# Harvard R7 1N vs. South Eugene Independent

## Offs

### Theory

#### Interpretation: If the affirmative defends anything other than, “The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust,” then the affirmative must have a solvency advocate clearly delineated in the text of the 1AC that advocates the plan is a good idea and is normal means

#### Violation: They don’t

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Fairness – the shell is a litmus to determine whether the aff is fair

#### a) Limits – there are infinite things you could defend outside the exact text of the resolution which pushes you to the limits of contestable arguments, even if your topic is better, our model makes it so only affirmatives within the scope of topic literature can find. Our interp narrows out trivially true aff’s and ensure there is possible contestation that o/w on predictability

#### b) Shiftiness-Having a solvency advocate helps us conceptualize what their advocacy is and how it’s implemented. Intentionally ambiguous affirmatives we don’t know much about can’t spike out of DA’s and CP’s if they have an advocate that delineates these things.

#### DTD

#### Fairness

#### No RVI

#### Competing Interps

### K

#### Their scholarship is hateful and a reason to lose the round—their author endorsed pedophilia and actively advocated for pedophilic content.

Moen 15 [Moen, O. M. (Professor of Ethics at Oslo Metropolitan University). “The ethics of pedophilia”. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 9(1), 111-124. 2015-05-09. Accessed 2/2/2022. <https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/1718> //CHO]

If my arguments in this article are sound, then being a pedophile—in the sense of having a sexual preference for children—is neither moral nor immoral. Engagement in adult-child sex is immoralbecause it exposes children to a significant risk of serious harm, butit is perhaps not always blameworthy to the extent that we intuitively assume. Finally, the enjoyment of fictional stories and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content is, in and of itself, morally acceptable. If these conclusions are correct, what practical implications follow? A central implication is that in dealing with pedophilia, our aim should not be to find outlets for our disgust and outrage, but rather, to minimize what is the real problem: harm to children. On the least revisionist side, the aim of reducing harm provides us with a good justification for upholding current bans on adult-child sex and child pornography. There are, however, also a number of more revisionist implications. One revisionist implication is that we should stop the outright condemnation of pedophiles. Condemning pedophiles for being pedophiles is unjust, and non-offending pedophiles, rather than deserving condemnation for their pedophilia, deserve praise for their admirablewillpower.4 Possibly, today’s condemnation also prevents pedophiles from telling health professionals about their attraction to children, and insofar as detection and counseling can help prevent abuse, this is very unfortunate. To prevent harm to future children, we would also be well advised to start teaching high school students not just what to do in case they are victims of sexual abuse (which, thankfully, we have started telling them over the last few decades), but also what to do in case they themselves are pedophiles. A certain percentage of high school students either are or will become pedophiles, and currently they are not given any advice on how to handle their sexuality. The production, distribution, and enjoyment of texts and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content should almost certainly be made legal. Until or unless it can be shown that such texts and graphics lead to more adult-child sex, the justification for today’s widespread ban is weak.

#### Drop the debater—academic spaces have way too many sympathizers who ignore violence against children, and every act must be challenged in the most unflinching terms because anything else reinforces the epistemic bias in favor of rationalizing disgusting behavior.

#### Grant 18 **[**Alec Grant (Independent Scholar, retired from the Uiversity of Brighton where he was a Reader in Narrative Mental Health). “Sanitizing Academics and Damaged Lives” Mad In The UK, 12 April 2018. https://www.madintheuk.com/2018/12/sanitizing-academics-and-damaged-lives/ //WWDH]

Academics who sympathize with paedophilia constitute its intellectual public relations arm. Their role is to make child-adult sex presentable, more acceptable to the public, fit for polite society, sugar-coated, glossed with a scholarly veneer, sanitized. Snapshots of sanitizing academic activity from the last 40 years show how this seeps into and contaminates public policy, education and practice in insidious ways. This is done via the workings of power, privilege, perverse cronyism, and, as Pilgrim (2018) argues, as a result of widespread moral stupor and denial. It’s astonishing that this happens in the face of the psychological and development features of complex post-trauma which are often a consequence of child sexual abuse. By pathologizing adult survivors, often with the ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’ (BPD) tag, mainstream psychiatric business-as-usual plays out its role in suppressing the truth about the consequences of paedophilia among adult survivors. Pilgrim (2018) reminds us that care and mutuality are core ethical features of all sexual practices. As someone who was for many years associated with cognitive therapy, I’m interested in ‘cognitive, or thought distortions’, which are used by people in rationalising their behaviour in self-serving ways. We know from Pilgrim and many other writers, researchers and practitioners about the rationalisations of perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation. They include: Children are not victims but willing participants; They want it; They enjoy it; It’s about friendship; It’s about love; It helps children develop and mature. According to Pilgrim (2018), the ‘heyday’ period of academic versions of such rationalisations was the 1970s. 1977 was the year of an unsuccessful lobby by French intellectuals to defend intergenerational sex. Included among these were the otherwise well-respected philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Jaques Derrida, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. These figures were at the forefront of the use of academic authority to lobby governments to liberalise and decriminalise adult-child sexual contact. In 1978, Foucault took part in a France-Culture broadcast with two other gay theorists, Hocquengham and Danet, to discuss the legal aspects of sex between adults and children. They wanted a repeal of the law preventing this because they took the view that in a liberal (they really meant libertarian) society, sexual preferences generally should not be the business of the law. Foucault, Hocquengham and Danet made the following assertions: that children can, and have the capacity to, consent to such relations without being coerced into doing so; that abuse and post-abuse trauma isn’t real; that the law is part of an oppressive and repressive heteronormative social control discourse which unfairly targets sexual minorities; that children don’t constitute a vulnerable population; that children can and are capable of making the first move in seducing adults (they introduced here the category of ‘the seducing child’); that the laws against sexual relations between children and adults actually function to protect children from their own desires, making them an oppressed and repressed group; that – in the language of the sociologist Stanley Cohen – international public horror about sexual relations between adults and children is a form of moral panic which feeds into constructing the ‘paedophile’ as a folk devil, in turn provoking public vigilantism; that sex between adults and children is actually a trivial matter when compared with ‘real crimes’ such as the murder of old ladies; that many members of the judiciary and other authority figures and groups don’t actually believe paedophilia to be a crime; and that consent should be a private contractual matter between the adult and the child. Fast forward to 1981. The Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE) has been active for seven years. This was a pro-paedophile activist group, founded in the UK in 1974 and officially disbanded in 1984. The group, an international organisation of people who traded in obscene material, campaigned for the abolition of the age of consent. Dr Brian Taylor, the research director and member of PIE, and sociology lecturer at the University of Sussex produced the controversial book Perspectives on Paedophilia, which had the aim of enlightening social workers and youth workers about the benefits of paedophilia. Taylor, who identified as gay, advocated ‘guilt-free pederasty’ (sexual relations between two males, one of whom is a minor). He argued that people generally are hostile to paedophilia only because they don’t understand it, and If they did wouldn’t be so against it. So it was simply a matter of clearing up prejudice and ignorance.

### CP

#### CP: The Member Nations of the UN should draft, sign, and ratify a treaty banning the purposeful destruction of space objects. (anti-satellite weapons)

#### This solves the aff better –

#### A) Our plan solves non-aggressive weapons testing, which is a more probable impact (via space debris) than space war – Porras 19:

Daniel Porras (2019) Anti-satellite warfare and the case for an alternative draft treaty for space security, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:4, 142-147, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1628470 // LHP PS

