reasonable c]

#### No RVI – a] logic – you don’t win for meeting your burden of proof – showing up to a basketball game with the correct clothes doesn’t mean you win b] baiting – incentivizes good theory debaters to be infinitely abusive and prep out the 1ar and 2ar, that means we can never check abuse or set norms

#### DTD – a] DTA on T is functionally the same b] key to deterring future abuse, or people will just bait it out c] epistemics – the abuse already happened so the rest of the flow is skewed

### NC

#### The Role of the Ballot is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution. Vote aff if the resolution is true, and negate if I disprove its truth:

#### 1] Constitutive: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity

#### 2] Bindingness: a) all arguments pre-assume that they are true as judges don’t vote an arguments proven false b) in order to win that your ROB is superior to TT you must prove true the claim that your ROB is better than TT.

#### Permissibility Negates –

#### 1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two.

#### 2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### Presume neg –

#### 1] We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories. The lack of a reason something is false does not me it is assumed to be true.

#### 2] Statements are more often false then true. If I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true in one way by demonstrating that it is indeed red, where I can prove it false in an infinite amount of ways.

#### Util collapses into a world of chaos without the will of an absolute sovereign:

#### 1] Humanity’s ability to think about the future leads to perpetual pain created by fear of the future – only a sovereign that can protect future wellbeing solves. Pettit 09,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

This capacity to focus on the future may look like a release, freeing human beings from what Hobbes calls “the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure” (L 6.35). But the liberation has another side to it as well, since the ability to reason about how things may be in the future enables people to worry about what may yet transpire, and be paralyzed by fear and anxiety. This is the side of things that Hobbes emphasizes. He thinks concern for future evil is absolutely inevitable among human beings: “it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come” (L 12.5). And so whereas “wolves, bears and snakes” are not “rapacious unless hungry,” “man is famished even by future hunger” (DH 10. 3). As he puts it in Leviathan, the “object of man’s desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desire” (L 11.1). Thus he posits as “a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death”; man “cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.”

#### This explains the real implication of pleasure being intrinsically good to humans – the relationship doesn’t just end there.

#### 2] Non-descriptive words necessary for ethics don’t have a stable meaning so there is infinite conflict over how to interpret them making peace impossible. Pettit 09,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

But what sort of reasoning or ratiocination does the expression of passion allow? The words that are paradigmatically associated with passion, as we saw in the second chapter, are thin evaluative terms like good or bad. Hobbes’s view is that we use positive terms for anything that we desire, and corresponding negative terms for anything to which we are averse. If we are attracted to something we call it good, and call it good only on that account; if we are averse to something we call it bad, and call it bad only on that account. As Hobbes says, “Whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil” (L 6.7). Hobbes thinks that where there is desire for something, there is pleasure in the presence or at least the immediate prospect of the object desired, and where there is aversion, there is pain or displeasure; the attractive is the pleasant, and the aversive the unpleasant. He can take the pleasure to be “the appearance, or sense, of good; and molestation or displeasure, the appearance, or sense, of evil” (L 6.11). Thus, he can say that everyone “calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil which displeaseth him” (EL 7.3). As we learn to use words like rough, red, or round on the basis of the effects that things have on our senses, so we learn to use good and bad on the basis of the effects they have in giving or promising us pleasure or displeasure. The question, then, is how words introduced on that sort of basis can be recruited to a process of reasoning. And the question is troublesome, of course (L 6.7). We naturally use words that name what Hobbes regards as real properties of bodies according to how things “simply and absolutely” are; an example might be a word like round. We naturally use words that do not name real properties of bodies but are guided by the common effects that bodies happen to have on us—words like red and rough—according to “a common rule”; the rule will be common insofar as bodies affect us in more or less the same ways. But what are we to do with evaluative terms? There are two problems with these words, as we already know. First of all, words like good and bad are used by different people to pick out different things, since people vary in the things they find pleasant or unpleasant; “while every man differeth from other in constitution, they differ also one from another concerning the common distinction of good and evil” (EL 7.3). Words like good and bad “are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves” (L 6.7). They are used by me to pick out those things I find pleasing or displeasing, and by you to pick out those things that you find pleasing or displeasing. This makes for a problem, because differences in our judgments of good and evil are likely to lead us into strife with one another; our “controversy must either come to blows or be undecided” (L 5.3). As we saw in chapter 3, that problem may stem from the fact that we each mistakenly take ourselves to be making conflicting, nonindexical judgments, or just from the fact that the judgments, even understood as indexical, support conflicting practical dispositions. The second problem that arises with evaluative terms, however, is that not only are we each disposed to use them for different things but we are also each liable to use them differently at different times. We are subject to intertemporal as well as interpersonal inconstancy. This arises “because the constitution of a man’s body is in continual mutation,” so that “it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions” (L 6.5). What Hobbes has in mind here can hardly be the way we are each likely to change our views about what is attractive and good, or aversive and bad; after all, such a change of mind is likely with any beliefs whatsoever. He seems rather to be thinking of the ways in which things may engage our desires differently, depending on which of their elements or aspects is currently salient, and whether our desire is still alive or satiated. These problems are both reflections of the indexicality of the terms good and bad, according to Hobbes’s analysis. The terms are used differently, depending on the personal and indeed temporal index given by the speaker. And yet they are used across persons and times to shape what is done, whether done by one person or many, so that they raise a possibility of controversy and strife. We cannot expect any person at different times, or different people at the same time, to “consent in the desire of almost any one and the same object” (L 6.5).

#### Only a sovereign can absolve conflict over the meaning of pleasure to providing a starting point for its maximization. Pettit 09,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

But right reason will not be in place with words like good and bad, “for want of a right reason constituted by nature.” Therefore, Hobbes says, “The parties must by their own accord set up for right reason the reason of some arbitrator or judge to whose sentence they will both stand” (L 5.3; see also D 26). The picture he has is that just as a common measure is needed to establish shared meanings for purely conventional terms of measurement like pint or quart, foot or yard, so a measure is needed to establish shared meanings for evaluative terms, at least when they are used of matters that engage everyone in the society. It “was necessary that there should be a common measure of all things that might fall in controversy; as for example: of what is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what meum and tuum, what a pound, what a quart, etc.” (EL 29.8). No one can cease to regard their own death as evil, according to Hobbes, insofar as a natural necessity will lead them each to seek their own good (EL 14.6; DC 1.7; L 27.8). Yet there is no reason, he thinks, why people should not be able to give up many of their self-indexed uses of evaluative terminology in favor of a usage that is tied to someone who speaks for them all equally—someone who relates to them as the agent over time relates to the agent at different times. In envisaging that possibility, of course, he is looking to the possibility of a sovereign who will speak for the commonwealth, fixing the meaning of good or bad so that it refers to what is attractive or aversive by the sovereign’s judgment. More on this in the next chapter

#### That o/w pain and pleasure are structurally negative and can’t refer to reality. If I say that I gain lots of pleasure or pain from doing X activity, you may be able to relate, but you can’t feel the exact same way and don’t have the same orientation as I do.

