# 1NC

**I negate the resolution resolved: A Just Government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike**

**v. morality, because ought requires a moral obligation**

1. **Our fundamental identity as humans is as rational beings. All other human features and decisions are based on this because rationality is constitutive to humans. Mitchell-Yellin 2012**

The central idea of **Korsgaard’s view is that you impose reasons and obligations on yourself by valuing yourself under certain descriptions. Each particular descriptionn**\ under which you value yourself **is a** particular practical **identity** of yours—teacher, parent, citizen—and imposes a consistency constraint on candidate motivations for actions. You have reason to act on those motivations consistent with one of your practical identities and are obligated not to act on those motivations inconsistent with any of your practical identities. But **the fact that you have any practical identities** at all **means that you** value yourself under the description of one who **needs reasons to act** and to live. That you have contingent practical identities entails that you have the necessary practical identity of a human being. Your human identity is explained in the same way as all other practical identities: you value yourself under a certain description. But is is special in two ways. First, **your human identity is** implicitly **affirmed in the adoption** and maintenance of all **of your** particular **practical identities.** **It** “stands behind” them. Your particular identities are normative only given that it is normative. The normativity of any particular practical identities is parasitic on the normativity of your human identity. And your human identity requires that you have some particular practical identity or other. Without these particular identities you would not have reasons to do particular things. Your human identity **is necessary**, in other words, **because you** do **act for reasons,** and this presupposes that you value the need to do so. Second, your human identity is the source of all of your specifically moral reasons and obligations. Your human identity gives you reason to value others’ humanity, and it obligates you not to flout the value of others’ humanity.

This introduces a distinction between moral and non-moral reasons and obligations. One has a moral reason to act on those motivations consistent with one’s human identity and a moral obligation not to act on those motivations inconsistent with one’s human identity. One has a non-moral reason to act on those motivations consistent with one of one’s particular practical identities and a non-moral obligation not to act on those motivations inconsistent with one of one’s particular practical identities. This makes room for conflict between obligations. For example, a non-moral obligation may conflict with a moral obligation when it would be both inconsistent with one’s human identity to act on a given desire and inconsistent with some particular practical identity not to. The resolution of such conflicts is dictated by the structure of Korsgaard’s view. From the two special characteristics of your human identity, it follows that **morality is** both **rationally** **inescapable** **and** **overriding**. Morality is **rationally inescapable** **because** **your human identity**, the practical identity that underwrites moral reasons and moral obligations, is necessary. It **is not one that can be shed**. **Morality is** **overriding** because, in a case of conflict, the conflict must be resolved by shedding the source of one or the other conflicting reasons or obligations. But **since the source of your** **moral** **reasons cannot be shed**, it will always be the case that a conflict between a moral reason or obligation and a non-moral reason or obligation will be resolved in favor of the moral reason or obligation. Morality always wins the day because the source of its normative force is a necessary feature of human agency.

1. **Freedom is an innate right. As rational beings, freedom to question authority and to ask for reasons is at the core of our being. This right is central to Kantian theory. Hodgson 2010**

How might one establish that we have a right to freedom in the stark sense intended by Kant? As I mentioned at the outset, Kant has surprisingly little to say on the issue; what he does say, however, points in a promising direction. Consider first Kant’s claim that the right to freedom is an innate right. As I said above, this denotes a right that human beings have “by nature, independently of any act that would establish a right.” What is it about our nature that gives rise to the right to freedom? The passage I quoted at the beginning of the previous section holds the answer: **the right to freedom belongs “to every human being by virtue of his humanity.”** In other words, bearing in mind Kant’s idiosyncratic use of the term “humanity,” **we have a right to freedom in virtue of our rational nature, understood specifically as our rational agency—**our capacity to set ends for ourselves according to reason.11 The question is how exactly this capacity can ground the right to freedom. Two related characteristics of rational nature play a crucial role in 9. For an argument that supplements Hart’s by showing just how absurd a political theory would be that had no place for rights, see Hillel Steiner, “The Natural Right to Equal Freedom,” Mind 83 (1974): 194–210. 10. The same holds for Steiner’s argument. 11. For Kant’s conception of humanity, see notably Doctrine of Right, 6:392, and Groundwork, 4:428–29 and 437. See also Christine M. Korsgaard, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity,” in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 106–32, esp. 110–14 and 124; and Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 118–22. 796 Ethics July 2010 the argument. First**,** rational beings engage in full-fledged actions that contrast with the merely instinctual behaviors of nonrational Creatures. Second, rational beings can demand and give justifications for these actions. Together, these two facts mean that having a rational nature [requires] puts one in the business of exchanging justifications for actions. By contrast, nonrational beings can neither exchange justifications nor behave in ways that could be rationally justified.12 Now, I want to suggest that rational agency gives rise to the idea of a right to freedom through a particular—and particularly stringent—ideal of justifiability to others.13 The thought is as follows: if we ask when the use of force against me can be justified from my point of view qua rational agent,

#### Practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to question it is to concede its importance.

Velleman (James David, “Ethics professor. Let's cut to the chase, this guy is THE man for Ethics.” – someone on ratemyprofessor, “Self To Self”, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pg 18-19)

As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source of authority turn out to be escapable because the authority behind them can be questioned. We can ask, “Why should I act on this desire?” or “Why should I obey the U.S. Government?” or even “Why should I obey God?” And as we observed in the **case** of the desire to punch someone in the nose, this question demands a reason for acting. The authority we are questioning would be vindicated, in each case, by the production of a sufficient reason. What this observation suggests is that any purported source of practical authority depends on reasons for obeying it—and hence on the authority of reasons. Suppose, then, that we attempted to question the authority of reasons themselves, as we earlier questioned other authorities. Where we previously asked “Why should I act on my desire?” let us now ask “Why should I act for reasons?” Shouldn’t this question open up a route of escape from all requirements? As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask “Why should I?” is to demand a reason; and so to ask “Why should I act for reasons?” is to demand a reason for acting for reasons. This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to question—namely, the authority of reasons. Why would we demand a reason if we didn’t envision acting for it? If we really didn’t feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldn’t help. So there is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons.

1. **The relevant feature of reason is universalizability – ethics has to be universalizable to matter at all, otherwise not everyone can follow the necessary maxims.**

**Thus, my value criterion is respecting individual rationality. Prefer this for the following reasons—**

#### First, inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.

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#### Second, taking action concedes the importance of freedom.

Gewirth 84 [Alan Gewirth, () "The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alternative" American Journal of Jurisprudence: Vol. 29: Iss. 1 Article 5, 1984, https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ajj/vol29/iss1/5/, DOA:9-10-2018 // WWBW]

Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, **every agent acts for purposes [t]he[y] regards as good. Hence, [t]he[y] must regard as necessary goods the freedom and well being that [is] are the** generic features and **necessary conditions of his action and successful action in general**. From this, it follows that **every agent logically must hold or accept that he has rights to these conditions.** For **if he were to deny that he has these rights, then he would have to admit that it is permissible for other persons to remove from him the very conditions of freedom** and well-being **that, as an agent, he must have. But it is contradictory for him to hold both that he must have these conditions and also that he may not have them.** Hence, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. Moreover, **every agent must further admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other actual or prospective agents have the same general characteristics of agency on which he must ground his own right-claims.** What I am saying, then, is that **every agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and must hold that** he and **all** other actual or prospective **agents have rights to these necessary goods.** Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the following principle: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, freedom, and well-being. I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action.

## Offense

#### Negate:

#### [1] Strikes fail to fulfill duty

**Fourie 17** Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

Kantian Ethics Kantian ethics suggest that actions are morally permissible based on **whether it fulfils a person's duty** (Banks, 2006). To further the concept of duty, Kantian ethics held the notion of Categorical Imperatives which is believed to determine the morality of duties as it enforces and commands adherence, complicity and application. The Categorical Imperatives consist of three formulas. Once such a formula is to "act only on the maximum whereby at the same time you can will that it become a universal law" (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). Through this perspective, Kant held that persons are to engage in actions that they are willing to allow others to engage in as well without conditions and exceptions. Applying this formula to the ethicality of social workers **participating in labor strike** demonstrations, it becomes evident that such an action is **not morally permissible or executing its duty**. Arguably, as much as social workers are trained professionals and rendering services that are crucial to the functioning and well-being of society, they remain ordinary citizens who also at some point will **require crucial services**. Examples of these crucial services that may cause significant harm because of its absence due to labor strike action are **medical personnel, suicide watch centers, mental health care professionals, law enforcement, court systems**, municipal service delivery, etc. With these services not available, social workers will experience suffering, frustration, unhappiness, harm as the clients will do with their absence from the office. To this regard, participating and demonstrating labor strike action is not adhering to duty or morally permissible.

