# R3 1N Barkley Forum

## 1

#### Space-Based Solar Power (SBSP) is a megaconstellation, and it’s going to happen within 10 years in the squo. Aff banning private megaconstellations kills the necessary tech – David 21:

David, Leonard. 11/03/21 Space Solar Power’s Time May Finally Be Coming.”https://www.space.com/space-solar-power-research-advances // LHP BT + LHP PS

The sun never sets in space. **The idea of** harvesting solar energyvia power-beaming satelliteshas therefore long intrigued researchers looking for ways to feed an energy-ravenous [Earth](https://www.space.com/54-earth-history-composition-and-atmosphere.html). That reflection has fomented for decades but is now garnering new looks all over the world: Technologists in the U.S. and China, experts in Japan and researchers within the European Space Agency and the United Kingdom Space Agency are all working to make space-based solar power a reality. Related: [Solar power stations in space could be the answer to our energy needs](https://www.space.com/solar-power-stations-in-space-could-be-the-answer-to-our-energy-needs.html) History machine Peter Glaser, the father of the solar power satellite concept. (Image credit: Arthur D. Little Inc.) The idea of wireless power transmission dates back to [Nikola Tesla](https://www.livescience.com/45950-nikola-tesla-biography.html) near the end of the 19th century. Fast-forwarding to 1968, the notion of a solar power satellite was detailed and patented by U.S. space pioneer Peter Glaser. He blueprinted a novel way to collect energy from sunlight using solar cells and beam down an energetic muscle of microwaves to receiving antennas ("rectennas") on Earth. Those microwaves could then be converted to electrical energy and supplied to the power grid. Then, in the mid-1970s, microwave power transmission experiments in the tens of kilowatts were successfully conducted at the Goldstone Deep Space Communications Complex in California, a facility of NASA's [Jet Propulsion Laboratory](https://www.space.com/16952-nasa-jet-propulsion-laboratory.html). And this "power trip" doesn't stop there.The Space Solar Power Incremental and Demonstrations Research (SSPIDR) project is designed to beam power from space to Earth. SSPIDR consists of several small-scale flight experiments that will mature technology needed to build a prototype solar power distribution system. (Image credit: Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)) Impressive **advances Over the past decade,** researchers have made impressive advances **that** increase **the** likelihood **that space solar power (**SSP**)** will be realized during the next decade, said John Mankins, president of Artemis Innovation Management Solutions of Santa Maria, California. His view: the longstanding vision for SSP as a sustainable energy alternative should be revisited in light of such recent advances.Bolstering that outlook is a set of key perspectives, Mankins told Space.com. "Climate change is really going to be a disaster. Nations are committed to go [carbon net-zero](https://www.livescience.com/climate-report-net-zero.html) … and they have no idea how to do it."**The** rapidly unfolding value of "NewSpace**" is also** reshaping the landscape of 21st century space activities**, he added. "Two of the biggest hurdles to the realization of SSP have always been the cost of launch and the cost of hardware**," said Mankins. "Add flight rate, and all of a sudden you're looking at numbers always talked about for solar power satellites."Related: [What is climate change?](https://www.livescience.com/climate-change.html) Megaconstellations **Another** recent change isthedawn of the megaconstellations, Mankins added. **That's** exemplified by SpaceX's [Starlink](https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellites.html) broadband network**, a** mass-production effort that now cranks out 30 tons of satellites a month**. SpaceX is on course to potentially manufacture 40,000 satellites within five years, and launch all of them. "The path to low-cost hardware has been shown," Mankins said. "It's modular and mass-produced. The hurdles of less-expensive launch and lowering hardware costs have been overcome.**"Mankins said that the economics of SSP concepts in the near term, within the next decade, have never been more viable. He flagged advances in space launch capabilities; progress in robotics for space assembly, maintenance and servicing systems; and the growth in various component technologies, such as high-efficiency solid state power amplifiers. **As a result, SSP is ready to see the light of day,** Mankins said.Astroelectricity An early entrant in focusing on understanding the energy policy needed and establishment of SSP is James Michael Snead, president of the Spacefaring Institute. He's adopted the use of the term "astroelectricity" to describe the transmitted electrical power produced by SSP systems.In looking at what he terms the "[coming age of astroelectricity](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5E-0NYnAaUA)," he sees a world needing a replacement for oil and natural gas, the two primary sources of energy currently maintaining an industrial standard of living. Snead envisions a world in the year 2100 where about 20% of electrical power comes from terrestrial nuclear and renewables, with 80% supplied by astroelectricity."Just as the military, economic and diplomatic control of Middle East oil has substantially influenced world events for the past 80 years, the control of space solar power platforms will come to dominate outer space activities this century," Snead told Space.com. Wanted: high-priority leadershipIf SSP becomes a reality later this century, Snead said, the U.S. military will be required to protect and defend these new sources of national energy security