# Bronx R2

## FWK

#### **Pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable – to justify beyond that runs into moral incoherence. Moen 16,**

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI // RCT by JPark

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well-being (Act Util). Prefer additionally.

#### [1] It’s a lexical pre-requisite. Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis, and if people are dead they can’t actualize any ethical theory.

#### [2] Actor specificity

#### [A] governments must aggregate because their policies benefit some and harm others so the only non-arbitrary way to prioritize is by helping the most amount of people

#### [B] Actor specificity comes first because different agents have different obligations. Takes out calc indicts because they’re empirically denied.

#### [3] Degrees of wrongness – only consequences can explain why some actions are better or worse than others – breaking a promise to take someone to lunch isn’t as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital but only the consequences of breaking it can explain why, so all ethical theories collapse to util & other ethical theories are irresolvable/unweighable.

#### [4] No intent-foresight distinction—if we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen.

#### [5] Topic lit – most articles are written through the lens of util since they’re crafted for policymakers and the general public to understand who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors. Fairness bc you vote for better debater not better cheater. Education because that is the terminal impact of debate. These are framework warrants, not a reason to drop the debater.

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## Plan

#### **Plan Text: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to eliminate data exclusivity intellectual property protections for medicines through TRIPs – Diependaele 17**

Diependaele, Lisa, et al. “Raising the Barriers to Access to Medicines in the Developing World - the Relentless Push for Data Exclusivity.” Developing World Bioethics, John Wiley and Sons Inc., Apr. 2017, [www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5347964/](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5347964/). // LHP PS

**There seem to be few, if any, reasons left to accept data exclusivity in addition to the existing patent regime. Data exclusivity poses a considerable additional risk to the affordable access to medicines in developing countries.** In the absence of evidence that data exclusivity will support innovation and economic development, there is **no legitimate ground for developing countries to favour such a policy.** Moreover, **since current levels of revenue already generate copious profit margins for the pharmaceutical industry in US and EU markets, it is inequitable and highly problematic to require developing countries to implement data exclusivity**. For developed country markets, the key question remains whether society should pay the price for extended monopolies in return for merely ‘incremental’ innovations**. Even in the US and the EU, the implementation of data exclusivity, by undermining legitimate competition,** seems **incompatible with the long tradition of stringent competition and anti‐trust policies, which have always been vital components of the economic structure.** In its current form, **data exclusivity offers the pharmaceutical industry an ‘easy route’ to market exclusivity, without fear of challenges. Indeed, it seems that data exclusivity is meant to increase the (already significant) profitability of the pharmaceutical industry, rather than allowing them to have a legitimate demand fulfilled.**

#### It’s topical and the aff solves – Data Exclusivity is a TRIPs Plus IP protection – Thrasher 21

Thrasher, Rachel. “How Data Exclusivity Laws Impact Drug Prices:” *Global Development Policy Center Chart of the Week How Data Exclusivity Laws Impact Drug Prices Comments*, 25 May 2021, [www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/05/25/chart-of-the-week-how-data](http://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/05/25/chart-of-the-week-how-data)-exclusivity-laws-impact-drug-prices/. // LHP AB

**Data exclusivity is a form of intellectual property protection that applies specifically to data from** pharmaceutical **clinical trials. While innovator firms run their own clinical trials to gain marketing approval, generic manufacturers typically rely on the innovator’s** clinical **trials for the same approval.** Data **exclusivity** rules **keep generic firms from relying on that data for 5 to 12 years**, depending on the specific law. Data exclusivity operates independently of patent protection and **can block generic manufacturers from gaining marketing approval even if the patent has expired or the original pharmaceutical product does not qualify for patent protection.** Although data exclusivity laws are matters of domestic legislation, the United States, the EU and others increasingly demand in their free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations that their trading partners protect clinical trial data in this way. **Data exclusivity is just one of a host of “TRIPS-plus” treaty provisions designed to raise the overall level of intellectual property protection for innovator firms**. Although the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) does require Member states to protect clinical trial and other data from “unfair commercial use,” it does not require exclusivity rules that block the registration of generic products.

#### Data Exclusivity is uniquely bad when compared to patents, especially in developing countries, in the context of monopolies, WHO 17

“Data Exclusivity and Other ‘Trips-plus’ Measures.” *UHC Technical Brief*, WHO, 2017, apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1140151/retrieve. // LHP AB

Yet, there are some questions as to whether **data exclusivity could prevent the registration of medicines produced under a compulsory license** (Fig. 1b). If so, data exclusivity would **effectively render the compulsory license inoperative**. Second, **if** a period of data exclusivity is also **granted when an existing medicine obtains** marketing **authorization (or registration) for a second or new indication or for a new form, as in the case of paediatric versions of already approved drugs, data exclusivity could (be used to) extend** the **period of exclusivity** of the originator product (Fig. 2). Fig. 2: Extension of data exclusivity for second indication Patent granted Registration market entry End patent term Data exclusitvity Data exclusitvity Registration 2nd indication Finally, data exclusivity **could prevent** the **registration of generic** versions of **medicines even when** there is no patenton a medicine, e.g. **when a pharmaceutical product does not meet the standards for patentability** (e.g. **because it is not new or an inventive step),** **the patent lapses, when a country has no patent law,** or **when patents are not being granted for pharmaceuticals**. The **latter** situation **can arise in least-developed countries that are World Trade Organization (WTO) Members**, which do not have to grant or enforce patents for pharmaceuticals until 2033.b