Today, **there are few explicit rules related to conflict in space**, and it is not entirely clear how we can apply them. The two main sources of laws in this area are the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the UN Charter. **The Outer Space Treaty**, which has been adopted by every space-faring nation, **contains a prohibition on the placement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space**. **This does not include nuclear weapons that may merely be passing through space on their way to a target, but rather weapons that are stationed in orbit.** Additionally, the Limited Test Ban Traty prohibits nuclear explosions in space, whether a test or any other nuclear explosion. The Outer Space Treaty also contains language say- ing that all space activities must be carried out in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter. As such, there is a prohibition against the threat or use of force in outer space. But **it is unclear what constitutes a “threat or use of force” against a space object** and whether jamming or hacking would rise to the level of “use of force” or an “armed attack.” The Russian military, for example, has used jamming and spoofing during the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, while countries such as Iran and North Korea and the United States have also demonstrated their abilities to interfere with telecommunications and glo- bal positioning (Secure World Foundation 2019). The muted reactions from states whose space objects have been jammed or hacked would indicate that these are not considered attacks, though we do not know if these states responded in some covert way. **Different actors might also have different interpretations of what gives rise to the right of self-defense, as stipulated by Article 51 of the UN Charter**. While it is not clear whether electronic or cyber warfare against space objects reaches the required threshold of hostilities for permis- sible self-defense, there is at least some convergence of opinion that intentionally destroying someone else’s space object without permission would be considered an armed attack. Apart from these few rules, **there is little else by way of guidance or prohibitions for space conflict**. The Constitution and Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union prohibits what it terms “harm- ful interference,” but the organization has no means to enforce this prohibition beyond consultations (Takaya 2019). For this reason, **many UN Member States are calling for new rules to contain conflict on Earth**, or at least to strengthen the space law regime that does exist. For nearly 40 years, UN Member States have been divided about how best to strengthen the international space regime. One group of states would like to negoti- ate a treaty that prevents an arms race or conflict from emerging in outer space. To this end, in 2008, the Russians and Chinese put forward a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, as well as the threat or use of force therein (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2016). This draft text is seen by many as, if 2 nothing else, a starting point for negotiations This is particularly true of countries that have few space assets of their own. But **a second group of states (many of them with significant space capabilities) does not see a treaty that bans an arms race in space as a viable option, citing the inability to define a “space weapon” and problems with 3 verification and monitoring. Indeed, the ability to inde- pendently verify compliance and adherence is one of the most critical – if not the most critical – elements of a future treaty for space arms control, due to the low levels of trust among space powers today**. This second group of states would prefer to see voluntary measures be adopted that can strengthen trust and confidence in space. These mea- sures could include the enhanced sharing of space data, as well as notifications of upcoming rocket launches or in- orbit manuevers. To be clear, there would be no legal obligations binding states to adhere to these measures, but they would help to establish rules of the road for space activities, and could reduce some tension between any entities working in space. Unfortunately, despite some recent hopeful prospects, UN Member States are still at odds over how best to proceed; efforts to adopt either a treaty or voluntary mea- sures are not making much progress. Last year, there seemed to be momentum building within the United Nations to tackle space security issues, particularly in the form of a potential agreement around a topic known as the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The United Nations had three major processes taking place that were focused specifically on PAROS, looking for practical measures to resolve the situation – including legally bind- ing treaties and measures that are purely voluntary. The hope was to find commonalities and areas of convergence in PAROS, where UN Member states could focus their efforts. Unfortunately, this year, each of the three tracks hit its own individual roadblock. One was unable to reform its working groups, another ended without reaching a consensus on recommendations for a treaty, and the last could only meet informally due to political issues among its membership. Consequently, there is a real risk that all of the momentum behind space security dialogues will dissipate. Meanwhile, states continue to seek counter- space capabilities at a time when there is high tension among geopolitical space rivals. Possible next steps While it is a shame that the UN initiatives have been unable to reach consensus, they have at least identified some options for moving forward. One idea is to focus on one of the few areas where there is convergence of opinions: the destruction of space objects. While there is some disagreement on the precise threshold that must be met for an action to be considered an “armed attack,” there is a consensus that the destruction of someone else’s object would qualify. Moreover, there is a shared concern about the increase of space debris, including debris that results from the mere testing of ASATs. Consequently, this could be a topic where states are able to find common ground, particularly since everyone’s objects would be put at risk from any one’s destructive actions in space. This issue could be addressed through both voluntary and legally binding measures. Rather than just taking one step, this approach would entail taking two: one short step and one long step. First, the short step, which could take place in the United Nations Disarmament Commission – whose mandate is to consider ways to implement voluntary measures – States could examine anti-satellite test guidelines. As I wrote last year at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, anti-satellite test guidelines could mitigate the threats from debris through three principles, known as no debris, low debris, and notification (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 2018). This idea is based on recommendations by another UN expert group that met in 2013. The guidelines can be summarized as follows: No Debris: If an actor wishes to test anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, they should not create debris. Low Debris: If an actor must create debris during an ASAT test, the test should be carried out at an altitude sufficiently low that the debris will not be long-lived. Notification: Actors testing ASATs should notify others of their activities in advance (even if they are not com- pletely transparent on the motivation behind the test) to avoid misperceptions or misinterpretations. While not a perfect solution, these guidelines would, at a minimum, ensure that the emergence of ASAT technol- ogy does not unduly disrupt the current stability, promot- ing the long-term sustainability of human space activities. They would also provide some legal clarity on what is considered responsible behavior when conducting certain tests. This is important, because the notion of liability in space is still novel and would require additional guidance in case it ever needs to be applied to an accident involving space debris generated by an ASAT test. As seen from public (non)reaction to the Indian anti-satellite test, there is at least some acceptance from the public and from states that tests under 300 kilometers (186 miles) are acceptable. If not, then states could say explicitly in the Guidelines how low tests should be carried out. These Guidelines could take into consideration new constellations of small satellites that are being deployed in LEO, also around 300km in altitude. Since the guidelines would be voluntary, they could be adopted relatively soon. If the members agree, the United Nations Disarmament Commission could refer these guide- lines to the UN General Assembly for adoption in a resolution. Alternatively, states could enact such guide- lines on a unilateral or regional basis, which would still have the effect of establishing a norm of behavior when it comes to testing ASATs. As regards a longer-term step forward, the United Nations could consider an alternative approach to a legally binding instrument such on PAROS. **Instead of seeking to limit the types of technology deployed in space (namely, “weapons”), the UN could seek to limit the kinds of actions that can be carried out in space. As there is already some consensus on the hazards posed by the destruction of space objects, UN Member States would likely find greater convergence around a treaty that pro- hibits the intentional destruction of objects in orbit. In other words, rather than ban space weapons, it could ban the destruction of space objects.** Much like the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention, this approach would limit the use of force even in legitimate situations such as self-defense. By acknowledging the threat posed by debris to the general population, states could agree that they should not resort to physically destroying each other’s satellites, though jamming and hacking could still be employed. This approach has the benefit of being verifiable, since states can use their own inde- pendent technical means to monitor the destruction of objects in space and correctly attribute them to an aggressor. A treaty on the prohibition of the intentional destruction of objects in orbit could have built-in exceptions for cases where there is necessity based on safety, but it would promote the overall objective of containing the conflict to the parties involved**. By prohibiting the destruction of objects, states would ensure that the debris resulting from a full-blown kinetic con- flict does not create threats to everyone else’s space systems. Such** an alternative text would need to be proposed by a UN Member State. And there does appear to be some inclination to consider an alternative to the Russian/ Chinese proposal. For example, in February 2019, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested that efforts would be better spent focusing on limiting unac- ceptable behavior in space rather than the current draft treaty before the United Nations (Payne 2018). An alter- native draft treaty does not need to come from one of the major space powers (such as China, Russia, or the United States) but could come from a medium space power – one that could generate support from both the treaty- and the voluntary-measures camps. Indeed, looking at the votes from last year’s General Assembly, one can see that most states in the United Nations are not fixated on a particular approach to PAROS, so long as it is taken up seriously and with the intent to produce a result. A more difficult question, however, is the venue where such a proposal could be made. The Conference on Disarmament, the main multilateral body for discussing disarmament, has been at a standstill for 20 years. And the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has traditionally declined to take up space security issues. But a proposal could be made at the UN General Assembly. If there is traction for a treaty in this body, then it could form a working group to develop a draft text, to be put before the General Assembly at a later date. This process would likely take years to work its way through the UN system and should be seen as a long-term solution. As such, it would be important to adopt some short-term immediate measures in the meanwhile, such as anti-satellite test guidelines. **The Indian anti-satellite test is a reminder that countries are preparing themselves for conflict in space**. **The current trend towards the militarization of space will continue, so it is likely that the world will witness another ASAT test soon.** For example, Russia, which is developing its own anti-satellite missile capabilities but has never used one against a space object, may see the value of conducting its own anti-satellite test. **The main concern with the emergence of ASATs is not necessarily their effect on targeted space systems, but rather their impact on the space systems of innocent bystanders from the space debris those attacks would generate**. So far, UN Member States have been unable to agree on the best approach to comprehensively address a Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty and the potential spread of conflict into space. **But recent UN discussions on this issue revealed that there is convergence around the intentional destruction of objects in orbit. Consequently, future multilateral discussions on space security should focus on destructive counterspace cap- abilities to limit the impact of space debris.** As an immediate solution, the United Nations Disarmament Commission could recommend the adoption of ASAT test guidelines to the UN General Assembly. Simultaneously, UN Member States could also look at developing an alternative text for a legally binding instrument on PAROS, one that prohibits the intentional destruction of objects in orbit. By focusing their atten- tion on a single aspect of PAROS where there is wide- spread agreement, UN Member States could build on the limited but valuable momentum that emerged over the last year-and-a-half. The result would be a strengthened international regime for space activities suitable for the long-term sustainability for all human space activities.

