# Minneapple R3 1N

## 1

#### Permissibility negates – ought implies an obligation but permissibility is a lack of one which means the neg met their burden of disproving an obligation.

#### Presumption negates – a] statements are more often false than true b] contradictions – would justify saying both p and not p if you knew nothing about p

#### Ethics is based in language –

#### 1] It creates out ability to think and makes us agents – life outside language is deterministic and without morality. Pettit 09,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

This picture of the mental life with which nature furnishes human beings, according to Hobbes, has two striking features. The first is that every process that takes place within the mind, cognitive or appetitive, is entirely particularistic. People will see and remember, represent and desire, only concrete things and situations. They will have no capacity to hold by general claims about how things are, or by general policies or principles for the direction of action. They will be prisoners of the imagined particular. Presented with a triangle, they will register just the individual figure contemplated, not any general aspect of the triangle (DCr 6.11; L 4.9). They will see the triangle before them, but will not register it as a triangle, a closed figure, or a drawing; not having access to such classes, they will not have the capacity to register it as anything more general than this particular thing: they will not be able, however implicitly, to classify it. The second aspect of Hobbes’s picture is that all that happens in the natural mind does precisely that: it happens. The succession of conceptions in which mental life consists is a form of vital motion, not of animal or voluntary motion; “one conception followeth not another, according to our election, and the need we have of them, but as it chanceth us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our mind” (EL 5.1). The process does not evolve under the prompting or guidance of the agent’s desire to have those conceptions assume a certain pattern—say, constitute correct and consistent representations—but only as a by-product of a desire to act in one or another concrete fashion. If the subject is well constructed, then the succession of conceptions will lead rationally to action; the action will satisfy the subject’s desires according to evidentially sensitive representations. But no matter how rational the process or result, this succession of conceptions will not be prompted or guided by the agent’s desires in the manner of an active, intentional performance. The natural agent, animal or human, may be rational, instantiating a certain model of homo rationalis. Yet no one in this natural state will exemplify homo ratiocinans. No one will display the sort of active reflection that we naturally ascribe to Auguste Rodin’s sculpture of the thinker, bent over in concentrated thought. But while the natural mind is particularistic and passive in Hobbes’s portrait, he had no doubt that is not how our minds are. We adult, articulate human beings have words and concepts, not just for particular things, but for classes and categories of things, and we use them to classify, cross-check, and pursue interconnections. More specifically, we do this actively or intentionally, asking ourselves questions about how the words and concepts go together, and seeking to determine the answers. We may do this publicly in speaking with one another, but we may also do it silently, as in reflecting and taking counsel with ourselves. In these two respects, then, we reveal a mind that is decidedly different from the natural mind that Hobbes finds in the animal kingdom. The Linguistic Way Beyond How do human beings escape the constraints of the natural mind? How do they achieve the capacity to represent and desire things under general aspects, and think about them in an active, voluntary way? Hobbes’s answer is the most startling and original claim that he makes in the whole of his philosophy. The claim is that language or speech is a historical invention, and that it is language that makes possible the general, active form of thinking that we human beings display; it enables us to classify as well as register particulars, and seek out the implications of those classifications in a voluntary or active manner. Language, in Hobbes’s story, provides the magic that enables us to jump the limitations of the natural, animal mind. The claim is most vividly expressed in Leviathan. Having reviewed the capacities of the natural mind that human beings share with animals, Hobbes directs us to other human capacities or faculties that “proceed all from the invention of words, and speech. For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.”(L 3.11).

#### 2] It’s inescapable – even if moral theorization could occur absent language it can only be communicated within it when getting others to act on it to create goodness

#### And language causes infinite violence –

#### 1] Language gives rise to comparison which results in endless competition and violence. Pettit 2,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

Lacking the capacity to think in a classificatory way, other animals are insensitive to the ways in which they differ from or resemble their fellows, and so they live in the private as well as the present. But human beings can transcend the boundary of private concern as they can transcend the boundary of concern for the present. And transcend it they certainly will. It will be important for their welfare that they know how they compare with others and that they achieve a high relative standing.5 According to the Hobbesian picture, people’s concern with returns to themselves—their own pleasure, or their avoidance of pain—will naturally lead them to want access to the resources or powers whereby such returns can be produced. If they are to satisfy their wants, they will need the “natural” resources represented by “the faculties of body and mind” as well as “instrumental” resources such as “riches, place of authority, friendship or favour, and good fortune” (EL 8.4). Bent on the pursuit of their own self-interest, then, they will seek the means of conducting that pursuit; moved by the love of self, they will look for a way of consummating that love. In this they will be no different from other animals, though they may be more adept at spotting the means whereby their ends can be realized. But there is one aspect of the resources sought by human beings and other animals that only becomes clear on reflection and reasoning. This is that in a competitive world where the objects of desire are scarce, what will really matter to any creature is not the absolute level of its resources but their level relative to the resources of others. Where there is competition for resources, or competition in the use of resources, the important thing for each will be not the absolute quantity of resources commanded but the extent to which those resources enable the creature to outdo its competitors; “what all have equally is nothing” (DH 11.6). Letting the word power serve for resource, Hobbes finds a nicely turned way of putting the point. “And because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another: power simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another. For equal powers opposed, destroy one another”. These observations are true in some measure of all animals, but given their longer time horizons, it is particularly true of human beings. And it is only human beings, of course, who can become aware of the observations, since only they will be able to compare themselves with others for the resources they each command, and only they will be able to see that the important thing for each will be to have more resources than others—greater power. Under the pressure of this perceived need, the human being becomes a creature “whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men”

#### 2] Language is structurally negative and doesn’t refer to reality – if I say a saw an oak tree you know I didn’t see a car or person but you can’t visualize what I did see – since our rationality is based in language truth is created by individuals rather than extrinsically found but that creates infinite violence over meaning creation.

