# Harvard Trips 1N vs. Dulles TY :D

## Offs

### Theory

#### Interpretation: Debaters must follow their own disclosure interpretation that they disclose on their High School NDCA LD wiki page

#### Violation: They disclose the interp that the affirmative must disclose advantage areas, frameworks, advocacis 30 minutes before the round – they don’t follow that – they didn’t sent me stuff barely before the round started and didn’t disclose advantage areas

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#### Vote neg:

#### ~1~ Norming – if we are going to deliberate about what is the best disclosure practice, but you don’t follow your own, you destroy all possibilities of setting norms because no follows them – it just becomes a game – norming comes first it’s the terminal impact to theory and o/w on scope

#### ~2~ Academic Integrity – they are actively lying and being a hypocrite in a school based and funded space – academic integrity controls the internal link to all other voters because fairness only matters given that we only want to keep the game fair to precure some sort of benefits – it’s the worst form of unfairness by disadnvating people otusdie of the debate by making fake arguments. Also link turns education because eduaction is only attainable by being academically honest – for example if I plagarized a research paper I don’t learn due to dishonesty

#### ~3~ Reciprocity – the justify an reciprocal burden where they never have to follow their norms but everyone else has to

#### Fairness is a voter- A] procedural constraint—if they had 10 minutes to say fairness bad and I only had 1 minute to defend it, they would win because it was structurally unfair to begin with.

#### Drop the debater (a) deter future abuse – empirically confirmed with aprioris and (b) norm setting c~ dropping the arg  is incoherent because it is dropping the aff advocacy so its functionally the same.

#### No RVI’s –

#### (a) creates a chilling effect – aff is dangerous on theory because they get to prep a long counterinterp in the 1ar and then get the 2ar to collapse, weigh, and contextualize - negs would always be disincentives from reading theory against good theory debaters which leads to infinite abuse so it outweighs time skew and

#### (b) they’re illogical - "I’m fair vote for me" doesn’t make any sense - logic comes first on theory since all args need to make sense in order to be evaluable.

#### Competing interpretations –

#### a~ reasonability is arbitrary since it relies upon judge opinion which outweighs since it’s terminally unfair – it relies on something completely out of control and

#### b~ reasonability collapses into competing interpretations since you need to justify why your brightline is better than competing ones

#### A. Interpretation: If the affirmative defends anything other than the explicit topic then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy in the 1AC. (To clarify, you must have an author that states we should not do your aff, insofar as the aff is not a whole res phil aff)

#### B. Violation:

### Topicality

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not defend action on celestial bodies. To clarify, if the affirmative does defend an action, it must only be within outer-space.

#### Merriam-Webster defines Outer Space as:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outer%20space // LHP PS

**space immediately outside the earth's atmosphere**

#### That outweighs on text – it relates to the physical space outside the atmosphere not land on other planets themselves.

#### Merriam-Webster defines Celestial Bodies as:

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/celestial%20body> // LHP PS

**an aggregation of matter in the universe (such as a planet, star, or nebula) that can be considered as a single unit (as for astronomical study)**

#### And, Toppr defines them as:

toppr.com/guides/physics/stars-and-solar-system/celestial-bodies // LHP PS

**By the definition, a celestial body is a natural object outside of the Earth’s atmosphere. For examples, Moon, Sun, and the other planets of our solar system. But, actually, these are very partial examples. The**[**Kuiper belt**](https://www.toppr.com/ask/question/what-is-the-difference-between-the-kuiper-belt-and-the-oort-cloud-d60b8d-1/)**is holding many celestial bodies. Any asteroid in our space is the celestial body.** This article will give the necessary details about the celestial bodies in a simple manner.

#### It’s actively confusing and bad for international law to conflate outer space and celestial bodies – Cheng 2k:

Cheng, Bin. "Properly speaking, only celestial bodies have been reserved for use exclusively for peaceful (non-military) purposes, but not outer void space." International Law Studies 75.1 (2000): 21.// LHP BT + LHP PS

First of all, it may be necessary to clarify the meaning of the term "outer space" and to introduce the term "outer void space." **Up to and including the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo~ ration and Use of Outer Space in General Assembly Resolution 1962, adopted on December 13, 1963,7 the United Nations, including its Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), where international space law was constantly being discussed with a view to its progressive development, always referred to outer space separately from celestial bodies**. For instance, Article 3 of the Declaration provides: "Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation .... " (emphasis added). According to this terminology, extraterrestrial space consists, therefore, of "outer space" and "celestial bodies." Celestial bodies are thus treated as a cate~ gory apart from outer space as such, as illustrated in figure 1. However, since the 1967 Space Treaty, which in other respects follows the 1963 Declaration closely in form and in substance, the United Nations always speaks of "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies" in treaties and other in, struments relating to outer space which it has sponsored. Thus, the 1967 Space Treaty, in its Article II, which is equivalent to the above,quoted Article 3 of the 1963 Declaration, provides: "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation .... " (emphasis added). In other words, henceforth the moon and other celestial bodies were no longer treated as being separate from outer space as such, but rather as forming part of it, as shown in figure 2. It follows that **whenever reference is made to "outer space," the moon and all the other celestial bodies are automatically included. One of the consequences of this change in the use of the term outer space is that the vast space in between all the celestial bodies has lost any specific desig, nation. It has become nameless, causing a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding.**

