# 1N Barkley Forum R2

## 1

### Framework

#### The meta-ethic is practical reason.

#### A] Bindingness – Any obligation must not only tell us what is good, but why we ought to be good or else agents can reject the value of goodness itself. That means ethics must start with what is constitutive of agents since it traces obligations to features that are intrinsic to being an agent – as an agent you must follow certain rules. Only practical agency is constitutive since agents can use rationality to decide against other values but the act of deciding to reject practical agency engages in it.

#### B] Action theory – every moral analysis requires an action to evaluate, but actions are infinitely divisible into smaller meaningless movements. The act of stealing can be reduced to going to a house, entering, grabbing things, and leaving, all of which are distinct actions without moral value. Only the practical decision to steal ties these actions together to give them any moral value.

#### That justifies universalizability.

#### A] The principle of equality is true since anything else assigns moral value to contingent factors like identity and justifies racism, and the principle of non-contradiction is true since 2+2 can’t equal 4 for me and not for you meaning ethical statements true for one must be true for all.

#### B] Ethics must be defined a priori because of the is ought gap – experience only tells us what is since that’s what we perceive, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory. Applying reason to a priori truth results in universal obligations.

#### That justifies a minimalist libertarian state – Otteson 09

James R. Otteson, 2009, “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism,” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3., Winter 2009, available at [https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_13\_03\_4\_otteson.pdf //](https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_13_03_4_otteson.pdf%20//) LHP PS

**The link between Kantian agency and the limited libertarian state is plausible, and indeed the former explains the latter;** moreover, **the evidence suggests that Kant himself believed that the former implied the latter**. That conclusion leaves us, however, with the final question of how exactly to characterize Kant’s position. To approach this question, consider two claims. **First, Kant believes that people create a state in order to protect their rational, autonomous agency and that this state is justified insofar as it protects that agency.** **Moreover, coercive state action can also be justified if it serves only to secure the conditions necessary for continued or more effective protection of this agency**. A plausible extension of this argument is that the **conditions of morality themselves are possible only within the protections of a Kantian minimal state**. Given that extension, Kant’s endorsement of limited, state-based welfare measures might have been motivated by a belief that they exemplify **state coercion necessary to secure the conditions of agency**. For the reasons explained earlier, I deny that such institutions can be defended successfully on these grounds, but the particular application notwithstanding, we may be able to endorse—consistently and rationally—Kant’s principle of granting the state those, and only those, coercive powers necessary for the protection of “right.” Second, Kant may not have been as convinced as one might be today of intermediary “civil” institutions’ ability to do the work of foundling hospitals and so on. Substantial evidence now attests, however, to the perhaps surprisingly effective scope and reach of civil society’s private institutions to find and meet the needs of society’s most destitute (for a recent treatment, see Beito, Gordon, and Tabarrok 2002). Kant might well have been unaware of such institutions, or—for reasons owing to his particular time and place—he might have been positively suspicious of them, including organized churches. I believe these two points absolve Kant of the claim of contradiction. He can claim consistently that the state’s purpose is to protect individual free agency and that it is justified in using coercion to secure the conditions that allow such protection—but not in any other circumstances. If this account correctly represents Kant’s position, then **we may properly describe him as a political libertarian, though one sensitive to libertarianism’s limitations. Thus, we might aptly call his position constrained libertarianism.**

### Contention

#### Injustice requires someone wronged, but initial acquisition doesn’t violate any entity’s rights– therefore, private appropriation of outer space cannot be unjust, Feser 05:

Edward Feser, [Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College] “THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION,” 2005 //LHP AV

The reason **there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition** of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of **justice**, that is to say, simply **does not apply** to initial acquisition. **It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place**. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned**. Consider the following example. **Suppose** **an individual** **A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R**. **For it to be** the case that A commits an **injustice** in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that **there is some individual** **B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice**. **But for B to have been wronged** by A’s acquisi- tion of R, **B would have to have had a rightful claim over R,** **a right to R**. By hypothesis, **however**, **B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all**. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, **the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R**. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. **The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer**. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

## 2

#### Interp: Debaters must disclose tournaments on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki under the actual name of the tournament on tabroom.