#### Thus, morality requires an authority to enforce a universal moral theory and resolve conflict. Only an absolute sovereign can do this. Parrish 2:

Derrida`s Economy of Violence in Hobbes` Social Contract, Richard Parrish

“All of the foregoing pints to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign’sfirst and most fundamental **job is to be the ultimate definer.**Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes’ theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that **peace “is possible only if** the **ambiguity and disagreement** that pervade general thinking and acting **are eliminated** by the stipulations of a sovereign.” Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes’ mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that“one of the primary functions of **the sovereign is to provide** the necessary **unity of meaning** and reference **for the**‘ primary **terms in which [people]** men try to **conduct their** social **lives.” “The** whole **[purpose]** raison d’entre of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic**[is to] defus[e]**ing of **interpretive clashes,”without which humans would**“fly off in all directions” and **fall** inevitably **into the violence of the natural condition.”**

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the will of the sovereign. Prefer it for motivation – morality lacks authority over agents. Even if the aff defines the good it gives no way to obligate agents to actually be good. That hijacks the aff since defining good and denying the ability to enforce it the sovereign creates is contradictory.

#### That negates –

#### 1] The aff creates post-fiat obligations for the state – this is incoherent because it implies an authority higher than the state to constrain the sovereign. Only sovereign entities can create moral obligations, so the state can’t have an obligation to act

#### 2] The aff gives employees, specifically public sector ones, the right to strike against the state which is definitionally a violation of the sovereign’s will

## 2

#### Counterplan: A just government ought to:

#### recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike, except in the case of educators.

#### raise educators’ salaries to a living wage contingent on the regional cost of living

#### Educator strikes are devastating – they ruin generational educational outcomes, distort democracy, cause massive violence, and perpetuate inequality, but pay raises solve any aff offense, le Grange 12:

Corlene le Grange, [BA, LLB Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree Magister Legum in Comparative Child Law at the North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa]April 2012, “The limitation of the educator’s right to strike by the child’s right to basic Education” <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.840.4795&rep=rep1&type=pdf> //LHP AV