## Offense

### Advantage – Medicine Access

#### TRIPs Plus Provisions, namely data exclusivity, are being used in many bilateral trade agreements – Thrasher et al 21

Thrasher, Rachel, Veronika J. Wirtz, Warren Kaplan, Kevin P. Gallagher, Hattie Werk. “How Data Exclusivity Laws Impact Drug Prices:” *Global Development Policy Center Chart of the Week How Data Exclusivity Laws Impact Drug Prices Comments*, 25 May 2021, [www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/05/25/chart-of-the-week-how-data](http://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/05/25/chart-of-the-week-how-data)

Despite these decisions at Doha (and post-Doha) there continue to be concerns about the extent to which the trading system is compatible with SDG 3. **Trading partners from high-income countries continue to pursue bilateral and regional trade agreements that seek intellectual property and investment protections beyond what is required by the TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS-plus).** Those same partners also tend to **limit the adoption and use of public health flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS-flexibilities), including those clarified and extended by the Doha Declaration and its aftermath**. As a result, since 2001, the WTO has waned in importance with regards to the regulation of intellectual property rights, while **a proliferation of new regional and bilateral trade and investment treaties have increased in prominence in the global trade policy landscape**. Moreover, investment provisions in these treaties have the potential to expose governments looking to increase access to medicines to costly investor-state disputes (Baker & Geddes 2017). Overall, there is concern that, despite the flexibilities in multilateral arrangements, **trade and investment treaties can pose threats to access to some essential medicines**. Trade and investment policy is entering a new era of debate and (re)negotiation. The most recent proposed US trade agreement, the USMCA, has further raised the access bar by including new intellectual property protections exceeding those found in prior agreements. Furthermore, many least 1 “Essential medicines” is the term found in SDG 3.8. It is a term of art employed by the World Health Organization (WHO) for those medicines which satisfy the specific priority health needs of a cou\ntry’s population, recognizing that resources are limited in any context, even an affluent country such as the US. Over 130 countries have adopted this process of setting priorities for government medicines reimbursement and it is up to each nation to define its national priorities. Some activists, academics, and civil society organizations view this list as under-inclusive from the perspective of access to medicines, because many medicines are excluded because of cost, health system incapacity, and delayed government action. Indeed the **UN High Level Panel (UN 2016) suggested a broader concept of “access to medicines for all conditions for all people.”** In order to maintain our connection between access to medicines and SDG 3, we are using the term “essential medicines” as defined by the WHO, while acknowledging that other views exist. There is concern that, **despite the flexibilities in multilateral arrangements, trade and investment treaties can pose threats to access to some essential medicines.”** RETHINKING TRADE TREATIES & ACCESS TO MEDICINES: Toward a Policy-Oriented Agenda | bu.edu/gdp | October 2019 7 developed countries (LDCs) with current rights to exempt themselves from TRIPS will graduate and will have to adhere to the agreement when their transition periods end. Over the last two decades **many organizations and expert groups have issued policy recommendations to increase policy alignment between trade treaties and access to medicines in low- and middle-income countries**. **Two recent global landmark reports were published by The United Nations High Level Panel on Access to Medicines (UN 2016) and The Lancet Commission on Essential Medicines Policies (Wirtz et al. 2017).** However, despite the large number of policy recommendations, including those that encourage countries to adopt TRIPS flexibilities into national legislation and avoid TRIPS-plus provisions, there are large variations in their implementation between countries. Many important knowledge gaps remain about the processes and factors that influenced both the outcome and the implementation of trade treaties, which can explain the variation between countries. Furthermore, rigorous evaluation of the effects of trade treaties on access to medicines is restricted by limited availability of data, and a lack of uniformity in indicators and methods.

#### **AND**

**TRIPS-plus provisions impact access to medicines** in three key ways: (1) by increasing IP protection available to the patent holder under old TRIPS provisions, (2) by introducing new standards of IP rules and IP protection, and (3) by ramping up the enforcement requirements for intellectual property infringement. Traditional standards of patentability, disclosure in patent applications, revocation and opposition, and limited exceptions now contain new standards which provide increased protection for intellectual property holders. Rather than allow flexibility in patenting rules, these treaties tend to require patents on new uses and new methods of use on known substances. They set lower standards for “novelty” and “industrial applicability”, as well as disclosure in patent applications. They also limit the grounds for patent opposition or revocation, and weaken the limited exceptions (TRIPS Art. 30) to decrease access to early-working and government use exceptions (TRIPS Art. 31). Finally, many FTAs restrict the grounds on which a compulsory license may be granted, and some prohibit international exhaustion standards. New provisions likewise limit the policy options available to member states. These treaties introduce patent term extensions, which require countries to grant extensions for patent processing and regulatory delays. They contain patent registration linkage provisions which effectively halt a generic medicine’s registration in the event of any claim by the originator (however substantiated) that it would infringe on a patent. The treaties also demand that member states recognize patents on diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for treatment. **One of the most commonly discussed new provisions in trade agreements is the protection of data exclusivity. Unlike “data protection” (TRIPS Article 39.3) which relates to “unfair commercial use”, data exclusivity provisions require that a country’s medicine regulatory authority protect the test data (i.e., typically a product’s clinical trial data) of a company wishing to be first on the market exclusively for a certain number of years (e.g. 5 to 12 years in most trade agreements).** This could delay the launch of generic competition if those generic companies must either generate their own data or wait until the data exclusivity period ends (Shadlen et al. 2019). Data exclusivity provisions have become more prevalent as the United States and the EU have pushed for these heightened standards in their agreements. China has proposed to include the most stringent data exclusivity rules in their domestic law – 6 years for innovative drugs and 12 for biologics (Wang 2018).