#### 3] Collapses – whenever a sovereign is removed, each person becomes their own sovereign and must attempt to force others under their will until someone prevails and becomes the sovereign. Parrish :

Derrida`s Economy of Violence in Hobbes` Social Contract, Richard Parrish

“But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that **in the state of nature persons must** not only try to control as many objects as possible -- they must also try to **control as many** persons **as possible**. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, **by force** or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among [persons in the state of nature] there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. **Persons,**as rationally self-interested beings **who**"measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and **value themselves above all** others, attempt to **force that valuation on others**."The **human desire** for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," **is** therefore primarily **about subsuming others beneath one**'s own personhood, **as** direct **objects** or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that **this discursive struggle** rapidly **becomes physical** by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 **The ultimate violence**, the surest and most complete way **of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person**, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning.”

#### Now negate:

#### 1] The aff creates post-fiat obligations for the state – this is incoherent because it implies an authority higher than the state to constrain the sovereign. Only sovereign entities can create moral obligations, so the state can’t have an obligation to act

#### 2] The aff gives employees, specifically public sector ones, the right to strike against the state which is definitionally a violation of the sovereign’s will

#### 3] Concept Skep – there are 2 forms of knowledge – deductive, knowledge from logical proofs, and empirical, knowledge from experience. However, all knowledge is grouped into two concepts – universals or particulars. The concept “I am Prateek” is particular because there is only one me, but “bears are white” is universal because it applies to all theoretical bears. Universal knowledge is epistemically inaccessible because you must prove a negative existential which requires omniscience to prove. For the concept, “bears are white” to be true, I must be certain there are no brown bears, as that would disprove my claim. That negates because it’s impossible to prove a universal concept like the resolution i.e., striking is uncondtionally good. At best, they prove this means particularism is true, which still means you negate because the aff isn’t particular.

#### 4] Rule Following – nothing inherent a rule mandates a specific interpretation to be followed. For example, nothing inherent in an arrow means that it has to point in one direction. Thus, the moral rule the aff sets is infinitely regressive and fails.

#### 5] Justice Paradox – a just decision requires immediate action else on is complicit with the injustice they critique. However, the formulation the belief that x practice is unjust and y solution solves takes time, which means making claims about justice are contradictory.

#### 6] I get New 2NR paradigm issues, arguments, and framing arguments – a] I don’t know implications until the 2nr b] k2 method testing since we maximize the time spent debating the paradigm and wararnt c] I won’t know what the 1ar strategy is until after, so its impossible to pre-empt and make all framing claims in the NC

## Case

### Hedge

#### Reject 1ar theory – the 2AR has 3 uncontested minutes full of new responses to the 2N CI. That means that either the aff always win because we don’t have the ability to justify our counter model of debate and the judge has to intervene in order to determine whos ahead.

#### T first – 1] Lexicality - their abuse happened prior to my abuse, means that you cannot truly evaluate other abuses – a] its epistemically skewed and b] it means my abuse was justified insofar that I had to be abusive to combat their abuse 2] T determines possible arguments in the round

#### Negating is harder, means your err neg on every arg – [a] they get infinite prep before round [b] 2ar judge phycology [c] 1ar has infinite uplayering potential,

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention,

#### Yes RVI on 1ar shells – k2 check back against them trying to get out of their abuse by spamming shells, eval 1ar theory directly after the 2nr – k2 reciprocal speeches,

### Framework

#### Consequentialism triggers permissibility – a] cascading b] induction c] culpability

#### Group all the naturalism stuff – a] We don’t need to respond – the hijack claims that if it is the case we use moral facts about the world via empirics, the impacts of chaos and state of nature are inevitable b] Triggers skep – in order to base ethics in empirics in the natural world we must verify our knowledge of it. However, truth requires one to be absolutely certain about a statement or else the statement cannot be held true. For example, saying all apples are red requires certainty that no apples are blue or else the statement is an assumption. However, one cannot rule out the possibility of a deceptive demon who deceives all in their beliefs while simultaneously assuring ourselves that we are right. Thus, one can never prove that the external world exists because our knowledge of it may always be incorrect. This also proves solipsism is true as we can only be sure of our own mind and consciousness, but we can never verify that of the other - Sinnott-Armstrong 15:

Sinnot-Armstrong, Walter, (Philosopher), “Moral Skepticism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. September 17, 2015. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/#MorExp>. //LHP AV

The famous Cartesian hypothesis is of **[Consider]** **a demon who deceives me in all of my beliefs about the external world, while also ensuring that my beliefs are completely coherent.** **This** possibility **cannot be ruled out by any experiences or beliefs, because of how the deceiving demon is defined**. This hypothesis is also contrary to my beliefs about the lake. So **my beliefs** about the lake **are not justified**, according to the above principle. And there is nothing special about my beliefs about the lake. **Everything I believe about the external world is incompatible with the deceiving demon hypothesis.** Skeptics conclude that **no** such **belief is justified.**

#### Group any pleasure and pain justifications – a] the hijack is what hijacks this – we don’t need to respond to be it being intrinsic the point is that results in infinite violence b] absent the hijack permissibility is true – everyone’s pain and pleasure is different – proven by CX – that means absent the sovereign its infinitely interpretable and meaningless – assigning coherence to an ought statement is vacuous c]

#### Group any impact justified reason to prefer – they would all apply to the hijack as well because its just the logical conclusion of the aff

#### On ASPEC – a] is-ought fallacy – they explain descriptive premises about how some states act but not what they ought to do b] the NC hijacks it explains what the state ought to do

#### On Ground – 1] empirical claim without a warrant 2] you can still turn the nc 3] turn – it excludes all school debaters and forces people who don’t have thousands of dollars for debate coaches to cut them a bunch of prep to loose all rounds

#### On Extinction o/w – 1] Uncertainty is inevitable – their only warrant is we are uncertain so we should try to save future life to become certain – but the hijack shows that we can’t ever be certain as dispute is inevitable as pain and pleasure are infinitely interpretable 2] Value to life – 3] Ethics Framing issue 4] probability 5] assumes consequentialism 6]

### Advantage

#### Impact turn – Heg is net destabilizing which internal link turns all your impact card warrants – empirically confirmed, Cambanis 12

[Thanassis - Fellow at The Century Foundation and Professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs “The lonely superpower,” <http://bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/01/22/the-lonely-superpower/FRkSf1s5n9lXku4VqvEtqJ/story.html>]