Spring9 argues that **strikes in the American educational sector occur when a teachers’ union and the department** of education **are unable to reach an agreement** with regard to educators’ salaries and working conditions**. In South Africa the situation is similar**: Solidarity states that **people in South Africa generally strike to direct attention to a grievance they might experience and to reach an agreement** regarding a problem which pertains to interests of employers as well as employees.10 In chapter 1 of this study it was shown that, in the educational sector, these grievances are generally related to educators’ compensation.11 Strikes are usually preceded by union representatives who bargain with the department of education over a new contract, containing a particular wage scale and labour rules.12 Examples of these proposed bargaining agreements can be seen on various South African education unions’ web pages.13 Wage scales will typically include educators’ salaries and other benefits such as health benefits. The length of school days, class sizes and teaching loads are discussed in the labour rules. When the unions and the department of education cannot agree on contract terms, conflict is generated and a strike may follow.14 It is said that the implementation of collective bargaining into public education is the primary cause of strikes by educators.15 Collective bargaining can be described as a:16 good faith process between an organisation’s management and a trade union representing its employees, for negotiating wages, working hours, working conditions, and other matters of mutual interest. This process usually presents the management with a group of people with whom to negotiate, while greatly enhanced bargaining power is given to employees. The trade union system is based on the principle of collective bargaining.17 **A strike (which is usually induced by trade unions) can be seen as:18 the partial or complete concerted refusal to work**, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the purposes of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, and every reference to work in this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or compulsory.’ It is Neal’s19 opinion that the industrial mode of collective bargaining, in particular labour strikes, should not have been transferred to the public sector, the reason being that **monopoly government services (services that can’t be purchased)20 are essential to the health, safety and welfare of the public**. **Strikes are furthermore**, in principle, **an economic** **weapon** that is **inappropriate to public employment**. **Strikes by teachers are** strikes against the South African community as a whole,21 and, as part of the public sector, these strikes do not serve the same purpose as in the private sector.22 **When teachers strike, there exists no fair relationship** **between the economic gains for the educators** on strike **and the damage they inflict upon fellow citizens**,23 **in this case, specifically children who are an especially vulnerable group of society**. It is different in a private company where strikes are more legitimate because those who strike and those who employ are mutually dependent on each other in the following sense: if any of the two groups are unreasonable, the company and all involved will suffer irreparable damage.24 People in general have a choice to make use of a certain company or product, but apart from the extremely wealthy, **most people have no other option but to make use of government services**.25 **Strikes** in the public sector **are thus inappropriate because they “distort the political decisionmaking process.”**26 It is in the opinion of Mahlomola Kekana, president of the National Association of Parents in School Governance (NAPSG) that27 **the impact of the [2010] strike may affect** the entire generation **as the damage far outweighs the gains made by public servants, in particular the teachers**. He further states that such a strike perpetuates the class system and causes inequality, **because the majority of South Africans** do not have a choice **between public and private schools**.28 It has been reported that **the nation-wide strike in 2010 caused disruption and was extremely destabilising**.29 **Schools** were **shut**,30 **teachers attacked pupils and pupils retaliated**.31 **This left an array of broken relationships** that had to be repaired.32 In a previous educator strike in 2007,33 grade 12 learners were prohibited from applying for bursaries on time, because they could not hand in their first term marks or testimonials from their teachers. Furthermore, **many of the grade 12 learners that were to fail due to 2-3 months of missed classes, were not able to repeat their final year**, because the school syllabus was changed.34 It is obvious that **this situation jeopardized the futures of countless children, especially learners from previously disadvantaged backgrounds.** The 2010-strike that had lasted about 3 weeks35 occurred less than 2 months before the final grade 12 examinations.36 It has been reported during this time that Allen Thompson, president of NATU (National Teacher’s Union), made the following staggering announcement:37 There will be no Matric exams written this year in South Africa. We have decided to use the Matric exams as a lever if the government does not come forward with a better offer. **This shows an absolute disregard for children’s right to education.** Anne Bernstein, director for the Centre for Enterprise Development has stated that between 75-89% of South African public schools are dysfunctional.38 In 2007, pass rates fell from 67% in 2006 to 61%.39 Also, in a 2007-study of forty one countries by United States-based National Centre for Education Statistics, South African Grade 8 learners came last in Maths and Science.40 South Africa has also recently finished last of all developing countries when literacy and numeracy skills of children were tested.41 South Africa has further participated in two crosscountry comparative studies during recent years: Progress in International Reading Literacy, which focuses on Grade 4 reading skills, and the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality, which focuses on Grade 6 reading and mathematical skills. Our country compared poorly to our more impoverished neighbouring countries and even worse to developing countries in other parts of the world.42 Woolman and Fleisch43 correctly state that “we stand very much at risk of losing a second generation of learners.” The Minister of Basic Education, Angie Motshekga, has stated that although South African schools are doing relatively well on enrolments, “our weakness is in the quality of education.”44 It has been found with regard to rural primary schools that the absence of teachers, the neglect of their duties and lack of discipline had lead to a decrease in pupil discipline, increased learner absences and the repetition of grades.45 Another big problem that is related to **an average teachers’ strike is the intimidation of other teachers who choose to keep working, as well as of schoolgoing pupils**. A grade 10 pupil of a high school in Gauteng told a reporter that they were busy writing a test when about a 100 presumed striking teachers from other schools stormed into the classroom and assaulted the learners.46 **One striker hit a non-striking teacher in the face and tore up test papers while other pupils were threatened that they would be hurt if they contacted their parents**. At another high school, **armed strikers took down a fence to gain entry, broke windows and threw garbage cans from the first floor.**47 **Learners and teachers left school early** on the day of the attack **and** were afraid to return because of threats to burn down the school.48 It is clear that **violence and intimidation during strikes erode people’s freedom to choose whether they want to strike or not and negatively affect the safety and security of non-striking educators and children during strikes**.49 There exists an important issue relating to the main question posed in the introduction of this study that needs to be answered at this point, namely, whether educator strikes aimed at influencing government policy should be permitted in a democratic state. In answer to this question: 50 it can be said that **that political issues should be exposed, debated, decided, and legislated upon in the open political arena of Parliament, and those involved at the centre of the political process be accountable to the electorate.** **If strikes can be used to influence government policy, governments can no longer act upon the views of the majority of the people they purport to represent**. Because the typical municipal political structure is vulnerable to strikes by public sector employees, like educators, **a non-strike model is preferable** to a strikemodel.51 Schermers52 is of the strong opinion that political strikes are unacceptable in a society where the wishes of the majority of the population are the basis for decisions. He also states that a small group of persons in key positions that try to force a democratic government into a policy that the majority doesn’t want, cannot be tolerated.53 An important sub-question, as identified by Spring54 is: Should teachers worry only about fulfilling their instructional duties without concern for their wages or working conditions? Coombe55 suggests that **while severe budget constraints do not at the moment allow for dramatic increases in teachers’ salaries**, **policy makers** and planners **must**: **reflect a positive intention to pay teachers a wage which enables them to give their best** as professionals. There are however, ways in which educators’ conditions of service can be temporarily improved which are not dependant on salary levels.56 **The government can formally diversify all resources** on which teachers depend for their survival **by rationalising and streamlining benefits** that teachers already receive from outside the public budget, for example, community built houses. **The government can also decentralise fiscal responsibilities and do its best to ensure that the delays, inconsistencies, inconvenience and errors that currently occur in paying teachers’ salaries are eliminated** or, at least, drastically reduced.57 **Educators’ conditions** of service **must be framed to suit the specific nature of the educational sector**. These conditions must be put on paper and drafted in consultation with educators’ representatives and must include leave arrangements the length and configuration of teaching periods, an educators’ code of conduct, arrangements with regard to transfers and maternity leave, cover for educators on leave, appraisal and staff development and arrangements with regard to promotions.58 Negotiated agreements should be transformed into tangible benefits for educators and their families. The administrative capacity and sensitivity of government officials can diffuse a potential explosive situation and peaceful negotiations are definitely an alternative to an educator strike.59 It is, however, also claimed that the state’s legislative, regulatory and budgetary attempts come down to almost nothing more than ‘hand-waiving.’60 It is therefore suggested that, in accordance with our country’s commitment to transformative constitutionalism,61 courts are in the position to help the government to achieve an adequate basic education for all,62 as well as provide educators with a voice with regards to the problems they face. Keeping the above mentioned in mind it can be said that **to strike is wrong when one’s decision to strike causes someone else’s vulnerability; people that cannot solve their own problems and who are not involved in a dispute between an employer and employee or have any say in the solution.**63 Although many people are not content with their salaries, it is important to remember what a salary is, which is the minimum sum that a person and his/her employer agrees on that is to be paid for services rendered according to our country’s labour laws, which makes extreme exploitation very difficult. We also have a very open labour market, so **if one doesn’t like his/her job, he/she can always get another one if his/her services are so highly in demand**.64 **South Africa has a great number of unemployed, qualified teachers who would gladly take over some of the employment and salaries educators are striking over**.65 These circumstances make it clear that **a strike shifts the emphasis from the child as first priority with regard to education to the problems of teachers with teaching authorities**.66 This displacement of emphasis is strongly prohibited, as will be seen in the next chapter on international and regional law.

#### Educational innovation solves extinction.

**Serdyukov 17** Peter Serdyukov, National University, La Jolla, California. 03/27/2017. “Innovation in Education: What Works, What Doesn’t, and What to Do about It?” Journal of Research in Innovative Teaching & Learning, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 4–33.