#### [3] Strikes in essential services hurt the patient but not the employer which reduces the patient to a mere means to an end.

**Loewy 2K**, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

“Essential” Work and Strikes Healthcare professionals, garbage collectors, and other “essential” workers have a responsibility that is considered to be different from, say, the responsibilities of workers in a supermarket chain. There are almost certainly other supermarkets, but there is generally only one municipal garbage collection service**, one police force, and one fire department; and in general, only one healthcare system available to us. In the medical setting, furthermore, workers are much more apt to deal with identified lives**: they know their patients and often have known them for some time. Striking against their employer (even if it is done in part to benefit the patient) is **denying meaningful and often essential services to some of these identified lives**. We tend to relate differently with those lives we know and therefore call “identified” from those whom we consider “unidentified” or statistical lives, in part, because we have obligations as a result of relationships; in part because we fail to recognize that these so-called unidentified lives are not in fact unidentified but are merely not identified by us.4 When strikes are called by healthcare professionals, both types of lives are apt to be injured or, at least, severely inconvenienced. Except in the pocketbook, strikes in the healthcare setting generally do not directly hurt the employer. The employer **is hurt through the** **patient**. The patient thus becomes a **means toward the employees’ ends**, a football being kicked between two contending parties—**even if one of the employees’ goals is to serve the good of patients in general.** Theoretically, patients will then bring pressure on the employer (be it the government or a managed care organization), thus, quite frankly, using the patient as a means toward the ends of the health professionals.5 The dilemma, of course, is that without significantly inconveniencing or even endangering patients, no pressure is likely to be brought and, therefore, no amelioration of working conditions is effected. To be effective, a strike of healthcare professionals has to “hurt” patients and often patients known to the healthcare professionals.

#### Counterplan: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike except for police officers.

#### Police Strikes are used to combat racial progress and attempts to limit police power. Making them legal and easier only make progress much harder.

Andrew Grim 2020 What is the ‘blue flu’ and how has it increased police power? https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/01/what-is-blue-flu-how-has-it-increased-police-power/