just as it guards oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf today."While some people are developing SSP concepts that would be launched from the Earth and autonomously assembled in geostationary Earth orbit, I do not see this as a successful proposition," said Snead. He believes that building the thousands of SSP platforms needed requires a substantial [space industrialization effort](https://www.space.com/nasa-low-earth-orbit-iss-commercialization.html) involving more than a million people in space by the end of the century. The starting point, Snead said, will be establishing the enabling "astrologistics" infrastructure operating throughout the Earth-moon system. He stressed that those astrologistics require high-priority U.S. Air Force — not [Space Force](https://www.space.com/42089-space-force.html) — leadership to draw upon nearly a century of human flight/operational logistics experience and expertise.That is necessary to manage industry's efforts to design and build the required new human spaceflight systems, with a clearly needed emphasis on safety and effectiveness, Snead said. As these new military astrologistics capabilities begin, Snead contends, commercialization of these capabilities will extend these safety and operational benefits to support the coming space industrial revolution needed to undertake SSP. "This is exactly what happened to enable U.S. airline manufacturers to dominate the airline and air cargo industry for decades. It is a successful model to now replicate in space — a model that neither NASA nor the U.S. Space Force can effectively execute," Snead said. The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory’s Paul Jaffe holds a module designed for space solar power investigations in front of a customized vacuum chamber used to test the device. (Image credit: NRL/Jamie Hartman) 'Performing like a champ' While new artwork, economic plots and conceptual SPS thinking and visions flow, there's an in-space technology experiment already underway. On its latest mission, which launched in May 2020, the Space Force's robotic [X-37B space plane](https://www.space.com/25275-x37b-space-plane.html) is toting the Photovoltaic Radio-frequency Antenna Module Flight Experiment (PRAM-FX), a Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) investigation into transforming solar power into radio-frequency microwave energy. The focus of that X-37B investigation is not establishing an actual power-beaming link, but more on appraising the performance of sunlight-to-microwave conversion. "It is performing like a champ," said Paul Jaffe, an NRL electronics engineer working on power beaming and solar power satellites. "We are getting data regularly, and that data is exceeding our expectations," he told Space.com. [PRAM-FX](https://www.space.com/x-37b-space-plane-solar-power-beaming) is principally made out of commercial parts, not "space-grade" hardware. "The fact that it is continuing to operate and give us positive results is quite encouraging," Jaffe said. Commercial parts are mass-produced, while many space-grade parts are one-offs. Solar power satellites, like those envisioned in high Earth orbit, would have thousands of elements made out of similar components being tested onboard the X-37B, Jaffe said. [The US Space Force's secretive X-37B space plane: 10 surprising facts](https://www.space.com/x-37b-military-space-plane-surprising-facts) Space-based solar power could help the UK achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, according to a leading British systems, engineering and technology company. (Image credit: Frazer-Nash Consultancy) Making the economics work There's much more work ahead, of course. "The big strike against space solar power has always been making the economics work. People who have looked at the idea seriously do understand that, from a physics standpoint, there is no reason you couldn't do it," Jaffe said. "With mass production of space hardware, and with the cost reduction of space access, it is more plausible that it could work," he added. "I would caution against excessive optimism … but also point out that things are changing. There are a lot of encouraging developments." SPS will assuredly be compared to a "levelized cost of energy" metric, Jaffe concluded. "There's just not enough data to come up with a levelized cost of energy basis for space solar power. It's premature. What you are seeing now is laying the foundation for that sort of evaluation." Clear, affordable path To that end, Mankins of Artemis Innovation Management Solutions has rolled out SPS-ALPHA ("Solar Power Satellite by means of Arbitrarily Large Phased Array"), a design he showcased at the 72nd International Astronautical Congress, which was held from Oct. 25 to Oct. 29 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Detailing a business model and step-by-step SSP roadmap, he feels the concept promises a clear, affordable path to deploying a critically needed new energy option. "**I believe you could have operational solar power satellites to scale within a decade,"** Mankins said. That possibility, combined with the fact that multiple nations are eying SSP as a promising power generation system of the future, begs a question: Is there a solar power satellite race afoot? It is close to that, Mankins said. "I think it has to be cooperation among friends and allies. But I think it's very likely to end up being competition with China. The longer we wait with regard to the urgency of policies on [climate change](https://www.space.com/climate-change-dimming-earth), the more likely it is we're going to miss the boat." Mankins is a 26-year veteran of assessing SSP and the technologies required. "The moment has come," he said. "I think the right answer is really clear: We need to just go do it."