Introduction Education, being a social institution serving the needs of society, is indispensable for society to survive and thrive. It should be not only comprehensive, sustainable, and superb, but must continuously evolve to meet the challenges of the fast-changing and unpredictable globalized world. This evolution must be systemic, consistent, and scalable; therefore, school teachers, college professors, administrators, researchers, and policy makers are expected to innovate the theory and practice of teaching and learning, as well as all other aspects of this complex organization to ensure quality preparation of all students to life and work. Here we present a systemic discussion of educational innovations, identify the barriers to innovation, and outline potential directions for effective innovations. We discuss the current status of innovations in US education, what educational innovation is, how innovations are being integrated in schools and colleges, why innovations do not always produce the desired effect, and what should be done to increase the scale and rate of innovation-based transformations in our education system. We then offer recommendations for the growth of educational innovations. As examples of innovations in education, we will highlight online learning and time efficiency of learning using accelerated and intensive approaches. Innovations in US education For an individual, a nation, and humankind to survive and progress, innovation and evolution are essential. Innovations in education are of particular importance because education plays a crucial role in creating a sustainable future. “Innovation resembles mutation, the biological process that keeps species evolving so they can better compete for survival” (Hoffman and Holzhuter, 2012, p. 3). Innovation, therefore, is to be regarded as an instrument of necessary and positive change. Any human activity (e.g. industrial, business, or educational) needs constant innovation to remain sustainable. The need for educational innovations has become acute. “It is widely believed that countries’ social and economic well-being will depend to an ever greater extent on the quality of their citizens’ education: the emergence of the so-called ‘knowledge society’, the transformation of information and the media, and increasing specialization on the part of organizations all call for high skill profiles and levels of knowledge. Today’s education systems are required to be both effective and efficient, or in other words, to reach the goals set for them while making the best use of available resources” (Cornali, 2012, p. 255). According to an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, “the pressure to increase equity and improve educational outcomes for students is growing around the world” (Vieluf et al., 2012, p. 3). In the USA, underlying pressure to innovate comes from political, economic, demographic, and technological forces from both inside and outside the nation. Many in the USA seem to recognize that education at all levels critically needs renewal: “Higher education has to change. It needs more innovation” (Wildavsky et al., 2012, p. 1). This message, however, is not new – in the foreword to the 1964 book entitled Innovation in Education, Arthur Foshay, Executive Officer of The Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute of School Experimentation, wrote, “It has become platitudinous to speak of the winds of change in education, to remind those interested in the educational enterprise that a revolution is in progress. Trite or not, however, it is true to say that changes appear wherever one turns in education” (Matthew, 1964, p. v).

## Case

### Hijack

#### Hobbes hijacks util. Humanity’s ability to think about the future leads to perpetual pain created by fear of the future – only a sovereign that can protect future wellbeing solves. Pettit 09,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

This capacity to focus on the future may look like a release, freeing human beings from what Hobbes calls “the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure” (L 6.35). But the liberation has another side to it as well, since the ability to reason about how things may be in the future enables people to worry about what may yet transpire, and be paralyzed by fear and anxiety. This is the side of things that Hobbes emphasizes. He thinks concern for future evil is absolutely inevitable among human beings: “it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come” (L 12.5). And so whereas “wolves, bears and snakes” are not “rapacious unless hungry,” “man is famished even by future hunger” (DH 10. 3). As he puts it in Leviathan, the “object of man’s desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desire” (L 11.1). Thus he posits as “a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death”; man “cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.”

#### This explains the real implication of pleasure being intrinsically good to humans – the relationship doesn’t just end there.

#### Non-descriptive words necessary for ethics don’t have a stable meaning so there is infinite conflict over how to interpret them making peace impossible. Pettit 09,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

But what sort of reasoning or ratiocination does the expression of passion allow? The words that are paradigmatically associated with passion, as we saw in the second chapter, are thin evaluative terms like good or bad. Hobbes’s view is that we use positive terms for anything that we desire, and corresponding negative terms for anything to which we are averse. If we are attracted to something we call it good, and call it good only on that account; if we are averse to something we call it bad, and call it bad only on that account. As Hobbes says, “Whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil” (L 6.7). Hobbes thinks that where there is desire for something, there is pleasure in the presence or at least the immediate prospect of the object desired, and where there is aversion, there is pain or displeasure; the attractive is the pleasant, and the aversive the unpleasant. He can take the pleasure to be “the appearance, or sense, of good; and molestation or displeasure, the appearance, or sense, of evil” (L 6.11). Thus, he can say that everyone “calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil which displeaseth him” (EL 7.3). As we learn to use words like rough, red, or round on the basis of the effects that things have on our senses, so we learn to use good and bad on the basis of the effects they have in giving or promising us pleasure or displeasure. The question, then, is how words introduced on that sort of basis can be recruited to a process of reasoning. And the question is troublesome, of course (L 6.7). We naturally use words that name what Hobbes regards as real properties of bodies according to how things “simply and absolutely” are; an example might be a word like round. We naturally use words that do not name real properties of bodies but are guided by the common effects that bodies happen to have on us—words like red and rough—according to “a common rule”; the rule will be common insofar as bodies affect us in more or less the same ways. But what are we to do with evaluative terms? There are two problems with these words, as we already know. First of all, words like good and bad are used by different people to pick out different things, since people vary in the things they find pleasant or unpleasant; “while every man differeth from other in constitution, they differ also one from another concerning the common distinction of good and evil” (EL 7.3). Words like good and bad “are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves” (L 6.7). They are used by me to pick out those things I find pleasing or displeasing, and by you to pick out those things that you find pleasing or displeasing. This makes for a problem, because differences in our judgments of good and evil are likely to lead us into strife with one another; our “controversy must either come to blows or be undecided” (L 5.3). As we saw in chapter 3, that problem may stem from the fact that we each mistakenly take ourselves to be making conflicting, nonindexical judgments, or just from the fact that the judgments, even understood as indexical, support conflicting practical dispositions. The second problem that arises with evaluative terms, however, is that not only are we each disposed to use them for different things but we are also each liable to use them differently at different times. We are subject to intertemporal as well as interpersonal inconstancy. This arises “because the constitution of a man’s body is in continual mutation,” so that “it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions” (L 6.5). What Hobbes has in mind here can hardly be the way we are each likely to change our views about what is attractive and good, or aversive and bad; after all, such a change of mind is likely with any beliefs whatsoever. He seems rather to be thinking of the ways in which things may engage our desires differently, depending on which of their elements or aspects is currently salient, and whether our desire is still alive or satiated. These problems are both reflections of the indexicality of the terms good and bad, according to Hobbes’s analysis. The terms are used differently, depending on the personal and indeed temporal index given by the speaker. And yet they are used across persons and times to shape what is done, whether done by one person or many, so that they raise a possibility of controversy and strife. We cannot expect any person at different times, or different people at the same time, to “consent in the desire of almost any one and the same object” (L 6.5).