#### B) China would honor the commitment.

Cerny et. al 21[Michael B. Cerny has a Bachelor’s in International Relations from Emory University, Raphael J. Piliero is a Fulbright Scholar in Taiwan. David Bernstein has a Bachelors from Georgetown, Brandon W. Kelley is the Associate Director of Debate at Georgetown , May 2021,*Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits*, Chapter 5: Countering Co-Orbital ASATs: Warning Zones in GEO as a Lawful Trigger for Self-Defense https://npolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Space\_and\_Missile\_Wars.pdf, 12-18-2021 amrita]

There is some evidence to suggest that **Russia** and **China would** also **accept the warning zone proposal.** **First**, **Russian** and **China** might **recognize that warning zones are mutually beneficial**, **giving them a legal right to defend their satellites** while maintaining stability as a variety of RPO capable spacecraft are rapidly deployed.454 Even if the two parties do not accede to the agreement at first, **the failure of existing proposals** to address dual-use threats from RPO capable spacecraft **might** **encourage Russia** and China towards acceptance of warning zones. Second, **the U**nited **S**tates can **gain political leverage** and engage in "full-contact lawfare" **by highlighting** the **contradictory positions of Russia** and China regarding space arms-control diplomacy.455 As the two nations continue to conduct potentially destabilizing RPO tests in orbit, the international community will **eventually recognize** their dual-use nature as **ASATs**. This is especially salient considering the recent Russian testing of the Nudol, as well as the much-pilloried Chinese direct-ascent and debris-producing ASAT test of 2010. With regards to China, this reality is particularly relevant when one considers **China’s desire to leave a mark on international institutions in the space domain**. For example, Brian Weeden and Xiao He, an assistant research fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argue that China feels boxed out of most international arenas where the US is already well-established. **Space offers an area** where China can proactively participate and lead in international governance, shaping rules **to align with their own interests**.456 Furthermore, He writes that China has recognized international resistance to the PPWT proposal and considers the likelihood of success as remote. Furthermore, Chinese President **Xi** Jingping has **emphasized coop**erative **security** a central aspect of China’s foreign political approach, hoping to produce win-win outcomes in contrast to the zero-sum thinking that dominated during the Cold War.457 Additionally, **China has an economic incentive** to pursue stability in orbit. As China continues to use satellites to expand its Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), they have a strong incentive to protect their own assets.458 Such international and economic incentives similarly exist for Russia, a declining power with a desire to increase international engagement in orbit.

#### C) Shared commitment to space regimes key to avoid Sino-US war. (second card in doc I sent you.)

#### Weak Chinese space vastly increases risk of Sino-US war. This card is amazing – Fabian 22:

[Fabian, Christopher David](https://www.proquest.com/indexinglinkhandler/sng/au/Fabian,+Christopher+David/$N). “A Neoclassical Realist's Analysis of Sino-U.S. Space Policy “ The University of North Dakota. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2019. 13880083. https://www.proquest.com/docview/2581550024?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true DOA: 2/20/22