But the result of such protests matter deeply as we consider police reform today. Historically, blue flu strikes have helped expand police power, ultimately limiting the ability of city governments to reform, constrain or conduct oversight over the police. They allow the police to leverage public fear of crime to extract concessions from municipalities. This became clear in Detroit more than 50 years ago. In June 1967, tensions arose between Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanagh and the Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA), which represented the city’s 3,300 patrol officers. The two were at odds primarily over police demands for a pay increase. Cavanagh showed no signs of caving to the DPOA’s demands and had, in fact, proposed to cut the police department’s budget. On June 15, the DPOA escalated the dispute with a walkout: 323 officers called in sick. The number grew over the next several days as the blue flu spread, reaching a height of 800 absences on June 17. In tandem with the walkout, the DPOA launched a fearmongering media campaign to win over the public. They took out ads in local newspapers warning Detroit residents, “How does it feel to be held up? Stick around and find out!” This campaign took place at a time of rising urban crime rates and uprisings, and only a month before the 1967 Detroit riot, making it especially potent. The DPOA understood this climate and used it to its advantage. With locals already afraid of crime and displeased at Cavanagh’s failure to rein it in, they would be more likely to demand the return of the police than to demand retribution against officers for an illegal strike. The DPOA’s strategy paid off. The walkout left Detroit Police Commissioner Ray Girardin feeling “practically helpless.” “I couldn’t force them to work,” he later told The Washington Post. Rather than risk public ire by allowing the blue flu to continue, Cavanagh relented. Ultimately, the DPOA got the raises it sought, making Detroit officers the highest paid in the nation. This was far from the end of the fight between Cavanagh and the DPOA. In the ensuing months and years, they continued to tussle over wages, pensions, the budget, the integration of squad cars and the hiring of black officers. The threat of another blue flu loomed over all these disputes, helping the union to win many of them. And Detroit was not an outlier. Throughout the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s, the blue flu was a [ubiquitous and highly effective](https://www.akpress.org/our-enemies-in-blue.html) tactic in Baltimore, Memphis, New Orleans, Chicago, Newark, New York and many other cities. In most cases, as author Kristian Williams writes, “When faced with a walkout or slowdown, the authorities usually decided that the pragmatic need to get the cops back to work trumped the city government’s long term interest in diminishing the rank and file’s power.” But each time a city relented to this pressure, they ceded more and more power to police unions, which would turn to the strategy repeatedly to defend officers’ interests — particularly when it came to efforts to address systemic racism in police policies and practices. In 1970, black residents of Pittsburgh’s North Side neighborhood raised an outcry over the “hostile sadistic treatment” they experienced at the hands of white police officers. They lobbied Mayor Peter F. Flaherty to assign more black officers to their neighborhood. The mayor agreed, transferring several white officers out of the North Side and replacing them with black officers. While residents cheered this decision, white officers and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), which represented them, were furious. They slammed the transfer as “discrimination” against whites. About 425 of the Pittsburgh Police Department’s 1,600 police officers called out sick in protest. Notably, black police officers broke with their white colleagues and refused to join the walkout. They praised the transfer as a “long overdue action” and viewed the walkout as a betrayal of officers’ oath to protect the public. Nonetheless, the tactic paid off. After several days, Flaherty caved to the “open revolt” of white officers, agreeing to halt the transfers and instead submit the dispute to binding arbitration between the city and the police union. Black officers, though, continued to speak out against their union’s support of racist practices, and many of them later resigned from the union in protest. Similar scenarios played out in Detroit, Chicago and other cities in the 1960s and ’70s, as white officers continually staged walkouts to preserve the segregated status quo in their departments. These blue flu strikes amounted to an authoritarian power grab by police officers bent on avoiding oversight, rejecting reforms and shoring up their own authority. In the aftermath of the 1967 Detroit walkout, a police commissioner’s aide strongly criticized the police union’s strong-arm tactics, saying “it smacks of a police state.” The clash left one newspaper editor wondering, “Who’s the Boss of the Detroit Police?” But in the “law and order” climate of the late 1960s, such criticism did not resonate enough to stir a groundswell of public opinion against the blue flu. And police unions dismissed critics by arguing that officers had “no alternative” but to engage in walkouts to get city officials to make concessions. Crucially, the very effectiveness of the blue flu may be premised on a myth. While police unions use public fear of crime skyrocketing without police on duty, in many cases, the absence of police did not lead to a rise in crime. In New York City in 1971, [for example](https://untappedcities.com/2020/06/12/the-week-without-police-what-we-can-learn-from-the-1971-police-strike/), 20,000 officers called out sick for five days over a pay dispute without any apparent increase in crime. The most striking aspect of the walkout, as one observer noted, “might be just how unimportant it seemed.” Today, municipalities are under immense pressure from activists who have taken to the streets to protest the police killings of black men and women. Some have already responded by enacting new policies and cutting police budgets. As it continues, more blue flus are likely to follow as officers seek to wrest back control of the public debate on policing and reassert their independence.

#### Those strikes cement a police culture which leads to endless amounts of racist violence and the bolstering of the prison industrial complex.

Chaney and Ray 13, Cassandra (Has a PhD and is a professor at LSU. Also has a strong focus in the structure of Black families) , and Ray V. Robertson (Also has a PhD and is a criminal justice professor at LSU). "Racism and police brutality in America." *Journal of African American Studies* 17.4 (2013): 480-505. SM//do I really need a card for this