#### Only a sovereign can absolve conflict over the meaning of pleasure to providing a starting point for its maximization. Pettit 09,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

But right reason will not be in place with words like good and bad, “for want of a right reason constituted by nature.” Therefore, Hobbes says, “The parties must by their own accord set up for right reason the reason of some arbitrator or judge to whose sentence they will both stand” (L 5.3; see also D 26). The picture he has is that just as a common measure is needed to establish shared meanings for purely conventional terms of measurement like pint or quart, foot or yard, so a measure is needed to establish shared meanings for evaluative terms, at least when they are used of matters that engage everyone in the society. It “was necessary that there should be a common measure of all things that might fall in controversy; as for example: of what is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what meum and tuum, what a pound, what a quart, etc.” (EL 29.8). No one can cease to regard their own death as evil, according to Hobbes, insofar as a natural necessity will lead them each to seek their own good (EL 14.6; DC 1.7; L 27.8). Yet there is no reason, he thinks, why people should not be able to give up many of their self-indexed uses of evaluative terminology in favor of a usage that is tied to someone who speaks for them all equally—someone who relates to them as the agent over time relates to the agent at different times. In envisaging that possibility, of course, he is looking to the possibility of a sovereign who will speak for the commonwealth, fixing the meaning of good or bad so that it refers to what is attractive or aversive by the sovereign’s judgment. More on this in the next chapter

#### Collapses – whenever a sovereign is removed, each person becomes their own sovereign and must attempt to force others under their will until someone prevails and becomes the sovereign. Parrish :

Derrida`s Economy of Violence in Hobbes` Social Contract, Richard Parrish

“But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that **in the state of nature persons must** not only try to control as many objects as possible -- they must also try to **control as many** persons **as possible**. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, **by force** or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among [persons in the state of nature] there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. **Persons,**as rationally self-interested beings **who**"measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and **value themselves above all** others, attempt to **force that valuation on others**."The **human desire** for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," **is** therefore primarily **about subsuming others beneath one**'s own personhood, **as** direct **objects** or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that **this discursive struggle** rapidly **becomes physical** by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 **The ultimate violence**, the surest and most complete way **of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person**, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning.”

### Right to Life

#### 1] no, this misconstrues it, intrinsic right to life means you can’t act against SELF PRESERVATION because it’s a contradiction, that doesn’t allow for things like self-sacrifice or aggregation or even assign moral worth to life in general

### Offense

#### 1] The right to strike necessarily involves violating the right to property and contract – it’s coercive, Gourevitch 16 summarizes:

Gourevitch, A.. “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (2016): 307 - 323. //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

A second problem follows on the first. **If workers have rights to the jobs they are striking then they must have some powers to enforce those rights**. **Such powers might include** mass picketing, secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes, **coercion and intimidation of replacement workers, even destruction or immobilization of property** – the familiar panoply of strike actions. While workers have sometimes defended such actions without using the specifically juridical language of ‘rights,’ in many cases they have used that kind of appeal.3 Even when they have not employed rights-discourse, they have invoked some related notion of demanding fair terms to their job (Frow, Frow and Katanka 1971). Each and any of the above listed activities of a strike – pickets, boycotts, sympathy actions – are part of the way workers not only press their demands but claim their right to 3 See James Gray Pope’s (1997) remarkable reconstruction of the way, in the 1920s, rights-discourse helped organize and sustain a ‘constitutional strike’ against attempts to curtail and outlaw the strike. the job. Strikers regularly implore other workers not to cross picket lines and take struck jobs. **These are more than speech-acts. At the outer edges, they amount to intimidation and coercion**. Or at least, workers claim the right to intimidate and coerce if the state will not itself enforce this aspect of their right to strike. Liberal societies rarely permit a group of individuals powers that come close and even cross over into rights of private coercion. It is no surprise that regulation and repression of these strike-related activities have been the source of some of the most serious episodes of strike-related violence in US and European history (Brecher 2014; Lambert 2005; Forbath 1991; Adamic 1971; Taft and Ross 1969; Liebknecht 1917). So, alongside the unclear basis for the strikers’ rights to their jobs, the problem for a liberal society is that this right seems to include private rights of coercion or at least troubling forms of social pressure. Yet there is more. **The standard strike potentially threatens the fundamental freedoms of three specific groups**. • Freedom of contract **It conflicts with the freedom of contract of those replacement workers who would be willing to take the job** on terms that strikers will not. Note, this is not a possible conflict but a necessary one. **Strikers claim the job is theirs, which means replacements have no right** to it. But replacements claim everyone should have the equal freedom to contract with an employer for a job. • Property rights **A strike seriously interferes with the employer’s property rights**. **The point of a strike is to stop production**. **But the point of a property right is that, at least in the owner’s core area of activity, nobody else has the right to interfere with his use of that property**. **The** **strikers**, by claiming the employer has no right to hire replacements and thus no way of employing his property profitably, **effectively render the employer unfree to use his property as he sees fit**. To be clear, strikers claim the right not just to block replacement workers, but to prevent the employer from putting his property to work without their permission. For instance, New Deal ‘sit-down’ strikes made it impossible to operate factories, which was one reason why the courts claimed it violated employer property rights (Atleson 1983, 46-48). Similarly, during the Seattle general strike in 1919, the General Strike Committee forced owners to ask permission to engage in certain productive activities – permission it often denied (Brecher 2014, 106-111). • Freedom of association Though the conceptual issues here are complicated, a strike can seriously constrain a worker’s freedom of association. It does so most seriously when the strike is a group right, in which only authorized representatives of the union may call a strike. In this case, the right to strike is not the individual’s right in the same way that, say, the freedom to join a church or volunteer organization is. Moreover, the strike can be coercively imposed even on dissenting members, especially when the dissenters work in closed or union shops. That is because refusal to follow the strike leads to dismissal from the union, which would mean loss of the job in union or closed shops. The threat of losing a job is usually considered a coercive threat. So not only might workers be forced to join unions – depending on the law – but also they might be forced to go along with one of the union’s riskiest collective actions. **Note that each one of these concerns follows directly from the nature of the right to strike itself**. **Interference with freedom of contract, property rights**, and the freedom of association **are all part and parcel of defending the right** that striking workers claim to the ‘their’ jobs. These are difficult forms of coercive interference to justify on their own terms and **they appear to rest on a claim without foundation**. Just what right do workers have to jobs that they refuse to perform?