Similarly, Western intervention in Asia has repeatedly been met with unexpected hostility from China due to its fear of encirclement. When the Chinese view of preemption encounters the Western concept of deterrence, a vicious circle can result; **acts conceived as defensive in China may be treated as aggressive by the outside world; deterrent moves by the West may be interpreted in China as encirclement**. The United States and China wrestled with this dilemmarepeatedly during the Cold War; to some extent they have not yet found a way totranscend it… [In the case of Korea] a Chinese offensive was a preemptive strategyagainst dangers that had not yet materialized and based on judgements about ultimateAmerican purposes toward China that were misapprehended. 446 **The assertion of American space superiority and the capability to deny China access to the domain can be seen as yet another aspect of strategic encirclement**. **This pattern makes it difficult to expect peaceful outcomes. Resentment of American bullying has led for some in China to call for it to consolidate gains and assert a claim to superpower status**. On the other hand,misunderstanding of China’s active defense posture has strengthened the view within Americanpolicy circles that Sino-U.S. relations are zero-sum.447h. Cultural DifferencesWar has a tendency to become ritualized when opponents share a common culture and/orcivilization and are highly invested in international norms. The result is adequate signalingbefore an attack occurs, strict rules of engagement, and tactics that reduce collateral damage.448 **During the Cold War, strategic warfare between the U.S. and Russia became ritualized** due torepeated crisis and diplomatic interaction. A system of mutual restraint in space emerged becausespace capabilities were inherently linked to treaty verification and early warning. **However**, dueto conventional-strategic decoupling, no first-strike nuclear posture, and lack of firebreaks, **no such system has emerged between China and the U.S**.449 **Disparate views on strategic deterrence and China’s unwillingness to conform to normative behavior further solidified the divide**. **As Mao famously stated “I’m not afraid of nuclear war. There are 2.7 billion people in the world; it doesn’t matter if some are killed.** China has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are killed, there are still 300 million people left.”450 Or, “If the worst came to the worst and half ofmankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist; in a number of years there would be 2.7 billion people again and definitely more.”451 **This sharply juxtaposes the nuclear taboo that developed between the U.S. and Soviet Union.** i. PreconceptionsThird, preconceptions limit imagination and empathy in ways that distort perception of threat. Unfortunately, preconceptions are generally oversimplified or overgeneralized lessons learned from a biased history.452 These lessons are cemented in an individual or collective conscious through confirmation bias.453 Therefore, cultural narrative is likely to alter threat perception by shaping availability. Strategic culture is the shared, culturally embedded social, economic, and political values and priorities of a society, relevant to security preferences, as historically shaped by successful interactions with and adaptations to their prevailing biophysical and strategic environment.454 Americans tend to view war in terms of crusades, fought on behalf of truth, justice, and the American way (democracy, freedom of the seas, and selfdetermination); they fight wars for ideals rather than for an objective.455 Therefore, the goal for warfare tends to be the unconditional surrender and the overthrow of the adversary’s system of government.456 This requires the overwhelming use of force and advanced technology to bring about swift and decisive victory.457 It inherently demands a worthy foe who deserves U.S. attention. The ideological roots of the United States’ China policy are firmly grounded in its vestigial understanding of China as a Communist threat from the Cold War era. American strategic interactions with China are often framed by China’s human rights record, domestic reform, and even régime change, especially in the wake of Tiananmen.458 Mistrust and suspicion characterizes American’s view of China, believing that the emergence of China may be a threat to world peace.459 This increases the availability of a Chinese challenge to the status quo; potentially causing U.S. policy makers to overestimate the risk of a Chinese challenge to American hegemony and/or misinterpreting Chinese signaling. The opaqueness of China’s decision-making apparatus and apparent internal debate as to what role China desires to play in the world further convolutes this dynamic. Why does it matter if scenarios involving an opponent’s defection are highly available? **Fear and mistrust brought on by high availability of a catastrophic Cooperate/Defect scenario lead players to “buy” probabilistic insurance through increased readiness posture, the formation of alliances, and arms buildups. This, in turn, increases tension between the players, making it more difficult to build trust and see gains from mutual cooperation. Policy makers’ biases involving the other player’s hostile intentions are confirmed, further entrenching them in the decisionmaking apparatus. This mechanism acts strongly in an offensive dominant environment.460 The players become trapped in the cyclical pattern of the security dilemma. In current Sino-U.S. relations, the danger of this self-fulfilling prophesy is exceptionally high due to the attention that Chinese policy makers pay to American doctrine, literature, and policy. This is especially true when U.S. policy makers make their suspicion of China public and tout the inevitability of a space war in the very near future**.461 During the current tumultuous period of time, the creation of new modes of international order is inevitable. However, if the previously discussed pattern of separate arrangements devolves into many spheres of activity, competing world orders could come into existence. Should this be the case, **one goal of coevolution would be to ensure that the United States and China pool efforts internationally to bring about an agreed world order. In the absence of common goals and agreed rules of restraint, institutionalized rivalry is likely to escalate beyond the calculation and intentions of its advocates. In an era in which unprecedented offensive capabilities and intrusive technologies multiply, the penalties of failure could be drastic and perhaps irrevocable.462** The evolution of the world order does not necessarily require accommodating China’s rise at the expense of America’s influence in the Pacific, nor does it necessitate dividing into opposing power blocks (as was the case during the Cold War). Further, it does not require seeing the U.S. undermine China’s emergence through economic, social, and military means, and does not demand friendly cooperation between the U.S. and China. **There is room for a competitive relationship that redefines the world order, while simultaneously preserving the shared core interests of both parties.463 Ultimately, the stability of mutual restraint is advantageous to the U.S. and China, therefore disarming the inherently unstable security dilemma present in Sino- U.S. relations should be the primary concern of U.S. space policy.** 462 **The unstable equilibrium of the security dilemma can be dampened by shifting the Nash equilibrium from defection to cooperation for both players. This can be accomplished by altering the players’ utility in three ways: first, increase the benefit of mutual cooperation; second, decrease the benefit gained from a Defect/Cooperate outcome; third, reduce the cost of a Cooperate/Defect outcome**. The security dilemma can also be dampened by making offensive and defensive postures distinguishable from one another, as well as creating an environment in which defense has the advantage over offense. These mechanisms operate by altering the players’ perception of the zero-sum nature of the game, thereby altering their utility of the Cooperate/Defect and Defect/Cooperate outcomes. Furthermore, revealing and accounting for cognitive biases allows for a more accurate perception of threat, reducing the probability that a player will view the other’s actions as harmful and ultimately increase the likelihood of cooperation. The weakness of the current space law régime has resulted in multiple efforts to develop a code of conduct or an arms control agreement for space for the purpose of limiting the proliferation of debris and protecting the continued use of the domain. However, these efforts have been held hostage by a China-U.S. strategic stalemate.464 On one side, China has demonstrated a heavy reliance on asymmetric anti-satellite warfare (primarily composed of kinetic direct-ascent and laser ASAT weapons) to supplement their A2/AD strategy in East Asia. Therefore, they have staunchly rejected any ban on terrestrial based or debris-causing ASAT weaponry. The PPWT, introduced jointly by Russia and China, failed to garner support from the United States because it did not limit the use of ground-based weapons, failed to introduce a coherent definition of space weapons, and did not include a verification régime.465 This was seen by Washington as a blatant attempt to preserve China’s deterrent threat while removing a key U.S. military advantage. A resolution against “no first placement” of weapons in outer space further confirmed U.S. fears that the PPWT was aimed at reducing U.S. warfighting capability. In 2014, the European Union proposed the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), but it failed to gain traction in the U.S. due to concerns that it would constrain space capabilities, including space-based missile defense interceptors and anti-satellite weapons.466 A cornerstone of U.S. policy is the avoidance of policy decisions that would limit the use of existing ASAT weapons against Chinese space systems during a regional conflict.467 This is particularly true when taking into consideration that the concepts of space warfighting, space superiority, and space control are thoroughly integrated with national policy.468 A. Policy Recommendations j. **The U.S. military must reduce reliance on** **space**. It is difficult to codify international norms involving space weaponization and free access to outer space when the two most influential actors have diametrically opposed strategic interests. China will likely block initiatives that reduce its own ability to utilize debris causing or terrestrial ASATs, while simultaneously attempting to limit conventional U.S. military advantage by pursuing a ban on space weapons. **The United States, reluctant to block its path to potential space dominance, is unlikely to support a definitive ban on space weaponization; yet, it is incentivized to create international norms that limit the creation of debris in outer space to protect its highvalue space assets.469 This dynamic is unlikely to change unless China’s space-based ASAT capability reaches operational maturity, thus reducing its reliance on direct ascent ASATs. Alternatively, China’s space capabilities may mature to the extent that they are symmetric with the United States, allowing for a system of implicit mutual restraint to develop. The U.S. and China are unlikely to come to an agreement until the structural security dilemma is addressed.** To accomplish this, the United States must reduce the benefit that China gains from the continued development of debris causing anti-satellite weapons through a denial of gains strategy. The primary U.S. strategy must be to reduce its reliance on space by substituting terrestrial capabilities for space-based capabilities in its AirSea Battle (ASB) concept. This will reduce the role of space in the F2T2EA chain and devalue ASATs as a tactical and operational weapon. When Chinese strategists believe that the tactical value of direct ascent ASAT weapons are outweighed by the international stigma of their use, the U.S. may be able to gain traction in banning such weapons. It may be attractive for U.S. policy makers to pursue a denial of gains strategy by hardening U.S. space assets against attack because it allows for the continued reliance on space capabilities. However, this is not an economical strategy due to an unfavorable offense/defense balance.470 k. **Reducing fear of U.S. space domination (Reduce fear of C/D)** The dual-use of space technologies results in an inability to conduct offense/defense differentiation, and creates mistrust, misperceptions, and miscalculations that can undermine political and strategic stability involving the space domain.471 When offense/defense differentiation cannot be accomplished, developing acceptable norms of responsible behavior, if only to reveal benign intentions and ritualize conflict, is preferable to an attempt to identify and ban specific technologies and capabilities.472 Therefore, the United States should seek to introduce a series of top-down TCBMs that codify a space code of conduct, work toward a treaty that bans the testing and use of destructive methods against space objects, and increase transparency and trust in U.S. space policy. Collectively, these initiatives could alleviate the fear of U.S. space domination. The infrastructure for introducing TCBM to the international community is well established. The UNCOPUOS is the principal international forum for the development and codification of laws and principles governing activities in outer space.473 A set of Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines was endorsed by the UNCOPUOS in 2007; however, this set of guidelines was nonbinding and contained ambiguous language, such as: “avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities,” rather than specifically banning debris-causing space weapons.474 A working group under the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee set forth guidelines for the long term sustainability of space in 2016, but (like the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines) these were non-binding.475 The UN General Assembly adopted the non-binding Resolution 69/32 that advised against the first placement of weapons in space with 126 in favor, 4 against (including the United States), and 46 abstentions.476 These measures, introduced through UNCOPUOS and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) show that space we aponization and debris mitigation TCBMs have received adequate attention in the United Nations. The United States’ decision to remain aloof in these forums in the face of the international consensus will damage U.S. prestige, raise fear of space weaponization, and threaten its space leadership. **The United States should work through the CD to provide an alternative to China and Russia’s** PPWT **proposal. This proposal should ban the testing and use of debris-causing ASAT weapons and include a definition of “debris-causing” that allows for minor satellite breakups.