#### **Links:**

#### **[1] In depth analysis – data exclusivity raises medicine prices – Palmedo 21**

Palmedo, Michael. “Evaluating the Impact of Data Exclusivity on the Price per Kilogram of Pharmaceutical Imports.” *Boston University Global Development Policy Center*, Apr. 2021,  [https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2021/04/GEGI\_WP\_048\_Palmedo\_FIN.pdf. //](http://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2021/04/GEGI_WP__Bing_FIN.pdf.%20//) LHP AB

Michael Palmedo directs interdisciplinary research on intellectual property at American University (AU) Washington College of Law’s Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property. His research focuses on the empirical evaluation of the impact of changes to patent and copyright laws. He recently completed the Shamnad Basheer IP/ Trade Fellowship at Texas A&M University, where he researched pharmaceutical industry influence into the U.S. government’s Special 301 Review.

Previous studies of **data exclusivity** have found that it **raises medicine prices and**/or **reduces access**. Data exclusivity requirements **have led to higher prices and $396 million additional expenses for Colombia’s public health system** (Cortés, et. al., 2012). **In the US, the price of one particular off-patent drug increased from nine cents to $4.85 per pill after data exclusivity** was applied (Kesselheim and Solomon, 2010). Two **studies of data exclusivity required by FTAs find a significant impact** – data exclusivity **blocked generic versions of off-patent medicines from** the **Guatemala**nmarket (Shaffer and Brenner, 2009) and **delayed the introduction of cheaper generics into the Jordanian market for 79 percent of medicines** (Malpani, 2009). Table 3 shows the **results of four regressions based on** the binary indicator of **data exclusivity**. **Each indicates that the relationship between data exclusivity and higher prices for pharmaceutical imports is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of controls**. The coefficient on Year\*DataExclusivity is positive and significant in all specifications. The overall models fit the data well – all the right hand side variables have significant coefficients with the expected signs, the adjusted R-squared are all above 0.80 and the within-entity R-squareds range from 0.39 to 0.49. Column (1) shows the results with the overall time trend as a variable for the period 1996-2010. The **annual growth rate for pharmaceutical imports in countries without data exclusivity was 3.9 percent**, but the **corresponding growth rate in countries with data exclusivity was 7.6 percent**. Though the difference is small year to year, it compounds. **Over 15 years at these rates of growth, a price in a theoretical country without data exclusivity would increase 78 percent and the corresponding price in a theoretical country with** data exclusivity would increase **200 percent**. GEGI@GDPCenter Pardee School of Global Studies/Boston University www.bu.edu/gdp 11 The control variables in this specification behave as expected. Logged GDP per capita in US dollars, taken from the World Bank, is positive, indicating the expected relationship between a country’s wealth and prices. Logged total kilograms is negative, supporting previous findings that larger pharmaceutical purchases are associated with lower prices (Helbe and Aizawa 2017).

#### Impacts:

#### [1] They directly push people into poverty

Hoban 10 Rose Hoban 9-13-2010 "High Cost of Medicine Pushes More People into Poverty" <https://www.voanews.com/science-health/high-cost-medicine-pushes-more-people-poverty> (spent more than six years as the health reporter for North Carolina Public Radio – WUNC, where she covered health care, state health policy, science and research with a focus on public health issues. She left to start North Carolina Health News after watching many of her professional peers leave or be laid off of their jobs, leaving NC with few people to cover this complicated and important topic. ALSO cites Laurens Niens who is a Health Researcher at Erasmus University Rotterdam)//Elmer

Health economist Laurens Niëns found that **drugs needed to treat chronic diseases could be considered unaffordable for many people in poor countries. Medicines can be expensive** and often make up a large portion of any family's health care budget. And the burden can be even greater for people in poor countries, where the **cost of vital medicines** can **push them into poverty**. **The problem is growing as more people around the world are diagnosed with chronic diseases such as high blood pressure and diabetes.** Being diagnosed with a chronic disease usually **compells patients to seek treatment for a prolonged period of time.** That **increases the eventual price tag for health**, says health economist Laurens Niëns at Erasmus University in the Netherlands. **Niëns examined medication pricing data from the World Health Organization** **and also looked at data from the World Bank on household income in many countries.** Using the data, he calculated how much people need to spend on necessities such as food, housing, education and medicines. "**The medicines we looked at are medicines for patients who suffer from asthma, diabetes, hypertension and we looked at an adult respiratory infection**," Niëns says. "Three conditions are for chronic diseases, which basically means that people need to procure those medicines each and every day." Niëns focused on the cost of medicine for those conditions. He found the **essential drugs could be considered unaffordable for many people in poor countries** - so much so that their cost often pushes people into abject poverty. "**The proportion of the population** that is living **below the poverty line, plus the people that are being pushed below the poverty line, can reach up to 80 percent in some countries for** some **medicines," Niëns says. He points out that generic medicines - which are more affordable than brand-name medications - are often** **not available in the marketplace**. And, according to Niëns, poor government policies can drive up the cost of medications. "For instance, a lot of governments actually tax medicines when they come into the country," he says. "[They] have no standard for the markups on medicines through the distribution chain. So often, governments think they pay a good price for the medicines when they procure them from the producer. However, before such a medicine reaches a patient, markups are sometimes up to 1,000 percent."