#### Outweighs –

#### A] Policy Freeze – they actively make it impossible for policymakers to determine what to do

#### B] Common usage – every treaty makes an explicit distinction between them by either saying outer space or/and celestial bodies which demonstrates an understood legal difference engrained within law.

#### C] Pragmatics – Cheng 99:

Cheng, Bin. "Introducing a New Term to Space Law." The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy 11 (1999): 321-327. // LHP BT + LHP PS

**However, one of the consequences of this change in the use of the term outer space is that the vast space in between all the celestial bodies (including in this case also the Earth) has lost any specific designation**. **It** **has become nameless**, as Figure 2 seeks to show. **The problem with this new nomenclature in depriving the vast void in outer space of a name is that it can cause a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding**. For instance, **there is a prevelant misconception that, because Article IV(2) of the 1967 Space Treaty provides that “[t]he moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes”, this means that the whole of outer space, including the whole empty space in between the celestial bodies, has been reserved exclusively for uses for peaceful purposes, but this is far from the truth.** **This vast empty space has not been totally demilitarized**. **Only certain restrictions have been placed on its military use by Article IV(1**) of the Treaty under which “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.” Otherwise, the **States** Parties **remain entitled** to use this empty space **for any military** **purpose** they wish, subject only to the observance of international law and treaty obligations, including the United Nations Charter. This **misunderstanding** can easily have **arisen because of** the **lack of a term** **to describe this vast empty space.**

#### Violation: They defend – action on lunar sites

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision - they are definitionally not topical or even a subset of the resolution – vote them down –

#### A] Stasis point – the topic is the only reasonable focal point for debate – anything else destroys the possibility of debate because we will be two ships passing –

#### B] Internal link turn – violating semantics justifies the aff talking about whatever with zero neg prep or prediction which is the most unfair and educational –

#### C] Jurisdiction – you can’t vote for them because the ballot and the tournament invitation say to vote for the better debater in the context of the resolution –

#### 2] Limits – they explode them – multiple warrants – A] their model justifies an infinite possibility of affs as space is extremely unexplored which is extremely unpredictable and impossible for negs to have prep to – B] justifies reading any aff because Earth is a celestial body, and if celestial bodies and space are the same Earth is included, which means the aff can read any action on Earth which kills quality engagement and negative ground. That also justifies affs reading trivially true affs

### NC

#### Permissibility negates – A] Semantics - unjust is defined as morally prohibited or bad which means permissibility is definitionally negative ground as proving the affirmative would require proving a prohibition which permissibility denies – B] Shiftiness – Permissibility ground encourages the aff to load up with triggers and the 1ar controls the direction of the round which means they can moot all my offense, I need permissibility in the 2n to compensate

#### Presumption negates – A] We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories. The lack of a reason something is false does not mean it is assumed to be true – B] Statements are more often false then true. If I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true in one way by demonstrating that it is indeed red, where I can prove it false in an infinite amount of ways.

#### The meta-ethic is practical reason.

#### A] Bindingness – Any obligation must not only tell us what is good, but why we ought to be good or else agents can reject the value of goodness itself. That means ethics must start with what is constitutive of agents since it traces obligations to features that are intrinsic to being an agent – as an agent you must follow certain rules. Only practical agency is constitutive since agents can use rationality to decide against other values but the act of deciding to reject practical agency engages in it.

#### B] Action theory – every moral analysis requires an action to evaluate, but actions are infinitely divisible into smaller meaningless movements. The act of stealing can be reduced to going to a house, entering, grabbing things, and leaving, all of which are distinct actions without moral value. Only the practical decision to steal ties these actions together to give them any moral value.

#### That justifies universalizability.

#### A] The principle of equality is true since anything else assigns moral value to contingent factors like identity and justifies racism, and the principle of non-contradiction is true since 2+2 can’t equal 4 for me and not for you meaning ethical statements true for one must be true for all.

#### B] Ethics must be defined a priori because of the is ought gap – experience only tells us what is since that’s what we perceive, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory. Applying reason to a priori truth results in universal obligations.