** This would keep space free of massive debris causing incidents in the event of a conflict, while simultaneously allowing the continued development of counterspace capabilities. No binding resolution will be established without an agreement between China and the United States, but (as discussed previously) a misalignment of strategic interests makes that outcome unlikely. Therefore, the United States must be prepared to make substantial concessions in order to gain acceptance from China. A variety of concessions may induce Chinese ratification: first, the U.S. could include a sidecar that bans on-orbit force application technologies in order to assuage fears that the U.S. intends to expand its global strike capability through the deployment of space weapons; second, the U.S. could reconsider its position on an ABM prohibition; third, the U.S. could pursue a bilateral non-first use pledge with China; fourth, the U.S. could open up the ISS program to China; and fifth, the U.S. could restructure ITAR regulations to increase interaction between Chinese and American commercial markets. In the absence of a formal treaty, the United States must nonetheless continue to work towards implementing TCBMs that seek to increase transparency, familiarity and clarity of intentions, and provide a basis for strengthening mutual trust building and confidence amongst states.477 Improving space situational awareness (SSA) through an international outreach effort is the ideal platform through which to accomplish these goals. SSA is vital to the long-term sustainability of the space environment because it helps mitigate natural environmental threats and identifies behavior that would be detrimental to responsible use and long-term sustainability.478 Therefore, SSA will be a foundational verification mechanism for potential treaties as well as an opportunity for cooperative trust building.479 SSA is generally made up of two components: space surveillance and tracking (SST) and space traffic management (STM). First, SST involves using ground-based and space-based optical sensors and radars in order to track, characterize, and analyze space objects. Second, STM utilizes SST data in order to ensure safe passage through the space environment.480 Both SST and STM require cooperative efforts to be successful. SST necessitates a diverse, geographically dispersed sensor network to provide timely, accurate data on objects in a wide array of orbits.481 A single nation is not able to provide the geographical coverage needed for a comprehensive SST network. STM requires agreed upon standards of behavior to ensure spaceflight safety.482 There is currently no standardized regime for conducting the broad SSA mission in order to analyze and communicate threats to the space domain.483 This creates an opportunity for the U.S. to utilize its position of technical superiority in order to score a soft power coup by taking the lead in a global SSA initiative. The major obstacle to building an international SSA coalition is the military utility SST data, which can be used to reveal classified military capabilities and conduct ASAT targeting.484 The United States possesses the most comprehensive network of SST sensors and maintains a database of 20,000+ space objects.485 However, the U.S. military did not share this data until an Iridium satellite collided with a Russian military satellite, prompting the amendment of 10 U.S.C. § 2274 to authorize the provision of SSA services if they were consistent with national security interests.486 After this event, the U.S. Strategic Command’s SSA sharing program grew exponentially, providing close approach notices to satellite owner operators and freely sharing SST data on its website.487 This was a good first step, but an increase in the quantity of SST sensors in the past decade has done little to bolster space traffic management efforts due to the disjointed nature of the data.488 As the space community attempts to consolidate SST data as part of a broader SSA régime, multiple nascent SST data sharing organizations show that a U.S. centric model is not guaranteed.489 The U.S. could put itself in a dangerous situation if it attempts to control SST data for the purposes of military use; this could potentially result in having complete control over only a fraction of the SST market, while American commercial SST companies lose their competitive edge.490 In order to leverage the proliferation of SST sensors, increased interest in orbital debris mitigation from the international community, and the extant U.S. technological advantage in SST, the U.S. needs to encourage a U.S. centric data sharing model. The first step in this process will be separating the SSA mission from its military origins. Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy, issued by President Trump on June 18, 2018, indicates that the White House intends to act in that manner. The space policy directive orders the U.S. government to do the following: pioneer new SST technologies, encourage the commercial SST market, create SST data interoperability, develop STM standards and best practices, improve U.S. domestic space object registry, and encourage SST data sharing. All this will be accomplished primarily by the Department of Commerce, reducing the role of the DoD in the SSA mission.491 SPD-3 is absolutely in line with the recommendations of this thesis. While the United States is attempting to build bridges in the international space community, it may be burning others at an equivalent rate. In order to reduce Chinese fear of U.S. space domination, American decision makers must be careful to avoid inflammatory and militaristic rhetoric. The groundwork for space warfighting was set by the George W. Bush administration on the heels of the Rumsfeld Commission’s “Space Pearl Harbor” warning. The 2006 U.S. National Space Policy maintained the right to deny adversaries use of space if those capabilities are hostile to U.S. national interests.492 Note that the policy does not say “deny adversaries use of space if those capabilities are hostile to U.S. space assets,” which would infer a natural right to self-defense. Rather, the language of the space policy suggests that the U.S. has the right to interdict an adversary’s space capabilities if they provide space effects that are disadvantageous to national security. This is consistent with the militaristic vernacular in the United States Space Command Vision for 2020, which promises to provide full spectrum space dominance hinging on space control capabilities. The Vision for 2020 compares space to other warfighting domains (land, air, and sea) and asserts that during the early 21st century, space power will evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare.493 **This rhetoric, combined with technological developments during the Bush administration, made the prospect of U.S. space domination seem incipient to Chinese policy makers and reignited conversation about space weaponization.494** The Obama Administration brought more moderate rhetoric by excluding inflammatory language in the 2010 National Space policy, recommending space arms control, suggesting TCBMs for space stability, as well as allowing Bush era technology programs expire.495 This policy was received very well in Asia, allowing the Obama administration to open high level strategic dialog about space cooperation with China and strengthen relations with East Asian allies.496 However, inflammatory and militaristic rhetoric returned with the Trump administration. Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson and other top Air Force leaders resurrected the idea of space as a warfighting domain during testimony to Congress, saying that the Air Force needed to maintain its capability regardless of consensus on international norms.497 In 2017 Air Force Space Command created the National Space Defense Center to integrate space capabilities and C2 methods in order to help conduct a space war.498 President Trump echoed that space is a war-fighting domain by signing the Space Policy Directive-4 on 19 February 2019, which proposes the creation of a Space Force as the sixth branch of service.499 These reorganizations alone are not as inherently threatening or substantive as the weapons development programs pioneered during the early 2000s. However, the incendiary rhetoric that accompanied these reorganizations may have counteracted the potentially powerful TCBMs outlined in SPD 2-3. **The White House should emphasize cooperative, collaborative space initiatives as part of future space policy directives, rather than set a course for unilateralist (America First) action.** l. Pursue active cooperation. (Increase benefit of CC) **The U.S. space community must pursue active cooperation with China in order to increase the potential benefit of a Cooperate/Cooperate outcome**. Robust bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and China could increase trust and transparency, as well as improve signaling byengendering repeated diplomatic and scientific interaction, increase interdependence by giving each country a stake in the success of the other’s space program, foster China’s interest in space sustainability, and give China and the United States insight into each other’s space program.500 **China could benefit by learning from a more technologically advanced partner, while the United States learns about the capabilities and organization of a traditionally opaque bureaucracy.501 Collaboration may also have significant cost sharing benefits**, especially considering that the ISS may be reaching end of life and funding is precarious.502 Additionally, active engagement with China on manned space exploration and deep space science may prevent the development of a China-led space station, which could solidify its diplomatic ties within Europe and East Asia.503 **For these reasons, increased cooperation with China has the potential to yield great results; however, U.S. decision makers must take care to avoid pitfalls of past space cooperation projects when crafting Sino-U.S. policy.**504 **China has showed an openness to bilateral cooperation**, particularly between NASA and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) regarding manned space exploration and space science.505 In 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and other top NASA officials toured Chinese space facilities in a landmark visit on the invitation of Laiyan Sun, administrator of the CNSA.506 This event was followed shortly after by a second visit by NASA administrator Charles Bolden (Griffin’s successor) in 2010.507 Additionally, in October 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie emphasized the need for dialog about space security and bilateral TCBMs.**508 This high level engagement could have marked a significant breakthrough in Sino-U.S. space relations**, and been preceded by lowerlevel technical discussions, had the U.S. Congress not passed Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 in 2011, which banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China.509 Current NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine and CNSA administrator Zhang Kejian discussed SSA and deep space exploration as potential areas of cooperation in 2018, but this was not followed up by technical discussion.510 In order to foster cooperation between China and the United States, domestic reforms need to be made. First, NASA should be the focal point for Sino-U.S. space cooperation: Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 should immediately be repealed to allow for NASA-CNSA engagement. Likewise, long-awaited domestic export control reforms would need to take place in order to streamline scientific and technical exchange and prevent further legal barriers to cooperation.511 Additionally, the U.S. must be prepared to make a long-term commitment to China-U.S. joint Chinese space facilities in a landmark visit on the invitation of Laiyan Sun, administrator of the CNSA.506 This event was followed shortly after by a second visit by NASA administrator Charles Bolden (Griffin’s successor) in 2010.507 Additionally, in October 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie emphasized the need for dialog about space security and bilateral TCBMs.508 This high level engagement could have marked a significant breakthrough in Sino-U.S. space relations, and been preceded by lowerlevel technical discussions, had the U.S. Congress not passed Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 in 2011, which banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China.509 Current NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine and CNSA administrator Zhang Kejian discussed SSA and deep space exploration as potential areas of cooperation in 2018, but this was not followed up by technical discussion.510 In order to foster cooperation between China and the United States, domestic reforms need to be made. First, NASA should be the focal point for Sino-U.S. space cooperation: Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 should immediately be repealed to allow for NASA-CNSA engagement. Likewise, long-awaited domestic export control reforms would need to take place in order to streamline scientific and technical exchange and prevent further legal barriers to cooperation.511 Additionally, the U.S. must be prepared to make a long-term commitment to China-U.S. joint over-weighted risk in order to overturn the existing status quo**. Key cultural differences proliferate conflict between the U.S. and China, further altering leaders’ decision calculus and creating an opportunity for self-fulfilling prophesy. Despite this grim prescription, arms race and conflict between the two nations is not inevitable. The implementation of top-down TCBMs designed to build trust and transparency can direct both nations towards a globally optimal outcome.**