Racism and Discrimination According to Marger (2012), “racism is an ideology, or belief system, designed to justify and rationalize racial and ethnic inequality” (p. 25) and “discrimination, most basically, is behavior aimed at denying members of particular ethnic groups’ equal access to societal rewards” (p. 57). Defining both of these concepts from the onset is important for they provide the lens through which our focus on the racist and discriminatory practices of law enforcement can occur. Since the time that Africans [African Americans] were forcibly brought to America, they have been the victims of racist and discriminatory practices that have been spurred and/or substantiated by those who create and enforce the law. For example, The Watts Riots of 1965, the widespread assaults against Blacks in Harlem during the 1920s (King 2011), law enforcement violence against Black women (i.e., Malaika Brooks, Jaisha Akins, Frankie Perkins, Dr. Mae Jemison, Linda Billups, Clementine Applewhite) and other ethnic women of color (Ritchie 2006), the beating of Rodney King, and the deaths of Amadou Diallo in the 1990s and Trayvon Martin more recently are just a few public examples of the historical and contemporaneous ways in which Blacks in America have been assaulted by members of the police system (King 2011; Loyd 2012; Murch 2012; Rafail et al. 2012). In Punishing Race (2011), law professor Michael Tonry’s research findings point to the fact that Whites tend to excuse police brutality against Blacks because of the racial animus that they hold against Blacks. Thus, to Whites, Blacks are viewed as deserving of harsh treatment in the criminal justice system (Peffley and Hurwitz 2013). At first glance, such an assertion may seem to be unfathomable, buy that there is an extensive body of literature which suggests that Black males are viewed as the “prototypical criminal,” and this notion is buttressed in the media, by the general public, and via disparate sentencing outcomes (Blair et al. 2004; Eberhardt et al. 2006; Gabiddon 2010; Maddox and Gray 2004; Oliver and Fonash 2002; Staples 2011). For instance, Blair et al. (2004) revealed that Black males with more Afrocentric features (e.g., dark skin, broad noses, full lips) may receive longer sentences than Blacks with less Afrocentric features, i.e., lighter skin and straighter hair (Eberhardt et al. 2006). Shaun Gabiddon in Criminological Theories on Race and Crime (2010) discussed the concept of “Negrophobia” which was more extensively examined by Armour (1997). Negrophobia can be surmised as an irrational of Blacks, which includes a fear of being victimized by Black, that can result in Whites shooting or harming an AfricanAmerican based on criminal/racial stereotypes (Armour 1997). The aforementioned racialized stereotypical assumptions can be deleterious because they can be used by Whites to justify shooting a Black person on the slightest of pretense (Gabiddon 2010). Finally, African-American males represent a group that has been much maligned in the larger society (Tonry 2011). Further, as victims of the burgeoning prison industrial complex, mass incarceration, and enduring racism, the barriers to truly independent Black male agency are ubiquitous and firmly entrenched (Alexander 2010; Chaney 2009; Baker 1996; Blackmon 2008; Dottolo and Stewart 2008; Karenga 2010; Martin et al. 2001; Smith and Hattery 2009). Thus, racism and discrimination heightens the psychological distress experienced by Blacks (Robertson 2011; Pieterse et al. 2012), as well as their decreased mortality in the USA (Muennig and Murphy 2011). Police Brutality Against Black Males According to Walker (2011), police brutality is defined as “the use of excessive physical force or verbal assault and psychological intimidation” (p. 579). Although one recent study suggests that the NYPD has become better behaved due to greater race and gender diversity (Kane and White 2009), Blacks are more likely to be the victims of police brutality. A growing body of scholarly research related to police brutality has revealed that Blacks are more likely than Whites to make complaints regarding police brutality (Smith and Holmes 2003), to be accosted while operating [driving] a motorized vehicle (“Driving While Black”), and to underreport how often they are stopped due to higher social desirability factors (TomaskovicDevey et al. 2006). Interestingly, data obtained from the General Social Survey (GSS), a representative sample conducted biennially by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago for the years 1994 through 2004, provide further proof regarding the acceptance of force against Blacks. In particular, the GSS found Whites to be significantly (29.5 %) more accepting of police use of force when a citizen was attempting to escape custody than Blacks when analyzed using the chi-squared statistical test (p The average Southern policeman is a promoted poor White with a legal sanction to use a weapon. His social heritage has taught him to despise the Negroes, and he has had little education which could have changed him….The result is that probably no group of Whites in America have a lower opinion of the Negro people and are more