#### 2] Strikes trigger inflation snowball, collapsing the economy – Moore 21:

Moore, 10-30, 21, Stephen Moore is a senior fellow at FreedomWorks. He is also a co-founder of the Committee to Unleash Prosperity and a Washington Examiner columnist., North State Journal, OORE: Will all of America go on strike?, https://nsjonline.com/article/2021/10/moore-will-all-of-america-go-on-strike/

We already have nearly 11 million unfilled jobs thanks to super-generous welfare benefits. The shortage of dockworkers, truckers and factory workers is inciting higher inflation due to shortages. Now, **if thousands of more workers in critical industries go on strike, havoc could prevail.** The worker shortages only give more leverage to the unions to walk off the job for higher pay and benefits. **The John Deere workers balked at a proposed 5% raise — and not without cause. With inflation running closer to 6%, a 5% raise could mean a loss in real income to the rank-and-file workers.** Here’s the vicious cycle we could be looking at in due time**. Inflation means higher prices at the stores, which means workers want higher pay, which means companies have higher costs, which means the firms have to raise their prices further. And the process repeats. Six percent inflation could snowball into 8% to 10% *inflation by the end of the year.*** Yikes. History proves that mismanagement of the money supply and a dollar that loses value causes convulsions in the labor market. E.J. Antoni, an economist at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, recently ran the numbers. Annual inflation spiked to 7.9% for 1951, and a record 470 strikes occurred the following year. In the late 1960s, inflation rose to 5.4%, and the number of strikes rose above 400 in a single year. But as price volatility moderated, starting in the Ronald Reagan years, so did strikes. A stable dollar that was “as good as gold” retained its value and allowed labor and management to reach mutually agreeable contracts on wage increases. From 1947 to 1982, a period of many strikes, inflation rose and fell wildly, with the annual rate changing as much as 8.7 percentage points in a single year and having a 14.5 percentage point range from -1% to 13.5%. Suddenly, it feels as though we are in a “Back to the Future” sequel with Michael J. Fox. Rising prices and a slowdown in the economy — the worst of all worlds. I predict that there will be many more strikes in the months ahead. Unions will flex their muscles in part because they have Joe Biden in the White House, who genuflects in front of the union bosses who spent hundreds of millions of dollars on his campaign. Reagan famously fired illegally striking air-traffic controllers in 1981. Does anyone believe Biden would ever have the backbone to do that? **Bottlenecks now squeeze a supply chain that was once the hallmark of American economic efficiency at every turn. It’s getting worse, and the unions and their rank-and-file workers paying higher bills aren’t happy. Nor should they be. History shows that strikes are a form of mutually assured destruction. Both sides generally lose in the long term from work stoppages — and so does America**. **The best way for Washington to ensure long-term worker** gains, for union or nonunion workers, **is to get inflation, which is a de facto wage tax, under control.**

#### 3] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

**Gourevitch 18** summarizes: [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy **recognizes** that workers have a **right** to **strike**. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose **serious** **problems** for **liberal** **societies**. They involve **violence** and **coercion**, they often violate some **basic** **liberal** **liberties**, they appear to **involve** group rights having **priority** over **individual** **ones**, and they can **threaten** **public** **order** itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of **disruptive** **collective** **protest** in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ **froze** major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as **statewide** in **West** **Virginia**, **Oklahoma**, **Arizona**, and **Colorado**; a **strike** by taxi drivers played a **major** role in debates and court decisions regarding **immigration**; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises **far** more **issues** than a **single** **essay** can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its **relation** to **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. I argue that strikes present a **dilemma** for liberal societies because for **most** **workers** to have a reasonable chance of **success** they need to use some **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. But these coercive strike tactics both **violate** the law and **infringe** upon what are widely held to be **basic** **liberal** **rights**. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know **why** workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of **understanding** the right to strike is as a right to **resist** the **oppression** that workers face in the **standard** **liberal** **capitalist** **economy**. This way of **understanding** the right explains why the use of **coercive** **strike** **tactics** is not morally **constrained** by the requirement to respect the **basic** **liberties** nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.

#### 3] The aff homogenizes all strikes as an unconditional right which is unethical.

**Loewy 2K**, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic—that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, in as much as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.

### Spark

#### Small arsenals and tests prove no extinction

Frankel et al. 15 [Dr. Michael J. Frankel is a senior scientist at Penn State University’s Applied Research Laboratory, where he focuses on nuclear treaty verification technologies, is one of the nation’s leading experts on the effects of nuclear weapons, executive director of the Congressional Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, led development of fifteen-year global nuclear threat technology projections and infrastructure vulnerability assessments; Dr. James Scouras is a national security studies fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and the former chief scientist of DTRA’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office; Dr. George W. Ullrich is chief technology officer at Schafer Corporation and formerly senior vice president at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), currently serves as a special advisor to the USSTRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group’s Science and Technology Panel and is a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. 04-15-15. “The Uncertain Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use.” The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. DTIC. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a618999.pdf>] Justin