### China Space DA

#### Chinese presence in space essential to prevent escalation and inevitable security conflict – Fabian 22:

[Fabian, Christopher David](https://www.proquest.com/indexinglinkhandler/sng/au/Fabian,+Christopher+David/$N). “A Neoclassical Realist's Analysis of Sino-U.S. Space Policy “ The University of North Dakota. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2019. 13880083. https://www.proquest.com/docview/2581550024?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true DOA: 2/20/22

Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation.60 Furthermore, **technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and nonlethal functional kills of space assets.61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable**, but the extent to which it will happen is unknown. **This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build.** The rules of the game have changed, but the danger of nuclear apocalypse is still real and a risk of miscalculation has increased. Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response. **The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike.62 Conversely, the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and protect the continued use of the domain**. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness (SSA) prevents a rapid response.63 **Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into military doctrine.** **This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East Asia.** The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful restructuring of East Asia. However, **a bipartisan grand strategy that preempts conflict, is sustained and refined over decades, and has an acute sense of both a competitor and one’s own culture and history may be able to subvert structural determinism**.64 When imperfect rationality and miscalculation results in deterrence failure it is difficult to underestimate the importance of understanding a competitor’s decision making apparatus. Strategic culture, political climate, and soft power interactions are the core of this apparatus. Joan Johnson-Freese, who is equal parts East Asia policy and space policy expert, asserts that, “it might be generally possible to grasp the mechanics of the Chinese space program without the benefits of historical information, but the likelihood of truly understanding the policy aspects without this contextual information is slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become superficial at best.”65 Likewise, competitive strategy will be ineffective absent an understanding of one’s own limitations. Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block. Henry Kissinger’s On China is a nuanced examination of Chinese strategic culture that benefits from the author’s understanding of Chinese history and the nation’s role in late20th/early-21st century global power politics. He conveys a unified message through On China, that continual diplomatic engagement between the two powers is the key to peace and develops two motifs throughout the work. First, misapprehension of Chinese intent by western powers has repeatedly resulted in conflict, which could be avoided with better understanding of Chinese strategic culture. Traditional Chinese strategic culture, shaped for millennia by geography and Confucian principals, was not destroyed by Mao and the communist revolution as many assert. Kissinger uses the traditional martial games of wei qi (go) and chess to exemplify Chinese and western strategic cultures respectively. Where wei qi teaches the art of strategic flexibility by emphasizing encirclement, protracted and asymmetric warfare, generating unperceptively small advantages, and momentum; chess teaches total victory achieved by attrition, decisive moves, centers of gravity, and symmetry. Carl von Clausewitz teaches that war is policy by other means, inferring war as a distinct phase of politics; while Sun Tsu emphasizes victory before fighting by achieving psychological advantage with military means as a small part of overall strategy. The ideal Chinese military conflict is geographically limited and easily contained; the American way of war concludes only upon total victory.66 Kissinger then describes the feedback loop that results from conflicting strategic perspectives. **The western desire for control threatens Chinese freedom of maneuver and exacerbates their siege mentality. In response, China assumes a policy of active defense (preemption) in order to maintain the strategic initiative.** This, in turn, is seen as hostile by the west and typically results in escalation in order to establish deterrence through cost imposition. The western idea of deterrence is incompatible with ambiguity and flexibility while Chinese preemption demands it.67 This results in a distinguishable pattern. **First, a state consolidates power on China’s peripher**y, surrounding China and threatening its structural integrity on both physical and psychological levels. **Second**, ever aware of shi, **Chinese strategists employ measures to maintain their strategic flexibility and prevent total encirclement**. **Third, the peripheral power** misinterprets preemption for aggression and **escalates the conflict**. **At this point, China is either able to contain the threat and achieve its geopolitical aims or it is too weak to do so and is thrown into existential crisis**. In the 20th century, this pattern has been exemplified by Chinese involvement in the Korean War and its continued support of an independent state to buffer the U.S. alliance bloc from a historical ingress point to the Chinese mainland; its own Vietnam War to prevent the emergence of a competitive power bloc led by Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Chinese political maneuvering against the Soviet Union to prevent its consolidation of power over the Eurasian landmass. Disregarding the similarities between these disputes and the current Sino-U.S. position in East Asia is impossible.68 Second, the Sino-centric worldview is rising in China as she emerges from a century of humiliation to become an economic and military superpower. The over-proselytized American belief that the implementation of democracy should be the end goal of global politics and unapologetically moralist positions conflict with Sino-centrism. It is seen by China as an extension of colonial interventionism and a threat to their fiercely held autonomy. U.S. diplomacy is often contingent on the improvement of China’s human rights record. Widespread support for China’s various separatist movements and public outcry over the Tiananmen Square incident has exacerbated this problem. American reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of a communist government, give up democratization as long term policy goals, or give China its due in international relations has weakened Sino-U.S. relations. America’s moralist rather than pragmatic approach to policy threatens China’s delicate social order and undermines CCP legitimacy, resulting in missed diplomatic opportunities. Other policy analysts are certainly influenced by Kissinger, but add their own insight into Chinese Strategic culture. Kenneth Johnson and Andrew Scobell writing for the Strategic Studies Institute both attribute the apparent cognitive dissonance in Chinese policy to a curious blend of Confucian ideals and realpolitik thought, supporting Kissinger’s assertion that Confucianism is not dead. There is a cult of defense within China, accompanying a deeply held belief that China’s strategic culture is overwhelmingly pacifist.69 However, preemptive action is permissible as long as it can be a justifiable “defense” of Chinese strategic interests.70 In addition, China bemoans aggressive territorial expansion and hegemony by force. This historical sensitivity has only been exacerbated by the “century of humiliation” at the hands of European powers.71 However, the benevolent expansion of influence and the use of force for Chinese national unification is just. **Furthermore, the Chinese fear of encirclement could cause a disproportionate reaction to the U.S. force realignment and restructuring of alliances in East Asia.72 This could exacerbate the worsening of the security dilemma that alliance forming typically causes**. Joan-Johnson Freese emphasizes the influence of Confucianism in internal decision making and the penchant for isolationism. Confucianism emphasizes peace, order, and knowing one’s place within society. This invites authoritarianism and the Chinese people have little experience with participation in the political process. Rather, there is an instability lurking beneath the calm surface of society that leaders must constrain and satisfy in order to maintain their mandate to rule.73 The social contract has a simple results based nature where political stability and prosperity is exchanged for the continued political power. The Chinese Communist Party then is less beholden to communist ideology than it is to continued prosperity.74 Also, despite the negative connotation of nepotism in the West, it is an institution of Chinese culture (known as Guan Xi).75 From the outsider, the familial ties, importance of relationships, compartmentalization, and ambiguity in the Chinese bureaucracy are confusing and frustrating. This research paints the picture of the U.S. and China as diametrically opposed cultures that are almost designed to create misunderstanding between the two. Therefore, being aware of cultural and political sensitives is necessary to create sound strategy. Michael Pillsbury identifies 16 psycho-cultural pressure points where, if correctly considered in reassurance, cost imposition, or dissuasion strategies, will yield disproportionately effects whether they be positive or negative. Each of these factors are referred to as “fears”. 76 Eleven of the sixteen fears are linked to the ability of the U.S. military to project power into East Asia and the strategic sea lines of communication from the Strait of Malacca to the Bohai Gulf, which is contingent on the ability to deliver space effects in support of U.S. military operation. Pillsbury identifies the fear of attack on their anti-satellite capabilities as a specific Chinese fear, but warfighting in the space domain is intrinsically linked to the other 11. Another of the sixteen fears is the fear of escalation and loss of control. This is particularly important because the **Chinese view ASAT** weaponry **as** a legitimate cost imposition option **designed to limit conflict**. Contrast that with the American strategy of threatening escalation in order to prevent the spread of the conflict into space and implicit red lines that fail to account for limited conflict in a strategic domain. **Space’s role in soft power links it to two final fears, the fear of regional competitors and the fear of internal instability. Space technology development is essential to the CCP’s techno-nationalist narrative as it is assigned great importance internally to strengthen CCP’s mandate to rule and externally to legitimize China as a regional leader**. According to Sun Tzu, “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”77 While studying a competitor’s strategic culture is useful to avoid mirroring; understanding one’s own strategic culture is vital to effectively utilizing national resources and avoiding bias.78 This thesis benefits from being able to perform a thick analysis of American strategic culture using a panoply of English language sources. Russell Howard describes American strategic culture as that of a traditional sea power with moralistic overtones. The American military is highly constrained by legal and moral considerations, meaning that in order for the U.S. to enter a war there must be an existential threat to its national security or a crusade of good versus evil.79 This results in national mobilization so that the U.S. can “bear the burden of a long twilight struggle against the common enemies of man,” to borrow from John F Kennedy’s inaugural address. 80 America’s history is punctuated with these struggles from the Civil War to WWII. This ideology has become more prominent since the Vietnam War, which entrenched the view that, “when America uses force in the world, the cause must be just, the goal must be clear, and the victory must be overwhelming.”81 Max Boot in his three books provides excellent analysis of how the global wars of the 20th century, the rise of technology, and casualty aversion has impacted American strategic thought in the 21st century.82 American space power doctrine has shown itself to be a microcosm of its strategic culture rather than an exception to it. In his influential work, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, Walter McDougall asserts that the space age did not usher in a new era of cooperation, nor was it disconnected from the geopolitical mechanisms of earth-bound policy. Rather, it simply extended business as usual to a new realm.83 The American technocracy that the genesis of the space age solidified and the international legal framework that U.S.-Soviet competition created persist in the 21st century.

## Case

#### Co-operation key between US and China – Cochetti 21:

Cochetti, Roger J. “US-China Space Cooperation Is up in the Air More than Ever.” TheHill, The Hill, 4 Dec. 2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/584314-us-china-space-cooperation-is-up-in-the-air-more-than-ever#:~:text=Throughout%20China's%20space%20growth%2C%20there,by%20Congress%20every%20year%20since.