Now, however, with a few decades of experience to study, a young international relations theorist at Yale University has proposed a provocative new view: American dominance has destabilized the world in new ways, and the United States is no better off in the wake of the Cold War. In fact, he says, a world with a single superpower and a crowded second tier of distant competitors encourages, rather than discourages, violent conflict--not just among the also-rans, but even involving the single great power itself. In a paper that appeared in the most recent issue of the influential journal International Security, political scientist Nuno P. Monteiro lays out his case. America, he points out, has been at war for 13 of the 22 years since the end of the Cold War, about double the proportion of time it spent at war during the previous two centuries. “I’m trying to debunk the idea that a world with one great power is better,” he said in an interview. “If you don’t have one problem, you have another.” Sure, Monteiro says, the risk of apocalyptic war has decreased, since there’s no military equal to America’s that could engage it in mutually assured destruction. But, he argues, the lethal, expensive wars in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and Afghanistan have proved a major drain on the country. Even worse, Monteiro claims, America’s position as a dominant power, unbalanced by any other alpha states actually exacerbates dangerous tensions rather than relieving them. Prickly states that Monteiro calls “recalcitrant minor powers” (think Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan), whose interests or regime types clash with the lone superpower, will have an incentive to provoke a conflict. Even if they are likely to lose, the fight may be worth it, since concession will mean defeat as well. This is the logic by which North Korea and Pakistan both acquired nuclear weapons, even during the era of American global dominance, and by which Iraq and Afghanistan preferred to fight rather than surrender to invading Americans. Of course, few Americans long for the old days of an arms race, possible nuclear war, and the threat of Soviet troops and missiles pointed at America and its allies. Fans of unipolarity in the foreign policy world think that the advantages of being the sole superpower far outweigh the drawbacks -- a few regional conflicts and insurgencies are a fair price to pay for eliminating the threat of global war. But Monteiro says that critics exaggerate the distinctions between the wars of today and yesteryear, and many top thinkers in the world of security policy are finding his argument persuasive. If he’s right, it means that the most optimistic version of the post-Cold War era -- a “pax Americana” in which the surviving superpower can genuinely enjoy its ascendancy -- was always illusory. In the short term, a dominant United States should expect an endless slate of violent challenges from weak powers. And in the longer term, it means that Washington shouldn’t worry too much about rising powers like China or Russia or the European Union; America might even be better off with a rival powerful enough to provide a balance. You could call it the curse of plenty: Too much power attracts countless challenges, whereas a world in which power is split among several superstates might just offer a paradoxical stability. From the 1700s until the end of World War II in 1945, an array of superpowers competed for global influence in a multipolar world, including imperial Germany and Japan, Russia, Great Britain, and after a time, the United States. The world was an unstable place, prone to wars minor and major. The Cold War era was far more stable, with only two pretenders to global power. It was, however, an age of anxiety. The threat of nuclear Armageddon hung over the world. Showdowns in Berlin and Cuba brought America and the Soviet Union to the brink, and the threat of nuclear escalation hung over every other superpower crisis. Generations of Americans and Soviets grew up practicing survival drills; for them, the nightmare scenario of thermonuclear winter was frighteningly plausible. It was also an age of violent regional conflicts. Conflagrations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America spiraled into drawn out, lethal wars, with the superpowers investing in local proxies (think of Angola and Nicaragua as well as Korea and Vietnam). On the one hand, superpower involvement often made local conflicts far deadlier and longer than they would have been otherwise. On the other, the balance between the United States and the USSR reduced the likelihood of world war and kept the fighting below the nuclear threshold. By tacit understanding, the two powers had an interest in keeping such conflicts contained. When the Soviet Union began its collapse in 1989, the United States was the last man standing, wielding a level of global dominance that had been unknown before in modern history. Policy makers and thinkers almost universally agreed that dominance would be a good thing, at least for America: It removed the threat of superpower war, and lesser powers would presumably choose to concede to American desires rather than provoke a regional war they were bound to lose. That is what the 1991 Gulf War was about: establishing the new rules of a unipolar world. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Monteiro believes, because he miscalculated what the United States was willing to accept. After meeting Saddam with overwhelming force, America expected that the rest of the world would capitulate to its demands with much less fuss. Monteiro compared the conflicts of the multipolar 18th century to those of the Cold War and current unipolar moment. What he found is that the unipolar world isn’t necessarily better than what preceded it, either for the United States or for the rest of the world. It might even be worse. “Uncertainty increases in unipolarity,” Monteiro says. “If another great power were around, we wouldn’t be able to get involved in all these wars.” In the unipolar period, a growing class of minor powers has provoked the United States, willing to engage in brinkmanship up to and including violent conflict. Look no further than Iran’s recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz to oil shipping and to strike the American Navy. Naturally, Iran wouldn’t be able to win such a showdown. But Iran knows well that the United States wants to avoid the significant costs of a war, and might back down in a confrontation, thereby rewarding Iran’s aggressive gambits. And if (or once) Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, it will have an even greater capacity to deter the United States. During the Cold War, on the other hand, regional powers tended to rely on their patron’s nuclear umbrella rather than seeking nukes of their own, and would have had no incentive to defy the United States by developing them. Absent a rival superpower to check its reach, the United States has felt unrestrained, and at times even obligated, to intervene as a global police officer or arbiter of international norms against crimes such as genocide. Time and again in the post-Cold War age, minor countries that were supposed to meekly fall in line with American imperatives instead defied them, drawing America into conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This wasn’t what was supposed to happen: The world was supposed to be much safer for a unipolar superpower, not more costly and hazardous.

#### American primacy and challenging revisionist powers to force their decline encourages revisionary lashout – “use it or lose it” means their impacts are triggered – this is comparatively more likely than a revisionary challenge, Brands 18’