#### SBSP key to solve climate change – Katete 21 :

Katete, Esthere. (December 17 2021) “Space-Based Solar Power: The Future Source of Energy?”https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2020/02/space-based-solar-power // LHP BT + LHP PS

Space-based solar power (SBSP) involves collecting the sun’s energy in space, and then wirelessly transmitting it to Earth. There are several [advantages to solar energy](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2014/08/5-advantages-and-5-disadvantages-of-solar-energy). Although expensive, it **is** **a** great source of [clean energy](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/clean-energy) that has the capacity to provide more energythan the world consumes **or is predicted to consume in the future**. A space-based solar power technological process includes using [solar panels](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/solar-energy/solar-panels) to collect solar energy in space with reflectors or inflatable mirrors that direct solar radiation onto solar panels, and then beaming it on Earth through a microwave or laser. The energy is then received on Earth via a microwave antenna (a rectenna). **According to the** [**National Space Society**](https://space.nss.org/space-solar-power/)**,** space-based solar power **has the** potential to dwarf all the other sources of energy combined**. They argue that space-based solar power can provide large quantities of energy** with very little negative environmental impact**. It can also** solve our current energy and greenhouse gas emissions problems**.** The infographic below highlights information about space-based solar power, current related trends, and what different countries are doing in terms of research and funding. Current Global Energy Consumption and Trends **The** world’s energy consumption is only growing. According to a report by the University of Oxford’s Our World in Data, on the global primary energy consumption, the current world consumption is over 160,000 TWh annually. Solar energy contributes only 585 TWh. Although there is an increase in renewable energy solutions, investments, and usage, oil, coal, and gas still generate more than 80% of the global energy that is consumed - with solar energy generating less than 1%. Between 2004 and 2015, investments in renewable energy increased by 600% from £36.2 billion (US$46.7 billion) to £220.6 billion (US$284.8 billion). Current predictions indicate that the world population will reach [9.7 billion by 2050](https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/world-population-prospects-2019.html). With the increase in population, the world energy consumption is also predicted to grow by 50% by 2050. In addition, climate change impacts are accelerating. Although we generate a big percentage of the world energy from fossil fuels, fossil fuels contribute significantly to the increase of climate change. **Comparatively,** solar energy is the [safest source of energy](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2020/02/Safest-source-of-energy.png) today - though it still only contributes a small percentage of the global energy production. The death rates from solar production are 1,230 times lower than coal, and it has one of the lowest CO2 emissions, at 5g CO2 eq per kWh. Why Space-Based Solar Power? Space-based solar power has several benefits; unlike solar panels on our roofs that can only generate electricity during the day, space-based solar power can generate continuous electricity, 24 hours a day, 99% of the year. This is because, unlike Earth, the space environment does not have night and day, and the satellites are in the Earth's shadow for only a maximum of 72 minutes per night. **Space-based solar panels can generate** 2,000 gigawatts of power constantly. This is **40 times more energy than a solar panel would generate on Earth annually**. This is also several folds higher than the [efficiency of solar panels](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2014/11/how-efficient-are-solar-panels) today. **What’s more, is that space-based** solar power would generate [0% greenhouse gas emissions](https://space.nss.org/space-solar-power/) unlike other alternatives **energy like nuclear, coal, oil, gas, and ethanol**. The current source of energy that generates the lowest CO2 is nuclear power, which generates CO2 of 5g CO2 eq per kWh. **Space-based solar power** generates almost 0% hazardous waste to our environment **compared to nuclear power**. Why Are We Not There Yet? While space-based solar power is an innovative concept, we are not able to fully launch a system into space yet. Launching a space-based solar system is very expensive. In fact, the cost is estimated to be about 100 times too high to compete with current