#### That justifies a minimalist libertarian state – Otteson 09

James R. Otteson, 2009, “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism,” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3., Winter 2009, available at [https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_13\_03\_4\_otteson.pdf //](https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_13_03_4_otteson.pdf%20//) LHP PS

**The link between Kantian agency and the limited libertarian state is plausible, and indeed the former explains the latter;** moreover, **the evidence suggests that Kant himself believed that the former implied the latter**. That conclusion leaves us, however, with the final question of how exactly to characterize Kant’s position. To approach this question, consider two claims. **First, Kant believes that people create a state in order to protect their rational, autonomous agency and that this state is justified insofar as it protects that agency.** **Moreover, coercive state action can also be justified if it serves only to secure the conditions necessary for continued or more effective protection of this agency**. A plausible extension of this argument is that the **conditions of morality themselves are possible only within the protections of a Kantian minimal state**. Given that extension, Kant’s endorsement of limited, state-based welfare measures might have been motivated by a belief that they exemplify **state coercion necessary to secure the conditions of agency**. For the reasons explained earlier, I deny that such institutions can be defended successfully on these grounds, but the particular application notwithstanding, we may be able to endorse—consistently and rationally—Kant’s principle of granting the state those, and only those, coercive powers necessary for the protection of “right.” Second, Kant may not have been as convinced as one might be today of intermediary “civil” institutions’ ability to do the work of foundling hospitals and so on. Substantial evidence now attests, however, to the perhaps surprisingly effective scope and reach of civil society’s private institutions to find and meet the needs of society’s most destitute (for a recent treatment, see Beito, Gordon, and Tabarrok 2002). Kant might well have been unaware of such institutions, or—for reasons owing to his particular time and place—he might have been positively suspicious of them, including organized churches. I believe these two points absolve Kant of the claim of contradiction. He can claim consistently that the state’s purpose is to protect individual free agency and that it is justified in using coercion to secure the conditions that allow such protection—but not in any other circumstances. If this account correctly represents Kant’s position, then **we may properly describe him as a political libertarian, though one sensitive to libertarianism’s limitations. Thus, we might aptly call his position constrained libertarianism.**

#### Prefer additionally,

#### 1] An intrinsic feature to any action is the acceptance of the goodness of universal freedom, Gewirth 84 bracketed for grammar and gendered language

[Alan Gewirth, () "The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alternative" American Journal Of Jurisprudence: Vol. 29: Iss. 1 Article 5, 1984, https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ajj/vol29/iss1/5/, DOA:9-10-2018 // WWBW Recut LHP AV]

Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, **every agent acts for purposes [t]he[y] regards as good.** Hence, **[t]he[y] must regard as necessary goods the freedom** and well being **that [is]** are the generic features and **necessary conditions of** his **action** and successful action in general. From this, it follows that **every agent logically must hold or accept** that he has **rights to these conditions**. For if he were **to deny** that he has **these rights**, then he **would** have to **admit that it is permissible** for other persons **to remove** from him the very **conditions** of freedom and well-being **that**, as **an agent**, he **must have**. But **it is contradictory** for him **to hold both that [t]he[y] must have these conditions and also that he may not have them.** Hence, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. Moreover, **every agent must further admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other actual or prospective agents have the same general characteristics of agency** on which he must ground his own right-claims. What I am saying, then, is that every agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and must hold that he and all other actual or prospective agents have rights to these necessary goods. Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the following principle: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, freedom, and well-being. I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action.

#### 2] Agency requires deliberation to choose what actions to take which creates a practical identity identical for every agent. It is the only form of ontology that can account for every individual, making it the only identity that can create obligations.

Christine M. Korsgaard, 1992

“The Sources of Normativity.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Cambridge University.

The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

#### Impacts: A] Since obligations arise from a universal identity, they must be the same for all, B] hijacks any role of the judge since judging is an identity contained within the practical one

#### Vote neg – I contend that the resolution i.e. the approprartion of outer space by private entities is unjust

#### 1] Injustice requires someone wronged, but initial acquisition doesn’t violate any entity’s rights– therefore, private appropriation of outer space cannot be unjust, Feser 05:

Edward Feser, [Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College] “THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION,” 2005 //LHP AV

The reason **there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition** of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of **justice**, that is to say, simply **does not apply** to initial acquisition. **It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place**. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned**. Consider the following example. **Suppose** **an individual** **A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R**. **For it to be** the case that A commits an **injustice** in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that **there is some individual** **B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice**. **But for B to have been wronged** by A’s acquisi- tion of R, **B would have to have had a rightful claim over R,** **a right to R**. By hypothesis, **however**, **B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all**. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, **the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R**. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. **The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer**. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

## Case

Nothing on case off doc :D