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There is, then, no disputing that rising powers can have profoundly disruptive effects. Yet such powers might not actually be the most aggressive or risk-prone type of revisionist state. After all, if a country’s position is steadily improving over time, why risk messing it all up through reckless policies that precipitate a premature showdown? Why not lay low until the geopolitical balance has become still more favorable? Why not wait until one has surpassed the reigning hegemon altogether and other countries defer to one’s wishes without a shot being fired? So while a rising revisionist power may be tempted to assert itself, it should also have good reason to avoid going for broke. Now imagine an alternative scenario. A revisionist power—perhaps an authoritarian power—has been gaining influence and ratcheting its ambitions upward. Its leaders have cultivated intense nationalism as a pillar of their domestic legitimacy; they have promised the populace that past insults will be avenged and sacrifices will be rewarded with geopolitical greatness and global prestige. Yet then the country’s potential peaks, either because it has reached its natural limit or because of some unforeseen development, and the balance of power starts to shift in unfavorable ways. It becomes clear to the country’s leadership that it may not be able to accomplish the goals it has set and fulfill the promises it has made, and that the situation will only further worsen with time. A roll of the iron dice now seems more attractive: It may be the only chance the nation has to claim geopolitical spoils before it is too late. In this scenario, it is not rising power that makes the revisionist state so dangerous, but the temptation to act before decline sets in.In this scenario, it is not rising power that makes the revisionist state so dangerous, but the temptation to act before decline sets in. In this sense, the dynamic bears a resemblance to the famous Davies J-Curve theory of revolution, wherein a populace is held to be more inclined to revolt not when it is maximally oppressed but rather when raised expectations are shown to be in vain. Obviously, rational analysis does not always prevail in world politics. Rising states can become intoxicated with their own strength; they may simply get tired of waiting to attain the status they desire; or some domestic pressure may impel leaders to act dangerously. But revisionists whose power has begun to decline, or who have hit a rogue bump in the road, may not feel that they even have the option of waiting. Consider again the outbreak of World War I. From a long-term perspective, Germany may have been a rising and increasingly confident power prior to the war, but Berlin’s decision-making in 1914 took place against the more immediate backdrop of deep pessimism caused by the fear of impending decline. In the east, Germany was menaced by the growth of Russian military power and the approaching completion of an improved railroad network that would dramatically shorten Russia’s mobilization timetable. In the west, changes in French conscription laws were rapidly enhancing the military manpower of another rival. The result, in Berlin, was mounting apprehension that Germany’s ability to fight a two-front war—the cornerstone of its military strategy—was about to collapse, and that its geopolitical aspirations were about to be crushed in a Franco-Russian-British vise. If that happened, internal frictions might become unmanageable: Nationalism and geopolitical ambition might no longer be able to dampen the shocks caused by intensifying conflicts between rival social and political groups. This is why Germany ran such enormous risks in the July 1914 crisis—by pushing Austria-Hungary to take an uncompromising position against Serbia after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by promising to back the Dual Monarchy come what may, by implementing the Schlieffen Plan for a knock-out blow against France despite the danger that this would bring Britain into the war. Chief of General Staff Helmuth von Moltke acknowledged the danger of a “war which will annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come,” but he and his colleagues pushed forward on grounds that Germany’s dreams of greatness would become hopeless illusions if not realized soon.4 Similar motives were at work in World War II. Hitler’s Germany had the most radical designs of any revisionist power in history, and it is inconceivable that Hitler would not have used Germany’s revived economic and military might to precipitate a major conflict at some point. Yet Hitler’s calculations about when and how to do so—namely, by invading Poland in 1939—were strongly influenced by fears of imminent decline. Due to rapid rearmament, the Germany economy was overheating by 1938-39, creating concerns that Berlin’s relative economic power would soon fade absent additional conquests. Just as importantly, German officials believed that their early rearmament and the absorption of resources from Austria and Czechoslovakia had given them a critical military advantage over other European powers, but that this advantage would fade as those countries—and the United States—began mobilizing. It had become necessary “to begin immediately,” Hitler explained to Mussolini to following year, “even at the risk of thereby precipitating the war intended by the Western powers.”5 In the same vein, the sense that the future would only be worse—that Germany had reached the apex of its power, that it must act boldly while it still could—underpinned the decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. As Timothy Snyder has argued, Hitler believed that Germany had only a finite window to seize and colonize Soviet lands—thereby solving the Third Reich’s food supply problems and making it strategically invulnerable—before ongoing British resistance and America’s feared entry into the war began to undermine Berlin’s position.6 Japan, too, was likely influenced by calculations of impending decline. The Japanese empire had been steadily expanding between 1931 and 1940, advancing toward dominance in the Asia-Pacific. But what ultimately provoked the Japanese to strike at America was the realization that the possibilities for attaining that dominance were fading. American rearmament, symbolized by the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940, was bound to vitiate Japanese military advantages. “Anyone who has seen the auto factories in Detroit and the oil fields in Texas knows that Japan lacks the national power for a naval race with America,” warned Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku.7 Likewise, the U.S. oil embargo of 1941 had the unintended effect of convincing Japanese leaders that they had to move quickly before they lost the economic wherewithal to wage war. Imperial Japan, like Nazi Germany, was an aggressive power with enormous ambitions; but its penchant for aggression grew strongest when it started to fear those aspirations might not be realized. This history has implications for understanding great-power rivalry today. Both Russia and China have broadened their geopolitical horizons in recent years; both are often thought of as rising or resurgent powers. Yet both Russia and China face the prospect—whether immediate or more distant—that their relative strength may ebb, a phenomenon that could make these countries more aggressive rather than less. The specter of decline surely haunts Vladimir Putin. Russia has compiled an impressive record of expansion over the past decade; it has achieved a significant military overmatch vis-à-vis NATO on the alliance’s eastern flank; it has attained a degree of global influence greater than that enjoyed by any government in Moscow since the 1980s. Yet