utility costs. One of the causes of the high costs is the high cost of launching the panels to space, which is mostly due to the high mass per watt generated by the current solar panels. In other words, the solar panels are currently too heavy per watt generated to make it feasible. Currently, the cost of launching in space is estimated to be £7,716 per kilogram - approximately £154 per watt. In comparison to the cost that homeowners pay today, which is approximately £2 per watt peak, the cost in space is extremely high to be competitive. In UK homes, the [installation cost of solar panels](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2014/08/what-is-the-installation-cost-for-solar-panels) can be as low as £1.5 per watt. Other reasons for high costs include the overall high transport costs to space. This is because transporting all other materials that are needed to space would require many space shuttle launches, and these space shuttles are currently not reusable. So, not only is the launch of solar panels themselves expensive, but the additional materials needing to be transported is also expensive. A lot of research and engineering is still ongoing to find the most feasible way to launch space-based solar panels and launch systems, at a lower cost. The environment out in space also has several hazards that could cause damage to the solar panels. These include space debris and extreme solar radiation, which could degrade the solar panels up to 8 times faster than panels installed on Earth. Finally, there is a potential of wasting large amounts of energy when transporting or during transmission from space to Earth. Therefore, scientists and engineers must continue their R&D efforts to ensure little to no energy is lost during the process. Current SBSP Projects and Progress The key players in SBSP include China, the US, and Japan, who have shown progress in terms of technology advancements, partnerships, and launch plans. China is already progressing to launch into space. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation plans to launch small to medium solar satellites in the stratosphere that can harness energy in space between 2021 and 2025. China also plans to generate one megawatt of energy from space-based solar panels by 2030, and to be operating a commercially viable solar space station by 2050. In the US, there are ongoing partnerships and investments. For example, a $100 million partnership between Northrop Grumman and U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory has been established to provide advanced technology for SBSP. Also in the US, a $17.5 million collaboration between Northrop Grumman Corporation and Caltech was set up to develop the space solar power project called ‘The Space Solar Power Initiative’. The initiative’s goal was to develop scientific and technological innovations that would enable a space-based solar power system generate electricity at a cost comparable to current sources of electricity. There has been ongoing research and technological advancements. In the US, the development of the SPS-ALPHA Mark-II concept is underway. This, if successful, would enable construction of huge platforms in space that can remotely deliver tens of thousands of megawatts of electricity to Earth, using wireless power transmissions. This will also enable delivery of affordable power to Earth and on space missions. In addition, progress is being made to build reusable launch systems. Success in this will lower the cost of transport to space and overall cost of space-based solar power. An example is SpaceX, that is currently working on reusable launch vehicles that can be used for transport to space. In Japan, researchers successfully transmitted electric power wirelessly using microwaves. Researchers transformed 1.8 kW of electric power into microwaves and accurately transmitted it into a receiver that was 55 metres away. This was a technological advancement towards bringing SBSP closer to reality. Japan also made space-based solar systems part of its future space exploration vision. Future Outlook for SBSP Fossil fuels are finite and can eventually run out. According to predictions, oil and natural gas could run out in 50 years and coal production in 115 years. With ongoing research and investments, there is a high possibility that space-based solar power is the viable [future of solar power](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2015/01/the-future-for-solar-power-in-the-uk). If the cost of space-based solar power can be lowered, it is likely to be a major source of sustainable energy that cannot diminish. Major players like China, who already have timelines of implementing the technology in space, may be able to provide some key learnings for future improvements in the technology.