Scientific work based on real data, rather than models, also cast additional doubt on the basic premise. Interestingly, publication of several contradictory papers describing experimental observations actually predated Schell’s work. In 1973, nine years before publication of The Fate of the Earth, a published report failed to find any ozone depletion during the peak period of atmospheric nuclear testing.26 In another work published in 1976, attempts to measure the actual ozone depletion associated with Russian megaton-class detonations and Chinese nuclear tests were also unable to detect any significant effect.27 At present, with the reduced arsenals and a perceived low likelihood of a large-scale exchange on the scale of Cold War planning scenarios, official concern over nuclear ozone depletion has essentially fallen off the table. Yet continuing scientific studies by a small dedicated community of researchers suggest the potential for dire consequences, even for relatively small regional nuclear wars involving Hiroshimasize bombs. Nuclear Winter The possibility of catastrophic climate changes came as yet another surprise to Department of Defense scientists. In 1982, Crutzen and Birks highlighted the potential effects of high-altitude smoke on climate,29 and in 1983, a research team consisting of Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollack, and Sagan (referred to as TTAPS) suggested that a five-thousand-megaton strategic exchange of weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively spell national suicide for both belligerents.30 They argued that a massive nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would inject copious amounts of soot, generated by massive firestorms such as those witnessed in Hiroshima, into the stratosphere where it might reside indefinitely. Additionally, the soot would be accompanied by dust swept up in the rising thermal column of the nuclear fireball. The combination of dust and soot could scatter and absorb sunlight to such an extent that much of Earth would be engulfed in darkness sufficient to cease photosynthesis. Unable to sustain agriculture for an extended period of time, much of the planet’s population would be doomed to perish, and—in its most extreme rendition—humanity would follow the dinosaurs into extinction and by much the same mechanism.31 Subsequent refinements by the TTAPS authors, such as an extension of computational efforts to three-dimensional models, continued to produce qualitatively similar results. The TTAPS results were severely criticized, and a lively debate ensued between passionate critics of and defenders of the analysis. Some of the technical objections critics raised included the TTAPS team’s neglect of the potentially significant role of clouds;32 lack of an accurate model of coagulation and rainout;33 inaccurate capture of feedback mechanisms;34 “fudge factor” fits of micrometer-scale physical processes assumed to hold constant for changed atmospheric chemistry conditions and uniformly averaged on a grid scale of hundreds of kilometers;35 the dynamics of firestorm formation, rise, and smoke injection;36 and estimates of the optical properties and total amount of fuel available to generate the assumed smoke loading. In particular, more careful analysis of the range of uncertainties associated with the widely varying published estimates of fuel quantities and properties suggested a possible range of outcomes encompassing much milder impacts than anything predicted by TTAPS.37 Aside from the technical issues critics raised, the five-thousand-megaton baseline exchange scenario TTAPS envisioned was rendered obsolete when the major powers decreased both their nuclear arsenals and the average yield of the remaining weapons. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the nuclear winter issue essentially fell off the radar screen for Department of Defense scientists, which is not to say that it completely disappeared from the scientific literature. In the last few years, a number of analysts, including some of the original TTAPS authors, suggested that even a “modest” regional exchange of nuclear weapons—one hundred explosions of fifteenkiloton devices in an Indian–Pakistani exchange scenario—might yet produce significant worldwide climate effects, if not the full-blown “winter.”38 However, such concerns have failed to gain much traction in Department of Defense circles.

#### Empirics – we’ve nuked ourselves 2,000 times and the largest event was only 1/1000th as powerful as natural disasters

Eken 17 [Mattias Eken - PhD student in Modern History at the University of St Andrews. “The understandable fear of nuclear weapons doesn’t match reality”. 3/14/17. <https://theconversation.com/the-understandable-fear-of-nuclear-weapons-doesnt-match-reality-73563>] // Re-Cut Justin

Nuclear weapons are unambiguously the most destructive weapons on the planet. Pound for pound, they are the most lethal weapons ever created, capable of killing millions. Millions live in fear that these weapons will be used again, with all the potential consequences. However, the destructive power of these weapons **has been vastly exaggerated**, albeit for good reasons. Public fear of nuclear weapons being used in anger, whether by terrorists or nuclear-armed nations, has risen once again in recent years. **This is** in no small part **thanks to the current political climate** between states such as the US and Russia and the various nuclear tests conducted by North Korea. But whenever we talk about nuclear weapons, it’s easy to get carried away with doomsday scenarios and apocalyptic language. As the historian Spencer Weart once argued: “**You say ‘nuclear bomb’ and everybody immediately thinks of the end of the world.**” Yet the means necessary to produce a nuclear bomb, let alone set one off, remain incredibly complex – and while the damage that would be done if someone did in fact detonate one might be very serious indeed, **the chances that it would mean “the end of the world” are vanishingly small**. In his 2013 book Command and Control, the author Eric Schlosser tried to scare us into perpetual fear of nuclear weapons by recounting stories of near misses and accidents involving nuclear weapons. One such event, the 1980 Damascus incident, saw a Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile explode at its remote Arkansas launch facility after a maintenance crew accidentally ruptured its fuel tank. Although the warhead involved in the incident didn’t detonate, Schlosser claims that “if it had, much of Arkansas would be gone”. But that’s not quite the case. The nine-megaton thermonuclear warhead on the **Titan II** missile had a blast radius of 10km, or an area of about 315km². The state of Arkansas spreads over 133,733km², meaning the weapon **would have caused destruction across 0.2% of the state.** That would naturally have been a terrible outcome, but certainly not the catastrophe that Schlosser evokes. Claims exaggerating the effects of nuclear weapons have become commonplace, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. In the early War on Terror years, Richard Lugar, a former US senator and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the Western way of life. What he failed to explain is how. It is by no means certain that a single nuclear detonation **(or even several)** would do away with our current way of life. Indeed, **we’re still here despite having nuked our own planet more than 2,000 times** – a tally expressed beautifully in this video by Japanese artist Isao Hashimoto). While the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty forced nuclear tests underground, **around 500 of** all **the nuclear weapons detonated were unleashed in the Earth’s atmosphere**. This includes the world’s largest ever nuclear detonation, the 57-megaton bomb known as **Tsar Bomba**, detonated by the Soviet Union on October 30 1961. Tsar Bomba was more than 3,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. That is immense destructive power – but as one physicist explained, **it’s only “one-thousandth the force of an earthquake, one-thousandth the force of a hurricane”.** The Damascus incident proved how incredibly hard it is to set off a nuclear bomb and the limited effect that would have come from just one warhead detonating. Despite this, some scientists have controversially argued that an even limited all-out nuclear war might lead to a so-called nuclear winter, since the smoke and debris created by very large bombs could block out the sun’s rays for a considerable amount of time. To inflict such ecological societal annihilation with weapons alone, we would have to detonate hundreds if not thousands of thermonuclear devices in a short time. Even in such extreme conditions, the area actually devastated by the bombs would be limited: for example, **2,000 one-megaton explosions with a destructive radius of five miles each would directly destroy less than 5% of the territory of the US**. Of course, if the effects of nuclear weapons have been greatly exaggerated, there is a very good reason: since these weapons are indeed extremely dangerous, any posturing and exaggerating which intensifies our fear of them makes us less likely to use them. But it’s important, however, to understand why people have come to fear these weapons the way we do. After all, nuclear weapons are here to stay; they can’t be “un-invented”. If we want to live with them and mitigate the very real risks they pose, we must be honest about what those risks really are. Overegging them to frighten ourselves more than we need to keeps nobody safe.