Putin cannot be confident about Russia’s long-term trajectory. After all, Russia’s economic revival from the early 2000s onward was largely a function of high energy prices; the collapse of those prices after 2014 revealed the long-term weakness of an economy that is probably destined—absent another sustained period of high energy prices—to stagnate over time. Russia is already losing ground against its rivals: Its inflation-adjusted GDP declined from 2014 through 2017, while that of the United States increased by over $1 trillion.8 And although Russia’s demographic trajectory is no longer as catastrophic as it once was, population growth will be anemic at best and negative at worst in coming decades. These trends, combined with the impact of Western economic sanctions, are beginning to upset Putin’s plans for continued military modernization: Kremlin defense spending declined, perhaps by as much as 20 percent, from 2017 to 2018, as Russia also began to cut spending on key social programs and pensions. Finally, fear of political instability is omnipresent for Russian leaders, who must deal with separatist forces in the North Caucasus as well as dissent provoked by their own repression and policy incompetence. Putin surely understands that these challenges imperil his goals of reasserting Russian dominance within the near abroad and playing a pivotal role in a more multipolar world—which is precisely what makes his statecraft so dangerous. Putin has already established a reputation as a risk-taker who uses bold strokes to compensate for Russia’s limited resource base. His method is to know what he wants and to catch stronger adversaries napping. (That tendency has only become more pronounced in recent years as Russia’s economic prosperity has faded and Putin’s domestic popularity has begun to wane.) He has argued that Russia requires authoritarian rule to be influential abroad; he has promised the Russian populace that the hardships it has endured will be rewarded by greater global stature. “Enormous sacrifices and privations on the part of our people,” he has declared, are the cost of “occupying a major place in world affairs.”9 If Putin perceives that he has only limited time to deliver on these promises, if he senses that the opportunity to redress his longstanding grievances against the West is slipping away, the effect may be to encourage still greater risk-taking. Russian risk-taking could take varied forms: more aggressive behavior in a crisis with NATO in the Baltic or Black Sea regions, perhaps aimed at discrediting NATO’s Article 5 guarantee; a more confrontational posture with respect to America and its partners in Syria or another Middle Eastern hotspot; intensified Russian efforts to disrupt U.S. and European electoral processes; more damaging cyberattacks on critical Western infrastructure; efforts to stir up additional “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet space; a stronger propensity for escalation—perhaps involving limited use of nuclear weapons—should conflict between Moscow and Washington break out. Whatever the specifics, Washington could find itself facing a competitor with a “now-or-never” mentality—always a dangerous mindset for an authoritarian, revisionist state to have. By contrast, the Chinese leadership still seems to have a “time is on our side” mindset. Even as Beijing’s energy and assertiveness have surged, Chinese leaders have proven less risk-acceptant than their Russian counterparts. They have remained satisfied to advance China’s aims through small, incremental steps—such as island-building and coercion in the South China Sea—rather than dramatic, aggressive lunges. Yet even Chinese leaders cannot be confident that the country’s upward trajectory will continue unbroken for very much longer. In a geopolitical sense, Chinese officials must worry about whether the country’s window is opening or closing with respect to issues like Taiwan. For while China has greater military capability than ever before to pursue reunification through forcible means, Taiwanese support for peaceful unification is at rock-bottom levels, the development of a distinctive Taiwanese national identify becomes more unmistakable every year, and the political pendulum in Taipei is clearly swinging away toward greater resistance to Chinese pressure. There are also warning lights flashing—perhaps flashing in the distance, but flashing nonetheless—when it comes to the fundamentals of Chinese power. Economic growth has been broadly declining for at least a decade (although it may have ticked upward slightly last year), according to official government estimates that are almost certainly inflated. China suffers from astronomic debt levels and has seen dizzying volatility in its stock market, both of which may be precursors to bigger economic troubles ahead. The demographic problems China confronts are even more severe than Russia’s: The rapid aging of the population will strain social spending, inhibit growth, and confront Chinese leaders with sharper guns-versus-butter trade-offs. Beneath the façade of stability imposed by increasingly repressive governance, moreover, dissatisfaction with a corrupt and autocratic elite is increasing: Chinese officials stopped publicly reporting the number of “mass incidents” in 2005, but the frequency of such incidents is widely believed to be rising. If the drastic domestic security measures taken in areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet are any indication, major sections of the country seem to be seething with discontent. Add in the fact that China’s behavior is stirring greater fears not just in Washington but throughout the Asia-Pacific and beyond, and Beijing may soon find itself dealing with greater geopolitical pushback, including the development of military capabilities designed specifically to neutralize the leverage provided by China’s own build-up. As unlikely as it may seem right now, it is entirely possible that sometime in the next decade or two, Chinese leaders may have to face a future that is not so bright and shining as seems the case now. When this happens, will Beijing become more or less aggressive on the global stage? The answer may well be “more.” Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders have been promising that the nation is on the verge of achieving national rejuvenation, that it can now take center stage in world affairs. The regime has assiduously stoked Chinese nationalism; it has staked out inflexible positions on maritime disputes and other issues; it has even begun to issue soft deadlines for reunification with Taiwan. It has done so on the assumption that the continued growth of national power will enable Beijing to make good on its pledges and back up its demands. If that assumption does not hold, if the “Chinese Dream” begins to elude its dreamers, Chinese leaders may be tempted to take more dramatic steps rather than admitting that they cannot deliver. In these circumstances, an attempt to retake Taiwan by force or coercion, to teach Japan a lesson in the East China Sea, to break Vietnamese or Filipino resistance in the South China Sea, or to rupture America’s alliance system in the Asia-Pacific would still be highly dangerous. But these initiatives might come to seem more attractive than simply remaining passive while Beijing’s relative power fades. Robert Kaplan has put it aptly: If a confident China has been pursuing a “methodical, well-developed” strategy of revisionism, an insecure China could shift to “daring, reactive, and impulsive behavior.”10 Limiting the damage done to U.S. interests by a rising China will be a test of epic dimensions for American policymakers. But the moment of peak danger in the relationship may actually come when China starts to fade from its own wishful trajectory.