#### Warming causes extinction - Xu 17:

Yangyang Xu 17, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose **existential threats** to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and **species extinction**. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of **tipping points**. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as **abrupt and irreversible climate changes**, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has **catastrophic human health effects**. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose **existential risks to humans** and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses **existential threat** if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and **expose** as much as **90% of species to** the dangers of **extinction** (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of **existential threats**. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).

## 2

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

## 3

#### Pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable – to justify beyond that runs into moral incoherence. Moen 16,

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI // RCT by JPark

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well-being. Prefer additionally.

#### 1] Life is a prerequisite to value – stop death because it ontologically destroys the subject and is irreversible. And extinction hijacks and side constrains the framework.

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 2] Theory –

#### A] Ground – Every impact can be linked to util but other ethics exclude most impacts. Ground key to fairness since you need arguments to win.

#### B] Topic Lit – Most articles are written through the lens of util since they’re written for policymakers and the general public to understand who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors. Key to fairness and education since it’s a lens through which we engage the res.

#### 3] Use epistemic modesty for evaluating the framework debate – that’s multiplying the probability a framework is true by its relative offense

#### A] Substantively true since high probability of winning your framework increases the odds that your impacts matters, but that probability is still dependent of the impacts. A 51% chance your framework is true still means there is a 49% chance my impacts matter – modesty produces the highest chance of moral actions

#### B] Clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed

#### 4] Only consequences can explain degrees of wrongness, i.e. why it’s worse to break a promise to a dying friend than to skip meeting someone for lunch – either ethical theories cannot explain comparative badness, or it collapses

## Case

#### 1] Extinction outweighs –

#### A] Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible

#### B] Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### C] Moral obligation – allowing people to die is unethical and should be prevented because it creates ethics towards other people

#### D] Objectivity – body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### E] Moral uncertainty – if we’re unsure about which interpretation of the world is true – we ought to preserve the world to keep debating about it

#### 2] Only evaluate the net amount cap solved by the aff Filter the debate through scope of solvency—there’s no impact to root cause if they don’t solve it. Aff cannot overcome the sum total of capitalism– structural barriers that are outside the scope of resolution will always exist

#### 3] The Role of the ballot is to evaluate the consequences of the aff plan vs any competitive alternative or the status quo –

#### A] Ground

#### B] Apocalyptic images challenge dominant power structures – contest the implausibility that inequitable structures can produce catastrophe

Jessica Hurley 17, Assistant Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago, “Impossible Futures: Fictions of Risk in the Longue Durée”, Duke University Press, https://read.dukeupress.edu/american-literature/article/89/4/761/132823/Impossible-Futures-Fictions-of-Risk-in-the-Longue