#### To clarify- when you look up the tournament name from the wiki on tab, the entry must pop up

#### Violation – they disclose a tournament as ‘bronx, when bronx is looked up on tabroom, nothing comes up that andrew went to with these pairings. Screenshots in the doc

Table

Description automatically generated

Graphical user interface, application, table

Description automatically generated

**The standard is inclusion - they make debate inaccessible to novices or small schools who compete on the circuit but don’t have access to resources or have knowledge of debate lingo to know the shorthand nicknames for tournaments. Two internal links to accessibility - 1) lets debaters see if you won or lost on tab going for specific strategies or hitting specific strategies, letting debaters adapt around that and b) lets debaters see what speaks judges gave to help them see how good you were at going for x argument. Independently links into reciprocity since if I disclosed one way and you didnt’ you had the advantage in this round. Outweighs - none of their standards matter if debaters can’t access them and means reasonability is uniquely wrong since even a 1% risk of exclusion is bad, you obviously don’t say some level of exclusion is justif****ied**

#### Inclusion ow, other impacts assume that you have the ability to access the round in the first place.

#### Reject reasonability on inclusion impacts- you can’t be reasonably inclusionary

#### Reject every reason why disclosure is bad- you concede to the validitiy of putting tournament names by putting it on your wiki in the first,

#### They will say the shell is arbitrary but literal wiki rules prove otherwise

## 3

Extempt

## Case

### Theory

#### Drop the arg on 1ar theory – that means drop \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### A] the 1ar will always be incentivized to go for theory because they get a ballot implication, destroying substance engagement

#### B] You shouldn’t stake the round on incomplete 1ar blips that become 3 minute 2ars – that wrecks neg win percentage because it means the 2nr has to overcover 1 second arguments

### FWK OV

#### 1)I Intuitionism can’t explain if our intuitions reliably track moral facts. What if we’re the sort of species that has radically wrong intuitions? This means that either a) the truth of the resolutional moral claim is indeterminate and you negate or b) you default to the NC, because we provide an explanation of how our reason

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/#OpeQueArg

One interesting objection to the non-naturalist’s deployment of **intuitionism** is that this combination of views **makes it a “cosmic coincidence” that our intuitions would reliably track the moral facts** (see Bedke 2009). The force of the worry derives from the fact that **non-natural properties**, on some construals, **are causally inert, whereas our intuitions are psychological states and hence part of the natural world. It is simply not clear how our intuitions could reliably track such facts, given that they are causally isolated from them. An obvious contrast is with the way in which our knowledge of the empirical world plausibly does depend on reliability secured through suitable causal connections. This is obviously related to other worries about the way in which the origins of our moral intuitions does not cohere well with their reliability**, given non-naturalism – e.g. worries which focus more on the Darwinian influences on human moral judgment (see also Street 2006; for a reply to such worries, see Vavova forthcoming). Interestingly, some non-naturalists have tried to give a Darwinian argument for a kind of non-theological pre-established harmony between our moral intuitions and the moral facts (see especially Enoch 2011).

#### 2) Their impact calc about how intuions can be unreasonable makes it impossible to affirm the truth of any moral statement—I have the intuition res is false, you have the intuition res true—this means a) you can’t meet your burden of proving the resolution true b) only hegel solves because hegel allows for intutions to be made coherent with one another.

#### 3) There are a bunch of skep triggers in here about motivation and if it guides actions. Group them. A) If there is no internal motivation, the resolution is false because law enforced by violence is the only plausible way to guide action, making whatever the state chooses to do legit, including strong IPR. B) Motivations are guided by social norms, meaning Hegel prereq. Only social power can solve any rule following/motivation.

#### 4) Intuitions always negate because the squo is the squo, we got there for a reason.

#### 5) Don’t let them pull any indexicality nonsense—their non-naturalism arguments means that morality is not an indexical claim like a pronoun. The implication of indeterminacy in the context of non-naturalism is that we can’t EVER UNDERSTAND what we are trying to index. This takes out the very least the “fw share equal moral value” thing, and probably others.

#### 6] Cartesian Skep – truth requires one to be absolutely certain about a statement or else the statement cannot be held true. For example, saying all apples are red requires certainty that no apples are blue or else the statement is an assumption. However, one cannot rule out the possibility of a deceptive demon who deceives all in their beliefs while simultaneously assuring ourselves that we are right. Thus, one can never prove that the external world exists because our knowledge of it may always be incorrect. This also proves solipsism is true as we can only be sure of our own mind and consciousness, but we can never verify that of the other.

### Framing

#### Permissibility Negates –

#### 1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two.

#### 2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### 3] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the "P" and "~P" are true.

#### 4] Shiftiness – Permissibility ground encourages the aff to load up with triggers and the 1ar controls the direction of the round which means they can moot all my offense, I need permissibility in the 2n to compensate.

#### Presume neg- A. We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories. The lack of a reason something is false does not me it is assumed to be true. B. Statements are more often false then true. If I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true in one way by demonstrating that it is indeed red, where I can prove it false in an infinite amount of ways.