#### Hegemonic decline in favor of other powers is stable and maintains the present international system, Ikenberry 18’

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In this essay I look at the evolving encounters between rising states and the post-war Western international order. My starting point is the classic “power transition” perspective. Power transition theories see a tight link between international order—its emergence, stability, and decline—and the rise and fall of great powers. It is a perspective that sees history as a sequence of cycles in which powerful or hegemonic states rise up and build order and dominate the global system until their power declines, leading to a new cycle of crisis and order building. In contrast, I offer a more evolutionary perspective, emphasizing the lineages and continuities in modern international order. More specifically, I argue that although America’s hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal international characteristics of order—openness, rules, multilateral cooperation—are deeply rooted and likely to persist. This is true even though the orientation and actions of the Trump administration have raised serious questions about the U.S. commitment to liberal internationalism. Just as importantly, rising states (led by China) are not engaged in a frontal attack on the American-led order. While struggles do exist over orientations, agendas, and leadership, the non-Western developing countries remain tied to the architecture and principles of a liberal-oriented global order. And even as China seeks in various ways to build rival regional institutions, there are stubborn limits on what it can do. Power Transitions and International Order There is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a long-term global power transition. Wealth and power is diffusing, spreading outward and away from Europe and the United States. The rapid growth that marked the non-Western rising states in the last decade may have ended, and even China’s rapid economic ascendency has slowed. But the overall pattern of change remains: the “rest” are gaining ground on the “West.” While there is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a global power transition, there is less agreement on the consequences of power shifts for international order. The classic view is advanced by realist scholars, such as E. H. Carr, Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and William Wohlforth, who make sweeping arguments about power and order. These hegemonic realists argue that international order is a by-product of the concentration of power. Order is created by a powerful state, and when that state declines and power diffuses, international order weakens or breaks apart. Out of these dynamic circumstances, a rising state emerges as the new dominant state, and it seeks to reorganize the international system to suit its own purposes. In this view, world politics from ancient times to the modern era can be seen as a series of repeated cycles of rise and decline. War, protectionism, depression, political upheaval—various sorts of crises and disruptions may push the cycle forward. This narrative of hegemonic rise and decline draws on the European and, more broadly, Western experience. Since the early modern era, Europe has been organized and reorganized by a succession of leading states and would-be hegemons: the Spanish Hapsburgs, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and post-Bismarck Germany. The logic of hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica, the nineteenth-century hegemonic order based on British naval and mercantile dominance. The decline of Britain was followed by decades of war and economic instability, which ended only with the rise of Pax Americana. For hegemonic realists, the debate today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war order? Are we in the midst of a hegemonic crisis and the breakdown of the old order? And are rising states, led by China, beginning to step forward in efforts to establish their own hegemonic dominance of their regions and the world? These are the lurking questions of the power transition perspective. But does this vision of power transition truly illuminate the struggles going on today over international order? Some might argue no—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic leadership. Here one would note that there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order. Far-flung security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain intact. But there may be even deeper sources of why the liberal world order will survive. continuity in the existing system. This would be true if the existence of a liberal-oriented international order does not in fact require hegemonic domination. It might be that the power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing post-war international order does not depend on the concentration of American power. In fact, international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power. The rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power. This is true in two respects. First, international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state. International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions. There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are governing institutions, starting with the United Nations. There is a sprawling array of international institutions, regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth. These governing arrangements cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations. Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise, they do not simply confront an American-led order; they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced. By separating “American hegemony” from “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of relationships. The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states. The United States embraces many of the core global rules and institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization. But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements. China also embraces many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others. Generally speaking, the more fundamental or core the norms and institutions are—beginning with the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and the United Nations system—the more agreement there is between the United States and China as well as other states. Disagreements are most salient where human rights and political principles are in play, such as in the Responsibility to Protect. Second, there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the international order. The struggles over international order take many different forms. In some instances, what rising states want is more influence and control of territory and geopolitical space beyond their borders. One can see this in China’s efforts to expand its maritime and political influence in the South China Sea and other neighboring areas. This is an age-old type of struggle captured in realist accounts of security competition and geopolitical rivalry. Another type of struggle is over the norms and values that are enshrined in global governance rules and institutions. These may be about how open and rule-based the system should be. They may also be about the way human rights and political principles are defined and brought to bear in relations among states. Finally, the struggles over international order may be focused on the distribution of authority. That is, rising states may seek a greater role in the governance of existing institutions. This is a struggle over the position of states within the global political hierarchy: voting shares, leadership rights, and authority relations. These observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power transition. Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order. The international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and institutions and not others. Moreover, stepping back, the international orders that rising states have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order. The British-led order that Germany faced at the turn of the twentieth century is different from the international order that China faces today. The contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past orders. It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms. There are also both regional and global domains of governance. This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and institutions. Rather than a cyclical dynamic of rise and decline, change in the existing American-led order might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation. The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony. Sources of Continuity in Liberal International Order If the liberal international order endures, it will be because it is based on more than American hegemonic order. To be sure, the United States did give shape to a distinctive post-war liberal hegemonic system, and many of its features— including the American-led alliance system and multilateral economic governance arrangements—are themselves quite durable. But the broader features of the modern international order are the result of centuries of struggle over its organizing principles and institutions. Rising states face an international order that is long in the making, one that presents these non-Western developing states with opportunities as well as constraints. The struggles over the existing international order will reshape the rules and institutions in the existing system in various ways. But rising states are not simply or primarily “revisionist” states seeking to overturn the order; rather, they are seeking greater access and authority over its operation. Indeed, the order creates as many safeguards and protections for rising states as it creates obstacles and constraints. For example, the World Trade Organization provides rules and mechanisms for rising states to dispute trade discrimination and protect access to markets. After all, more generally, it was this liberal-oriented international order—its openness and rules—that provided the conditions for China and other rising states to rise. Indeed, if the liberal international order survives, it will be in large part due to the fact that the constituencies for such an order that stretch across the Western and the non-Western worlds are larger than the constituencies that oppose it. We can look more closely at these sources of continuity and constituency. Long-Term Ordering Projects The existing international order is not just the product of American power but of two long-term internationalist projects. One is what can be called the Westphalian project. Beginning in the seventeenth century and continuing through to the present, European states—and later the wider world—have struggled to create and expand the rules and institutions of the sovereign state system. The Peace of Westphalia of  is widely seen as a watershed moment when norms of state sovereignty were put at the center of an evolving European political order. The founding principles of the Westphalian system—sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonintervention—reflected an emerging consensus that states were the rightful political units for the establishment of legitimate rule. Over the centuries other norms and principles, such as self-determination and nondiscrimination, were added and elaborated within the evolving Westphalian system. The post-war settlements of , , , and  provided historical moments when these organizing ideas were hammered out. Westphalian norms of sovereignty were originally only a European project, but in the twentieth century they went global. Under the banner of sovereignty and self-determination, political movements for decolonization and independence were set in motion in the non-Western developing world. Westphalian norms have been violated and ignored at times, but they have been the most salient and agreed upon rules and principles of international order in the modern era. “The genius of the Westphalian system, and the reason it spread across the world,” as Henry Kissinger argues, “was that its provisions were procedural, not substantive.” If a state agreed to the basic rules of the Westphalian system, “it could be recognized as an international citizen able to maintain its own culture, politics, religion, and internal policies, shielded by the international system from outside intervention.”  