If contemporary ecocriticism has a shared premise about environmental risk it is that genre is the key to both perceiving and, possibly, correcting ecological crisis. Frederick Buell’s 2003 From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century has established one of the most central oppositions of this paradigm. As his title suggests, Buell tells the story of a discourse that began in the apocalyptic mode in the 1960s and 70s, when discussions of “the immanent end of nature” most commonly took the form of “prophecy, revelation, climax, and extermination” before turning away from apocalypse when the prophesied ends failed to arrive (112, 78). Buell offers his suggestion for the appropriate literary mode for life lived within a crisis that is both unceasing and inescapable: new voices, “if wise enough….will abandon apocalypse for a sadder realism that looks closely at social and environmental changes in process and recognizes crisis as a place where people dwell” (202-3). In a world of threat, Buell demands a realism that might help us see risks more clearly and aid our survival.¶ Buell’s argument has become a broadly held view in contemporary risk theory and ecocriticism, overlapping fields in the social sciences and humanities that address the foundational question of second modernity: “how do you live when you are at such risk?” (Woodward 2009, 205).1 Such an assertion, however, assumes both that realism is a neutral descriptive practice and that apocalypse is not something that is happening now in places that we might not see, or cannot hear. This essay argues for the continuing importance of apocalyptic narrative forms in representations of environmental risk to disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the status quo. Taking the ecological disaster of nuclear waste as my case study, I examine two fictional treatments of nuclear waste dumps that create different temporal structures within which the colonial history of the United States plays out. The first, a set of Department of Energy documents that use statistical modeling and fictional description to predict a set of realistic futures for the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (1991), creates a present that is fully knowable and a future that is fully predictable. Such an approach, I suggest, perpetuates the state logics of implausibility that have long undergirded settler colonialism in the United States. In contrast, Leslie Marmon Silko’s contemporaneous novel Almanac of the Dead (1991) uses its apocalyptic form to deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude that undergird state realism, transforming nuclear waste into a prophecy of the end of the United States rather than a means for imagining its continuation. In Almanac of the Dead, the presence of nuclear waste introjects a deep-time perspective into contemporary America, transforming the present into a speculative space where environmental catastrophe produces not only unevenly distributed damage but also revolutionary forms of social justice that insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain: that the future will be unimaginably different from the present, while the present, too, might yet be utterly different from the real that we think we know.¶ Nuclear waste is rarely treated in ecocriticism or risk theory, for several reasons: it is too manmade to be ecological; its catastrophes are ongoing, intentionally produced situations rather than sudden disasters; and it does not support the narrative that subtends ecocritical accounts of risk perception in which the nuclear threat gives rise to an awareness of other kinds of threat before reaching the end of its relevance at the end of the Cold War.2 In what follows, I argue that the failure of nuclear waste to fit into the critical frames created by ecocriticism and risk theory to date offers an opportunity to expand those frames and overcome some of their limitations, especially the impulse towards a paranoid, totalizing realism that Peter van Wyck (2005) has described as central to ecocriticism in the risk society. Nuclear waste has durational forms that dwarf the human. It therefore dwells less in the economy of risk as it is currently conceptualized and more in the blown-out realm of deep time. Inhabiting the temporal scale that has recently been christened the Anthropocene, the geological era defined by the impact of human activities on the world’s geology and climate, nuclear waste unsettles any attempt at realist description, unveiling the limits of human imagination at every turn.3 By analyzing risk society through a heuristic of nuclear waste, this essay offers a critique of nuclear colonialism and environmental racism. At the same time, it shows how the apocalyptic mode in deep time allows narratives of environmental harm and danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In the world of deep time, all that might come to pass will come to pass, sooner or later. The endless maybes of risk become certainties. The impossibilities of our own deaths and the deaths of everything else will come. But so too will other impossibilities: talking macaws and alien visitors, the end of the colonial occupation of North America, or a sudden human determination to let the world live. The end of capitalism may yet become more thinkable than the end of the world. Just wait long enough. Stranger things will happen.

#### 3] Group private space col bad – A] none of it is contextual to actual private space – B]

#### 4] Group debate bad stuff – A] Vote negative on presumption – they don’t rectify or solve anything by “stirking” against debate – B]

#### 5] Ballot DA – A] Turn – they are the form of capitalism they critique by asking for the ballot in return for partaking in a supposed capitalist system – B]

#### 6] Double Bind - either A] debate is a bad institution that co-exists within an already capitalist and racist world in which case even if aff solvency is correct and ruptures debate, they just recreate cruel optimism given the world is structurally capitalist and racist and changing debate wont change it or B] they don’t create cruel optimism and hypothetically voting aff would rupture debate in which case progress is possible and we can create change

#### 7] Not only does the aff plan do nothing, it legitimates the fiction that the actions of a coopted settler-colonial state are in fact for the people, while the state continues to make the private sector do its dirty work on command. Klinger 18

Klinger, J. M. (2018). *Rare earth frontiers: From terrestrial subsoils to lunar landscapes*. Cornell University Press.