#### [3] They force patients to go underground for drugs.

Bryant 11 Clifton Bryant 2011 “The Routledge Handbook of Deviant Behaviour” (former professor of sociology at VA Tech)//Elmer // Recut LHP AB

Now, the field of medicine is able to achieve seemingly miraculous results, through organ transplantation, reviving patients who have been "clinically" dead, and curing supposedly "incurable diseases." Medical miracles are not cheap, however, and the **costs of medical care and drugs have risen (and continue to rise) at a near-astronomical rate. Consequently**, neither private medical insurance plans nor Medicare will now cover certain procedures, treatments, and medicines. In the future, with continuing reform of the US healthcare system, even fewer procedures, treatments, and medications might will be covered. Certainly, some medical treatment will be "rationed," and **particular categories of people (such as the elderly) may be systematically denied the coverage they need**. As a result of all this, **medical- and health-related crime and deviance will inevitably rise**. Medical insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid **fraud**, which is already prevalent today, **will increase exponentially**. **Smugglers will "bootleg" ever more pharmaceuticals into the US, and a large, thriving, nationwide black market will develop for those who cannot afford to buy uncovered medications.** More **medicines and diagnostic equipment will be stolen, and back- street medical procedures using such stolen equipment may well be offered for cash with no questions asked**. **Armed robberies of valuable pharmaceuticals from drug stores and super- markets will increase, too**. **Bribery to obtain insurance-uncovered or rationed medical care** (or, indeed, any kind of medical care where demand exceeds supply) will likely mushroom. **This is actually common in some countries around the world.** **Counterfeiting expensive pharmaceuticals will be prevalent, and medical frauds of all kinds will be very widespread**. Many of these frauds will be directed at the elderly population as it continues to increase in size. The elderly will be particularly vulnerable because they are most likely to be denied coverage for certain medical procedures or treatments. For instance, **private health insurance and Medicare will both refuse to cover a woman in her mid-80s for potentially life-saving heart-bypass surgery. As a result, she will be a prime candidate for victimization by medical fraud that offers her affordable, but bogus, treatment.** There is already a **thriving international black market in human organs** (Schepper-Hughes 2009). Kidneys are obtained from poor individuals in impoverished countries for relatively modest sums of money. This cash allows the donors to purchase luxuries, such as a small automobile, educate their children, or simply sustain their families for a few months. The organs are sometimes **transferred** quickly **to a hospital in the donor's own country** for transplant surgery. But on other occasions they are **transported to the US or another Western country**. In the US, obtaining an organ for transplantation in this fashion is illegal. Nevertheless, the practice will undoubtedly increase greatly in the future. Where medical care and medicines become exorbitantly expensive, cheaper ways to obtain them, even when these are illicit, will be sought. Where there are shortages of medical care or medicines, perhaps because of rationing, other means of obtaining them, even if deviant, will surely be employed. **As the cost and the difficulty of obtaining medical care and medicines increase, the implications for increased crime and deviance become almost limitless.**

#### **Counterfeit drugs kill millions –**

Greenberger 20 Phyllis E. Greenberger 12-3-2020 "Counterfeit Medicines Kill People" <https://www.healthywomen.org/health-care-policy/counterfeit-medicines-kill-people/who-suffers-because-of-counterfeit-drugs> (HealthWomen’s Senior Vice President of Science & Health Policy)//Elmer // Recut LHP AB