The Westphalian state system was European in origin, but within its organizational logic were inchoate universal ideas that were seized upon by other peoples and societies around the world. It was this globalizing Westphalian system that provided the foundation for the liberal international project. Fundamentally, the liberal project has entailed efforts by liberal great powers to orient world politics in the direction of openness and at least loosely rule-based relations. Beyond this, the liberal project has had a diversity of visions and agendas, including open markets, multilateral institutions, cooperative security, shared sovereignty, and the rule of law. In the nineteenth century the liberal project was manifest in Britain’s championing of free trade and freedom of the seas. The emerging Western liberal democracies pursued various sorts of “internationalisms” in areas such as commerce, law, war and peace, and social justice. In the twentieth century the liberal project was pushed forward by the United States and its partners after the two world wars. After World War II the American architects of post-war order, drawing lessons from the Wilsonian failure and incorporating ideas from the New Deal period, also advanced more ambitious ideas about economic and political cooperation embodied in the Bretton Woods institutions. As the cold war unfolded, in both security and economic realms, the United States found itself taking on new commitments and functional roles. Its own economic and political system became, in effect, the central component of the larger liberal hegemonic order. why the liberal world order will survive Both projects—the Westphalian and liberal internationalist—were founded on ideas that were implicitly universal in their normative and legal-political scope. The struggles and upheavals of the twentieth century, most notably the collapse and defeat of the great empires and the spread of nationalism and de-colonialization movements, pushed and pulled these ideas outward. Liberal internationalism across the last two centuries has been premised on a stable system of states. Wilsonian-era liberal internationalism coopted Westphalian notions of sovereignty and self-determination, even if Wilson himself did not fully acknowledge nationalist aspirations outside the West. Roosevelt-era liberal internationalism went further and sought to empower states to pursue progressive goals of social and economic rights and protections. To be sure, some strands of liberal internationalism—particularly the recent norm of Responsibility to Protect—argue for abridgements of sovereignty, giving the international community rights and obligations to intervene in societies to protect lives. But the great expanse of Westphalian and liberal international rules and norms are deeply embedded in a widely agreed upon vision of the modern foundations of world politics. Rising states are operating within this broad framework of ordering rules and institutions. Self-Reinforcing Characteristics of Liberal International Order The United States has dominated the post-war international order. It is an order built on asymmetries of power; it is hierarchical. But it is not an imperial system. It is a complex and multilayered political formation with liberal characteristics— openness and rules-based principles—that generate incentives and opportunities for other states to join and operate within it. Four characteristics reinforce and draw states into the order. First, it has integrative tendencies. Over the last century states with diverse characteristics have found pathways into its “ecosystem” of rules and institutions. Germany and Japan found roles and positions of authority in the post-war order; and after the cold war many more states—in Eastern Europe, Asia, and elsewhere—have joined its economic and security partnerships. It is the multilateral logic of the order that makes it relatively easy for states to join and rise up within the order. Second, the liberal order offers opportunities for leadership and shared authority. One state does not “rule” the system. The system is built around institutions, and this provides opportunities for shifting and expanding coalitions of states to share leadership. Formal institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, are led by boards of directors and weighted voting. Informal groups, such as the G- and G-, are built on principles of collective governance. Third, the actual economic gains from participation within the liberal order are widely shared. In colonial and informal imperial systems, the gains from trade and investment are disproportionately enjoyed by the lead state. In the existing order, the “profits of modernity” are distributed across the system. Indeed, China’s great economic ascent was only possible because the liberal international order rewarded its pursuit of openness and trade-oriented growth. For the same reason, states in all regions of the world have made systematic efforts to integrate into the system. Finally, the liberal international order accommodates a diversity of models and strategies of growth and development. In recent decades the Anglo-American model of neoliberalism has been particularly salient. But the post-war system also provides space for other capitalist models, such as those associated with European social democracy and East Asian developmental statism. The global capitalist system might generate some pressures for convergence, but it also provides space for the coexistence of alternative models and ideologies. These aspects of the liberal international order create incentives and opportunities for states to integrate into its core economic and political realms. The order allows states to share in its economic spoils. Its pluralistic character creates possibilities for states to “work the system”—to join in, negotiate, and maneuver in ways that advance their interests. This, in turn, creates an order with expanding constituencies that have a stake in its continuation. Compared to imperial and colonial orders of the past, the existing order is easy to join and hard to overturn. What Rising States Want The liberal international order was built by the Western liberal democracies, but its basic features do not exclusively advance the interests of these countries. In fact, as China and other non-Western developing states rise, they have already demonstrated a growing interest in the perpetuation of some sort of open and multilateral global system. These countries may not want Western dominance of global institutions, but they want the West’s rules and organizational principles. These rising states certainly want an open world economy. They want access to other countries for trade, investment, and technology. It is their outward-oriented development strategies that have propelled them forward. The ascent of these countries began in the late s with broad-gauged reform efforts. Countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey broke with their closed, authoritarian pasts and moved toward more reform-oriented and accountable governments. Together with China, these countries opened up to the world economy. As Ted Piccone argues, they all “entered the global marketplace through an increasing reliance on international trade, migration, remittances, energy, and foreign investment flows.”  This liberalization and economic openness has come along with a mix of nationalist and populist appeals, and ideological critiques of Western neoliberalism. More generally, however, these rising states see their prospects for growth and advancement to be tied to engagement with and integration into a reformed and open world economy. The rising non-Western states also have an interest in the preservation—and perhaps the expansion—of a rules-based international system. A multilateral system of rules and institutions offers rising states some measure of protection and equal treatment. As John Ruggie argues, multilateralism is an “institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions.”  Multilateralism gives relations among states a rule-based character. The more rule-based the order is, the less it is subject to the straightforward domination of powerful states. This sort of system of governance should be attractive to weak and peripheral states. So, too, as rising states gain in wealth and standing, they will want a rule-based system to protect their gains. One fear of these states is that they will face discrimination and marginalization. In the trade area, for example, the World Trade Organization is attractive to rising states because of its multilateral principle of equal and most-favored nation treatment. For these reasons, rising states have incentives to be stakeholders in some sort of updated and reformed liberal international order. As Miles Kahler argues, Brazil, China, and India have shown themselves to be the “conservative globalizers.” None is directly allied with the United States, yet each has made “large bets on opening its economy and breaking with a more autocratic past”; and along the way their “populations have endorsed the benefits of trade and foreign investment, providing a political base for this turn to the global economy.”  Rising states want predictable and fair-minded access to and treatment within an open global system. They resist the political domination of existing global institutions by Western powers. But the remedy for this problem is actually the deepening of the foundations of an open and rule-based order, not its destruction Competitive Order Building Even if we were to assume that China, as the leading non-Western state, wanted to undermine and replace the existing liberal international order, the constraints on doing so are overwhelming. Presumably, an alternative order would be less open and less rule-based. Historically, such orders have been organized into various illiberal political formations: regional groupings, imperial zones, spheres of influence, and closed autarkic blocs. How might China and other rising states build a comprehensive alternative to the existing order? As a start, China would need to be able to come forward with some alternative set of rules and institutions, presumably reflecting an alternative model of political and economic organization. This might be a so-called “Beijing Consensus,” an international order that accommodated (and even promoted) illiberal and authoritarian polities and statist economic relations. China does have its own statist approach, but it is not clear how this approach might work as a wider model of global order. First, China’s mercantilist strategy seems to work best when the rest of the world is relatively open and liberal in orientation. A closed world in which great powers carve out spheres of influence cuts off China from markets and investment opportunities. If all the countries of the world adopted the Chinese model, this would restrict China’s market space and leadership opportunities. Second, a Chinese-led illiberal international order would require some buy-in by other states, and this is also problematic. China is the largest and leading non-Western developing country, but it is the only rising state that is genuinely illiberal and authoritarian. It is not clear that Brazil, India, South Africa, or even Turkey is eager to embrace and operate within a Beijing consensus. If China were to try to promulgate a Sino-centered order—a hegemonic/imperial order that did not immediately rest on the consent and cooperation of other states—it would face very steep costs. If these potential partner states did not experience substantial material benefits from participating in the Chinese-led order, China would need to spend resources to entice and bully these states into cooperation. This would be a very huge task for a developing country with mid-range per capita income. Over the longer term, the success of a Chinese-centered order would depend on its ability to “outcompete” liberal internationalism. But the less the rival order is open and negotiated, and the less that China—as a rival hegemon —is willing to exercise restraint and provide public goods, the greater the difficulty it will have in establishing a viable and legitimate alternative. Conclusion China and other rising states have growing opportunities to shape the rules and institutions of the existing system. But it is very unlikely that they will do so as part of a “power transition” moment, that is, a dramatic moment when the old order is overturned and rising states step forward to build a new one. In the past such moments tended to come after destructive great-power wars; but in an age of nuclear weapons, great-power wars are less likely, and so the geopolitical opportunities to “start from scratch” do not (and will not) exist. At the same time, the rising states are already deeply embedded in the existing modern international order. Their “rise” has been made possible by the openness and loosely rule-based character of the post-war system. Seen in this light, it might actually be the rising states that become the new constituencies for liberal internationalism, while support in the old Western industrial democracies wanes. This would be ironic. After all, these non-Western states were not “present at the creation” of the post-war liberal order. A hint of this possibility emerged in January  at the World Economic Forum in Davos, where Chinese President Xi offered a full-throated defense of the open, multilateral trade system, while in Washington, President Trump threatened to pull back from various regional trade agreements. Either way, whether it is the West or the rest that poses the greater challenge to the existing order, its basic elements will likely outlast American hegemony.