Since a great deal of all information about America’s space programs could potentially have a dual civilian/commercial and a national security use, it’s not surprising that very few FBI certifications of “no risk whatsoever” have taken place. And thus, **virtually no cooperation between the space leaders has occurred**. **This legally-based limitation has recently been strengthened by the rising chorus of defense-minded policy advocates who firmly advocate for little or no cooperation between the United States and China in virtually every field**. **Those advocating for a more confrontational U.S. approach to China often find these legal restrictions on space cooperation with China the minimum necessary to protect American security**[**and they tend to tie their support for any U.S.-China space cooperation to such things as China’s approach to Hong Kong, Taiwan, trade practices, and minorities.**](https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/552495-what-should-nasa-do-about-the-chinese-space-station)Their evidence includes **the very close relationship between the Chinese space program and the People’s Liberation Army and allegations of Chinese scientific espionage for decades. Other defense-minded policy advocates take the opposite view, however: They tend to cite the fact that the U.S. boycott of space cooperation with China**[**has done nothing to slow down the Chinese space program — and it has probably strengthened it**](https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-the-wolf-amendment-limiting-collaboration-with-china-in-space/)**by making the Chinese program autonomous**. Moreover, they argue that, **given China’s enormous programs** to explore outer space and conduct scientific experiments combined with China’s plans to collaborate with other countries, **the U.S. boycott of space cooperation with China will only limit our own science and isolate us. Their evidence would be the inability of American scientists to examine the new Chinese moon rocks or use the world’s largest radio telescope or use their planned giant space telescope**. Two enormously important public figures have entered this debate, neither of whom could be considered either uninformed about U.S. outer space polices or soft-headed about the Chinese Communist Party: [Elon Musk](https://thehill.com/people/elon-musk), the world’s wealthiest and most successful capitalist and a premier military space contractor; and Maj. Gen. [Charles Bolden](https://thehill.com/person/charles-bolden), a Marine Corps combat veteran of Vietnam and Desert Thunder, NASA astronaut, and NASA administrator under [President Obama](https://thehill.com/people/barack-obama). In September, Musk sent shockwaves through the space policy communities in both U.S. and China by [tweeting](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1439687664547115011) that there should be “[some amount of cooperation](https://futurism.com/elon-musk-cooperation-nasa-china)” between the U.S. and China in outer space activities. Although some China-hardliners dismiss Musk’s call [as a marketing gimmick for Tesla](https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/24/tech/elon-musk-china-intl-hnk/index.html), it’s impossible to ignore the facts that he is extremely well-informed, his defense-orientation is beyond question, and his capitalist credibility is unmatched. In contrast, Gen. Bolden has [consistently called for cooperation between the U.S. and China in outer space activities](https://www.space.com/9321-nasa-chief-trip-china-sparks-controversy.html). Speaking at a policy forum sponsored by The Hill in October, Bolden said we can work collaboratively with China on space if we just put our minds to it.

### Advantage

#### 1] No uniqueness – most of Chinese militarization isn’t private

Lee-Singer, 21, “China’s Space Program Is More Military Than You Might Think”, 7/16/21, Defense One, P.W. Singer is Strategist at New America and the author of multiple books on technology and securityTaylor A. Lee is an analyst with BluePath Labs, a DC-based consulting company that focuses on research, analysis, disruptive technologies, and wargaming. URL <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/07/chinas-space-program-more-military-you-might-think/183790/>, KR

The militarized tilt of the Chinese space program complicates these plans. Space planning and directing organizations, the ground infrastructure supporting its space programs, and the taikonauts themselves are all under the purview of the People’s Liberation Army. Understanding these connections is important for any plans to cooperate with China in space, whether governmental or commercial.

On the organizational side, China’s equivalent to NASA is the civilian China National Space Administration, which has a focus on the space program’s international exchanges. It falls under the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which handles defense-related science and technology, including China’s state-owned defense conglomerates. However, unlike NASA, the CNSA doesn’t oversee China’s astronauts. The organization actually in charge of China’s manned space program is the China Manned Space Engineering Office, which is under China’s Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department.

Likewise, the infrastructure of China’s space program is also heavily militarized. The launch sites, control centers, and many of the satellites are directly run by the PLA. Taikonauts lift off from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (aka Base 20 of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, its space and cyber arm); directed by the PLASSF’s Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center, with Telemetry, Tracking and Control support from the Xi’an Satellite Control Center (aka the PLASSF’s Base 26); and land at one of two sites in Inner Mongolia operated by the two bases.

#### 2] Circumvention - No separation between private/public in China – China would just take over its private space, making them public – Wei 20:

Wei, Lingling. 12/10/20. “China’s Xi Ramps Up Control of Private Sector. ‘We Have No Choice but to Follow the Party.’” <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-xi-clampdown-private-sector-communist-party-11607612531>

**Xi** Jinping, **long distrustful of the private sector, is moving** assertively **to bring it to heel**. China’s most powerful leader in a generation wants even greater state control in the world’s second-largest economy, with **private firms** of all sizes **expected to fall in line**. **The government is installing more Communist Party officials inside private firms**, starving some of credit and demanding executives tailor their businesses to achieve state goals. **In some cases, it is taking charge entirely of companies** it regards as undisciplined, absorbing them into state-owned enterprises.

#### Doesn’t contradict the DA – Xi still want’s apprioration so risk of offense flips neg, but aff has 0 solvency then which proves the Cp

#### 3] No link:

#### Even if they’re right that they work on private projects to help each other – the larger iniative is space dominance which the aff doesn’t solve

#### their card literally says they’ve already militarized it so they don’t need alliances (which is what the impact ev is ABOUT, not alliances)

1AC Bowman and Thompson 3/31 [(Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) (Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.) “Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space” Foreign Policy 3/31/2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/] BC

Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have sprinted to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons.

To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring.

The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and Moscow have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty.

On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space?

The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, said in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.”

#### 4] China-Russian alliances don’t last- “US causes them to draw together” narrative is wrong

Carafano 19 (Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges., <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/why-the-china-russia-alliance-wont-last>, August 7th, 2019, “Why the China-Russian Alliance won’t last”)//AK

So, now everybody wants to be Bismarck. They see themselves shaping history by artfully moving big pieces on the geostrategic chessboard. And one gambit they just can’t resist is moving to snip the growing bonds of Sino-Russian cooperation. My advice to them: Just stop. Fears of an allied China and Russia running amok around the world are overblown. Indeed, there is so much friction between these “friends,” any attempt to team up would likely give both countries heat rash. Siren’s Cat Call Here’s the lame narrative that’s animating the Bismarck wannabes: The United States is pushing back against Moscow and pressing Beijing. This is driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. Beijing and Moscow will then gang-up on the United States. To prevent this, the United States should make nice with Moscow (undermining the incipient Sino-Russian détente) and then focus on beating back against China. This is an idea that should be dumped into the dustbin before it has any history. Yes, China and Russia are going to work together to some degree. They have important things in common. For example, both are unaccountable authoritarian regimes that share the Eurasian continent. Other indicators of compatibility: they like doing business with each other, and both like to make up their own rules. Heck, they don’t even have to pretend the liberal world order is a speed-bump in their joint ventures. Both happily engage with the world’s most odious regimes, from Syria to Venezuela. And, of course, neither has any compunction about playing dirty when it serves their interests. They already play off of each other to frustrate foreign-policy initiatives from Washington. For example, if the United States pressures Russia to vote a certain way on a measure before the UN Security Council, Russia will often don the white hat and vote as we desire, knowing that Beijing will veto the measure for them. Similarly, if the United States leans on Beijing stop giving North Korea some form of aid and comfort, Beijing can go along with the request, knowing that Moscow will pick up the baton for them. What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why would Russia or China ever consider giving up these practices? Why would they make the ongoing great power competition easier for the United States? That makes no sense. That is not in their self-interest. Any notion that the United States could somehow seduce Russian president Vladimir Putin from playing house with Beijing is fanciful. Putin doesn’t do something for nothing; his price would be quite high. He could demand a free hand in Ukraine, or lifting sanctions, or squelching opposition to Nordstream II, or giving Russia free rein in the Middle East. Any of these “deals” would greatly compromise American interests. Why would we do that? And what, exactly, is Putin going to deliver in return? What leverage does Russia have on Beijing? The answer is not near enough to justify any of these concessions. On the other hand, what leverage would a Russia-China alliance have on the United States? They wouldn’t jointly threaten Washington with military action. A central element of both their strategies is that they want to win against the United States “without fighting.” Moscow might be happy if the United States got distracted in a military mix-up with China. Conversely, Beijing could okay with the Americans have an armed confrontation with the Russians. But, neither of them will be volunteering to go first anytime soon. Even if they linked arms to threaten the United States in tandem, the pain would not be worth the gain. As long as America maintains a credible global and strategic deterrent, a Sino-Russian military one-two punch is pretty much checkmated. Peace through strength really works. If direct military confrontation is out of bounds, then what can Beijing and Moscow do using economic, political, and diplomatic power or tools of hybrid warfare? The answer to that question is easy: exactly what they are already doing. We have plenty of evidence of on-going political warfare aimed at the United States, its friends, allies, and interests. Some of these activities are conducted in tandem; some are instances of copy-catism; and some are independent and original. The political warfare takes many forms—ranging from corrosive economic behavior to aggressive diplomacy to military expansionism and more. All these malicious efforts are a problem. What they don’t add up to is an existential threat to vital U.S. interests. In other words, we can handle this without sucking up to Putin and undermining our own interests. In fact, we already have a national-security strategy that adequately addresses these concerns. There are also limits to the Sino-Russia era of good feelings. Other than trying to take America down a notch, their global goals are not well aligned. Indeed, the more they try to cooperate, the more their disparate interests will grate on the relationship. For example, China is meddling more in Central Asia and the Arctic—spaces where Russia was dominant. Moscow has to ask itself: Why is Beijing elbowing in? There is an argument that rather than looking for a strategic partnership, China is just biding its time till Russia implodes, and Beijing steps in and sweeps up the choice pieces. And, as much as Putin likes to tweak Trump about Moscow’s ties with Beijing, it is becoming more apparent to Washington that Russia is ever more the junior partner. Can Putin really continue to play Robin to a Chinese Batman? As for China, they have to ask: What does Robin really bring to the dynamic-duo? Play the Long Great Power Game The world doesn’t require a twenty-first century Bismarck. The United States will do better simply by continuing its strategy of pushing back on Russia and China, while letting them know there’s an off-ramp waiting for them if—and only if—they respect U.S. interests. Sure, this makes double duty for Washington. The United States has to mitigate Moscow’s efforts to destabilize Europe, even as it pushes for a free and open Indo-Pacific. But these tasks are not beyond our capabilities—and for us the pain is worth the gain. Rather than try to pry Putin and Xi Jinping apart, Trump should continue to squeeze them from both sides. The natural friction in the Russian and Chinese relationship will prevent them from effectively ganging up on the United States. And it wouldn’t hurt if the United States should find subtle ways to remind them that they would be foolish to trust each other too much. The primary interest of both Putin and Xi is to assure the survival of their regimes. The American squeeze play will leave them with little choice but to accept the fact that America is strong, it’s here to stay, and their regimes have to live with it. This is the only kind of global balancing that will bring about stable relationships in the long-term.