**Over 1 million people die each year from fake drugs**. COVID-19 Have you ever had a hard time getting a prescription filled? Or maybe you've had to wrestle with your insurance provider to get them to pay for a medication vital for your health? Worse, maybe you're one of the 27.5 million uninsured Americans who find it difficult to get health care, let alone obtain the prescription drugs you may need. If you've had any of these experiences, then perhaps you've turned to the internet to buy medications that would require a prescription. While legal online pharmacies do exist, many **online pharmacies are fraudulent, selling counterfeit medications, and millions of people have fallen victim to these scammers**. Make no mistake: Counterfeit medicine is not real. The active ingredients that help you stay healthy may be missing or diluted to levels that are no longer potent. This **can be dangerous and even life-threatening**, as people rely on their medications to keep them well, and sometimes even alive. Many **counterfeit medicines aren't even drugs at all, but rather snake oil cures that make people sick — they may even contain dangerous ingredients such as heavy metals, highway paint or even rat poison**. The World Health Organization (**WHO) estimates that over 1 million people die each year from these substandard drugs**. It's estimated that more than 10% of all pharmaceuticals in the global supply chain are counterfeit in normal times, and during COVID-19, the increased use of telehealth and the appearance of fraudulent doctors has led to a surge in drug fraud. In October of this year, Peter Pitts, president of the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, a nonpartisan research organization, said pharmaceutical fakery was a "spreading cancer." Counterfeiting is a major problem that requires the federal government to step up to slow — and eventually prevent — its spread. It's also vital that consumers know exactly what's at stake when taking these fake drugs. Who suffers because of counterfeit drugs? Expensive prescription medications and generic drugs in nearly every therapeutic class may be counterfeited. **Out of $4.3 billion worth of counterfeit medications seized between 2014 and 2016**, 35% were marked as antibiotics. Some of the other most common culprits in counterfeit medicine are used to "treat" HIV/AIDS, erectile dysfunction and weight loss. No matter what condition or disease the counterfeit medication is intending to treat, the outcome can be disastrous. Counterfeit medications **exacerbate other existing health crises**. The United States, for example, is in the midst of an **opioid epidemic that is killing 130 people per day**. As of 2018, counterfeit drugs containing **illegally** **imported fentanyl** (a powerful opioid) had contributed to this tragedy by causing deaths in 26 states. The U.S. Department of Justice found that, in at least one case, these counterfeit drugs had been sold through a fraudulent online pharmacy.

## UV

#### The role of the ballot should be a critical pedagogy of hope centering around formulating concrete alternatives to existing conditions.

Amsler, Sarah S. 2007 “Pedagogy against “dis-utopia”: From conscientization to the education of desire.”

In other words, **critical pedagogy is often assumed to be an inherent source of hope because it disrupts and denounces the illusion of historical fate** and liberates emergent utopian impulses through which self-determination is announced (da Veiga Coutinho 1974: 11). **But** critical educators are now asking **what relevance this understanding of pedagogy might have in a society where desires for individual transcendence and social change are or appear to be absent, devalued or denied. What are the possible consequences of conscientization in conditions where exposing complex power relations and dominant social forces emboldens fatalistic emotions rather than transforming them into hope; where, to paraphrase a well-worn theory, we see through ideologies and yet still buy into them?** Or as Henry Giroux more poignantly asks – and here what appears as hyperbole must be understood in the context of contemporary American political culture and the moral indignities of Abu Ghraib – ‘**what resources and visions does hope offer…when most attempts to interrupt the operations of an incipient fascism appear to fuel a growing cynicism rather than promote widespread individual and collective acts of resistance?’** (Giroux 2002: 38) What become of efforts to democratize knowledge when consuming publics democratically demand authoritarian teaching, or when self-realization is defined as the skilful adaptation to an existing order of things? In such circumstances, **‘critical hope’ becomes a paradoxical problematic rather than an assumed outcome of critical education**. **If the need or desire for personal transcendence or social change is not taken for granted as pre-existing or immanent, then the object of critical pedagogy must either be to create them, or to create the conditions for their emergence**. The aim of educating against the ideological forces of post-modern capitalism is therefore neither simply to recognize the social world, nor to create conditions of emancipatory communication. Instead, it is to produce the value orientations that make both of these activities meaningful in the first place. Hence, **the new movement in critical pedagogy prioritizes the ideational production of ‘critical hope’ as a motivational basis for transformative social action prior to and outside of concrete political or economic struggle, rather than beginning from it. Institutionalized critical education has become a project less in the service of particular political struggles and more an attempt to resist the closure, privatization, apathy, and psycho-emotional ‘coldness’ that is presumed to abort political struggle at its immediate roots of subjective experience.** Writing in defence of higher education as a key site of cultural resistance, **Giroux argued that critical pedagogy is no longer simply a matter of ‘raising consciousness’ about the possibilities for realistic opposition, but a question of educating people to believe that these possibilities are worthwhile in the first place** (1997: 28). This type of educational practice moves beyond cognitive rationality and towards the psychological, emotional and ethical experiences through which it is mediated. **The question here is not only what makes it possible for people to rationally formulate alternatives to existing conditions, but also what makes it possible for them to want to do so**. This reflects a turn away from the duality of ‘reason and freedom’ towards a more complex theory of social agency that includes its ‘morethan-rational’ and ‘less-than-rational’ dimensions (or in other words, the ‘pretheoretical’ and ‘extramundane’ elements) of human action, as well as the social and emotional foundations of inter-subjective ethics (Ahmed 2004; Anderson 2006; Anderson and Harrison 2006). In other words, contemporary critical educators are trying to produce through pedagogy a condition which, according to Honneth, is presumed to have been lost in the mid-twentieth century and yet which critical theory requires for its own justification: an innate, essential and indomitable need for personal and social transformation. This presents a familiar dilemma: ‘how can we imagine these new concepts even arising here and now in living beings if the entire society is against such an emergence of new needs?’ (Marcuse 1970: 76). Or, in the words of C. Wright Mills, we seem to have two choices when theorizing need and desire. On the one hand, he wrote, ‘if we take the simple democratic view that what men [sic] are interested in is all that concerns us, then we are accepting the values that have been inculcated, often accidentally and often deliberately’. On the other hand, ‘if we take the dogmatic view that what is to men’s interests, whether they are interested in it or not, is all that need concern us morally, then we run the risk of violating democratic values’ (Mills 1959: 194). In his habitually accessible way, Mills expressed the stubborn tension between socially constituted need asit-appears or is experienced, on the one hand, and universal norms of need that may be abstracted from or alien to lived experience, on the other. **It is this unhappy no-choice between the reification of immediate particular experience and the authoritarian imposition of abstract generality that critical theory must aim to transcend.**