#### Small arsenals and tests prove no extinction

Frankel et al. 15 [Dr. Michael J. Frankel is a senior scientist at Penn State University’s Applied Research Laboratory, where he focuses on nuclear treaty verification technologies, is one of the nation’s leading experts on the effects of nuclear weapons, executive director of the Congressional Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, led development of fifteen-year global nuclear threat technology projections and infrastructure vulnerability assessments; Dr. James Scouras is a national security studies fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and the former chief scientist of DTRA’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office; Dr. George W. Ullrich is chief technology officer at Schafer Corporation and formerly senior vice president at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), currently serves as a special advisor to the USSTRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group’s Science and Technology Panel and is a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. 04-15-15. “The Uncertain Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use.” The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. DTIC. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a618999.pdf>] Justin

Scientific work based on real data, rather than models, also cast additional doubt on the basic premise. Interestingly, publication of several contradictory papers describing experimental observations actually predated Schell’s work. In 1973, nine years before publication of The Fate of the Earth, a published report failed to find any ozone depletion during the peak period of atmospheric nuclear testing.26 In another work published in 1976, attempts to measure the actual ozone depletion associated with Russian megaton-class detonations and Chinese nuclear tests were also unable to detect any significant effect.27 At present, with the reduced arsenals and a perceived low likelihood of a large-scale exchange on the scale of Cold War planning scenarios, official concern over nuclear ozone depletion has essentially fallen off the table. Yet continuing scientific studies by a small dedicated community of researchers suggest the potential for dire consequences, even for relatively small regional nuclear wars involving Hiroshimasize bombs. Nuclear Winter The possibility of catastrophic climate changes came as yet another surprise to Department of Defense scientists. In 1982, Crutzen and Birks highlighted the potential effects of high-altitude smoke on climate,29 and in 1983, a research team consisting of Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollack, and Sagan (referred to as TTAPS) suggested that a five-thousand-megaton strategic exchange of weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively spell national suicide for both belligerents.30 They argued that a massive nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would inject copious amounts of soot, generated by massive firestorms such as those witnessed in Hiroshima, into the stratosphere where it might reside indefinitely. Additionally, the soot would be accompanied by dust swept up in the rising thermal column of the nuclear fireball. The combination of dust and soot could scatter and absorb sunlight to such an extent that much of Earth would be engulfed in darkness sufficient to cease photosynthesis. Unable to sustain agriculture for an extended period of time, much of the planet’s population would be doomed to perish, and—in its most extreme rendition—humanity would follow the dinosaurs into extinction and by much the same mechanism.31 Subsequent refinements by the TTAPS authors, such as an extension of computational efforts to three-dimensional models, continued to produce qualitatively similar results. The TTAPS results were severely criticized, and a lively debate ensued between passionate critics of and defenders of the analysis. Some of the technical objections critics raised included the TTAPS team’s neglect of the potentially significant role of clouds;32 lack of an accurate model of coagulation and rainout;33 inaccurate capture of feedback mechanisms;34 “fudge factor” fits of micrometer-scale physical processes assumed to hold constant for changed atmospheric chemistry conditions and uniformly averaged on a grid scale of hundreds of kilometers;35 the dynamics of firestorm formation, rise, and smoke injection;36 and estimates of the optical properties and total amount of fuel available to generate the assumed smoke loading. In particular, more careful analysis of the range of uncertainties associated with the widely varying published estimates of fuel quantities and properties suggested a possible range of outcomes encompassing much milder impacts than anything predicted by TTAPS.37 Aside from the technical issues critics raised, the five-thousand-megaton baseline exchange scenario TTAPS envisioned was rendered obsolete when the major powers decreased both their nuclear arsenals and the average yield of the remaining weapons. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the nuclear winter issue essentially fell off the radar screen for Department of Defense scientists, which is not to say that it completely disappeared from the scientific literature. In the last few years, a number of analysts, including some of the original TTAPS authors, suggested that even a “modest” regional exchange of nuclear weapons—one hundred explosions of fifteenkiloton devices in an Indian–Pakistani exchange scenario—might yet produce significant worldwide climate effects, if not the full-blown “winter.”38 However, such concerns have failed to gain much traction in Department of Defense circles.

#### Empirics – we’ve nuked ourselves 2,000 times and the largest event was only 1/1000th as powerful as natural disasters

Eken 17 [Mattias Eken - PhD student in Modern History at the University of St Andrews. “The understandable fear of nuclear weapons doesn’t match reality”. 3/14/17. <https://theconversation.com/the-understandable-fear-of-nuclear-weapons-doesnt-match-reality-73563>] // Re-Cut Justin

Nuclear weapons are unambiguously the most destructive weapons on the planet. Pound for pound, they are the most lethal weapons ever created, capable of killing millions. Millions live in fear that these weapons will be used again, with all the potential consequences. However, the destructive power of these weapons **has been vastly exaggerated**, albeit for good reasons. Public fear of nuclear weapons being used in anger, whether by terrorists or nuclear-armed nations, has risen once again in recent years. **This is** in no small part **thanks to the current political climate** between states such as the US and Russia and the various nuclear tests conducted by North Korea. But whenever we talk about nuclear weapons, it’s easy to get carried away with doomsday scenarios and apocalyptic language. As the historian Spencer Weart once argued: “**You say ‘nuclear bomb’ and everybody immediately thinks of the end of the world.**” Yet the means necessary to produce a nuclear bomb, let alone set one off, remain incredibly complex – and while the damage that would be done if someone did in fact detonate one might be very serious indeed, **the chances that it would mean “the end of the world” are vanishingly small**. In his 2013 book Command and Control, the author Eric Schlosser tried to scare us into perpetual fear of nuclear weapons by recounting stories of near misses and accidents involving nuclear weapons. One such event, the 1980 Damascus incident, saw a Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile explode at its remote Arkansas launch facility after a maintenance crew accidentally ruptured its fuel tank. Although the warhead involved in the incident didn’t detonate, Schlosser claims that “if it had, much of Arkansas would be gone”. But that’s not quite the case. The nine-megaton thermonuclear warhead on the **Titan II** missile had a blast radius of 10km, or an area of about 315km². The state of Arkansas spreads over 133,733km², meaning the weapon **would have caused destruction across 0.2% of the state.** That would naturally have been a terrible outcome, but certainly not the catastrophe that Schlosser evokes. Claims exaggerating the effects of nuclear weapons have become commonplace, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. In the early War on Terror years, Richard Lugar, a former US senator and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the Western way of life. What he failed to explain is how. It is by no means certain that a single nuclear detonation **(or even several)** would do away with our current way of life. Indeed, **we’re still here despite having nuked our own planet more than 2,000 times** – a tally expressed beautifully in this video by Japanese artist Isao Hashimoto). While the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty forced nuclear tests underground, **around 500 of** all **the nuclear weapons detonated were unleashed in the Earth’s atmosphere**. This includes the world’s largest ever nuclear detonation, the 57-megaton bomb known as **Tsar Bomba**, detonated by the Soviet Union on October 30 1961. Tsar Bomba was more than 3,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. That is immense destructive power – but as one physicist explained, **it’s only “one-thousandth the force of an earthquake, one-thousandth the force of a hurricane”.** The Damascus incident proved how incredibly hard it is to set off a nuclear bomb and the limited effect that would have come from just one warhead detonating. Despite this, some scientists have controversially argued that an even limited all-out nuclear war might lead to a so-called nuclear winter, since the smoke and debris created by very large bombs could block out the sun’s rays for a considerable amount of time. To inflict such ecological societal annihilation with weapons alone, we would have to detonate hundreds if not thousands of thermonuclear devices in a short time. Even in such extreme conditions, the area actually devastated by the bombs would be limited: for example, **2,000 one-megaton explosions with a destructive radius of five miles each would directly destroy less than 5% of the territory of the US**. Of course, if the effects of nuclear weapons have been greatly exaggerated, there is a very good reason: since these weapons are indeed extremely dangerous, any posturing and exaggerating which intensifies our fear of them makes us less likely to use them. But it’s important, however, to understand why people have come to fear these weapons the way we do. After all, nuclear weapons are here to stay; they can’t be “un-invented”. If we want to live with them and mitigate the very real risks they pose, we must be honest about what those risks really are. Overegging them to frighten ourselves more than we need to keeps nobody safe.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)