On November 24, 2015, US president Barack Obama signed the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act, which grants US citizens the legal right to claim outer space resources and to bring civil suits against enti- ties that pose “harmful interference” to the exercise of private property rights in outer space. Chapter 513, section 51303 states: “A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, includ- ing to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource obtained in ac- cordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United States.” This legislation, which passed with bipartisan support,24 is an oblique attack on the reigning res communis regime espoused in the OST and the Moon Treaty. By granting US citizens property rights, primarily over asteroid resources and secondarily over “space” resources, the legislation attempts to present itself as consistent with the very international treaty obligations it undermines. It is physically impossible to mine rare earths for profit on the Moon or on any other body in outer space in a manner that is consistent with the provisions of the OST. **Mining obliterates a given landscape, while profiteering requires exclusive access. This is precisely why mining is so useful for extending territorial control to historically elusive places: because it quite simply, brutally, and unam- biguously eliminates the possibility for other uses of the site in question.** If it is a US company, rather than a US public venture, that establishes an exclusive min- ing site in outer space, the geopolitical ambitions of the United States would, in theory, be served either way. **In this case, the private sector can do the dirty work25 of fulfilling the state’s geopolitical agenda while the public sector provides protections and guarantees to the private sector.** But in fact, **a distinction between the public and private sector obscures more than it clarifies.** After all, many of the new space industries were founded by former state space agency personnel, and many of the most effective advocates for the privatization of space have backgrounds in both finance and government. **State promotion of the private sector in pursuit of lunar mining closely resembles the cases reviewed in the previous two chapters, wherein the private sector was selectively enlisted to execute the territorial agenda of the state.** In this case, **the national government provides force and backing to a risky and illegal venture in exchange for anticipated geopolitical advantages**. This is where critical geopolitics helps us see further than conventional geopolitics. Conventional geopolitics would hold that this is simply twenty-first- century statecraft instrumentalizing the private sector to further national inter- ests. For the moment, this particular contrivance of a public-private divide is conceived as enabling US actors on all sides to maximize benefits and dodge in- ternational treaty obligations while they territorialize the Moon. The flaw in this reasoning is the assumption that all interests are wedded to the US national interest, so the newly empowered private sector is imagined as acting as an extension of government interests. But there is no such guarantee. Critical geopolitics, by contrast, challenges fixed notions of the state and therefore fixed notions of public and private sector interests. Private sector firms, newly em- powered by the US government to sue any entity that damages their private interests in outer space, are free to contract with any paying customer regardless of their national origin or the integrity of their enterprise. With the case of the Moon, the stakes of the state’s investment in private sec- tor mining differ from those discussed in previous chapters. It is not just a matter of pursuing profit and geopolitical control, but of maintaining the status quo of the global political economy. Under the terms of the OST—to which all state ac- tors advancing space mining are party—any mineral extracted from the Moon would have to be distributed in a way that is “to the benefit of all peoples” on Earth. To pursue lunar mining in compliance with the OST would fundamentally change the global political economy of resource production and consumption from profiteering to sharing. There is no having it both ways—the terms of the OST have made it thus. Any state or nonstate entity doing otherwise would clearly be operating with impunity regardless of the verbal gymnastics involved in legislative attempts at the national scale to sidestep these agreements. But by insisting on a false premise of legal ambiguity at best and “chaos” at worst (Whit- tington 2013), **private sector actors can do the dirty work of the state, until such time that international treaties are supplanted or other parties acquiesce to violation as the new norm.** For a particular government to assert the right of its citizenry to mine resources in any particular place, and to secure for that citizenry the right to pursue puni- tive legal action against any entities who interfere with the exercise of their prop- erty rights is, by definition, an assertion of sovereignty over those places, whether they are scattered across multiple celestial bodies or consolidated in one place, such as on the Moon. Such claims directly and unambiguously contradict existing international treaty obligations of the United States. The SPACE Act attempts to evade this by concluding with a Disclaimer of Extraterritorial Sovereignty, elabo- rated in Section 403: “It is the sense of Congress that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.” The United States need not assert sovereignty over an entire celestial body in order to claim a particular territory therein. After all, that is how the political ge- ography of Earth is organized: no single state controls the entirety of the celestial body we call home, but that does not negate the sovereignty of 192 national gov- ernments over their respective territories. The verbal gymnastics of the SPACE Act do not succeed in side-stepping the OST’s prohibition of assertions of national sovereignty “by means of use or occupation, or by any other means” (UN 1967, Article II). None of this is to suggest that a coherent agenda exists between the state and the private sector. Advocates of privatized space exploitation have multiple per- spectives on the role of the state. Some denigrate civilian space exploration as too slow (Wingo, Spudis, and Woodcock 2009) and bogged down in bureaucracy, which inhibits the fantastic innovation potential of the private sector (Jones 2013). Others see the state as critical to securing their investments. Of the signing of the SPACE act of 2015, Eric Anderson, cofounder and cochairman of Planetary Re- sources, Inc. gushed: “This is the single greatest recognition of property rights in history. This legislation establishes the same supportive framework that created the great economies of history, and will encourage the sustained development of space” (quoted in Navarro 2015). Regardless of their perspective, **private sector interlocutors are working toward capturing maximum possible support** and minimal regulatory intervention **from the public sector**. This effectively translates into massive transfers of public wealth to private hands while reducing oversight mechanisms concerning the use of that wealth. This coheres with the extensively theorized relationship between the “re- treat of the state” and the “financialization of everything” under contemporary neoliberalism. But as with other cases examined in this book, this is not simply a case of deregulation, but also of reregulation. **The proliferation of commercial space agencies represents not a retreat of the state per se, but rather a reconfiguration of state functions to support a program of redistributing public assets into the private sector in the name of beating a bogeyman from the East.** Indeed, the most vocifer- ous political, public, and legal opinion holds that the private sector should lead the way, and that “**the** **government should focus on its role as enabler**” (Whitehorn 2005). This is overwhelmingly compatible with the US government’s approach since the end of the Cold War (United States House of Representatives 1998).