#### And, forms of fragmented politics completely cedes the political to capitalism. Engagement in undercommon communication is too individualized and resists collective and concrete change. This constitutes enjoyment of melancholic pleasures of being distanced and accommodated to the real world, and as a result remains stuck in parasitic oppression without change. Dean13

“Communist Desire”, Jodi Dean, , 2013, LHP AM

An emphasis on the drive dimension of melancholia, on Freud's attention to the way sadism in melancholia is 'turned round upon the subject's own self', leads to an interpretation of the general contours shaping the left that differs from Brown's**. Instead of a left attached to an unaclmowledged orthodoxy,** **we have one that has given way on the desire for communism, betrayed its historical commitment to the proletariat, and sublimated revolutionary energies into restorationist practices that strengthen the hold of capitalism**. **This left has replaced commitments to the emancipatory, egalitarian struggles of working people against capitalism - commitments that were never fully orthodox, but always ruptured, conflicted and contested - with incessant activity** (not unlike the manic Freud also associates with melancholia), and so **now satisfies itself with criticism and interpretation, small projects and local actions, particular issues and legislative victories, art, technology, procedures, and process**. It sublimates revolutionary desire to democratic drive, to the repetitious practices offered up as democracy (whether representative, deliberative or radical). **Having already conceded to the inevitably of capitalism, it noticeably abandons 'any striking power against the big bourgeoisie',** to return to Benjamin's language. For such a left, **enjoyment comes from its withdrawal from responsibility, its sublimation of goals and responsibilities into the branching, fragmented practices of micro-politics, self-care, and issue awareness**. Perpetually slighted, harmed and undone**, this left remains stuck in repetition, unable to break out of the circuits of drive in which it is caught** - unable because it enjoys. **Might this not explain why such a left confuses discipline with domination, why it forfeits collectivity in the name of an illusory, individualist freedom that continuously seeks to fragment and disrupt any assertion of a collective or a common?** The watchwords of critique within this structure of left desire are moralism, dogmatism, authoritarianism and utopianism - watchwords enacting a perpetual self-surveillance: has an argument, position or view inadvertently rukeo one of these errors? Even some of its militants reject party and state, division and decision, securing in advance an inefficacy sure to guarantee it the nuggets of satisfaction drive provides. **If this left is rightly described as melancholic, and I agree with Brown that it is, then its melancholia derives from the real existing compromises and betrayals inextricable from its history - its accommodations with reality, whether of nationalist war, capitalist encirclement, or so-called market demands.** Lacan teaches that, like Kant's categorical imperative, the super-ego refuses to accept reality as an explanation for failure. Impossible is no excuse - desire is always impossible to satisfy. A wide spectrum of the contemporary left has either accommodated itself, in one or another, to an inevitable capitalism or taken the practical failures of Marxism-Leninism to require the abandonment of antagonism, class, and revolutionary commitment to overturning capitalist arrangements of property and production. **Melancholic fantasy (the communist Master, authoritarian and obscene) as well as sublimated, melancholic practices (there was no alternative) shield this left, shield Ltd, from confrontation with guilt over such betrayal as they capture us in activities that feel productive, important, radical.**

#### Integrating the state is essential to any overarching analysis of oppression.

Barma 16 [May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>]

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### Apocalyptic images challenge dominant power structures to create futures of social justice

Jessica Hurley 17, Assistant Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago, “Impossible Futures: Fictions of Risk in the Longue Durée”, Duke University Press, https://read.dukeupress.edu/american-literature/article/89/4/761/132823/Impossible-Futures-Fictions-of-Risk-in-the-Longue