fixed in their views than Southern policeman. (Myrdal 1944, pp. 540–541) Myrdal (1944) was writing on results from a massive study that he undertook in the late 1930s. He was writing at a time that even the most conservative among us would have to admit was not a colorblind society (if one even believes in such things). But current research does corroborate his observations that less educated police officers tend to be the most aggressive and have the most formal complaints filed against them when compared to their more educated counterparts (Hassell and Archbold 2010; Jefferis et al. 2011). Tonry (2011) delineates some interesting findings from the 2001 Race, Crime, and Public Opinion Survey that can be applied to understanding why the larger society tolerates police misconduct when it comes to Black males. The survey, which involved approximately 978 non-Hispanic Whites and 1,010 Blacks, revealed a divergence in attitudes between Blacks and Whites concerning the criminal justice system (Tonry 2011). For instance, 38 % of Whites and 89 % of Blacks viewed the criminal justice system as biased against Blacks (Tonry 2011). Additionally, 8 % of Blacks and 56 % of Whites saw the criminal justice system as treating Blacks fairly (Tonry 2011). Perhaps most revealing when it comes to facilitating an environment ripe for police brutality against Black males, 68 % of Whites and only 18 % of Whites expressed confidence in law enforcement (Tonry 2011). Is a society wherein the dominant group overwhelming approves of police performance willing to do anything substantive to curtail police brutality against Black males? Police brutality is not a new phenomenon. The Department of Justice (DOJ) office of Civil Rights (OCR) has investigated more than a dozen police departments in major cities across the USA on allegations of either racial discrimination or police brutality (Gabbidon and Greene 2013). To make the aforementioned even more clear, according to Gabbidon and Greene (2013), “In 2010, the OCR was investigating 17 police departments across the country and monitoring five settlements regarding four police agencies” (pp. 119–120). Plant and Peruche (2005) provide some useful information into why police officers view Black males as potential perpetrators and could lead to acts of brutality. In their research, the authors suggest that since Black people in general, and Black males in particular, are caricatured as aggressive and criminal, police are more likely to view Black men as a threat which justifies the disproportionate use of deadly force. Therefore, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that police officers’ decisions to act aggressively may, to some extent, be influenced by race (Jefferis et al. 2011). The media’s portrayals of Black men are often less than sanguine. Bryson’s (1998) work in this area provides empirical evidence that the mass media that has been instrumental in portraying Black men as studs, super detectives, or imitation White men and has a general negative effect on how these men are regarded by others. Such characterizations can be so visceral in nature that “prototypes” of criminal suspects are more likely to be African-American (Oliver et al. 2004). Not surprisingly, the more Afrocentric the African-American’s facial features, the more prone he or she is expected to be deviant (Eberhardt et al. 2006). Interestingly, it is probable that less than flattering depictions of Black males on television and in news stories are activating pre-existing stereotypes possessed by Whites as opposed to facilitating their creation. According to Oliver et al. (2004), “it is important to keep in mind that media consumption is an active process, with viewers’ existing attitudes and beliefs playing a larger role in how images are attended to, interpreted, and remembered” (p. 89). Moreover, it is reductionist to presuppose that individual is powerless in constructing a palatable version of reality and is solely under the control of the media and exercises no agency. Lastly, Peffley and Hurwitz (2013) describe what can be perceived as one of the more deleterious results of negative media caricatures of Black males. More specifically, the authors posit that most Whites believe that Blacks are disproportionately inclined to engage in criminal behavior and are the deserving on harsh treatment by the criminal justice system. On the other hand, such an observation is curious because most urban areas are moderate to highly segregated residentially which would preclude the frequent and significant interaction needed to make such scathing indictments (Bonilla-Silva 2009). Consequently, the aforementioned racial animus has the effect of increased White support for capital punishment if questions regarding its legitimacy around if capital punishment is too frequently applied to Blacks (Peffley and Hurwitz 2013; Tonry 2011). Ultimately, erroneous (negative) portrayals of crime and community, community race and class identities, and concerns over neighborhood change all contribute to place-specific framing of “the crime problem.” These frames, in turn, shape both intergroup dynamics and support for criminal justice policy (Leverentz 2012).