#### 8] Forms of fragmented politics completely cedes the political to capitalism. Engagement in undercommon communication is too individualized and resists collective and concrete change. This constitutes enjoyment of melancholic pleasures of being distanced and accommodated to the real world, and as a result remains stuck in parasitic oppression without change – Dean 13:

“Communist Desire”, Jodi Dean, , 2013, LHP AM

An emphasis on the drive dimension of melancholia, on Freud's attention to the way sadism in melancholia is 'turned round upon the subject's own self', leads to an interpretation of the general contours shaping the left that differs from Brown's**. Instead of a left attached to an unaclmowledged orthodoxy,** **we have one that has given way on the desire for communism, betrayed its historical commitment to the proletariat, and sublimated revolutionary energies into restorationist practices that strengthen the hold of capitalism**. **This left has replaced commitments to the emancipatory, egalitarian struggles of working people against capitalism - commitments that were never fully orthodox, but always ruptured, conflicted and contested - with incessant activity** (not unlike the manic Freud also associates with melancholia), and so **now satisfies itself with criticism and interpretation, small projects and local actions, particular issues and legislative victories, art, technology, procedures, and process**. It sublimates revolutionary desire to democratic drive, to the repetitious practices offered up as democracy (whether representative, deliberative or radical). **Having already conceded to the inevitably of capitalism, it noticeably abandons 'any striking power against the big bourgeoisie',** to return to Benjamin's language. For such a left, **enjoyment comes from its withdrawal from responsibility, its sublimation of goals and responsibilities into the branching, fragmented practices of micro-politics, self-care, and issue awareness**. Perpetually slighted, harmed and undone**, this left remains stuck in repetition, unable to break out of the circuits of drive in which it is caught** - unable because it enjoys. **Might this not explain why such a left confuses discipline with domination, why it forfeits collectivity in the name of an illusory, individualist freedom that continuously seeks to fragment and disrupt any assertion of a collective or a common?** The watchwords of critique within this structure of left desire are moralism, dogmatism, authoritarianism and utopianism - watchwords enacting a perpetual self-surveillance: has an argument, position or view inadvertently rukeo one of these errors? Even some of its militants reject party and state, division and decision, securing in advance an inefficacy sure to guarantee it the nuggets of satisfaction drive provides. **If this left is rightly described as melancholic, and I agree with Brown that it is, then its melancholia derives from the real existing compromises and betrayals inextricable from its history - its accommodations with reality, whether of nationalist war, capitalist encirclement, or so-called market demands.** Lacan teaches that, like Kant's categorical imperative, the super-ego refuses to accept reality as an explanation for failure. Impossible is no excuse - desire is always impossible to satisfy. A wide spectrum of the contemporary left has either accommodated itself, in one or another, to an inevitable capitalism or taken the practical failures of Marxism-Leninism to require the abandonment of antagonism, class, and revolutionary commitment to overturning capitalist arrangements of property and production. **Melancholic fantasy (the communist Master, authoritarian and obscene) as well as sublimated, melancholic practices (there was no alternative) shield this left, shield Ltd, from confrontation with guilt over such betrayal as they capture us in activities that feel productive, important, radical.**