## Stuff I didn’t read is Below

If contemporary ecocriticism has a shared premise about environmental risk it is that genre is the key to both perceiving and, possibly, correcting ecological crisis. Frederick Buell’s 2003 From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century has established one of the most central oppositions of this paradigm. As his title suggests, Buell tells the story of a discourse that began in the apocalyptic mode in the 1960s and 70s, when discussions of “the immanent end of nature” most commonly took the form of “prophecy, revelation, climax, and extermination” before turning away from apocalypse when the prophesied ends failed to arrive (112, 78). Buell offers his suggestion for the appropriate literary mode for life lived within a crisis that is both unceasing and inescapable: new voices, “if wise enough….will abandon apocalypse for a sadder realism that looks closely at social and environmental changes in process and recognizes crisis as a place where people dwell” (202-3). In a world of threat, Buell demands a realism that might help us see risks more clearly and aid our survival.¶ Buell’s argument has become a broadly held view in contemporary risk theory and ecocriticism, overlapping fields in the social sciences and humanities that address the foundational question of second modernity: “how do you live when you are at such risk?” (Woodward 2009, 205).1 Such an assertion, however, assumes both that realism is a neutral descriptive practice and that apocalypse is not something that is happening now in places that we might not see, or cannot hear. This essay argues for the continuing importance of apocalyptic narrative forms in representations of environmental risk to disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the status quo. Taking the ecological disaster of nuclear waste as my case study, I examine two fictional treatments of nuclear waste dumps that create different temporal structures within which the colonial history of the United States plays out. The first, a set of Department of Energy documents that use statistical modeling and fictional description to predict a set of realistic futures for the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (1991), creates a present that is fully knowable and a future that is fully predictable. Such an approach, I suggest, perpetuates the state logics of implausibility that have long undergirded settler colonialism in the United States. In contrast, Leslie Marmon Silko’s contemporaneous novel Almanac of the Dead (1991) uses its apocalyptic form to deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude that undergird state realism, transforming nuclear waste into a prophecy of the end of the United States rather than a means for imagining its continuation. In Almanac of the Dead, the presence of nuclear waste introjects a deep-time perspective into contemporary America, transforming the present into a speculative space where environmental catastrophe produces not only unevenly distributed damage but also revolutionary forms of social justice that insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain: that the future will be unimaginably different from the present, while the present, too, might yet be utterly different from the real that we think we know.¶ Nuclear waste is rarely treated in ecocriticism or risk theory, for several reasons: it is too manmade to be ecological; its catastrophes are ongoing, intentionally produced situations rather than sudden disasters; and it does not support the narrative that subtends ecocritical accounts of risk perception in which the nuclear threat gives rise to an awareness of other kinds of threat before reaching the end of its relevance at the end of the Cold War.2 In what follows, I argue that the failure of nuclear waste to fit into the critical frames created by ecocriticism and risk theory to date offers an opportunity to expand those frames and overcome some of their limitations, especially the impulse towards a paranoid, totalizing realism that Peter van Wyck (2005) has described as central to ecocriticism in the risk society. Nuclear waste has durational forms that dwarf the human. It therefore dwells less in the economy of risk as it is currently conceptualized and more in the blown-out realm of deep time. Inhabiting the temporal scale that has recently been christened the Anthropocene, the geological era defined by the impact of human activities on the world’s geology and climate, nuclear waste unsettles any attempt at realist description, unveiling the limits of human imagination at every turn.3 By analyzing risk society through a heuristic of nuclear waste, this essay offers a critique of nuclear colonialism and environmental racism. At the same time, it shows how the apocalyptic mode in deep time allows narratives of environmental harm and danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In the world of deep time, all that might come to pass will come to pass, sooner or later. The endless maybes of risk become certainties. The impossibilities of our own deaths and the deaths of everything else will come. But so too will other impossibilities: talking macaws and alien visitors; the end of the colonial occupation of North America, perhaps, or a sudden human determination to let the world live. The end of capitalism may yet become more thinkable than the end of the world. Just wait long enough. Stranger things will happen.¶