#### Isolated island populations repopulate after radiation and nuclear winter – bunkers and submarines.

Turchin and Green 18 [Alexey Turchin – Scientist for the Foundation Science for Life Extension in Moscow, Russia, Founder of Digital Immortality Now, author of several books and articles on the topics of existential risks and life extension. Brian Patrick Green – Director of technology ethics at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, teaches AI ethics in the Graduate School of Engineering at Santa Clara University. <MKIM> “Islands as refuges for surviving global catastrophes”. September 2018. DOA: 7/20/19. <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/FS-04-2018-0031/full/html?fullSc=1&mbSc=1&fullSc=1>] // Re-Cut Justin

Different types of possible catastrophes suggest different scenarios for how survival could happen on an island. What is important is that the island should have properties which protect against the specific dangers of particular global catastrophic risks. Specifically, different islands will provide protection against different risks, and their natural diversity will contribute to a higher total level of protection: **Quarantined island survives pandemic**. An island could impose effective quarantine if it is sufficiently remote and simultaneously able to protect itself, possibly using military ships and air defense. **Far northern aboriginal people survive an ice age**. Many far northern people have adapted to survive in extremely cold and dangerous environments, and under the right circumstances could potentially survive the return of an ice age. However, their cultures are endangered by globalization. If these people become dependent on the products of modern civilization, such as rifles and motor boats, and lose their native survival skills, then their likelihood of surviving the collapse of the outside world would decrease. Therefore, preservation of their survival skills may be important as a defense against the risks connected with **extreme cooling**. Remote polar island with high mountains survives brief global warming of median surface temperatures, up to 50˚C. There is a theory that the climates of planets similar to the Earth could have several semi-stable temperature levels (Popp et al., 2016). If so, because of climate change, the Earth could transition to a second semi-stable state with a median global temperature of around 330 K, about 60˚C, or about 45˚C above current global mean temperatures. But even in this climate, **some regions of Earth could still be survivable for humans**, such as the Himalayan plateau at elevations above 4,000 m, but below 6,000 (where oxygen deficiency becomes a problem), or on polar islands with mountains (however, global warming affects polar regions more than equatorial regions, and northern island will experience more effects of climate change, including thawing permafrost and possible landslides because of wetter weather). In the tropics, the combination of increased humidity and temperature may increase the wet bulb temperature above 36˚C, especially on islands, where sea moisture is readily available. In such conditions, proper human perspiration becomes impossible (Sherwood and Huber, 2010), and there will likely be increased mortality and morbidity because of tropical diseases. If temperatures later returned to normal – either naturally or through climate engineering – **the rest of the Earth could be repopulated**. ‘‘Swiss Family Robinsons’’ survive on a tropical island, unnoticed by a military robot ‘‘mutiny’’. Most AI researchers ignore medium-term AI risks, which are neither near-term risks, like unemployment, nor remote risks, like AI superintelligence. But a large drone army – if one were produced – could receive a wrong command or be infected by a computer virus, leading it to attack people indiscriminately. Remote islands without robots could provide protection in this case, allowing survival until such a drone army ran out of batteries, fuel, ammunition or other supplies: Primitive tribe survives civilizational collapse. The inhabitants of **North Sentinel Island**, near the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean, are hostile and uncontacted. **The Sentinelese survived the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami apparently unaffected** (Voanews, 2009), and if the rest of humanity disappear, **they might well continue their existence without change.** Tropical Island survives extreme global nuclear winter and glaciation event. Were a **nuclear**, bolide impactor or volcanic “**winter**” scenario to unfold, these islands would remain surrounded by Warm Ocean, and local volcanism or other energy sources might provide heat, energy and food. Such island refuges may have helped life on Earth survive during the **“Snowball Earth”** event in Earth’s distant past (Hoffman et al., 1998). Remote island base for project “Yellow submarine”. Some catastrophic risks such as a gamma ray burst, a global nuclear war with high radiological contamination or multiple pandemics might be best survived **underwater in nuclear submarines** (Turchin and Green, 2017). However, after a catastrophe, the submarine with survivors would eventually need a place to dock, and an island with some prepared amenities would be a reasonable starting point for rebuilding civilization. Bunker on remote island. For risks which include multiple or complex catastrophes, such as a bolide impact, extreme volcanism, tsunamis, multiple pandemics and nuclear war with radiological contamination, **island refuges could be strengthened with bunkers**. Richard Branson survived hurricane Irma on his own island in 2017 by seeking refuge in his concrete wine cellar (Clifford, 2017). Bunkers on islands would have higher survivability compared to those close to population centers, as they will be neither a military target nor as accessible to looters or unintentionally dangerous (e.g. infected) refugees. These bunkers could potentially be connected to water sources by underwater pipes, and passages could provide cooling, access and even oxygen and food sources.