### AT: ASAT Prolif

#### 1] No link – chronological is not equal to casual – their ev says ASATS is another example, not b/c of its space sector

1AC Rajagopalan 5/12 [(Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. As a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues. Dr Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), Government of India, where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan in 2012. Dr Rajagopalan has authored or edited nine books including Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS (2018), Space Policy 2.0 (2017), Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009). She has published research essays in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law and Strategic Analysis. She has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and The Economic Times. She has been invited to speak at international fora including the United Nations Disarmament Forum (New York), the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union.) “China’s irresponsible behaviour: A threat to space security” Observer Research Foundation, 5/12/2021. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-irresponsible-behaviour-a-threat-to-space-security/] BC

With China planning an ambitious space programme that includes its own space station, it is likely that there will be more such risky incidents in the future as well. It is somewhat disturbing because China’s space programme has advanced to a degree that it undertakes missions including landing on the South Pole-Aitken Basin (on the far side of the Moon), returning rocks from the moon, and an interplanetary mission to Mars, which clearly demonstrates China has the technical capability to design and launch rockets whose spent stages can land without putting others at risk. That it has not done so is odd. It is not exactly what can be characterised as responsible behaviour in space.

Another example of China breaking norms and engaging in irresponsible behaviour in space is its ASAT test. China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, at an altitude of 850 kilometres, resulted in creating around 3,000 pieces of space debris. More significantly, it broke the unwritten moratorium that was in place for two decades. Beijing also started developing various counterspace capabilities with the goal of competing with the US. Nevertheless, each of China’s actions have led to a spiral effect, with others seeking to match China’s actions, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, given the contested nature of Asian and global geopolitics. For example, China’s repeated ASAT tests have led to the US’ own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost in 2008), and India’s ASAT test (Mission Shakti in 2019). India had no plans to go down this path until China’s first ASAT test, which became a gamechanging moment for India. Even so, India did not react to it for more than a decade, but the final decision was a carefully calibrated and a direct response to China’s growing military space capabilities and its less-than responsible behaviour. Other countries like Japan and France are also contemplating moves in this direction. Australia may not be far behind either.

Even though it may not be linked to the uncontrolled re-entry of the Chinese rocket, Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University noted that “about six minutes after Tianhe and the CZ-5B separated, they both came close to the ISS—under 300 km, which given uncertainties in trajectory is a tad alarming.” Making this point, he added “it’s \*possible\* that this ISS/Tianhe close encounter was one of those unlikely coincidences. I’m open to that possibility, but they should still have spotted the closeness and warned NASA (or better, called a collision avoidance hold in the count).”

Rocket re-entries are not uncommon, but space powers have tried to avoid the freefalls by usually conducting controlled re-entries so that they may fall in the ocean, or they may be directed towards the so-called “graveyard” orbits that may lie there for decades. But Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University argues that the Chinese rocket was designed in a manner that “leaves these big stages in low orbit.” And even in the case of controlled re-entries, there are failures sometimes and they can be dangerous too. SpaceX’s rocket debris landing on a farm in Washington in March this year is a case in point.

Moriba Jah, an Associate Professor at The University of Texas at Austin argues in a media interview that such events are going to become more common, and will happen more frequently and, therefore, humanity should come together to “jointly manage near earth space as a commons in need of coordination, protocols, and practices to maximise safety, security, and sustainability.” On the NASA Administrator’s statement, Jah said this should not be “singling out China.” Certainly, this is not about apportioning blame, but China’s actions cannot be condoned either.

What can be done? Given that usable orbits in space are finite in nature, there will need to be steps taken by all the space players to ensure that their actions do not contribute to further pollution of space and make it unusable in the near term. States have to invest in technologies that would aid in cleaning up and getting rid of some of the debris. States also need to come together in developing norms, rules of the road, and legally binding and political instruments on large rocket body re-entries.

The Long March 5B episode has yet again rekindled the debate on the need for rules for rocket and large body re-entries. Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation, for instance, questioned why, despite all ranting about China’s rocket re-entry issues, the US State Department has “consistently oppose[d] anything stronger than voluntary guidelines.” Weeden has provided a useful Twitter thread on the US hesitancy to get on board with legal agreements on outer space. One problem is that while the US abides by international obligations, other do not. This is a concern that Weeden notes “has a grain of truth” but adds the caveat that “reality is not that definitive”.

While he is correct to note that the issue is complicated, it is also true that countries like China have a terrible track record when it comes to meeting their treaty commitments. China’s violation of its own commitments with respect to nuclear non-proliferation, or in the South China Sea and East China Sea are well-known. Given this history, it is difficult to believe that China will allow itself to be bound by any restraints on its space programme, even if it signs any of these agreements. But given the US’ almost allergic reaction to signing legal agreements that others like China may violate, it doesn’t hurt China to keep bringing up PPWT-like (Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects) measures every now and then. This puts the whole international community in a bind. If we have to ensure safe and uninterrupted access to space, creating a secure, sustainable, and predictable outer space framework is essential. But unless all states demonstrate a commitment to living up to existing rules and norms, creating new ones will be difficult.

Weighing – it o/w

#### No China ASATs - China can’t hit high enough orbits where our military satellites would be

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at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at

the RAND Corporation

Jaganath Sankaran, “Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threat to the United States,” Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 8, No. 4. Pp. 19-46. Winter 2014. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26270815.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab5dce757fd3faf27546af10c9c6c9d80>

China’s Missiles Will Not Be Enough

The substantial range of orbital altitudes—1,000 km to 36,000 km— across which satellites operate poses a challenge to China’s ability to attack US military satellites. Of the three sets of orbiters discussed above, ISR imagery satellites operating at altitudes less than 1,000 km are most vulnerable to ASAT attack by China’s intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM). This was demonstrated by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. On 11 January 2007, China launched a two-stage, solid-fuel, mediumrange Dong Feng (DF)-21 ballistic missile using a mobile transportererector-launcher (TEL) from the Xichang Space Center which slammed into one of its polar-orbiting LEO weather satellites (Feng Yun 1C) orbiting at an altitude of approximately 850 km.13

Caution should be exercised, however, in linearly scaling this Chinese ASAT capability to satellites operating at higher altitudes. The DF-21 ballistic missile used in the 2007 test cannot reach either GPS or communications satellites. In fact, even China’s most powerful solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are unable to reach an altitude of 20,000 km where GPS satellites operate. These limitations of Chinese missiles are due to fundamental constraints of physics.

To illustrate: a Chinese ICBM carrying a 2,000 kilogram (kg) payload with a burn-out velocity of 7.0 km/sec (traveling a ground distance of approximately 11,500 km) when launched straight up with a reduced payload of 500 kg reaches a maximum altitude of only 10,500 km. The same ICBM with a reduced payload of 250 kg reaches an approximate maximum altitude of only 15,000 km. This limitation, as discussed above, implies that China would not be able to execute an ASAT attack against GPS satellites operating at 20,000 km or US military communications and SIGINT satellites operating at 36,000 km using its current missile inventory. To reach these higher orbiting satellites, China would have to build new and more-powerful ICBMs. Even if it manages to develop such an ICBM, China certainly will not be able to produce a large number of them without substantial financial stress. Alternatively, it can use its liquid-fueled space launch vehicles; however, this imposes other difficulties discussed below.