#### Youth participatory action research enables transformative resistance and is crucial to make activism work

Cammarota and Fine 08

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In the Matrix, Morpheus, played by Laurence Fishburne, places Keanu Reeves’ character Neo in a chair to tell him face to face about the real truth of his experience. Morpheus shows Neo a red pill in one hand and a blue one in the other, describing that the red pill will lead him “down the rabbit hole” to the truth while the blue pill will make him forget about their conversation and return everything back to “normal.” Neo looks confused and worried, hesitates for a moment, and then reaches to grab and then swallow the red pill. " e “blue and red pill” scene in ! e Matrix serves as an excellent metaphor for the relationships some educators/activists have with their students, and the kinds of choices we ask them to make. The critical educational experience offered might lead the student “down the rabbit hole” past the layers of lies to the truths of systematic exploitation and oppression as well as possibilities for resistance. A$ er he ingests the red pill, Neo ends up in the place of truth, awakening to the reality that his entire world is a lie constructed to make him believe that he lives a “normal” life, when in reality he is fully exploited day in and day out. What is “normal” is really a mirage, and what is true is the complete structural domination of people, all people. " is book, Revolutionizing Education, literally connects to the metaphorical play on chimera and veracity forwarded by the narrative in ! e Matrix. Examples are presented throughout in which young people resist the 1 normalization of systematic oppression by undertaking their own engaged praxis—critical and collective inquiry, re% ection and action focused on “reading” and speaking back to the reality of the world, their world (Freire, 1993). The praxis highlighted in the book—youth participatory action research (YPAR)—provides young people with opportunities to study social problems affecting their lives and then determine actions to rectify these problems. YPAR, and thus Revolutionizing Education, may extend the kinds of questions posed by critical youth studies (Bourgois, 1995; Fine and Weis, 1998; Giroux, 1983; Kelley, 1994; Macleod, 1987; McRobbie, 1991; Oakes et al., 2006; Rasmussen et al., 2004; Sullivan, 1989; Willis, 1977). How do youth learn the skills of critical inquiry and resistances within formal youth development, research collectives, and/or educational settings? How is it possible for their critical inquiries to evolve into formalized challenges to the “normal” practices of systematic oppression? Under what conditions can critical research be a tool of youth development and social justice work? The Matrix infers revolution by showing how Neo learns to see the reality of his experiences while understanding his capabilities for resistance. " e YPAR cases presented in this book also follow a similar pattern: young people learn through research about complex power relations,histories of struggle, and the consequences of oppression. They begin to re- vision and denaturalize the realities of their social worlds and then undertake forms of collective challenge based on the knowledge garnered through their critical inquiries. As you will read in this volume, the youth, with adult allies, have written policy briefs, engaged sticker campaigns, performed critical productions, coordinated public testimonials—all dedicated to speaking back and challenging conditions of injustice. What perhaps distinguishes young people engaged in YPAR from the standard representations in critical youth studies is that their research is designed to contest and transform systems and institutions to produce greater justice—distributive justice, procedural justice, and what Iris Marion Young calls a justice of recognition, or respect. In short, YPAR is a formal resistance that leads to transformation—systematic and institutional change to promote social justice. YPAR teaches young people that conditions of injustice are produced, not natural; are designed to privilege and oppress; but are ultimately challengeable and thus changeable. In each of these projects, young people and adult allies experience the vitality of a multi- generational collective analysis of power; we learn that sites of critical inquiry and resistance can be fortifying and nourishing to the soul, and at the same time that these projects provoke ripples of social change. YPAR shows young people how they are consistently subject to the impositions and manipulations of domi-nant exigencies. These controlling interests may take on the form of white supremacy, capitalism, sexism, homophobia, or xenophobia—all of which is meant to provide certain people with power at the expense of subordinating others, many others. Within this matrix or grid of power, the possibilities of true liberation for young people become limited. Similar to the film the Matrix, the individual, like Neo, may be unaware of the infections of power fostering oppression. The dawning of awareness emerges from a critical study of social institutions and processes in influencing one’s life course, and his/her capacity to see differently, to act anew, to provoke change. Critical youth studies demonstrate that the revolutionary lesson is not always apprehended in schools; sometimes, young people gain critical awareness through their own endogenous cultural practices. Such is the case of Willis’ (1977) Lads in Learning to Labor. Working- class youth attain insights about the reproductive function of schools through their own street cultural sensibilities. However, they use these insights to resist education en masse by forgoing school for jobs in factories. Scholars (Fine, 1991; Solórzano and Delgado- Bernal, 2001) identify this form of resistance as “self- defeating,” because the students’ choice to forgo school for manual labor contributes to reproducing them as working class. Although the Lads resist the school’s purpose of engendering uneven class relations, their resistance contributes to this engendering process by undermining any chance they had for social mobility. Young people also engage in forms of resistance that avoid self- defeating outcomes while striving for social advancement. Scholars (Fordham, 1996) identify this next level of resistance as “conformist”—in the sense that young people embrace the education system with the intention of seeking personal gains, although not necessarily agreeing with all the ideological ! ligree espoused by educational institutions. " ey use schooling for their own purposes: educational achievements that garner individual gains with social implications beyond the classroom, such as economic mobility, gender equality, and racial parity. Solórzano and Delgado- Bernal (2001: 319–20) contend that students may attain another, yet more conscious form of resistance, which they call “transformational resistance.” A transformational approach to resistance moves the student to a “deeper level of understanding and a social justice orientation.” Those engaged in transformational resistance address problems of systematic injustice and seek actions that foster “the greatest possibility for social change” (ibid.). Although Solórzano and Delgado- Bernal (2001) provide a useful typology (self- defeating, conformist, and transformational) that acknowledges the complexities of resistance, the education and development processes leading to resistances are somewhat under- discussed. Apparently, the production of cultural subjectivities (Bourgois, 1995; Levinson et al., 1996; Willis, 1977) is related to resisting ideological oppressions. However, these cultural productions tend to occur in more informal settings (non- institutional, non- organizational) such as peer groups, families, and street corners. The work presented in this volume agitates toward another framework— where youth are engaged in multi- generational collectives for critical inquiry and action, and these collectives are housed in youth development settings, schools, and/or research sites. With this series of cases, we challenge scholars, educators, and activists to consider how to create such settings in which research for resistance can be mobilized toward justice. A key question is whether resistance can develop within formal proces ses (pedagogical structures or youth development practices). If this question is left $ unattended, we risk perceiving youth resistances as “orientations” as opposed to processes. In other words, the kinds of resistances, whether self- defeating, conformist, or transformational, will be identified as emerging from some inherent fixxed, cultural sensibility. This perspective of young people sustains the ridged essentialization trap that has plagued studies of youth for years (Anderson, 1990; Newman, 1999; Ogbu, 1978). The traditional essentialized view maintains that any problem (poverty, educational failure, drug and alcohol abuse, etc.) faced by youth results of their own volition, thereby blaming the victim for the victim’s problems. Critical youth studies goes beyond the traditional pathological or patronizing view by asserting that young people have the capacity and agency to analyze their social context, to engage critical research collectively, and to challenge and resist the forces impeding their possibilities for liberation. However, another step is needed to further distance critical youth studies from essentialized perspectives by acknowledging that resistances can be attained through formal processes in “real” settings, through multi- generational collectives, and sometimes among youth alone. YPAR represents not only a formal pedagogy of resistance but also the means by which young people engage transformational resistance. (1-4)